ARTICLE IN PRESS

Marine Policy 34 (2010) 36–41

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Marine Policy

0308-59

doi:10.1

�Tel.:

E-m

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Venue shifts and policy change in EU fisheries policy

Sebastiaan Princen �

Utrecht University, School of Governance, Bijlhouwerstraat 6, 3511 ZC Utrecht, The Netherlands

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 18 March 2009

Accepted 13 April 2009

Keywords:

European Union

Common Fisheries Policy

Policy change

Punctuated equilibrium theory

Venue shopping

7X/$ - see front matter & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. A

016/j.marpol.2009.04.006

+3130 2539087; fax: +3130 2537200.

ail address: s.b.m.princen@uu.nl

a b s t r a c t

Over the past two decades profound changes have taken place in the European Union’s (EU) fisheries

policy. Partly these changes have occurred within the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy itself, but partly

policy change has been effected by the application of environmental legislation and policy instruments

to fisheries issues. This article argues that the process of policy change in EU fisheries policy can best be

understood in terms of the interaction of policy images and policy venues that is at the core of the

punctuated equilibrium theory of policy-making. As a result of the rise of a biodiversity perspective on

fisheries issues, environmental policy-makers have become active in fisheries issues, which has led to

profound changes in both the content of fisheries policies and the institutional organisation around this

issue area.

& 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction: stability and change in EU fisheries policy

Since the early 1970s, the European Union (EU) has beenstruggling to develop a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) capable ofeffectively conserving fish stocks. It was not until 1983 that acomprehensive conservation regime was added to the earlierregulations on access to fishing grounds, trade in fish products,and subsidies for fleet modernisation [1]. The results ofthis system were, at best, mixed. As Mike Holden, former headof the European Commission’s Fisheries Conservation Unit,noted in a 1994 review of the CFP: ‘On the basis of whetherthe conservation policy has achieved its political objectives,the conservation policy can only be adjudged a total success.[y] In contrast, it has been an almost total practical failure’[2, p. 167].

The political success of the CFP stemmed from the fact that ithad succeeded in pacifying longstanding conflicts betweenEuropean states about access to fishing grounds and a commonapproach to conserving fish stocks. At the same time, the ability ofthe CFP to protect and conserve endangered fish stocks has beendeemed a failure by most observers [3, p. 190; 4; 5, p. 306; 6, p.139]. To begin with, the EU’s fisheries ministers have routinely setTotal Allowable Catches (TACs) and quotas above the levelsrecommended by fisheries scientists in order to protect thefishing industry and coastal communities dependent on it [2,56p., 106p. 3, p. 190; 4; 6, p. 147]. Similarly, proposals tostrengthen technical measures (such as increasing minimally

ll rights reserved.

allowable mesh sizes in order to protect immature fish) and toreduce the capacity of the EU’s fishing fleet were delayed for yearsdue to controversies among fisheries ministers [2, 91p. 3, p. 190; 6,p. 148; 7].

In addition, enforcement of the official standards has provendifficult, leading to high levels of illegal, unreported andunregulated (‘IUU’) fishing [8]. The difference between officiallyregistered catches and actual catches has been estimated to bearound 60 percent [4, p. 245]. Related to this, the CFP has beenunable effectively to tackle the problem of by-catch andassociated discards. By-catch occurs when fishermen catchspecies of fish for which they have no quota or for which theirquota is already exhausted, alongside species of fish which theyare allowed to catch. By-catch has been estimated to make uparound 40 percent of global fish catches [9] and can amount to upto 60 percent of a vessel’s catch [10, p. 154; 11, p. 142]. If the by-catch is not landed illegally, it has to be thrown back into the seaeven if by that time most fish are already dead. Either way by-catch contributes to stock depletion without being included in anyTAC or quota.

