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Date: 13/07/2017

Our Reference: FOIA-2017-0046

Your Reference: n/a

(Via email: )

Dear ,

RE: Freedom of Information Act 2000 Request

I write in response to your Freedom of Information Act 2000 (or ‘FoIA 2000’) request dated 03/06/2017. I

note from your request that you seek the following information:

‘Please provide the documents referred to on the web page https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-

content/armed-policing/armed-policing-strategic-threat-and-risk-assessment-stra as the "‘Anytown’ STRA

templates (blank and completed examples)’

Decision

After conducting careful searches for any information relevant to your request I can confirm that there is

information held in relation to part of your request. I have included with this response a copy of both the

Armed Policing Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment Guide and a blank version of the template

(Disclosure 1 and Disclosure 2 respectively).

However, the reference to the “completed examples” on the webpage you included in your request is

incorrect as there are no “completed examples” available for use or guidance. The College of Policing only

holds force completed STRA assessments which are provided to us as supporting evidence for the force

annual firearms license submission. As you have implicitly requested a completed assessment, please note

the disclosure of these is being refused under the following exemption:

Section 31(1)(a) and (b) Law Enforcement

Your attention is therefore drawn to the refusal notice provided in Appendix A.

I have included with this response a copy of both the Armed Policing Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment

Guide and a blank version of the template (Disclosure 1 and Disclosure 2 respectively).

2

May I take this opportunity to thank you for your interest in the College of Policing. Your attention is drawn to

the complaint rights provided in Appendix B.

Yours sincerely,

Melda Squires | Legal Adviser, Ethics, Legal and Corporate Assurance

Ethics, Integrity and Public Interest Unit

College of Policing

Email: [email protected]

Website: www.college.police.uk

3

Appendix ARefusal Notice

Please note the completed STRA Anytown template is the property of the applicable force or region that has

completed the assessment and the College of Policing only holds a copy of the completed template as

supporting evidence for their annual firearms licence submission. Therefore the reference to the completed

templates being available via POLKA on the webpage you included in your request is incorrect and will be

amended accordingly.

Section 31 (a) and (b) (Law Enforcement)

Section 31 provides –

(1) Information which is not exempt information by virtue of Section 30 is exempt information if its

disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice—

(a) the prevention or detection of crime,

(b) the apprehension or prosecution of offenders

The provision to refuse access to information under section 31(1)(a) and (b) of the FoIA 2000 is both

qualified and prejudice based. I am, therefore, required to establish the nature of the prejudice and/or harm

that may result from disclosure and where prejudice and/or harm is established but not certain, determine

the likelihood of it occurring. In addition, I must also conduct a public interest test to determine whether the

public interest lies in disclosing or withholding the requested information.

Prejudice and harm considerations

The disclosure of the completed template has the very real risk of disclosing law enforcement tactics and

investigative techniques as they contain sensitive tactical and capability data unique to each force such as

the number of firearms officers, deployment profile, tactics employed, capability, limitations and force

threats.

To disclose such information would be very likely to prejudice the prevention and detection of crime and the

apprehension and prosecution of offenders, this is because allowing the requested information into the

public domain would enable criminals to defeat police tactics and potentially avoid apprehension.

Additionally the release of the requested information would undermine the ability of law enforcement

personnel to gather intelligence for the purposes of the investigation of crime, which in turn would lessen the

ability of law enforcement personnel to effectively investigate crime and apprehend offenders. The release of

the requested information would also have the potential to undermine live ongoing investigations by

4

releasing tactics used, which is very likely to frustrate law enforcement operations both now and in the

future.

Public interest considerations favouring disclosure

There is a clear public interest in making appropriate information available to the public in order to promote

openness, transparency and to provide reassurance to the public. The release of the information would

reinforce the College of Policing’s commitment to being an open and transparent organisation, serving to

maintain public confidence in both the College and the wider police service.

Additionally the increased public awareness of law enforcement capabilities and tactics, and the way in

which the police seek to investigate crime and bring law enforcement operations and incidents to a safe

conclusion would promote a feeling of safety in the general public.

Public interest considerations favouring non-disclosure

The disclosure of the requested information has the very real and likely risk of releasing specific law

enforcement tactics and investigative techniques as they contain sensitive tactical and capability data unique

to each force such as the number of firearms officers, deployment profile, tactics employed, capability,

limitations and force threats.

Therefore to release such information would undermine the ability of the police to gather intelligence and this

is very likely to hinder the prevention and detection of crime and the subsequent apprehension and

prosecution of offenders. It would also release information into the public domain that would be available to

criminals and this would allow criminals to alter their behaviour and enable further crime to be committed.

Furthermore, disclosure of police tactics would compromise the ability of the police to bring situations with

criminals to a safe conclusion.

Overall the disclosure of information that undermines the operational integrity of law enforcement tactics and

capabilities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on law enforcement generally and

this cannot be said to be in the public interest.

Evaluation

The public interest test is a consideration of whether the community benefit of possession of the information

outweighs the potential harm. It is not an evaluation of what interests the public. On weighing up the

competing interests, I consider that the public interest test favours withholding the requested information.

5

I acknowledge that there is a clear public interest in transparency in relation to how the College conducts its

business and to release the information would promote openness, transparency and to provide reassurance

to the public. However, this must be weighed against the very real and considerable risk that disclosure of

the information would reveal specific law enforcement tactics, which is very likely to undermine the ability to

gather intelligence and this is likely to undermine live investigations as well as those that take place in the

future. The release of the requested information would also release information into the public domain that

would be available to criminals and this would allow criminals to alter their behaviour and enable further

crime to be committed.

The release of information that hinders the investigation of crime and assists offenders in compromising

operational tactics and committing further crime cannot be in the public interest and therefore I am unable to

provide you with the information requested under section 31 (1) (a) and (b).

6

Appendix B

Complaint Rights

If you are dissatisfied with the handling procedures or the decision of the College of Policing made under the

Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act) regarding access to information you can lodge a complaint with

the College of Policing to have the decision reviewed.

Complaints should be made in writing, within forty (40) working days from the date of the refusal notice,

and addressed to: FOI team, Central House, Beckwith Knowle, Otley Road, Harrogate, North Yorkshire,

HG3 1UF or email: [email protected]

In all possible circumstances the College of Policing will aim to respond to your request for internal review

within 20 working days.

The Information Commissioner

If, after lodging a complaint with the College of Policing you are still dissatisfied with the decision you may

make application to the Information Commissioner for a decision on whether the request for information has

been dealt with in accordance with the requirements of the Act.

For information on how to make application to the Information Commissioner please visit their website at

https://ico.org.uk/for-the-public/official-information/.

Alternatively, write to:

Information Commissioner's Office

Wycliffe House

Water Lane

Wilmslow

Cheshire

SK9 5AF

Phone: +44 (0)1625 545 700

Armed Policing Strategic Threat and Risk

Assessment Guide

2

nd Edition

This has been published as an interim product due

to the development of Authorised Professional

Practice (APP) and will be published in an alternative

format in the future as part of the APP programme.

Version 3.0

2013 Produced on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers by the College of Policing

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Firearms Threat and Risk Assessment Guide © ACPO © College of Policing Limited (2013) Page 2

This guidance contains information to assist policing in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

It is not protectively marked under the Government Protective Marking Scheme.

It has been produced by the College of Policing on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). It will be updated according to legislative and policy

changes and re-released as required.

Guidance produced by the College of Policing should be used by chief officers to shape police responses to ensure that the general public experience consistent levels of service. The implementation of all guidance will require operational

choices to be made at local level in order to achieve the appropriate police response.

(This publication is available as a PDF only.)

Second Edition Published 2013

First published 2006

Registered address: College of Policing Ltd, Leamington Road,

Ryton-on-Dunsmore, Coventry CV8 3EN.

Registered number: 8235199 The College of Policing is committed to making a valuable contribution to

improving public safety. ACPO and the College of Policing would like to express their thanks to all those involved in the drafting of this document. All of the

responses during the consultation phase of this project were appreciated and contributed to the final document.

© College of Policing Limited (2012) © ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) 2012

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, modified,

amended, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior written permission of the College of Policing Limited and the Association of Chief Police Officers or its representative.

For additional copies, or to enquire about the content of the document, please

email [email protected]

For copyright specific enquiries, please email [email protected]

NB: Version 1.0 is NPIA branded.


Contents

Preface...............................................................................................................5

Section 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................7

1.1 STRATEGIC THREAT & RISK ASSESSMENTS ................................................ 8

1.1.1 WHY DO FORCES NEED A STRATEGIC THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT? ...... 8

1.1.2 WHAT IS A THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT ............................................. 9

1.1.3 WHO WILL USE THE STRATEGIC THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT? ........... 11

1.1.4 REVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC THREAT & RISK ASSESSMENT? ..................... 11

1.1.5 DEFINITIONS...................................................................................... 12

1.2 INFORMATION ........................................................................................... 12

1.2.1 TYPES OF INFORMATION...................................................................... 12

1.2.2 PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION.......................................................... 13

1.2.3 REFERENCING ..................................................................................... 13

1.2.4 INFORMATION GAPS............................................................................ 14

1.2.5 SENSITIVITY OF INFORMATION ............................................................. 14

1.3 LAYOUT OF THE STRATEGIC THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT ........................ 15

1.4 PROCESS FOR MANAGING THREATS AND RISKS ........................................... 15

1.4.1 IDENTIFICATION OF RISKS .................................................................. 16

1.4.2 ASSESSMENT OF RISKS....................................................................... 16

1.4.3 CONTROL OF RISKS ............................................................................ 20

1.4.4 REVIEW AND MODIFICATION OF RISKS ................................................. 20

Section 2: STRATEGIC THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDE.......................21

2.1 THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT CONTENTS GUIDE....................................... 22

2.2 GUIDE FOR THE COMPLETION OF A STRATEGIC THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT

..................................................................................................................... 24

2.2.1 COVER PAGE ....................................................................................... 24

2.2.2 CONTENTS PAGE.................................................................................. 24

2.2.3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................... 24

2.2.4 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 26

2.2.5 LOCAL AND NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND INITIATIVES............................... 27

2.2.6 CRIME/INCIDENT PATTERN ANALYSIS OF FIREARMS-RELATED CRIME ........ 28

2.2.7 OPERATIONAL DEMANDS ...................................................................... 28

2.2.8 TRAINING – OVERVIEW ........................................................................ 29

2.2.9 RESOURCES ........................................................................................ 29

2.2.10 COMMUNICATIONS............................................................................. 30

2.2.11 REFERENCES ..................................................................................... 30

2.2.12 GLOSSARY OF TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS........................ 31

2.2.13 APPENDICES...................................................................................... 31

ANNEX 1: STATEMENT OF MISSION AND VALUES .................................................. 41

ANNEX 2: Guidance on Presenting Information ...................................................... 43

ANNEX 3: Example of Layout for Key Findings ....................................................... 45

ANNEX 4: Example of Layout for STRA Risk Register .............................................. 47

ANNEX 5: Example of Layout for an Action Log ...................................................... 49

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................51


Preface The purpose of this document is to help police forces produce a Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA) as required by the Home Office (2003) Code of

Practice on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons.

