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Virginia Review of Asian StudiesVolume 16 (2014): 217-230Liu: Tumen Initiative

REVISITING FRUSRATED MICRO-REGIONALISM: AN ANALYTICAL ECLECTIC ANALYSIS OF THE GREATER TUMEN INITIATIVE1

TONY TAI-TING LIU NATIONAL CHUNG HSING UNIVERSITY

Since the end of the Cold War, a flurry of regional cooperation took shape around the world. More than a half a dozen have caught the attention of observers and continue to develop in various ways at various paces. However, while an outburst of regional multilateralism has injected more diversity and excitement into global politics, observers are left in disarray about how to interpret and make sense of the trend. While the dominant traditions of standard IR --- realism, liberalism and constructivism --- provide insights into the development of regional cooperation, each approach has its shortcomings. The complexity of regional cooperation calls for a perspective beyond the standard approaches in order to capture the whole picture.

As an attempt to gain a panoramic view of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia, this author seeks to address the topic through an eclectic approach that takes under its wings the realist, liberalist and constructivist traditions. This author examines the particular case of the Greater Tumen Initiative, an initiative that provides great insights into the slow progress of regional integration in East Asia today. This article seeks to clarify on the push and pull between competition and cooperation among great powers and understand the unsuccessful run of the Tumen River Programme to become the dominant economic project in East Asia.

Key Words: Greater Tumen Initiative, Northeast Asia, Regional Integration, Analytical Eclecticism

Introduction

It is typical for the study of international relations (IR) or the relationship between (among) states to begin with “something grand.” Perhaps a major reason for this emphasis on the macro perspective relates to the issues and topics that IR traditionally focuses on. IR as a formal field of study began after the First World War, none less than as a study into the question of war and peace. “Order” is the prime concern of most traditional IR specialists. As the development of technology and the emergence of international organizations began to complicate world order, the study of IR gradually broadened to encompass issues on the global scale. In an

1 Paper presented at seminar at Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea, June 10, 2013. This author sincerely thanks the Department of Sociology at Yonsei University for hosting the seminar and Professors Nam-lin Hur and Wang-bae Kim for insightful comments and suggestions for revisions to the paper.

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interdependent world where a state’s well-being is subject to the fate of another state, “security” became the top concern of IR.

The flipside of IR’s macro-emphasis is the field’s de-emphasis on the micro, the local and the individual. Other sublevels are deemed as the primary concern of other brethren fields of study such as political science and classical economics. However, IR’s traditional emphasis may be weak reasoning for an ever changing world where the individual’s role continues to grow, a phenomenon justified in both reality and the academic world. Perhaps as early as the second “great debate” in the study of IR --- the methodological debate between traditionalism and scientism --- IR has been under attack in terms of methodology by political scientists and economists. The rise of “the scientific study of the individual” in the social sciences in general has relegated fields with a strong normative content (such as IR) to little more than secondary status.

Methodological debate aside, it is a fact that new developments in the world constantly challenge the human mind to think outside the box --- a phenomenon justified in reality but not necessarily in the academic world. Emergence of the “region” is one such phenomenon. Since the end of the Cold War, the rapid development of regional cooperation and regional regimes across the world has caused academics to coin the phrase “the third wave of regionalism” to describe the phenomenon. Yet political scientists and IR specialists alike flounder for tools to understand the “region.”

Unlike for economists, quantitative methodology is scarcely enough for political scientists to capture the driving force behind regional cooperation. Realists have convictions against cooperation and continue to regard states as the central actor of global politics; institutionalists heed the virtue of cooperation and discount the cynicism of men; and constructivists value the influence of ideas and beliefs in shaping order. The complexity of regional cooperation calls for a perspective beyond the standard approaches in order to capture the whole picture.

As an attempt to gain a panoramic view of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia, this author seeks to address the topic through an eclectic approach that takes under its wings the realist, liberalist and constructivist traditions. Based on the approach, this article examines the case of the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI), formerly known as the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP), and makes two assumptions: (1) regional cooperation is a product of systemic changes; in other words, changes to the system is the driving force of regional cooperation; and (2) great powers influence the development of the system; the hegemonic power or great powers pursue regional cooperation as a way to consolidate power and interest. This article seeks to clarify on the push and pull between competition and cooperation among great powers and understand the unsuccessful run of the TRADP to become the dominant economic project in East Asia.