In 2002, a large-scale reform of the CFP was adopted that wasmeant to remedy many of these deficiencies [12,13]. Moreover,since the mid-1990s environmental policy communities in the EUhave become increasingly active on fisheries issues, applyingapproaches and policy instruments developed in the context ofenvironmental policy to the formerly separate area of fisheriespolicy. This article offers an explanation for these changes in EUfisheries policies in comparison to the preceding stability in thispolicy area. In so doing, it seeks to contribute to our under-standing of policy dynamics in EU fisheries policy. The analysis isbased on a study of relevant policy documents, existing studies of

ARTICLE IN PRESS

S. Princen / Marine Policy 34 (2010) 36–41 37

EU fisheries policy-making, and a number of interviews conductedwith participants in EU fisheries policy in 2007.1

2. Policy change: the interplay of images and venues

Students of policy-making have noted that policy change tendsto occur in fits and starts: long periods of relative stability orincremental change are ‘punctuated’ by shorter periods of radicalchange [14,15]. In the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ theory of policy-making, this pattern is explained by the interaction betweenpolicy-making within and between different institutional venues[14,16,17]. The predominant pattern of policy stability is inducedby the fact that most of the time policy is made in a relativelyclosed circle of policy experts in a given issue area. The experts inthis ‘policy community’ share a number of fundamental assump-tions about the ultimate objectives of their policies and theinstruments that are most appropriate to reach those objectives.As a result, they tend to support (at least the fundamentalelements of) the existing policy approach in their issue area, andpolicies will only change within the limits set by the basicassumptions underlying the existing approach.

The status quo is underpinned by two interrelated factors.First, each policy is based on a given image of the issue it dealswith. For instance, the issue underlying fisheries policy can bedefined as an ecological problem (protecting vulnerable fishspecies) or as an economic development problem (sustaining aviable fishing industry). Once a specific image becomes generallyaccepted, some policy options become more plausible than others.Thus, if viewed from an economic development perspective,logical options for fisheries policy include subsidies for fleetconstruction and other measures to increase fleet capacity andrentability, whereas these options do not make sense if one startsfrom an ecological problem definition. In this way, policy imagesand problem definitions shape policy content.

Second, the competence to make decisions in a policy area isallocated to certain institutional policy-making venues, such asgovernment departments or committees in parliament. Thesevenues determine to a large extent which actors will participateand what angle these actors will take. For instance, if fisheriesissues are dealt with by venues in the field of economic affairs,policy-makers are likely to take an economic point of view on theissue. After all, their department’s remit relates to economicissues and this is the point of view they are most knowledgeableabout and care about. By contrast, if fisheries issues are dealt withby environmental policy venues, the ecological aspects will bestressed. Therefore, who decides on an issue largely determineswhat the decision will be.

Images and venues are interrelated and reinforce each other.On the one hand, the prevailing image of an issue will determinewhich venue will deal with it. If fisheries is considered to be aneconomic development issue, it makes sense to entrust it to aneconomic development agency. On the other hand, the fact that apolicy is allocated to a given venue reinforces the image under-lying it because other perspectives on the issue or signals aboutnegative consequences of the existing policy will be ignored.

Radical policy change is only likely to take place if decision-making on that policy is transferred to another venue. Given theclose link between venues and images, this will only occur if the

1 Interviews have been conducted with representatives of Europeche (14

February and 25 September 2007), Greenpeace (14 February 2007), the Spanish

Permanent Representation to the EU (14 February 2007), the European Commis-

sion’s DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (25 September 2007) and DG Environ-

ment (26 September 2007), WWF Europe (26 September 2007), and the European

Bureau for Conservation and Development (EBCD; 17 October 2007).

dominant image underlying the policy is successfully challenged.If and when the policy image changes, venues that were formerlyexcluded from an issue area (or ignored it because theyconsidered it to fall outside of their remit) will become active inthat area, initiating a process of more fundamental reflection onthe existing policies and, possibly, more radical policy change.

This type of ‘venue shift’ is propelled by two processes. Tobegin with, policy venues themselves are often in competition toattract issues that are (politically or otherwise) appealing to them.Actors within competing policy venues may therefore seek toexpand their remit by taking up issues that formerly belonged toanother venue. They can only do this if they can construct acredible argument about why their venue should be involved inthe issue now, even though it was not before. Second, interestgroups can also try to induce a venue shift by: (1) reframing theissue in terms that appeal to other venues than the one currentlydealing with the issue and (2) alerting actors in those othervenues to the fact that they should be involved in the issue. In thisway, actors that are unable to challenge the status quo within anexisting policy community can try to find a more receptive earoutside of that community and thus tip the balance of power in anissue area. This strategy of moving an issue from one venue toanother is known as ‘venue shopping’.

