AGAINST ACTUAL-WORLD RELIABILISM:EPISTEMICALLY CORRECT PROCEDURES AND RELIABLY TRUE OUTCOMES

Peter J. GrahamProfessor of Philosophy & Linguistics

Associate Dean, College of Humanities, Arts and Social SciencesUniversity of California, Riverside

Forthcoming inPerformance Epistemology, Oxford University Press

Edited by Miguel Angel Fernandez

Abstract. Reliability theorists claim that what makes epistemically correct procedures

of belief-formation correct is that these procedures produce reliably true outcomes. If

correct procedures are necessarily correct, and reliability in the world of use is only

contingent, then reliability in the world of use cannot be what makes correct

procedures correct. The reliabilist rejoinder shifts from de facto reliability to

reliability in a special set of worlds; reliability in special worlds makes correct

procedures correct in all worlds. The most popular version identifies special worlds

with the actual world; correct procedures in all worlds are reliable procedures in the

actual world. There are two variants: absolutist actual-world reliabilism and

indexicalist actual-world reliabilism. Neither work. Both both fail to substantively

explain why procedures are made correct by reliability in the actual world. The way

forward for the reliabilist is to shift from reliability in the actual world to reliability in

normal conditions.

Keywords: Epistemic justification, reliabilism, actual-world, Alvin Goldman, Ernest

Sosa

I. BEING IN THE RIGHT

Being justified in general means being in the right. This involves meeting some standard

or norm for correctness. Justified in theology means being made righteous in the eyes of

God. Justified in printing means the text lines up along the left, right or both margins; the

edges set the standard. Justified in the law means having or showing reasons for having

committed the act to be answered for. What does being justified in epistemology mean?

In general, being justified in epistemology means being in the right vis-à-vis the

goal of believing truth and avoiding error. That tells us something. But it leaves quite a

lot open. Let us narrow the scope to beliefs. A justified belief is then a belief that is in the

right vis-à-vis the goal of believing truth and avoiding error. A justified belief then meets

a standard or norm understood in terms of promoting truth and avoiding error.

One way for a belief to be in the right in this sense is to be true; truth would set

the standard. Are all true beliefs then justified? No. This is not the sense intended in

epistemology. A belief may be false yet justified and a belief may be true but unjustified.

Being justified in epistemology, though understood in terms of promoting truth and

avoiding error, is not the same as being true. Truth is one standard; justification is

another.

Many traditional epistemologists connect justified belief to the individual’s ability

to justify her belief. For an individual’s belief to be justified, the individual must be able

to refer to her evidence, reasons or grounds in favor of the belief. She must be able to

2

apply standards or norms to her beliefs; she must be able to use the standard or norm as a

guide in deliberation. According to these epistemologists, only individuals who have the

capacity to engage in critical reasoning have justified beliefs.1

This view has fallen on hard times. Not because being able to justify a belief isn’t

a way of being in the right vis-à-vis promoting truth and avoiding error. It has fallen on

hard times because it is overly narrows the scope of justified beliefs. Small children and

many non-human animals have justified beliefs. But they lack the capacity to critically

reason in support of their beliefs. They cannot justify their beliefs. Even mature,

reflective humans have a hard time justifying most of what they believe. Most

epistemologists recognize that the property of a belief’s being justified is much broader in

scope than the traditional view.2

1I have presented previous versions under different titles to audiences at Pomona College, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, National University of Singapore and the University of Aberdeen. I recall stimulating and rewarding discussions. I recall comments that led to improvements from Juan Comesana, Richard Fumerton, Claudia Lorena Garcia, James Jhun, Jinho Kang, Hilary Kornblith, Peter Kung, David Sosa, Ernest Sosa and Crispin Wright. I am sure I have forgotten just as many, if not more. To those I have forgotten, I apologize. For comments on the penultimate draft that led to substantial improvements, I am grateful to the referees and to Zachary Bachman, Meredith McFadden and Megan Stotts. I am intellectually and professionally indebted to Alvin Goldman and Ernest Sosa for their landmark work in epistemology and for their continual encouragement and advice.

For views that tie justifiedness to justifying, see Audi 2001, BonJour 2009, Foley 1993, Leite 2004 and Smythies 2014. For further discussion see Graham 2011: 138-141. For more on critical reason, see Burge 2006.

2 For this reason it can prove useful to reserve ‘being justified’ for the narrower positive epistemic status associated with critical reasoning, and use other words such as ‘warrant’ and ‘entitlement’ for the broader positive epistemic status. I prefer this practice (see my 2011, 2012, partly following Burge 1993, 2003, 2013). However, since the authors I am engaging in this paper prefer to use ‘justification’ and ‘justifiedness’ for this broader status, I shall follow their use here.

3

I shall speak to this large audience of epistemologists who allow that non-human

animals, small children and ordinary adults have justified beliefs, even though they may

be unable to justify them, or lack justifications (as reflectively accessible arguments) in

favor of their beliefs.3

II. THE CORRECT PROCEDURES CONCEPTION

Nearly everyone in my audience—“internalists” and “externalists” alike—believes the

following fact:

FACT ONE: On the one hand, beliefs based on perception, introspection, good

reasoning and memory are, for the most part, prima facie justified beliefs. These

psychological capacities are paradigm ways of coming to form justified beliefs.

Relying on these capacities are all paradigm ways of being in the right vis-à-vis

promoting truth and avoiding error. Beliefs so formed and maintained are correctly

formed beliefs.

On the other hand, beliefs based on wishful thinking, emotional attachment, hasty

generalization and random blows to the head are not justified beliefs. These

psychological influences on belief are paradigm ways of forming unjustified beliefs.

Relying on these influences are all paradigm ways of being in the wrong vis-à-vis

3 I thereby also exclude social constructivists about justification such as Robert Brandom, Richard Rorty and Michael Williams.

4

promoting true belief and avoiding error. Beliefs so formed and maintained are not

correctly formed.4

Generalizing, the idea is that justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, beliefs that are

correct or proper responses to inputs to our cognitive systems, where perception, good

reasoning, etc., are paradigm cases of correct or proper responses to inputs to our

cognitive systems, epistemically correct belief-forming procedures.

Here’s how Alvin Goldman put the idea:

Justifiedness seems to be a function of how a cognizer deals with his environmental

input, i.e. with the goodness or badness of the operations that register and transform

the stimulation that reaches him. (‘Deal with’, of course, does not mean purposeful

action; nor is it restricted to conscious activity.) A justified belief is, roughly

speaking, one that results from cognitive operations that are, generally speaking, good

or successful…A belief is justified iff it is ‘well-formed’ (1979: 12-14).

Here’s how John Pollock put the idea:

4 The “externalist” Alvin Goldman writes: “[S]tandard perceptual processes, remembering, good reasoning and introspection [are] intuitively justification-conferring…[C]onfused reasoning, wishful thinking,…emotional attachment, mere hunch or guesswork, and hasty generalization [are not]” (1979: 9-10, 1986: 103-4, 2011). The “internalists” Pollock and Cruz write: “[T]here are a number of natural processes that lead to belief formation. Among these are such “approved” processes as vision, inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning, memory, and also some “unapproved” but equally natural processes such as wishful thinking...[W]e do not accord it the same status as some other belief-forming processes like vision” (1999: 126).

5

In arriving at our beliefs, epistemic agents follow various procedures. Some of these

procedures are epistemically praiseworthy….There is a procedural sense of epistemic

justification according to which a belief is epistemically justified iff it was arrived at

or held on the basis of procedures that are epistemically praiseworthy (1999: 385).

[T]he justiedness of a belief is determined by whether it was arrived at or is currently

sustained by “correct cognitive processes”. The view is that being justified in holding

a belief consists in conforming to epistemic norms, where the latter tell you “how to”

acquired new beliefs and reject old ones…being justified consists of “making the

right moves.” (Pollock and Cruz 1999: 25).

