Department of Development and International Relations

Sino-Japanese Crises from 2012 Bring Opportunities

for China’s New DiplomacyMaster Thesis

Supervisors: Jian Tao, Peer Møller Christensen

Submitted by: Rong Chen

Submitted on: 20th May 2014

Table of Contents

Abstract...........................................................................................................................I

1. Abbreviations..........................................................................................................1

2. Introduction.............................................................................................................2

3. Methodology...........................................................................................................5

3.1. Motivation and Main Focus..........................................................................5

3.2. Research Method & Research Approach......................................................6

3.3. Empirical Data..............................................................................................7

3.4. Structure........................................................................................................7

3.5. Choice of the Theory....................................................................................8

3.6. Key Concept.................................................................................................9

3.7. Limitations..................................................................................................11

3.8. Project Design.............................................................................................12

4. Theory...................................................................................................................13

4.1. Crisis Management.....................................................................................13

5. Analysis.................................................................................................................21

5.1. Signals of Intense Sino-Japanese Relation from 2012...............................21

5.2. China’s New Diplomatic Performance during the Crises...........................26

5.3. Lesson-Learned from Dealing with the Sino-Japanese Crises...................37

6. Conclusion.............................................................................................................43

7. Bibliography..........................................................................................................46

Abstract

The Sino-Japanese relation has been in a historically low point since 2012. A

territorial row over the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands has been flared up after right-

wing Tokyo Governor Shintaro’s purchase of this group of islands. Besides this,

different attitudes towards Japan’s historical wartime doing was an ingrained thorn in

Sino-Japanese relation. With hawkish Abe taking into power, he has taken a tougher

position over the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands and paid tribute to the Yasukuni

shrine regardless of the strong condemnation of China and other Asian countries. On

the other hand, US’ high-key strategy of ‘Returning to Asia’ and its long-standing

security commitment with Japan make the intense Sino-Japanese ties even more

complicated. Against this backdrop, Chinese new administration led by Xi Jinping

realizes that there is urgency for them to handle this crisis and convert it into

opportunities to explore China’s full-pledged diplomatic horizon.

Out of this consideration, crisis management mode initiated by Ian I. Mitroff is

chosen as the theory for the thesis. Generally there exist five stages in the mode which

are signal detection, prevention & preparedness, damage containment, recovery and

learning. In the case of Sino-Japanese crisis, three of them are picked up in the

analysis part as the rest of two are skipped in reality. Guided by the revised crisis

management mode, the author starts from selecting typical incidents which imply the

deterioration of the Sino-Japanese relations. On the basis of it, the analysis of China’s

new diplomatic performance in managing the crisis is presented. After that a

rethinking or evaluation on China’s diplomatic performance during the crisis is added.

In this sequence, the author tries to show the intention of writing this thesis that

although the recent Sino-Japanese crisis from 2012 exerted more pressure on China’s

foreign policy-making, it made Chinese new leadership broaden their diplomatic

horizon and turn the risk into precious opportunities to promote the development of

I

China’s new diplomacy in a full-pledged manner. By studying the Sino-Japanese

crisis, China’s new diplomacy in Xi’s administration featured as more confident and

active is fully presented.

Key Words: the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations; crisis management mode,

China’s new diplomacy

II

1. Abbreviations

Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Japanese)

ICT – Information and Communications Technology

PPRR – Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery

LDP – Liberal Democratic Party

ADIZ – Air Defense Identification Zone

MTDP – Mid Term Defense Plan

MSDF – Maritime Self Defense Force

ASDF – Air Self Defense Force

GSDF – Ground Self Defense Force

APEC – Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations

1

2. Introduction

Intense diplomatic relations between China and Japan have been received much

attention from the rest of the world nowadays. “Although China and Japan have been

deepening economic interdependence over the last two decades, their relationship has

been one of the tensest among the most important bilateral relationships in the world,

and the most recent territorial dispute on Diaoyu Islands between them has made it

even worse.”1 The lasting economic downturn caused by global economic crisis in

2008 and frequent political change of the ruling parties make Japan much worried

about its decline of power in Asia. On the contrary, China by virtue of its remarkable

economic performance and relative stable political transfer is expected to replace

Japan’s superiority in this region. “Now hardly a day goes by without a new flare-up

in the war of diplomatic attrition being fought out by China and Japan.”2 It is argued

that the deterioration of the bilateral relations between these two countries will be the

keynote in the political realm of East Asia.

Shinzo Abe, Japan’s present prime minister, compared to his first term, turns to

maintain a tough stance on China. Abe, on his visit to Okinawa’s Ishigaki Island on 17

July 2013, firmly claimed that “his government would never make concessions to

China on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Japanese), and The Senkakus are an

inherent part of Japan’s territory in terms of history and international law and there is

no territorial dispute between the two countries.”3 On the other hand, China’s newly-

elected president Xi Jinping also tries to adjust former moderate policy towards Japan

during Hu-Wen administration which highlighted economic cooperation and

interdependence between the two countries. With the ascendant of China’s

comprehensive strength and active integration into the international community,

1 Hiroki Takeuchi, “Sino-Japaneseese relations: power, interdependence, and domestic politics,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14 (2014) : 8.2 “The Horcrux of the Matter,” The Economist, last modified 25 January, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21595026-intense-diplomatic-competition-between-china-and-japan-shows-tempers-rising-dangerously-horcrux#sthash.9EwYSHAr.dpbs.3 “Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,” Global Security. org, last modified 23 April, 2014, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm.

2

Chinese new leadership shows its willingness to become more confident and active in

its foreign-policy making as President Xi once said: “No foreign country should ever

nurse hopes that we will swallow the bitter fruit of harm to our country’s sovereignty,

security and development interests, published on Xinhua news agency – the

mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party.”4 Therefore, the escalation of territorial

dispute over Diaoyu Islands in East China Sea is not likely to come to an end in the

short run. Apart from the ownership over Diaoyu Islands, Japanese government’s

ambiguous attitude to its historical experience of invasion in China during the WWII

worsens the bilateral relationship. There is no doubt that Abe’s visit to Yasukuni

Shrine in 2013 as well as many right-wing Japanese officials’ remarks on the denial of

Nanjing massacre to a large extent irritates Chinese ruling elites as well as ordinary

Chinese citizens. It is commonly agreed that present Sino-Japanese relation since

2012 is in the most intense and frosty phase after their official establishment of

diplomatic relation.

The complexity of Sino-Japanese relation is closely related to the significant

involvement of the United States who intends to manipulate Japan to contain China’s

potential regional dominance in Asia. At the same time, backed up by the US’ security

commitment, Abe’s administration takes the initiative to exacerbate the anxiety about

‘China threat’ and counterbalance the rising China. The United States’ high-key

‘Returning to Asia’ strategy and the stable US-Japan alliance leave less room for

China to create a favorable external environment to explore its diplomatic relations.

Because of this, Chinese new leadership come to realize the previous low-profile

foreign policy should be adjusted to be more proactive which requires China’s voices

should be expressed and heard more in the international community. The strained

bilateral relations between China and Japan on the one hand, exert much pressure on

China’s diplomacy in East Asia, on the other hand, stimulate President Xi’s

administration to make some transformation of China’s diplomacy not only to Japan,

4 “Chinese Leader Affirms Policy on Islands,” Chris Buckley, The New York Times, accessed April 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/world/asia/incoming-chinese-leader-will-not-to-bargain-on-disputed-territory.html?_r=0.

3

but also to major powers such as the US and Russia as well as neighboring countries.

Hence, it is necessary for me to make a comprehensive analysis on the causes and

process of the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relation from 2012 so as to form a better

understanding of this crisis to China’s diplomacy. Against this backdrop, China’s

diplomacy is expected to make some transformation to deal with these crises.

Therefore, the problem of my research will be focused on:

Why the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations from 2012 bring opportunities for

China’s new diplomacy from the perspective of crisis management?

4

3. Methodology

3.1. Motivation and Main Focus

The author’s motivation to write this thesis is mainly out of the attention to recent

intense Sino-Japanese relations. China’s speedy economic growth makes Japan fear

its relative decline of power in Asia. With the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) coming

into power, the new Japanese cabinet pursues a hard-line foreign policy to divert

public complaint on the domestic stagnant economy. As for China, thanks to its

concentrated efforts on the domestic modernization in past 30 years, its economic

competitiveness as well as national pride is rapidly elevated. “Chinese new leaders

become increasingly confident in its ability to deal with territorial disputes on its own

terms. They also become more willing to proactively shape the external environment

rather than passively react to it and forcefully safeguard China’s national interests

rather than compromise them”.5 In terms of Diaoyu Islands dispute, Chinese central

government condemns Japan’s unilateral deed to these Islands and takes persistent

efforts to claim its ‘undisputed’ sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands. Apart from the

territorial disputes, Japan’s reluctance to repent for its historical wartime wrongs is

another major factor which intensified bilateral relations. Given the complexity of

Sino-Japanese relations, President Xi’s administration turns to a more active foreign

strategy which is different from the low-profile policy adopted by the last four

generations of leadership, to deal with the deteriorated Sino-Japanese diplomatic

crisis. Hence, the author’s curiosity is greatly aroused to correlate the research of

China’s new diplomacy with its performance in conducting sensitive Sino-Japanese

crises from 2012.

The main focus of this thesis is to make an in-depth analysis of China’s new

diplomatic performance in dealing with intractable Sino-Japanese relations from

2012. Due to the limited scope of the thesis and different periods of Sino-Japanese

5 Suisheng Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: the strident turn,” Journal of Contemporary China 22 (2013):545.

5

relations, recent intensity between two countries in regard to Diaoyu Islands and the

historical issues in Abe’s second term is chosen to be analyzed. Crisis management

system mode is employed as it presents China’s diplomatic capacity in identifying,

responding and learning from the Sino-Japanese crisis. On the basis of it, China’s new

diplomacy which is characterized as more confident and active is clarified. The

escalation of territorial dispute on Diaoyu Islands and the long-standing divergence on

Japan’s historical aggression in China will be exemplified to clarify the progress of

China’s diplomacy in Xi’s administration. The author plans to interpret China new

leadership’s plan in making a difference in China’s diplomacy in the face of Sino-

Japanese relation.

3.2. Research Method & Research Approach

This thesis is largely based on a qualitative study as it aims to present a solid

understanding of China’s new diplomatic performance under Chinese new leadership

in the case of the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. The application of crisis

management system mode to this topic requires associating the features of each stage

with concrete foreign affairs in Sino-Japanese relations. In addition to this, high-

ranking officials’ statements as well as information released at News Briefing of the

governments will be the important source for the analysis. Hence, these components

are not likely to be directly reflected in the form of data. On the contrary, qualitative

method is much preferred in terms of its advantage in interpretation of the elements.