The account of policy change and policy stability given by thepunctuated equilibrium theory stresses the interdependence ofpolicy content and policy institutions. Only when the institutionalvenues in which an issue is dealt with change will policy contentchange fundamentally. Likewise, radical changes in policy contentare usually accompanied by changes in the institutional venuesthat deal with an issue.

Below, I will argue that much of the policy dynamics aroundfisheries policy in the EU can be understood in terms of the image-venue dynamics discussed above. By reframing the issue offisheries in terms of biodiversity, environmental policy-makers(partly driven by environmental groups) were able to insertthemselves in the debate over fisheries issues. This has led to aprofound shift in the way policies are made on fisheries issues inthe EU—not just within the CFP itself, but also (and importantly)in environmental policies that impinge on fisheries.

3. Venue shopping and policy change in EU fisheries policy

3.1. The origins of the CFP’s conservation regime

With the adoption of the 1983 Regulation that established itsconservation regime, the CFP tried to balance three objectives:economic development of the fisheries sector, the protection ofvulnerable fishing communities, and the conservation of fishstocks [2,18,19]. To achieve the first two objectives, the CFPincluded subsidies for the construction and renewal of fishingfleets as well as minimum prices for fish products on the EUmarket. The conservation objective led to the adoption of annualTACs and quotas for single fish species. In addition, technicalmeasures could be adopted, such as minimum mesh sizes. Thisapproach was in line with the prevailing orthodoxy on fisheriesmanagement of the time, laid down in the Law of the SeaConvention (LOS Convention) [18, p. 8; 20].

For the adoption of TACs and quotas, the CFP relied on scientificadvice from the International Council for the Exploration of theSea (ICES), which had been created in 1902 to increase theknowledge base on fish stocks in the North East Atlantic [19, p.78–79]. The European Commission formulated a proposal for TACson the basis of ICES advice, which the fisheries ministers of the EUmember states, assembled in the Council of Fisheries Ministers,could amend and eventually adopted. The division of TACs in

ARTICLE IN PRESS

S. Princen / Marine Policy 34 (2010) 36–4138

quotas was done on the basis of fixed percentages (the principle of‘relative stability’) in order to avoid annually recurring contro-versies.

This system tended to inflate TACs because the Council ofFisheries Ministers systematically adopted higher TACs than theones recommended by ICES or proposed by the EuropeanCommission [2, p. 56, p. 106; 3, p. 190; 4; 6, p. 147]. In addition,the approach of setting single-species TACs has a number of morefundamental drawbacks. Single-species TACs assume that fishstocks can be managed in isolation from each other. In reality,however, there exist complex interactions among fish stocks andbetween fish stocks and other living organisms in the seas. Forinstance, if one species of fish is a predator of another species,catching the latter will reduce the available food for the formerwhile catching the former will reduce mortality due to predationamong the latter. These interactions extend to all organisms in themarine environment that belong to those species’ food web [21, p.22; 22, pp. 383–384]. Apart from the interactions in food webs,fisheries activities can also cause other types of damage to themarine environment, for instance when fish nets hit coral reefs ordisturb the sea floor. Such interactions are not taken into accountwhen setting single-species TACs. An alternative approach istherefore to focus on the marine ecosystem as a whole rather thanfisheries activities in relation to single fish stocks. This hasbecome known as an ‘ecosystem-based’ approach to fisheriesmanagement [21–23].

3.2. The rise of ecosystem-based approaches

When the CFP’s conservation regime was adopted, ‘ecosystem-based’ approaches were known but were not well developed. Acontemporary observer, Mike Leigh, noted the existence ofecosystem-based approaches as an alternative to single-speciesTACs in his 1983 book on the CFP, but his passing referencetestifies to the rather ephemeral status of the concept at thetime [18, p. 89]. This changed during the 1990s, whenecosystem-based approaches were included in the fisheries policydiscourse.