Here’s how Richard Feldman put the idea:

Reliabilists, proper functionalists, evidentialists of various stripes, and others, all

agree that there is some notion of a proper response to information (or evidence or

stimuli), and that the paradigmatic epistemic evaluations [being rational, being

justified, being warranted] are about this. A belief is favorably evaluated [justified, in

the right] when it is a proper response and unfavorably evaluated when it is an

improper response. (2008: 347)

Let us call this first fact the correct procedure conception of justified belief. This

conception is a “horizontal” or mind-to-mind conception of justified belief, for it locates

justifiedness in relations between inputs to cognition (stimuli, representations,

6

experiences, beliefs, understanding) and the outputs of cognition (further beliefs). It

locates justifiedness in relations between mental states (inputs to cognition) and other

mental states (outputs of cognition).

This point is often put in terms of epistemic norms. Epistemic norms are standards

of correct cognition. Though some epistemic norms guide cognition, in general they do

not. Epistemic norms as standards for correct cognition need not guide cognition or be

accessible to the individual. They are standards that apply to an individual’s cognition

even if the individual cannot recognize or represent the standard. They are more like

standards for a healthy heart than recipes for cooking chicken livers.5

Epistemic norms of correct cognition take an input-output form, where the input

consists in mental or other internal states of the individual and the output consists in what

the individual is permitted or obligated to believe. If the individual conforms to the norm

5 Goldman: “[The justification-rules] I shall be discussing should not be understood as rules for guiding a cognizer’s intellect. A person need not even understand the rules, and if he does, he need not be able to apply them in the process of belief formation” (1986: 59). Pollock and Cruz: “If [belief-formation] is governed by epistemic norms, just how is it governed? There is a model of this regulative process that is often implicit in epistemological thinking, but when we make it explicit it is obviously wrong. The model assimilates the functioning of epistemic norms to the functioning of explicitly articulated norms….This “intellectualist” model is almost always wrong. [Knowing how to form beliefs in approved ways] is a form of procedural knowledge….Our epistemic norms are just the norms that describe this procedural knowledge, and [justified] cognition is cognition in compliance with the norms” (1999: 125-129). Burge: “Natural” epistemic norms “for perception, deductive reasoning, perceptual belief, primitive agency, and agency guided by perception or perceptual belief do not depend on any individual’s setting, appreciating, or acceding to the norms. Such norms do not depend on intention, convention, or rational agency. The norms apply whether or not anyone recognizes them” (2010: 315).

7

in her cognition (i.e. believes what she is permitted or obligated to believe on the input)

then her belief is prima facie justified.6

Psychologists investigate the actual input-output relations in cognition. On the

assumption that human perception, reasoning, and so on produced justified beliefs, then

in studying how we actually cognize, psychologists are discovering, inter alia, how we

ought to cognize.

III. THE RELIABILIST PROGRAMME

Nearly everyone in my audience believes the following as well:

FACT TWO: As a matter of fact, perception, introspection, good reasoning and

memory are, for the most part, reliable belief-forming capacities. They have a

tendency to produce more true beliefs than false beliefs. These capacities are good

routes to truth.

Wishful thinking, emotional attachment, hasty generalization and random blows

to the head, on the other hand, are not reliable for the most part. They do not have a

6 Pollock and Cruz 1999: 122-143. Reliabilists agree. This is the whole idea behind Goldman’s “rule framework” from Epistemology and Cognition (1986: chs. 4 & 5). Witness also Burge: “I believe that entitlements always make reference to the way an individual’s cognitive (or practical) psychological competencies operate. So they are partly internal. They are never merely statements that the individual’s beliefs are produced by just any old process that is reliable in producing true beliefs. They are certain norms governing operation of the individual’s internal states. For example, the norms may make reference to the belief’s dependence on a reliably veridical type of perceptual representation” (Burge 2013: 367; cf. Burge 2010: 49ff). See also Graham 2010a and 2011: 142-145.

8

tendency to produce more true beliefs than false beliefs. These influences on belief

make a poor route to truth.

My audience disagrees over the significance of this fact.

Reliabilists believe this second fact explains the first. Reliabilists hold that the

“good” psychological processes—the good mind-to-mind transitions—are epistemically

correct because they are good routes to truth. Being based a good route to truth is the

standard—the criterion of correctness—that a justified belief meets; to be in the right in

the way of belief is to be based on a reliable belief-forming psychological capacity.

Justification is understood in terms of promoting true belief and avoiding error.7 In

canonical form:

SIMPLE RELIABILISM: In all possible worlds W, a belief is prima facie

justified in W if and only if (to the extent that) the psychological process that

caused or sustained the belief reliably produces true beliefs in W.

And by “explain” the reliabilist sets out to really, genuinely explain. In Goldman’s

words:

7 See Goldman 1979; 1986: 103-4; 2011. Here’s how John Greco puts the idea: “Generic reliabilism is a powerful view. For one, it accounts for a wide range of our pre-theoretical intuitions regarding which beliefs have epistemic justification. Thus reliabilism explains why beliefs caused by perception, memory, introspection, logical intuition, and sound reasoning are epistemically justified, and it explains why beliefs caused by hallucination, wishful thinking, hasty generalization, and other unreliable processes are not.” (2005: 290, emphasis added)

9

What I have in mind is an explanatory theory, one that explains in a general way why

certain beliefs are…justified and others…unjustified…I want a set of substantive

conditions…I seek an explanatory theory, i.e. on that clarifies the underlying source

of justificational status. [I]t is not enough for a theory to state ‘correct’ necessary and

sufficient conditions. Its conditions must be appropriately deep or revelatory. (1979:

1-2, emphasis added)

Simple reliabilism is a “vertical” mind-to-world account of justification.8 Beliefs

are justified because the psychological capacity (the mind) stands in the relation of

reliably representing its subject matter (which is, for the most part, the world). Simple

reliabilists believe that perception, reasoning and so on good ways of forming beliefs

because they reliably form true beliefs. Epistemic norms are true because conforming to

the norms results in reliably true beliefs. The correct mind-to-mind procedures are those

that result in reliably true outcomes. Justifiedness consists in both mind-to-mind and

mind-to-world relations, where correct mind-mind relations are made correct because of

8 For the use of the phrases ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’, see Burge 2010: 50-1. I have discussed this contrast between mind-mind and mind-world conceptions in earlier papers (Graham 2009, 2010a, 2011). I earlier contrasted “actual-result” (mind-world) conceptions with “proper-aim” (mind-mind) conceptions, partly inspired by Robert Audi’s (1988) contrast between “ontological” (mind-world) and “teleological” (mind-mind) conceptions. Moral philosophers may find Audi’s labels misleading, as ‘teleological’ connotes consequentialist notions in ethics, and so might be misread as connoting reliabilism in epistemology. That would not be Audi’s intent. Goldberg (forthcoming) identifies “the” internalism-externalism debate as asking whether a mind-world relation is required as well as a mind-mind relation for a complete account of justifiedness. “Externalists” say yes but “internalists” say no.

10

mind-world relations; the mind’s relations to the world constitutes the correctness of its

psychological procedures.9

IV. COGNITIVE ESSENTIALISM

Most non-reliabilists allow that the reliability of the process in the world of use matters to

knowledge; our second fact surely matters to knowledge. But many epistemologists deny

that reliability matters to justifiedness. Many readers do not agree that correct procedures

are correct because they produce reliably true outcomes. There are two standard

counterexamples that purport to sever the connection between correct procedures and

reliably true outcomes: the clairvoyance case and the brain-in-a-vat case.10 I shall focus in

what follows on a metaphysically possible version of the BIV or “demon world” case.11

BRAIN-IN-A-VAT. Imagine Dennis1. Dennis1 is an ordinary human adult, with

normally functioning perceptual and cognitive capacities. Dennis1 forms reliably true

perceptual beliefs and other beliefs about his environment.

9 Pollock calls this view “norm externalism.” However, he sees norm externalism as committed to the view that epistemic norms are revisable because contingent. He then purports to “refute” externalism by arguing that epistemic norms are necessary (Pollock and Cruz 1999: 137-43). But this is not a necessary piece of the norm externalist package. As we will see, the norm externalist (even Goldman) can (and does) agree that (basic, primary) epistemic norms are necessary.