“Most obviously, qualitative research tends to be concerned with words rather than

numbers. Besides this, one of its distinguishing features is that qualitative techniques

from an epistemological position described as interpretivist, meaning that the stress is

on the understanding of the social world through an examination of the interpretation

of that world by its participants”.6 Therefore, qualitative method will be practiced

throughout the thesis. A comprehensive approach should be taken in the analysis of

China’s new diplomatic performance in dealing with the bilateral crises which

includes the relation with Japan, the major powers (US & Russia), the neighboring

6 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 266.

6

countries and the Europe. The consideration of all these aspects will be conducive to

forming an insight into China’s new diplomacy.

3.3. Empirical Data

The literature for reference of this thesis is largely based on the secondary material.

Since the qualitative method is wielded in the thesis, the texts used in the thesis will

be in “a cognitive manner to play the basic role of introduction” and “lays the

foundation for further interpretation and analysis”7 as well. Therefore, the major

supported materials the author chooses are from published books and high-academic

journals. In terms of the internet sources, government official websites and prominent

news agencies like The Economist are also taken into consideration for the high

credibility. What’s more, the internet sources from the two mentioned channels also

reveal the latest situation which may be ignored or not assumed by the scholars and

published volumes.

China’s new diplomatic performance in handling the intense Sino-Japanese crises is

the focus of this thesis, hence, the general introduction of China’s foreign policy

before President Xi’s era in the following part will help the author to conclude the

China’s progress in diplomatic strategy. Furthermore, several typical catchphrases

proposed by Xi Jinping will be used as the evidence standing for the new perspective

of China’s diplomacy in Xi’s administration.

3.4. Structure

The project is divided into five parts. The first part is the introduction. The second

part is the methodology. The third part is the theory, which provides the theoretical

support to the following analysis. The fourth part is the analysis, which combines the

crisis management mode with the interpretation of China’s new diplomatic

performance in Sino-Japanese relation. The final part goes to the conclusion, which

7 Joanna Aneta Lalik, Xiaoxi Lou, Rong Chen, “The Transformation of China’s Foreign Policy In the Case of South China Sea Dispute,” Project Module II, Aalborg University(2013): 7.

7

aims to present an answer for the problem formulation.

3.5. Choice of the Theory

Crisis Management Mode

Frictions between China and Japan have become one of the most frequent issues

raised in China’s press conference held by Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 2012.

The incumbent Japanese Prime Minister Abe took a series of steps to declare Japan’s

sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands, which aroused China’s strong condemnation. On the

other hand, Abe as well as other high-ranking Japanese officials’ visits to Yasukuni

Shrine offend China’s sensitivity over the humiliating and miserable past caused by

Japan’s militarism. This triggers a wave of outrage and protest in China’s society.

China’s new leadership is expected to take a tough position towards Japan under the

pressure of the rising public nationalism. However, Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine is

approved by over half of the public according to the opinion poll made by Jiji News

Agency on January 11th, 2014. It is predicted that Abe’s administration will continue

its uncompromising posture towards China in view of domestic support rate. Although

both sides try not to take the initiative to start a war, the deterioration of Sino-

Japanese relation is not likely to change in the short run. Hence, the tension between

China and Japan is a crisis which should be handled with crafted tactics. With the

ascent of China’s comprehensive strength, China’s new leadership realizes the great

necessity to adjust former low-profile diplomatic keynote to a more initiative and

progressive stance. Sino-Japanese relations play a significant role in China’s overall

diplomatic strategy. In view of the complexity of this bilateral relation, multiple and

comprehensive diplomatic efforts are needed. Against this backdrop, a clue for

China’s new diplomacy could be traced. The application of crisis management mode

will help the author have a better understanding of China’s new diplomatic efforts in

the face of Sino-Japanese crises. According to the mode, not only China’s

performance during the crises, but also China’s action before and after the crises will

be altogether taken into account. Through this process, a full picture of China’s new

diplomacy in Xi’s era will be presented. Hence, the employment of crisis management

8

model could interpret China’s attempts in dealing with the tensions between China

and Japan, at the same time reveals the tendency of China’s new diplomacy under

China’s new leadership. This is the main reason why the author chooses crisis

management mode as the theory.

3.6. Key Concept

China’s New Diplomacy

According to ZHAO Kejin’s “China’s Diplomacy 3.0: China’s New Diplomacy in

Post 18th Party Congress”, the development of China’s diplomacy could be divided

into three periods: the first phase (1949-1979) is called revolutionary diplomacy in

which a clear line with the diplomatic system of the capitalist world dominated by

imperial powers was drawn. The priorities during this period were anti-imperialism

and safeguarding national independence and sovereignty. Besides this, the alliance

strategy should not be ignored. The second period (1979-2012) is featured as

development diplomacy which put an emphasis on the open-up reforms and the

integration into international system. It pursued a non-aligned and low-profile stance

to create a peaceful exterior environment for the development of domestic

modernization. The third stage from 2013 under the new leadership aims to behave

more positively and proactively which means China will shoulder more

responsibilities in accordance with its capacity to promote the mutual development

and world peace, at the same time be committed to protect its increasingly overseas,

maritime interests as well as in the region of polar and space.8 The new performance

of China’s diplomacy will be interpreted mainly from the two following aspects:

More openness and inclusiveness is reflected in China’s diplomatic concepts. On July,

2012, Xi Jinping attended the first World Peace Forum at Tsinghua University. He

stressed that “for a country to pursue its own development, we must also let other

people; to seek their own safety, you must also allow the safety of others; to pursue its

8 Kejin, Zhao, “China’s Diplomacy 3.0: China’s New Diplomacy in Post 18th Party Congress,” Social Science 7 (2013): 10.

9

own better life, must also allow others better life. States must adhere to a cooperative

mind, the spirit of innovation and responsible attitudes, the same boat, win-win

cooperation, jointly cope with various problems and challenges.”9 This opinion was

highly affirmed by other participating scholars and politicians. Xi considered that

“zero-sum mentalities should be abandoned and nations should establish a new

security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation and

foster the notion of universal, common and cooperative security.”10 Furthermore, the

idea of ‘a community of common destiny and interests’ is frequently mentioned by

Chinese high-ranking officials at different occasions. President Xi, in his speech at

the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference in 2013 also appealed for the practice of

this new idea. He said: “While pursuing its own interests, a country should

accommodate the legitimate concerns of others. In pursuing their own development,

countries should promote the common development of all and expand common

interests among them. We should respect the right of a country to independently

choose its social system and development path, remove distrust and misgivings and

turn the diversity of our world and difference among countries into dynamism and

driving force for development.”11

More activeness and willingness in doing something is shown in China’s diplomatic

attitudes. China is expected to transform from a follower to a contributor to the

improvement of the international system. China’s initiative in a new mode of Sino-US

relationship is an evident proof. During Xi-Obama’s meeting in California, both

leaders hoped that this new mode could help the two countries to avoid the historical

tragedy of major powers. Just as Xi said “the vast Pacific Ocean has ample space for

China and the United Sates”12, this new mode aims to foster Sino-China relationship 9 “Xi Jinping’s Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Word Peace Forum,” Sourcejuice, last modified 7 July, 2012,http://www.sourcejuice.com/1505530/2012/07/07/Jinping-opening-ceremony-World-Peace-Forum-speech-full/.10 “Xi addresses World Peace Forum,” China Daily Website, last modified 7 July, 2012, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2012-07/07/content_15557706.htm.11 “Working Together toward a Better Future for Asia and the World,” China Daily Website, last modified 11 April, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/news/2013-04/11/content_16393483.htm.

12“Xi Jinping stirs nationalistic sentiments ahead of trip to U.S,” Keith Richburg, the Washington Post, last

modified 13 February, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/xi-jinpings-comments-stir-

10

on the basis of no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. This new

model advocates “China and US go beyond their differences in ideology and choices

on the development paths, and expand their common knowledge and plan the future

prospect for human progress.”13 It is considered that the development of the new

mode of Sino-US relationship is conducive to realizing the ‘Chinese Dream’ and the

‘American Dream’ in two countries respectively. Moreover, the harmonious co-

existence between China and the US will largely contribute to world peace and

development. In fact, this new mode of Sino-US relationship could also be applied to

China’s relationship with other major powers. Its key values will play a major

principle in guiding China’s diplomacy with these significant countries. The

progresses in concepts and attitudes indicate that China’s diplomacy is transforming

from negatively response to positively planning. This new look in China’s diplomacy

is expected to constantly executed by Chinese new leadership.

3.7. Limitations

The interpretation of China’s new diplomacy in this thesis is based on the strained

Sino-Japanese ties since 2012. From the perspective of the specific Sino-Japanese

crises, China’s new diplomatic performances are manifested by its relations with

Japan, the major powers including the US and Russia, neighboring countries

especially those in the Southeast Asia and the Europe. However, the development of

China’s new diplomacy in Xi’s administration include more than these aspects

mentioned in this thesis, such as more practical Sino-Africa relations and China’s

more initiative in multi-lateral regional and international organizations. In view of the

correlation with China’s performance in dealing with the Sino-Japanese crisis, these

important aspects of China’s new diplomacy are not included in this thesis.

nationalist-sentiments-on-chinese-twitter-ahead-of-trip-to-us/2012/02/13/gIQADPunAR_blog.html.13 “Building a New China-US Relationship,” CHEN Jimin, China US Focus, last modified 27 June, 2013,http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/building-a-new-china-us-relationship/.

11

3.8. Project Design

12

Introduction

Methodology

Crisis Management Mode

Analysis1. Signals of the Crisis2. Performance in the Crisis3. Lesson-learning from the Crisis

Conclusion

4. Theory

4.1. Crisis Management

The study of crisis management is a vigorous field within political science and public

relation. A definition of ‘crisis’ will be introduced as the first step. “We speak of crisis

when a community of people—an organization, a town, or a nation—perceives an

urgent threat to core values or life-sustaining functions, which must be urgently dealt

with under conditions of deep uncertainty.”14 A variety of crises are likely to occur in

the public life, such as natural disasters and war, economic depression, terrorist

attacks, epidemics and failures of information and communications technology (ICT).

To make things worse, “Crises are inconceivable events that often take politicians,

citizens, and the media by complete surprise.”15 This brings great challenge for public

authorities and their organizations to take efficient action to prevent the interests of

citizens from the threat in the circumstance of considerable time pressure and lacking

of integrated information about the causes and consequences. Based on the definition

presented above, a public crisis usually bears the following characteristics:

Abruptness, urgency and uncertainty.

The notion of crisis is often related to conflict and war. According to Professor HU

Ping in “International Conflict Analysis and Crisis Management Study”, “crisis is a

special phenomenon in the process of conflict formation. The range of crisis is smaller

than that of conflict.”16 It is generally considered that the ending of crises does not

mean conflicts to be resolved. The outbreak of war may trigger a crisis, and a crisis

may escalate into a war. However, in the present era appealing for peace and

development, crises are more manifested in the form of political tension. Hence, a

casual relationship doesn’t exist between crisis and war. Referring to the types of

crises, many a criteria have been proposed in the international academic community.