The driving force behind this change was the link that wasforged between fisheries and environmental protection by theconcept of ‘biodiversity’. Biodiversity gained currency after the1992 Rio Summit on Environment and Development and theConvention of Biological Diversity (CBD) that was adopted at theSummit [24]. The main objective of the CBD was the maintenanceof biodiversity, defined as ‘the variability among living organismsfrom all sources’ [24, Article 2]. Maintaining biodiversity, accord-ing to the CBD, implied a focus on ecosystems, defined as the‘dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism commu-nities and their non-living environment interacting as a functionalunit’ [24, Article 2]. One of the work programmes developed underthe CBD concerned ‘marine and coastal biological diversity’ [25].As a basic principle, the work programme declared that ‘[t]heecosystem approach should be promoted at global, regional,national and local levels’. This way, fisheries policy and theecosystem-based approach were linked through the concept ofbiodiversity.

The discourse of biodiversity also had a great influence on theUN Agreement on the Conservation and Management of Strad-dling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (or: UN FishStocks Agreement, UNFSA) [26]. Formally, this was an implement-ing agreement to the LOS Convention, but in approach it followedmuch more closely the biodiversity and ecosystem-based ap-proach inherent in the CBD. The protection of biodiversity wasincluded as one of its basic principles [26, Article 5(g)] whilefurther reference to ecosystems and/or interdependence of

species was made in four additional principles. Two otherprovisions laid down the ‘precautionary principle’, which statesthat action to protect the environment should be taken even in theabsence of full scientific evidence.

Parallel to UNFSA, the Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO), which is responsible for fisheries management issueswithin the UN system, developed a Code of Conduct forResponsible Fisheries, which would become a standard for bestpractice in the fisheries policy community [27]. The Code ofConduct stated as its first general principle that ‘[s]tates and usersof living aquatic resources should conserve aquatic ecosystems’[27, Article 6.1], while the text of the entire Code referred to‘biodiversity’ five times and to ‘ecosystem(s)’ no fewer than 24times.

As a result, international agreements on fisheries issues in the1990s became infused with the language of ecosystem-basedmanagement approaches. Of course, adopting language onbiodiversity and ecosystems did not mean a direct change infisheries management practices. After all, even though focusing onecosystems makes sense from a theoretical point of view, it ismuch more difficult to design and implement practical policytools to put it into effect. As Barnes and McFadden noted asrecently as 2008, ‘the practical applications of this strategy are notyet completely defined’ although ‘the philosophical shift towardsEAM [‘‘Ecosystem Approaches to Management’’] has begun’ [23, p.387]. What this philosophical shift did, however, was to alert anew set of actors to fisheries-related issues.

3.3. Biodiversity and environmental policy-making in EU fisheries

policy

Traditionally, fisheries management and environmental policywere seen as two distinct policy areas, each with its own set ofinstitutions, principles and actors. However, with the rise of abiodiversity and ecosystem perspective on fisheries this was nolonger self-evident. After all, if fisheries activities and thedepletion of fish stocks could be seen in terms of threats tobiodiversity, they fell squarely into the remit of environmentalpolicy-makers. This has had a number of consequences forfisheries policies in the EU.

The European Commission’s Directorate General (DG) forEnvironment began to pick up the issue from the mid-1990sonwards. Under the EU’s Birds Directive [28] and HabitatsDirective [29], nature areas were established throughout the EUthat received special protection because of their significance insustaining certain species. Under both directives, the establish-ment of protected areas was not confined to land but alsoextended to the sea. At a global level, the establishment ofsuch Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) was promoted by theConference of the Parties to the CBD in 2004 [30]. Even beforethat, building on the text of the CBD itself, the EU had developed aBiodiversity Action Plan for Fisheries in 2001 that included acommitment to integrate environmental concerns in fisheriespolicy and create a network of MPAs under the Birds and HabitatsDirectives [31].

