Exclusion to Promote Inclusion: Understanding the Impact of Olympics Bans through Apartheid South

Africa

Sarah Rosston3/13/14

Introduction

In a blog post for the Huffington Post, founder of OutSports.com, the premier

website for LGBT sports, Cyd Ziegler proposed that in response to Russia’s

discriminatory anti-gay laws, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) should “ban

Russia from competing in their own games.” The games in Sochi went on despite the

laws and the Russian Delegation was not banned from competing in the 2014 Winter

Olympics in Sochi, but the proposal, even if implausible, raises questions about the

efficacy and impact of banning a country from Olympic competition. What kind of role

can a ban play in influencing policy and when is it a reasonable tool to use for advancing

human rights? As discrimination continues around the world whether in the form of anti-

gay laws, gender-based discrimination, or policies targeting other groups, the Olympics,

with its visibility and influence around the world seems to be a logical means for

advancing equality. Moreover, the Olympics clearly have a purpose that goes beyond

athletic competition and is relevant to the promotion of human rights; The Olympic

Charter states that “any form of discrimination with regard to a country or a person on

grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is incompatible with belonging to

the Olympic Movement” (International Olympic Committee)

The anti-discrimination statement in the Olympic Charter has been used in the

past as justification for banning three countries from the Olympics, so Cyd Zeigler’s

proposal is not without precedent. South Africa’s Apartheid-era ban from the Olympics is

the most significant, longest lasting, and most readily analyzed of the three bans so

investigating its effect within South Africa and on policy towards South Africa around

the world is valuable for understanding the potential impact of banning another nation

from Olympic competition in response to discrimination (Rosner and Low).1 There are

many criteria to consider when deciding whether an the IOCs ban on South Africa, which

lasted from 1964 to 1992, was ultimately the right decision, including whether the ban

was necessary to preserve the Olympic Charter’s legitimacy or whether competing

against Apartheid teams would have been morally impermissible, but this paper focuses

on the ban’s role in influencing Apartheid law and foreign policy towards South Africa.

1 Afghanistan and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) were also banned from the Olympics, but a confluence of other factors makes the impact of the ban difficult to judge in those cases

1

The paper examines whether the ban was a legitimate tool for creating change either by

directly affecting Apartheid policies or by making Apartheid more visible outside of

South Africa or if instead it simply gave other countries an easy way out of using higher-

cost and higher-risk sanctions to fight Apartheid. Through an examination of South

Africa’s twenty-eight year exclusion from the Olympic Games played and the role in

ending Apartheid, I will both evaluate what happened in South Africa and speculate on

what my findings mean about the role of an Olympic ban as a political tool in the future.

Perspectives on the Ban: Catalyst, Sideshow, or Impetus for Change?

The idea for banning South Africa from the Olympics did not start with the IOC;

it was a begrudging response to outside pressures and thus in many ways started without

clear goals or measures of success (Booth). Avery Brundage, president of the IOC when

the ban started, was widely considered racist and was opposed to the ban because he

believed sports should exist separately from politics, saying that the IOC “must not

become involved in political issues, nor permit the Olympic Games to be used as a tool or

as a weapon for extraneous causes. (Booth 87)” His decisions as IOC president on issues

of race and religion, however, bring in to question how apolitical his decisions really

were. In South Africa’s case, he ignored the discriminatory Apartheid policies that began

when the National Party was elected in 1948. Those policies were not only visible inside

the country but in Olympic competition as well; in 1956 and 1960, the South African

teams were entirely white even white made up less than 20% of the country’s population.