14 Arjen Boin, "Crisis Management," in International Encyclopedia of Political Science, eds. Bertrand Badie & Dirk Berg-Schlosser & Leonardo Morlino, (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2011), 495.15 Boin, ibid.16 Ping, Hu, International Conflict Analysis and Crisis Management Study (Beijing: Yi Wen Publishing Military, 2003), 98.

13

The dichotomous method which considers crises as either natural or human-made will

not be adopted in this thesis. This traditional classification, despite simplicity, is not

sufficient enough to deal with the diversity and complexity of crises nowadays which

usually bear the two-mentioned factors altogether. In this thesis, a classification

proposed by HU Ping in International Crisis Management and Its Research Methods

will be employed. Professor Hu regarded two considerations, namely threat

perception and international environment should be taken in defining the categories of

crises. “The first term called realistic crises, in which policy makers feel threatened

and the international environment also in change, for example the Cuban missile crisis

in 1962 and 9.11 Incident; the second term called isolated crisis, in which only policy

makers are threatened. This kind of crisis is usually caused by accidents, for example

Japanese toilet paper crisis; the third one called potential crises, in which only the

international environment is changing. This form of crisis is generally not escalated

into view.”17

Former US Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara once said: “In

the future, strategies will not exist and it will be replaced by the crisis management.”

The study of crisis management was not booming until the 1960s with its focus on the

prevention of the war. Nowadays, crisis management is generally defined as “a set of

factors designed to combat crises and lessen the actual damage inflicted.”18 This

notion later is further equipped as “crisis management pertains to the strategic

protective actions taken within a community to prepare for, respond to, or recover

from the occurrence of a crisis.”19 Ian I. Mitroff, the father of modern crisis

management, proposed a model for crisis management which is “based in an older

and widely cited disaster management model known as the ‘comprehensive

emergency management’ model, or PPRR (prevention, preparedness, response and

recovery) model.”20 It is composed of five stages (in Mitroff’s terms): signal 17 Ping Hu, “International Crisis Management and Its Research Methods,” Systems Engineering, 45 (1991): 2.18 W. Timothy Coombs, Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, and responding (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2012), 5.19 Stacy Peerbolte, "Crisis Management," in Encyclopedia of Disaster Relief, eds. K. Bradley Penuel & Matt Statler (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2011), 88.20 Alexandros Paraskevas, "Mitroff's Five Stages of Crisis Management," in Encyclopedia of Crisis Management,

14

detection, prevention/preparedness, containment, recovery, and learning. The first two

stages are the prodromal steps to crisis management which determine the readiness of

the organization to handle a crisis. The rest of the three stages form the reactive

approach to crises, with activities implemented after the breakout of a crisis. Mitroff

considered that the former crisis management model neglects the importance of crisis

detection as the first step and the lesson-learning work in the end. Therefore, he added

these two essential stages to constitute a more rounded crisis life cycle.

Crisis Management Mode by Mitroff

Stage 1: Signal Detection

According to Mitroff, a string of early warning signals are manifested long before the

occurrence of a crisis when there exist possibilities to prevent it from happening. “The

Institute of Crisis Management reported in a study that, in the last decade, sudden

crises accounted for only between 30 and 40 percent of the crises that the world has

faced; the remaining 60 to 70 percent were characterized as “smoldering” (creeping)

crises that emanated warning signals that were either detected but ignored or went

completely undetected.”21 Hence, the real challenge for any public authority or

organization is not to find crises but also to detect them in time.

eds. Bradley Penuel & Matt Statler & Ryan Hagen (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2013), 629.21 Paraskevas, ibid., p.630.

15

Signal Detection Prevention & Preparedness

DamageContainment

RecoveryLearning

The priority in the signal detection stage is to distinguish the signals that might warn

of a crisis from other ordinary ones in the daily operation of organizations. It is agreed

that the precise and timely analysis of signals determines to a large extent the

efficiency of the work in this phase. Therefore, a crisis signal detection network

comprising technical and human detectors is suggested to be established in the

organizations. “Technical detectors can be devices or machines that monitor functions

or data received by the organization's internal or external environment and are able to

identify changes in them. Human detectors can be members of the organization or

people external to the organization who have access to data pertinent to its functions

and are willing to transmit these data to the organization's decision-making centers.

They may be people specifically assigned to signal detection even if this may not be

their full-time occupation.”22 It is worth noting that the accuracy of the detectors

should be regularly updated and examined. Otherwise, these detectors may lead to

wrong decision-makings by policy makers. Moreover, an efficient communication

platform or channel is expected to be developed so that vital information will reach

the ears of senior management staffs without delay.

Stage 2: Prevention and Preparedness

Compared to the traditional PPRR model which regards prevention and preparedness

as two separate activities, Mitroff tends to put them together in the second stage. “In

this view, organizations can be either ‘crisis prone’ or ‘crisis prepared’.”23 Although it

is impossible to prevent all the crises by means of planning, a consciousness of

preparation will to some degree avoid a crisis or mitigate its consequences. Crisis

preparedness in the context of Mitroff’s model requires the organizations to formulate

a systematic planning to cope with a crisis which clarifies the pre-assignment of

staffs, resources and actions during a crisis situation. “Mitroff calls for crisis

managers in this stage to think like ‘controlled paranoids’, questioning every

22 Paraskevas, ibid., p.632.23 Paraskevas, ibid., p.633.

16

assumption about what is normal, impossible, or absurd and unthinkable by taking

even low probability situations into consideration and bracing themselves for the

worst-case scenario.”24 A habit of over-caution is more welcomed than underreaction.

The pre-establishment of a crisis management plan will be conducive to time-saving

since people are informed of their responsibilities in advance. One reminder about the

formulation of a crisis management plan is not making it too detailed or complex.

Concerning the uniqueness of each crisis, each plan should be accommodated

accordingly.

As for the personnel in the crisis management team, representatives from different

sectors with mixed knowledge and skills are encouraged to pick up. “Typical crisis

team membership includes representatives from legal, operations, public relations,

facilities management, and security.”25 A significant but often ignored step in this

stage is the practice of crisis management plans. “There are three types of exercises:

tabletop exercises, typically involving senior management staff and with the purpose

of introducing them to their roles and responsibilities in the execution of the plan;

functional exercises, usually more complex, involving a combination of tasks played

out in “real time;” and full-scale simulations involving multiple agencies with actual

players in the field.”26 The exercises are considered to be the best approach to

examine the mistakes in the crisis management plans and to improve the efficiency as

well as coordination among different participants.

Stage 3: Damage Containment

Efforts in this stage are endeavored to alleviate further exacerbation of the crisis and

control the damage. “This is accomplished by attempting interventions in the source

of the crisis in order to reduce its intensity and control its impact and by safeguarding

mission-critical assets and infrastructure.”27 It is commonly agreed that in the face of a

24 Paraskevas, ibid., p.633.25 W. Timothy Coombs, "Crisis and Crisis Management," in Encyclopedia of Public Relations, ed. Robert L. Heath (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2013), 211.26 Paraskevas, op. cit., p.634.27 Paraskevas, ibid., p.636.

17

crisis public authorities are likely to perform well with a well-prepared plan in hand.

The coordination among different departments is highlighted because its efficiency is

closely related to the authorities’ tackling capacity of the crises. Besides this, the work

of information collection and dissemination should also be taken into consideration by

policy makers. The crisis management team members are required to get critical

information related to the crises under limited time: “what happened, what was the

cause, who was/might be affected, where it occurred, and how much damage and

what kind of damage was sustained.”28 The mentioned above information are vital for

the policy makers to make decisions on the disposition of a crisis. At the same time,

authorities need to make good use of different forms of social media to get correction

information out to the public. Therefore, a mature public communication skill is a

must for any authorizes to deal with crises.

Stage 4: Recovery

The recovery stage is about fixing the damage caused by the crisis. The target of this

stage is to turn the status of emergency to normal mode. Two critical things should be

paid attention to. The first one is the restoration of ‘business continuity’, that’s to say,

the normalization of the operations is of great importance to the organization’s

revitalization; the second is about the resumption of its connection with its

stakeholder groups after the crisis. It is widely considered that the more rapidly the

organization restarts its operation, the better position it is likely to achieve compared

to its competitors. Here, Mitroff adds that apart from the stress on the physical aspects

of recovery, the psychological sides should also be taken into account. The

combination of these two aspects will speed up the revival of the organization. With

regards to policy makers who failed to fulfill their commitment prior to or during the

critical stages, the performance during this stage plays an important role in regaining

their reputation among the public.

Stage 5: Learning

The learning stage calls for the efforts of re-examining and evaluating the crisis

28 Coombs, "Crisis and Crisis Management," op. cit., p.213.

18

management performance. Through this learning-experience, policy makers realize

the weaknesses and the aspects to be improved. Although the learning obtained from a

crisis is limited, it may bring some progress for the organization and to some extent

decrease its vulnerability to specific crisis. “In large-scale crises and disasters,

learning may result in knowledge-based adaptation that impacts not only the fringes

of the organization but also the core of its practices and policies.”29 It should be

pointed out that the learning stage is not a process looking for blame, but aims at

collecting valuable information for the future. Mitroff advocates institutional

organizations called ‘crisis learning center’ to be set up so that systematic information

will be stored and referenced whenever needed. In the practice of lesson-drawing

process, it is “constrained by the role of these lessons in determining the impact that

crises have on a society.”30 In some circumstances, other stakeholders could make use

of the lessons to promote policy reforms that present administration objects.

Therefore, the incumbent leadership plays a significant role in stimulating the lesson-

drawing process in the political and bureaucratic fields.

To sum up, the theoretical model proposed by Mitroff is a general one consisting of

five integrated stages. However, in the realistic world, a crisis may only experience

two or three stages due to the uniqueness of each crisis. The sequence of each stage in

Mitroff’s model may change slightly in daily operation, for example, learning is

expected to take place when the crisis is over, whereas learning activities occur in

each one of the stages. These phenomena will not affect the accountability of the

model. In the case of recent Sino-Japanese crisis studied in this thesis, three stages

named signal detection, damage containment and learning occurr in sequence, while

the other two steps called prevention & preparedness and recovery are skipped. It is

found that very few efficient measures are pre-established in the prevention &

preparedness stage due to the continued escalation of Sino-Japanese crises. In addition

to that, the Sino-Japanese crises are not likely to be resolved in the short run. Hence,

29 Paraskevas, op. cit., p.636.30 Boin, op. cit., p.498.

19

these two stages are removed in this thesis. To form a better understanding of the

process of crisis management in the circumstances of Sino-Japanese relations, a

revised crisis management mode for the analysis of Sino-Japanese crisis in this thesis

is presented as follows:

Crisis Management Mode in the Case of Sino-Japanese Crises

20

Signal Detection Prevention & Preparedness

DamageContainment

RecoveryLearning

5. Analysis

5.1. Signals of Intense Sino-Japanese Relation from 2012

According to the theory part, signal detection focuses on distinguishing those

‘dangerous’ events from those ordinary ones in timely and precisely fashion.

