VANGUARD SER IES

ED ITOR : MARTI I WINDROW

British GUARDS ARMOURED

DIVISION 1941-45

Text by JOHN SANDARS

CoLour pLates by MIKE CHAPPELL

OSPREY PUBLISHING LONDON

Published in ' 979 by Osprey Publishing Ltd Member company of the George Philip Group to '4 Long Acre, London WCo E 9 LP © Gopyrigh t ' 979 Osprey Publishing Ltd

This book is copyrigh ted und er the Berne Convention. All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose ofprivalc study, research, cri ticism or revic\\', as permitted under the Copyright Act. 1956, no part o f this publica tion may be reproduced , stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical , chemical , mechanical, opLieal, photocopying, recording or otherwise, wilhoUl the prior permiss ion oflhe copyright owner. Enquiries shou ld be addressed to the Publishers.

ISBN 0 850453'35

FilmsCl by BAS Printers Li mited Over Wallop, Hampshire Primed in Hong Kong

The author wishes LO thank the Imperial \ Var ?-.1useum and Mike Conniford, for perm iss ion to usc phOlographs from their collections, and the RA I nstiLUte, "Voolwich, The RA C Museum, Bovi ngLOn, the MOD Library (C & A) and David List for assistance with resea rch. The main sources consulted were: The Guards Armoured Division '94' 45, Rosse & Hill ; The Guards AmlOured D ivision, Verney; Thl' Grenadiers 1939- 45 Vol. I , Forbes; The Coldstream Guards J 920- ' 946, Howard & Sparrow ; Irish Guards in 11111111, Fitzgerald ; Welsh Gllards 01 lVar, Ellis; 2nd Household CavabJl Rrgt, Orde ; 61h Guards Tallk Brigade, Forbes; History q/ the Royal JVort}wmberlalld Fusiliers '919- '945, Barclay; Craftsmen oJlhe Amry, Kennell & Tatman ; The Slory oflhe RASe 1939- 45.

~Like Chappell's cover painling shows Sgt. Robinson's lroop, No. I Squadron, 2nd Armoured Bn . Grenadier Guards rushing th e Nijm cgcn road bridge on 2 0

September '944,

Introduction

Although organized and eq ui pped in basica ll y the sarne ,,,'ay, and faced with genera lly simil ar tasks. there were marked differences between th e three British armoured divisions vvhich fOllght in -:\onh­West Europe during 1944- 45. The 7th had evolved graduall y from pre-war days (as described in Vanguard J by th e present a uthor) and had fought continuously since 1940, w hi le Guards and I J lh Armoured wcre formed only in 1941 and spent nearly three yea rs tra ining in th e U nited Kingdom before going into ac tion for th e first lirn e in ~ormandy in mid-1 944. The II th Armoured, like 7th , had a mixt ure of cava lry, yeomanry a nd RTR uni ts in its a rmoured brigade, and had riO e, light infantry and county ba ua lions amo ng its in fa ntry, while Guards Armoured was uniqu e in th at vi rtually all its units, both armoured and infantry, had C0I11111 0 n origins as fOO L guards battalions within th e Brigade of Guards, be fore re tra ining as tank crews and lorri cd or mo tor infantry. Guards Armoured a lso po"ibl y enjoyed less disrupt ion and greater continuit y th an the others once it went inlO action : unlike 7th Armoured it kept the sam e divisional and brigade commanders throughout its period o f aClive se rvice, and unlike I I th it reta ined the same type of tan k, th e Sherm an , unlil th e end of the war. h a lso drew reinrorcemenlS ror its two brigades from th e G uards depots, but this proved

Tanks of tht" .md GT"C'nadi("n; in France. The n("arcs! b a Shennan V 'Rh inoceros' fitted with the American-designed Culin cutler for breaking through hedgerows; a Sherman Ie Fire fl y is in the centre, and a Vc Fire fl y on the right, both wit h 17pdr. guns. The uni t taesign '5 1' on red lhe divisional sign, and '8 ' S<fuadron sign l'ndmlll,g liluk.~' indi\-idual nUTllb~r.; "ithin Ihe battalion t-an be lit'en on II,,: 'Rhinuct'ro:;', while the Ie Fircfl) .1p]X'ars to h:lve a name p .... lintt·d on tilt' platC' in from of the driv('r'<; halch _ 'nlis. and all othtr phot~raph~ not ']X'cifica ll) c-r~dit(:d Qlhen\ ist' .. Ift' Irolll the Imperial \\'ar ).hl~(·urn colleniolls.

something of a mixed blessing since the Armoured Di\' ision had 1O compete wilh th e o th er Guard~

form at ions in Ita ly and elsewh ere for the limited ava ilable man power.

All th ese factors led to each a rmoured division developing its own distinc tive character. Thus Guards Armoured , rar rrom being conscrva uvc in o utlook as th e uninitiated mig ht have ex pected , we nt rurth cr than either o f the other divisio ns in integrating its armo ur and infanu) I in to permanent mixed units, and was less influenced by the systems used in prev ious campaigns for the supply and WppOrl of its brigades. It is agai nst this background th a t we sha ll co nside r th e orga ni za tion and ac ti vities of th e di vision from June 1944 to May 1945; but fi rs t it is necessary to look brieOy at its fo rma tion and history up to that lim e .

The decision to form a Gua rds Armoured Di \' ision was taken, "vith th e Kjng's approva l, in spring 1941 , because of the lack of annourcd troops in England to race a possibl e Germ an in vasion. [t was ac tua ll y formed in tvl'ay under th e command of MajoJ·-Genera l Sir Oliver Leese. By September key o ffi cers and o ther ranks had compl e ted courses a t Bov ing to n and Luhvorth and th e Di vision assem­bled for th e first time in the Sa lisbury Plain a rea. At this slage it consisted or two armo ured brigades, each or three armo ured regiments and a mOLOr

3

in fa ntry ba lla lion, and a suppOrt group of anill ery with a single lorried infantry ba ttalion.

Equ ipment was at fi rst scarce and a ntiqua ted. Although the need for good maintenance and the ability to rectify fa ul ts, which was insti lled by the fi·equelll breakdowns of th e worn-out Covena lller tanks, may have sLOod th e Division in good stead la ter, it is doubtful if the point was apprecia ted by stranded tank crews a t the time ! Organiza tiona l problems peculi ar to th e Guards also had to be solved ; thus the 1 st Bn. Grenadi ers were made into a motor ba tta lion when the inadvisability of trying LO squ eeze th e six-foot gua rdsmen of their King's Company in LO tanks was apprecia ted . On the whole Lhe nc\v ro les were tackled with enthusiasm, and only a few NCOs and others hadLO be replaced as being LOO traditional in outlook to adapt.

By April 1942 tra ining and equipment had reached the stage where full di visiona l exercises were possible. From th en on exercises of increasing scale and complexi ty were organized, until most of the formations in th e country were involved for up

ARN H£ M

,

t

4

to a fortnight at a tim e in g igantic manoeuvres, to train what was now th e arm y for the invasion of Europe in a ll its tasks. Administrative exercises even went LO th e lengths of requiring uni ts LO submit d ummy recomm endations for gall antry awards, so thorough was the prepara tion. The tac tics in which th e Division was tra ined were panl y [he result of lessons learnt in th e desert , and partl y the outcome o f tria ls and c..xercises in Eng land which were ex pected to be more a ppropria te LO th e equipment with which, and the type of country over which , it would fi ght.

At the end of 1942 several changes took place within the Di vision. In line with generaJ policy one of the two a rmoured brigades was replaced by a lon·ied infantry brigade, and thesuppongroup was reorganized as divisional anillery; at th e same time lhe armoured car regim ent le ft to become Corps troops and was replaced by an armoured recon­naissance regim enl in tanks. This gave, wilh minor subseq ucnt alterations, th e organiza tion for the rest of th e war, which can be seen on Pla te A. Personn el

o 50 , ,

NORTH SEA

'00 ,

BA EM EN

.. , •

GERMANY

BA'tEUX .

CAUMONT •

AAAOMAHCH£S

• CH[HEDOlLE FALAIS[ •

changes a lso put a neVI divisiona l commander, Maj .-Gen. A. 1-1 . S. Ada ir, and Lhe two brigad iers- :\' . 1-1 . G watkin in command of 5th Guards Armoured Brigade, and G. F. J ohnson of 32nd Guards Brigade- in Lh e pos ts Lh ey were LO

hold throughout Lh e Division's active life. Tn mid - 1943 th e Division became pan of V III

Corps, und cr Lieutenant-G cnera l O 'Connor, where it rema ined urHil a ft er landing in Nor­mand y, Follovl ing vari ous changes in equipm ent and funh er tra ining in Norfolk and Yorkshire, the Gua rds Armoured Di , ·ision fina ll y congrega ted , a full y equipped and highl y trained fo rm a Lion as yet umricd in ba lllc, in the Brighton area in June

' 944·

Organization and

Equipment

Before considcring the Division IS achievements, it is perh aps as well to exa mine briefl y th e means at its disposal. As it onl y too k part in one rela tively shon campa ign once it c\'c J1 lUall y went into action, its organi za lion and equipm ent remained basically unchanged from tha t lime, th e onl y major excep­Lion being the replacement o f Lhe ISL Bn . Welsh Guards by Lhe 2nd Bn . SCOL' G uards in earl y ' 945. It land ed in Norma nd y as a standa rd armoured division of th e period (see Pl ate A), and a lLhough various intcrn al rcgroupings were mad e, as wcsha ll see, the arrangement of one a rmoured and one in fa ntry brigade remai ned its o ffi cia l com position ; vehicles reta ined th e tac ti ca l signs shown , and units rcvcrlcd LO this organi zation when req uired , O ne permanent change from th e usua l system, whi ch was unique to Guards Armoured, was th e grouping of all service units not need ed in the fi ghting area into a single administra ti ve group, command ed a nd controlled virtua ll y as a third brigade, instead of the looser arra ngement, with a rear di visional HQused by oth er divisions (see T a ble I).

Apa rt from the purely G ua rds requirement for two extra Warrant Officers per ba llalion as drill sergea nts, th e armoured and in fa nLry units were also standard, bu t in deference to Lheir origins th e armoured regiments con tinued to be referred to as

Univcrs.'l l Carrier Mkll of 3rd Bn, (Infantry) Irish Guards, armed with n pivot-mounted ,go cal. Browning machine gun and fitted \ ... ith \\ irdcss, probabl ) an 'IB' or '38' set, As Ihe upper surfaces of ca rri ers \\trc small lind tendl..'d to get con'red with loose gca r, the a ir recognition s i~n a \\'hite !llar in a eirel!" was someti mes painted 0 11 a pla te, as here, that could be put on top of the pile, The unit t:tcsign '62 ' on green C:III be set'n in li'OIl! or Ihe drive l'. and there i~ a waltr jcrryca n, with thc inclcmations filled in white, on th!" i).-u.-k,

~1 3 ha lftraeks of 1st Motor Bn" Grenadiers, T h!" ulli t tacsign '54' on red the ground and a ir recognition Stars, and the bridging circle ~dIO\\ rim , hla('k 'to' outlined in )dlr)\\ on circular khaki plat~- can be set'n on l1('arl'~ 1 vehicle, Tht."St 3n~ the motor in r.'lntT} \'~rsion ofthis vehicle, used h} man y Lln i l~ withi n the Division in different forms, Ea( h (;lrri<.,(\ llnc ~CClion , and had a rin~ lo r an .\ A mach inc gun brside 1111' t!ri\'CI', side ra('ks and hoop~ for rig~ing a C<lll\a~ tilt on'r th~ open bo<h , Rolls o f barbed \\ire were o ften -.:arri('(1 0 11 the frOIll A~ hue,

5

6

T A BLE I

ARMO U RED DIVIS IO NAL HQ , ' 944 :

I 'G' Staff & Sigllt",,' (ACV , Command ACV 2 Intell igence ACV 3 O perations ACV 4 Rear li nk lO Main HQ ACV 5 Rea r link LO Corps ACV 6 Spare & Signal O ffi ce ACV 7 RAJ' liaison)

Advance HQ.

G,O,C, (Cromwell tank) I

GSO"

I 'G'

I Difelice Troop (8 Cromwells 2 Crusader AA tanks)

Main HQ.

I AA &QMG

I SiglUds

I Liaison & intercom Troop

( , 0 Scout Cars)

I 'A & Q:

I Fld, Security

SecLion

I I-lQ

RO)'ai Ar11· ( , ACV

I (2 LCVs)

I

I CRASC I CdME I

ADMS ADOS

4 Scout Cars)

I I , ,

, Brigade Coys RASC

, Brigade '8' Echelons

, Brigade Workshops & Ordnance

Adrn.in..istrative Group

I HQ (Command , Signal &

, Provost SCClions) , ,

Fld . Amb, Reserve Coy

I Field Dressi ng S talion

I Fi eld Hygiene Section

T ank Delivery Sq uadron

, Inlly. ReinforccmcnlS

ARMO U RED BR IG ADE HQ , I

' 944:

I Commond Croup (4 Sherm an HQ tan ks 6 Shenna n defence lanks 2 Annd., 9 Scout Ca rs (lia ison) 3 Valenti ne Scissors Bridges)

Brigad ier (ACV)

I Office & Reece Grollp (2 J eeps 15 cwt ''\fi rcless T ruck 15cwt Office Truck ' 5cwt GS Truck 6 Motorcycles)

I Admin Croup (6 J eeps & Ca l~ 8 Motorcycles 15cwt '·Valcr Truck ,sewl ''''ireless Truck 2 x 15CW l GS Trucks 9 x 3-lOn T rucks)

battalions (sec T able 2) . r\rter graduation from Covena nters th rough Crusader Mkill s, by 1944 the basic lank in th e armou red regiments was th e 75mm-gun Sherman , \-"hieh Guards Armoured were to retain , unlike either of the o lh er divisions, until the end of the war. The proportion of I 7pdr. Sherman Firefli es \-vas in creased from the initial one per troop as more became ava ilable. The Stuarts. or 'Honeys' as they were known , were lOa

lightly arm ed and armoured for lise as tanks and were stricLi y reconnaissance vehicles, 'vvhile the anti-a ircra n tanks were discarded as unn ecessary shortly after landing in "ormandy. The a rmoured recovery vehicle (ARV) issued to each squadron was a turre Ll ess Sherman. The administrati ve vchicles were splil up into echelons: F'2 J \·"hieh included the filters and medical ha lftracks, ready­use petro l and ammunition in some twenty lO thirty vehicles, travelled wi lh th e regiment. The bulk petrol , ammunition etc. ) in about fift y vehicl es, moved behind in ·A' Echelon und er brigade contro l: th e remaining baggage, no t needed in aClion, formed 'H' Echelon, which stayed with the divisiona l Admin Group.