Until 1962, however, Avery Brundage and the IOC ignored Apartheid despite realizing it

put South Africa in violation of the Olympic Charter (Booth). In 1962, however, the

Sharpeville Massacre occurred. 69 peaceful black protesters were killed by white South

African police and as a result pressure mounted for the IOC to stop turning a blind eye to

Apartheid (Nixon). At the same African countries were beginning to gain political

influence as they emerged from European colonialism and began lobbying the IOC to ban

South Africa (Nixon). The IOC’s role unhappily enforcing the ban rather than leading in

the decision explains University of Otago Professor Douglas Booth’s criticism that the

ban was not particularly effective in countering Apartheid because its goals were

nebulous and changing. When the ban started in 1964 the IOC’s only condition for South

Africa’s return to the Olympic games was that they field an integrated team, but by 1968

2

the South African government had agreed to send a mixed-race team on the conditions

that Olympic trials and all other athletic competition in South Africa would remain

segregated. The IOC initially agreed to the plan, but facing a massive boycott by 32

nations, backpedaled on its decision, going toward the philosophy that would define the

ban for the rest of its existence: that there could be “no normal sport in a abnormal

society.” The phrase, which became a rallying cry for the ban, meant that sport could not

possibly be completely free from the discrimination that was so entrenched in South

African law and thus South Africa would not be allowed to compete again until the legal

basis for Apartheid was removed (Kidd). Although the lack of clear goals at the outset of

the ban makes measuring the success of the ban against own goals impossible, it is still

possible to investigate how much the ban did to create political change in South Africa.

Perspectives on the efficacy of sport as a means for influencing politics are

decidedly mixed. While some scholars argue that sport plays a central role in influencing

policy, other argue that it is merely symbolic, while still others say that sport alone does

not effectuate change, but it can act as a starting point for other diplomatic measures like

economic sanctions. Scarlett Cornelissen, a South African professor called the beginning

and end of the ban “watershed moments,” arguing that the IOC’s implementation of the

ban “precipitated a series of diplomatic actions by other organisations” and that end of

the ban led to South Africa’s “full diplomatic reincorporation.” She explains that the

connections formed by anti-Apartheid activists and governments as a result of IOC’s ban

in the anti-Apartheid movement paved the way for other actions and sanctions that fought

Apartheid. She also argues that the sports boycott was possibly the most potent form of

protest against Apartheid because sports had been such a central part Afrikaner’s sense of

national pride. Cornelissen has one of the most positive opinions on the ban; no one

claims it is the sole reason for the end of Apartheid, and other scholar’s opinions range

from agreeing with Cornelissen to saying that the ban was high-profile but ineffective

form of protest. University of Wisconsin Professor Rob Nixon says that the main value of

the sports ban was as a “mechanism for training the media spotlight on Apartheid” and

making the issue visible around the world. In their paper, “Sport and the End of

Apartheid,” Marc Keech and Barrie Houlihan also argue that the ban’s positive impact

was in keeping Apartheid in public view and meaning that the rest of the world

3

understood what was going on in South Africa and would have had a hard time refusing

to enforce diplomatic and economic sanctions in the late 1980s. However, they say that

before the mid-to-late ‘80s the ban allowed countries to feel they were doing enough and

let them “combine moral condemnation of apartheid with a continuation of trading links.”

Keech and Houlihan’s stance is in the middle of the range of opinions on Apartheid,

saying it did have benefits but also had significant shortcomings. On the opposite end of

the spectrum from Scarlett Cornelissen’s overwhelmingly positive view of the ban, Scott

Rosner and Deborah Low say that a “heavy resistance movement” not an Olympic ban

caused the end of Apartheid. Most scholars agree that the ban kept Apartheid within

public view because of the Olympics’ prominence on the world stage, but there is

significant disagreement on whether it led to real change in South Africa or just attempts

and appeasement and whether internationally it set the stage for economic sanctions or

instead made it easier for countries to put off use of economic sanctions by letting them

feel they were already doing enough to fight Apartheid.

