A Critique of Realism towards a Normative Theory of International Relations

Francisco C. Riodique III

Department of Political Science, San Sebastian College Recoletos Manila

franciscoriodiqueiii@yahoo.com

Abstract:

This paper deals with the question, what are the possibilities of a Normative Theory of International relations, to Supplant Realism in promoting not only a better understanding of IR, but of promoting better international relations as well. This is done by first outlining how realism became a dominant force in IR theorizing thus affecting the multitude of IR scholarship. Realism has been seen as the perfect lens for capturing the objective reality of international relations. This paper will provide for a critique of Realism (Scientific Realism) in order to prove that IR is not comparable to the physical sciences, hence cannot objectively capture the reality of international politics. This idea will be articulated by pointing out that IR scholarship greatly affects international relations itself. Discussions on this part will be facilitated by my critique of Wendt’s defense of the objectivity of scientific realism. IR theories cannot capture the objective stance of international politics because IR theories influence the discourse and outcomes of international relations. This will now in turn pave the way for a more normative approach to IR theorizing. As a conclusion, since realism cannot really capture objectively international politics, a more normative theory of IR is possible to supplant it. In effect, IR theorizing can discuss how scholarship in IR can influence international relations for the better.

Keywords: Realism, Normative Theory, International relations, IR Theory, Objectivity, Social Constructivism, English School

Introduction, Problem and Background

Realism as a theory has shaped the face of International Relations. For several decades it has served as the framework for all theoreticians in the discipline of International Relations to theorize and conceptualize about the various endeavors in world politics. Realism as a theory became the springboard that facilitated most of the discussions in International Relations theory, that even lead to other variations of the theory such as but not limited to Liberal-Institutionalism, Liberalism and Constructivism in order to cope up with the changes in the international arena without foregoing the basic insights of realismi. With these things being said, I think no one will question the assumption that Realism is the hegemon in IR theory that dominates all other theories, those which already exist and those which are about to exist in the future.

What could be the reason why Realism has received a wide range of audience in IR theorizing? There are many things that could be said about realism that make it so appealing to scholars and layman alike. However for the purposes of this research paper, I would like to focus on the aspect of Realism that many scholars consider to be its best feature. This is its strong commitment to science and its method of objectivity. Thus realism in this regard is sometimes called scientific realism. (Wendt, 1999) ii Nevertheless, there is still that long-standing doubt about its scientific character that persisted along-side it. It is my aim in this regard to make the claim that no matter how realist theorists say and prove that Realism is a science, it is not. Not that there are no traces of scientific features in Realism. I will admit that realism is the closest a theory could get to science compared to the other alternatives theorizing in IR. I am also cognizant of the fact that the methods of science have contributed so much in its success. Regardless of its self-proclaimed stature as being scientific, I will argue later that, this is not enough for scientific realism to claim the status for being a science at least in the naturalistic sense of the word as espoused by philosophers of science. If scientific realism stands on precarious grounds because of its infirm footing as a scientific endeavor, then there could be room for more theorizing. I do not intend to supersede realism. I only intend to supplant it. I aim to explore how a normative theory of international relations could be justified side by side with realism given the inadequacy of scientific realism as a form of science.

Realism as a Science

Before I go to the main arguments of this paper, I would first like to have a survey as to how Realism had been regarded by many IR scholars as scientific and therefore, objective. Social scientists have always been jealous of science. Probably the reason for this is the fact that science has already produced so much undeniable results while the social scientists, not so much. This could be the reason why theorists in the social sciences decided to study science and tried to imitate its methods with the hope of having the same success. International Relations as a discipline is a social science (Brown with Ainley, 2005), therefore it is also situated in the same playing-field with it. That is to say that the predicaments of the social sciences also apply to IR although there could be some quandaries that apply to IR alone. iii This

is the reason why Realism has turned to science for its method. Proponents of realism have always argued just like in the natural sciences that there are general laws out there governing international relations waiting to be discovered and analyzed iv. Realists claim that it is an objective science that passes the criteria of both objectivity and falsifiability.