Although origina ll y intended to have one squad ­ron of light tanks and two of Cen taur cruisers, Lh e Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment went to war with lh e same orga ni za tio n as an a rm ou red regiment, except th at it had 75111111 Cromwell and

On lhe road to Brussels: prisoncr1 Kliarcied b\ a dtspatch rider t!XlrC!l1t' Idt, wal(h a Stuart \ ' recce lank passin~ a Cromwell of the

2nd Welsh Gmmls. T he Cromwell h :l_~ :l cable recl fix pulling out mine.'s Oil tilt' right front Ira ck~lIard, and a smoke generator oUlboard of the hull machitl(' gun, \ 'chicles in ,he.' bad.~round include D<"I im lcr .tnllOurl'd cani of .mel l-I ou~dlOld C'1\:lIr)".

I 7pdr. Chall enger tanks in place of Shermans, and a pair of 95 mm-gu n support Cromwells in each squadron H Q Later its troop of LUarts were a lso replaced by Cromwells. and th ese were eventuall y absorbed into the squadrons to make good losses. I niti a lly th e Valentine Scissors bridge tanks be longing to th e a rmoured brigade HQ were allocated to th e reconnajssa nce regiment, but they were soo n sent back, and good usc was made of them during the later stages of the war in Holl and and German y,

Wi th the exception of the Grenadiers, the infanll,' battalions were lorri ed (Table 3), which meant that they each had a small pl a toon of RASC Bedford QLT troop-carrying vehicles (TCVs) perm a nentl y attached to th em. The Grenadiers. being mOtOr infantry, had th eir own transport in th e form of a rm oured ha lf tracks (T ab le 4). They were initiall y opera ted with companies alloca ted LO each armoured regiment, but after Norma nd y they ha nd ed in half of th eir twelve 6pdr. anti-ta nk guns, formed extra motor pia lOons fi'om th e crews, and operated in th e same manner as the other infantry battalions. The only

7

M 10 self-propelled anti-tank gun rollowillg a Crusader O P tank, both or2 lst Anti-Tank Regimt"nt, RA . Both 3in and I 7pdr. ~II OS W('re used in the Di\-ision: this one has ils .50 cal. 13rO\\ lIin~ machine gun mounted on the turret tOP and has the di\'i~iollal sign on the len and the unit tacsign on tht right orthe rear plate. There is:t troop sign above 1\11' caoign but Ihis is obscun.:d b~ till' tarpaulin. Tht: Crusader could be a redundant AA lank.

non-Guards in ra ntry unit was th e independ en t machine gu n company, No. I Coy., 4th Bn. Roya l Norlhumberland Fusiliers (th e ba llalion's olher companies were with lhe other lWO armoured divisions) . Equipped inilia ll y wi lh 4.2in mon a rS and Vickers machine guns, th ey also rorm ed a '\"'asp' carri er-borne namethrower pl aLOon in earl y '945, but it had relatively lillie a pport unity ro show its worth,

The Di visional Anillery (Table 5) had, as was usual, one of its Fi eld Regiments self-propelled , with Sexton 25 pdrs. and Ram OP lanks; and lhe other with lOwed 25 pdrs. Bo th ,"'ere converted rrom Yeomanry (T erri roria l Army cavalry) regiments; the fonner , 15grd Ficld R egl. , from the Leices ter­shire Yeomanry, and th e la ller, 55 th Ficld , (i·om th e \Nest Somerset. The light anli-aircrart regim elll was also a recent conversion, in this case rrom a ba llalion of the King's Own Yorkshire Light In fantry . Shortly before D-Day it disbanded its '20mm troops and th e personnel eventua lly went to rorm counter-mortar tcams (which loca ted mortars by tracking the bombs with radar). In North-West Europe the LAA regiment remained on a six- troop basis, usua lly dispersed to protect Di visional HQ,

B

the field guns, and bridges in th e divisional a rea. By 1945 it was full y self-propelled and was sometimes used in th e ground role, while in March of tha t yea r two 4-omms in each troop were replaced by Ameri ca n ha lfirack-moumed quadruple .5111 machin e guns, The anti-tank regiment went into aClion with a bout half th e M,os in its two self­propelled batteries filled with Ameri can gin guns, and th e other ha lf wilh British I 7pdrs.; the proportion of th e lalter increased as they beca me avail able. It a lso ga ined Crusad ers, possibl y redundant AA tanks, as command vehicles. In March '945 th e two LOwed a nti-tank batteri es were converted to inrantry, with three riAe troops, and a support troop Or lWO 17pdrs., a carrier secLion, and two 3in mortars. As well as its own units the Divisional Artillery usuall y had a flight of the Corps Air Observation Post squadron a ttached, and often had temporary control of Med ium and ex tra Field balleries from Corps.

The Divisiona l Royal Engi neer Regiment had th e usual two Field Squadrons ror engineer lasks, and a Field Park Squadron as a planl unit , as well as an assault bridging troop. The units were operated centrall y ralher than being permanelllly a llocated to th e brigades, a nd fo r bridging, probably their major task during the latcr stages of the campaig n, th ey were o rten assisted by or gave assistance to Corps or Arm y units.

I-laving no separate troop-carrying company, the RASC column had perm anent detachmems from the infantry brigade and the a rmoured troops com panies with the lon'ied infan try battalions. The RASC com pan ies were basically equipped with Ford WOT6, Bed ford QLD and a few Canadian Ford F60L, 4x 4 3-tonn ers, as well as the Bed ford Q LTs with the inla mry. Until the Seine was crossecl the column opera led with brigade compan­ies, each carrying mixed loads or amm unition, petrol and suppli es; aftcr th a t th ey cha nged to cOlTImodiLi cs, one compa ny ca rrying ammun ition, anoth er petrol and the third supplies. Petrol and suppl ies were norma ll y sent forward once a clay rrom th e adm inistrative area to points where they were coll ected by unit ' r\' Echelons. A group of twen ty vehicles from th e ammunition compa ny was kept close to Di visiona t HQ, li·ol11 wh ich lorri es could be senL rorward direct lO the g uns; these were replaced with oth er lorries from funher back as

TABLE '2

ARMOURED REGIME NT, '944:

(Allached: Signal Troop 3 x 15cwt I x 3-l0 llncr

RHQ (4 lanks , ttrack , car)

Guards Armoured Division Tacsigu Colours: 2nd (Armd. ) Grenadiers- Red ISl (Armd.) ColdSlream­Yeilow

" flo. S'Iuadron

L.A.D. ( REME) 3 x 15C\\Il , I x t lra ck '2 x 3-lOnners '2 x Sca mmell Recovery Tractors)

,

(Tacsig11: 0 )

flO. I

'A' Squadron (Tacsig11: 6 )

(2 J eeps, ' x '5CWl)

,

2nd (Armd. ) Irish- Blue 1St (MolOr) Grenadiers- Green 2nd (Armd. Recce) Welsh­While

'B' Squadro1l (Tacsign: 0 )

. ' t C" Squadron (Tacsign: 0 )

I Admin. Troop (8 MOlOrcycies GJ ee!,s

I Reece Troop

I Intercom Troop

I Ail Troop

( I t x Stuart lanks)

(9 x SCOlll Cars) (8 x Crusader AA lanks)

3 x '5CWl GS I x 15cw1 "Vater 3 x medic. !lracks '2 x fitters' tlracks ,G x 3- lo1111ers) Tr~ofi Tr~ofi Tr~OI) Tr~op Trhop

Sherma~ 75mm Sherm175mm

Admin Troop

(3 x itr.cks

lh ey were used. The divisional RASC collected in bulk from a Corps Forward Maintenance Area , and lhe com posite plaloons then split lhe com­modilies into the loads required LO go forward in each company.

On lh e medical side lhe Lighl Field Ambulance normally worked Wilh 5 lh Brigade and lhe Ficld Ambulance with 32nd, leapfrogging companiesl sections when on lhe move. They operated advanced dressing stalions and collected wounded from unit Regim en tal Aid Posts for transporta tion to lhe Corps Casualty Clearing S,ations.

For lhe recovery and repair of vehicl es REME Light Aid Detachments (LADs) travelled with

I Shemlan Fireny

I x 15ew1 \Vater I x 15C\\' 1 GS 12 x 3-tonncrs)

./

unit 'A' Echelons , and Advanced Workshop Delachments followed behind each brigade LO recover lh e more seriously damaged veh icles to the brigade workshops in the Admin Group. Allhough armoured squadrons had lheir own AR Vs, these had no jibs and cou ld only LOW, so LAD Scammell recovery lracLOrs had LO be sent ronvard LO recover any vehicles Wilh damaged running gear.

As ea n be seen from Plate A there were several oLhcr units and sub-unils wilhin the division , and the LOlal strenglh came to just over 3,000 vehicles and ' 4, iDO men (which needed nearly ' ,200 gallons or petrol to move them all one mile) . Of lhese juSl over 300 vehicl es were tanks, and 800

9

hennan i-\R\" recovering a Shennan gun lank. Each squadron had one ARV, virtua lly :I lurrCllcss gun lank with a .50 cal. Browning. Although good for towing, they could not recover vchid es with damaged I'unning gear which wel'e unabll' to 'roll'.

vehicl es and 3,00 0 mcn form ed th e adminisn"alivc group .

C:unouHage Schemes and Vehicle Markings AFVs were kha ki O\·era ll , and most softskins seem LO have been the same; some may have had the 'M ickey Mouse ear' bl ack scheme applied over this, but pictu res of Guards Armoured vehi cles makc this doubtful. Some tanks had chi cken wire around the turrets and wire wound spirally a long the gun barrels for a ttaching foliage or skrim , but this was by no means general even in Normandy. All ,·ehicles usua ll y had the divisiona l sign on the left front and rear and their unit tacocal signs on th e right (sec Plate A) . RAS e troop-carrying vehicl es wore the sign of th e unit calTi ed over tha t o f th e RASC company. igns secm mosuy LO have been painted direct onto vehicle bodies, mud­guards or hulls. The a ir recognition sign of a white Star in a circle was painted on tank turret lOpS and

10

so ftskin bonn ets or cab roofs; vehicl es such as carri ers without such tOP surfaces sometimes used sta rs on a disc whi ch could be put on top of their loads. Plain Stars without circle were sometim es seen on lorry and ha lf track ca b doors. T ank squadron signs (see T able 2) were painted on hull sides and rear, and sometim es (i'ont surfaces, but not on turrets. They were sometimes quite large, and the Grenadiers seem to have pUllhe lank serial number within th e uni t in whi te inside th e squadron sign on u, e sides, whil e the Coldstreams painted th e troop number and letter, to indica te Lhe lank within th e troop, on th e LUrrct back stowage boxes. So fL, kin vehicles a ttached to a rmoured regiments often had squad ron signs on front and rear, but the vehicles of th e Grenadi er motor ba tta lion do not seem LO have used them a lthough they were pa rt of the armoured brigad e. Ou,er standard signs were th e bridge classifi cation pi ale, a bl ack number on a yellow disc a t th e front. and the vehi cle seri a l number in white on hull or cab sides; th ese were no t always visibl e, and tanks seem in many cases to have dispensed with bridging circles as well. The Irish Guarcls painted names on the

rrOnts or their tanks in a distinctive style wi th lhe letters increasing and then decreasing in size through the words, but other units do not seem to have rollowed su it, although photographs oc­casionall y show namcs painted in varying styles, very small, on ind ividual tanks. presumabl y on the crews' initiati\·c.

Apart rrom markings, spare track plates and a spare bogey wcre OrlCll slowed on the rront pla tes or the Shermans, while Cromwells had a cable reel ror pulling ou t mines) and a smoke generator at

the rront, and a spare road"vheel on the turret side or rear hull pla te. Personal gear was orten stowed under the tarpaulin on the engine decks, wrapped in groundsheets and hung rrom the turre t sides, or put in empt), ammunition boxes secured about the ,·chicle .

6th Guards Tank Brigade and 2nd Household Cavalry RegiInent These two units both rormed part or the original Guards Armoured Di\'ision l)tll were remo\'ed in the reorganization at the end or 19l~2 . The tank brigade did not return until the end or the war when the Division ceased to be armoured, but 2H CR operated with it, as Corps troops, rrom time to time during the sUl11mer or 1944 berore being permanently attached and then once again becom­ing officially part or the Division later in the yea r.