Northeast Asia after the Cold War

Northeast Asia, defined here as China, Japan and Korea (CJK), seems to be an arena of incessant tug-of-war between conflict and cooperation. As far back as the first Sino-Japanese War near the end of the nineteenth century, the region has never been short of conflicts.

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Therefore, it was proper for the region to begin thinking about cooperation near the end of the twentieth century, especially under the global trend of regionalization in the 1990s. NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN are some of the often cited examples of this wave of regionalism. Bereft with conflict and tension, Northeast Asia hardly recognized the concept of cooperation.

Official ignorance and disinterest aside, many academics indulged in the ideal of cooperation in the region and introduced ideas that served as the groundwork of future regionalist projects. In Japan, scholar Nishikawa Jun proposed the concept of cooperation along the Japanese Sea (Japan Sea Rim Economic Circle) while in Korea, scholars Kogawa Yuhei and Kim Yong-ho proposed a similar concept that centered around the Yellow Sea (Yellow Sea Rim Economic Circle).i In China, scholar Ding Shi-cheng proposed the Tumen River golden triangle project.ii Unfortunately, to this day, the initiatives merely survived as textbook cases of the initial interest towards cooperation among CJK.

In a sense, cooperation in Northeast Asia did not commence until after the dual shocks of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the global economic recession in 2008. The direct result of the economic crises was to push forward cooperation among CJK. In December 1997, ASEAN and CJK held the first ASEAN plus Three meeting in Malaysia, first time in the post-Cold War period that the leaders from CJK have conducted direct talks in a multilateral/regional setting. At the same time, a separate breakfast meeting among the CJK leaders held in parallel of the plus Three meeting gave rise to the ASEAN plus One mechanism. In terms of the second economic crisis, CJK leaders jointly initiated the first trilateral summit meeting in 2008. A direct result of the CJK summit meeting is that in March 2013, CJK completed the first round of negotiations towards the establishment of a free trade area (FTA) in Northeast Asia.iii

However, in the post-Cold War period, progress towards regional cooperation in Northeast Asia was constantly cut short by historical legacies that outlived past wars and frequent changes in the geopolitical environment. Besides nationalist sentiments among CJK that break out from time to time over issues such as island disputes, war crime and history textbooks, China’s rise and North Korea’s nuclear ambition served as the dominant driving forces of conflicts in the region.

In recent years, “the rise of China” has become an increasingly undeniable fact. Despite contrary views that forecast the eventual collapse of China, the country’s expanding market continues to serve as the major driving force of the global economy today. However, as China continues to grow, outcry of a “China threat” grows in parallel as well. Whether Beijing deliberately intends to implement measures conforming to its wishes and aims in the international community or not, actions have spoken louder than words. China’s unrelenting stance over the South China Sea, the Diaoyudao/Senkaku Islands and Taiwan continue to be cases that pessimists cite as evidences of Beijing’s regional ambitions. Not only has China’s rise alerted Japan to keep a close watch of its neighbor’s every move, the U.S. under the Obama administration returned to Asia in 2008 with China as its top concern.iv Regardless of China’s true intentions, the country’s growth has stimulated much response both from inside and outside Northeast Asia.

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In terms of North Korea, the rogue state continues to be a major destabilizing factor of security in Northeast Asia. Since exiting from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1993, Pyongyang repeatedly undertook actions that demonstrated its determination to acquire nuclear weapons. Besides numerous test explosions of nuclear weapons, Pyongyang test fired several long range and short range missiles in the past two decades, with several entering Japanese air space and landing in the Pacific Ocean. As a result, not only did North Korea-Japan relations sour, South Korea became caught up in a dilemma of choosing between its compatriots or ally (the U.S.) while the U.S. sought to strengthen its relationship with allies in East Asia. Beijing is repeatedly counted on by regional powers to “reign in” Pyongyang. The situation becomes ever more complex when one takes into account other considerations based on the China threat theory.