10 Bonjour 1980, Cohen 1984, Feldman 1985, Foley 1985, Lehrer 2000.11 Call any case where a belief-forming capacity that is intuitively reliable and

justification conferring in one world but massively in error but still intuitively justification conferring a “demon-world” case. I do not believe the classic Cartesian case of a lone disembodied spirit and a powerful malevolent demon is metaphysically possible, and I do not believe Descartes thought so either. I am enough of a materialist to require a functioning brain or equivalent for cognition.

11

Then imagine a twin duplicate of Dennis1, Dennis2 in another possible world.

Imagine that Dennis2’s sensory systems are hooked up to a massive super-computer

that continually induces perceptual representations type identical to Dennis1’s.

However, Dennis2’s perceptual representations are massively in error; the super-

computer causes Dennis2 to be massively deceived about his external surrounds. In

Dennis2’s possible world, human perception is massively unreliable. Dennis2 is

completely unaware of the deception. He continues to form exactly the same type of

perceptual beliefs Dennis1 forms.

Dennis1 forms reliably true beliefs about his environment on the basis of his

perceptual capacities; human perception is reliable in his world. Dennis2 forms

massively false beliefs about his environment on the basis of the very same

perceptual capacities; those capacities are massively unreliable in his world.

Dennis1 and Dennis2 use the same capacities. Intuitively they both arrive at justified

beliefs. Intuitively Dennis2’s perceptual beliefs and beliefs derived from reasoning are

just as justified as Dennis1’s—he is conforming to the correct epistemic procedures in

cognition—even if his beliefs are no more reliably true than wishful thinking or sheer

guesswork. Reliability in the world of use does not seem necessary for justifiedness.

This case and the clairvoyance case have led many epistemologists to reject

reliabilism as a theory of justified belief. Beginning in the 1980s, reliabilism has been

rejected by Robert Audi, Laurence BonJour, Stewart Cohen, Earl Conee, Joseph Cruz,

Catherine Elgin, Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, Susan Haack, Michael Huemer, Keith

Lehrer, John Pollock, Michael Slote, Matthias Steup, Jonathan Vogel, Ralph Wedgwood

12

and many, many others on the basis of either or both of these two cases. Nearly all of

these philosophers believe that justification consists entirely in mind-to-mind relations.

Reliably true outcomes does not make epistemically correct procedures correct.12

A number of epistemologists even hold that the BIV case establishes a stronger

point. They believe that it is not just contingently true that human perception and

reasoning produce justified beliefs, but it is necessarily true that they do, that it is part of

the nature or essence of these psychological capacities to produce justified beliefs.

Witness John Pollock and Joseph Cruz:

COGNITIVE ESSENTIALISM. Internalist theories are committed to the principle

that the correctness of an epistemic move (a cognitive process) is an inherent feature

of it. For example, it may be claimed that reasoning in accordance with modus ponens

is always correct, whereas arriving at beliefs based on wishful thinking is always

incorrect. This is implied by the claim that the justifiability of a belief is a function of

one’s internal states, because what that means is that we can vary everything about

12 Pollock and Cruz, citing the “demon” world and clairvoyance cases, conclude: “[R]eliability has nothing to do with epistemic justification….[B]eliefs are justified because the believer is “reasoning correctly” (in a broad sense of “reasoning”). If one makes all the right epistemic moves, then one is justified regardless of whether her belief is false or nature conspires to make such reasoning unreliable” (1999: 113-114). Correct procedures are not made correct by reliably true outcomes. Sosa comments on this idea: “A further issue is now pressed by internalist epistemologists. Is there not some…notion of epistemic justification….However it may relate to knowledge…According to which the victim of the demon would still be justified….Sometimes internalist epistemologists even claim that traditional issues of epistemology concern only such rational justification…. It is this kind of justification that, according to internalists, you might still have even if unlucky circumstances make your animal mechanisms unreliable” (2003: 160-1). Sosa sets out to capture this kind of justification in reliabilist terms.

13

the situation other than the internal states without affecting which beliefs are

justifiable. In particular, varying contingent properties of the cognitive processes

themselves will not affect whether a belief is justified. This is called cognitive

essentialism. According to cognitive essentialism, the epistemic correctness of a

cognitive process is an essential feature of that process and is not affected by

contingent facts such as the reliability of the process in the actual world. (1999: 25)

Goldman agrees:

[T]here is a right system of epistemic norms…The system that is right in the actual

world is right in all possible worlds…Positive judgments of justification about

demon-world cases support the idea that norm-rightness may be rigidified rather than

be allowed to vary across worlds. (2011)

Epistemic norms are then necessary truths about the nature of the psychological capacity.

Justifiedness is constitutively associated with the nature of the psychology. But if the

reliability of the capacity is a contingent feature, how could reliably getting things right

explain why the psychology necessarily confers justified beliefs? The BIV case seems to

conclusively show that what makes correct procedures correct cannot be the reliability of

the procedure.

V. SPECIAL-WORLDS RELIABILISM

14

Leading reliabilists like Alvin Goldman and Ernest Sosa are well aware of these cases

and remain undeterred. Goldman and Sosa believe they can accommodate these cases. So

how can a reliabilist accommodate the “rigidity” of epistemic norms, given the

“flaccidity” of reliability in the circumstances of use? Confronted with the scenario, the

idea is to modify the theory so that the victim’s perceptual beliefs turned out justified

after all. How does one do that?

Here is the idea. Instead of explaining the correctness of procedures in terms of

reliability in the world of use, explain the correctness of procedures in terms of reliably

true outcomes in a special set of worlds. If the capacity is reliable in the special set, then

the belief-forming process is correct in all possible worlds; if the capacity is not reliable

in the special set, then the process is always incorrect. Necessary epistemic norms thus

turn on reliability in a special set of worlds.

SPECIAL-WORLDS RELIABILISM: In all possible worlds W, a belief is prima

facie justified in W if and only if (to the extent that) the psychological process that

caused or sustained the belief reliably produces true beliefs in special worlds.

If Dennis2’s perceptual capacities are reliable in special worlds SW, then his beliefs even

while envatted and massively deceived are still justified, for they are justified in all

worlds because they are reliable in special worlds SW.

Reliability theories of justifiedness will supposedly not run afoul of cognitive

essentialism provided they identify a kind of reliability that is a necessary property of the

process in question. Find the right kind and the reliabilist is free to explain what makes

15

epistemically correct procedures correct in terms of reliably true outcomes. The

challenge, however, is to find the right kind.13

VI. NORMAL-WORLDS RELIABILISM

Goldman’s first major attempt was the normal-worlds theory (1986, 1988).14 It shall

prove illustrative to see why it failed.

Here is how he defines normal worlds:

We have a large set of common beliefs about the actual world: general beliefs about

the sorts of objects, events, and changes that occur in it. We have beliefs about the

kinds of things that, realistically, do and can happen. Our beliefs on this score

generate what I shall call the set of normal worlds. These are worlds consistent with

our general beliefs about the actual world. (1986: 107).

We might as well call them doxastic-general worlds, for they are generated by our beliefs

about the general features actual world. These worlds are relative (relative to what we

believe) and subjective (they are determined by what we believe). We can now state the

theory:

13 Tyler Burge (2003), Sandy Goldberg (2012), David Henderson and Terry Horgan (2011), and Jack Lyons (2013) provide alternative reliabilist solutions to the demon-world problem. I provide another (Graham 2012). I discuss Burge in Graham (forthcoming), Henderson and Horgan in Graham 2014a and Lyons in Graham 2011. I intend to further discuss these alternative approaches in future work.

14 In “What is Justified Belief?” he tentatively suggested relativizing justifiedness to reliability in natural environments or to the actual-world (1979: 16-17).

16

NORMAL-WORLDS RELIABILISM. In all possible worlds W, a belief is prima

facie justified in W if and only if (to the extent that) the psychological process that

caused or sustained the belief reliably produces true beliefs in normal worlds.

Normal-worlds reliabilism apparently avoids the counterexample:

Now an evil demon world is a paradigm case of a non-normal world. So it does not

matter that the processes in question are highly unreliable in that world. It only

matters whether they are reliable in normal worlds, and that is apparently the case.

(1986: 113)15

Despite that desirable outcome, Goldman soon gave up on the theory entirely. In

“Strong and Weak Justification” (1988) he listed the following three problems. The

fourth is from Pollock and Cruz (1999: 115). I claim credit for the fifth. Many, I am sure,

have asserted the sixth.