Therefore, a list of events signifying the intense Sino-Japanese relations is the priority

of this part. Compared to the natural crises whose signals generally appear before the

occurrence of the crises, the signals in diplomatic crises are hardly defined by a

concrete date. In the case of Sino-Japanese crises, it is not likely to end or may have

more escalation in the short run. Hence, the author tends to choose the signals on the

basis of their impacts and the two countries’ responses to them, rather than the date of

newly-elected Prime Minister Abe taking into power.

The purchase of Diaoyu Islands in Yoshihiko Noda’s cabinet on 11 September, 2012

was regarded as a key event directly leading to the deterioration of the bilateral

relation. This so-called ‘nationalization’ deed was interpreted by Beijing as a Japanese

unilateral action to change the status quo of Diaoyu Islands. In a response, China’s

Foreign Ministry spokesman HONG Lei at the press conference on 13 September,

said: “Chinese government is strongly against Japan’s illegal purchase of Diaoyu

Islands. China will take a series of measures to firmly defend its sovereignty and

territorial integrity. We urge Japanese government to correct its mistakes, stop

infringing China’s territorial sovereignty and return to the track of negotiation and

consultations to handle and resolve relevant issues.”31 This incident triggered Chinese

people’s strong patriotic sentiment that a wave of protests for safeguarding Diaoyu

Islands and boycotting Japanese goods was voluntarily raised during the year since

then. Although 2012 was the 40th anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Japanese

diplomatic relation, due to Japan’s ‘nationalization’ of Diaoyu Islands, a lot of

exchange activities and commemorations were put off or canceled. Chinese

31 “China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Responds to Japan’s Illegal Purchase of Diaoyu Islands,” Xinhua News, last modified 13 September, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-09/13/c_113071308_2.htm.

21

government informed that the celebration ceremony on 40th anniversary of the

normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relation in the Great Hall of the People on

27th September, 2012 would be called off. Not only official activities but also civil

ones were postponed or removed such as the visit of a group of 30 Japanese non-party

congressmen to China on 26th September and the famous Japanese musician Tanimura

Shinji’s concert in Beijing this month were all canceled. “Chinese former Foreign

Minister YANG Jiechi on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress in Beijing

said the sharp deterioration in Sino-Japaneseese relations was “single-handedly”

caused by Japan’s purchase of Diaoyu Islands.”32

The newly-elected Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe who was considered as a hawkish

nationalist seemed to have no intention to soothe matters. On 17 July, 2013, Abe went

to Okinawa Prefecture and visited Ishigaki Island which is only about 170 kilometers

away from the Diaoyu Islands. According to the Asahi Shimbun, the purpose of Abe’s

visit to Ishigaki Island was to encourage coast guards who are responsible for

patrolling the waters around the Diaoyu Islands. This visit made him the first sitting

prime minister to visit the island in 48 years. In his short speech to the 40 coast

guards, Abe stressed: “With frequent approaches and the wandering of Chinese

government vessels in surrounding waters, the security situation has become

increasingly severe. I am determined to take the lead in protecting our territories.”33 In

the afternoon of the same day during a campaign speech in the city of Ishigaki, Abe

claimed: “the Diaoyu Islands are undoubtedly an integral part of Japan, historically

and under international law and Japan won’t budge one bit.”34 Besides this, Abe also

visited Miyako Island, which is located about 160 kilometers from the Diaoyu Islands

and is the place of a Japan Air Self-Defense Force sub base. Abe remarked that the

surveillance task of Diaoyu Islands was shouldered by the air force on this island.

Abe’s arrangement of visiting these two remote islands during the election campaign

32 “Beijing Urges Senkaku Islands Reversal,” The Japanese Times, last modified 10 March, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/10/national/beijing-urges-senkaku-nationalization-reversal/#.U3C-YLKBQgo.33 “Abe Pays Visits to Diaoyu,” Yuhuan, Ling, Global Times, last modified 18 July, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/797032.shtml.34 “Abe Pays Visits to Diaoyu,” ibid.

22

of his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was mainly seen to show his tough position

over the Diaoyu Islands. In response to the visit, Chinese foreign ministry

spokeswoman HUA Chunying said in a statement that “the Chinese government will

take necessary measures to resolutely safeguard its territorial sovereignty over the

islets, and urged Tokyo to face up to the history and reality and stop provocative

words and deeds.”35

The standoff of the territorial dispute over Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan

has extended to the air with the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense

Identification Zone (ADIZ) by the Chinese government on 23 November, 2013. It

includes the airspace over Diaoyu Islands. China's Defense Ministry spokesman Yang

Yujun stressed at the press conference in the same day that “the Chinese government

has followed common international practices in the establishment of the zone, with

aims of protecting its state sovereignty and territorial and airspace security, and

maintaining flying orders. It is a necessary measure in China's exercise of self-defense

rights. It has no particular target and will not affect the freedom of flight in relevant

airspace.”36 Faced with Japan’s demand for its revocation, the spokesman indicated

that China’s decision on setting up the ADIZ is in line with the Charter of the United

Nations, international laws and practices and China's domestic laws and regulations,

including the Law on National Defense, the Law on Civil Aviation and the Basic

Rules on Flight. Furthermore, he added that “a relevant country established its air

defense identification zone as early as 1969, which is also about 130 kilometers from

the Chinese mainland at its closest distance.”37 Although YANG didn’t mention the

name, the most possible reference goes to Japan. On the other hand, the approval of

Japan’s five-year defense plan called the Mid Term Defense Plan (MTDP) from 2014

to 2018 and its latest National Defense Program Guidelines by the cabinet on 17

December, 2013 drew China’s close attention. Both two documents addressed Japan’s

35 “Abe Pays Visits to Diaoyu,” ibid.36 “China Exclusive: Defense Ministry spokesman responds to air defense identification zone questions,” Xinhua News, last modified 23 November, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132912145.htm.37 “China Exclusive: Defense Ministry spokesman responds to air defense identification zone questions,” ibid.

23

great concern about China’s military capacity and expanding activities in water and

airspace. A redeployment of the Self Defense Forces from across Japan to the

southern periphery, close to Senkaku islands in the MTDP was in accordance with

Japan’s high alert on safeguarding the remote southern islands. “The number of

diesel-electric submarines for Japan’s navy—the Maritime Self Defense Force

(MSDF) is set to increase from 16 to 22. A boost in destroyers will bring the total

number from 47 to 54. Besides this, the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) will also

multiply the number of aircrafts which to deal with the increasing tasks of

intercepting foreign aircrafts particularly over the East China Sea. Japan is also

sending fighters southward. Naha Airport will receive a second squadron of F-15J air

superiority fighters, doubling the number of fighters based there from 20 to

40. Furthermore, Japan’s Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) will add a significant

division named amphibious brigade who is expected to undertake the main task of

‘seizing islands’.”38 Apart from the update of military equipments, MTDP also

highlighted the consolidation of the U.S.–Japan security alliance; at the same time

actively work with Russia, India, Australia, South Korea, and the ASEAN states on

regional defense issues. Hence, the issue of these documents was interpreted by many

Chinese pundits as Japan’s full preparation for the potential conflict with China over

Diaoyu Islands and its intention of inviting the US and neighboring countries to

contain China.

The fraught Sino-Japanese relations were even jeopardized by Abe’s visit to Yasukuni

Shrine in December just a few days after his announcement of Japan’s new and

ambitious National Defense Plan. Not only China but also many other Asian nations

that suffered from Japan's wartime actions such as South Korea showed strong

opposition against Abe’s visit because Yasukuni is a symbol of Tokyo’s imperial

military past and is the place where honors 14 class-A war dead committing

atrocities during Japan’s invasion across the Asia. After his visit, Abe indicated to the

38 “Inside Japan’s New Defense Plan,” Kyle Mizokami, USNI News, last modified 20 December, 2013, http://news.usni.org/2013/12/20/inside-japans-new-defense-plan.

24

media that “what he did was just to show respects to those who lost their precious

lives for Japan, and prayed that their souls may rest in peace. He also stressed that he

had no intention at all of hurting the feelings of the Chinese or the South Korean

people.”39 However, these conciliatory words could hardly be accepted by people in

the two countries. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs persistently claimed that “the

Yasukuni Shrine problem concerns whether or not Japan properly recognizes and

deeply reflects upon its history of invasion and colonialism, and whether or not it

respects the feelings of the people of China and other victim Asian countries.”40

Shortly after the visit, Beijing summoned Japan’s ambassador to deplore this act, at

the same time Qin Gang the spokesman of China’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a

concisely worded statement, saying “The Japanese leader's visit to the Yasukuni

Shrine is, in nature, an attempt to whitewash the history of aggression and colonialism

by militarist Japan, overturn the just trial of Japanese militarism by the international

community and challenge the outcome of WWII and the post-war international order.

The Japanese leader has gone out of his way to once again create a serious incident on

the issue of history, thus erecting a new, major political barrier to the improvement

and development of bilateral ties.”41

The deterioration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic crises is mainly manifested through the

events listed above. The purchase of Diaoyu Islands ignited the flame between China

and Japan. With newly-elected leaders taking up the positions in the two countries,

mutual provocation over the ownership of Diaoyu Islands and the approach to Japan’s

wartime doings seemed to suggest the frosty relationship between China and Japan is

not likely to be easily mended.

39 “Abe’s Visit to Controversial Japanese Shrine Draws Rare US Criticism,” George Nishiyama, The Wall Street Journal, last modified 26 December, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304483804579281103015121712.40 “Japanese PM Abe Visits Yasukuni Shrine, Chinese Reaction,” China Smack, last modified 26 December, 2013, http://www.chinasmack.com/2013/stories/japanese-pm-abe-visits-yasukuni-shrine-chinese-reactions.html.41 “The Statement by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine,”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, last modified 26 December, 203, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1112096.shtml.

25

5.2. China’s New Diplomatic Performance during the Crises

The second stage in the crisis management mode is called prevention and

preparedness. It stresses the importance of pre-establishing a systematic plan to deal

with the occurrence of the crises. However, in the case of Sino-Japanese crisis, this

stage was not aroused great attention of Beijing and Tokyo and in most circumstances

was just skipped due to the rapid exacerbation of the crises. The principle of shelve

territorial disputes and carry out joint development in disputed waters proposed by

former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, though provides an alternative for territorial

disputes through mutual cooperation for the sake of energy exploration, failed to

present a feasible solution for the sovereignty issue. Hence, the author will not put this

policy under the category of prevention and preparedness. Referring to China’s

endeavors in the stage of damage containment, China’s new diplomatic performance

will be thoroughly interpreted as an evidence of its crisis management capacity. Its

efforts in dealing with the relationship of Japan, the US and Russia, the neighboring

countries in Asia and the European countries will be analyzed as follows.