The guide reflects the recommendations of HMIC with regard to content as well as feedback from experienced practitioners. A STRA Anytown template has been produced to accompany the guide to help ensure consistency and ease of use.

Each force should produce a Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment, using the

STRA Anytown template. The document should take account of local needs and contain information considered essential to understanding local threats and risks related to armed policing. Better management of these will result in a better

service to the public and better protection for staff.

Each local Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment will contribute to the development of regional and national STRAs. Forces may also choose to work with particular forces on a collaborative STRA.

This guide replaces the ACPO (2006) Firearms Threat and Risk Assessment

Guide. Key changes include:

• Terminology (eg, ‘armed policing’ rather than ‘firearms’; ‘strategic

threat and risk assessment’ rather than simply ‘threat and risk assessment’; ‘practitioner groups’ rather than ‘working groups’);

• Additional Appendices; • An emphasis on producing Key Findings in a format that can easily

contribute to STRAs at all levels – force, regional and national.


Section 1: INTRODUCTION

This section outlines why forces need to produce a Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment. It also gives advice regarding information to be included in the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment. Finally, it describes the process of

assessing local strategic threats and risks relevant to armed policing for the creation of a risk register and action log.

Contents

1.1 STRATEGIC THREAT & RISK ASSESSMENTS ................................................ 8

1.1.1 WHY DO FORCES NEED A STRATEGIC THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT? ...... 8

1.1.2 WHAT IS A THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT ............................................. 9

1.1.3 WHO WILL USE THE STRATEGIC THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT? ........... 11

1.1.4 REVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC THREAT & RISK ASSESSMENT? ..................... 11

1.1.5 DEFINITIONS...................................................................................... 12

1.2 INFORMATION ........................................................................................... 12

1.2.1 TYPES OF INFORMATION...................................................................... 12

1.2.2 PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION.......................................................... 13

1.2.3 REFERENCING ..................................................................................... 13

1.2.4 INFORMATION GAPS............................................................................ 14

1.2.5 SENSITIVITY OF INFORMATION ............................................................. 14

1.3 LAYOUT OF THE STRATEGIC THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT ........................ 15

1.4 PROCESS FOR MANAGING THREATS AND RISKS ........................................... 15

1.4.1 IDENTIFICATION OF RISKS .................................................................. 16

1.4.2 ASSESSMENT OF RISKS....................................................................... 16

1.4.3 CONTROL OF RISKS ............................................................................ 20

1.4.4 REVIEW AND MODIFICATION OF RISKS ................................................. 20


1.1 STRATEGIC THREAT & RISK ASSESSMENTS

This section explains why forces need to produce a Strategic Threat and Risk

Assessment. It outlines the nature and purpose of a Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment.

1.1.1 WHY DO FORCES NEED A STRATEGIC THREAT AND RISK

ASSESSMENT?

The statutory instrument governing the use by police forces of firearms and less

lethal weapons is the Home Office (2003) Code of Practice on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons (hereafter ‘the Code’).

The primary reason for producing a Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment is that it is required by the Code (paragraph 3.2).

It is also necessary because “Risk is unavoidable, and every organisation needs to take action to manage risk in a way which it can justify to a level that is

tolerable. The amount of risk which is judged to be tolerable and justifiable is the risk appetite” (HM Treasury, 2004, p 9)

The main aim of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment is to provide chief police officers with information relating to armed policing that they can use to make decisions around operational requirements, deployment, policy and

training.

This has the benefit of ensuring that:

• adequate resources (human, equipment and financial) are available and can be prioritised against likely demand;

• threats and risks are managed efficiently, and decisions are taken

on preventive and corrective action as needed.

The information contained in the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment would be available to a wider audience for decision making at regional, national and governance levels.

The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment allows forces to assess threats and risks for the purposes of meeting policing obligations as set out in the Statement

of Mission and Values (see Annex 1). The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment also reflects the Risk Principles

endorsed by ACPO in October 2009 which recognise that risk management necessarily involves an absence of complete information, lack of full control, and

acceptance that harm can result irrespective of effort. Even when harm does result, it is better for the decision-maker and their organisation to be able to say risks were identified and considered rather than to be accused of ignoring risks.

The critical issue is that risk decisions have to be justifiable ie, rational, objective and capable of being defended in court.


1.1.2 WHAT IS A THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT

In general, a Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment:

• provides a strategic framework for managing armed policing-related risk proportionately and realistically across all parts of the Force (and at a

regional and national level);

• is a guide to action. It involves the use of available information to determine

how often specified events may occur and the magnitude of their consequences;

• is a systematic approach for describing and/or calculating risk. Risk analysis

involves the identification of undesired events, and the likely causes and consequences of these events;

• is an evaluation of the chance that an identified threat or risk will cause harm. It takes account of significant factors that can affect the likelihood and extent of harm;

• is an ongoing process which requires constant review and modification, with the primary aim of ensuring public safety;

• forms the basis for subsequent risk management so the likelihood of harm may be reduced.

The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment for armed policing should identify a wide range of threats that are unique to the particular force and may require the

police use of firearms or less lethal weapons (whether occurring naturally, accidentally or maliciously), as well as assessments of the potential risks that these threats may pose to public or police safety.

Crucially, the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment should identify and assess

those threats and risks that require specific planning over and above that which is carried out under normal circumstances through the force’s existing risk

management processes.

The identified strategic threats and risks may include those against the force, police officers, police staff or members of the public. They should include those

which are presently known and any others which are foreseeable (ie, perceived as likely to occur) that may require special authorisation for the use of weapons

(see the Code, paragraph 3.2.1).


To meet the requirements of the Code, the Strategic Threat and Risk

Assessment must:

• Identify and assess the known and foreseeable threats and risks to the police (personnel and organisation) and the public;

• Assess the risks in terms of proportionate resources, planning and resource allocation;

• Identify gaps in current policies, procedures and training;

• Include a list of recommendations and action plans, that address the identified threats, risks and gaps;

• Provide a clearly evidenced link between threats and current firearms establishment;

• Provide a rationale for current levels of resources.

According to the Code (paragraph 3.2.5), the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment may include the following points:

• The pattern of crime in the police area;

• The geographical and logistical considerations affecting the availability of weapons requiring special authorisation, and the deployment of personnel

trained to use such weapons or to command incidents involving their use;

• The threat posed by armed persons such as criminals, terrorists and armed

groups, which members of the force might need to confront;

• The force’s potential obligations under mutual aid arrangements; and

• The force’s responsibilities in respect of national emergencies and nationally

based plans.

Section 2 of the guide and the STRA Anytown template incorporate the above

points into the required format.


1.1.3 WHO WILL USE THE STRATEGIC THREAT AND RISK

ASSESSMENT?

The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment will be useful to:

• forces as the basis for corporate policies, procedures and systems relevant to

armed policing;

• senior personnel whose leadership is crucial to generating an appropriate culture in which armed policing risk management is visible and effective;

• frontline teams and individuals in fostering a common approach to armed policing risk management, particularly better decision-making;

• staff tasked with providing training on armed policing.

The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment will also be able to be used to encourage multi-agency working around armed policing.

1.1.4 REVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC THREAT & RISK ASSESSMENT?

The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment is a living document and should be monitored, reviewed and updated on a regular basis to ensure it remains

current.

The review should take into account any recommendations from HM Inspectorate

of Constabulary (see the Code, paragraph 3.2.4).

The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment should set out the review process, including:

• The designated owner responsible for ensuring reviews are carried out (including nominating the person or persons responsible for reviewing the

document), and for following up any recommendations;

• The timing for:

– Scheduled reviews. These should take place at least every six months

and occur alongside other strategic and financial planning processes. Forces may choose to link the timing of reviews to their designated armed

policing policy group, its remit and how often it sits;

– Unscheduled reviews. Possible prompts include changes to legislation or statutory codes; recommendations arising from public enquiries or IPCC

reports; identification of a new or heightened threat or risk; and new research or evidence on good practice.

For more on the review of local, regional and national Strategic Threat and Risk Assessments, see Appendix 14.


1.1.5 DEFINITIONS

There is no consensus on definitions for the terms ‘threat’ and ‘risk’. Many

argue that there are crucial differences (eg, ‘threat’ is a function of capability and intent, whereas ‘risk’ is a function of probability and impact). Just as many says the terms are synonymous (ie, a threat is also a risk; a risk is also a

threat).

The Code of Practice and the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment tend to use

the terms ‘threat’ and ‘risk’ as synonyms, although the guide does present specific information on carrying out a risk assessment on identified threats (see 1.4 Process Of Managing Threats And Risks).