The creation of MPAs does not automatically lead to changes infisheries practices because decisions about these practices stillneed to be taken by the Council of Fisheries Ministers. At the sametime, the wider and more explicit application of the Birds andHabitats directives has changed the playing field for fisheriespolicy-makers. This was exemplified by a 2004 ruling from theEuropean Court of Justice, which held that the Habitats directiverequires a strict precautionary approach to fisheries activities innature areas [32]. As a result, permits for the mechanical

ARTICLE IN PRESS

S. Princen / Marine Policy 34 (2010) 36–41 39

harvesting of cockles and mussels in the Dutch Waddenzee areahad to be revoked.2

Another example of how biodiversity concerns have affectedfisheries is the debate on bottom trawling, a technique wherebynets are towed close to the sea floor in order to scrape out the fish.Arguing that it led to the increased depletion of fish stocks andcaused great damage to the sea floor, a coalition of NGOs started acampaign for a moratorium on bottom trawling in the early 2000s[35]. In so doing, they did not target organisations directlyresponsible for fisheries management but the UN GeneralAssembly, striving for the adoption of a General AssemblyResolution similar to the earlier one banning the use of large-size driftnets [11, pp. 142–143]. While campaigning for amoratorium on bottom trawling, the NGOs used the language ofbiodiversity that had become generally accepted. As a Greenpeacerepresentative explained during an interview:

The technical bottom trawling moratorium [y] was presentedby NGOs as a biodiversity issue. The problem is that it damageshighly sensitive habitats in the deep seas. It is also a problem offisheries management, because a lot of these fisheries stocks[y] are under threat. It is an important point, but it is asecondary point if you see what biodiversity damage is caused.So there the environmental ministries woke up and realisedthey needed to take part in the discussion.

Although, in the end, the campaign did not lead to the desiredGeneral Assembly Resolution, it did have repercussions within theEU, leading to measures to limit the use of bottom trawling insensitive areas [36]. Apart from the EU itself, the debate onbottom trawling also had an effect in Regional Fisheries Manage-ment Organisations (RFMOs), which have been set up to managefisheries on the high seas beyond the jurisdiction of individualstates. In another interview, a representative of WWF explainedabout the North East Atlantic Fisheries Council (NEAFC), one suchRFMO:

They have changed the way they are working a lot, mainly dueto the lobby on bottom trawling. Because, we were saying thathigh-seas fisheries is not managed, RFMOs are not doing theirjob, things need to be changed and we need a UN resolution todo that. Then NEAFC said: OK, we are going to step up to theplate and we are going to do more than we are doing now.

The ascent of biodiversity and ecosystem-based approacheshas also had an impact on the CFP itself. In 2002, the Council ofFisheries Ministers adopted a full-scale reform of the CFP, whichwas aimed at improving the conservation of fish stocks byintroducing a number of changes [12,13]. First, TACs and quotaswould be set for multiple years, thus avoiding the annual clashbetween long-term conservation objectives and short-termeconomic considerations. For fish stocks under threat of depletion,these plans would take the form of recovery plans aimed atrestoring stocks to safe biological levels. In addition, besidessingle-species TACs and quotas, the EU has now also adoptedmulti-species TACs and quotas for species that are ecologicallyinterrelated. Second, stakeholders would be engaged more closelythrough Regional Advisory Councils (RACs), which were createdfor each major fisheries region in Europe. These RACs includerepresentatives from both the fishing industry and environmentalNGOs. Third, subsidies for fleet construction and modernisationwere phased out. And finally, the reform sought to strengthen theenforcement of fishing standards through a Community FisheriesControl Agency, which was created in 2005.

2 See the final rulings of the Dutch Raad van State in relation to cockles [33]

and mussels [34].

The 2002 reform meant a fundamental change in the balancebetween the objectives underlying the CFP. The economicdevelopment of the fishing sector has effectively dropped off theagenda as fleet reductions are now the main objective andsubsidies for fleet construction and innovation have beenabolished. Social concerns are still important to a number ofmember states, since fisheries activities tend to be concentrated incoastal communities with few alternative forms of subsistence.However, this debate is waged mostly in terms of softening theeffects of fleet reductions and fishing restrictions and findingalternatives to fisheries. Environmental concerns, by contrast, arenow at the heart of fisheries debates.