Most scholars in philosophy of science will agree at least in the generic outset that objectivity entails unbiased judgment of the world around us. It precludes all kinds of predispositions that can affect one’s interpretation of observations about the world. In short being objective implies a kind of attitude that seeks unblemished understanding of the world. The philosopher Karl Popper (1968) has injected a concept that will demarcate scientific disciplines from the non-scientific ones which will further enhance the idea of objectivity attached to science. This is the celebrated idea of falsifiability.v For Popper’s theory of demarcation, he claimed that it is the criterion of falsifiability that makes a particular endeavor as scientific.vi Realism at first glance seems to pass the rigorous tests put forward by the various philosophers of science like Popper, Hempelvii and even Kuhn.viii Nevertheless I will not devote too much time and effort in this paper proving that scientific realism is not contrary to the various standards enshrined by our philosophers of science because this has been explored by many theorists and I guess realism really corresponds to such criteria. I am more intrigued by the grandiose arguments espoused by Alexander Wendt in his beautiful book Social Theory of International Relations.

Before I go and expound on what Wendt has to say about scientific realism, let me introduce first and discuss briefly the main problem which I want to investigate in this paper. I don’t want to sound cliché here but I would like to start my discussion of the problem by describing science as a discipline. ix Objectivity in science implies an observer observing a phenomenon or any natural occurrence in the natural world. The observer thereby moves away from all his biases and predispositions in order to arrive to a more objective and unblemished observation of the world. The observer then analyzes the data which he gathered from his observation and from there he will construct his findings. After these things mentioned are done, the observer now tries to build theories that can explain what just happened. This is where things really begin to look obfuscated because the question of ontology and epistemology will enter the picture. Some theorists like Waltz (1979)x will say that a theory is a kind of abstraction from the real world. Some will say that what happens in reality could be reflected by theory and the story will go on and on without arriving in a definite conclusion.

If we talk about the natural world or what Wendt called natural kinds, there will be no problem. Objectivity will be achieved. However this is not so when it comes to the social sciences. The object of the natural sciences is the natural world around us governed by steady laws of nature. Thus the observer simply needs to fairly observe and he can already conclude and theorize in an objective manner. In the case of the social sciences, what the observer (social scientist) observes is not simply the natural world although Wendt has rightly argued that the natural world is a part of it,xi but a social world which is mainly composed of culture, human practice and social relations. It is true that the natural world is a part of the social world but the social world is more complex than nature because it governs not only what is natural but also what is social. In this juncture it will be ripe to say that the difference between natural

science and the social sciences is the fact that an observer of the natural environment no matter how he constructs his theory will never affect the general laws that govern the world. Say for example, a physicist has erroneously constructed a proof or theory, this error in theory will never affect the cosmos he is trying to explain and thus the methods of science can smoothly operate and in the near future a right theory could be constructed. This is not so in the social sciences because theories in the social sciences will affect the social world it is trying to understand. Hence it will be difficult to arrive in a certain truth because the circumstances surrounding a particular social phenomenon could change because it has been affected by the theory which it is trying to explain. People and social occurrences are always connected to each other because they are not simply logically tied to each other but they are socially constructed. Social scientists and scholars are always part of the society they are trying to explain. What social scientists have to say about the social world will always have an effect on it. The same can be said about International Relations. The theories that govern international relations with all its attending circumstances are always affected by the various theories espoused by learned individuals. Thus scientific realism is an illusion. There will never be a purely objective IR theory output. This is so because IR theories will always contaminate the events that take place in international relations. The world of international affairs is not independent from the theories that try to explain it.