A familiar lask lor the -I0nnn Bofors guns of 9_1th LAA RegL, Rf\ : guarding Baill'}' bridges built h~ the sappers on the divisional or brigade centrc iinC5. 111e nearer brid.\.:c has been !;panl1t'cI acrO!;1> moored civilian b.,rges, while under Ihe furlheronc trcsties h,\Vc been built to rcp!<u:c th(' blown piers o f the ori~illal masonry bridge.

Scammell S\' ,2S hea\'~ reco\'cf"\ tr3ctonhowing the cxtrndingjiband \\inch gear thai t'Oablccl it to recon"r vchides that could nOt be handled b} the .\R\'s. Each annourcd battalion's RE:\IE LAD had two Scammcl11), :tnd the infhl1lr} brigade workshop had another lour ; the armoured bri'{adc workshop had six transporters for recover\ purposes. Conniford

The organization orboLh units is shown in Table 7. The Tank Brigade was intend ed ror usc as Army troops, to be allocated to support infantry divisions as required, being one or three such rormal.ions or ' heavy tanks' in the army at that lime. It was basically similar to th e armoured brigade in the Division, but lacked any inrantry or iLS own, and had Armoured Command Vehicles down to bat­ta lion level, as well as being more sel r-con tained in other respects. J ts basic equipment was the Chur­chill ihrantry tank \-\lhi ch, although not impervious to the heavier German tank and anti-tank guns at ballie ranges, was bener armoured Lhan the Shermans and Cromwells; its cross-country ability was also greater, enabli ng itlO move more rreely in the l\onnancly bOCllge and other difficult going. W hen the Brigade landed in France it still had a considerable number or the older marks or Chur­chill a rmed with the 6pdr. gu n, and a lthough man y or these were up-gunned by the workshops, and others were replaced by the MkV lI with a 75mm weapon when it became available, photographs ind icate that some were still in use quite late on in the war. Despite thi the 6th Guards Tank Brigade was able to give a good account or itselr in Normandy south of Ca umolll ) \·vhcre it briefly supported inrantry rrom the Guards Armoured Division , and again in the battles in Holland and Germany, al though iL took litt le part in the rush lhrough Fra nce and Belgium. I n 1945 it was

II

TABLE 3

INFANT RY BATTALION , 1944;

BHQ ( I each Humber seOUl

car, carrier, 15CWl; 2 jeeps 2 x t lracks, or

which 1 medic. )

I Ho.. C'!Y

I Admin. Pi. 1 jeep 2 x '5CW l GS 1 x 15cwlOffice 1 x 15cwt \,y alcr 13 x 3-lOnncr Signal PI. 3 x 15CWl

I Support C'!Y

I Ho.. 1 Jecp 1 x 15CWl AT PI. 2 x ' 5CW l

12 carriers 6 x 6pdr. guns Carrier Pl. 2 x 15CWl 13 carriers .Hortar PI. 7 carriers 6 x 3in mortars 3 x 15cwl Pioneer PI. 3 Jeeps 1 x t track

I ' ;I ' Coy

I No.. 1 jeep I carri er 3 x 15 cwt

I Platooll NQ 2in morta l' PlAT

I SecLWl1 1 x LMG 1 x SMG 8 rifles

I , J3' C'!Y

I Platooll

t Sectioll

I 'c" Coy

I Pla/ool1

I Section

I . D' C,!>'

Attached RASC Troop Carryiug Detachmen/: I ca l' o r jeep, '2 x ISCWl, 21 x 3 -lon TCVs

redesignated as a n armoured brigade a nd m ade some spectacular advances carrying BriLish and America n paratroops, despile th e relative slowness or its Churchills. In addition to these troops and Guards Armoured it a lso supported 15 th Scottish , 3rd and 5 th British and 43rd Wessex Div isions berore finishing the war on the Baltic coast.

The tanks usua lly had old track plates Sherman as well as C hurchill types- libera ll y welded to th e rronts and turre ts for e..xtra pro­tection. 'T'hey were marked wi lh the tac tica l sig n on the le rt o'ont, and th e brigade emblem on th e Irrt rear (see Plate A). fndividual tank names were painted on the air intakes each side, sq uadron sign ' on th e rear o f turre t boxcs, and sometim es troop numbers a nd letters on th e hull side doors. In add itio n to the 75mm/6pdr. tanks, squadro n HQ; had close -support C hurchills with 95mm howitzers

12

and Stuart recce tanks, while the Coldstream balla lion used a captured Panther, ror a while christened 'Cuckoo'.

The 2nd Household Cava lry Regiment , whi ch is o f morc direct relevance lO the slory of LilC Guards Armo ured Division , was convened from a mo tor ballali on, and consisted of a rniXlure of R oyal Horse Guards and Lire Guards personnel. Bo th retained th ei r 0'''''11 reg im ental ca p badges, and o ffi cers their distinc tive rank 'pips' , but they were otherwise full y amalga mated . 'r he unique Ho use­hold Cava lry nom enclature ror their Warrant Officers a nd NCOs, with 'corporals or horse' and 'corporal majors' in place orsergeants a nd sergeant­majors, remained un changed.

I nitiall y 'the stable boys', as lhey were sometim es known , were VlII Gorps troops and during the fighting in :\ormand y, where several divisions were

operating III close proximity, dio-crent squadrons worked with dilferent di visions. This sometimes led to dup li ca tion o f reconna issance elTon) and opera t­ing wi th an infantry division unfarniliar with armou red cars was not found to be a success . It was a gruelling time for the Regiment, scouting ahead in close country where first COlllaCt was invariably made with concealed tanks or guns rather than with th e enemy's light recce forces. The Roors of cars were soon sandbagged as protection against mines, and electri cally operatcd smoke gcnerators were filled LO the fronts a nd wired in to the sidelight ci rcui ts. Although these proved very eOcctive, th e practice of reversing a t high speed a long na rrow lanes wi th ditches on both sides while enveloped in a cloud o f smoke probably ca used as ma llY, albeit less serious casualties, as th e ambushes that made it necessary . nlike some oth er regiments, 2H CR did not remove the turrets of its Daimler armoured cars to reduce th eir silhouette; instead th e scoul cars in th e troops were normal ly sent ahead with the armoured cars covering them from behind . Although th ese only boasted 2pdr. guns, the one in each troop filled with a Littl ejohn ada pLOr LO increase penetration was ca pab le of piercing the front a rmou r ofa tuG [II a t the ranges normal in close co untry.

Control of th e Regiment was far from easy. I ts job was not onl y LO locate th e enemy, but also to find ways around defended areas and, in creasingly as th e war went on, 1O fllld unblown bridges, so th e troops ranged far more widely afield than those of an armoured regim ent ; on one occasion, for exampl e, a bridge was discovered across th e Soulevre in France some six mil es down an ungua rded road behind the enemy lines. [t was a lso little use obtaining infonnalion unless it could be relayed LO those behind needing it. For this reason RHQhad to move frequently to keep in LOuch both forwards and backwards, and liaison o ffi cers in Humber scout ca rs with rad ios on th e regim enlal net were kept a t a ll headqu arters in the vicinity whether th e regiment was working for them or not. In the squadrons the Staghound proved a good HQ car, wilh its fi ve-man crew able LO provide reli ef wireless operators, a lthough it was too bulky for use as a troop car. Because of their dispersed nalUre and the distance from RHQ, squadrons often kept a Im ixed load' lorry of petrol and ammunition with

Vickers .303 MMG in action. 111(~c g'UllS ,,·ere used botJ} by the Nort humberland Fusi lier.) and the support company of the lSI Motor Bn. , Grenadicrs. The condenser tin for the cooling water jacket and an :wununition box can be st."'Cn under the front of the gun , and the dial sigh t for indirect firc isjusl visible above the loading number's helmet .

the SHQ while the rest of the echelons were at RHQ or behind. Despite th e nature of the work casual ties were not excessive and the MO wilh his White scout cars (compared in the unit history for lack of comfort with Boudicca's chariot!), was genera lly a ble to cope. The possession of their own infantry/pioneers in the support troops, and of the AEC cars (known in the regiment at the time as 'Matadors' ) with their 75mm guns, enabled squad­rons to push ahead or d efend themselves in a way that had not proved possible for a rmoured car units in ea rli er campa igns.

The R egiment 'S problems were not all caused by the enemy; as the CO remarked , 'When liberating lerriLOry the auentions of civili ans very mu ch impede operat ions.' As ;first in' to most towns they were frequently mobbed. On one occasion a trooper was knocked out by an unripe pear, and on oth ers bedrolls, wireless aerials and anything else left on the outsid es of th e cars were taken by the populace as souven irs of lheir liberation; at one point onl y u,c intervention of the loca l police prevented th e removal ofa scout car's wheels, and sometimes the positions of carefull y concealed cars were given away to th e enemy by the presence ofa crowd of curious onlookers. Operating ahead of the main advances the Regiment was also vulnerable to

Fitters at work in the engine bay ora Crolll\\cll. The nearest man is ~iui ngon the )" 1(,[t'Or engine with tht' len-hand fuel tank in rronl onlim and Ihe Icrt-hand radiator to hi~ I(,ft , \\ hi lc his male si ts on the gcaroox to work on the fina l drive, steering :111<1 brake uni l.

th e mista ken au cntions o f Allied a ircra ft ; and on morc than onc occasion was fruslrated lO find that bridges tha t had been blown by th e retrea ting fiEF in t940 had not been repa ired .

When the Alli es broke out or the No rmandy bridgehead, , HCR was swi tched rrom VIII to XXX Corps, a nd with the more dispersed na ture o r the fighting worked ma inl y ror Gua rds Armoured Division therea fter, o ffi ci all y rejoining th e Division in th e a utumn. They norm a ll y opera ted with two or lhreesquadrons up and th e remainder in reserve. On long, fas t advances, such as th aL lO Brussels, troops and even sq uadrons had to be ro ta ted as th e leaders ran Oll t o f ammunition, o r bccarn e too depleted as a result o r dropping 00-detachm ents to gua rd crossroads a nd bridges as th ey passed th em_ O n o ther occasions, such as th e attempt to link up with th e I st Airborne Divisio n a t Arnhcl11 , when lhe Divisio n and other troops were supported along a single road through enemy territo ry, wh ole sq uadrons were employed , spaced throughout convoys a t abo ut one ca r to every twenty lorri es, to

try and give some sort ofprotcction aga inst attacks rrom th e fl a nks.

[n addition t.o reconnaissa nce tasks 2H C R also provided observa tio n pOSts (ex lension leads from th e 1\0. t9 sets in the scout cars enabled offi cers to keep wa tch fI'olll such \'anlage po ints as the LOpS of buildings), a nd did -Pha ntom' work, listening in to

uni ts' battlefield chan er and relaying back impor­tant iLems to the rea r. It was a troop rrom lh e Regiment which, having sneaked th rough in th e morning mist, made the first d irect conlaCt w ith th e a irborne troops a t Arnhem a nd provided the fi rst pro per radio link with thelll ; while during lhe Ardennes sca re o ne o f lhe ir o Uiccrs on security dUlies had to admit to an A merican truck dri ver larking proper ic1entifi ca tio n th al. no. he never had actually seen a black German ! From lim e La lim e they even worked as in fan t ry.

\Vh en the wa r ended plans were a root to replace the AECs with Al ec to 95 ml11 selr-propelled guns, a nd the White scout cars in u,e medica l a nd assault troops with halfhacks, but th ese never came to anything and the organiza lion remained basica ll y as in T a ble 7.

Normandy Guards Armoured Division fin a ll y sail ed for wa r a fortnight a fter D -Day, 30 nd Brigade from London Docks a nd 5 th Brigade from Gosport, th e whole division reaching Norm a ndy by th e end of June 1944. V ill Corps, to whi ch they still belonged , a lso contained 11th Armoured and 15th (Sconish) Infantry divisions a nd fo rm ed pa rt of th e build -up of ond British Arm y under Lt.-Gen. Sir i'diles Dempsey, which itself, toge th er with I Sl Canadi an and 1St Am erican Armies, made up th e Allied in vasion force, 2 1 Sl Arm y Gro up, comm anded by Genera l Montgomery. The Am eri cans held th e right of th e bridgehead , reach ing as far as Cher­bourg. while th e British a nd Ca nadia ns held th e left sectOr to a depth o f some eightee n mil es be tween Cacn and Bayeux by th e time Guards Armoured landed .

Very few members orthe Division had ever been in action before, but th e infantry of 32nd Brigade and some o f th e divisiona l uni LS had a chance to accli ma ti ze themselves in a static ro le just west o f Cacn be fore the armour 3lTived. It was during this period ofsk;rmishing with loth SS Pa nzer Division

AEC armoured car from one of the 2nd Household Cavalry heavy troops. followed h} two Staghound HQ cars down a typical Continelltal pad' road. TIl(' A I~C has shon bridging beams 011 each ~i(k to htlp cru~ing" l1arro\\ ditthcs. etc .. and is libl'rally drapt·(\ wi lh camouflagl' m'lIing whidl d(K"s linle to ("onccal Iht' square·shaped 75mm turret.

'Hilledugeurl' a round Carpiqu ct a irfield tha t the guardsmen had th eir first tas te of th e sniping, shelling and intense mortar fire that \,·crc to ca use so man y casua l Li es in Normand y. 11 was here also th a t th ey got used to the perm a nent stcnch of dead cattlc; and discovered th at however enthusiastic Ih c rirer, a PlAT was unlikely to bring down a stra fIl1g Bfl 09 r The 1st Bn . \Velsh Gua rds a lone lost two comm anding o ffi cers during this period , and nobody was sorry to bc pulled out a fter a fortnight, back lO BayclIx; here calvados and cider were plentiful , a nd th e a rm y posta l service soon had to

put a ba n on pa rcels o f" Camembert cheese being senl home.