With Japan

Concerning China’s new diplomatic approach to Japan, Chinese ambassadors’

collective protest action by media was a typical example. Shortly after Abe’s visit to

Yasukuni Shrine, more than 30 Chinese ambassadors published signed articles on the

local prominent newspapers in the host countries to strongly denounce Abe’s ‘ghost

worship’. The characteristics of China’s new diplomacy such as being more confident

and proactive are apparently shown during the process. Among these ambassadors,

the performance of China’s ambassador to UK, Liu Xiaoming should be highlighted.

In a BBC Newsnight TV episode on January 8, 2014, Liu and his Japanese

counterpart Keiichi Hayashi engaged in a tense debate over the ongoing Sino-

Japaneseese spat though not held face-to-face, but in two separate studio rooms. Liu

emphasized the importance of abiding by the Cairo Declaration which clearly

specified that Japan should return to China the territories it seized by force during the

26

WWII including the Diaoyu Islands. “Liu also made a special effort to reach out to the

British audience by quoting Winston Churchill’s famous saying: “Those who fail to

learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”42 Later, Liu’s performance was appraised

by most media for his more logically and skillfully expression than Hayashi. Besides

this, in his opinion article for The Telegraph, Ambassador Liu compared Japan’s

militarism to Voldemort, an extremely evil and violent figure in the popular book and

film series Harry Potter. It is not hard to conclude that Chinese new leadership pays

more attention to public relations, and is willing to “utilize more efficient means and

approaches to try and win more international empathy and support in Western

media.”43 China’s initiative in reaching global audience is largely conducive to

winning the recognition of those who won World War II and to reshaping the national

image which was sometimes misunderstood by Western media. Chinese diplomats’

collective vocal condemnation to Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine is still a strategy by

the central government to control the escalation of Sino-Japanese crisis. With these

well-educated diplomats, China’s intention of pressuring Japan is achieved, at the

same time the risk of direct military confrontation is likely to be avoided.

Although Sino-Japanese relations have been severely damaged in the end of 2013 due

to Abe’s blatant visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine and Chinese officials even

reacted that Chinese people don’t welcome Abe, both Beijing and Tokyo come to

realize that there is a great urgency for them to improve the bilateral relations not only

for the benefit of economy, but also for the regional stability in the Asia. April

witnessed two important visits which showed the two sides’ intention of mending

delicate bilateral ties. The first visit was by Hu Deping to Tokyo, the eldest son of the

late Chinese leader Hu Yaobang from April 6 to 13 at the invitation of Japan’s foreign

ministry. “Riding on his father's legacy as a friend of Japan and with direct access to

China's top leadership,”44 Hu Deping was considered as an appropriate envoy to help 42 “Global Media, China’s New Weapon against Japan,” Kai Jin, the Diplomat, last modified 13 January, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/global-media-chinas-new-weapon-against-japan/.43 “Global Media, China’s New Weapon against Japan,” ibid.44 “High Hopes for Princeling Hu Deping's Tokyo Visit,” Julian Ryall & Kristine Kwok, South China Moring Post, last modified 10 April, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1474609/high-hopes-princeling-hu-depings-tokyo-visit.

27

improve the strained relations between China and Japan. During his stay in Japan, he

is scheduled to exchange views with many senior officials including Chief Cabinet

Secretary Yoshihide Suga and Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida as well as former

premiers Yasuo Fukuda and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. In his meeting with

Suga, Hu emphasized the need for cooperation instead of confrontation between the

two countries. Although some analysts doubted whether Hu’s arrival would make

much difference, it was at least evident to see China’s desire to thaw chilly ties.

In no time a Japanese counterpart was left for China to send the similar message of

repairing the worsening relations. Tokyo Governor Yoichi Masuzoe arrived in Beijing

on 26th April, 2014 at the invitation of the city government. This 65-year-old Masuzoe

was Abe's favored candidate during the governor election in February. During his

three-day visit to Beijing, Masuzoe was committed to playing a constructive role in

improving bilateral relations by having a series of meeting with major Chinese

officials among which the one with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang aroused the

most attention. During the meeting, Wang said: “the two countries should push

forward bilateral relations on the basis of the four China-Japan political documents, in

the spirit of taking history as a mirror to guide the future. The Chinese government

supports local friendly exchanges between the two countries and hopes that Beijing

and Tokyo will continue to deepen mutually beneficial cooperation.”45 At the press

conference after the meeting Masuzoe stressed that his visit was totally supported by

Prime Minister Abe who “hoped Sino-Japanese relations could take a turn for the

better.”46 Just as Masuzoe said: "If this can even help just a little to dispel some

misunderstandings or areas where there is not enough understanding, then this will be

the best thing about my visit,”47 this visit may predict that the reconciliation of Sino-

Japanese relation is likely to be put on the agenda by both sides. Therefore, the

arrangement of these two events was interpreted by analysts as opening an alternate

45 “Chinese Vice Premier Meets Tokyo Governor,” Xinhua net, last modified 26 April, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/26/c_133292188.htm.46 “Tokyo governor passes on Japan PM's goodwill on China visit,” Ben Blanchard, Reuters, last modified 26 April, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/26/us-china-japan-idUSBREA3P05W20140426.47 “Tokyo governor passes on Japan PM's goodwill on China visit,” ibid.

28

channel of dialogue between the two countries which made a good preparation for the

restart of stalled high-level exchange.

With Major Powers

Sino-US Relations

The role of the United States should not be overlooked in the formulation of China’s

new diplomatic strategy. It is the involvement of the United States that make it more

complex in dealing with Sino-Japanese crisis. With China’s growing economic and

political muscle, the United State feels increasingly uneasy about its predominant

position established after the World War II to be replaced by this rising challenger.

The sour maritime territorial disputes between China and its neighbors such as Japan

become a great opportunity for the US to return to Asian stage. This move is proved

by ‘US’ Pivot to Asia’ diplomatic strategy during Obama’s administration. On the

matter of the strained Sino-Japanese relations, Chinese new leadership consciously

knows that the stable US-Japan alliance should be taken into their consideration. The

development of China-US relationship has a great influence over the direction of

Sino-Japanese ties. Therefore, the development of Sino-US relationship is of great

importance in China’s crisis management system. Against this backdrop, Chinese new

administration is committed to promoting a positive and healthy relationship with the

US.

The two leaders had the first sit-down meeting at the former Annenberg Estate in

California from 7 June to 8. This landmark meeting in a ‘no-ties, shirtsleeves’

atmosphere was unprecedented in the history of U.S.-China relations. The two-day

schedule gave two heads plenty of time to enhance personal understanding of each

other, and “exchange views and reach common understanding on a wide range of

issues of their concerns in a candid and straightforward manner.”48This new form

showed Xi’s considerable confidence in presenting China’s new diplomatic posture in

48 “Time to Update the Major Power Relations between China and the US,” Wenzhao, Tao, China US Focus, last modified 13 June, 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/time-to-update-the-major-power-relations-between-china-and-the-us/.

29

his generation of leadership. The most important achievement in this summit is that

the two leaders reached a consensus on building a new type of major power relations

between each other. As for the connotation of the new type of major power relations,

“Xi summed it up in three incisive phrases: no confrontation or rivalry, mutual respect

and cooperation for win-win results.”49 During his talk with Obama, President Xi

reiterated China’s commitment to peaceful development. He admitted that there

existed competition between China and the US in almost all areas: trade, science and

technology, etc, but “a collaborative yet healthily competitive interaction is ought to

be cultivated.”50 The US and China, as the No.1 developed country and the largest

developing country in the world, have much difference from ideologies to social

systems. Hence, mutual respect plays a fundamental role in dealing with the

differences in Sino-US relationship. On the basis of enhancing mutual respect, can the

two major powers “avoid the tragic path in major power politics where an established

major power competes against and later clashes with an emerging power but ends up

fighting each other in war.”51 In the era of globalization, the two countries should

broaden the fields for cooperation and develop common interests to create a win-win

result. Of course, the proposal of this new type of major power relations by Chinese

new leadership could not remove all the divergence between China and the US. On

the matter of the Diaoyu Islands, US’ side with Japan is not likely to totally change in

the foreseeable future. However, the promotion of the three new keynotes for Sino-US

relationship allows the White House to understand the new perspective of China’s

diplomacy and be willing to create more strategic discussions for the overall

development of Sino-US relations.

Sino-Russia Mode

Japan’s increasingly aggression in East China Sea and US’ return to Asia made China

feel much worried about its position and the external environment in Asia. Hence, Xi

49 “Time to Update the Major Power Relations between China and the US,” ibid.50 “Opening a New Window at Sunnylands,” Dingli,Shen, China Us Focus, last modified 30 May, 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/opening-a-new-window-at-sunnylands/.51 “Time to Update the Major Power Relations between China and the US,” ibid.

30

Jinping, upon assuming the presidency turned to tighten the relationship with China’s

largest neighbors in Eurasia –Russia. Both China and Russia want to strive for more

room for their presence in Asia in spite of US’ security guarantee in this region. This

common interest let Chinese new leadership put Sino-China relation on the top of its

diplomatic agenda. It is proved by the facts that Russia is the first destination chosen

for President Xi’s overseas trip, and Putin is the foreign leader Xi met frequently as

many as six times in 2013. Xi’s attendance in the opening ceremony for the Sochi

Winter Olympics was also a sign of strong cooperation between the two countries in

the circumstance of the collective resistance by many Western heads’ absence. “Xi

equated his visit to Russia for the Sochi Olympics to congratulating a neighbor on a

happy occasion.”52 According to Reuters, Xi told Putin during his first visit to

Moscow: “I get the impression that you and I always treat each other with an open

soul, our characters are alike.”53 The personal chemistry between the two heads would

to some extent be conducive to the prospect of Sino-Russian relations.

The main purpose of Xi’s meeting with Putin is to consolidate the China-Russia

comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination which “is distinguished for high

mutual trust, fruitful bilateral cooperation, and deep sentimental attachment between

the two nations.”54 Xi clearly indicated that “two countries should keep close

contact and coordination on major international and regional issues and strengthen

their close cooperation in economy.”55 It is known that both China and Russia are

challenged by Japan’s territorial ambition. At the same time, faced with US’

encirclement and its allies’ agitation in the South China Sea, Chinese new leadership

was eager for heating up Sino-Russia ties to relieve China’s external pressure in Asia.

As both two countries show sensitiveness towards Western criticism of their domestic

politics, Xi-Putin meeting allowed two countries to reach a consensus on “supporting

each other in promoting their respective development and national renewal,

52 “Xi Jinping Arrives in Sochi, Meets with Putin,” Shannon Tiezzi, The Diplomat, last modified 07 February, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/xi-jinping-arrives-in-sochi-meets-with-putin/.53 “Xi Ushers in New Era of Sino-Russian Ties,” Sha, Liu and Jingjie, Yang, Global Times, last modified 23 March, 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/770022.shtml54 “Xi Jinping Arrives in Sochi, Meets with Putin,” op.cit.55 “Xi Jinping Arrives in Sochi, Meets with Putin,” ibid.