1.2 INFORMATION

The quality and usefulness of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment will depend, predominantly, on the information on which it is based. The following section highlights some of the main considerations regarding information.

1.2.1 TYPES OF INFORMATION

Information relevant to the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment may be

political, economic, social, technological, environmental, legal, organisational and demographic.

Possible sources are:

• Other strategic assessments (eg, previous firearms assessments; national, regional and force strategic assessments);

• Intelligence products (eg, problem profiles);

• Databases (eg, crime and incidents; force databases; national

databases).

• External reviews and reports (eg, HMIC recommendations; IPCC reports);

• Research (eg, Home Office; academic; and research commissioned specifically for the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment);

• Police practitioners in the field (eg, any documented or undocumented concerns or issues);

• Partner agencies (eg, any documented or undocumented concerns

or issues);

• Information used in the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment must

be:

• Accurate

• Up-to-date

• Clear


• Relevant

• Timely

• Reliable

1.2.2 PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION

There are potentially many ways to present information in the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment. These include:

• Written text;

• Diagrammatic methods, ie, some form of chart presenting statistical or other data (eg, pie charts, tables, graphs, frequency curves,

histograms, trends, time series);

• Images (eg, maps, photographs, pictures from publications);

• Discs containing visual and/or audio information.

The use of a mixture of methods (including different colours, fonts and so on) will enable the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment to quickly convey a wide

range of information that is interesting and useful to readers. The skill is in making sure that the intended message comes across.

See Annex 2 for more specific guidance on presenting information creatively, consistently and accurately.

1.2.3 REFERENCING

Information, data, text and ideas that are used in the creation of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment that result from the work of others (whether published or unpublished) should always be clearly identified as such within the

work and attributed to their originator.

This is to:

• fulfil moral and legal obligations to recognise and acknowledge the author(s) of the original ideas;

• avoid plagiarism;

• demonstrate intellectual integrity;

• support and substantiate arguments;

• enable readers to find the sources used, check the information used and use the sources for further information.

The Harvard referencing system is the most frequently used style and is also

known as the Author-Date style. It emphasises the name of the creator of a piece of information and the date of publication, with the list of references

provided in alphabetical order at the end of a piece of work.

For more information on how to reference material, see the POLKA website at http://www.polka.pnn.police.uk.


1.2.4 INFORMATION GAPS

It may not be possible to gather certain information which is considered relevant

to the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment. Any such gaps should be clearly identified and explained in the document.

Attempts should be made to obtain the missing information in time for the next

assessment; for example, through an intelligence requirement or a written data collection plan.

1.2.5 SENSITIVITY OF INFORMATION

The Government Protective Marking Scheme (GPMS) must be adopted for the

Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment.

The classification should be displayed predominantly on the first page and on the top and bottom of each subsequent page.

If information from a protected document is incorporated into the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment, the entire document must be protectively marked in

accordance with the most sensitive information used. For example, if some of the information used is classified as being ‘confidential’, the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment should also be marked ‘confidential’.

If the information is highly sensitive, it may be possible to insert a reference stating that it exists, without detailing its contents. This would leave the

Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment as able to be labelled ‘Not Protectively Marked’.

It is possible that the disclosure of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment may

seriously reduce the capabilities of the Police Service and partner agencies to deal effectively with armed incidents. Where this is considered a risk because of

the nature of certain information, consideration should be given to creating two versions:

• a confidential version that contains all relevant and sensitive

information and is only for a police or selected audience;

• an unprotected version that can be made freely available to the

general public and wider audiences.

Reasons for making such a decision should be documented. The Freedom of Information Act 2001 and the Freedom of Information Scotland Act 2002 apply to

the Police Service, therefore the assumption should be that the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment will be disclosed upon request unless there is a justifiable

reason why it should not be disclosed.

Those producing the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment should seek advice

from the force Freedom of Information (FOI) manager about the appropriate GPMS classification and make the FOI position clear in the opening text.

Any FOI request for the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment should be referred

to and managed by the force’s FOI manager.

More information on the GPMS can be found on the POLKA website at

http://www.polka.pnn.police.uk.


1.3 LAYOUT OF THE STRATEGIC THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT

The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment should be divided into three main parts.

1. An Executive Summary. This should be a condensed version of the main report that provides the reader with the most critical information from the full

report, including a sense of its contents, an analysis of key findings and summary recommendations.

2. The main body of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment. This should

contain information about the document itself as well as information which is directly relevant to the purpose of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment,

ie, decision making around operational requirements, deployment, policy and training. A chief officer must be able to read this part of the document and

gain a clear, accurate and comprehensive understanding of the threats and risks relating to armed policing within their force area.

3. The appendices. These contain all the detailed background information used

to inform and support the main body of the document.

1.4 PROCESS FOR MANAGING THREATS AND RISKS

The overarching risk management process relates to the systematic application of principles, policies, procedures and information to the task of establishing the

context of threat and risk and then planning and implementing appropriate responses.

Whilst there are numerous risk management models, they all include the following basic processes:

• Identification;

• Assessment (or ‘evaluation’);

• Control (or ‘management’);

• Review.

These are explained in the following sub-sections – see 1.4.1 to 1.4.4.

Risk management is not a linear process; nor should the management of one

threat or risk be addressed in isolation from all others.

Risk processes relating to armed policing should be carried out in line with the

force’s established risk management practice, and use should be made of any established risk management forums, risk managers and risk registers. Current

practices may need to be reviewed to ensure that they are meeting established practices at a national level (eg, for interoperability purposes).


1.4.1 IDENTIFICATION OF RISKS

In a broad sense, the proactive identification of strategic threats and risks can be separated into two distinct phases:

• Initial Risk Identification (RI) whereby an organisation identifies its

high level risks in a structured way (eg, using a model such as PESTELO – political, economic, socio-cultural, technological,

environmental, legal/regulatory and organisational – see Appendix 5);

• Continuous RI whereby an organisation constantly re-assesses

existing threats and risks and identifies emerging ones.

The identification of strategic threats and risks is something that should be

achieved through wide consultation. A workshop or discussion group comprising representatives from both the police service and partner agencies, as well as other external subject matter experts, may be useful in helping gain a better

overview of relevant threats and risks.

Once a threat or risk has been identified, the following should be considered:

• Why do chief officers need to know this information?

• What implications does it have for:

– Levels of resources (types of personnel and equipment)?

– Training needs?

– Deployment arrangements?

– Planning of operations and training?

1.4.2 ASSESSMENT OF RISKS

Proactive risk assessment (RA) is a standardised, systematic process that

usually involves a specifically developed format for describing or calculating risk. RA should be documented in a way that:

• Facilitates identification of threat and risk priorities (particularly those that senior management should most concern themselves with);

• Captures the reasons for decisions made about what is and is not tolerable

exposure; • Facilitates recording of the way in which it is decided to address risk;

• Allows all those concerned with risk management to see the overall risk profile and how their areas of particular responsibility fit into it;

• Facilitates the monitoring and review of threats and risks.


Process

Proactive RA allows evaluation of both the likelihood of each threat being

realised, and the impact if it does occur.

Considerations include:

• what harm could occur?

• what is the likelihood/probability of that harm occurring (eg, how frequently are firearms present in this sort of situation)?

• what is the likely seriousness/impact of the harm?

• how imminent is the threat of harm?

• what are the benefits that might offset the potential harm?

• what information/intelligence is available about the situation, including the wider context in which it is occurring?

Both ‘likelihood’ and ‘impact’ are given a value. Methods for this vary. For example, some use numbers (eg, 1-5); others use words (eg, Minor, Moderate,

Major, Massive); others use colours (eg, red, amber, green).

Preferred format

The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment for Armed Policing should use a 3 point-scale with the terms

• High

• Medium

• Low.

MEDIUM HIGH HIGH

LOW MEDIUM HIGH

LIKELIHOOD

LOW LOW MEDIUM

IMPACT


In relation to Likelihood:

• High = likely to occur;

• Medium = just as likely not to occur as to occur

• Low = unlikely to occur

In relation to Impact:

• High = would cause significant harm to people and/or property;

• Medium = may or may not cause significant harm;

• Low = would not cause significant harm.

Where possible, the text accompanying the assessment of likelihood should specify a time frame (eg, likely to occur in the next few days, in a few months, within the coming year).

The threats and risks are then rated according to the likelihood and impact ‘scores’. The reason for the overall rating should be given.

For example:

• Low = Current evidence does not indicate likelihood of actual realisation of

the threat or major impact if it did occur.

• Medium = Current evidence suggests the threat is likely to occur but is

unlikely to cause serious harm; or Current evidence suggests the threat is unlikely to occur but could cause serious harm if it did;

• High = There are identifiable indicators of risk of serious harm. The potential event could happen at any time and the impact would be serious.

Benefits

The advantage of the 3-pt High, Medium and Low approach is that it allows a systematic, thoughtful consideration of individual threats and risks which:

• Is easy to learn, apply and understand;

• Is robust (i.e. reliable, consistent and able to be replicated);

• Is transparent (accompanying notes should clearly specify the data source

and assessment method of each threat or risk);

• Involves consistent terminology (to assist both the person producing the assessment and any readers);

• Provides compatibility with other STRAs (as all forces will be using the same scale);

• Is consistent with national good practice, including in a multi-agency context.

In addition, the High, Medium, Low approach helps avoid the pseudo-scientific

precision that other models can imply, particularly those using numbers.

Feedback on preliminary risk assessments of identified threats should be sought

from a range of people to ensure consistency and agreement.


Partner agencies

Other agencies may hold the information, skills and professional knowledge to be

better placed to make an accurate identification and assessment of certain threats and risks relating to armed policing. To the extent possible, police should

work with partner agencies on this part of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment.