The reform of the CFP has been criticised as being much moreradical on paper than in reality. After all, decisions on TACs andquotas are still made by fisheries ministers, and after the 2002reforms they have continued to set them above the levelsrecommended by scientists [3, p. 190]. Moreover, doubts havebeen raised about the true extent of stakeholder involvement inthe new CFP [37]. Nevertheless, the change in approach that isenshrined in the 2002 reform has further strengthened theposition of environmental concerns, environmental groups andenvironmental policy-makers in the EU’s fisheries policy.

Outside of the CFP, the role of the EU’s environmental policycommunity in fisheries issues was further institutionalised in2008 with the adoption of the Marine Strategy FrameworkDirective [38]. The Directive is meant to stimulate the develop-ment of integrated marine policies in European sea areas, and it isto become the environmental ‘pillar’ of a comprehensive maritimepolicy that is currently under debate in the EU [39]. The MarineStrategy Directive will solidify the role of environmental policy-makers with regard to fisheries and further strengthen anapproach that views fisheries activities in the context of marineecosystems as a whole. For some environmental NGOs this hasbeen a conscious strategy. Said the representative of Greenpeace:

The reason why we focus our effort more toward the marineframework is that this is also a recognition that we need tocreate other governance structures to parallel the fisheriesgovernance if we want to achieve better governance in theoceans. The underlying theme is that we challenge the fisheriesstronghold over decisions in the marine environment.

All in all, the biodiversity/ecosystem angle has opened up newopportunities for proponents of more stringent conservationpolicies to push their cause. By reframing fisheries issues inbiodiversity/ecosystem terms, they have been able to shift thoseissues to other than the traditional fisheries managementvenues—venues that are much more receptive to calls forrestrictive fisheries policies. This has already had a number oftangible effects in fisheries policy practice, as well as leading tomore fundamental and long-term shifts in the set-up of the CFP.

4. Images and venues in EU fisheries policy

The development of EU fisheries policy over the past 15–20years shows many characteristics of the image-venue dynamicspredicted by the punctuated equilibrium theory. The challenge totraditional fisheries management approaches materialised in thefirst half of the 1990s when environmental policy-makers, whichhad previously not been involved in this area, gained an interest infisheries issues. This growing interest was fuelled by the rise of abiodiversity perspective on fisheries that formed a natural linkbetween fisheries issues and environmental policies, and legiti-mated a role for environmental policy-makers in this area.

Partly, fisheries issues were picked up by environmentalpolicy-makers themselves, out of recognition of these links. In

ARTICLE IN PRESS

S. Princen / Marine Policy 34 (2010) 36–4140

addition, environmental NGOs have engaged in active andstrategic ‘venue shopping’ in order to involve environmentalpolicy venues in fisheries issues. This way, they could bypass thefisheries policy community that they felt was less receptive totheir claims. Venue shifts with regard to EU fisheries policies tookplace at two levels. Within the EU itself, DG Environment becamemore active in fisheries issues from the mid-1990s onwards,applying existing policy instruments in the field of natureconservation to fishing areas. Moreover, at the global level new,more environmentally conscious venues have become engaged infisheries issues. These include, most notably, the CBD and the UNGeneral Assembly.

These venue shifts have led to a growing de-compartmenta-lisation of fisheries policy. Whereas previously fisheries was seenas a separate activity that could be managed in isolation fromother activities on the seas, it has increasingly come to be viewedas part of a broader set of activities that affect the seas (such asshipping and oil and gas extraction) and as part of a wider set ofconcerns (such as the maintenance of ecosystems). As a result ofthis trend, novel policy instruments are now applied to regulatefishing activities.

In addition to this de-compartmentalisation, the rise ofnew venues has also had repercussions within the fisheriespolicy community itself. Traditional fisheries policy venues,including the EU’s DG Fisheries,3 the FAO and RFMOs, haveincorporated elements of ecosystem-based approaches in theirpolicies and have become more sensitive to ecological concerns.The rise of new venues has forced the fisheries policy communityto redefine its role and approach, leading to much morefundamental policy change since the mid-1990s than in precedingdecades.