31

safeguarding core interests, and independently choosing their own development paths

and social and political systems.”56 This notion is once again highlighted in Xi’s

meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Beijing on 15 April, 2014,

during which “Xi called for enhanced political mutual support between the two

countries.”57 Just in the same day, the Foreign Ministers of the two sides also had a

talk stressing that “the two countries would hold joint celebrations in 2015 for the

70th anniversary of the end of World War II and Chinese people's victory against

Japanese aggression.”58 In fact, the two foreign ministers had a telephone talk on

Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine. The two counterparts showed their condemnation on

Abe’s visit. “Lavrov told Wang: Russia holds a completely identical stance with China

on the Yasukuni Shrine issue" and urged Japan to correct its "erroneous historical

view.”59 Backed by Moscow’s commitment of collectively maintaining the

achievements after the World War II, China feels more confident in handling the

historical issues with Japan. The strong impetus of Sino-Russia ties will enhance the

two countries’ regional security presence in Asia.

With Neighboring Countries

The escalation of Sino-Japanese crises made Xi’s administration realize that it’s a high

time for China to further relations with other neighboring countries, especially those

in South East Asia. At the same time, Japanese Prime Minister Abe actively promote

his partnership with India and ASEAN states in the name of ‘value-based diplomacy’

which emphasized Japan and these countries “have shared commitment to democracy,

human rights and the rule of law.”60 By means of exaggerating the unsettled territorial

disputes in the South China Sea between China and some Southeast Asian countries,

Abe aims to set up an Asian alliance to contain and isolate China. The outburst of

56 “Xi Ushers in New Era of Sino-Russian Ties,” op.cit.57 “President Xi Called for Enhanced Relations with Russia,” Xinhua net, last modified 15 April, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/15/c_133264622.htm.58 “China, Russia Foreign Ministers Hold talks,” Xinhua net, last modified 15 April, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/15/c_133264927.htm.59 “Chinese, Russian Foreign Ministers Criticize Abe’s Shrine Visit,” Global Post, last modified 31 December, 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/131230/chinese-russian-foreign-ministers-criticize-abes-shrin.60 “Abe’s Value Diplomacy Goes against the Grain,” English. People.cn, last modified 02 July, 2013, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/8307032.html.

32

these two disputes in China’s adjacent sea at the same time is the last thing Chinese

leaders want to see. In order to create a sound surrounding environment for China’s

domestic reforms and national rejuvenation, Chinese new leadership decides to

advance close relations with neighboring countries. At the beginning of October in

2013, President Xi began his state visits to Indonesia and Malaysia, two important

members of the ASEAN and attended the 21st leaders' meeting of the Asia-Pacific

Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Indonesia's Bali afterwards. During his maiden

visit to Southeast Asia, Xi’s catchphrase of building a community of common destiny

between China and ASEAN countries could not be missed. A Five-point proposal in

Xi’s address to Indonesian lawmakers can mainly reflect Xi’s understanding of this

idea: “Firstly, the two sides should build trust and develop good-neighborliness.

Secondly, China and ASEAN countries should work for win-win cooperation. Thirdly,

the two sides should stand together and assist each other. Fourthly, China and ASEAN

countries should enhance mutual understanding and friendship to increase the social

support for bilateral ties. Fifthly, China and ASEAN countries should stick to

openness and inclusiveness.”61 These points were later transferred to China’s updated

principle in handling the diplomatic relations with neighboring counties.

Shortly after his return from the APEC Summit, President Xi held a conference

focusing on the diplomatic work with neighboring countries in the coming five to ten

years from 24 to 25 October, 2013 in Beijing. This conference aroused great attention

of the media as it released signals of Chinese new leadership’s principles in

developing relations with neighboring countries. “Xi Jinping emphasized that the

basic principle of diplomacy with neighbors is to treat them as friends and partners, to

make them feel safe and to help them develop. The concepts of friendship, sincerity,

benefit and inclusiveness should be highlighted.”62 Xi pointed out that “China needs

to develop closer ties with neighboring countries, with more friendly political

61 “China Vows to Build Community of Common Destiny with ASEAN,” English. People.cn, last modified 03 October, 2013, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8416675.html.62“Xi Jinping: Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, last modified 25 October, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/t1093870.shtml.

33

relations, stronger economic bonds, deeper security cooperation and closer people-to-

people contacts.”63 The proposal of building Silk Road economic belt and Maritime

Silk Road of the 21st century as well as the strategy of free trade zone by Xi’s

administration aims to accelerate closer economic cooperation between China and

neighboring countries. The development of regional economic integration on the basis

of mutual benefits is largely conducive to enhancing neighboring countries’ more

friendly, closer tendency to China and “increasing China's affinity, magnetism and

influence.”64 In addition to closer economic interaction, the CPC Central Committee

also indicated the necessity of promoting regional security cooperation. “The new

security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation is

advocated together with the notion of comprehensive security, common security, and

cooperative security.”65 Chinese leaders hope that the proposal of new security

concept could to some extent dispel misgivings of neighboring countries and enhance

its influence in the regional security mechanism. To sum up, the tensions in China’s

peripheral areas allows China’s new leadership to redefine its neighboring diplomacy

in a full-pledged manner. Only by virtue of this all-round boost between China and its

neighbors, can a peaceful and stable surrounding environment around China be

established.

With the European Countries

Europe is also taken into serious account of China’s broader diplomatic horizon under

the Xi-Li leadership. Chinese leaders realize it is their great responsibility to

initiatively introduce China’s story to the outside world and higher China’s voice in

the international system dominated by Western powers who have different

development paths, ideologies and cultural background from China. In the case of

Sino-Japanese crises, China’s resolution in safeguarding sovereignty and territorial

integrity is sometimes misinterpreted by the Western media as China’s increasingly

63 “Xi Jinping: Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries,” ibid.64 “Xi Jinping: Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries,” ibid.65 “Xi Jinping: Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries,” ibid.

34

aggression and apparent ambition in dominating the Asia and the world as its next

step. Hence, apart from elevating China’s hard powers such as economic and military

strengths, the approaches to enhance China’s soft powers should be given more

consideration. In January this year Abe’s comments on “comparing Sino-Japanese

relations to those between Germany and Britain on the eve of World War One”66 at the

World Economic Forum in Davos, once again intensified the world’s anxieties about

the feasibility of China’s peaceful development. China felt that in addition to

conventional diplomatic protest, a ‘go out’ plan is needed to exchange its real

opinions with the developed countries in Europe. Therefore, Xi’s tour around the

Europe at the beginning of Year 2014 is an evident example of Beijing’s awareness of

“spreading China's own model of governance and development and removing the

doubts about a rising China.”67

Xi Jinping spent nine full days for his first presidential visit to Europe, during which

he had stops in the Netherlands, France, Germany and Belgium as well as the

European Union headquarters in Brussels. This visit is historically important in

China-EU relations as “it is the very first visit paid to the EU institution by Head of

State of China since the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and the EU in

1975.”68 Although economic cooperation lay on the top of Xi’s agenda due to several

trade tensions between the two sides such as the dispute over the price of Chinese

solar panels in the last year, President Xi did his utmost to clarify what kind of

country of China is manifested by his speech in the Belgian city of Bruges — derived

from the old Flemish for "bridges". With vivid description, Xi aimed to present a

more transparent picture of China to the European audience. Five features of China

were listed by Xi as follow: “a time-honored civilization, the experience of many

66 “Japanese PM Compares China-Japan Relations to Pre-WWI Europe,” CCTV.com, last modified 29 January, 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/program/asiatoday/20140129/105202.shtml.67 “Xi Deepens EU Strategic Ties,” Global Times, Sun Xiaobo, last modified 01 April, 2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/851976.shtml.68 “Address at the Seminar on President Xi Jinping's Visit to Europe and China-EU Relations By H.E. Ambassador Yang Yanyi, Head of the Chinese Mission to the EU at the Brussels Press Club,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, last modified 27 March, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1141531.shtml.

35

vicissitudes, a socialist country with Chinese characteristics, the world's biggest

developing country and a country undergoing profound changes.”69 Chinese splendid

civilization has cultivated “a strong sense of national confidence in the Chinese

people and a national spirit with patriotism at the very core.”70 The history of being

invaded by foreign powers make Chinese so dearly cherish peace and firmly

safeguarding its sovereignty. That is the main reason for China’s choice of an

independent foreign policy of peace. China’s unique development path is determined

by its distinctive culture, history and circumstances. By employing a Chinese proverb

“the tasty orange, grown in southern China, would turn sour once it is grown in the

north,”71 Xi smartly clarified the causes for China’s insistence on its own model.

Through nearly half of his speech on the real China, Xi aimed to encourage European

countries to form a solid understanding of China from the perspective of “its history,

culture, the Chinese people's way of thinking and the profound changes taking place

in China today.”72 Referring to the directions of China-EU strategic partnership,

President Xi proposed to “build four bridges for peace, growth, reform and the

progress of civilization.”73 Xi’s speech at the Körber Foundation also left a deep

impression on the world. His quotation of “Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s saying:

‘History should not encumber memory. It should enlighten common sense.’ And

Former Chancellor Willy Brandt comment ‘He who forgets the past will get sick in

his soul”74 was interpreted as Beijing’s warning of Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s

approach to history. Xi explicitly indicated that “China will never pursue development

at the expense of other countries' interests or follow a beggar-thy-neighbor policy.”75

It is not difficult to find that Chinese new leadership learns to higher China’s voices

and seek for more support and recognition in the international platform. Xi’s

diplomatic attempts of proactively introducing China and spreading China’s domestic 69 “Speech at the College of Europe,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, last modified 02 April, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1144230.shtml.70 “Speech at the College of Europe,” ibid.71 “Speech at the College of Europe,” ibid.72 “Speech at the College of Europe,” ibid.73 “Speech at the College of Europe,” ibid.74 “Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China at the Körber Foundation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, last modified 29 March, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1148640.shtml.75 “Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China at the Körber Foundation,” ibid.

36

and foreign policies during his stay in Europe was an significant step to dispel the

prejudice and misinterpretation of China’s newly tough stance to Japan.

5.3. Lesson-Learned from Dealing with the Sino-Japanese Crises

According to the sequence in the crisis management mode, the fourth stage goes to

recovery which emphasizes on the efforts of turning the status of emergency to

normal mode after the crises come to an end. However, in the case of Sino-Japanese

crises, it is not likely to be resolved in the short term. The ruling elites of both sides

are not expected to compromise on the sovereignty of territorial issue concerning the

domestic and foreign policy requirements. Hence, the step of recovery will be omitted

in this thesis. Next to the recovery is the last step called learning. Although learning is

put at the end of crisis management mode by Mitroff focusing on evaluating the

performance, it may also occur in the middle of the mode. In this thesis, some

reflection could still be obtained through the analysis of China’s new comprehensive

diplomatic horizon in dealing with the Sino-Japanese crisis such as the role of social

media during the crisis. These points will be the important sources for the stage of

learning.