15 Megan Stotts pointed out to me that Goldman’s claim here can be difficult to evaluate. It is true that a world where only a malevolent demon and a massively deceived disembodied spirit exists is a paradigm case of a non-normal world. But it also a paradigm case of an imaginable world that is not a metaphysically possible world, so it is hardly a counterexample to anything. The metaphysically possible “demon” world case with a massive supercomputer causing misleading stimulations on a normally functioning human perceptual system (e.g. Dennis2’s case), though possible, does not clearly fall outside of the scope of Goldman’s “normal-worlds.” There could be a world like that within the range of Goldman’s “normal-worlds.”

17

1. Which general beliefs count for determining normal worlds? There seem to be too

many choices.

2. Whichever ones we select, it looks like dramatically different worlds might fall in

the class of normal worlds. Does justification turn on reliability in all of these

worlds? Is any process even a candidate for reliability in all of these worlds?

3. Who is the “we”? All humans ever? Does the referent change over time? Does it

mean a special subset?

4. The theory puts no constraints on how we get our general beliefs. What if the

beliefs are unjustified? Should justification turn on crazy or wild beliefs? Do

normal worlds involve wizards and witchcraft?

5. What if the beliefs include (hidden, unnoticed) contradictions? Surely everything

we’ve ever believed about the general features of the actual world can’t be

consistent. Does that mean there are no normal-worlds? Does that mean no belief

is ever justified?

6. Should justification turn on beliefs at all? Why relativize justification to what

“we” believe? Isn’t that too subjective, too non-realist, to fit fall within the spirit

of reliabilism? Why should what we believe determine what beliefs are really

justified?

The “normal-worlds” maneuver fails to provide a good explanation of correctness of

epistemic procedures. We’re at a loss to understand why correctness in all worlds should

turn on reliability in “doxastic-general” worlds. Even if the theory provides “correct”

necessary and sufficient conditions (which seems impossible to evaluate), it clearly does

not “clarify” the “underlying source” of justificational status.

18

Even worse, the theory fails to provide “correct” necessary conditions. There’s a clear

counterexample imagined by Stewart Cohen that Goldman reported as follows:

ALIEN. Finally, even if all of these problems could be resolved, it isn’t clear that the

normal-worlds approach gets things right. Consider a possible non-normal world W,

significantly different from ours. In W people commonly form beliefs by a process

that has a very high truth-ratio in W, but would not have a high truth-ratio in normal

worlds. Couldn’t the beliefs formed by the process in W count as justified?

To be concrete, let the process be that of forming beliefs in accord with feelings

of clairvoyance. Such a process presumably does not have a high truth ratio in the

actual world; nor would it have a high truth ratio in normal worlds. But suppose W

contains clairvoyance waves analogous to sound or light waves. By means of

clairvoyance waves people in W accurately detect features of their environments just

as we detect features of our environment by light and sound. Surely, the clairvoyance

belief-forming processes of people in W can yield justified beliefs (1988: 62).16

Couldn’t there be another kind of psychological capacity in another kind of cognitive

being that is among the right ways of forming beliefs? Couldn’t relying on that capacity

be among the epistemically correct procedures—correct in all possible worlds—even if

not reliable in “doxastic” normal worlds? Why restrict correct procedures to procedures

reliable in normal worlds? Goldman concluded: “For all the foregoing reasons, it seems

16 Compare Sosa’s “extraterrestrial mechanisms of belief-formation” (1980: 188; 2001: 390). See also Graham 2012: sec. 5.4 ‘Aliens’.

19

wise to abandon the normal-worlds version of reliabilism” (1988: 62). Simply relativizing

to worlds won’t do the trick; you have to relativize to the right set of worlds.

VII. ACTUAL-WORLD RELIABILISM

If the normal-worlds version does not work, does another? Alvin Goldman, Ernest Sosa

and Juan Comesana have each advanced versions of actual-world reliabilism.

ACTUAL-WORLD RELIABILISM: In all possible worlds W, a belief is prima

facie justified in W if and only if (to the extent that) the psychological process

that caused or sustained the belief reliably produces true beliefs in the actual

world.

Epistemically correct procedures are then correct in all possible worlds because they are

correct in the actual world; reliable outcomes in the actual world makes correct

procedures correct in all worlds. Here is Goldman:

First, there is a right system of epistemic norms or principles, norms that govern

which belief-forming processes [are correct]. These norms are grounded in

considerations of reliability…The right set of norms is “made” by the true facts of

reliability pertaining to our cognitive processes and the actual world…a belief is

really justified iff it is arrived (or maintained) in conformity with the right set of

20

norms or principles….The system that is right in the actual world is right in all

possible worlds. (Goldman 2011).

Goldman, Sosa, Comesana and many others think this is enough to avoid the

demon-world case. Witness Goldman:

A belief is “really” justified if (and only if) it meets a correct standard, where a

correct standard specifies a process that is genuinely reliable in the actual world.

Rigid use of a correct standard would render perceptual beliefs in demon worlds

“really” justified. (2002: 49).

Witness Sosa:

…if one were a demon’s victim, one’s intellectual performance might still be adroit

(adroit-justified). That is to say, in a world W in which one was a victim, one’s

beliefs acquired through our normal perceptual faculties would come out of processes

that in our actual world are reliable, and hence those beliefs of ours in that world

would be adroit (adroit-justified). (2001: 391-2)

Will the actual-world theory save the day where the normal-worlds theory failed? I

have grave doubts.

VIII. ABSOLUTIST ACTUAL-WORLD RELIABILISM

21

There are two views of what counts as the “actual” world, the “absolutist” and the

“indexicalist” conception. And so there are at least two versions of actual-world

reliabilism, “absolutist” actual-world reliablism and “indexicalist” actual-world

reliabilism. I shall discuss them in turn.

On the “absolutist” view, among all the possible worlds there is but one and only

one actual world; being actual is an absolute, non-perspectival feature of just one world.

Draw a number of circles in the margin and label one the actual world. Once you have

done that, all of the other circles represent non-actual, possible worlds, where in no sense

will any of those other possible worlds ever be the actual world. The actual world is, as it

were, “intrinsically” actual, and all other possible worlds are, as it were, “intrinsically”

non-actual. On the “absolutist” view, the word ‘actual’ is like a name or a predicate that

applies to one and just one world, the actual world. Being actual is never a “perspectival”

or “varying” feature of worlds. Being actual is a “real” and “non-varying” feature of just

one world.

Goldman advocates the absolutist variant of actual-world reliabilism (2001: 467;

2002: 49; 2011). According to Goldman, in all possible worlds, a belief is prima facie

justified iff based on a psychological process that is reliable in the actual world. Reliably

true outcomes in the actual world then sets the standards for correctness in all possible

worlds.

This view faces a clear counterexample, the aliens counterexample just raised to

Goldman’s normal-worlds theory. It is just as effective against the “absolutist” actual-

world reliability theory, for the process we imagined was a possible, non-actual process.

22

And so it is not reliable in the actual world, for it does not exist in the actual world. And

were it to exist in the actual world, so to speak, it would not be reliable. Hence their

beliefs are ruled non-justified by the absolutist actual-world reliablity theory; their

belief-forming procedures are ruled epistemically incorrect in all possible worlds, and

so in their world. This is counterintuitive. Surely there are possible, non-actual belief-

forming processes (that are as reliable as you please) in possible, non-actual worlds that

confer justification on the beliefs they cause and sustain. Surely there are possible but

non-actual epistemically correct belief-forming procedures. Surely the scope of

epistemically correct processes transcends the actual processes. Our actual procedures

may be correct, but not all correct procedures are actual. This view is clearly mistaken.

It is just as “wise to abandon” the absolutist actual-world reliability theory as it was to

abandon the normal-worlds theory.

IX. INDEXICALIST ACTUAL-WORLD RELIABILISM

I now turn to the indexicalist variant. Perhaps it will do better.

On the indexicalist view of “actuality,” the word ‘actual’ is an indexical. The

words ‘now’ and ‘here’ are paradigm indexicals. When I utter ‘I am here’ or think I am

here I am referring to the location where I am. When you utter ‘I am here’ or think I am

here you are referring to the location where you are. That’s how indexicals work.