Wendt’s Argument for Scientific Realism

Alexander Wendt in his book Social Theory of International Relations (1999) is cognizant of the various criticisms against scientific realism including the one cited above. According to Wendt, scientific realism is a philosophy of science that has the assumption that the world exists independent from human beings.xii This is actually the contrary of my claim above that scientific realism cannot be considered as a science and cannot objectively give a clear and objective picture of international relations. However I believe it will be fruitful to survey the intricate but carefully woven arguments of Wendt in favor of scientific realism in order to fully appreciate the investigation I am undertaking in this paper.xiii

Wendt in his book defended the claim of scientific realism that the world is independent of the human mind and the language of the observer and that mature scientific theories refer to the world even when the structures of international relations are unobservable. He argued for the realist that ontology comes first before epistemology. That is to say that the world existed first before we learned about it. This way of thinking presupposes that the world exists independent of human beings thus it can be subject to objective scrutiny by socials scientists. To illustrate, a dog will always remain a dog, that is, a creature exhibiting the features of a dog with or without human beings explaining and analyzing it. Wendt was trying to prove that no matter how we see the world or what words we use to talk about the world, the world is still the world and all other discourse must be rooted in the world otherwise it will be nonsense. Wendt even went as far as using descriptive theory of reference and relational theory of reference to put contrast to the causal theory of reference which is rooted in the external world. Thus in causal theory of reference, there has to be an external world which is being

referred to by language making it rooted on that external world. This is so in what Wendt called natural kinds which is actually the object of natural science. The problem of the social kinds which is the proper subject of the social sciences is more problematic because of its nature. It is true that social kinds are in some sense still rooted to natural kinds but social kinds are not simply materialistic like its counterpart. This is the reason why many scholars are inclined to think that realism is inappropriate to social science. But Wendt went on and claimed that despite the differences between natural kinds and social kinds, there is still some sense in the claim of the realist view of social science.

There are three arguments posited by Wendt in order to preserve the claim that social science can still lodge on a realist perspective. The first one is the fact according to Wendt, that material forces constitute social kinds. This simply means that no matter the kind of discourse a particular language-game imputes to an object, it should still correspond to the materiality of such object or thing. The second one deals with the role of self-organizing structures to the constitution of social kinds. Natural kinds have structures that are self-organizing. They are what they are according to their constitution which is structured internally without any outside interference. Hence the theories that refer to them are also shaped by their internal structure. The third is explained by Wendt in this way, despite the fact that social kinds are socially constructed in a collective manner in the society due to societal interactions and the like, it is still independent to the individual that tries to explain them.xiv

These arguments espoused by Wendt imply that there is still a great possibility for a realist perspective not only to natural kinds but even to social kinds. Social kinds are socially constructed and thus most likely only susceptible to an idealist explanation. But Wendt went on and claimed that explaining social kinds is still possible through a realist perspective. He argued in favor of this statement by espousing the three arguments mentioned above and if synthesized, it can be inferred that social kinds even though mostly are ideas and socially constructed, must still be rooted to a concrete fact of reality. Such social kinds also have an internal structure akin to that of a self-organizing structure of a natural kind which can be seen by its resistance to erroneous explanations. That is to say that if an explanation or reference to a social kind is misconstrued, it will be refuted or resisted by that social event which will be shown by the revolting circumstances surrounding the social kind. Lastly, international relations confronts a theorist in an objective and independent manner. That is to say that there are objective facts that state actors cannot simply deny because these facts once assessed in an erroneous manner could backfire to the assessing state. This can be seen in the case of Hussein when he tried to invade Kuwait thinking that it was a province of Iraq. It failed because the world intervened. In this example, the intervention of the world served as a reality check for Iraq saying that the way it sees the world is not rooted in reality that is why intervention by other world powers became necessary. International relations, is a world independent from the human mind and its language.

International Relations is a World not fully Independent from the Observer

By saying all this stuff about the arguments of Wendt defending scientific realism, it strengthens the argument that scientific realism is very much possible even in the social sciences. I investigated the claims of Wendt because they provided for a rich breeding ground for ideas in favor of scientific realism. Not only that, he defended his argument that even social kinds which are known to be socially constructed are deeply rooted in reality. Wendt has provided for an elegant answer to the subject-object problem that scientific realism was facing. Nevertheless, given all these complex arguments advanced by Wendt to defend the objectivity in scientific realism, I still believe in the fact that it has internal flaws and the history of mankind will be able to extrapolate a different conclusion.