Protective Risk Factors

Most risk assessments focus on negative risk factors. However, they should also

take account of ‘protective’ factors which may mitigate or dilute some of the negative risk factors. These are generally the positive opposites of the risk factors (eg, an offender considered a high risk because of his serious criminal

history and membership of a violent criminal gang may now be in a stable marital/co-habitation relationship, have a job, have strong social support and

have moved to a location where there is no association with former associates – all of which might reduce his risk status).

Risk opportunity

Risk assessment for armed policing should also take into consideration anything

that could have a favourable impact on organisational objectives (eg, expected government funding for new ARVs). Typical responses to risk opportunities are:

• realisation – the delivery of potential improvements to an

operational activity;

• enhancement – both the realisation of a benefit and achieving

additional gains over and above the initial opportunity;

• exploitation – changing an activity (eg, scope) in order to achieve a beneficial outcome.

Caveats

Risk assessment is only as accurate/good as the information it is based on and would benefit from notes to explain how assessments were made.

Consideration should be given to the part that professional judgement plays in any risk assessment, including interpreting the likelihood of the threat or risk

eventuating and its potential impact. The identification and assessment of threats and risk can never be completely accurate. The object is to think clearly and rigorously to obtain a good picture

without pretending this can ever be exact. Threats and risks are not equal in importance, and the categories and items

should not be regarded as mutually exclusive.


1.4.3 CONTROL OF RISKS

Once risks have been identified and assessed, it is important to consider a range of possible responses to manage or mitigate each one. This involves weighing up

what steps might be taken to deal with the risk. The acronym PRACT can be useful:

• P = Prevention – choosing to stop the threat or problem from occurring;

• R = Reduction – choosing to take action to reduce the likelihood of

the risk developing or to limit its impact; • A = Acceptance – choosing to do nothing (ie, the risk is considered

tolerable); • C = Contingency – choosing to make plans for when the risk

escalates to a level that requires action;

• T = Transference – choosing to pass the management of the threat or risk to a third party.

Decisions on individual threats and risks should be described in the form of recommendations and action plans. They should be specific, have a timescale attached and should identify a risk owner. The recommendations can be short-

medium- or long-term ones. The risk owner should be a named person, rather than a department or group.

Any potential action to manage or mitigate risks may have an impact on other areas of the organisation; therefore, the force’s risk management team should be aware of the development of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment and have

the opportunity to provide input and feedback. For example, if the risk of harm is significant, it may need to be included in the force risk register.

1.4.4 REVIEW AND MODIFICATION OF RISKS

As a living document, the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment itself will be subject to regular review (see 1.1.3 Review of the Strategic Threat and Risk

Assessment). However, constant review and modification of individual threats and risks is also required so the likelihood of harm is reduced and the chance of

success is increased. If no local risk management forum exists, it may be necessary to create a group for this purpose.

An audit trail should be kept of any modifications to current risk status and actions, including the rationale and details of those involved in the decision. This information should be captured in the Risk Register and Action Log.

The information achieved from reviewing the current risks should be used to inform any future iterations of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessments.


Section 2: STRATEGIC THREAT AND

RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDE

This section provides a guide to information which should be included in a Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment and the format in which it should be presented.

Contents

2.1 THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT CONTENTS GUIDE....................................... 22

2.2 GUIDE FOR THE COMPLETION OF A STRATEGIC THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT

..................................................................................................................... 24

2.2.1 COVER PAGE ....................................................................................... 24

2.2.2 CONTENTS PAGE.................................................................................. 24

2.2.3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................... 24

2.2.4 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 26

2.2.5 LOCAL AND NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND INITIATIVES............................... 27

2.2.6 CRIME/INCIDENT PATTERN ANALYSIS OF FIREARMS-RELATED CRIME ........ 28

2.2.7 OPERATIONAL DEMANDS ...................................................................... 28

2.2.8 TRAINING – OVERVIEW ........................................................................ 29

2.2.9 RESOURCES ........................................................................................ 29

2.2.10 COMMUNICATIONS............................................................................. 30

2.2.11 REFERENCES ..................................................................................... 30

2.2.12 GLOSSARY OF TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS........................ 31

2.2.13 APPENDICES...................................................................................... 31

ANNEX 1: STATEMENT OF MISSION AND VALUES .................................................. 41

ANNEX 2: Guidance on Presenting Information ...................................................... 43

ANNEX 3: Example of Layout for Key Findings ....................................................... 45

ANNEX 4: Example of Layout for STRA Risk Register .............................................. 47

ANNEX 5: Example of Layout for an Action Log ...................................................... 49


2.1 THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT CONTENTS GUIDE

This section provides a recommended minimum content for creating a Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment. Specific instructions for its completion are provided in Section 2.2.

Figure 1 Contents of a Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment

• Cover Page

• Contents Page

• Executive Summary:

o Aims and Purpose of the Document

o Governance

o Key Findings

o Decisions and Rationale

o Methodology

o Intelligence Gaps

o Recommendations

o Document Review

o Threat and Risk Register

o Action Log

• Introduction:

o Governance

o Scope of Document

o Methodology

o Limitations

o Circulation and GPMS

• Local, Regional and National Priorities and Initiatives:

o Strategic Policing Requirements

o Policing Priorities

o Firearms Priorities

o Policing Policy

o Armed Policing Policy

• Crime/Incident Pattern Analysis of Armed Policing-Related Crime:

o Firearms Incidents

o Less Lethal Incidents


• Operational Demands

• Training – Overview

• Resources:

o Command

o Officers

o Equipment

• Communications – Overview

• References

• Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Acronyms

• Appendices:

• Appendix 1 Force Firearms Policy

• Appendix 2 Firearms Certificates and Recovered Firearms

• Appendix 3 Potential Obligations under Mutual Aid

• Appendix 4 Responsibilities in Respect of National Emergencies and

Nationally-Based Plans

• Appendix 5 PESTELO Analysis

• Appendix 6 Crime/Incident Pattern Analysis of Armed Policing-Related

Crime

• Appendix 7 Firearms Incidents

• Appendix 8 Operational Demands

• Appendix 9 Training – Overview and Venues

• Appendix 10 Resources

• Appendix 11 Communications

• Appendix 12 Threat and Risk Register

• Appendix 13 Action log - Control Measures to Reduce Risk

• Appendix 14 Key findings and Recommendations linking local, regional and

National STRAs.

• Appendix 15 Glossary of Abbreviations, Acronyms and Technical Terms


2.2 GUIDE FOR THE COMPLETION OF A STRATEGIC THREAT AND

RISK ASSESSMENT

These instructions should be considered when using the STRA Anytown template.

2.2.1 COVER PAGE

The cover page should include the following information:

• Force name/logo;

• Name of document;

• Dates covered by the document;

• Owner;

• Author(s);

• Authorising officer;

• Freedom of Information statement and Protective Marking (GPMS);

• Date document was written and approved;

• Contact details for further information;

• UK STRA – Name of Senior Responsible Officer.

2.2.2 CONTENTS PAGE

The Contents page should contain a detailed list of all main headings and sub-headings used in the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment, including the appendices. These should be numbered sequentially, be clearly labelled and

show relevant page numbers.

If considered appropriate, the Contents page could also contain a detailed list of

all tables, figures, charts and maps.

2.2.3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Executive Summary should provide the reader with the most critical information from the full Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment, especially the

main findings and recommendations arising from them.

It should include the following:

• Aim and purpose – This section should clearly state what the document is

setting out to achieve and its intended audience;

• Governance – This section should briefly outline the governance

arrangements (ie, membership, decision-making structure, etc) established to ensure the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment fulfils its purpose (see 2.2.4 Introduction below).


• Key Findings – This section should present the main findings (normally no more than 10) in relation to known and perceived strategic threats and risks

around armed policing. The findings should provide both specific and aggregated information as deemed necessary to highlight and support

decision making at force, regional and national levels. Findings specific to the force should be presented first, followed by those with regional implications, then those likely to contribute to a national armed policing STRA. This section

will be closely aligned with information presented in the Risk Register (Appendix 12), the Action Log (Appendix 13), and the Key Findings (Appendix

14);

• Decisions and Rationale – This section accompanies each key finding and must be completed by the ACC nominated by the Owner and should include

(a) the decisions they have made on the basis of the information contained in the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment, and (b) their rationale for those

decisions.

• Methodology – this section should briefly outline how the information presented in the report was gathered, collated and analysed. Among other

things, this section should clearly identify and explain any significant information gaps in the document, whether attempts are being made to fill

those gaps, and when (if at all) the missing information is expected;

• Recommendations – These should clearly support the key findings and

should be clearly signposted to supporting evidence within the document;

• Rationale for Recommendations – This section should have a strategic focus and be brief. Further information could be provided as a

supplementary appendix to assist the Owner in evaluating the key findings and recommendations;

• Document Review – This section should briefly set out the review process, including details of the person responsible for ensuring reviews are carried out; the timing for scheduled reviews; and possible prompts for an

unscheduled review (see 1.1.4 above). This information could be incorporated in more detail in the section on governance arrangements (see

2.2.4 Introduction below).

• Risk Register – This section should present a summary of the Risk Register (see Appendix 12 in 2.2.13 Appendices for details on what the full risk

register should include and how it should be presented);

• Action Log – This section should present a summary of the control measures

to manage the identified risks (see Appendix 13 in 2.2.14 Appendices for details for completing an Action Log);


2.2.4 INTRODUCTION

The Introduction should provide the following information:

• Governance – this should outline the governance arrangements the force

put in place to oversee the development, completion, implementation and

management of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment.

• Scope of the document – this should answer the following questions:

� Why is this document being written?

� What are its aims and objectives?

� Who is it being written for?

� What time period does the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment cover?

� What geographical area is being covered?

� What risk assessment approach is being used (eg, High / Medium / Low), including an explanation for any departure from this?

� When was the last Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment produced?

� When will the next Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment be produced?

� Who is responsible for producing the next one?