The lull d id no t las t long; on th e evening of 17 Ju ly th e whole di vision moved olfin th e dark , dust a nd heat, a long bulldozed tracks across country ro und to th e north-east of eaen, now caplUrcci , to jo in lip with th e o ther twO British armo ured d ivisions. 7t h a nd 11th, grouped under VI II Corps

15

for Operation 'Goodwood ' . The aim of this was [or a ll the British armour to a ttack southwards over the relatively good tank country to the south-east of Caen with the immediate object of brea king out of the bridgehead towards Fa la ise, and the wider intention of forcing U1 C Germans to concentrate more of their ava ilable armour on the left, while the Americans on the right prepared to make the main breakout aga inst reduced opposition. T he attack was preceded by saturation bombing, which was made possible by the complete air superiority achieved by the Allied air forces.

Need less to say, things, d id not go exactly accordi ng to plan. Owing to the diOiculty of starting the a ttack from restricted gaps through minefields, the British a rmour did not advance as a

solid wave, close on the heels of the bombers and supported by its own massed guns; instead the divisions straggled forward one after the other with considerable gaps, and soon outran their own artillery, which could not move forward in the general congestion. Although the area was 'good tank country' by Normandy standards, with large open cornfields, and fairly Aat, the combination of woods and villages dotted a bout a t intervals o[ a mile or so, a couple of railway embankm ents across the line of advance, and high ground a lmost untouched by the bombing on tl,e left and in (ront some six m iles (rom the start line, all gave the defenders th e advantage.

The Guards advanced for their first divisiona l action on the morning of the 18tl, in the wake of

, 'ABLE 4

16

MOTOR BATTALION , 1944:

BHQ.

I , Supporl Coy

I I

, Molar CO)'

, Molar Coy

I

, Molar Coy

3 AT Plllloolls each 2 x 6pdr. guns towed by carriers

I i 2 MMC Plaloolls each 4 x Vickers MMG in carriers

HQ 2 While SCOllt Cars 2 x 3in mortars

,I , 3 M olor PlaloollS each I x 2in mortar I x Pl AT, 2 x LMG 4 x tlracks

INDEPENDE I T MACH II E GUN COMPANY:

HQ.

r, ---------"r---------II--------" - - -Morlar Plarooll MC Plaloon MC Ploloon MC Plaloon 4 x 4·2in mortars 4 x Vickers 4 x Vickers 4 x Vickers

MMG MMG MMG

I 48 carriers, 4 jeeps 34 x J 5CWl, ' 4 x 3-tonncrs

. , Carner Platooll I I carriers, l OX LMG 2 x 2in mortars 2 x Pl AT

---, Flamethrower Platooll 6 ""asp carriers

I I th Armoured and [ollowed by 7th , one RSM at least having reminded his battalion to 'shave this morning the same as any other morning .... ' The armoured regim entS went first, with the Grenadiers leading, one squadron up, th en lh e Irish, 5th Brigade HQ a nd fina ll y th e Coldstream. Each regiment had one motor infalltry com pany of the Grenadi ers and a self-propelled os pdr. ba ttery allached. Behind the a rmoured brigade the recce regiment, Welsh Guards, in their Cromwells, came to protect th e Oan ks, whil e the infanu·y of 30nd Brigade followed up in their una rmoured lorries as best they could , to take over ground won.

The majority o f the first day was spellt trying to su bdue the enemy dug in around Cagny, some four miles south-cast of Caen , wh ich had been by­passed by 11th Armoured. After heavy losses both from German guns and tanks the village was finall y entered in th e afternoon. Near th ere Ll. Gorman of the Irish Guards destroyed the Division's first King Tiger tank by ramming it with his Sherman when his own gun jammed, and then bringing up a FireOy to Gnish it oW I t was evening before the lorri ed infa lltry caught up wi th th e a rmour, de­bussed, and tried to advan ce on foot beyond Cagny, only to be held up and forced to dig in for the night on unreconnoitred ground , while the tanks formed their tight tri angu lar harbours where they could. Even the confused and frustrating night which followed had its ligiller moments in re-

Scx{Qn self-pm/Jelled 25JXlr. guns. as used by 153 rd Field Rtgimcnl. 'rhcsc were mo )i lc fidd arlillt:ry , not assault gu ns. and were normally positioned and cOlHrollcd by field telephone from command posts in tilt" same wa) a50 to\\t .. d guns. Ammunition \\'as handed up by mt'mbers of the detachment on the ground when firing long programme!;.

trospect, as when the CO of the J rish Guards infantry lost his map as th e tank on which he had propped it whil e briefing his offi cers drove away.

Next morning the advance \·\1as call ed 00'. as clearly the bombing had stopped short of the main defences on the high ground , where th e enemy showed no signs orcracking, and the Bri tish armour was sta lled well short of its objectives. Guards Armoured remained in the vicinity of Cagny, making local a llacks and existing, as one omccr pu t il, in a sta le or'inLimatc animosity' with units or 1St

and loth SS Panzer Divisions. Four days later, during two of which rain brought plagues of mosquitoes to add to th eir more lethal prob lems, the Division was wi thdrawn.

Despite considerable losses in both tanks and men in a confusing first action th at appeared to ha ve been a failure , Guards Armoured had acquitted itself well. The in fantry had had loca l successes aga inst crack SS troops, the tanks and ant i-tank g uns had accounted for several Tigers a nd Pan th ers as well as th e less formidable pzKwIV tanks ; th e light anti-aircrart regiment had also proved its WOrLh towards the end of th e ba ttle when the Luftwa ffe had begu n to appear

17

occasionally. Much had been learned; the tank crews discovered that the 75mm Sherman gun could only successfully engage Tigers and Panthers from the side or rear and at less than 500 yards, while the danger of having tanks on their own, where their infantry could not get up to them, was never to be forgotten within the Division. The operation as a whole in fact achieved its more important purpose in that it forced the Germans to commit twO extra Panzer divisions to hold it; and according to his Chief of Staff, it finally convinced the German C-in-C, von Kluge, that Germany's days in ormandy were numbered.

Aided by this concentration of ule ava ilable German armour against the eastern seeLOr of the bridgehead, the Americans in the west were able to

launch their breakout on 25 July and to start the swing to south and east behind the main German defences. Once uley were under way it became important to capture the close hilly country five to

ten miles south ofCaumont in order to protect their left flank, to SLO p German armour moving west from Caen, and to deny the enemy an ideal pivot for counter-attacks. To this end VlI I and XXX Corps attacked th is area from the north on 25 July in Operation 'Bluecoat'. Guards Armoured was initially in reserve. VITI Corps made good progress on the right of the attack, partly due to a fine first action by 6th Guards Tank Brigade- whose Churchills were better at moving in the bocage country than the Shermans- and to the discovery of the intact bridge over thc Soulevre by 2nd Household Cava lry. On the lefi. XXX Corps did not do so well, however, and 15th Scottish had to stop in order to protect VII I Corps' flank. At this juncture Guards Armoured was summoned to take its place a longside I I th Armoured to maintain the momentum of the advance.

After a move of forty-five miles in a day on the 3 1 St, Ule Division was rapidly regrouped; the Coldstream infantry and Irish tanks were made into one battlegroup in 5th Brigade, and the Grenadier infantry and tanks another, while the Coldstream tanks were split up between the Irish and Welsh infantry in 32nd Brigade to form two more all-arms groups. This was as a result of 'Goodwood', where the rig id separation of infantry and armoured brigades had proved unsatisfactory. At this stage the resul tant battlegroups were of a

Guards infantry: an ofliccr Oflhc Scots Guards in battlcdl'css, \)cakcd (·ap. webbing anklcts, and ''1earing ~I scrim net as a scarf is ho ding a Ccnnan ~Iauscr 98K riAe, while the Warrant OlJlcc.· behind him wears the General Service c.'lp-a SOrt or beret bul made up rrom several pieces or material which was used in the infantry battaJions by :'\'oos, other ranks, and sometimes WOS. He has it doth and tape bandolier or ri flc ammunition in dips over his shoulder. Both ha ve SeaLS CUllrdsshouldcr flasht'S and tbe divisional sign ollthc slccvcs. but the officer is without ,,!Ilk badges, whidl would seem unusual.

very ad hoc nature, [hose units parked nearest each other at the time being paired; nor was this a purely Guards idea , for General O'Connor had ordered both his armoured divisions to adopt this organi ­zation for 'Bluecoat'.

There foll owed a fortnight of fierce, if often disjointed, action as th e Division forced its way soulh in a series o f limited auacks to caplure successive ridges and vi llages, usually with battalion/regimental groups, but sometimes only on a squadron/company sca le. The bocage country, where the vario us tributaries of the River Vire ran down steep gu llies from the Mont Pincon massif to the left of th e divisional front, reminded many

observers of Devon or Cornwa ll, with its hills (some too steep for Shermans), sma ll fields with thi ck banks a nd hedges, su nken la nes, a nd woods. I t was ideal for defence; on one occasion a n infa ntry pa trol clearing a la ne fo r the ta nks passed with in ten yards ora Tiger ta nk withou t seeing it, and th e Guards lank crews, trained on Salisbury Pl ain and the Wolds of Yorkshire, were quick to complai n that they 'had been brought up on indirect shooting al lWO mil es; none of this fifteen yard business .. "

lniti ,tll y progress was good , a nd a weird col­lection of prisoners from many races, in cl uding ~Ilongol ia n s, \,vcrc ca ptured, but on I Aug ust resistance stiffened as units Of 21Sl Panzer Di vision, rushed from south o f eacn, were encountered; during succeeding days the Di vision ra n into elements ofg th and loth SS Pa nzer a nd 3rd a nd 5th Parachu te Divisions. Although at one time forty German tanks wcre seen together, this was un ­usual ; these units were commitled piecemeal as they arrived in th e area. As a res ult th ere was no defence line to c rac k, or major armo ured counter­attack for the G uards to repel ; instead small mobile groups of infantry with one or two ta nks (often Tigers or Pa nthers) a nd sel f-propelled guns were the main opposition, which were well suited to

defence in the bocage. Snipers and mortars were particularly troubl esome, no t onl y to th e in fa ntry; 6th Gua rds T a nks e,'en welded veni ca l meta l plates behind Lheir lUrret ha tches to pro LeCt their coml11.ilnders, whil e a n Irish Gua rds Sherm a n was literally blown a part when a mon a r bomb dropped down an open ha tch .

By 4 August th e attack had a ll but haiLed a nd iL was proving d ifficu lt to ge t supp li es to, a nd evacuate wo unded from, isola ted sub-units du e to

the diffi culty in compl etely clea ring areas ofpockelS of enemy. At one point a fie ld ba ttery was nea rl y OVCITun by German tanks. These were dri ven o lf by the anti-ta nk regiments' self-propell ed 17pdrs., oneofwhich knocked OUt a Panth er with a shot th at went through bo th wa lls of a ba rn before hitting it. On 7 August the Germa ns launched their ill-fated counter-o ffensive against the Ameri cans a t Mor­tain, and G uards Armo ured had a welcome rest, merely holding the line whil e th e offensive em ­phasis was shi fLed elsewhere, but this was shon­lived . On the 8th th ey LOok over the 11th Armoured's area as well as their own, and for lhe

nex t week no major allempl lo advance was made, although fie rce local a ttacks were kept up. [n one of th ese near the village of Ch ene do li e (, Chi na doll' to th e G ua rdsmen) Lh e Irish in fa ntry and Coldstream lanks su (fered partic ularly severe casualties with no gain LO show for them . At one point 6 th Guards ta nks jo ined up with Lh e Welsh infantry, and a t a nother 2nd H ousehold Cavalry came in LO the li ne to help OU L as imprompw fOOLs loggers. By 15 August serious signs of enemy withd rawa l became a ppa rent, and Lhe d ivision had completed its task.

During th is gruelling period the D ivision's losses in both ta nks a nd in fa ntry had been heavy; but th e

Valentine Bridgdavt'r: three or these rOl"l1lt, .. d part or the Armoul"ed Brilpdc J-IQ I niti;dly they seem to luwt' bt"cn allocated to the rccce rcgim{·IlI . and lOiter "ere giWlllO the REs. l lllhe latcr sta~es orthc campaigu man~ w;lt("l· obstach"!:l \'ere ll1et , btl! most \\CI·e tOO \\ide ror their Ihirt) -root scis..~OI"S bridges.

Alli es could a fford to lose six Lanks for every G erm a n one destroyed . In fac t duri ng the whole campaign the Irish Guards were La lose 175. and wou ld end th e war with only twO o f their original outfit , bo th of whi ch had been hiL and repa ired. [nfa nlry re placemen ts were nOt so easy to come by a nd losses, part icul arl y of officers, were to be a cOlllill uing problem. AL th is point X Coy. Scots Guards was switched from the lrish to Lhe Welsh ba uai io ll beca use o f lh eir relative reinforcement sit ua tions. The Sherman had not shown up well in th e boeage, wi th the poor an ti- tank perfo rmance of th e 75 mm gun , its Lend ell cy to burn easily when hiL, and its inability to breach th e field ban ks which were not themselves necessarily protection against fire li'OJn th e enemy long 75mm a nd 88mm gu ns. (The C ulin device tha t would have ena bled the Shermans to break th rough banks did not reach

Ig

Guards Armoured until th e end of August, too late to be of use. ) Other weapons, such as the PlAT, which accounted for severa l Tigers a nd lesser tanks a t close range, and the sel f-propelled 17pdr. gu ns, did well, while the lack of air opposition led to th e anti-aircraft tanks being pensioned off.