The Role of Social Media

The deterioration of Sino-Japanese crisis also leads to the sharp decline of people’s

favorable impression to the other country. According to the 9th Japan-China Joint

Popular Opinion Poll organized by Japanese Genron NPO and China Daily in 2013,

the percentage of Chinese favorable impression to Japan and Japanese positive

impression to China has reduced to the lowest rate in the last nine years with less than

10% in both countries.76 People participating in the survey in Japan consisted of 1000

ordinary people and 805 intellectuals, while in China respondents were composed of

1540 ordinary people, 200 elites from the government, media, NGO and Research

Institutes as well as teachers and students from five universities named Perking

76 “The 9th Japan-China Public Poll,” The Genron NPO, last modified 13 August, 2013, http://www.genron-npo.net/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=59:the-9th-japan-china-public-opinion-poll&catid=2:research&Itemid=4.

37

University, Qstinghua University, Renmin University, University of International

Relations and China Foreign Affairs University.

Source: The 9th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll Analysis Report on the

Comparative Data, accessed 20 April 2014,

http://www.genron-npo.net/english/index.php?

option=com_content&view=article&id=59:the-9th-japan-china-public-opinion-

poll&catid=2:research&Itemid=4.

According to the chart above, it was found that the percentage of Chinese unfavorable

or relatively unfavorable impression about Japan was as high as 92.8%, while a

comparative figure of Japanese polled came to 90.1%.77 The first cause for the

worsening of people’s likeability reflected from the survey is the escalation over

Diaoyu Islands which accounted for 77.6% and 53.2% in China and Japan

respectively.78 The historical issue about Japan’s wartime doing went to the second

place. Besides this, this survey also found that domestic media played a major role for

the people from the both sides to access to the information about the other country. In

the side of China, 89.1% ordinary people and 81.2% elites and college teachers and

77 “The 9th Japan-China Public Poll,” Ibid.78 “The 9th Japan-China Public Poll,” Ibid.

38

students agreed that Chinese media was the most important channel for them to get

the latest news about Japan. In Japan, this manner won 95% ordinary people’s

approval.79 The results of this survey lead the author to rethink the influence of social

media to people’s impression to the other country. Generally speaking, the coverage

of social media should be in a true and objective way. However, in reality it is really

difficult for the media to report strictly according to the facts concerning its own

national interests. With the rapid development of the Internet, many new social media

are vigorously rising such as Weibo, QQ and internet forum. Chinese people

especially the young generation at their 20s to 30s are more willing to get the

information via internet or mobile media and exchange their opinions in the network

community. In the case of Diaoyu Islands dispute, mainstream media tried to convey

China’s tough stance on safeguarding its sovereignty, while some of the media over-

exaggerated the confrontation between China and Japan and even predicted the war

between the two countries is going to outbreak soon after. This kind of report to some

extent misled the public that the solution for Sino-Japanese crises could only resort to

military means. In such circumstances, people’s anti-Japan sentiment may grow

stronger and turn to violence which did great harm to the stability and security of

China’s society. Therefore, a more sensible attitude is called for among the media.

Besides this, a more comprehensive perspective is expected to present by the media to

the public. It is not difficult to find that most Chinese media rest on Japan’s

infringement of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, less attention

was given to the base of Japan’s doing and Japanese understanding of the issue as

well as some key concepts such as the baseline of territorial sea. The introduction this

kind of information by the media is conducive to leading the public to form a more

rational and muti-dimensional understanding of the bilateral crisis. The strengthening

of social media’s responsibility actually plays a significant role in the stage of

prevention in the crisis management system. Both Tokyo and Beijing are expected to

take a serious consideration of their effort in this aspect.

79 “The 9th Japan-China Public Poll,” Ibid.

39

The Dilemma of the Principle of Shelving the Dispute

The principle of shelving the dispute was proposed by Deng Xiaoping to provide an

alternative mean of solving territorial disputes between China and its neighboring

countries. It initially aimed at the dispute over Diaoyu Islands. Later, it was also

applied to dealing with the disputes in the South China Sea between China and other 9

Southeastern Asian countries. However, the Abe government recently denied that

there existed any agreement between Japan and China to ‘shelve’ issues regarding the

Diaoyu Islands. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Kan Yi-wei said “There has never

been consensus achieved on shelving disputes.”80 On the website of Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of Japan, it asserts: “There is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands are

clearly an inherent part of the territory of Japan, in light of historical facts and based

upon international law. There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved

concerning the Senkaku Islands.”81 This denial put the intense bilateral ties into a

graver situation. Hence, a recalling of the history of Sino-Japanese relations is

necessary to find out why the two countries hold opposite opinion on this principle.

In the 1970s, Chinese and Japanese governments were preparing for the normalization

of diplomatic ties between the two sides. According to a series of commentary and

narration based on Japanese documentaries, the first reference of Diaoyu Islands was

on the third summit of the Sino-Japaneseese diplomatic normalization talks between

the then Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Chinese former premier Zhou

Enlai on 27 September, 1972 in Beijing. During the meeting, when the Japanese

delegate asked China’s attitudes towards the Diaoyu Islands, Zhou answerd: “It is not

good to discuss this at this time. This has become an issue because of (the discovery

of) oil (in the region). Neither Taiwan nor the Unites States would pay any attention

(to the issue) if it were not for oil.”82 This meeting was important as “Prime Minister

Tanaka regarded the Diaoyu Islands issue as a significant and pending issue that

80 “Shelving the Diaoyu Islands Dispute: A Tacit Consensus and Abe Cabinet’s Policy Change,” China Institute of International Studies, Xin, Zhai, last modified 20 January, 2014, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-01/20/content_6623684.htm.81 “About the Senkaku Islands,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/index.html.82 “Shelving the Diaoyu Islands Dispute: A Tacit Consensus and Abe Cabinet’s Policy Change,” ibid.

40

should be put forward and negotiated on important diplomatic occasions.”83 Zhou’s

status was inherited by Deng Xiaoping who considered that the principle of ‘shelving

the dispute’ was the best choice for China at that time for China’s relatively weak

national strength and the urgent need for winning support from the United States and

Japan against the threat of soviet Union. On 10 August, 1978, another significant

meeting related to Diaoyu Islands was held between Deng Xiaoping and Sunao

Sonoda in Beijing during which Deng indicated: “we should not touch it now. It won’t

matter if we stay in line with the Peace and Friendship Treaty and put it off for several

years. (…) Our generation won’t be able to sort it out. Let’s leave it to the next

generation or our grandchildren. They will find a way out.”84 Despite the oral form of

agreement, a tacit consensus on the Diaoyu Islands could be detected between the two

sides from these meetings. This tacit consensus of ‘shelving the disputes’ has

generally guided the peaceful development of Sino-Japanese relations for the past 40

years. However, with Abe’s ignorance of this agreement, many scholars show their

concerns about the feasibility of this principle in nowadays Sino-Japanese relations.

From author’s perspective, the dilemma of ‘shelving the disputes’ principle centers on

the difficulty of maintaining the continuity of the foreign policies in two countries. In

Japan, the incumbent Abe’s cabinet disregards former Japanese leaders’ avowable

attitudes towards the shelving the disputes’ consensus for the sake of consolidating its

political sustainability and “creating a favorable atmosphere for amending and re-

interpreting the constitution.”85 The tougher stance on foreign affairs can to some

extent divert public’s attention on the domestic governance. Besides this, a certain

degree of tension in Japan’s security environment is easier for the government to

convince Japanese people of regaining collective self-defense right which is a vital

step of Abe’s ambition for turning Japan into a real normal country. In China,

although the principle of ‘shelving the disputes’ has been upheld by the past four

generations of leadership, few efforts was concentrated on working out solutions

83 “Shelving the Diaoyu Islands Dispute: A Tacit Consensus and Abe Cabinet’s Policy Change,” ibid.84 “Shelving the Diaoyu Islands Dispute: A Tacit Consensus and Abe Cabinet’s Policy Change,” ibid.85 “Shelving the Diaoyu Islands Dispute: A Tacit Consensus and Abe Cabinet’s Policy Change,” ibid.

41

during the period of laying aside the disputes. ‘Shelving the disputes’ is a general

strategy in the specific context of China. It is considered that more concrete measures

are expected to formulate to deal with the escalation of disputes. That’s to say, more

specific mechanism such as interactive maritime warning system between the two

countries should be added to the content of ‘shelving the disputes’. Only in this way,

can the principle of ‘shelving the disputes’ play a positive role in preventing the crisis

in Sino-Japanese relations.

42

6. Conclusion

The deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations since 2012 is regarded as one of the

hottest issues in the international community. Territorial disputes over Diaoyu Islands

and the historical approach to Japan’s wartime doing are the two major causes for the

deadlock between the two countries. Newly elected leaders Shinzo Abe in Japan and

Xi Jinping in China both intend to take a tough position in their foreign policies

related to national sovereignty and integrity. The involvement of the United States

makes the situation in East Asia even more complex. Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy

and the long-standing US-Japan Security Treaty commitment make Japan become

more aggressive in its confrontation with China. In the domestic society, thanks to the

advance of social media, Chinese people especially those at their 20s to 30s become

more active in expressing their opinions on China’s foreign policy-making. With the

elevation of China’s comprehensive strength, the national pride among Chinese

people also become stronger. Hence, the voice calling for China’s tough position in its

diplomacy among the public becomes higher which to some extent limits Beijing’s

diplomatic decisions. In this circumstance, Chinese new leadership realizes that it is

urgent for them to re-examine China’s foreign policies and make some adjustments

accordingly.

Crisis management mode is chosen as the theory in this thesis as the author believe

that the escalation of Sino-Japanese crisis on the one hand intensifies the instability of

China’s surrounding environment, on the other hand inspires Chinese new leadership

to explore its diplomatic horizon in a full-pledged manner, during which the crisis has

been transformed into opportunities for China’s diplomacy. According to the sequence

of the crisis management mode, the first priority is to find out the events that could

indicate the worsening ties between China and Japan. It is commonly considered that

Japan’s nationalization of Diaoyu Islands inflame antagonism between the two

countries. Chinese government then cancelled many exchange activities and

commemorations to show its strong dissatisfaction. More typical incidents occur in

43

2013 such as Abe’s inspection to remote islands close to the Diaoyu Islands aiming at

declaring its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, China’s establishment of the East

China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), the issue of two ambitious

defense documents by Japanese cabinet and Abe’s tribute to controversial Yasukuni

Shrine. The list of these flaring incidents

After detecting the ‘risky’ events in the intense Sino-Japanese relation, the new

diplomatic efforts of Chinese new leadership in containing the negative impacts

brought about by the deterioration of Sino-Japanese ties is clarified as the second step.