• Methodology – this section should set out the research design and how the information presented in the report was gathered, collated and analysed. It should be clear, concise and straight to the point – and detailed enough for

other experienced people to repeat the research and reproduce the results. The major point is to find the balance between keeping the section short,

while including all of the relevant information.

Among other things, this section should:

� Describe the chosen research design and the rationale for it;

� Describe the primary data sources used (eg, surveys, interviews, focus

groups) and attach copies of any questionnaires, letters/emails to individuals/ organisations inviting participation, and so on);

� Describe any secondary data sources used (eg, databases, literature searches, reports, reviews);

� Describe the type of data analysis used (eg Excel, SPSS);

� Describe any community consultation carried out, in particular to assess the impact of any proposed policy on race, disability and gender equality.

• Limitations – this section should outline any limitations of the report, including those associated with methodology.

• Circulation and GMPS – this section should state the classification of the

document and the rationale for it. (See Section 1.2.5 Sensitivity of Information and the STRA Anytown template.


2.2.5 LOCAL AND NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND INITIATIVES

This section should give details of local, regional and national priorities and

initiatives which have the potential to have an impact on armed policing. These should include:

• Strategic Policing Requirements (SPRs)

• Policing priorities;

• Armed policing priorities;

• Policing policy;

• Armed policing policy (full details should be provided in Appendix 1, see 2.2.13 Appendices).

This section should also include any threats and risks linked to:

• Police use of firearms and less lethal weapons

• Firearms certificates and recovered firearms (see Appendix 2 in 2.2.13 Appendices);

• Potential obligations under mutual aid agreements (see Appendix 3 in 2.2.13

Appendices);

• Responsibilities in respect of national emergencies and nationally based plans

(see Appendix 4 in 2.2.13 Appendices).

This section should be presented so it is clear what level the information is relating to ie, force, regional or national.

The information contained in this section should be drawn from a comprehensive PESTELO analysis:

P – political

E – economic

S – social

T – technological

E – economic

L – legal

O – organisational

While the full PESTELO analysis should be included in Appendix 5 (see 2.2.13 Appendices), this section should focus on how these PESTELO issues affect local, regional and national armed policing priorities and policies.

Any threats and risks should be clearly identified and recommendations should be made to address these. A SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses,

Opportunities, Threats) on each could be useful.


2.2.6 CRIME/INCIDENT PATTERN ANALYSIS OF FIREARMS-RELATED

CRIME

This section should identify and examine any patterns and trends in crime and incident data associated with firearms and less lethal weapons-related crime.

It could include the identification and analysis of:

• Hotspots;

• Crime/incident trends;

• Crime/incident series;

• General profiles.

Threats and risks should be identified at a local, regional and national level and then assessed for impact on the priorities and policies of armed policing units at a local, regional and national level. Recommendations should be made to

address these possible impacts.

Appendix 6 Crime/Incident Pattern Analysis of Crime Related to Armed Policing

(see 2.2.13 Appendices) should contain the detailed information. Armed Policing Incidents

This section will provide an overview of incidents relating to firearms and less lethal weapons over a specified period. The focus should be on analysing the

information in order to identify trends which may pose a threat to the force. It should identify any changes in trends and whether there is an explanation for

this change. It should also provide predictions for the next reporting period and any issues relating to command.

Detailed information to support this analysis should be included in Appendix 7

Incidents involving Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons (see 2.2.13 Appendices).

2.2.7 OPERATIONAL DEMANDS

This section should consider all operational demands relating to armed policing

on a force, regional or national basis.

Operational demands will be influenced by any significant incidents or events. These events may occur with little or no warning (eg, sieges); or be planned in

advance (for example, political/major conferences and certain VIP visits). Any threats and risks which may arise from such events should be summarised in

this section.

This section should also cover:

• Operational demands around sensitive establishments such as airports, prisons and VIP residencies;

• Strategic threats and risks associated with anti-terrorist operations;

• Any known strategic threats and risks associated with operations occurring in neighbouring forces.


Detailed information relating to this section should be included in Appendix 8 Operational Demands (see 2.2.13 Appendices).

2.2.8 TRAINING – OVERVIEW

This section should outline any strategic threats and risks associated with armed

policing training. This includes:

• the provision of training; and

• the availability of training venues.

More detailed information regarding training should be provided in Appendix 9 Armed Policing Training – Overview and Venues (see 2.2.13 Appendices).

2.2.9 RESOURCES

This section should provide information on the resources required for armed policing, ie, command, officers and equipment.

Command

Issues relating to command, including cadres, resilience and availability should

be included in this section.

Officers

This section should report any problems, issues, threats or shortfalls which may occur due to the availability and training of firearms officers (including issues

around recruitment, selection and retention). It should also cover any measures which have been put in place to manage these matters in the short-term and

recommendations for future measures which would help manage them in the long-term.

Detailed information regarding human resources for armed policing (eg, the

exact numbers, training, and availability of officers) should be included in Appendix 10 Resources (see 2.2.13 Appendices).

Equipment

This section should report any problems, issues, threats or shortfalls of the

current situation regarding the existence and availability of equipment.

Detailed information regarding equipment, its use and its availability for

deployment, should be included in Appendix 10 Resources (see 2.2.13 Appendices)


2.2.10 COMMUNICATIONS

This section should outline in summary form any threats and risks that are

relevant to armed policing communications and how these are managed. It should include:

• How armed policing communities within the force communicate amongst

themselves at a local level;

• How armed policing communities within the force communicate with other

armed policing communities at a regional and national level;

• How the armed policing communities within the force communicate with external parties;

• How information regarding armed policing policies is communicated.

Appendix 11 Communication (see 2.2.13 Appendices) should provide detailed

information to support this assessment.

2.2.11 REFERENCES

The reference section is a list of all the documents and information sources which have been consulted and used to write the document. This section must

provide enough detail to enable someone else to find the document or information source.

It is recommended that the Harvard system of referencing is used and that care is taken to ensure all references are correct, complete and consistent.

In the Harvard system, which is also known as the Author-Date system, the

author's surname and year of publication are cited in the text of the work. The full details of the book (or article, etc) are included in a reference list at the

end of the assignment.

For example:

• Direct in-text citation (should include a page reference):

“The context of policing is changing and the challenges for policing with it” (Neyroud and Beckley, 2001, p.3)

• Indirect in-text citation (should include the author’s name, followed by the year of publication of their work):

A number of commentators (eg, Neyroud and Beckley, 2001) suggest that …

• Reference list (should include details for everything cited in the work and should be in alphabetical order by author). The required elements for a reference

are: Author, Initials., Year. Title of book. Place: Publisher. Neyroud, P. and Beckley, A., 2001. Policing, Ethics and Human Rights.

Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing.

More guidance on referencing can be found on the POLKA website at

www.polka.pnn.police.uk at the Uniform Operational Support, Firearms Section.


2.2.12 GLOSSARY OF TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment should contain a glossary, ie, a list of

abbreviations, acronyms and technical terms used throughout the document to help the reader understand new or uncommon vocabulary and specialised terms.

The glossary should be in alphabetical order and attached as Appendix 15 at the

end of the document (see 2.2.13 Appendices).

2.2.13 APPENDICES

The final part of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment is the appendices. These should contain the detailed information which has been used to inform the

main part of the report, particularly the key findings.

Appendix 1 Force Armed Policing Policy

This appendix should provide a copy of or link to the force’s armed policing policy. If appropriate, copies of or references to regional or national policies

should be included. Appendix 2 Firearms Certificates and Recovered Firearms

This appendix should include the following information should be included:

• Firearms and shotgun certificates (by type); • Firearms dealers; • Weapons recovered and destroyed by type (include information on,

for example, any amnesties and operations); • Firearms reported lost or stolen;

• Imitation firearms;

• Adapted firearms;

• General issues concerning information and intelligence of possible

firearms which are unlawfully held; • Details on how this information is kept and updated.

The information in this section will be specific at the local level, but may have relevance for regional and national Strategic Threat and Risk Assessments.


Appendix 3 Potential Obligations under Mutual Aid Arrangements

This appendix should include details on:

• The state of current obligations (formal and informal where

appropriate);

• Previous mutual aid that has been supplied (state details, including the time period);

• Anticipated mutual aid obligations in the foreseeable future;

• Resources which could potentially be supplied;

• Relationships with other forces and organisations in the region.

Appendix 4 Responsibilities in Respect of National Emergencies and Nationally-Based Plans

This appendix should report on the force’s responsibilities and availability:

• In the case of a national emergency; and/or

• To meet obligations to any national plans, eg, the National Armed Mobilisation Plan.

If appropriate, this appendix should also outline regional responsibilities and

availability.

Appendix 5 PESTELO

The acronym PESTELO is widely used to guide strategic assessments. It enables users to consider a range of factors that may affect the future in the short,

medium and long term.

The analysis should be carried out according to the following headings:

• P – Political

• E – Economic

• S – Social

� social demographics

� social profile.

• T – Technological (eg, any new technology which may have an effect on

armed policing)

• E – Environmental (eg, key political, economic and industrial sites, and

vulnerable sites and sectors; Also transport-related sites such as key roads, railways, waterways and ports and airports; and Coasts, main cities and

developments)


• L – Legal – any recent or forthcoming legislation which may have a direct effect on the work of armed policing. This should include legislation

surrounding human rights issues (Human Rights Act 1998); diversity and equality legislation; and Health and Safety legislation (Health and Safety Act

1974, Workplace Health and Safety and Welfare Regulations 1992 and Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999). For more information see http://www.hse.gov.uk and http://www.hsedirect.com).

• O - Organisational (eg, policing structures, systems, policies and procedures; and factors affecting the policing landscape at a local, regional and national

level).

Information that is able to be presented in a time series is useful for identifying trends.

The information in this section will be specific to the force, but may include information from or of relevance to regional and national Strategic Threat and

Risk Assessments.