Before going to some historical exploits to prove my claim, let me first, briefly assess the validity of Wendt’s arguments. Wendt has claimed that social kinds even though socially constructed are still deeply rooted to reality. I agree with him to some certain extent because social kinds really must be embedded in reality, otherwise they will be nothing but concoctions of a speculative mind. However that is not all. Since social kinds are socially constructed, saying that they are entirely rooted in objective reality is an understatement. I say that reality and human perceptions meet in order to meet social kinds. It is not only rooted in reality but it is also a product of human perceptions and understanding. Let us return to the example given above regarding the dog. A dog even without observers will still have the natural features of a dog, that is, it has fur, canine teeth, tail etc. However once it enters the real of the social sciences, there could be other things that may be imputed to a dog such as “man’s best friend” or it could even be “man’s worst enemy” (probably because it could be infected with rabbies). This dog now could be subjected to different treatment and hence the treatment can affect how the dog is seen or understood. This simple example shows that relying on the fact of objectivity could sometimes be misleading if its social construction will be marginalized. My point thus far is to juxtapose social construction and objective reality when trying to make assumptions in the social sciences. The same applies for IR. It is now time to turn to less complicated explanations, the history of mankind.

As stipulated in the first few pages of this paper, it is my contention that it is impossible even for scientific realism to capture in a purely objective manner that is, in a manner akin to that of the natural sciences where the observed can never be affected or influenced by the observer. As suggested above, international relations has always been influenced by the various theories that tried to explain it. I plan to argue this point in a less rigorous manner unlike Wendt who even went all the way to excavate deep philosophical insights from the philosophy of language and science in order to support his claim. I want to stick to the undeniable human experiences that point out to the situation that theories affect the world they are trying to study. I believe the question at hand is a product of common sense and therefore can be extrapolated through the use of common sense as well. This opinion of mine can be seen from the many instances in the history of mankind, that is man and that includes social scientists, influence the world where they live and theorize about.

I will now give some examples that can show how theorists in the social sciences can influence the world ordering we all live in. The western civilization was shaped by the Hellenistic philosophy of the classical Greek thinkers which was centered on the primacy of

reason and virtue over everything else (Hakim 2000)xv. This can be seen of course from the famous Platonic and Aristotelian discourses. The traditions of the Greeks were carried over by the Romans which further influenced the world due to the vastness of the Roman Empire. In the medieval period we can see how the great Christian philosophers were very much influenced still by the classical Greek way of thinking (Flew, 2010)xvi. Now we see St. Augustine adopting Platonic ideas in order to justify the dualism that existed between the material and the non-material. By the revival of Aristotelian way of thinking, St. Thomas Aquinas extracted certain Aristotelian frameworks in order to understand the completeness of a substance which can be seen in human nature. These turn of events influences Christianity forever. And as far as I know Christianity together with Greek Rationalism were two of the pillars that shaped western civilization.xvii Now we see the world in the light of the western tradition. The story can still continue on and on and we can write an entire book about it, how western thinkers influenced and shaped not only our conception of the world but the world itself.