The Rush to Brussels

The Didsion enjoyed a well-earned rest during the final phase of the Norm andy fighting in which the Germ an 7th Army was first trapped and then annih il ated in the Fa laise pocket, between the Americans advancing eastwards and th e British and Canad ia ns attacking southwards from the bridgehead.

The manner in which all available enemy units had been rushed into the :\lormandy battles, and the completeness of their defeat, left something of a vacuum in north-west France, which the Allies were quick to exploit. The Americans pushed on to Paris a nd beyond, while the British and Canadian armour struck north-west lo\vards th e Channel ports and the V -weapon launching sites, o'om which southern Engla nd was being increasingly bombarded. At first Guards Armoured was not involved, but a change o f plan to include Brussels as a n objecti ve soon brought them in. On 27 August Lhey were transferred to XXX Corps under Ll.­Gen. Horrocks, and set oB'for the Seine, which they crossed ncar Evreux on th e 29 th , in the wake of 8th Armoured Brigade.

Here, before further advances were made, th e Division was once again reorganized, this Lim e into the fonn that it was to retain, apart from brief reversions, for the rest of the war. The return of2ncl Household Cavalry to the Division removed th e need for the Welsh Guards to remain a recon­naissance unit, and so it was possible to form four permanent mixed ba ulegroups: one each frol11 the Grenadiers, Coldstream, Irish and Welsh Guards, as they each had an armoured and an infantry unit within th e division. Although they were switched as necessary th e Grenadier and [rish Groups usually formed the 5th Brigade, while the Coldstream and Welsh Guards together with th e machine gun company of the Northumberland Fusi liers made up the 32nd.

20

The 4.2in mortars were usually kept under divisional control, a nd 5th Brigade in fact had medium machine guns in the Grenadier Group, since apart from the reduction in its anti-lank gu ns the 1 st Bn. was sti ll equipped as mOtor infantry. At this stage the d ivisional RASC a lso switched £i'om individual companies tied to each brigade wi th a ll commod iti es, to each company concen trat ing on a single commodi ty and supplying both brigades and di\'isional troops as required.

The advance to the Seine a nd beyond was very diU'crent from the mass cross-country move of deployed armou r seen in 'Goodwood'. Now move­ment was at best speed along si ngle road axes o r cen lrc1incs, and lhis was to be typical of advances for the rest of the war. In some cases brigades or even battlegroups would move along pa rall el roads, in others the whole Division would be limited to a single road. Although the a rmoured cars of 2nd Household Cavalry moved in th e van and tried to find ways around obstacles, a nd the leading squadron/company group often managed to brush aside minor opposition, with or without the help of the rocket-firing T yphoon fighter bombers which were of len on call , this method of advance mea nt that quite small enemy groups could delay the whole or a major part of the Di vision, particularly in areas where the tanks could no t ge t off the road, but that where opposition was light high-speed advances were possible.

As the Division took th e lead after crossing th e Seine opposition was fortuna tel y slight a nd disor­gani zed, so they were able to push on, with th e Grenad iers lead ing, to cross the Somme by a bridge that th e Household Cavalry had found intact near Amiens, on 3 ' August; they entered Arras th e next day. Severa l members of the Division had passed this way in less propitious circumstances du ring the retrea t of 1940; one Welsh Guards officer even recovered a suitcase of his kit 0'01ll the fami ly with whom he had then been billeted , and Gen. Ada ir had both been wounded and won th e Me there in the First World War. The advance was not entirely unopposed, and several tanks were lost in minor skirmishes, but no serious delays wcre imposed by th ese.

It was at this time that the Division first really encountered the tumultuous welcomes, with checr-

ing crowds o ffering fl owers, fruit , wine and em­braces to their liberators, which were to be a fea ture of the advance lhrough France and th e Low Counlri es. They a lso bega n lO a pprecia le lhe services of the Resistance movements, who Look prisoners o ff th eir hands, wa rned them of min es or ambushes and aCled as guides. The local pop­ul ations, as wel l as being morc demonstrative than lh e stolid Norm ans, were a lso nOlicea bl y hungri er, and Germ a n horses killed on the road were bUlchered on th e SpOl. In many areas it seemed lO be de rigueu,. lO be libera led in one's Sunday besl !

The speed of the Allied advance had clearly compl clel y overtaken Germ an defensive pl ans, and Il lh Armo ured Division, to th e north of Guards, even captured th e general commanding th e Somme area wilh his HQ This beingso, Gen. Ada ir ordered the Division lO push on a l full speed . On 0 September, however, a brief halt was made a t Doua i to a llow suppli es to calch up. Since no major pon s had yel been caplured , nor ra ilways repaired , lhese were still having lO come over th e Normand y beaches and on by road , and consequ ently posed an increasing problem. T o make besl use of lhe transport avail abl e within the division, RASe

Typi<:al oradvances on the CollIinelll. Slwnnan "s or 2nd Grenadiers no:.e 1(1 tail in a small 10WIi. The chicken ,,·ire round turrets and lal>C!i around gun barrels to ~(:CUrt· branches or scrim to hide the turrets abO\c hedges, togetlwr wi th a complete absence orcamouflagr lo ..... er down and prnrnillellt serial llumb('fS on the sick'S orthc hull an't),pical, as arc the spare track Icnglhs and bogey wheels secured on thl' front plates. T ht' nearest urh'er weilrs tht' riml('S.~ RAC·paucrn hdnwt slandard at this timc' in am-loured units.

Company loads were a llered lO increase the pe lrol carried at th e expense of ammunition, but maps were also in sho rt supply and some echel ons had to ma ke do wilh < ~10torists' Guides to Europe', and suchlike unmilitary ex pedi ents.

I I was a l Doua i lha l the pla n was made for lhe fin al dash to Brussels, some seventy-fi ve miles ahead . Airborne lroops were to seize bridges a long lhe roule and a bombing progra mme was to precede Lh e ad\·ance. I n the event the air pro­gramm e was ca ncelled due to bad weather, and so th e Di vision was abl e to make an ea rlier SLarl 1

a round 0700hrs. Having crossed a 'Class 9' bridge in some trepida tion with their 'Class 30' tanks, they deployed OIllO lWO single road centre-lines. 5lh Brigad e wilh th e Grenadi er a nd Coldslrea m Groups was on th e left and 30 nd Brigade, wi lh lhe Welsh and Irish G roups and th e majori lY of lhe supporting arms, on the right, whil e an in fa ntry

01

Bed ford MWO 15cwt truck. T his vehicle provided !.he bulk of lhe Division's Iighllransporl in all units. The example above is fiued with a welding gent'fa tor, but office, compressor, WIT , water lruck and various other vt'rsions \\'crc used as well as the simple gcneral serv ice opcn·bodied t)'pe . Conniford)

brigade group and a Belgian brigade followed up behind. It was now tha t the tanks, disappointing in Norma ndy , rea lly came into their own , with their reliability d uring periods of continuous high-speed running. [n parti cul a r th e Cromwells, noisy, draughty and cramped though th ey were, easi ly outran wheeled transport a long th e Belgian pave roads.

Despite repeated fi erce but minor skirmishes, and detours a round blown bridges, both brigades rushed on through the day, overrunning slan led Germ an convoys and brushing aside unprepared defences, until they evelllua lly reached the Belgian ca pi tal at around 2000hrs. The welcome was stupendous and fo rtuna tely the enemy made littl e a ttempt to interfere, a lthough a further foray b)' the Irish Gua rds to Waterloo found Bli.i cher's descendants v.tith Panther tanks, and in a very unfriendly mood.

T otal casualties had been light, and despite misunderstand ings with Allied a ircra ft d ue to th e speed of the advance (whi ch had caused much yellow recognition smoke to be used, and in one instance reco urse tasomc First World \tVar trenches th a t happened LO be ha nd y), they amoullled to less Lhan seventy men between the Seine and Brussels . REME workshops had deli bera Lely kept up with the Division and were on hand to repair vehi cles Lha t had j ust managed to compleLe ule journey, while Corps recovered those tha t had not. Al­Lhough a run of seventy miles in a day may seem tri fling to a modern motorist, tanks dre not cars,

22

and the Welsh Guards had been glad o fa half-hour delay a t one point whi ch enabled th em to do some greasing and tightening up of nu ts and bolts on th eir Cromwells.

Although Lh e advance to Brussels was the most spectacul ar the Division was to make, and its implications for poli tical and morale considera tions were clea rl y important, militaril y it was something of a pleasalll in terlude between periods of more serious fighting.

The Low Countries; Autumn and Winter

The stay in Brussels was not long. As the oth er BriLish a rmoured divisions had reached Ghent and Antwerp, and the Americans were well up on the right flank, the orders were to push on in to Holland to threa ten th e Ruhr. After an offi cial entry into the ci ty by Gen. Adair to declare it well and trul y li bera ted , the Division set off" eastwards again on 4- 6 September ; not, however, before much cham­pagne had been consumed with Lh e jubilantlocals, and the LwO Armoured Command V chicles hous­ing the Divisional Opera tions Room had been accidenta lly destroyed by fire.

Although th ey were able to pass th rough Louvain, some fi fteen miles from Brussels, and cross the R iver Dyle, well remembered by Lhose who had served with the BEF in ' 940, it soon became clear Lh a t the enemy was a t last making a stand in th e north-easL corner of Belgium, and th aL the days of high-speed advances with little fighLing were over. Here, in f1a L marshy hea thland dOlled with woods and sma.ll mining towns and intersected by num ­crous streams and canals, the Division met the newly formed 1St German Parachute Arm y: a motl ey collection of excellent LufLwa ff"e infantry mixed with redund ant troops and stragglers from mall Y sources. (Even a deep-sea diver was ca ptured among them.) Although short of tanks and a rtillery Lhey were well provided with 'bazookas' and self­propelled guns, incl uding th e fo rmidableJ agdpan­Lhers, as well as 88mm fl ak guns dug in to proLect the ma ny bridges. They were LO prove skilful and unscrupulous foes, not averse on occasion to

abusing the Red Cross, and although they had little hope of actually sLOpping the Allied advance they were adept at causing it maximum clelays­part icularly now that shonages of field gun ammunition and other essential stores were being felt by the Guards, whose line of communication was some three hundred miles long. Although Antwerp had been ca ptured its pon cou ld not be used LO shonen this distance until the enemy had been cleared from the banks of th e Scheidt below it, and from the islands round the river mouth.

By 8 September, al though th e first of the major canals, the Alben, had been rcached after a fight, the Division was having difficulty forming a bridgehead beyond it among fiercely held LOwns and vi ll ages, and was even subjcCLcd to CQUlller­

atlacks for th e first time since Normandy . For a time th ey were very isolated, but late on the 9th, 11th Armoured Division came lip on their right Aank and they were able LO think offensively again. The Coldstream and Welsh Groups had diffi culty disengaging, but the Irish and Grenadiers fought their way across country towards the Meusc-Escaut Canal a long the Dutch frontier. Here the House­hold Cavalry, using borrowed bicycles so as not to alarm the defenders, found a bridge intact just north of Overpelt, but it was well defended by at least four 88mm guns. By the evening of the 100h the Irish Group had reached the vicinity of this

6JXlr. anti-lank gUll in posi tion alongside a road. This Tcmainl'Ci th(" inr;1Il(1) anti-lank gun throughoUi th(' campaign. The cre\\ W(,:U' the old paltern siraighl-rogcd helnlet, \\ hith SCCnllJ 10 haH beell standard \\'jlhill the Division although the later palltrn was in u~t t·l~cwhcrc. A Slt~n gun can be seen 011 the lrail Oflhc gun, and lhe rear of the Loyd carrier which tow(:d it is just visible.

bridge, and it was successfully rushed under cover of a sudden 'pepperpot' barrage (direct fire from all availab le tank, anti-tan k, LAA, and machine guns on a specific target to thicken up artillery fire, or, as here, when beyond its range) . This was an important success as it opened up the way into Holland ; but numerous pockets of enemy still held out further back and th reatened the divisional axis, whil e the troops across th e canal were heavil y if somewhat belated ly counter-allacked. One parti­cula rly stubborn village required a full-scale attack on the J 2th preceded by a barrage from all the divisional arti ll ery and 4.2in mortars as well as borrowed medium guns to subdue it. Ater this an infantry brigade took over the bridgehead and the Guards pulled back to refit.

The head long advance clearly having been stopped, Field-Marsha l Montgomery, as he had just become, had various courses open to him ; the most obvious, perhaps, was to assume the defensive on the Dutch frontier and switch his major enort LO clearing Walcheren and the lower Scheidt, to open up Antwerp and enable supplics to be landed to support furth er advanccs. Instead , surprisingly for

one who was renowned for his reluctance LO altack until his forces were in balance and properly supported, he wenL for Lhe bolder but dskier course of making a dash for Lhe Zuider Zee a long a narrow corridor which was LO be held open by the American 82nd and 10 l SL and the British 1st Airborne Divisions, dropped near the bridges over Lhe six major water obstacles on the route. This, of course, was Operation' Market Garden'.

Guards Armoured were to lead the Lhrust, backed up by 43rd Wessex Division. The whole opera tion was fraught, to say Lhe least; for much of the way Lhe only possibl e road ran along high causeways beL ween bogs and pine forests which made iL impossibl e for veh icles to leave iL even if a ttacked. Once the fighting troops had gone Lhrough, th e supply veh icles on which Lhey de­pended had to follow along Lhe same single road ­some 12,000 for XXX Corps, of which Lhe Division had 800, plus some 5,000 bridging vehicles which might be needed aL any of Lhe major wa Ler obsLacles, and abouL 2,000 support vehicles for the airborne troops- and a ll in constan t danger from enemy troops by-passed in th e advance or brought across from the Reichswald. With only riOes, Brens and PlATs a nd a few dispersed armoured cars for its defence, this adm inistrative tai l in its corridor, in places only some forty yards wide, was highl y vu lnerable, and congestion made it difficult to send units up as Lhey were required.