During taking his post as China’s president, Xi Jinping has put forward many

catchphrases on China’s diplomacy which are termed by some Chinese scholars ‘Xi

Jinping Doctrine of Chinese diplomacy.’86 In the face of Japan, multi-dimensional

efforts have been made with the combination of hard and soft approaches. The most

noteworthy was that Chinese diplomats learned to take the initiative to speak up

China’s voice by means of different foreign media. In light of the US’ significant role

in Sino-Japanese relations, Xi proposed to establish a new type of major power

relations between the two countries. Although Xi broke the convention of choosing

the United States as the first destination of his state trip abroad, the California Summit

allowed the two head to exchange ideas in a more frank and relaxed way. The

essences of a new type of US-China relationship reflect Beijing’s political wisdom

and its expectation for the direction of this big power relationship with “the lowest

objective of having no confrontation or conflict, medium objective of mutual respect,

and the highest objective of cooperation and win-win. All three objectives can be

pursued in parallel.”87 In addition to the US, Xi’s administration also attaches great

importance to reinforce the relation with Russia. This move claimed by Xi was not

aligned diplomacy, but a comprehensive strategic partnership in which both sides will

respect and support each other’s core interests. Hence, it is more advanced and

independent compared to the old aligned form. Referring to China’s neighbors, the

86 “The Xi Jinping Doctrine of Chinese Diplomacy,” China US Focus, Kun, Zhai, last modified 25 March, 2014, http://www.chinausfocus.com/print/?id=36743.87 “The Xi Jinping Doctrine of Chinese Diplomacy,” ibid.

44

new concept of ‘building a community of common destiny’ was raised by Xi to ensure

a peaceful and stable surrounding environment. Western media’s bias on China and

their siding with Japan in Sino-Japanese crises allowed Chinese new leadership to

introduce the nowadays China to the West and encourage them to have a better

understanding of China. This consideration of improving China’s image is clearly

reflected in Xi’s trip to the Europe.

From the analysis of these diplomatic endeavors, the capacity of Chinese new

leadership in managing the Sino-Japanese crises is evidently proved. However, it is

not the end of the crisis management mode. The critical stage of learning requires the

author to reexamine the diplomatic performance by Chinese new leadership. In terms

of the role of social media, more responsibility and openness are needed since they

play a vital role in spreading and interpreting a country’s foreign policy. As for the

principle of ‘shelving the disputes’, is in an embarrassing situation with Japan’s denial

of this agreement. Despite originally being proposed to prevent the possible conflict

between China and Japan, it fails to realize that function. Therefore, more concrete

measures are expected to formulate to deal with the escalation of disputes. These

points could be used for enriching the stage of prevention by which the possibility of

the outbreak of Sino-Japanese crisis could be effectively reduced. Therefore, China’s

new diplomacy in Xi’s administration featured as more proactive and confident is

fully manifested through its handling of Sino-Japanese crises. To sum up, the

deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations does not put China into a passive status;

instead, Chinese new leadership alters it into precious opportunities to bring forth new

diplomatic approaches with the other countries.

45

7. Bibliography

Books:Bryman,Alan. Social Research Methods Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Boin, Arjen. "Crisis Management." In International Encyclopedia of Political Science, edited by Bertrand Badie & Dirk Berg-Schlosser & Leonardo Morlino, 495-503. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2011.

Coombs, W. Timothy. Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, and responding Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2012.

Coombs, W. Timothy, "Crisis and Crisis Management." In Encyclopedia of Public Relations, edited by Robert L. Heath, 217-221. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2013.

Hu, Ping, International Conflict Analysis and Crisis Management Study Beijing: Yi Wen Publishing Military, 2003.

Paraskevas, Alexandros, "Mitroff's Five Stages of Crisis Management." In Encyclopedia of Crisis Management, edited by Bradley Penuel & Matt Statler & Ryan Hagen, 629-633. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2013.

Peerbolte, Stacy. "Crisis Management." In Encyclopedia of Disaster Relief, edited by K. Bradley Penuel & Matt Statler, 88-92. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2011.

Journals:Hu, Ping. “International Crisis Management and Its Research Methods,” Systems

Engineering 45 (1991): 1-6.

Takeuchi, Hiroki. “Sino-Japaneseese relations: power, interdependence, and domestic politics,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14 (2014): 7-32.

Zhao, Suisheng. “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: the strident turn,” Journal of Contemporary China 22 (2013):535-553.

Zhao, Kejin. “China’s Diplomacy 3.0: China’s New Diplomacy in Post 18th Party Congress,” Social Science 7 (2013): 4-13.

Websites:Blanchard, Ben. “Tokyo governor passes on Japan PM's goodwill on China visit.”

46

Reuters. Accessed April 30, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/26/us-china-japan-idUSBREA3P05W20140426.

Buckley, Chris. “Chinese Leader Affirms Policy on Islands.” The New York Times. Accessed April 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/world/asia/incoming-chinese-leader-will-not-to-bargain-on-disputed-territory.html?_r=0.

CHEN, Jimin. “Building a New China-US Relationship.” China US Focus. Accessed April 20, 2014,

http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/building-a-new-china-us-relationshi p/.

CCTV.com. “Japanese PM Compares China-Japan Relations to Pre-WWI Europe.” Accessed April 29, 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/program/asiatoday/20140129/105202.shtml.

China Daily Website. “Xi addresses World Peace Forum.” Accessed March 7, 2014, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2012-07/07/content_15557706.htm.

China Daily Website. “Working together toward a Better Future for Asia and the world.” Accessed April 5, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/news/2013-04/11/content_16393483.htm

China Smack. “Japanese PM Abe Visits Yasukuni Shrine, Chinese Reaction.” Accessed March 28 2014, http://www.chinasmack.com/2013/stories/japanese-pm-abe-visits-yasukuni-shrine-chinese-reactions.html.

English. People.cn. “Abe’s Value Diplomacy Goes against the Grain.”Accessed April 17, 2014, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/8307032.html.

English. People.cn. “China Vows to Build Community of Common Destiny with ASEAN.”Accessed April 23, 2014, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8416675.html.

Global Security. org. “Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.” Accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm.

Global Post. “Chinese, Russian Foreign Ministers Criticize Abe’s Shrine Visit.” Accessed April 18, 2014, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/131230/chinese-russian-foreign-ministers-criticize-abes-shrin.

47

Jin, Kai. “Global Media, China’s New Weapon against Japan.” the Diplomat. Accessed April 13, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/global-media-chinas-new-weapon-against-japan/

Ling, Yuhuan. “Abe Pays Visits to Diaoyu.” Global Times. Accessed March 28, 2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/797032.shtml.

Liu, Sha and Yang, Jingjie. “Xi Ushers in New Era of Sino-Russian Ties.” Global Times. Accessed March 23, 2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/770022.shtml.

Mizokami, Kyle. “Inside Japan’s New Defense Plan.” USNI News. Accessed April 20, 2014, http://news.usni.org/2013/12/20/inside-japans-new-defense-plan.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Xi Jinping: Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighbouring Countries.” Accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/t1093870.shtml.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “The Statement by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.” Accessed April 14, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1112096.shtml.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Address at the Seminar on President Xi Jinping's Visit to Europe and China-EU Relations By H.E. Ambassador Yang Yanyi, Head of the Chinese Mission to the EU at the Brussels Press Club.” Accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1141531.shtml.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Speech at the College of Europe.”Accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1144230.shtml.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China at the Körber Foundation.” Accessed March 30, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1148640.shtml.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “About the Senkaku Islands.” Accessed April 20, 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/index.html.

48

Nishiyama, George. “Abe’s Visit to Controversial Japanese Shrine Draws Rare US Criticism.” The Wall Street Journal. Accessed March 26, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304483804579281103015121712.

Richburg, Keith. “Xi Jinping stirs nationalistic sentiments ahead of trip to U.S.” The Washington Post, Accessed February 13, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/xi-jinpings-comments-stir-nationalist-sentiments-on-chinese-twitter-ahead-of-trip-to-us/2012/02/13/gIQADPunAR_blog.html.

Ryall, Julian & Kwok, Kristine. “High Hopes for Princeling Hu Deping's Tokyo Visit.” South China Moring Post. Accessed April 15, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1474609/high-hopes-princeling-hu-depings-tokyo-visit.

Shen, Dingli. “Opening a New Window at Sunnylands.” China US Focus. Accessed May 30, 2014, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/opening-a-new-window-at-sunnylands/.

Source juice. “Xi Jinping’s Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Word Peace Forum.” Accessed April 7, 2014, http://www.sourcejuice.com/1505530/2012/07/07/Jinping-opening-ceremony-World-Peace-Forum-speech-full/.

Sun, Xiaobo. “Xi Deepens EU Strategic Ties.” Global Times. Accessed April 11, 2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/851976.shtml.

Tao, Wenzhao. “Time to Update the Major Power Relations between China and the US.” China US Focus. Accessed April 13, 2014, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/time-to-update-the-major-power-relations-between-china-and-the-us/.

The Genron NPO. “The 9th Japan-China Public Poll.”Accessed 18 April, 2014, http://www.genron-npo.net/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=59:the-9th-japan-china-public-opinion-poll&catid=2:research&Itemid=4.

The Japanese Times. “Beijing Urges Senkaku Islands Reversal.” Accessed March 25, 2014, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/10/national/beijing-urges-senkaku-nationalization-reversal/#.U3C-YLKBQgo.

The Economist. “The Horcrux of the Matter.” Accessed February 20, 2014.

49

http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21595026-intense-diplomatic-competition-between-china-and-japan-shows-tempers-rising-dangerously-horcrux#sthash.9EwYSHAr.dpbs.

Tiezzi, Shannon. “Xi Jinping Arrives in Sochi, Meets with Putin.” The Diplomat. Accessed April 07, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/xi-jinping-arrives-in-sochi-meets-with-putin/.

Xinhua News. “China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Responds to Japan’s Illegal Purchase of Diaoyu Islands.” Accessed April 13, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-09/13/c_113071308_2.htm.

Xinhua News. “China Exclusive: Defense Ministry Spokesman Responds to Air Defense Identification Zone Questions.” Accessed April 23, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132912145.htm.

Xinhua Net. “Chinese Vice Premier Meets Tokyo Governor.” Accessed April 30, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/26/c133292188.htm.

Xinhua Net. “President Xi Called for Enhanced Relations with Russia.” Accessed April 25, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/15/c_133264622.htm.

Xinhua Net. “China, Russia Foreign Ministers Hold talks.” Accessed April 27, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/15/c_133264927.htm.

Zhai, Xin. “Shelving the Diaoyu Islands Dispute: A Tacit Consensus and Abe Cabinet’s Policy Change.” China Institute of International Studies. Accessed April 21, 2014, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-01/20/content_6623684.htm.

Zhai, Kun. “The Xi Jinping Doctrine of Chinese Diplomacy.” China US Focus. Accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.chinausfocus.com/print/?id=36743.

50