To make my arguments even closer to IR, let me cite a few examples in the international arena that show how IR theorists especially the realists influenced and shaped international relations. We can find an abundance of examples from the history of IR itself. The discourses found in the history of IR influenced the way the world operates at present. The realist project which can be traced from E. H. Carr already showed how he influenced the way people see the world and the way people see the world influence the world itself. When Carr published his The Twenty Years Crisis in 1939,xviii it changed the way foreign policy not only of the United States but of other world powers as well. Carr was just merely trying to demean the liberal doctrine but ended up starting a chain of event that will change the way world leaders and policy-makers act in international decision making.xix World politics after that was began to be seen in the light of real conflicts between the “haves and the have-nots” that beleaguered the international affairs of the world since time immemorial. Carr’s ideas have the effect of belittling the role of international organization in the realm of international affairs. Since then theorists and world leaders little by little moved away from the idea of having a world organization that will tend to hinder conflict until the idea of having international institutions was rekindled by President Woodrow Wilson. When Morgenthau came to the picture he somehow followed some of Carr’s way of thinking but focused more on the role of power being pursued by states in the affairs of international politicsxx. Theorists, states men, leaders and policy-makers were influenced by this way of thinking and focused more on how to gain power and advantage vis-à-vis other countries. This can be seen from the foreign policies made by western powers at that time most especially that of the United States. One of the most intriguing and satisfying example that I can give to show that theorists in IR can influence other theorists, world leaders, policy-makers and in turn international relations itself is the case of George Kennan who became well-known for its containment strategy (Kennan 1952)xxi. He conceptualized the idea that USSR has the tendency to expand in order to avoid imploding inside due to its unscrupulous domestic affairs fueled by unstable and erratic cultural orientations. This prompted the US to challenge USSR in all the forefronts of international politics thus signaling the start of the Cold War. The list of examples can go on forever exhibiting the characteristic of theories in IR to influence the way international politics is being played.

In this regard I think it would be helpful for my paper to revisit the constructivist idea of social construction of international relations in order to strengthen my arguments claiming that the various theories of IR influence and help shape international relations. Constructivism is considered to be very critical of realism. In a general perspective, it argues that realism sees the constitution and structures of international relations as predetermined. These predetermined structures according to Kenneth Waltz are what govern the way states relate to each other. Constructivist thinkers like Wendt see this kind of thinking as misleading and very insufficient. Constructivists will claim that there has to be a distinction between brute facts such as the tree planted at the backyard and social facts which depends on human beings. What happens on the international arena is greatly influenced not by predetermined structures but by human actions shaping the structures that in turn shape international relations. Thus international relations can be socially constructed.xxii Social facts like international relations are dependent on a large scale on socially established norms and conventions. Even the realist conception of anarchy and power politics according to Wendt has some social dimensions to it that cannot be simply seen through the eyes of a purely realist observer.xxiii Wendt and as well as the other constructivist are ready to admit that there is indeed anarchy in the international arena just like what realists suggest but the social dimension of this situation also permits that the norms governing international relations are made possible through human actions and hence even in an anarchical society there is a great chance for the emergence of norms governing the relationship of nations which are socially made by the states themselves.xxiv

Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations

What I have discussed so far is the insufficiency of the realist argument that international relations can be seen as a world independent from the observer. As pointed out international relations is not a purely objective arena which is totally independent from the theorist who tries to explain it. International relations is greatly influenced by IR theories. This can be seen throughout the history of human civilization where the social order of world politics was affected by the various philosophers and scholars theorizing about it. This argument was also reinforced by the constructivist idea of social construction of international relations including its internal structures. Thus, international relations cannot be compared to the natural world because the natural world is always independent from its observer while international relations is never totally independent from the people who socially construct it. From the point of view of constructivism, international relations is comparable to that of a society which has norms that are socially constructed through culture and language which serves as the governing maxims for it. This line of thinking will pave way to the possibility of a normative theory of International Relations which can supplant the lacking mechanisms in the realist perspective.

If international relations will be affected by the various theories that try to understand it, then it can also be logically inferred that human beings in some sense can dictate the outcome of international relations. I do not want to be misunderstood here. I am not saying that human beings can control entirely the affairs of the international world. That for me is

impossible. I have to abide by some methodological point of view of the realist school that it can actually observe international relations in a somewhat objective sense and can therefore derive conclusions from it in the same fashion that science derives its conclusion based from observation of objective facts. However what I am trying to emphasize here is the insufficiency of scientific realism to capture the purely objective scenarios because of the fact that people together with their theories contaminate the field of international relations. In short what I am suggesting here is that scientific realism should be coupled with a normative theory in order to cure some of its systemic deficiencies.