Revisiting Frustrated Micro-regionalism: The Tumen River Project

In August 2000, British scholar Christopher Hughes published a working paper on the TRADP with the secondary title “frustrated micro-regionalism as a microcosm of political rivalries.”v Hughes was definitely not the only academic to research extensively into the TRADP. Researchers across the world, particularly in East Asia, have written in detail on the subject, though with less passion as other political and security concerns began to dominate the regional atmosphere in East Asia after the mid-1990s. Despite the passing of the Tumen River Project, Hughes’ paper left an imprint on the study of regionalism. The concept of “frustrated regionalism,” under various other terms, was adopted by the academia to describe the slow progress of regional cooperation in East Asia.vi

More than a decade since Hughes’ paper, regionalism remains “frustrated” in East Asia. Despite ASEAN’s progress and the commencement of free trade negotiations among China, Japan and Korea, East Asia remains “in flux.”vii As economist Jagdish Bhagwati points out, regional trade agreements (RTAs) are progressing in a “messy” manner in Asia, just like a bowl of spaghetti.viii Judging from the large number of bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives proposed over the past two decades in East Asia, optimists like to claim that regional cooperation/integration is making tremendous progress in the region. However, the facts entail otherwise, as many initiatives remain either stagnant and became sidelined over the years, or compete with other regional initiatives to the detriment of making real progress towards integration. Still other initiatives became little more than fleeting slogans or “talk shops.” Falling into the rank of frustrated projects in East Asia, the TRADP is a typical example of regional cooperation that portends the region’s slow progress in economic integration.

Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP)

The Tumen River spans about 500km and flows along the border of China, Russia and North Korea. Due to its unique geographic position, the Tumen River and its vicinity was proposed as the site for economic cooperation in Northeast Asia. In the First Northeast Asia Economic Forum (NEAEF) (1990) jointly sponsored by the East-West Center and the UNDP,

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Chinese scholar Ding Shicheng first proposed the theories for development of the “golden triangles” in the Tumen River region.ix The “golden triangle” concept aimed at utilizing the respective comparative advantages of China’s Northeast, the Russian Far East and North Korea to develop the Tumen River region or Northeast Asia in specific terms. The golden triangle theory can be further separated into two triangles: the “big triangle” refers to the region covered by Yanbian, Vladivostok and Chongjin while the “small triangle” refers to the area formed by Hunchun, Portshire and Rajin.x

Participants at the conference envisioned TRADP to become the heart of Northeast Asia’s future. Regardless of whether observers were carried away by the excitement surrounding the proposal or whether realistic evaluations regarding the project were carried out or not, general expectations that the Tumen River region could become an economic hub like Rotterdam or Hong Kong were not simple exaggerations.xi Under the hype of the moment, various proposals appeared, including plans to establish a Tumen River growth center, a Tumen River Development Corporation, a United Nations Core City and a Eurasian transportation network that seeks to bridge ports and cities across the continent.xii Study results at the first conference garnered the attention of the UNDP and led the UN to commence further studies to evaluate the potential for cooperation in the region.

October 1991, the UNDP released the preliminary studies on cooperation in the Tumen River region. Besides re-confirming previous expectations on the TRADP, the UNDP announced the provision of 3.5 million USD as technical support for the first phase of the project (1992-94) and the establishment of a program management office (PMO) in New York in the following year.xiii In the initial stage of the TRADP, the UNDP played a major role in coordinating the project, as member states struggled to find the specific goal of the project and practical ways to realize cooperation. In 1993, the TRADP officially went into working and aimed to establish a joint economic zone on regions designated for the purpose in China, Russia and North Korea. In 1994, the PMO moved from New York to Beijing in order to directly monitor progress of the Tumen River project.

After the early years of startup difficulties, the TRADP was rejuvenated in 1995. The UNDP sought the assistance of a consultative team from Australia to re-evaluate the project and re-develop development strategies for the TRADP. The revaluation process resulted in revised guidelines for the first phase of the Tumen River project for 1994-98. Furthermore, in the same year, member states to the TRADP signed two landmark agreements for the project, the Agreement on the Establishment of the Consultative Commission for the Development of the Tumen River Economic Development Area and Northeast Asia, and the Agreement on the Establishment of the Tumen River Area Development Coordination Committee.xiv The agreements were a major step towards institutionalization of the TRADP

However, since the first revamping of the TRADP, progress of the project has been slow and sporadic at best. Despite the initiation of investment forums, environmental evaluations and training workshops, the development of infrastructure moved at a slow pace and eventually stagnated due to the Asian financial crisis and the deterioration of relations among member

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states. In terms of infrastructure, the few projects completed since 1995 include a helipad in Rajin and a railway that connects Hunchun and Kraskino.xv In 1998, the official website of the TRADP went online.xvi While NEAEF continued to be held annually, the TRADP Consultative Commission Meeting terminated several times since 1995. By the beginning of the millennium, the TRADP clearly needed another push to keep it afloat.

Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI)

After a temporary hiatus in 2004, the TRADP Consultative Commission Meeting resumed in the following year. The Eighth Meeting was held in Changchun, China and generated the Changchun Agreement of the Member Countries of the Greater Tumen Initiative. The Changchun Agreement was significant in three ways. First, member states agreed to expand the geographic scope of the Tumen River project to include China’s northeast provinces (Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang), the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, North Korea’s Rajin-Sonbong area, Russia’s Primorsky region, Mongolia’s eastern provinces and the South Korean ports of Busan and Sokcho. Expansion of the TRADP led to the conversion of the project title to the “Greater Tumen Initiative” (GTI). Second, the GTI extended the project’s foundational agreements in 1995 to 2015 and confirmed investment, transportation, tourism, energy and environmental development as the main focuses of the GTI (the GTI Strategic Action Plan 2006-2015). Third, member states proposed the establishment of a Business Advisory Council (BAC) as a way to include private investment and corporate presence in the Tumen River project.xvii

November 2007, GTI hosted the Ninth Consultative Commission Meeting in Vladivostok, Russia. Besides reaffirming their determination towards cooperation as proposed in the Changchun Agreement, member states of the GTI agreed on the establishment of a BAC led by senior business leaders, eminent persons and foreign investors from across Northeast Asia.xviii At the same time, while trade and investment continued to be the focus of the Tumen River project, member states began to divert their attention to cooperation in tourism, energy and environmental protection, in the hope of establishing a comprehensive project corresponding to the vision of the Changchun Agreement. In the Vladivostok Declaration produced at the meeting, member states proposed the Cooperation Framework on Environment and agreed to establish respective consultative committees for the fields of energy and tourism.

After a one-year recess, the Tenth Consultative Commission Meeting was held at Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia in March 2009. The participant governments and UNDP agreed to hold Local Development Forums in conjunction with CC meetings and to promote “fast-track projects” to facilitate regional economic cooperation. A major step at the meeting was the initiation of the joint session with the BAC, which strengthened regional dialogue between the public and private sectors. At the Eleventh CC Meeting in Changchun in the following year, the member governments created the Trade Facilitation Committee (TFC). The TFC functions as an advisory committee to the GTI Consultative Commission that helps to facilitate technical procedures and remove existing barriers to trade in the region. Significant advances at the

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meeting include consideration for the establishment of new modes of cross-border cooperation such as Cross-border Economic Zones and extended invitation to institutions from Japan and the DPRK to participate in the joint session with the BAC.

South Korea hosted the GTI CC Meeting for the first time in 2011 at Pyeongchang. The meeting witnessed the establishment of the GTI Northeast Asia Local Cooperation Committee (LCC), a new unit designated with the tasks of promoting local government engagement, synergy for cooperation among local and central governments and the participation of local governments from Japan and the DPRK. In the following year (2012), two important advances were made at the CC Meeting a Vladivostok. First, in an effort to build an effective development financing mechanism for GTI activities and regional development, so-called “EXIM” or development banks from the four member states signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Northeast Asia EXIM Bank Association. Second, the GTI Strategic Action Plan was renewed at Vladivostok, which reset the timeframe of the plan from 2006-2015 to 2012-2015. The member states continue to stress the GTI’s focus on transportation, tourism, trade, energy, and environmental cooperation, with the aim of transforming the GTI into a full-fledged international organization in the future.

Identifying the Factors

Following the assumptions that a dominant power usually emerges from a systemic change in the international system and the dominant power initiates region wide cooperation as a strategy to consolidate its position in the system, one may begin to identify several crucial factors that have contributed to the TRADP’s ill fate. These factors include the absence of leadership in regional initiatives, a shift in regional culture and other exogenous shocks.

Absence of Leadership

As the assumptions suggest, the dominant power in the system plays a major role in determining the development of regional cooperation. In the Post-Cold War period, East Asia went through at least two major systemic shifts: first, from Japan’s economic decline (late 1980s onwards) to America’s hegemonic dominance (early 1990s onwards) and most recently, from U.S. decline since 9/11 to growing bipolarity between U.S. and China as a result of the latter’s economic rise. In terms of regional cooperation, the implication is clear: the success of regional initiatives depend heavily on participation of the dominant power in the system. The TRADP is a case in point where support from the dominant powers fell short.