Direct Impact of the Ban in South Africa

While scholars disagree on the overall impact of the Olympic ban, it is useful to

separate its effect into two separate pieces and examine them individually: direct effects

on policy in South Africa and indirect influences on Apartheid though the ban’s impact

on foreign policy. Sport was an extremely significant part of Afrikaner culture and

nationalism, so it would be reasonable to assume that the Olympic ban and resulting

sports boycott could have been enough to prompt change in policy (Booth). Douglas

Booth wrote that “the sports boycott was the only anti-apartheid strategy that adversely

touched the lives of ordinary citizens (80)” and before the ban was put in place an

editorial in Die Volksblad, an Afrikaner South African newspaper said “Every

international sports success of South Africa is a blow against our sports and political

enemies,” so sport clearly held a place in South African politics and was deeply

important to the average Afrikaner (Lapchick). Sports were so important to white South

Africans that a 1977 survey of indicated that they thought the sports boycott was one of

the top three most damaging parts of Apartheid, so exclusion from the international

sporting community was painful many white South Africans (Brutus). Despite the

4

political and cultural significance of sport, however, the Olympic ban was not enough to

create more than superficial changes in South African law.

After being pressured to examine South Africa’s Apartheid policies in 1962, the

IOC gave South Africa time to respond and field a mixed race team for the 1964

Olympics. The Apartheid government, however, did not change policy and Interior

Minister of South Africa, Johannes de Klerk unequivocally refused to concede to IOC

demands, saying “South African custom is that within the boundaries of the republic,

whites and non-whites exercise their sports separately and this custom must be adhered

to... Participation of mixed teams as representatives of South Africa as a whole in world

sporting tournaments or competitions cannot be approved” (Solomon). Between the 1964

Olympics and the 1968 Olympics, the South African government changed its policies

slightly to appease the IOC and attempt to reenter the Olympic Games. The government

agreed to send a mixed-race team, but stated it would hold separate tryouts and would not

allow integrated competition within its borders. The small concessions made by the South

African government demonstrate just how little the ban was able to change. It succeeded

in getting the government to agree to send an integrated team from the Olympics and

nominally lifting bans on mixed sport, but the owners of white sporting facilities were

allowed to and did exclude non-whites from their fields (Kidd).

Beyond the small changes in policy towards sports, the Olympic ban had no real

direct impact on South African law. Afrikaners were passionate about their sports, but

even more passionate about preserving Apartheid. South African Prime Minister Vorster

confirms this desire to preserve Apartheid instead of sports, saying “Sports is important

for the human individually, nationally, and internationally, but there are other interests

that have to be considered more important” (Booth 95-96). Because their desire to

continue Apartheid ultimately outweighed their desire to participate in the international

sporting community, the Olympic ban was unable to directly advance equality and end

discrimination in South Africa.

Impact on Foreign Policy Towards South Africa

One of the most significant and measurable achievements of Apartheid was

keeping South Africa’s discriminatory policies in the public eye and prompting articles

5

about Apartheid in publications that otherwise would have ignored the subject (Kidd).

Before the ban started, there were articles about Apartheid in traditional new sources, but

after the advent of the ban, coverage became much more widespread. Sports Illustrated is

perhaps the best example of this phenomenon. The popular sports magazine only

mentioned Apartheid in only ten articles between 1954 (when the magazine was founded)

and 1963, mostly with brief references as part of larger summaries of news related to

sport and occasionally to report on the possibility of a ban by FIFA or the IOC (Sports

Illustrated Vault). Throughout the ban’s 28 year span, however, hundreds of articles in

Sports Illustrated discussed Apartheid in magazine place where the political situation in

South Africa would have been almost completely ignored had the sports not been

involved in the fight against Apartheid.