For our understanding of fisheries policy-making in the EU, thisanalysis has a number of implications. First, the analysis points atthe importance of looking at developments in both policy contentand the institutions involved in policy-making. Not only doesinstitutional change offer a clue to understanding change in policycontent, but it is in the institutional mechanisms governingfisheries issues themselves that we see the most fundamental andfar-reaching changes in EU fisheries policy. The application ofenvironmental policy instruments such as the Birds and HabitatsDirectives to fisheries issues, and the integration of fisheriesissues into broader frameworks of marine and maritime policy arepotentially much more radical than the 2002 reform in the CFPproper. In any case, the EU’s fisheries policy can no longer beequated with its Common Fisheries Policy, as it now also includesa range of policy instruments beyond the CFP itself.

Second, the analysis directs our attention to the interplaybetween policy images and institutional venues and the waypolitical actors operate within this playing field. Each venuewithin fisheries policy has a different composition, differentconcerns and different procedural rules. This leads to differencesin the receptiveness of venues to certain issues and concerns.Political actors that are successful in one venue may find itdifficult to have their voices heard in another venue. As a result,some of the stakeholders in the fisheries policy area haveeffectively specialised in certain venues, choosing to be activeonly in traditional fisheries venues or focusing on environmentalpolicy venues. The former strategy is exemplified by Europeche,the EU’s umbrella organisation for fishermen, while the latterstrategy has been chosen by Greenpeace. These organisations thuschoose to play on their ‘home ground’: the venue which is most

3 In March 2008, DG Fisheries was renamed DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries

to mark the central role the DG plays in the development of the EU’s maritime

strategy. This in itself is a symbolic recognition of the broader perspective within

which fisheries issues have come to be placed within the EU.

receptive to their claims and in which they can have the greatestleverage.

As a result, policy-making on fisheries in the EU sometimesshows a dual dynamic. On the one hand, environmental policyvenues have engaged primarily in developing relatively abstractprinciples and theoretical approaches to fisheries managementthat have the potential radically to overhaul fisheries manage-ment practice but have been developed much farther on paperthan in practice. On the other hand, policy-making in fisheriesmanagement venues has largely continued along the lines ofestablished policy practice, setting TACs and quotas in a time-tested manner and on the basis of familiar considerations. At thesame time, the longer-term development of European fisheriespolicy shows a clear trend toward more ecosystem-basedapproaches. In the end, the detour via environmental policyvenues may therefore prove to be the fastest way to policy changein fisheries management.

References

[1] European Economic Community. Council regulation (EEC) no. 170/83establishing a community system for the conservation and management offishery resources. Adopted on 25 January 1983. Official Journal L 27 January1983;024:1–13.

[2] Holden M. The Common Fisheries Policy: origin, evaluation, future. Oxford:Fishing New Books; 1994.

[3] Daw T, Gray T. Fisheries science and sustainability in international policy: astudy of failure in the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy. MarinePolicy 2005;29:189–97.

[4] Karagiannakos A. Total allowable catch (TAC) and quota management systemin the European Union. Marine Policy 1996;20:235–48.

[5] Payne DC. Policy-making in nested institutions: explaining the conservationfailure of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy. Journal of Common MarketStudies 2000;38:303–24.

[6] Symes D. The European Community’s Common Fisheries Policy. Ocean andCoastal Management 1997;35:137–55.

[7] Hatcher A. Subsidies for European fishing fleets: the EuropeanCommunity’s structural policy for fisheries 1971–1999. Marine Policy2000;24:129–240.

[8] Bray K. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. In: Nordquist MH, MooreJN, editors. Current fisheries issues and the Food and Agriculture Organizationof the United Nations. The Hague: Kluwer Law International; 2000. p. 115–35.

[9] Davies RWD, Cripps SJ, Nickson A, Porter G. Defining and estimating globalmarine fisheries bycatch. Marine Policy 2009;33:661–72.

[10] Gray TS. The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union. EnvironmentalPolitics 1997;6(4):150–8.

[11] Todd E, Ritchie E. Environmental non-governmental organizations and theCommon Fisheries Policy. Aquatic Conservation: Marine and FreshwaterEcosystems 2000;10(2):141–9.

[12] European Commission. Green paper on the future of the Common FisheriesPolicy. COM (2001) 135; 20 March 2001.