Regarding the first systemic shift, one finds that both the declining power and the dominant power to be --- Japan and the U.S. --- did not actively participate in the Tumen River project. Surprisingly, Japan, an important regional power, was not involved in the TRADP. Although some sources claim that Tokyo served as an observer to early meetings of the TRADP while research institutes such as the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia (ERINA) continues to take interest in the TRADP,xix Japan’s role in the project was clearly minimal. Possible reasons for Japan’s absence from the TRADP include the geographic distance between Japan and the Tumen River region and Japan’s much keener interest in its own regional

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initiatives centered on the Japanese Sea Rim. Without the support of Japan, the strongest economic power in East Asia in that late 1980s – early 1990s despite the onset of domestic recession, the TRADP commenced with half hearted blessings from the region’s economic giant at the time.

On the other hand, emerging victoriously from the Cold War, U.S. power reached new height in the 1990s. Washington’s swift victory in the Gulf War was testament to America’s dominance. With Japan’s economic prosperity grinding to a halt in the early 1990s, a power vacuum appeared in Northeast Asia and the U.S. conveniently replaced Japanese leadership in the region. However, like Japan, the U.S. showed little interest in regional initiatives such as the TRADP (though for different reasons). In 1993, President Bill Clinton called for a “New Pacific Community,” a proposal that eventually materialized as the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC).xx APEC continues to serve as a key aspect of Washington’s multilateral strategy towards East Asia. Once again, the TRADP was slighted.

By the time the U.S. became absorbed in the quagmire in the Middle East after 9/11 and the Chinese economy soared ahead with great speed, the TRADP was no longer a focus in East Asia. In the new century, China’s rising power became a balancing source against U.S. regional influence and the East Asian system shifted evermore towards Sino-U.S. bipolarity.

In terms of regional initiatives, as early as 1997, China bypassed its aspirations for regional cooperation in Northeast Asia and concentrated its efforts in Southeast Asia instead. The Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) eventually became the leading conception for regional cooperation in the millennium, with the introduction of ASEAN plus one alongside ASEAN plus three in 1999 and the expansion of ASEAN into ASEAN plus six in 2005 with the addition of India, Australia and New Zealand.xxi

On the other hand, for the U.S., APEC served as Washington’s main multilateral connection with Asia. More recently, the Transpacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) proposed by the Obama administration in 2008 serves as reinforcement to Washington’s APEC conception. Despite renewed interests in China over the development of the GTI in 2009,xxii limited aspirations were not enough to save the project from obsolescence. In short, in the post Cold War period, none of the dominant powers in the system took a genuine interest in the Tumen River Project --- a major factor that undermined the project.

Shifts in Regional Culture

In the post Cold War period, one may find that the regional atmosphere in Northeast Asia swung between cultures. To a certain extent, the end of the Cold War ushered in possibilities for change in Northeast Asia by “lifting the cap off the bottle.” Specifically in Northeast Asia, the effect of the Cold War was to draw a line from the thirty eighth parallel on the Korean Peninsula down through the middle of the Taiwan Strait, separating Asia along ideological differences. Collapse of the Soviet Union near the end of the 1980s not only left a temporary power vacuum in Northeast Asia, it also provided opportunities for cooperation among countries in the region.

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With the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Northeast Asia, one could observe the beginning of a shift in regional culture. The region’s traditionally realist dominant or Hobbesian culture began to yield to more institutional developments. Micro-regional projects such as the Japan Sea Rim Economic Circle, the Yellow Sea Rim Economic Circle and the Tumen River Area Development Programme generated much discussion among academics and policymakers in the early 1990s. Although the excitement and commotion for micro-regionalism died down after practical difficulties in carrying out the projects began to set in, at least one project, the TRADP, held through into the 2000s. Members to the TRADP renewed their efforts towards cooperation by signing agreements that re-consolidate their commitment to the project and establishing a regional secretariat. Clearly, Northeast Asia began to move towards a Grotian culture since the end of the Cold War.