On the indexicalist view of “actuality,” being the actual world is like being here.

On the indexical view, ‘actual’ refers to the world of utterance or thought. When Dennis1

in his world says ‘I am in the actual world’ or thinks I am in the actual world he refers to

23

the possible world that he is in, and what he says and thinks is true. It’s like saying or

thinking I am here. And when Dennis2 in his distinct possible world says ‘I am in the

actual world’ or thinks I am in the actual world he refers to the possible world that he is

in—a world different from Dennis1’s world—and what he says and thinks is true too.

Again, it’s like saying or thinking I am here.

And so when Dennis1 in his world says ‘Dennis2 is in a possible world, not the

actual world’ what Dennis1 says or thinks is true. It’s as if Dennis1 said ‘I am here and

Dennis2 is there’ which is clearly true. So when Dennis2 says ‘Dennis1 is in a possible

world, not the actual world’ what Dennis2 says is also true. He might as well have said

‘He is there and I am here’.

If you drew those circles in the margins when reading the previous section, then

to get your mind around the indexicalist view, draw a stick figure in one circle uttering

‘actual.’ That circle is then the “actual” world (that circle is now “here”) from the point

of view (the world) of the utterance. All the other circles are then possible, non-actual

worlds. But then draw a stick figure in a different circle uttering ‘actual.’ That circle is

then the “actual” world (that circle is now “here”) from the point of view (the world) of

the utterance. All the other circles are then possible, non-actual worlds. No world is then,

as it were, “intrinsically” actual, just as no location is, as it were, “instrinsically” here.

Being actual, like being here, is then a varying, “perspectival” feature of worlds; it all

depends upon where the utterer stands.

On the indexicalist variant of actual-world reliabilism, in all possible worlds a

belief is prima facie justified iff based on a psychological process that is reliable in the

actual world, where ‘actual’ is an indexical, so “the” actual world depends on the world

24

of utterance. As we will see, this variant avoids the counterexample to the absolutist

variant, and for that reason is initially attractive. Maybe it is exactly what we’re looking

for.

I shall focus on Sosa’s discussion. For a period leading up to Sosa’s AAA

“performance-theoretic” analysis of knowledge, Sosa used the phrase ‘apt-justification’

to refer to the reliability of the belief-forming process in the world of use and ‘adroit-

justification’ to refer to the reliability of the belief-forming process in the actual world.

‘Adroit-justification’ is intended to follow our use of ‘justifiedness’ in the present paper.

To get your mind around Sosa’s proposal, consider first the “demon” (BIV) world

where human perception is not reliable. Since human perception is not reliable there,

perceptual beliefs there are not apt-justified there. However, perceptual beliefs there are

still adroit-justified there, because human perception is reliable here, in our actual world

(2001: 391-2; 2003: 160-1). Sosa thus claims to “solve” the “demon” world case.

So far, so good. But what about the counterexample to Goldman’s variant? How

does the indexicalist variant avoid that counterexample? Easy. Consider the aliens in their

possible world. When one of the aliens utters or thinks ‘I am in the actual world’ he or

she refers to their world. So when one of the aliens utters or thinks ‘our psychological

capacities are reliable in the actual world’ he or she is referring to their “actual” world.

Since by hypothesis their psychological capacities are reliable in their world, their

capacities reliably produce true beliefs in the actual world (their “actual” world). And so

according to indexicalist actual-world reliabilism, their beliefs are adroit-justified.

Counterexample diffused (Sosa 2001: 390, 400).

25

We can even imagine a “demon” case for the aliens. Imagine a world where the

aliens are hooked up to a massive super-computer that induces massive error,

unbeknownst to them. Are their beliefs adroit-justified on the indexicalist theory? Indeed

they are, for those psychological capacities are reliable in their “actual” world, and so

adroit-justified in all possible worlds, and so adroit-justified in this “demon” BIV world.

Pretty clever.

All, however, is not well. I shall argue that the indexicalist variant is implausibly

“perspectival” and “promiscuous.” It causes more problems than it solves.

Here’s why it is implausibly “perspectival.” Ask yourself this: is the alien

psychology reliable in the actual world? Well, if you are thinking that thought then, on

the view, you are referring to your “actual” world. In which case the answer is “no” for

the psychology does not exist in your “actual” world, and were it to exist, so to speak, it

would not be reliable in your “actual” world. Hence, on the indexicalist variant, the

alien’s psychology is an epistemically incorrect procedure in all possible worlds; the

beliefs of the aliens are not adroit-justified in any possible world. (It’s like saying

“because the process is not reliable here, it does not confer justification anywhere.”) But,

as we’ve just seen, the exact opposite is true if we start from the alien’s utterances or

thoughts in their “actual” world. (It’s as if they’ve said “because the process is reliable

here, it confers justification everywhere.”) So from our perspective their beliefs are not

adroit-justified in any possible world (and so not in their world), but from their

perspective their beliefs are adroit-justified in their world (and so in all possible worlds).

So their belief-forming procedures confer justification in no worlds and in all worlds at

the same time.

26

We don’t even need the alien psychology to reveal the implausibly perspectival

nature of the view. Take our two Dennis’s once more. Dennis1’s belief-forming capacities

are reliable in our (and his) “actual” world. According to indexicalist actual-world

reliabilism, beliefs based on those types of belief-forming capacities are thus adroit-

justified in all possible worlds, and so in Dennis1’s world and Dennis2’s world. (This is

how Sosa “solves” the BIV case.)

Dennis2’s type-identical belief-forming capacities, on the other hand, are not

reliable in his (not our) “actual” world (he’s being massively fooled in his “actual” world

by the super-computer). According to indexicalist actual-world reliabilism, beliefs based

on those types of belief-forming capacities are thus not adroit-justified in all possible

worlds, and so not in Dennis2’s or in Dennis1’s world. The cases are symmetrical; going

“indexical” guarantees that nothing privileges one world over another; each have equal

right to determine what is true for all possible worlds.

So from Dennis1’s perspective his belief forming-procedures are correct in all

possible worlds (and so from his perspective his beliefs and Dennis2’s beliefs are adroit-

justified), but from Dennis2’s perspective his belief-forming procedures are incorrect in

all possible worlds (and so from his perspective his beliefs and Dennis1’s are not adroit-

justified). But their psychologies are type-identical. So their belief-forming procedures

confer justification in no worlds and in all worlds at the same time.

The source of the trouble arises from the built in “symmetry” in the indexicalist

account. Since ‘actual’ is an indexical, all possible worlds are on a par; every world can,

as it were, be “actual” (just as every location can be, as it were, “here”). Hence what

happens in each possible world has just as much right to set the standard for epistemic

27

correctness in every possible world as any other world. The indexicalist variant has a

built in symmetry while the absolutist variant as a built in asymmetry. The asymmetry

invites the alien counterexample while the symmetry avoids it. But the symmetry invites

ever more troubles. 17

The indexicalist actual-world reliability theory clearly generates a bizarre,

implausible result. It generates the counterintuitive consequence that the aliens’s

psychological procedures are epistemically correct in all worlds and no worlds at the

same time. And what applies to the aliens applies equally well to us. Going “indexical”

may seem attractive for it allows one to initially dodge the aliens counterexample, but

going “indexical” and then rigidifying across all possible worlds makes matters even

worse.18

17 Sosa raised a problem for his view that, once solved, walks right into the problem I am raising in the text. If justification amounts to reliability in “our” world, then when the victim of the brain-in-a-vat scenario thinks to herself that her perceptual beliefs are justified, she must be thinking that her beliefs are reliably formed in our world, but not in her world (Sosa 2001: 397-8). But why should she be thinking of our world and not hers? After all, she may have no idea about us at all!

Sosa’s reply is that, on his theory, she isn’t thinking of our world at all. Rather she is really thinking of her world. The objection failed to track the shift in the use of the indexical “our.” She is thinking that her beliefs are justified because they are reliable in “our” world, where she utters “our” and so refers to herself and her conspecifics, and not to us. ‘Actual’, Sosa says, is an indexical; it shifts its reference from world to world.