19551958

19611963

19661968

19701972

19741976

19781980

19821984

19861988

19901992

19940

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Sports Illustrated Mentions of Apartheid

Year

Mentions

Figure 1: Mentions of Apartheid increased in Sports Illustrated following the Olympic Ban, and in were prevalent in Olympic years, which are marked in red. 1980 has many fewer mentions than other Olympic years, perhaps because the magazine was focused on the American Boycott of the Moscow Olympics. (Data from SI Vault)

Sports Illustrated did not always include pointed political commentary; in fact quite a

few of the references to Apartheid towards the beginning of the ban were rather flippant,

like an article about track that said “nobody except the South Africans, who can't go to

6

the Olympics because of apartheid and all that (Putnam)” when analyzing why some

athletes were peaking at an April track meet and not others. The popular sports

magazine’s coverage became more serious and stronger in its condemnation of Apartheid

as the ban continued and included articles like one published in 1968 titled “A Flare in

the Dark” that exposed the racism non-white South African Athletes faced every day and

shared it with an audience that might not have otherwise have known much about the

situation in South Africa. The article quoted the a government official explaining that

their were no black South Africans competing in swimming because “the African is not

suited to swimming: in swimming, the water closes their pores so they cannot get rid of

carbon dioxide and tire quickly” (Maule). Even to an American audience barely removed

from Jim Crow, the statements sounded ridiculous and the whole article painted an

accurate and scathing picture of the state of human rights under South Africa’s Apartheid

government (Schoenfield).

The ban’s impact around the world was not just creating awareness of Apartheid;

the awareness helped lead to action. While it would be easy to discount the effect of the

ban by arguing that if it was actually successful, Apartheid would not have lasted for

twenty-eight years after the ban began, the effects of the ban are more subtle. It kept

Apartheid within the public eye between 1964 until the mid-1980s when internal

resistance to Apartheid became more pronounced (Kidd). Instead of fading into the

background as just another event in a foreign country, the widespread coverage of

Apartheid meant that people around the world were much more familiar with the

situation in South Africa and thus were ready to respond when tension escalated between

the Apartheid government and the resistance movement (Kidd). There are also people

who argue that the ban allowed countries to say they were doing enough to punish South

Africa by instituting a sports sanction, but there is little direct evidence supporting the

claim. Rather than serving as a way to avoid more significant sanctions, the Olympic ban

and sports boycott helped set the stage for the later sanctions. The ban was not fast-acting

nor were its effects direct, but it prepared the world to use more powerful economic and

diplomatic sanctions that helped end Apartheid.

Application to other countries

7

The Olympic ban against South Africa was not successful in directly changing

Apartheid laws, and was instead effective by increasing awareness of Apartheid around

the world. How much of South Africa’s experience is relevant to other countries?

Country culture surrounding athletics is obviously an important factor in predicting the

impact of a sports-related sanction. By almost all accounts, the IOC banned a sports-

obsessed South Africa that placed high value on sports and athletic achievement, so it is

unlikely that sports would be so much more important to another nation that an Olympic

ban could create significant change with that country. Before the ban, not only did South

African’s care about sports, they were athletically successful: their teams were a well-

recognized competitors and they boasted some of the world’s best athletes (Booth). South

Africa’s relevance in international sports meant that not only was South Africa’s absence

from sports considered newsworthy in the same sources already reporting on Apartheid,

it was newsworthy in the sports world (Booth). In a country without a substantial or

international sports presence, a boycott would likely bring much less media attention and

have far less impact in raising awareness. A magazine like Sports Illustrated would have

fewer events to cover where the ban was relevant to competition if the banned country’s

international sports presence was minimal.

In addition to considering the prominence of sport, considering whether a sports

boycott is the best use of resources is also important. According to Heech and Houlihan,

sports diplomacy is “low-risk, low-cost, and high-profile” but their assessment ignores

the time and political capital spent advocating for the ban. The number of letters Dennis

Brutus sent politicians to campaign for the continued ban on South Africa competing the

in the Olympics in other sports indicates that a huge amount of time was poured in to

creating the ban and keeping it in place. The time and effort spent on ban is an important

consideration when time and resources are limited, so when there are other options

available the limited resources of those campaigning to end discrimination is an

important consideration: would the time be best spent of campaigning for a sports-related

or would time spent campaigning for economic sanctions be more influential? If

economic and political sanctions are already a possibility, then perhaps time spent

campaigning for those sanctions could do more to create change.