AL midday on 17 SepLember th e Irish Group led off from the bridgehead across the Escaul ca na l north of Over pelt and headed for Valkensward. By Lhis time groups had devised more or less slandard orders of march for single road attacks (sec diagram on p. 39), and infa ntry had slarted to ride on the tanks in the lead sq uadron, ready to leap off and deal with 'bazookas', etc., as soon as they revea led themselvcs. H ere they were supported by seven squad rons of rocket-firing Typhoons and preceded by a rolling barrage from eleven Field and six Medium regim ents, not lO mention all thc heavy mortars from two divisions. DespiLe all Lhis they had barely crossed the DULCh fronLier before one tank command er had the unnervi ng experience of watching nine Lanks in front of his own knocked out, one by one, by concealed self-propelled gu ns, wh ile he could neither advance, retire, nor get olf the road. Prompt and effective aCLion by th e

T yphoons followed by a concerted infamry atlack on Lhe woods on either side of the road restored the situat ion and the advance was continued afler a half-hour's delay. Valkensward was reached that even ing, and contact was made with the US paratroops further north via the civilian Lelephone sysLem.· By Lhis means Lhe Division learnt details of Lh e damage to a bridge blown north of Eindhoven, and the sappers were able to get the right equipmem ready for its repair when Lhey reached it. Next day th e Irish Group continued towards Eindh ven and 32nd Brigade took another route through GcJdorp LO the cast, but later had to return LO the main axis. The unsuspecLed presence of troops from 9th SS Panzer Division ' J-/oheIlJlaujen',

with Pamher Lanks and ample support weapons, came as a nasLY shock, while a succession of rickety bridges over su·eams also slowed down Lhe advance. By njghtfall, however, they had passed Lhrough Eindhoven, held by the Americans, and halted on Lhe Wilhelmina Canal while the sappers repa ired the bridge. This task was completed by 0600 nex t morning and Lhe Grenadiers took the lead through Veghel and Grave, where Lhe US 82 nd Airborne Di vision had captured the bridge intact. 5 th Brigade then pushed on to Nijmegen while 32nd dropped off to help guard againsL counLer-attaek.

UnlonunaleJy the Americans had been unab le LO capture ei th er the road or rail bridges at Nijmegen, alLhough bOLh were still intact. Wh en Lh ey and the Guards launched an allack when Lhe laner arrived there in the evening, it soon became clear that a systematic atlack LO clear Lhe LOwn was needed before the bridges cou ld be captu red. This started next morning in conjunction with a part.icularly bold assault crossing ofLhe river by the American para lroops LO try and secure the nor­thern end of the road bridge. After a whole day's intense fighting - lhere were accounts of tank machine guns 'running away', so hOl did they gC l ­

Lh e approaches LO Lhe road bridge from the Lown were secured by about 1900hrs. Then the Grena­diers succeeded in rushing a troop of Shermans across in the face of heavy fire from all direcLions, including Lhe girders overhead. The bridge was fully prepared for demolition and why iL was not blown remains a mystery. Next morning the

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railway bridge was a lso captured by the Grena ­d ien;.

The emphasis of the whole opera tion had by now changed from reaching the Zuider Zee to rescu ing th e British I st Airborne Division trapped at Arnhem. When th e Irish Group led orran the eight­mile stretch to link up with them at midday on 2 I September, however, the situation was very diOerent from their breakout at the stan or the advance. Now they had sufic red considerab le losses and -problems of ammunition fe-supply , and distance from airfields limited them to a single wlcdium regiment in support, and a handful of T yphoons, wh ich in th e event could not be cOlurollcd due to a communica tion failure. LL was hardly surprising, therefore, that th ey were unable to dislodge the enemy strongpoint some twO miles down the road ; nor were the Welsh , who had replaced the exhausted Grenadiers in 5th Brigade, ab le to get through later on another road. That night it was accepted that armou r could not get through, and th e task of linking up with the pa ra troops was passed to 43rd Di vision.

In retrospect it is perhaps less surprising that a single weak Guards brigade, which was a ll XXX Corps could even attempt to support a t the head of its firty-mile-Iong single road centreline, should fail to reach Arnhem, than that it shou ld get as fa r as it did , bearing in mind the five major watcr obstacles, unexpected SS troops and heavily defended state of Nijmegen, with whi ch Guards Armoured had to cope.

While alleIllion was natura ll y on the eOo n s to reach Arnhem , and iIllerest perhaps declined after the remains of the Airborne Division were with­drawn , this \vas by no means the end or th e affair as far as the Guards were concerned. The Coldstream Group had been busy helping the Americans beat off repeated couIller-anackssouth of the Waal; and when the main thrust stalled , 5th Brigade remained on the ' Island' nonh of the river enlarging and hold ing the bridgehead as more British troops came (ofwarci, and while 1St Airborne, having been cOIllacted by th e Household Cavalry, were evac­uated. Between 22 and 28 September 32 nd Brigade were kept busy, as the centreline was cut several times between Eindhoven and Veghel by troops of 6th German Parachu te Regiment and others, including 712th Infantry Division trying to fight its

way back to Germany [rom th e west. So serious did th e situation become at one time that th e RAF were ordered to attack within the corridor o n re ­cogn ition instead of adhering to a sa fe bomb line. Before th e road was finally re-opened those cut orr north of the gap were to be more than grateful for the ca pture of the town ofOss, which contained a vast German food dump, a few days before by th e General's troop o f Cromwells and th e Div. HQ defence platoon.

Even after 1st Airborne had been evacua ted. Nijmegen road bridge was attacked by everything frOI11 jet aircraft to frogmen , the latter doing it some damage. The Ooodlights rigged to prevent sur­reptitious night anack made those stuck on it in traffic jams going to or from 5th Brigade feel very naked. Elements of the LAA and AT regiments were involved in the close defence of the bridge and th e H ousehold Cavalry were ordered to 'splice the mainbrace' on one occasion, having sunk a tug by gunfire from their armoured cars. The Irish Group on the ' Island ' was involved in beating oera heavy coun ter-attack by troops [rom 9th SS and t 16th Panzer Divisions on 30 September. The infantry battalion positions were assaul ted by squads with manpack flamethrowers supported by ten tanks each followed by an infantry section, while more infantry came up behind in open order, and the whole was covered by the heaviest artil lery fire experienced since Normandy.

Infantry losses within tJ,e Division were by now giv ing cause for concern; Irish Guards, for exam­ple, had onl y one of their original platoon com­manders left, and the Coldstream were down to three weak. companies. On 6 October tJ, e whole Division was pulled back into reserve south of Nijmegcn and remained there for a month. During that tim e they provided guards for the various bridges, trained, and refitted ; while the Canadians and others cleared the approaches to Antwerp. The area was damp and unpleasant, but the in­troduction of leave schemes to Brussels and Antwerp was Illuch appreciated. This period was followed in November by a move south to the area around Siuard where the Division , itself relieved by the Canad ians, Look over th e frOlll line just inside Germany fi'om the American 9th Army, who were aboul to resume lhe offensive. This was mainl y an infanlry commitm enl of watching and

S''1>pcn; huildi ng a ponlOOIl bridgr with roldin~ boat MId 11 l,.'quipmcllI , This could takt, light loads such a~ cars, bUI lh" slrolll;cr Haile; bridgc~ were used 011 the maill <tXl'~ and ("('nln' 1int.~ \\ hen' bridge-; up hi class 40 ~pc:'dfkation \\cr(' lIl't'Cled for till" tanks,

patrolling, and was carded alit by the Grenadier, Coldslream, and VI' e1sh Groups under 3,nd Brig­ade. They remai ned lhcre lor fi, 'c weeks, lhe longest time spent in anyone place. 'I'he period was not without minor in cidents, as when a German palrol broke illlo a billel where Guardsmen were frying chi ps. and had lO be (vic led wilh fisls, and presumably, hot fat; orwhcn a patrol had lodcli ver a spy with a wooden leg into enemy terri tOry , In :\o\'embcr wintcr tank su iLS were issued; and during December 'end connectOrs' wcrc fiued to tank tracks to widen them by three inches, increasing th e area by aboul fony per cenl. a nd helping LO spread the load on the incrcasingly sodden ground. The Guards were now the only British division still using the Sherman ta nk exclusively as thcir main combat vehicle.

The next move, when XXX Corps was relieved by XII Corps in mid-December. should have been a lraigh tforward one to regroup near Brussels, but since it coincided with \'on RUl1stedt 's Ard cnnes oWensiv(' a confusing number of" mo\'cs and coun­termovcs were made to positions covering Brussels from the casl and south. In th e C,'enl the o([ensive nevcr reached lhe Guards positio ns, and Lhey were relieved by paralroops li'om the UK. There had , hov.revcr, been a number of postponemenrs and rcinstatements of the dates on \vhich the yarious units were ablr to celebrate Christmas; vcry

difficult, as one record put il , for . anta Claus's march lables ....

I n ea rl y J anuary 1945 eight-day leaves LO the UK were insli luled, and al the end or the monlh 2nd Bn. SCOlS Guards arrivedlo reli e"e the Isl Bn. \Velsh Guards, who were in diffi culti es over reinforcemen ts. Since many o f th e Scots were recen tl y remustcred RAF ground crews, such was the British shortage of infantry by lhis timc, a generous turnover period was allowed before th e Welsh left the Division.

Into Germany

Despite the fal se starts mOSt units eventuall y enjoyed a good Christm as dinner with suc h delicacies as linned turkey, fresh local pork and becf, plum puddings, and pi!'IllY of beer, cigarellcs and swee lS. Despile occasional shonages when communications were cut, and , as on th e road to \"ijmegen, captured German food had lO be used, lhe troops generally ale well. The 'com po' bailie ratio n w ith its seven va riations, some of which included tinned fruit and sa lmon , was a grea t improvcmelll on the bully beef a nd biscuils of earlier ca mpaigns, particularl y when augmented by NAAFl ralions and fresh food, either purchased or obtained by more direct means; sights such as that of one sergeant-major in hOl pursuit of farm liveslOck with a bloody halchel in one hand and a smo king revolver in th e other were nOlUnCOlTI mon once the Di v ision reached German y, Li ving conditions and recrea tion va ri ed considerabl y. In friendl y lcrritory hospilable undamaged billcLS were sometimes available, and at one point the ColdMream were even able lO hold an officers' reunion in some style in a chateau ; but farm buildings with or without roofs and livestock, and shattered houses without electricity or water were morc usual ; bivo uacking in the open was avoided where possible during the winter. As a result the mobile bath unit was in much demand throughout lhe cam paign, whil e the se lling up of clubs in Brussels and elsewhere, the organization of sports. and th e provision of film shows and £;\ISA conccn s helped pass the time when out of ac tion. Nor were Guardsmanlike pursuits neglected ; the lown of

Tilburg was quickly renamed 'Drill-burg' by the Grenadiers.

'The next stage in the advance was Operation 'V eritable' whereby the 1St Canadian Arm y reinforced by XXX Corps was to push south­eastwards to clear the area between the Nlaas and the Rh ine, including the Reichswald forest. start­ing on 8 February. Guards was 10 be the only armoured di\'ision involved although specialized armour and Churchill units, including 6th Guards T ank Brigade: were to work with the infantry divisions), and Lhey were intended to exploit the initial breakthrough and go for the Rhine. I n the event, however, a combination of bad wea ther and

the inab ility of the Americans LO prevent the RoeI' dams. south of' the Reichswa ld, being blown, caused extensive flooding and limitcd thc use of" tanks, As one historian succinctly pul it: 'A ccrtain amounl of damp was allowed for a greal deal more \\'a5 met.' 5th Brigade. with all the armour excepl the Welsh Guards, was therefore kept in reserve al T ilburg whi le the infalllry under 32nd Brigade attacked on their own: firs t north of lhe forcstLOwards Cleve, and then under 5' st High land Division for a fortnight in the baltic for the country round Goch, the keypoinl to the Siegfried Li ne at the south of the Reichswa ld. Casualties were heavy and condilions frighlfu l ; despite the relief of the Irish by the nc\\rl y arrived SCOlS LOwards the end of this period, by 20 Februa ry 32nd Brigade was down

to two weak battalions (the Coldstream having gone back 10 5 th Brigade) . Shortly after u,is the Americans broke through 10 the south and further progress was possible towards the Rhine .

For this next phase the whole division was reconstituted into its normal mixed brigade groups\ with the Scots battalion under divisional control. I nilially Guards Armoured wcre again in reserve as the infantry di\'isions bauled westwards against increasing opposition, including ,,6th Panzer Di\'ision and \'arious paratroop units, On 4 i\Iarch an ellen was made LO pass 5lh Brigade forward through 3rd I nfantry Division to capturc UIC high ground dominating the approaches LO the Rhine.