Appendix 6 Crime/Incident Pattern Analysis of Crime Related to Armed Policing

This appendix should cover the following topics:

• Local crime and incidents;

– Aggravated acquisitive crime

– Anti-social behaviour

– Domestic Abuse with emphasis on use of weapons

• Serious and organised crime;

– Drugs

– Gang-related crime

– Armed robbery

– Organised immigration crime (people smuggling and human trafficking)

– Hi-tech crime

– Fraud (against individuals and the private sector)

– Organised vehicle crime

• Terrorism;

– International terrorism

– Domestic terrorism

• Domestic Extremism (generally associated with a single-issue campaign, and

for policing purposes has been categorised into five themes: animal rights; extreme right-wing; extreme left wing; environmental; and emerging trends);

• Use of weapons (including air weapons and knives).


This section may also present data relating to:

• Any operations which have been carried out and the results and lessons

learned from them;

• Any diversity issues that have arisen operationally (eg, communication

difficulties due to disability or language);

• Surveys (eg, public perception of crime, public trust and confidence in the police).

The information in this section will be specific to the force, but may include information from or of relevance to regional and national Strategic Threat and

Risk Assessments.

Appendix 7 Incidents involving Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons

This appendix should include the number and types of incidents involving

firearms. The information could be broken down by:

• Year and month;

• Day of week analysis;

• Time of day analysis;

• Location of incidents;

• Type of incidents;

• Pre-planned incidents;

• Spontaneous incidents;

• Simultaneous incidents; • Number of arrests;

• Total deployments;

• Response times;

• SLA response time;

• Command Issues (cadres, resilience, when contacted, frequency of contacts).

• Resolution

Appendix 8 Operational Demands

This appendix should include details relating to significant incidents and events

which have happened within the force area since any previous assessment, such as:

• Sieges;

• Political/major conferences;

• VIP visits (including royalty and others);

• Other significant events or anniversaries;


• Number of authorisations made in connection to these.

List any similar anticipated future events including any operations which will

need specific armed policing resources. Details should be given as to how these resources will be provided.

This section should also include details on the policing of sensitive establishments such as airports, prisons and VIP residences as well as the following:

• Numbers of locations policed;

• Resource implications;

• Required tasks;

• Training;

• Weapons authorised to carry.

List any involvement in and preparation for anti-terrorist operations (at a local, regional or national level).

Appendix 9 Armed Policing Training – overview and Venues

This appendix focuses on armed policing training and should include details relating to:

• Training provision (eg, internal and/or external providers);

• Training staff available;

• Training venues available;

• Training records;

• Training Plan.

The information in this section will be specific to the force, but may include information from, or of relevance to, regional and national Strategic Threat and

Risk Assessments.

Appendix 10 Resources

This appendix should report on the following roles:

Command

• CT Command

• Strategic Command;

• Tactical Command;

• Operational Command

Officers

• Those roles identified within module A2 of the NPFTC

• Tactical Advisers;


• Negotiators;

• Dogs;

• Medics;

• Post-Incident Management;

• Trauma Management.

This list is not exhaustive.

Consideration should be given to national, regional and force requirements.

Others

• Interpreters and Translators;

• Community Advisory Groups.

The following information should be provided for all of the above roles:

• The number of officers by:

– Location;

– Rank;

– Type of armed policing training undertaken;

– Accreditation status;

– Operational currency.

This information will be aggregated in regional and national STRAs.

• Availability for deployment

– Numbers;

– Availability (by time period eg, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week

– Cadres, resilience.

• Any diversity issues including:

– application and recruitment data, and other employment data, broken

down by ethnic origin, gender, religion and beliefs, and sexual orientation;

– any evidence of under-representation of any group as compared with officers in the force as a whole, and any explanation for this;

– any allegations of discrimination or harassment arising in the course of application to or employment in the firearms unit.

• Succession planning for resilience.

• Issues surrounding the recruitment, selection and retention of staff.

• The training that has been delivered (eg, initial/ refresher training / NFPTC

modules).

• Training that is planned.


Equipment

This section of Appendix 10 should report the details of all available equipment

including:

• Weapons (including less lethal weapons);

• Vehicles;

• Personal protection equipment;

• IT kit;

• Surveillance kit;

• Communications kit.

The following information must be included for each of the above categories:

• Numbers;

• Suitability and availability for deployment;

• Analysis of use (every 12 months).

Appendix 11 Communications

This appendix should provide detailed information regarding any threats and

risks that are relevant to armed policing communication strategies.

It should include:

• How armed policing communities within the force communicate amongst themselves at a local level;

• How armed policing communities within the force communicate with other armed policing communities at a regional and national level;

• How the armed policing communities within the force communicate with

external parties;

• How information regarding armed policing policies is communicated.

• Any other relevant information (for use at a local, regional or national level).

Appendix 12 Risk Register

This appendix sets out the full prioritised Risk Register for the Strategic Threat

and Risk Assessment. It should bring together all the identified threats, the assessment of their likelihood and potential impact, and the recommendations to manage them.

The risk register should identify ownership and allow the force to record progress through changes in risk levels.

See Annex 4 for an example of the STRA Risk Register. This example and the Anytown STRA template will make it easy to develop, monitor and update the information in the risk register.


All identified threats and risks should be coded according to the likelihood of them actually occurring and the risk of harm they pose.

The recommendations in the Risk Register should be:

• Numbered;

• And cross-referenced to the domain/key finding/action log

• Organised under titles;

• Specific. The recommendations made can be short-term, medium-term or

long-term.

In addition:

• The responsibility for exploring or implementing a recommendation should be assigned to a particular person.

• The time frame to which a recommendation relates should be captured within

the risk register and cross referenced to the action plan.

• Recommendations from other reviews or documents should be included.

• If recommendations go beyond the capability and capacity of existing armed policing resources, a change in policy may be required (eg, to involve other units, commandeer other funding, etc). This could occur at force, region or

national level.

The Risk Register must make a link between the threats and risks and any

implications the recommendations may have for:

• Resources – of personnel and equipment;

• Training and accreditation;

• Making decisions about deployment of weapons and personnel;

• Other forces, regions or the UK as a whole (the information provided in the

STRA will inform local, regional and national STRAs).

Appendix 13 Action Log – Control Measures to Reduce Risk

This should include the measures introduced to control any identified risk to the

public and/or the police and associated agencies.

Control measures are those intended to deal with the risk: eg

• Remove, Avoid, Reduce, Accept the risk (RARA)

• Prevention, Reduction, Acceptance, Contingency, Transference (PRACT)

Appendix 14 – Key findings and Recommendations at Local, Regional

and National Level

The key findings and recommendations from a local Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment will be used in the creation of collaborative, regional and national

STRAs. This section outlines the process for setting out key findings and


accompanying recommendations at the local level, then elevating them to consecutive levels as appropriate.

Local STRA

As outlined in this guide, the information collected and analysed in relation to known and perceived strategic threats and risks around armed policing should be presented in Appendix 14 using a clear and succinct format that includes:

• the key findings (preferably no more than 10);

• the risk status of each finding (H/M/L);

• the ACC’s decisions and rationales;

• the recommendations.

Findings specific to the force should be presented first, followed by those with

regional implications, then those likely to contribute to a national armed policing STRA (see Annex 3 for an example).

The information presented in Appendix 14 of the local Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment should be clearly cross-referenced to information in:

– the local Risk Register (Appendix 12), and

– the local Action Log (Appendix 13).

The local Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment will be submitted annually to the

Regional Lead on Armed Policing to support:

• the development and review of the regional STRA

• decision-making at the regional level.

Before the STRA is submitted, the entire document should be reviewed to identify any issues that may have regional implications but have not been

included in the Key Findings. Amendments should be made as necessary.

Collaborative STRA

A force may decide to work with other forces on a Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment that offers shared opportunities but operates below regional level.

This collaborative document should be subject to the same processes as the local one, including assembling an aggregated Appendix 14, which, in turn, is

clearly cross-referenced to information in an aggregated Risk Register (Appendix 12) and an aggregated Action Log (Appendix 13).

Any collaborative Strategic Threat and Risk Assessments should be submitted

annually to the Regional Lead in the same way as a force-level STRA.

Regional STRA

The Regional Lead for Armed Policing will:

• receive copies of all local and collaborative STRAs on an annual basis;

• review the Executive Summary of each;


• review Appendix 14 from each STRA to confirm all threats and risks identified as relating to a regional level;

• use local and collaborative STRAs to produce a regional STRA comprising:

– an Executive Summary

– an aggregated Appendix 12 (Risk Register), 13 (Action Log) and 14 (Key Findings and Recommendations) that clearly set out:

(A) Issues Identified as Regional Ownership

(B) Issues Identified as National Ownership

– annexes with supporting information from the local and collaborative

STRAs.

The Regional Lead will ensure Appendix 14 is updated with appropriate (ie, regional) decisions and rationales in relation to each key finding.

Where the Regional Lead does not agree that a key finding is a regional threat or risk, they will inform the force of their reasoning and recommend a course of

action for handling that particular issue.

National STRA

The National Lead for Armed Policing will:

• receive copies of all regional STRAs on an annual basis;

• review the Executive Summary of each;

• review Appendix 14 from each regional STRA to confirm all threats and risks

identified as relating to both a regional and a national level;

• use regional STRAs to produce a national STRA comprising:

– an Executive Summary

– an aggregated Appendix 12 (Risk Register), 13 (Action Logs) and 14c (Key Findings and Recommendations)

– annexes with supporting information from the regional STRAs.

Where the National Lead does not agree that a key finding is a national threat or risk, they will inform the Regional Lead of their reasoning and recommend a

course of action for handling that particular issue. The National Lead will approve, ratify and action the Key Findings and

Recommendations in Appendix 14c of the national STRA.


ANNEX 1: STATEMENT OF MISSION

AND VALUES

STATEMENT OF MISSION AND VALUES

(ACPO July 2011)

The mission of the police is to make communities safer by upholding the law fairly and firmly; preventing crime and antisocial behaviour; keeping the peace;

protecting and reassuring communities; investigating crime and bringing offenders to justice.