However, the tide of developments began to turn again by the beginning of the new century (2000 - ). As a result of economic competition and renewed historical and political tensions among CJK, Northeast Asia seemed to regress towards a Hobbesian atmosphere. Regarding TRADP, despite continued meetings among member states, the project began to lose momentum in this period. CJK seemed to be preoccupied with much greater changes in the region. In terms of the security environment, China’s rapid economic development in the 1990s supported speculators’ concern over Beijing as a military threat while North Korea’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) destabilized regional security. Economically, China and ASEAN’s agreement to establish FTA caused Japan and Korea to follow the footsteps of Beijing in negotiations with Southeast Asia. As Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi’s numerous visits to the Yasukuni Shrine caused Japan’s relations with both China and Korea to deteriorate, one could reasonably interpret the development of FTAs in Southeast Asia more as a race than as a natural consequence in the regional integration process.

Finally, with Koizumi’s departure from office in 2006, the atmosphere in Northeast Asia began to shift again. To the surprise of many observers, Koizumi’s successor Shinzo Abe, a well known hawk, began to rebuild relations with China once in office, a move that led to several exchange leadership visits between China and Japan and the cooling of chronic tensions in the region. After 2006, Japanese PMs Yasuo Fukuda and Yukio Hatoyama made subsequent proposals for regional peace and community building such as the “Sea of Friendship” and “Fraternity” (Yuai).xxiii On the other hand, on the Korean peninsula, détente occurred as well as both Pyongyang and Seoul agreed on a peace agreement that ended almost six decades of confrontation. Overall, one may argue that Northeast Asia seemed to move towards cooperation again, with communal proposals such as Hatoyama’s “Yuai” giving developments a Kantian flavor. In terms of the TRADP, the project expanded as well in this period of détente in Northeast Asia, with the project changing its name to the Greater Tumen Initiative and member states coordinating on the realization of a new Strategic Action Plan for the next decade.

Conclusion

Since 2009, progress of the GTI slowed down again. Despite continued updates on news of meetings convened under the auspices of the GTI, the project seemed to have fallen into

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obscurity on the international stage. Compared to another micro-regional project carried out in Southeast Asia, the Mekong River project, the GTI is almost unheard of. Why?

Undeniably, the regional environment plays an important role in shaping the fate of the GTI. Upon close examination of the development of the Tumen River project, one may notice that the project expanded and stagnated in a pattern that parallels the development of the regional atmosphere in Northeast Asia. When regional state relations became tense due to bilateral competition and other issues, progress of the TRADP slowed down; when tensions among states changed for the better, the TRADP developed with speed. In contrast with traditional approaches that usually draw a condensed view of the studied event, an eclectic view that takes into account different aspects of a phenomenon may better reflect reality. Indeed, such an approach not only calls on the observer to heed changes on the systemic level but also consider the effect of changes on the relationship between the international and the regional.

From the first assumption that systemic changes influence regional cooperation extends the second assumption that great powers influence cooperation. Despite the fact that the latter conclusion may be achieved from the realist approach as well (though for different reasons), realism usually does not go well with the concept of cooperation. In other words, one may be taken to task by putting the concepts together; cooperation usually falls under the realm of liberal institutionalism or even constructivism. The contribution of an eclectic approach is to connect the three main approaches of IR in explaining a phenomenon. In terms of the hegemonic power or great powers, though power and interest remains the key concern of states, such a goal is not necessarily in conflict with cooperation. Therefore, from an eclectic approach, it is completely conceivable that states pursue cooperation and community building out of concerns for power and interest.

However, for the Tumen River Project, the insight of an eclectic approach regarding great powers also implies the importance of these actors in defining cooperation among states. Such implication hints at the ill fate of the TRADP: great powers simply did not invest enough efforts in the project. In other words, the powers of Northeast Asia had other priorities in the post Cold War period and the TRADP has fallen out of the priority list of most states since its early years. In terms of the TRADP, perhaps the clearest example is the exclusion of Japan from the project. As one of the most important powers in the region, if not the most important regional power at the turn of the 1990s, Japan could have but chose not to play a leading role in the TRADP. Although Japan gradually gave up its role of regional leadership to the U.S. and China (in recent years), neither of the latter powers held a deep interest in the Tumen River project. In short, early optimism of the TRADP concealed the practical issue of great power support and misled the perception of many observers.