:.!spdr. fidel gullS ur 55th Field Rcgimt'nt in action. The deta('hmcl1~ an' w('aring lhl' stal1d ard collarlcs.<; shirt , cit- ll,iTO troU!K'rs and CS caps. LJlllik(' the I.At\ :1IId .\'1' regiments, tll(: fidd gunner!! relaint'(llhdr IOW(><! gun .. right to the ('!ld ofth<.· \\;lr. A fidel Idcphonc box and cable n·d ('an b(' lol'en in till' left roreground.

but demolitions necessitaled bridging, and fierce opposition caused heavy lank casualties; the defences had been dented, however, and 32nd Brigade was ab le to take over and captu re the ridge before conlinu ing to advance against sliffresislance from nnd Parachute R egiment, both of whose battalion cOlllmanders they caplllred. On lhe afternoon of7 i\ larch 32nd Brigadcset out between lhe Canadian Armoured and the 52nd I nfanlry Divisions, on the final two miles to the Rhi ne. The route included crossing a strealll, a railway line and a la teral road. T he Slream held them lip overnight,

,--­REMELA D

TABLE 5

Divis ional Artillery

FIELD REG I MENTS

_____ ~I _____ RH-I-I Q-------,I- ----,I

Sig1lals Command Survey Admin I jeep T jeep 3 cars or jeeps 4jceps '2 oX '5cwt I x 3-lOn breakdown 3 x '5CW1 I x '5ew1 Office 4 x 3 -lOnners '2 x 3-LOnners

I Signals 5 x 15cwt

I Troop

I Batttry

AOP carrier or OP tank ; I jeep 1 x 15cWl

I

I Command '2 x Ram OP ta nks I jeep, 3 x '5ewt

I

I

I X 1'5CWI

Battery

I HQ I

I Troop

I Ammlmitioll 3 x 3 - LOl1ncrs

I BIII/'ry

I Admin 5 x 3- LOnners I \ValeT tfuck

I Troo/)

3 Quads 3 Trai ler limbers '2 x 25pdr. g uns

3 Quads 3 Trailer limbers '2 x 'lSpclr. guns } or, in SP Regiment, each troop with

4 x Sexton S P 25pdrs.

I SP Battery

L AA REG I MENT:

RHQ ~I -----------jl- - - - - - - -

SP Bal/try Towed 40mm Ballery

I I I I I I 3 Troops, each 3 Troops, each 6 x Morris SP 6 x 40mm Bofors 40mm Bofors 6 Bedford tractors

ANT I -TA N K REG I MENT:

I SP Bill/try

RHQ I

I Towed Ballery

'2 x Crusader OP tanks '2 carriers

I 3 Troops, each 4 x Mi a (17pdr. or 3in) I x Crusader OP lank

I I 3 Troops, each 5 x tl racks 4 x I 7pdr. guns

--I 20mm Battery

I I I 3 T roops, each 6 Bedford '5 Cwt 20mm

I Towed Ballery

J

and when it was bridged a damaged tank on the bridge caused funher delay; but nex t day, sup­ported by nine Field , three Medi um and two Heavy gun ba tteries, th ey crossed the embankment and fa nn ed out, cutting the road and forcing the Germans to abandon their fin a l bridgehead west of the Rhin e.

'Veri table' was amongst th e toughest ba ttl es ever fought by the Division ; one Field Regiment had fired more rounds than in the whole of th e campa ign up till then. The enemy had staned to make increasing use of min es and demolitions as well as employing fa r more a rtill ery than pre­viously.

Considerable prepa ra tion was needed before the assa ult crossing of th e Rhine coul d be made and so th e Division was able to enjoy a short rest in the Nij megen area. It was du ring this period tha t th e 1st (infa ntry) Bn., of the Welsh Guards left the Division, and th e towed ban eri es of the anti - tank regim ent were convened to in fa ntry for lack of suitable ta rgeLS. O nce again Guards Armoured was nOt involved in the initial assa ult of Operation 'Plunder' across th e river on 23 March , b ut like th e other a rmoured d ivisions was kept back unt il th e bridgehead was established by ti,e infantry and pa ra troo ps so tha t bridges could be builL. The divisional art..ill ery, incl uding the LAA regim ent fi ri ng in a ground role, took pan in th e suppon programm e fo r th e initi al crossings.

The Di vision itself crossed in the earl y hours of go March with 5th Brigade leading, a ided by a rtificial moonl ight from searchlights reAected on low cloud. It soon became clear that although resistance was wea k·on the XII Corps o'OI1lto th e so uth where the other a rmoured di" isions and 6th Guards T ank (j ust renamed 'Armoured ') Brigade were making spectacular advances, th e I Sl Parachu te Arm y faci ng XXX Corps (whi ch was led by Guards Armoured) were going to contest every inch of th e way. For the nex t three days the Division fought steadily up the Du tch- Germ an bord er towa rds Lingen. The enemy, mostly from 7th and 8th Parachute Divisions, resisted skil full y, cra tering roads and blowing bridges with prepa red aeria l bombs, in some cases a fter the leading British troops had rushed tllem, as well as ~ghting fi ercely with self-propelled guns, ' bazookas' and sma ll anns. Even though they do not seem to have used dumm y

Fordson 3-\on 4 x 4 as WOT6 lorry. "n lis vch icle provided much of the Division's softskinncd Iranspon, equipping 310 Coy. RASe <tnd unit echelons. The official camouflage scheme for softskins consisted of globular black patches on khaki, but many Guards vehido appear to have been k·ft plain khaki. (Conniford)

J\ Slwmlan \ ' of 1St ColdSlrcam filled with Typhoon rocket launching ra ils. Tlw.sC' Wf'rr a local modiftca\jon unique 10 the C.oldstrcalll ; tht.·", were <limed Llsing lhe blade va ne on tht, IUI'ret tOp. one being aligned lor a r.IIlI{I' or 100 yards and Iht, other for 800. ' nlC') pro\'ed good for dearing roadblocks but no opportunity occurred 10 evaluate them against armour. The lank has its troop number and individuallcucr a different system from Ihe straight-through numbering used by the Grcn:lclit·~ on tht" turn:! box. nnd th(' 'fr Squadron scluarc on the rear hull plat<·. Tht· t:tcsigu 'S:?' on red canjusl beset'!! on the ri~hl trackguard.

tanks a nd g uns as th ey di d in :\'orm anciy, mistakes sometim es came to th eir a id in delaying th e advance: as when a mOLOrcycl ist \\'ho seemed unshoo tab le turned o ut to bc a shce t metal advertisement o Ulsici e a ga rage, o r when a parti ­cula rl y formidable-looking gun was d iscovered a rter careful sta lking to be an ornamental cannon severa l hundred yea rs old! Progress was main­tain ed , howe\'cr, and aided by T yph oons and an attached regiment of med ium guns, and by maki ng a l\!VcJ\'C mile night tank adva ncc, the leading elements of 32nd Brigade reached Lingen on the Ems a t 0300hrs on the morning of 3 April. Firing in

17pdr. anti-tank gun guarding the ;\ijmegcn Orielge. Thcse large towed guns \\('re not as s.1. tisracloI") as the 51' version ror tilC' quick ;l(·tions rc..'q uir('d in an advance. ,t llllOligh utey were good in derc-nee, as hen·. As a rcsul l both Or21st AT Regt. '5 lOwed baueri were cOI1V('rtcd to inrantry bcfbrl' lhe Rhine crossing. I n this piC"tul"c a Hotchkiss machine gun can be 1>ecn in the roregrollnd, and lhe sergeant wi th thl' binoculan. appt' <ln; to have borrowl'd an American helmet.

lhe suburbs unfortunately a lerted the defenders, and th e bridge was blown before they co uld take it.

The Household Cavalry lu ck il y found another, heavil y defended but intact , some four miles down stream. A canfu i plan was made whereby a sudden and intcnsc concentration of arti ll ery, tank gu ns, and Typhoon rockc ts from the launchers recently filled to the turrets of some of the Coldstream ta nks, would be foll owed by an infantry company rushing the bridge on fOOL followed by a lroop of tan ks. The auack wcntlike clockwork, surprise was complete, a nd the bridge, plus a large number of prisoners, \vas ca ptured. "The commander of the Coldstream infantry company, Captain 1. O. Lidd le, was av,'arclrd the Vi ctoria Cross for leading the assa ult and calrnly c lilling thc wires to the demolition charges uncler heavy fire. He was subsequentl y killed before hearing of the award.

There was no pause for Guards Armoured on the Em~. The nex t phase was a s\·"ing north-cast towards Bremen. From here on they were per­manently in Gennan), instead of hopping to and fro across th e Dutch border. Although lhey missedlhe

30

help of" friendl y populalions and Resista nce mm·e­mcnts. and th ere were stric t orders aga inst fratcr­nizing \vith enem), civi lians, fears of resistance and sabolage by ·Werewolves' proved groundless, most civilians being apathetic or su ll en ly co-operati ve. SOllle, beginning lO sce a ll wh ich side th eir bread was buttered , cycn put up helpfu l notices Stich as 'Allelllion- Ihis bridge is unsure of itself By order: the Burgomaster'.

I fthe civilians posed rel atively few problems, the same could not be sa id of the enemy troops. The paratroops were now joined by 15th Panzer Grenadier Division , direct descendant of the Afrika k orp; Panzer division , and they continued not on ly to resist strongly with booby-trapped roadblocks, but also to launch vicious iflimitcd countcr-auacks and to pick olf anyone straying c\'cn a short distance fi·om th e main bodies of th e Brigade grou ps. The GellTIan roa Is were also found to be worse than ex pected; many shown on th e maps turned ou t to be only sandy tracks. Despite all this, stcad y progress was made for the next ten days, mostl y with brigade groups moving a long parallel axes and ousting opposition by a prac tiscd com­bination of tank, infantry, artillery and Typhoon effort. The sa ppers were kept busy clearing and 'de­lousing' obstacles. and built their longest Bailey bridge during this period. Casualties steadily

mounted up, even in HQs, which the Guards' tendenc), to site on cross-roads made parti cularl y vuln erabl e. By 14 April wh en they haltcdto allow the infantry dh"isions fOl'vvarci to attack Bremen itself, th ey were capturing t WO or three hundred prison ers a cla y, but th ere were few sig ns of the enemy g iving liP, and even new, if makeshift 1

wea pons, such as the obsole te 37mm g un adapted to fire a hollow charge rocket, were a ppearing.

On 16 April the Division was switched to XII Corps across th e Ri" er Weser to ca pture th e coulllry between Hamburg and Bremen. H ere th e), began La enco unt er G erman I ~tf.arine' cii visiolls­redund anL sailors including U -boaL crews and o ffi cers fi'om Lhe T iT/Iii;:, . These fought bravely; a nd on at least one occasion, wh en they slayed in th e vicinity oC a Lo wn Crom which Lhey were ousted and launched a counter-attack, their un conventio nal tactics caused embarrassment to th e Guards, who had assumed LhaL Lh ey would follow Lh e rig id IYehrm achL prac Lice o f pulling back faSLto Lh e nex t defended positio n. Efforts to persuad e indi"idual towns to surrender mel with varying degrees o f Sliccess, but lhe threats of H immlcr against th e (amilies of lilose who surrendered meant that most had to be fought fo r, however ob"iously futil e was Lhe defence. Although mOSt G ermans now realized that th e war was lost, sllch was the ranaLi cism o r some offi cers tha L Lh ey preferred suicide to ca pture; and one, wh en wounded , tri ed to shoo t a g uards­man coming to his aiel. In one incident a sudden counter-allack caug ht some Irish Guards tanks unawares, and it was only the heroism o f Guards-

man Charlton - who dismounted his ta nk's AA Browning machine g un as he baled OUl , and pinned down th e a llac k by fir ing it over a ga te, a lthough mortally wounded - that saved his comrades. H e was posthumo usly award ed the Division's second ve.

The rest of April was spent in tough but scrappy fi ghting between th e Elbe a nd the "Veser, in whi ch a column of Household Cavalry, Lhe ex -ami-ta nk g unner infa ntry and o thers played quite a part. A prisoner-or-wa r camp conta ining at least one guardsman caplUred in 1940, and a concentration camp at Sandbostel where th e conditio ns were every bit as bad as those a t the better-known ones such as Belsen. were bo th libera ted by the Divisio n. (I n these fin al sLages a new menace in th e form of sea mines lIsed as landmines began to appear ; these would blow up a tank witho ut trace a nd leave a sixty-foot cra ter in the road .) By the end of April it was clear tha t resistance was almost a t an end. When one of the dread ed 88mm guns missed a ta nk wilh no less than e ight successive sho ts, and turned a lit to bc crc\vcd entirely by women, th e guardsmen rea lizedthaLthc G ermans were at las L finished. On 27 April the 1st Household Cavalry joined the Division as an ex tra armoured car regiment , and shortl y a fterwards fighting more or less ceased , leaving the brigades to ha ndl e such stra nge requests as one LO prevelllthe Hitler Youth in o ne town from ProlC("lcti com·o}: a I),limlt r annoured ca r or 2nd J-I ou!;ehold Ca\all") traq'lIing in a lim' of sortskill vehicles. This was the on ly way to gi\ c anv protcction when it was nOt possible tD movc off' the road . ' 1w nearest vchicle is a Bedrord QLD 4 x 4 3-to nner, possibly or 2'l~ ('.oy. RASC. The Ikdford was another or the Division's main load carri~ 1"!i and the ll imilar QLT sel'.-(.'d as the troop-carrying vehide.

running amok and murderi ng th e civili ans. (They declined , on the basis tha t the Germans ought to be a ble to control th eir own children.)

Guards Armoured saw the end of hostiliti es on 5 l'v1ay at Oste, midway between Ham burg and Bremen. They had lost over one hundred tanks since crossing the Rhin e.

As the war ended the Division moved lO Lhe pan of Cux haven a t th e mouth of the Elbe, accepting the surrender of their old enemies 7th Pa rachute Division, and putt ing on their best uni forms to

drive their tanks noisil y through areas uJ1louched by th e fi ghting to discourage any u'oubl e from the civi lian popula tion. One company of Scots Guards a lso went wi th the team accepting the surrend er of Hel igoland.