We will act with integrity, compassion, courtesy and patience, showing neither fear nor favour in what we do. We will be sensitive to the needs and dignity of victims and demonstrate respect for the human rights of all.

We will use discretion, professional judgement and common sense to guide us and will be accountable for our decisions and actions. We will respond to well-

founded criticism with a willingness to learn and change.

We will work with communities and partners, listening to their views, building

their trust and confidence, making every effort to understand and meet their needs.

We will not be distracted from our mission through fear of being criticised. In

identifying and managing risk, we will seek to achieve successful outcomes and to reduce the risk of harm to individuals and communities.

In the face of violence we will be professional, calm and restrained and will apply only that force which is necessary to accomplish our lawful duty.

Our commitment is to deliver a service that we and those we serve can be proud

of and which keeps our communities safe.


RISK PRINCIPLES FOR THE POLICE SERVICE

(ACPO Oct 2009)

PRINCIPLE 1: The willingness to make decisions in conditions of uncertainty

(ie, take risks) is a core professional requirement of all members of the Police Service.

PRINCIPLE 2: Maintaining or achieving the safety and well-being of individuals and communities is the primary consideration in risk decision making.

PRINCIPLE 3: Risk taking involves judgement and balance, with decision

makers required to consider the value and likelihood of the possible benefits of a particular decision against the seriousness and likelihood, of the possible harms.

PRINCIPLE 4: Harm can never be totally prevented. Risk decisions should, therefore, be judged by the quality of the decision making, not by the outcome.

PRINCIPLE 5: Taking risk decisions, and reviewing others’ risk decisions, is

difficult so account should be taken of whether they involved dilemmas or emergencies, were part of a sequence of decisions or might appropriately have

been taken by other agencies.

PRINCIPLE 6: The standard expected and required of members of the Police is that their risk decisions should be consistent with those a body of officers of

similar rank, specialism and experience would have taken in the same circumstances.

PRINCIPLE 7: Whether to document a decision is a risk decision it itself which should, to a large extent, be left to professional judgement. Deciding whether or not to make a record, however, and the extent of that record, should be

informed by consideration of the likelihood of harm occurring and its seriousness.

PRINCIPLE 8: To reduce risk aversion and improve decision making, policing needs a culture that learns from successes as well as failures. Good risk-taking should be identified, celebrated and shared.

PRINCIPLE 9: Since good risk taking depends upon quality information, the Police Service will work with partner agencies to share relevant information

about those who pose risk or those who are vulnerable to the risk of harm.

PRINCIPLE 10: Members of the Police Service who make decisions consistent with these principles should receive the encouragement, approval and support of

their organisation.


ANNEX 2: Guidance on Presenting

Information

The information contained in the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment must be an ‘easy read’. When creating the document the following points should be

considered:

• The formatting should be consistent throughout the document.

• When making a decision about whether to use a table or graph, think about what sort of data it involves:

– Use a table if it is important that numerical details are maintained (eg, number of weapons, by type).

– Graphs are useful when the reader needs to see a pattern or trend in the results, and when precise numerical details do not have to be

communicated through the graph.

• An interpretation and explanation of the graphical representation should be included in the main body of the text. This will highlight the main points from the

information.

• The origin of the information must be clearly stated. At the foot of the

illustration, there should be a caption stating the information source, the date it was collected and who compiled the visual aid.

• Do not put too much information into one graphical representation.

• All graphical representations should be numbered sequentially.

• Make sure that headings in tables are accurate descriptions of the content

below them (eg, time period, number of officers, cost).

• In graphs, axes should be labelled fully with the units of measurement (eg, metres, £, %).

• If symbols are put onto a map then a key must be provided so that the symbols can be interpreted. If certain areas are colour coded or shaded, a key

should be included to explain what the different colours/shades mean.

• If colour is used, consider what the representation will look like in black and white. Many documents will be photocopied or printed in black and white, and

the information which is transmitted through the use of different colours is lost. Make sure that the main points can be clearly read as background shading

becomes very dark when reproduced in black and white.


ANNEX 3: Example of Layout for Key Findings

Example for Appendix 14, 14a & 14b: table presenting key findings, risk status, recommendations, decisions and

rationales

FORCE LEVEL - Appendix 14 To be completed by the appropriate Lead

Ref Key Finding Risk Status

Recommendation Decision Rationale Ownership Signature & Date

KF1 D RR AL

There is currently insufficient full time staff within the Firearms Training Department to deliver the scheduled training calendar in accordance with College of Policing licensing requirements.

H F

2 The number of Close Protection officers within the region is insufficient to provide 24/7 cover during the Royal visits planned in 2013 for the North West Region.

R

3 The current central funding does not meet the training needs for ammunition to maintain the identified number of AFOs authorised in 5.56 weaponry to

fulfil the National Armed Mobilisation plan

N

4

5

6

Key to References: D = Domain; KF = Key Finding; RR = Risk Register; AL = Action Log

NB:

1. Identify and list local/collaboration issues.

2. Identify and list issues which need to be reviewed as potential regional issues.

3. Identify and list issues which need to be reviewed as potential national issues.

4. Under "ownership" identify as "F"= Force; "R"=Regional"; "N"=National


REGION LEVEL. Appendix 14 (a)

Key Finding Risk Status

Recommendation Decision Rationale Signature & Date

1

2

3

NATIONAL LEVEL. Appendix 14 (b)

Key Finding Risk Status

Recommendation Decision Rationale Signature & Date

1


ANNEX 4: Example of Layout for STRA Risk Register

3 – Local and National Priorities and Initiatives References

Ref

No

Title &

Description

of Risk

Existing

Risk

Rating

Possible Impact and

Implication of Risk

Recommendations

Risk Level

Initial Action +

Review Date

Risk

Owner

D3.2

KF1

RR1

AL4

Dynamic

Entry

(H) No Dynamic Entry

/Intervention capability

within force capable of

reducing risk and dealing

with incident appropriately.

Continue to research the

opportunities to source

this capability from

another Force. SFG to

review and refer to

ACPOS Working Group on

Armed Policing

(H) Ongoing – following

extraordinary meetings

chaired by ACC Smith,

City Police, the provision

of specialist services is to

be reviewed and

discussed at ACPOS

Armed Policing Group

C/Insp

Fellows

D3.2

KF2

RR2

AL6

SKI (H) No trained suicide killer

intervention capability within

force to respond to

spontaneous incidents.

Continue to research the

opportunities to source

this capability from

another Force. SFG to

review and refer to

ACPOS Working Group on

Armed Policing

(H) Ongoing – following

extraordinary meetings

chaired by ACC Smith

City Police, the provision

of specialist services is to

be reviewed and

discussed at ACPOS

Armed Policing Group

C/Insp

Fellows



ANNEX 5: Example of Layout for an Action Log

To be provided

References Actions Owner Review Date Archived Date

AL

KF

RR D



REFERENCES

Home Office (2003) Code of Practice on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal

Weapons. Bramshill: Centrex. Available from:

http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-andpublications/publication/operational-

policing/useoffirearms.pdf [Accessed 10 August 2006].

Metropolitan Police Service Corporate Risk Team (2005) Business Risk

Management Standard Operating Procedure, Framework and User Guide.

[Electronic copy obtained from source].

National Police Training, PITO, ACPO and ACPOS (October 2001) Handling of

Protectively Marked Material, A Guide for Police Personnel. London: TSO.

Available from http://www.genesis.pnn.police.uk at the Uniform Operational

Support, Firearms section [Accessed on 10 August 2006].

Force/Collaboration name

Armed Policing StrategicThreat and Risk

Assessment Guide 2013

Authorising Officer:

Author:

Period Covered:

Date document written:

Date approved:

Handling Instructions

This document is GPMS classified as “RESTRICTED”

This cover sheet must not be detached from the report to which it refers.

This document is the property of Anytown Police. If found telephone XXXX XXXXXXX or hand in at yournearest Police Station.

RESTRICTED

AL-Anytown Template, Version 1 (30/01/2013) Page 2

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ContentsThe referencing used in this section relates to the relevant section in the ArmedPolicing Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment Guide 2013, which provides theauthor with detailed guidance for completion of the section and the relevantappendices that the author should use. All of the guidance material should beadhered to ensure that standardisation can be achieved in style and content.

• Contents Page (2.2.2)

1.0 Executive Summary: (2.2.3)

(All appendices can be referenced within this section to ensure the owner

Is signposted to the relevant detailed information)

1.1 Aims and Purpose of the Document1.2 Governance1.3 Key Findings1.4 Decisions and Rationale1.5 Methodology1.6 Intelligence Gaps1.7 Recommendations1.8 Document Review1.9 Threat and Risk Register1.10 Action Log

2.0 Introduction: (2.2.4)

2.1 Governance2.2 Scope of Document2.3 Methodology2.4 Limitations2.5 Circulation and GPMS

3.0 Local, Regional and National Priorities and Initiatives: (2.2.5)

(Appendices associated with this section are 1,2,3,4 & 5)

3.1 Strategic Policing Requirements3.2 Policing Priorities3.3 Firearms Priorities3.4 Policing Policy3.5 Armed Policing Policy (Full details Appendix 1)

4.0 Crime/Incident Pattern Analysis of Armed Policing-Related Crime: (2.2.6)(Appendix 6 & 7)

4.1 Firearms Incidents4.2 Less Lethal Incidents


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5.0 Operational Demands: (2.2.7) (Appendix 8)

5.1 Introduction – this should give an overview of the operational demandsrelating to Armed Policing for the force. It should also capture regional andnational demands.

5.2 Significant incidents or events, both spontaneous and planned.5.3 High profile visits or events.5.4 Demands for sensitive establishments e.g. airports, prisons, VIP residences,5.5 Demands and threat for anti-terrorist operations.5.6 Threat and risk associated with operations occurring regionally and/or

nationally.