8

One the most common commentaries on the overall sports boycott of South

Africa was that it was a useful stepping-stone for larger sanctions but in and of itself was

not effective in changing policies beyond a extracting a promise to send a few non-white

athletes to the Olympics. The team sent to the Olympics can be changed to follow

international demands without addressing larger issues of discrimination. That was the

case with South Africa when it promised to send a mixed delegation to the 1968

Olympics in Mexico City and could be the case for other countries. In putting a ban in

place considering whether integrating an Olympic team by race, gender, or other by

another changes anything for non-Olympians. The ban on South Africa theoretically

could have ended in 1968 with the promise of an integrated team, but racial makeup of

the team would have meant nothing for most black South Africans who still faced

rampant discrimination and did not have access to athletic facilities. As scholars

including Douglas Booth have noted, having such nebulously defined goals make

creating and measuring changes difficult and hinders the ability of a ban to have

substantive political impact. Because having success through athletic sanctions alone is

difficult, an Olympic ban can only help human rights there is a real possibility of the ban

being followed up with other forms of sanctions.

Considering the unique cultural and political situation of each country facing a

possible ban is important for applying the lessons of the South African ban from the

Olympics. The prominence and importance of sport is a necessary consideration as is the

desired outcome and criteria for readmission to the Olympic movement. One of the flaws

of the ban on South Africa is that its goals changed over time once it became clear that an

integrated Olympic team was not a sign of decreased discrimination, so setting

expectations of what change is necessary for Olympic participation is an important for

effectuating real change rather than just appeasement. In Sochi, a ban on Russia would

probably have been infeasible given that Russia was the host country, but also would

probably not have been particularly effective. It may have generated anger, but it might

have focused anger away from Russia’s anti-gay policies and towards a discussion of the

IOC’s role, in effect eliminating the discussion a ban serves to foster. As the host country,

Russia was already under scrutiny so its discriminatory policies were very much a part of

international dialogue and thus a ban was not necessary to bring them to light.. Although

9

the games are too recent to truly understand the impact of the increased scrutiny on

Russia, in a reflection on the Games in the New York Times, wrote that “the uproar about

Russia’s antigay law — among other oppressive laws — would not have been heard by

so many around the world” and that the exposure might “be the most important success

of the Games here [in Sochi]” (Macur).

Drawbacks of an Olympic Ban

There are many opponents of involving politics with the Olympics, and they voice

two major concerns. The first is that the Olympics are somehow above politics and sport

should exist in an entirely separate sphere from politics (Liu). That concern is the more

easily dismissed of the two: the Olympic Charter, with its anti-discrimination clause

clearly does not purport the Olympics to be some event separate from political realities.

The Olympics have been politically charged practically since their invention in ancient

Greece, and the assertion that not banning South Africa would have been apolitical given

that the South African team did not represent the vast majority of the country. The second

concern is a much more legitimate one: that the IOC, a body that is appointed rather than

elected, should not be making decisions about which country is worthy of punishment

(Smith). The problems with leaving decisions to the IOC are clear: the organizations

longest serving president, Avery Brundage, was both racist and anti-Semitic and as was

the case with South Africa, many of the decisions have been flawed. In South Africa’s

case, the IOCs votes were mostly along racial lines, with white members opposed to the

ban and black members voting for it, and the racial makeup of the IOC was no where

near representative of the world as a whole. With a body not representative of the world’s

population and not accountable through elections, ensuring that the IOCs decisions are

legitimate is difficult (Rosner and Low). The impetus for the ban on South Africa did

originate with IOC; it was forced by countries threatening to boycott, and perhaps that

international support, rather than the IOC’s stamp of approval is what gave the ban

legitimacy.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, the Apartheid government in South Africa is not the only

government that has blatantly discriminated against its own citizens and there will likely

10

be more governments that blatantly ignore human rights. Because governments that

discriminate against there own citizens are in violation of the Fundamental Principles of

Olympism outlined in the Olympic Charter, considering when to use an Olympic ban is

more than just a theoretical exercise. Before including two women on its Olympic team

in 2012, Saudi Arabia was almost banned from the Olympics for its gender-based

discrimination.