That may avoid that problem, but it walks right into the problem raised in the text: when she thinks to herself that her belief is adroit-justified, she would be mistaken, for her belief is not reliably formed in her world. But if not reliably formed in her world, then the process is not adroit-justified in all possible worlds, even hers.

18 Have I been unfair to the indexicalist? In attributing an apparent contradiction, have I unfairly attributed to the indexicalist the realist view that reliability in one world generates correctness in all worlds, where the indexicalist holds the perspectivalist view that reliability in one world W1 generates adroitness-vis-à-vis-W1 in all worlds, reliability in W2 generates adroitness-vis-à-vis-W2 in all worlds, and so on, where each kind of adroitness is compatible with every other kind? That view might seem better to

28

But that’s not all. The indexicalist variant is not just implausibly “perspectival,” it

generates an implausible promiscuity of degrees of adroit-justification. Adroit-

justification arises from reliability in “your” “actual” world. And it is rigid; the process in

question has it in all possible worlds. But if there is a plurality of worlds, then there is a

plurality of degrees or kinds of adroit-justification. For adroit-justification is reliability in the

“actual” world. Since there is a plurality of worlds, where each is “actual” (from its own

world), there is a plurality of degrees or kinds of adroit-justification, one for each world, for a

psychological process P will be reliable to various degrees or kinds in different worlds. So

a structure may be extremely reliable in W1, very reliable in W2, somewhat reliable in

W3, barely reliable in W4, unreliable in W5, very unreliable in W6, and so on. In each

world we will end up constructing a different degree of adroit-justification. High degrees,

low degrees, zero degrees, and so on. So if there is a plurality of possible worlds and so a

plurality of degrees or kinds of adroit-justification, then beliefs produced by P will have all of

these different degrees of adroit-justification at one and the same time. Going “indexical”

gets it all wrong.

X. THE EXPLANATORY BURDEN

I’m told the actual-world reliability theory is intuitive; that probably explains its

popularity. If you still find it intuitive, despite its counterintuitive consequences just

discussed, then I still have some work cut out for me. In this section and the next I

want to remove its intuitive plausibility. First I’ll argue that, even if we ignore the

the indexicalist, but not to me. For it creates a possibly infinite number of perspectivalist “kinds” of justification a belief-forming process will have, for once we rigidify it will have all of these “kinds” in all possible worlds where it exists.

29

counterintuitive consequences just raised, it doesn’t really explain what makes

epistemically correct procedures correct. Then in the next section I’ll argue that the

theory derives all of its appeal from a related (though rival) theory.

Remember first that our goal is to provide an explanatory, substantive theory

that is “appropriately deep or revelatory” that “clarifies the underlying source of

justificational status” that does not simply provide “necessary and sufficient

conditions” for justifiedness. So even if the actual-world reliability theory avoids

counterexamples that may not be enough to meet the explanatory burden.

Remember second that our goal is to explain an “inherent,” essential property

of belief-forming procedures. Remember that we have accepted cognitive

essentialism. That means if we are to explain what makes certain mind-mind

transitions epistemically correct—an “inherent” or essential property of those

procedures—in terms of certain mind-world relations then those mind-world relations

must be “inherent” or essential properties of the belief-forming capacities, or

constitutively associated with the nature or essence of the capacity.

Special-worlds reliabilism tries to meet these explanatory goals by

“rigidifying” epistemic correctness to mind-world relations in a special world or

worlds. If the process is reliable in that world or worlds, then it is epistemically

correct in all possible worlds. I shall argue that rigidity isn’t enough. The actual-world

reliability theory needs supplementation to discharge its explanatory burden.

To warm you up, let me remind you of a point that is gaining ever-wider

acceptance: rigidity is not enough for essence. Rigid properties are not always

essential properties (or properties constitutively associated with a nature or essence),

30

even if essential properties are rigid properties. Take any obviously contingent, non-

essential or non-constitutive property of anything. Take the color of this cell phone.

Surely its color is a contingent, non-essential property. I bought a black one, but they

also came in red. I think you can probably buy a transparent one in Japan if you really

wanted one. Now suppose someone said that its color is essential to it, part of its

nature. No, we would respond, for we can imagine a world where it is red, blue, or

even transparent. Well, our interlocutor responds, if we “actualize” being black, then

it turns out that in all possible worlds where the cell phone exists it has the property of

being-black-in-the-actual-world; it has the “actualized” property necessarily. You can

take any contingent property of a thing, or contingent relation between two properties

(no matter how irrelevant to the nature of the thing or the nature of the two

properties), and rigidify or “actualize” the property and thereby create a necessity.

Given the trick, necessities are cheap; you get at least one for every contingency. But

clearly these cheap necessities aren’t constitutively associated with anything. They are

just “actualized” contingent properties. “Actualizing” non-essential, non-

constitutively associated properties doesn’t create an essential, constitutive, or

constitutively associated property.

So if our goal is to identify substantive explanatory conditions that are

essential to the natures of belief-forming processes, or constitutively associated with

those processes, identifying a contingent property and then rigidifying it is not enough

to identify such a property. Goldman and Sosa might have though they had discharged

their explanatory burden when they (thought) they found “correct” necessary and

sufficient conditions for correctness in all possible worlds, but in fact they were just

31

getting started. Going “actual” to rigidify a property is a trick that will avoid counter-

examples, but it won’t, as such, provide an “appropriately deep or revelatory” theory

of anything. A trick of modal logic can generate strong supervenience without even

being in the ballpark for providing constitutive conditions for the nature or essence of

a property or thing.19

All of that was just to warm you up. You should now see why, technically

speaking, actual-world reliability theories still have some work to do. Since rigid

properties are not sufficient for explaining essences or natures, simply rigidifying isn’t

yet to explain essences or natures; you still need to explain why those rigid properties

do what they are supposed to do.

In the remainder of this section I will say why I find it intuitive that they don’t.

Then in the next section I’ll say why the appeal of the actual-world reliability theory

actually derives from a rival theory, a rival with a better shot at discharging its

explanatory burden.

Here’s why I don’t think the actual-world reliability theory explains what it is

supposed to explain. I’ll put my point rhetorically: why should epistemic correctness

in all worlds be constituted by, or constitutively associated with, reliably true

outcomes in the actual world (either the actual world or my “actual” world)? Why

should reliability in that world constitute correctness in all worlds? Why should the

fact that the process is a good route to truth in that world make it the correct

procedure to follow in all worlds, even in worlds where it is bound to lead one astray?

Why should reliability there constitute epistemic correctness everywhere? Has the

actual-world reliabilist even asked this question?

19 This is a theme in Kit Fine’s work (e.g. Fine 1994).

32

Remember that the original motivation behind simple reliabilism was that

correctness was tied to reliably promoting truth in the world of use; justifiedness is a

good route to truth: conditional on using the process, the belief produced has a good

shot at being true (justifiedness is not the same thing as truth, even so it is pretty

close). Now that idea can be initially very appealing. “Oh, I see! It’s because these

procedures reliably get us to the truth that using them is correct!” This idea can feel

“deep or revelatory” about the very nature of justifiedness. But once we confront the

BIV and clairvoyance cases, we realize that justifiedness isn’t the same as being a

good route to truth in the world of use. “Shoot, I guess that idea didn’t work.”

The “actual world” gambit says to try again, but to relativize to the actual

world. But the initial idea that was so attractive doesn’t apply in this case. The

maneuver won’t seem initially as attractive. “Hmm, reliability in the actual world?

Well, maybe, but I don’t see it. Why should the “demon” victim have justified beliefs

because his procedures produce true beliefs somewhere else? After all, in the vat they

are all false.” Why does the special world maneuver in general, and the actual-world

variant in particular, explain why the victim’s beliefs are justified? It is completely

natural to find oneself puzzled or unsure.

Since the obvious motivation of the actual-world reliability theory was to

dodge the counter-examples, its no surprise that it hasn’t won many (if any) converts

from the other side. For it doesn’t really explain to the philosophers on the other side

why the correctness of epistemic procedures should be partly constituted by reliably

getting things right in the actual world. For if the actual-world maneuver really

explained what makes a procedure correct, philosophers on the other side should have

33

an “Oh I see! I get it!” experience, for explanations are supposed to explain,

especially deep and revelatory explanations. But as far as I know, no one has had such

an experience. I know I haven’t. I don’t see why epistemic correctness in all worlds is

constituted by reliably true outcomes in the actual world.20

To really explain the actual-world theory needs considerable supplementation.