Let me go back to my main argument. There is room for normative theorizing because the various theories being conceptualized to reflect international scenarios can actually affect the outcome of international relations itself. Thus a normative theory of international relations is justified. With this line of thinking being explored, other facets for theorizing could also proliferate. Before it was very difficult to argue for a liberal-institutional approach to IR theory because of the difficult obstacles asserted by the realist way of thinking but with the normative approach I am arguing for, innovations and policy suggestions to further the betterment of international relations can be assessed more smoothly without the judgmental attitude of scientific realism. I understand that many theorists in international politics are inclined to think of ways on how international relations can be changed for the better. However with the hegemonic dominance of scientific realism these theories have been sidelined and labeled as not being scientific and unreflective of reality. With the emergence of a normative theory, more venues can be opened for open dialogues and state agreements to be facilitated by each country in order to provide for a better atmosphere for international affairs.

Some Points from the English School

At this juncture, it would be noteworthy to be enlightened by some of the ideas found in the English school that is coherent with my claims in this paper. The English school of International Relations is an emerging school of thought for theorizing about international affairs. It is not my intention to outline how it was conceived or discuss its pluralistic methodology. The English school of thought is closely related to the constructivist project. I think there are only thin methodological differences that outline their delineation. The link that ties the two schools of thought together is their commitment to a normative way of thinking.

In the book of Suganami and Linklater titled The English School of International Relationsxxv , professor Linklater emphasized the point on what is Fundamental in IR theory which is to answer the question “How much can world politics be changed for the better”. This question stemmed from a normative way of thinking in international relations. Linklater pointed out in the same book that there is a great chance that progress could be achieved which is difficult for realists to swallow. However professor Linklater cautioned the readers that the progress he was trying to investigate is different from the kind of progress revolutionist are trying to espouse. This means that there will still be some difficulty in achieving progress because of the structural constraints that are already hardwired in international relations

arena. Despite this fact, Suganami and Linklater are still optimistic that there is indeed a room for normative theory that can pave way to more progress.

According to Linklater, it is central to the English School to think and investigate how progress can occur and how it could be curtailed or limited. Hedley Bull has already conceptualized that the international community can be seen as a kind of society. In this sense, states must continue to work for rules and policies that will serve as norms that can guide their conduct with each other (Bull and Watson, 1984)xxvi. States have their own agenda and interests which is common for everyone. Under the normative approach, states can work out their differences and still pursue their own agenda in line with the parameters set by the norms which are made by the states themselves.

The English school recognizes the opportunity for progress to be achieved however it also is cognizant of the many limitations that can derail progress. There is pluralism in the international community. Pluralism in culture, religion, personal agendas and capacities can greatly affect how states will relate to each other. It can facilitate to push for progress because if progress is achieved, there could be more venues for the different state agendas could be pursued. On the other hand it could also curtail and hamper progress because of the many differences that plague the international system.

The English school rejects the Hobbesian approach to international relations that progress cannot be achieved due to the selfishness of human actions in an anarchic state of nature. By contrast, the English school believes in the opportunity for progress despite the many difficulties that pluralism in the society entails. It vacillates towards a more seductive way of thinking that a normative approach to International Relations theory can pave way for people, scholars and world leaders alike to fashion international relations into something which can facilitate progress and in turn, the betterment of the community of nations.

Conclusion

There are more things to be said and can be said about Scientific Realism, Philosophy of Science, Wendt’s argument defending the objectivity of social kinds, the possibility of a normative approach to international relations and the ideas found in the English school. However I limited the discussions on this paper about the arguments that can assert the possibility of a normative theory of international relations. For purposes of clarity, I would like to reiterate the point I made in this paper that I do not intend to replace scientific realism as the leading theory of international relations. As a matter of fact I do believe that there must be something self-organizingxxvii in the structure of international relations but theorizing about these structures should not be limited to the realist approach because scientific realism cannot entirely capture all the objective facts because as Wendt argued there are social kinds in international relations which could be best understood in light of social constructivism. Having said this, people and scholars always have an effect to international relations. When they observe the international arena and make comments on it, state actions are influenced by this and hence the objectivity sought is hereby lost. These instances will lead to a more normative

theory that can allow states and scholars alike to reflect on “what is ought to be” rather than simply relying on “what is”.