6.0 Training – Overview (2.2.8) (Appendix 9)

6.1 Training demands and delivery6.2 Training venues6.3 Risks associated with the delivery of training, (e.g. locations, staff, recruitment,

equipment).

Note: A detailed training plan for the year and all current role profiles must beincluded in Appendix 9

7.0 Resources: (2.2.9) (Appendix 10)

7.1 Command7.2 Officers7.3 Equipment

8.0 Communications – Overview (2.2.10) (Appendix11)

8.1 Locally8.2 Regionally8.3 National

Note: A detailed list of meetings which form the communication strategy includingdetails of attendees, frequency and standing agenda items should be included aspart of Appendix 11

9.0 References (2.2.11)

10.0 Glossary of terms, Abbreviations and Acronyms. (2.2.12) (Appendix 15)

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Force Firearms Policy

Appendix 2 Firearms Certificates and Recovered Firearms

Appendix 3 Potential Obligations under Mutual Aid


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Appendix 4 Responsibilities in Respect of National Emergencies andNationally-Based Plans

Appendix 5 PESTELO Analysis

Appendix 6 Crime/Incident Pattern Analysis of Armed Policing-Related Crime

Appendix 7 Firearms Incidents


Appendix 9 Training – Overview and Venues



Appendix 12 Threat and Risk Register

Appendix 13 Action log - Control Measures to Reduce Risk

Appendix 14 Key findings and Recommendations linking local, regional andnational STRAs.

Appendix 15 Glossary of Abbreviations, Acronyms and Technical Terms


RESTRICTED

1.0 Executive Summary : (2.2.3)

(All appendices can be referenced within this section to ensure the owner

Is signposted to the relevant detailed information)

Executive Summary – CoP Comments

This section will give an overview to the ACPO lead of the threat and risksfaced by the force or collaboration and will include the key findings,recommendations. Normally no more than 10.

The author needs to provide a clear link to the domain and appendix whichprovides the relevant supporting evidence. Guidance for each heading can befound in 2.2.3 of the Armed Policing Strategic Threat and Risk AssessmentGuide. 2013

The sign off boxes enable the ACC lead to record their decision and rationale.

The key findings and recommendations must provide a clear cross reference tothe risk register in Appendix 12 and the action log in Appendix 13.

If the author wishes to provide the ACPO lead with their rationale for therecommendations this should be provided as a separate appendix.

1.1 Aims and Purpose of the Document

1.2 Governance

1.3 Key Findings

Key Finding 1:

ACC Lead

Decision:

Rationale:

Signature & Date:

Reference Nos;Domain Appendix Risk Register Action Log


RESTRICTED

Key Finding 2:

ACC Lead

Decision:

Rationale:

Signature & Date:


Key Finding 3:

ACC Lead

Decision:

Rationale:

Signature & Date:



RESTRICTED

Key Finding 4:

ACC Lead

Decision:

Rationale:

Signature & Date:


Key Finding 5:

ACC Lead

Decision:

Rationale:

Signature & Date:



RESTRICTED

Key Finding 6:

ACC Lead

Decision:

Rationale:

Signature & Date:


1.4 Decisions and Rationale

1.5 Methodology

1.6 Intelligence Gaps

1.7 Recommendations

1.8 Document Review

1.9 Threat and Risk Register

1.10 Action Log


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2.0 Introduction :(2.2.4)

Introduction – CoP Comments

The introduction should provide the following information:

Governance Scope of the Document :

(This section must also include the risk assessment process being used bya force / collaboration)

Methodology Limitations Circulation and GMPS Classification

2.1Governance

2.2Scope of Document

Remember the following information in 1.1.2 should be used as a bench markfor the design, content and findings of the assessment;

To meet the requirements of the Code, the Strategic Threat and RiskAssessment must:

Identify and assess the known and foreseeable threats and risks to thepolice(personnel and organisation) and the public;

Assess the risks in terms of proportionate resources, planning andresource allocation;

Identify gaps in current policies, procedures and training; Include a list of recommendations and action plans, that address the

identified threats, risks and gaps; Provide a clearly evidenced link between threats and current firearms

establishment; Provide a rationale for current levels of resources.

Remember that the preferred format for the risk assessment process asarticulated in the guide is:The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment for Armed Policing should use a 3point-scale with the terms

• High• Medium• Low (Full guidance 1.4.2)


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LIK

ELIH

OO

D

MEDIUM HIGH HIGH

LOW MEDIUM HIGH

LOW LOW MEDIUM

IMPACT

2.3Methodology

2.4Limitations

2.5Circulation and GPMS


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3.0 Local, Regional and National Priorities and Initiatives: (2.2.5)

(Appendices associated with this section are 1,2,3,4 & 5)

Local & National Priorities – CoPComments

This section should give details of local, regional and national priorities andinitiatives which have the potential to have an impact on Armed Policing.These should included :

Strategic Policing Requirements Policing Priorities Firearms Priorities Policing Policy Armed Policing Policy ( Full details Appendix 1)

3.1 Strategic Policing Requirements

3.2 Policing Priorities

3.3 Firearms Priorities

3.4 Policing Policy

3.5 Armed Policing Policy (Full details Appendix 1)


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4.0 Crime/Incident Pattern Analysis of Armed Policing-Related Crime: (2.2.6)(Appendix 6 & 7)

Crime Incident Pattern Analysis of Firearmsrelated crime – CoP Comments

This section should identify and examine any trends in crime and incident dataassociated with firearms related crime. It should include the identification and analysisof:-

HotspotsCrime/Incidents trendsCrime/Incidents seriesGeneral profiles

The section should also include an overview of Armed Policing Incidents

4.1 Firearms Incidents

4.2 Less Lethal Incidents


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5.0 Operational Demands: (2.2.7) (Appendix 8)

Operational Demands – CoP Comments

This section should consider all operational demands relating to ArmedPolicing on a force, regional or national basis

Threats and Risk associated with significant events, planned orspontaneous ant-terrorist operations

Mutual Aid commitments – Appendix 8 should contain relevant information

5.1 Introduction – this will give an overview of the operational demandsrelating to Armed Policing for the force, capturing regional and national

demands.

5.2 Significant incidents or events, spontaneous and planned.

5.3 High profile visits or events

5.4 Demands for sensitive establishments e.g., airports, prisons, VIPresidences.

5.5 Demands and threat for anti-terrorist operations.

5.6 Threats and risk associated with operations occurring regionally and/ornationally.


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6.0 Training – Overview (2.2.8) (Appendix 9)

Training Overview – CoP Comments

This section should outline any strategic threats and risk associated with armed policingtraining.

Availability of training venues and ranges

Note: A detailed training plan for the year, the CFI’s risk register (with relevant crossreference to the STRA risk register and action log) and all current role profiles must beincluded in Appendix 9

6.1 Training demands and delivery

6.2 Training venues

6.3 Risks associated with the delivery of training, locations, staff, recruitment,equipment, etc.


RESTRICTED

7.0 Resources: (2.2.9) (Appendix 10)

Resources – CoP Comments

This section should provide information on the resources required for ArmedPolicing - Command, Officers, Equipment

Appendix 10 should contain exact details of training, availability of resources,vehicles and equipment. Additionally the current Minima document shouldbe included as this will evidence the approved establishment for firearmsstaffing levels.

7.1 Command

Strategic Command

Tactical Command

Operational Command

7.2 Officers

Those roles identified within module A2 of the NPFTC Tactical Advisers Negotiators Dogs Medics Post-Incident Management Trauma Management Interpreters and Translators Community Advisory Groups

This list is not exhaustive.Consideration should be given to national, regional and force requirements.

7.3 Equipment.

Weapons

Armouries

Vehicles


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8.0 Communications – Overview (2.2.10) (Appendix11)

Communications Overview – CoPComments

This section should include information on how any communications relatedthreats and risk, which are relevant to Armed Policing, are managed.

How Armed Policing communities within the force communicateamongst themselves at a local level;

How Armed Policing communities within the force communicate withother armed policing communities at a regional and national level;

How the Armed Policing communities within the force communicatewith external parties;

How information regarding Armed Policing policy is communicated.

8.1 Locally

8.2 Regionally

8.3 National

Note: A detailed list and flow chart of meetings which form the managementand meeting structure in support of the communication strategy includingdetails of the chair, attendees, frequency and standing agenda items should beincluded as part of Appendix 11


RESTRICTED

9.0 References (2.2.11)

References – CoP Comments

The reference section is a list of all the documents and information sourceswhich have been consulted and used to write the document.

This section must provide enough detail to enable someone else to find thedocument or information source.

It is recommended that the Harvard system of referencing is used and that careis taken to ensure all references are correct, complete and consistent.

10.0 Glossary of terms, Abbreviations and Acronyms. (2.2.12) (Appendix 15)

The final part of the Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment is the appendices.


RESTRICTED

These should contain the detailed information which has been used to informthe main part of the report, particularly the key findings.

All appendices should be included with a note identifying the appendiceswhich are not relevant to the force / collaboration. Additional appendices canbe added subsequently if required. This will ensure a standard format whichwill support the design, delivery and easy referencing of the regional andnational STRA’s.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Force Firearms Policy

Appendix 2 Firearms Certificates and Recovered Firearms

Appendix 3 Potential Obligations under Mutual Aid

Appendix 4 Responsibilities in Respect of National Emergencies andNationally-Based Plans

Appendix 5 PESTELO Analysis

Appendix 6 Crime/Incident Pattern Analysis of Armed Policing-RelatedCrime

Appendix 7 Firearms Incidents


Appendix 9 Training – Overview and Venues



Appendix 12 Threat and Risk Register

Appendix 13 Action log - Control Measures to Reduce Risk

Appendix 14 Key findings and Recommendations linking local, regionaland national STRAs.

Appendix 15 Glossary of Abbreviations, Acronyms and Technical Terms

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