But given the counterexamples and counterintuitive consequences we discussed

before, it is not even a candidate explanation. Supplementation won’t be enough. We

need to supplant the theory, not supplement the theory.

XI. MOVING FORWARD: NORMAL-CONDITIONS RELIABILISM

Should the reliabilist be forced to throw in the towel? I know many so-called internalists,

mentalists and evidentialists would like to think so. But I don’t think the fight is over yet.

In what little time we have remaining together, I shall make three suggestions.

First, I think the entire analytical tool of “worlds” should be replaced with

“circumstances” or “conditions” instead. If the reliabilist is going to relativize correctness

always and everywhere, the reliabilist should relativize to special circumstances or

conditions instead of special worlds. Second, I think the reliabilist should switch from

relativizing correctness to reliability in the actual world to reliability in “normal” or

“natural” circumstances or conditions; the right “special” circumstances are normal

20 I have a hunch (urged on me by Peter Kung) that “being actual” never explains. It is always some other property of the thing we want to explain that does the explaining. We explain why a glass fell by citing the ball hitting the glass. We do not explain why a glass fell by citing the actuality of these properties; we simply presuppose, in explaining them, that they are actual.

34

circumstances, not necessarily actual circumstances. Third, to meet the explanatory

burden, the reliabilist should explain why epistemically correct procedures are reliable in

normal conditions as a part of their nature or essence, that what makes epistemically

correct procedures correct arises from the fact that they are reliable in normal conditions

as a part of their nature or essence, or that their nature or essence is constitutively

associated with reliability in normal conditions.

Since this third suggestion is clearly the topic for another paper, I won’t say

anything further about it here, except for a brief remark when closing. Since the first two

suggestions, however, are relevant to my overall case against actual-world reliabilism, a

few more words are clearly in order. And since the first two are really just two aspects of

one idea (the reliabilist should switch from reliability in the actual world to reliability in

normal circumstances) I will talk about both aspects at once.

What do we all already know about normal conditions? First, normal conditions

or circumstances are relative to kinds. What are normal circumstances for fish? Being

submerged in water. Take them out of the water, and they won’t last for long. What are

normal circumstances for humans? Certainly not being fully submerged in water, at least

not for very long. Deep inside the center of the Sun certainly does not count as normal

either.

Second, normal circumstances, so understood, are repeatable types of

circumstances. A fish that has always lived in a lake would still be in normal conditions if

we moved it to another lake. A human that has always lived in Alaska would still be in

normal conditions if he or she moved to Nebraska. The same type of circumstance can be

instantiated in a variety of locales, even locales where one in never likely to go.

35

Third, “normal” here does not mean typical or average. Normal conditions are not

conditions typical in the Universe. There’s precious little water throughout the entirety of

the Universe. Of all the conditions in the Universe, very few may be normal. Nor are the

conditions that an animal typically occupies ipso facto normal. The majority of rhesus

monkeys may, unfortunately, find themselves in cages for laboratory experiments. It

happens.

Fourth, normal and abnormal environments transcend worlds. Fish in the actual

world are submerged in water. And in most possible worlds I can imagine, fish that aren’t

dead are submerged in water too. Normal conditions for fish exist in actual and possible

worlds. Normal conditions are not “world-bound.” So too abnormal conditions.

Fifth, normal circumstances or conditions comprise a subset of all of the

conditions in a possible world. If being submerged in water comprise normal

circumstances for fish, then the actual world is awash with non-normal circumstances for

fish, for the actual world is a vast Universe, possibly infinite in time-and-space, where

water is, as I just said, a rare occurrence.

In sum, here is what we all already know: normal conditions are (1) relative to

kinds, (2) repeatable types of circumstances (3) not (necessarily) typical, (4) transcend

worlds, and (5) (typically) comprise but a subset of all of the different kinds of

circumstances in a world.

With this admittedly brief discussion of normal conditions, I think the way

forward for the reliabilist is to relativize correctness in all conditions to reliability in

normal conditions:

36

NORMAL-CONDITIONS RELIABILISM: In all possible circumstances C, a belief

is prima facie justified in C if and only if (to the extent that) the psychological process

that caused or sustained the belief reliably produces true beliefs in normal conditions.

The theory already has weighty advocates. Ruth Millikan (1984) defends such a

view for knowledge, appealing to Mother Nature. Alvin Plantinga (1993) defends such a

view for knowledge and justified belief, appealing to God. Tyler Burge (2003) defends

such a view for knowledge and justified belief, appealing to anti-individualism about

psychological states. Michael Bergmann (2006) defends such a view for justification, but

without an appeal to Mother Nature, God or anti-individualism.21

This theory differs from Goldman’s “normal-worlds” theory for it refers to

conditions or circumstances (aspects of worlds, habitats or environments) instead of

complete possible worlds, and it differs to the extent that it explicates what counts as

“normal” differently. Burge, Millikan and Plantinga have all done just that.22 Let us

assume a realist development, letting our intuitive grasp of normal conditions from the

few examples provided so far be our guide.

We can see why this is the path for every reliabilist to take for it avoids all of the

problems raised for the two variants of the actual-world reliability theory. First, it avoids

the alien counterexample to the absolutist variant, for even though the alien psychological

21 I have also developed such a view, appealing to etiological functions. See my 2010b, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012, 2014b.

22 For example, see Millikan 1984 or Burge 2003. The general idea behind Millikan and Burge is that normal conditions are those that are relevant to individuating and/or constituting the nature of the psychological process. For Plantinga’s divinely inspired approach, the idea is that normal conditions are those that God intended for the use of the psychological process.

37

capacity is not reliable in the actual world, it is reliable in normal conditions (conditions

normal for the aliens). What happens or does not happen in the actual world is then

irrelevant to whether their psychologies are epistemically correct procedures of belief-

formation. And here is another difference with Goldman’s “normal-worlds” theory, for

what happens in worlds that share the general features we believe to hold true of the

actual world has nothing to do with what makes conditions normal for the aliens.

Second, taking this path avoids the objections we have raised to the indexicalist

variant. Human perceptual capacities reliably induce true beliefs in normal conditions for

humans. Thus on the view they confer prima facie justifiedness in all possible

circumstances when functioning normally. Both Dennis1 and Dennis2 are relying on

normally functioning human belief-forming capacities that produce reliably true

outcomes in normal conditions for humans. Dennis1 is in normal conditions though

Dennis2 is not. Even so, both of their perceptual beliefs are prima facie justified. And that

is the end of the story. There is no room in the theory, unlike the indexicalist theory, for

generating the judgment that Dennis1’s perceptual beliefs are not adroit-justified because

Dennis2’s perceptual capacities are not reliable in his “actual” world. And there is no

room in the theory, unlike the indexicalist theory, for generating a plurality of degrees of

justifiedness, for what matters is reliability in normal conditions for the capacity, not any

possible conditions or circumstances where the capacity might exist.

The normal conditions path also captures what is plausible—what is initially

intuitively attractive—about the actual-world reliability theory. The plausibility of that

theory derives from our two initial facts: that perception (etc.) is a correct procedure, and

that perception (etc.) is a reliable procedure in normal conditions. Since the conditions we

38

are actually in are normal conditions for our psychological capacities, it is natural to

confound normal conditions for actual conditions, and reliability in actual conditions for

reliability in the actual world. But since the metaphysical profile of the actual world is so

very different (as we have seen) from the metaphysical profile of normal conditions,

these are very different theories. But since prior to such metaphysical reflections they can

seem so similar, it is natural for one to fail to notice the difference, and so natural to find

the actual-world theory plausible when really it’s the normal conditions theory that’s so

appealing.