In the opening ceremonies of the 2014 Winter Olympics, IOC president Thomas

Bach at once urged competitors to model tolerance while also saying “I say to the

political leaders of the world - thank you for supporting your athletes. They are the best

ambassadors of your country. Please respect their Olympic Message of goodwill, of

tolerance, of excellence and of peace. Have the courage to address your disagreements in

a peaceful, direct political dialogue and not on the backs of the athletes” (Macur) While

Thomas Bach implored political leaders to separate politics from sport, the Olympics

have never been separate from politics, and the Olympic charter’s statement against

discrimination in sports opens up a way for the Olympics to be used promote human

rights

Excluding a country from the Olympics to influence political change does not

seem to be particularly effective in its own right. Not being allowed to compete in the

Olympics was probably not the deciding factor in ending Apartheid, but it did help keep a

wider group of people aware of the situation and led the way for other types of sanctions.

Essentially, an Olympic ban worked better as tool for raising awareness than for directly

influencing change. On its own the ban would not have done much to combat Apartheid,

but paired with economic sanctions it raised the profile of Apartheid around the world

and was a more visible sanction in popular culture in the earlier years of the campaign

against Apartheid than other measure were.

South Africa’s situation was not identical to other countries that include

discrimination in their legal system, in sports culture and means of discrimination so

considering each country’s situation is important for understanding what lessons from

South Africa really apply. In light of the small political effect a ban might have on a

country that places less value on sports, questions of ethics and morality may ultimately

be more important than political value for deciding whether to ban a country from the

11

Olympics. The deciding factors for instituting a ban when economic sanctions either have

already been instituted or where sport is of little importance to the country in question,

are likely whether a ban is necessary to show the legitimacy of the Olympic charter and

whether playing against a team that actively discriminates is a morally acceptable choice

even if it has relatively little political consequence. The Olympic ban clearly has

symbolic significance that goes beyond political effects, but in South Africa it was more

than just symbolic: the Olympic Ban helped advance human rights.

BIBLIOGRAPHY2

2 Many of these papers are from the 1990s because the majority of scholarship around the effectiveness of measures that tried to fight Apartheid was written right after Apartheid

12

“A Monthly Survey of News and Opinion.” Michigan State University African Activist Archive. January 1968. Web. 25 February 2014. http://kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/50/304/32-130-9F1-84-

al.sff.document.nusa196801.pdf

American Committee on Africa. “Americans Call for Continued Suspension of South Africa From Olympic Games.” 8 May 1966. Michigan State University African Activist Archive. Web. 25 February 2014. http://kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/50/304/32-130-FED-84- GMH%20ACOA

%20Olym5-8-66%5B1%5D.pdf

Beaubien, Michael. “The Cultural Boycott of South Africa.” Africa Today. Vol. 29, No. 4. 4th Qtr 1982. Web. JSTOR. 1 March 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4186110

Booth, Douglas. “Hitting Apartheid for Six? The Politics of the South African Sports Boycott.” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 38, No 3. July 2003. P477-493. JSTOR. Web. 1 March 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3180648

Booth, Douglas. The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa. Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998. Print.