[13] European Community. Council regulation (EC) no. 2371/2002 on theconservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under theCommon Fisheries Policy. Adopted on 20 December 2002. Official Journal L 31December 2002;358:59–80.

[14] Baumgartner FR, Jones BD. Agendas and instability in American politics.Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press; 1993.

[15] Jones BD, Baumgartner FR. The politics of attention. How governmentprioritizes problems. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press; 2005.

[16] Baumgartner FR, Jones B, editors. Policy dynamics. Chicago, London: TheUniversity of Chicago Press; 2002.

[17] Princen S. Agenda-setting in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave;2009.

[18] Leigh M. European integration and the Common Fisheries Policy. London,Canberra: Croom Helm; 1983.

[19] Wise M. The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Community. London,New York: Methuen; 1984.

[20] United Nations. United Nations convention on the law of the sea. Adopted on10 December 1982. Available at /www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htmS.

[21] Morishita J. What is the ecosystem approach for fisheries management?.Marine Policy 2008;32:19–26.

[22] Parsons S. Ecosystem considerations in fisheries management: theory andpractice. International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 2005;20:381–422.

[23] Barnes C, McFadden KW. Marine ecosystem approaches to management:challenges and lessons in the United States. Marine Policy 2008;32:387–92.

[24] United Nations. Convention on biological diversity. Adopted on 22 May 1992.Available at /www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtmlS.

ARTICLE IN PRESS

S. Princen / Marine Policy 34 (2010) 36–41 41

[25] Convention on biological diversity. Conservation and sustainable use ofmarine and coastal biological diversity, including a programme of work.Decision IV/5 at the fourth conference of the parties, Bratislava, 4–15 May1998. Available at /www.cbd.int/marine/decisions.shtmlS.

[26] United Nations. United Nations agreement for the implementation of theprovisions of the United Nations convention on the law of the sea of 10December 1982 relating to the conservation and management of straddlingfish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. Adopted on 4 August 1995.Available at /www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htmS.

[27] Food and Agriculture Organization. Code of conduct for responsible fisheries.Adopted on 31 October 1995. Available at /www.fao.org/fishery/ccrfS.

[28] European Economic Community. Council directive 79/409/EEC on theconservation of wild birds. Adopted on 2 April 1979. Official Journal L 25April 1979;103:1–18.

[29] European Economic Community. Council directive 92/43/EEC on theconservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora. Adopted on 21May 1992. Official Journal L 22 July 1992;206:7–50.

[30] Convention on biological diversity. Marine and coastal biological diversity.Decision VII/5 at the seventh conference of the parties, Kuala Lumpur, 9–20February 2004. Available at /www.cbd.int/marine/decisions.shtmlS.

[31] European Commission. Biodiversity action plan for fisheries. COM (2001) 162,27 March 2001.

[32] European Court of Justice. Waddenvereniging and Vogelsbeschermingvereni-ging. Case C-127/02. Judgment of 7 September 2004.

[33] Raad van State. Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee andNederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Vogels v. Minister van Land-bouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit. Case 200000690/1-A and 200101670/1-A.Ruling of 22 December 2004.

[34] Raad van State. Vogelbescherming Nederland v. Minister van Landbouw,Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit. Case 200607555/1. Ruling of 27 February2008.

[35] Deep Sea Conservation Coalition. DSCC statement to the United Nationsgeneral assembly; November 2004. Available at /www.savethehighseas.org/publicdocs/UNGA_GP_full.pdfS.

[36] European Community. Council regulation 734/2008 on the protection ofvulnerable marine ecosystems in the high seas from the adverse impacts ofbottom fishing gears. Adopted on 15 July 2008. Official Journal L 30 July2008;201:8–13.

[37] Gray T, Hatchard J. The 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy’s systemof governance—rhetoric or reality?. Marine Policy 2003;27:545–54.

[38] European Community. Directive 2008/56/EC establishing a framework forcommunity action in the field of marine environmental policy. Adopted on 17June 2008. Official Journal L 25 June 2008;164:19–40.

[39] European Commission. An integrated maritime policy for the EuropeanUnion. COM (2007) 575, 10 October 2007.