Indeed, I conjecture this is what drove Goldman and Sosa. I have little evidence

that this is so for Goldman, so it shall remain sheer conjecture. But there is plenty of

evidence that something like this is going on in Sosa’s mind. For even though the letter of

Sosa’s view is an actual-world view, the spirit of the view seems to be a normal-

conditions view, for his glosses frequently advert to normal conditions. For example:

What powers or abilities…enable a subject to achieve… justification? They are

presumably powers or abilities to distinguish the true from the false…One’s

power or ability must…make one such that, normally at least, in one’s ordinary

habitat, or least in one’s ordinary circumstances when making such judgments,

one would believe what is true and not believe what is false. (1988: 151, emphasis

added)

We are…a certain way by nature, a way that, given our normal environment,

enables us to attain truth and understanding on questions of interest… Our inbuilt

39

mechanisms may still operate correctly even if, unfortunately, we are in an

abnormal environment relative to which those very mechanisms distance us from

both truth and understanding… This is a way we can become justified by using

our basic faculties... Even victims of a Cartesian-Evil Demon would retain such

justification. (2004: 308, emphasis added)

Failed attempts in abnormal circumstances do not show lack of ability…what is

required is only that your attempts tend to succeed when circumstances are

normal. (2007: 84)

Talk of normal conditions and normal functioning fills Sosa’s writings on justification;

they just don’t enter into explicit statements of the theory. If the actual-world is the letter

of his theory, normal-conditions are the spirit.

I’m sure I’ve tried your patience for too long. Thank you for staying with me until

the end. Let me close. Reliabilists want to capture what makes epistemically correct

procedures correct in all possible circumstances in terms of reliability in a special set of

circumstances. I’ve argued against normal-worlds reliabilism and two variants of actual-

world reliabilism, my main target. I have suggested that normal-circumstances reliabilism

is the right way forward for the reliabilist. But for it to succeed, it too has to discharge its

explanatory burden; it must explain why correctness in all circumstances should turn on

reliably true outcomes in normal circumstances. Can it do that? It can, I believe, if it

constitutively interrelates the nature of the belief-forming psychology in a substantive

and explanatory way with reliably getting things right in normal conditions, so that

40

producing reliably true outcomes in normal conditions is constitutively associated with

the nature of the psychology. Discussing this is clearly a topic for another occasion.

41

References

Audi, Robert (1988) ‘Justification, Truth and Reliability’ Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 49: 1-29.

Audi, Robert (2001) ‘An Internalist Theory of Normative Grounds’ Philosophical Topics

29: 19-46.

Bergmann, Michael (2006) Justification Without Awareness (Oxford).

Bonjour, Lawrence (1980) ‘Externalist Theories of Knowledge’ Midwest Studies in

Philosophy V: 53-73.

Bonjour, Laurence (2009) Epistemology, second edition (Rowman & Littlefield).

Burge, Tyler (1986) ‘Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society.

Burge, Tyler (1993) ‘Content Preservation’ Philosophical Review.

Burge, Tyler (2003) ‘Perceptual Entitlement’ Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research 67: 503-48.

Burge, Tyler (2007) Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays volume 2 (Oxford).

Burge, Tyler (2009) ‘Primitive Agency and Natural Norms’ Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 79: 251-278.

Burge, Tyler (2010) Origins of Objectivity (Oxford).

Burge, Tyler (2013) Cognition Through Understanding: Philosophical Essays volume 3

(Oxford).

Cohen, Stewart (1984) ‘Justification and Truth’ Philosophical Studies 46: 279-295.

Comesana, Juan (2002) ‘The Diagonal and the Demon’ Philosophical Studies 110: 249-

266.

42

Dretske, Fred (1986) ‘Misrepresentation’ R. Bogdan, editor, Belief (Oxford).

Feldman, Richard (1985) ‘Reliability and Justification’ The Monist 68: 159-174.

Feldman, Richard (2008) ‘Moderate Deontologism in Epistemology’ Synthese 161: 339-

55.

Fine, Kit (1994) ‘Essence and Modality’ Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1-16.

Fodor, Jerry (1995) The Elm and the Expert (MIT Press).

Foley, Richard (1985) ‘What’s Wrong with Reliabilism?’ The Monist 68: 188-202.

Foley, Richard (1993) Working Without a Net (Oxford).

Goldberg, Sanford (2012) ‘A Novel (and Surprising) Argument Against Justification

Internalism’ Analysis 27: 239-43.

Goldberg, Sanford (forthcoming) ‘What is the Subject-Matter of the Theory of Epistemic

Justification?’ John Greco and David Henderson, editors, Epistemic Evaluations

(Oxford).

Goldman, Alvin (1979) ‘What is Justified Belief?’ George Pappas, editor, Justification

and Knowledge (D. Reidel): 1-23.

Goldman, Alvin (1986) Epistemology and Cognition (Harvard).

Goldman, Alvin (1988) ‘Strong and Weak Justification’ Philosophical Perspectives 2:

51-69.

Goldman, Alvin (1992) ‘Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology’ in his Liasons

(MIT Press).

Goldman, Alvin (2001) ‘Reply to Sosa’ Philosophical Topics 29: 465-468.

Goldman, Alvin (2002) Pathways to Knowledge (Oxford).

Goldman, Alvin (2011) ‘Reliabilism’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

43

Graham, Peter J. (2010a) ‘Theorizing Justification’ Joseph Campbell, Michael O’Rourke

and Harry Silverstein, editors, Knowledge and Skepticism (The MIT Press): 45-71.

Graham, Peter J. (2010b) ‘Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension’

Pritchard, Millar, editors, Social Epistemology (Oxford): 148-93

Graham, Peter J. (2011a) ‘Does Justification Aim at Truth?’ Canadian Journal of

Philosophy 41: 51-71

Graham, Peter J. (2011b) ‘Psychological Capacity and Positive Epistemic Status’ Jill

Graper Hernandez, editor, The New Intuitionism (Continuum): 128-150.

Graham, Peter J. (2011c) ‘Perceptual Entitlement and Basic Beliefs’ Philosophical

Studies 153: 467-75.

Graham, Peter J. (2012) ‘Epistemic Entitlement’ Nous 46: 449-482.

Graham, Peter J. (2014a) ‘Against Transglobal Reliabilism’ Philosophical Studies 169:

525-535.

Graham, Peter J. (2014b) ‘Warrant, Functions, History’ Abrol Fairweather and Owen

Flanagan, editors, Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue (Cambridge): 15-35.

Graham, Peter J. (forthcoming) ‘Perceptual Entitlement and Natural Norms’ Peter

Graham and Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen, eds., Epistemic Entitlement (Oxford).

Greco, John (2005) ‘Virtues in Epistemology’ Paul Moser, ed., The Oxford Handbook of

Epistemology (Oxford).

Henderson, David and Terry Horgan (2011) The Epistemological Spectrum (Oxford).

Lehrer, Keith (2000) Theories of Knowledge, second edition (Westview).

Leite, Adam (2004) ‘On Justifying and Being Justified’ Philosophical Issues 14: 219-

253.

44

Lyons, Jack (2012) ‘Should Reliabilists Worry about Demon Worlds?” Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research 86: 1-40.

Millikan, Ruth Garrett (1984) Language and Other Biological Categories (MIT Press).

Plantinga, Alvin (1993) Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford).

Pollock, John (1999) ‘Procedural Epistemology’ John Greco and Ernest Sosa, editors,

The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell): 383-414.

Pollock, John and Joseph Cruz (1999) Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, second

edition (Rowman & Littlefield).

Smythies, Declan (forthcoming) ‘Why Justification Matters’ John Greco and David

Hendersen, editors, Epistemic Evaluations (Oxford).

Sosa, Ernest (1980) ‘The Raft and the Pyramid’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy V.

Sosa, Ernest (1988) ‘Methodology and Apt Belief’ Synthese 74: 415-26.

Sosa, Ernest (1991) ‘Intellectual Virtue in Perspective’ in his Knowledge in Perspective

(Cambridge).

Sosa, Ernest (1993) ‘Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology’ Nous 27: 51-65.

Sosa, Ernest (2001) ‘Goldman’s Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology’ Philosophical

Topics 29.

Sosa, Ernest (2003) Epistemic Justification (Blackwell).

Sosa, Ernest (2004) ‘Replies to Critics’ John Greco, editor, Ernest Sosa and His Critics

(Blackwell): 275-326.

Sosa, Ernest (2007) A Virtue Epistemology (Oxford).

45

46