Brutus, Dennis. “Action Against Apartheid: The Cultural and Sports Boycott.” South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee. Michigan State University African Activist Archive. September 1988. Web. 25 February 2014. Web. http://africanactivist.msu.edu/document_metadata.php?objectid=32-130-1A52

Brutus, Dennis. “Statement by Dennis Brutus. South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee. Michigan State University African Activist Archive. 21 March 1967. Web. 25 February 2014. http://africanactivist.msu.edu/document_metadata.php?objectid=32-130-FEE

Cornelissen, Scarlett. "'Resolving 'The South Africa Problem'': Transnational Activism, Ideology And Race In The Olympic Movement, 1960-91." International Journal Of The History Of Sport 28.1 (2011): 153-167. Historical Abstracts with Full Text. Web. 4 Feb. 2014.

Culverson, Donald. “The Politics of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United States, 1969-1986.”Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1. Spring 1996. JSTOR. Web. 1 March 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2151931

D. B. “The Blacks and Whites in Sport.” Africa Today Vol 17, No 6. November 1970. JSTOR. Web. 1 March 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185120

ended.

13

International Olympic Committee. Olympic Charter. 9 September 2013. Web. 19 January 2014. http://www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf

Keech, Marc, and Barrie Houlihan. "Sport And The End Of Apartheid." Round Table 88.349 (1999): 109-121. Academic Search Alumni Edition. Web. 4 Feb. 2014.

Kidd, Bruce “The Campaign Against Sport in South Africa.” International Journal. Vol. 43, No. 4. Autumn 1988. Web. JSTOR. 28 February 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40202567

Kidd, Bruce. “From Quarantine to Cure: The New Phase of the Struggle Against Apartheid Sport.” Sociology of Sport Journal. 8, 1991 34-36. Web. 1 March 2014. http://journals.humankinetics.com/AcuCustom/Sitename/Documents/DocumentItem/9605.pdf

Lapchick, R.E. “Apartheid Sport: South Africa's Use of Sport in Its Foreign Policy.” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 1:52 (1977) 52-79. Sage Journals. Web. 30 January 2014.

Liu, Julie. “Lighting the Torch of Human Rights: The Olympic Games as a Vehicle for Human Rights Reform.” Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights. Spring 2007: Volume 5, Issue 2, Article 3. Web. 1 March 2014. http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context=njihr

Macur, Juliet. “Amid the Triumphs, an Argument for Tolerance.” The New York Times. 23 February 2014. Web. 25 February 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/sports/olympics/olympic-closing-ceremony-

proves-russia-a-worthy-host.html?ref=sports

Maule, Tex. “A Flare in the Dark.” Sports Illustrated. 3 June 1968. Web. 25 February 2014. http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1081244/

index.htm

Nixon, Rob. “Apartheid on the Run: The South African Sports Boycott.” Indiana University press on behalf of W.E.B. DuBois Foundation. Transition #58 (1992) 68-88. JSTOR. Web. 30 January 2014.

Putnam, Pat. “The Drake was for the Ducks.” Sports Illustrated. 8 May 1972. Web. 25 February 2014. http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1086064/index.htm

Rosner, Scott, and Deborah Low. "The Efficacy Of Olympic Bans And Boycotts On Effectuating International Political And Economic Change." Texas Review Of Entertainment & Sports Law 11.1 (2009): 27-79. Academic Search Premier. Web. 30 Jan. 2014.

14

Schoenfield, Albert. “19th Hole: The Readers Take Over.” Sports Illustrated. 24 June 1968. Web. 25 February 2014. http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1081328/3/index.htm

SI Vault. Sports Illustrated. Published by CNN. http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/

Smith, Maureen Margaret. “Revisiting South Africa and the Olympic Movement: The Correspondence of Reginald S. Alexander and the International Olympic Committee, 1961-86” International Journal of the History of Sport. Volume 23 Issue 7. 4 October 2006. Taylor and Francis Online. Web. 1 March 2014. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09523360600832478

Zeigler, Cyd. “Don’t Boycott: Ban Russia From Their Own Winter Olympics.” Huffington Post. 7 August 2013. Web. 16 January 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cyd-zeigler/dont-boycott-ban-russia-from- their-

own-winter-olympics_b_3720026.html

15