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i Yoji Koyama, “The Concept of Economic Area of the Japan Sea Rim and the Role of Niigata,” http://dspace.lib.niigata-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10191/599/1/9_0001.pdf ; Yuhei Kogawa, translated by Xiaomei Zhang, “dongya dizhonghai ziyoumaoyiquan xincheng de kenengxing” (The Possibility of a Regional Free Trade Circle in East Asia) Northeast Asia Forum (4) (2000), p.11.ii Hui Qing, “tumenjiang kaifa daidong dongbeiya jingji hezuo” (Tumen River Development Stimulates Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia) Economics Today (342) (February 1996), p.37.iii MOFA Japan, “First Round of Negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) among Japan, China and the ROK,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press6e_000019.htmliv See: Barack Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign Affairs 86(4) (2007), available online at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62636/barack-obama/renewing-american-leadership ; Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?page=0,0v Christopher Hughes, “Tumen River Area Development Programme: Frustrated Micro-regionalism as Microcosm of Political Rivalries,” CSGR Working Paper No.57/00 (August 2000)vi For example, see: Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Deepak Nair, “Regionalism in the Asia Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 31(1) (2009), pp.110-142; John Ravenhill, “East Asian Regionalism: Much Ado About Nothing,” Review of International Studies 35 (2009), pp.215-235.vii In a similar sense, the word “flux” has become a word commonly used to describe the disorganized and often conflictual process of regional integration, especially in East Asia. See: Philomena Murray ed., Europe and Asia: Regions in Flux (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); T.J. Pempel, “Northeast Asian Economic Integration: A Region in Flux,” Asia-Pacific Review 14(2) (2007), pp.45-61.viii See: Jagdish Bhagwati, “US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with FTAs,” Discussion Paper Series No.726 (April 1995), available online at: http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/download/fedora_content/download/ac:100123/CONTENT/econ_9495_726.pdf ; Kotera Akira, “What is the ‘Spaghetti Bowl Phenomenon’ of FTAs?” http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/columns/a01_0193.htmlix Cai Chen and Shuren Yuan, Dongbeiya Quyu Hezuo yu Tumenjiang Diqu Kaifa (Northeast Asia Regional Cooperation and Tumen River Area Development) (Changchun: Northeast Normal University Press, 1996), p.237.x Ibid.xi Katherine B. Burns, “Subnational Power and Regional Integration: The Case of Tumen River Development,” MIT Japan Program Working Paper 94-10, http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/17125/JP-WP-94-10-33434616.pdf?sequence=1xii Ibid.xiii Richard Pomfret, “The Tumen River Area Development Programme,” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 5(4) (1997-1998), pp.82-83.xiv Hisako Tsuji, “The Tumen River Area Development Programme: Its History and Current Status as of 2004,” ERINA Discussion Paper No.0404e, http://www.erina.or.jp/en/Research/dp/pdf/0404e.pdfxv Pomfret, op. cit., pp.84-85.xvi See the TRADP/GTI homepage: http://www.tumenprogramme.org/xvii “2005 Changchun Agreement of the Member Countries of the Greater Tumen Initiative,” http://www.tumenprogramme.org/news.php?id=500xviii “2007 Vladivostok Declaration,” http://www.tumenprogramme.org/news.php?id=503xix See Chan-Woo Lee, Ten Years of Tumen River Area Development: Evaluation and Issues (Niigata: Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, 2003).xx Mie Oba, “The U.S. Influence on the Developing ‘Regional Arrangement Complex’ in Asia,” USJP Working Paper 07-10 (2007), available online at:

http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/us-japan/research/pdf/07-10.Oba.pdf ; Also see: Bill Clinton, “Building a New Pacific Community,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4(28) (1993), pp.485-488.xxi Shujiro Urata, “An ASEAN+6 Economic Partnership: Significance and Tasks,” Asia Research Report 2007 (February 2008), available online at: http://www.jcer.or.jp/eng/pdf/asia07.pdfxxii In 2009, China’s State Department issued a report on the future development of cooperation in the Tumen River Area. See: “zhongguo tumenjiang quyu hezuo kaifa guihua gangyao (quanwen)” (Summary Report of Development Planning of Regional Cooperation in the Tumen River Area), http://news.sohu.com/20091117/n268265390.shtmlxxiii See: Yasuo Fukuda, “When the Pacific Ocean Becomes an ‘Inland Sea’: Five Pledges to a Future Asia that ‘Acts Together’,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/speech0805-2.html ; Yukio Hatoyama, “A New Path for Japan,” New York Times, August 26, 2009, available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27iht-edhatoyama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

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