References:

1. Brown, C and Kirsten Ainley. (2005). Understanding International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

2. Bull, H and A. Watson. (1984). The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press3. Carr, E.H. (1939/2001). The Twenty years Crisis, ed. Michael Cox. Basingstoke and New York:

Palgrave Macmillan4. Chernoff, Fred. Critical Realism, Scientific Realism, and International Relations Theory5. Freyberg-Inan. A. (2004). What Moves Man? Albany: State University of New York Press6. Flew, T. (2010). An Introduction to Western Philosophy, Ideas and Argument from Plato to

Popper. New York: Thames and Hudson7. Griffiths. M. (2007). International relations Theory for the 21st Century. Abington: Routledge8. Hakim, A. (2000). Historical Introduction to Philosophy. New York: Macmillan Publishing9. Kennan, G. (1952). American Diplomacy. New York: New American Library10. Linklater A. and Hidemi Suganami. (2006) The English School of International Relations. New

York: Cambridge University Press11. Morgenthau, H. (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York:

Alfred P. Knoff (5th Edition 1978)12. Popper. K. (1968). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Harper and Row13. Waltz. K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.14. Weber. Cynthia. (2001). International Relations Theory. Abington: Routledge15. Wendt, Alexander. Anarchy is What States Make of it? Social Construction of Power Politics16. Wendt. A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press

i Freyberg-Inan. A. (2004). What Moves Man? Albany: State University of New York Pressii Wendt. A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. New York: Cambridge University Pressiii Brown, C and Kirsten Ainley. (2005). Understanding International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillaniv Chernoff, Fred. Critical Realism, Scientific Realism, and International Relations Theoryv Popper. K. (1968). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Harper and Rowvi Ibid.vii Hempel’s deductive nomological model seems to be applicable to the realist method however this may still need some kind of philosophizingviii Even Kuhn’s vacillating paradigmatic shifts he called scientific revolutions are not far away from the realist perspective of IR and can even be argued that changes in the theories in IR involves shifting paradigms. ix I don’t want to discuss science here in the rigorous manner by which it has been described by Philosophy of Science. I want to stick with what is commonly accepted.x Waltz. K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Coxi Wendt. A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. New York: Cambridge University Pressxii Ibid.xiii The goal of Wendt in his book Social Theory of International Relations is not really to defend scientific Realism per se but to provide for a constructivist explanation of international relations grounded on the methods of scientific discourse.xiv The goal of Wendt in his book Social Theory of International Relations is not really to defend scientific Realism per se but to provide for a constructivist explanation of international relations grounded on the methods of scientific discourse.xv Hakim, A. (2000). Historical Introduction to Philosophy. New York: Macmillan Publishing xvi Flew, T. (2010). An Introduction to Western Philosophy, Ideas and Argument from Plato to Popper. New York: Thames and Hudsonxvii There are other roots that shaped western traditions. In the book Great Political Thinkers, Ebenstein included Jewish monotheism as one of the pillars of Western civilization xviii Carr, E.H. (1939/2001). The Twenty years Crisis, ed. Michael Cox. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan xix Brown, C and Kirsten Ainley. (2005). Understanding International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillanxx Morgenthau, H. (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred P. Knoff (5th Edition 1978)xxi Kennan, G. (1952). American Diplomacy. New York: New American Libraryxxii Brown, C and Kirsten Ainley. (2005). Understanding International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillanxxiii Wendt in his book Social Theory of International Relations tried to refute the realist structural analysis of international relationsxxiv In The Anarchical Society by Bull, he considered the community of states not just simply a consensus of an international system but it is also a kind of society. This strengthens the argument that international relations has some social dimensions which are socially constructedxxv Linklater A. and Hidemi Suganami. (2006) The English School of International Relations. New York: Cambridge University Pressxxvi Bull, H and A. Watson. (1984). The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Pressxxvii I am borrowing this terminology from Wendt