On 9 June ' 945 the whole Division was paraded for the las t tim e. The 'powers th a t be' had decided that both Guards Armoured Division and 6th Guards Armoured Brigade should revert to Lhe in fa ntry role on completion of hostili ties. For this 'Farewell to A rmour' parade th e tanks were spruced up with captured pa iJ1l, including Germ an Navy ba ttleshi p grey; Field -Marsha l Montgomery took the fi na l salute. So ended four years during which units o f th e Brigade of Guards, perh aps Bri tain 's most 'traditio nal' infantrymen, had proved their adaptability to a form of warfare more normal to cavalry, lank and rifle regim enlS, and had given a good account of themselves in the process.

The Plates A Orders of Battle The divisional sign: this was based on th e 'ever open eye' of th e Guards Division in the Fi rs t World War. The version used by th e Armoured Division was designed by th e a rtist Rex Whistler, who served in th e Division and was killed in Normandy. The divisio nal sig n was worll as a sleeve embl em by a ll ranks and as a vehicle sign on the left front and rear of a ll vehi cles.

2nd Household Cavalry Regimenl: served under V I 11 and XXX Corps before reverting to the Division, and wore their signs both as sleeve and vehicle

signs. The vehicle taesign has a white bar across the lOp to show tha t th ey are Corps troops. Personnel wore Life Guard or Roya l Horse Guard cap badges as a ppropriate; they were identi cal apa rt from the wording around the rim.

61h Guards Tank Brigade: wore th eir own sign in place o f a di visio nal or corps one. The \·"hile bar under lhe lac.sign ind ica led th al lhey were Arm y troops.

Un;llacsiglls: were norm ally pain ted on the right­hand side, front and rear, of a ll vehicles. The numbers showed the unit whi le the backing colours ind ica ted the brigade, th e arm of service, or wheth er they were Di visiona l HQ troops. In the case of th e RASC tToop-ca rrying detachments, both th e RASC Compa ny sign and tha t of the inranlry ba lla li on to which they \,,'cre semi­perma nently a uached were used as a combined sign. Some uni ts, such as the Ficld Cash O ffice, RAO C O rdn ance Ficld Park and Mobile Laundry and Ba th U nit , were techn ically Corps troops, hence the whilC bands above lheir tacsig ns. but they worked pcrm anentl y with the Di" ision, as did th e Forward Deli very Sq uadron RAe, an Army unil.

Backgrou nd colours of tacsigns are sometimes hard to distinguish in reprociuClio n, particul arl y th e darker shades. Note th a t the colours a rc as foll ows on Pla te A : Greell = 32 Gds. Bdc., and 6 Gds. T ank Bde. Black = 30 Corps; Divisiona l HQ, and Div. Troops a t bO llom centre; RAM C. Red/Green = RASC COl's. Green over red/green = RASC Troop-ca rryi ng detachments. Red over blue = RA Regiments. Blueoveryellow over red = REME Workshops. Greell ov("r blue, with or without added white bar = 2nd Household Cav. Regt. regimenta l sign ; 2nd Armoured Reece Bn . Welsh G uards; and 268 Forward Delivery Sqn. RA C. Blue-red-blue =

RAO C units a t boltom left. Abbrevia tions used in th e diagram are self­

ex planatory, e.g. ' IG ' = Irish Guards. The cap badges, apart from tha t of REME, are th e same as those worn today . They a rc illustra ted in th e following sequ ence for the main combat regiments : under 5 Guards Armoured Brigade . lifl 10 righi, Grenadi er, Coldstream and Irish Guards. Under 32

Guards Brigade, lift to righi, Welsh Guards, SCOlS Guards and Royal 1\orthumberland Fusiliers.

B W elsh Guard s, Normandy, July 1944 During the initial weeks or the campaig n in Normandy, th e narrow la nes, sleep banks a nd dense vegetation provided ideal ambush conditions and proved a c1eaLh trap LO tanks on their own, so it became largely an infantry battlc at tim es. Here part o f a platoon headquarters and of an infa ntry section of the Welsh Guards arc supported by a Churchill IV of 6 th Guards Tank Brigade.

'rhe pre-war pallel'll helmet seems, from photo­g ra phs, to have been almost universal among th e infantry v.rilhin th e Divisio n, although the later pallcrn \''IIas in usc elsewhere. i\Ja ny Guards units wore denims, as here, rath er than battl cdrcss when in action, and scrim rathe r than vege tation in helm et !lelS also seems to have been common. The '937 paltern webbing equipment is worn, with the excep tion of th e '944 pattern respirator ha"ersacks slung from the back of the belt; the mortar number has the larger lItility pouches, ca pable of carrying three 2in mortar bombs each, slung around his neck over his ord inary pouches. The officer (right backg round) is ca rrying his map case, and his small haversack by th e handstrap, although it was more commonly worn o n the left hip, slung li'om the tails of the webbing braces. He has '937 pattern battledress, but although wearing coll a r and ti e he docs not have th e faced lapels usual among Guards Officers. He wears the r ibbon of th e MC.

In Lhe pla toon headq lIarters group (bottom and left foreground ) the PlAT ' number one' is fusing a bomb lor his weapon. The handle of his entrench­ing LOol, with the end fitting to take a bayonet , ca n be seen beneath his respirator, and his cape above it ; packs were sometimes left in the unit vehicles. He has No. 80 white phosphorus smo~e, and No. 36 (Mills bomb) grenades WiLh their handl es tucked into the jacket of" his water bottle. To h is right is a signaller with a No. 38 wireless set ; these were not pIa LOon equipm ent at this lime, but were allocated as needed by battalion. He carries an HE 2in mortar bomb secured by the straps of his pack. On his right lies a company slrctcherbcarcr- a guardsman, not an RAl\1C rank ; he wears a less conspicuous brassard than the beller-known white one with the red cross. At left is the 2in mortar

E\·cn in the countryside single-line 'ldvances were alien the norm. ll crc Shermans, It'd hy a Fin~ ny Ve, debouch rrom a forest. Thr 17pd r. Fin:·nit.'5 had the hull machine gun Temov('(1 and the aperture blanked, as can be ~('cn ht~rc. 111C apparent absence or markings and thr generally uncluttered and clean lookorthis tank suggCSts that it may be a replaccl1lrlll. III addition to making good batlle casualties of Iht'ir own I)'pe, I~jrcnics gradually replaced i5mm Shermaru as l1lore ixcall1(' 3\':lilablc-.

t ,ight brcakdo\\ n vchidc; this shows another version or the Fordson WOT6 which w;u. used in LADs a nd brigade workshops b)' thc divisional REt-.IE rOT tasks nOI nceding Ihe heavier Scatllmells. This \"chicle has occn painlNI with the official black and khaki scheme for $Orukins all AFVs WCTC plain khaki. Thc horizontal plate over the .-aciilnor was coa lt.'d wilh a special paint to act as a gas detector by chilllging colour when conwminalcd: this was standard ancl ca n be Sl'cn in SOllle of the olher illustrations. Con nirord)

number, checking whether his bombs will clear the overhead foli age when fired , and the PTAT 'number two' , holding the :'>10.4 riAe with spike bayone t the standard infantry riRe in '944., Behind him is the section leader, a lance-sergeant (equivalenllo corporal in line infantry uni LS) with a Sten g un Mk. 2, which had largely replaced th e Thompson as a section leader 's weapon, as \vell as being issued to motorcyclists, tank and gun c rews as a morc cffective means of defence lhan a revolver. Spades and pickaxes were often carried tucked through Lh e straps of the pa k as shown. In the left

33

3+

I B,;dgillg Troop I jeep I x 15cWl 13 x 3-LOllners with Bailey bridging

AmId. Bdt. Coy I

HQ

TAIlLE 6

Supporting Units

EI\G INEER REG IMENT:

I Field S"II

I H Q & 3 Troops 6 COUl Cars 13 x 15cWl 6 White SC or ttracks 16 x 3-LOllncrs

HQ. I

I Fifld S"II

RASC COLU~ I N:

HQ.

I Field Park & LAD

HQ, iVorkshop & Siom Sm .. Bridgil1g Sell. 3 cars, 9 x 15cWl, 3 tracLOrs 26 x 3-lonners,3 bulldozers 12 recce boalS, 80ft of Bailey bridge

~ bifalltry Bde. CO)'

I HQ

Itt I 4 Transport Pia LOons, each 34 x 3-tonners

I I

Composite PlaLOon

I Workshop Platoon

I Transport Platoon

I Transport Platoon

I I

Composite PlatOon

I . Workshop PlalOon

I .Transport Platoon

I

I Transport Platoon

Ligltt Field Ambulallce I

HQ 4 x 4-berth & 4 x 2-benh ambulance cars

I I I I

... sections each 2 x 2-bcrth cars

Divisiollal Troops COJI I

I Transport Platoon

HQ I

Transport Pl atoon

I Ammunition Platoon

MED ICAL SERVICES:

I Field Ambulance

I HQ

6 x 4-berth & 4- x 2-benh ambulance cars

I I I 2 Coys, each 3 x 2-berth c.:'lrS

ADMS I

I Field Dressing Statiofl

I j 2 sections, eac~ 2 x 4-bcnh cars

I Composite PlaLOon

I Workshop Platoon

I H.ygieTIt' Sectioll '2 x 3-tOnners

background the Bren group of the section a nd two o rthe riOe group take up posi tions along the bank.

T he Churchill tank is armed with th e 6pdr. g un ; many or 6th Guards Tank Brigade's tanks were rearmed with 7SmlTI , but a number retained th e 6pdr. until quile la te on. The turret is heav ily camou Oaged to disguise its shape above th e hedgerows. while the hull has little concealmen t and even has a prominent troop sign on the side door and a name on the air intake louvre at th e rear. A vertica l steel plate has been welded to th e tUlTCL LOp behind the commander's head as protection against snipcrs, and a ltho ugh hidden here by vegetation, old lengths or track would have been welded to the fi'ollt or the vehicle .

C 2nd Household Cavalry Regirn.ent, Belgium, autwnn 1944 Vehicl es or 2nd Ho useho ld Cava lry Regim ellt are greeted in typical fashion in a Belgian town during the advance to Brussels. Although not in this case ' first in ' (see the sq uaddie and the XXX Corps M P sergeant in the crowd ) the initia l en thusiasm has clearly not worn off!

The White 15cwt armoured truck (orten mis­lead ing ly known as a scou t ca r) in the lert roreground belongs to the regimental medical section. The HQSquadron d iamond sign in wh ite is on the front bumper, a nd the unit tacsign and VI Il Corps sign are on ul e wings. Although at this time the regiment had been switched to XXX

TABLE 6 (continued)

REPAIR & RE COV ERY (REME ) :

HQ. I

I I AnI/d. Bde. Workshop Irif. Bdt. Workshop

HQ II x 15cwt

Repai r Sn. Recovery Sn. RAOC Stores

{ 43 x 3-lon ners 39 x 3-tonners

{

7 X I SCW l

I x 3-lonncr BO 6 transporters

2 x 3-lOnner BO 4 Scammell traClors

Advanced Workshop Detachment (A \vD) {

5 x 15c\\'t 2 x 3- lonners

I Sectioll Div. HQ; &

PiW duties

I Sectioll Admin area

{ 3 x 15CWl

3 x 3-lOnners

MILITARY POLI CE:

Div. Provost Coy

I HQ

I I

Sectioll Supply ftlel and am mo points

I Sec/iOll

Each Seclioll, 2 jeeps, I x 15tWl , 10 mOlOrcycies

I Unit Light Aid Detachments ( LADs)

Each: I or 2 Scammells or I x 3 -l0 11 BD ; 1 [04 x 15CW1

I to 3 x 3-tonners (depending on unit served) LADs auached 10:

HQ In f. Bde. ; Armd . Regts.; Malar Bn. ; Field Regts. RA; Field Park Sqn.; Div. HQ; Div. Signals; AT Regt.; LAA Regt. ; Armd. Reece Regt. ; Armd. Car Regt.

I Section Marking CLs, and traffic control

I Section (Spare)

35

Canadian Ford e M!> 4 x 4- 3 -(onncr with mctal pan el CS body. The third main load ca rrier w it hin the Division, ahhough less numerous ,ha n the Fordsons and Ikd fords; some were used by 224 Coy. R.Ase. t C.onniford )

Corps, in some cases vehicl es still hael the a iel sign. The colour scheme, as ror all the divisiona l AFVs, is a ma ll overa ll khaki. Slogans cha lked on by th e loca ls, and messages for mi ss ing fri end s and relatives whom it was hoped mig lu see th em, were common on Allied vehicles at lhis time, as were lhe Aowers and fruit with whi ch th ey were sometimes showered.

T he corporal in the White isan RAMC rank (th e Household Cavalry NCOs wore crO""I1S above lh eir chevrons). The driver wears his issue shin and

Officers of the SCOIS Gua rds intervic\\ a prisoner. Thc major on till" rig!ll We,ll'S lhl· in f.'lntry·s khaki beret and the o ffi cers' pa ncrn battlcdrL'SS blouse; designed to be worn opcn-neckt"(! \"hh collar and lic. He has a captured holster 0 11 his webbing belt and, unusually, docs not have a divisional sleeve flash. T ht' officci' in tbe cent re wean; a RO}lal Stewart tartan flash on the side of his peaked ca p, and the onc with glasses, despitc his infantry beret, \Vears a tan k suit. The o th er British figure \\'ith a black RAC berct is possibl y a Welsh Guardsman.

braces, having removed his ba ttled ress blouse. Behind th e White a Staghound armoured car, as used by regimental and sq uadron HQs, moves through the crowd . The bridge circle, without the usual number insid e it , ca n be seen below the unit ta csign on the right hand bumper ; and pan or th e vehicl e serial number (an ' I" rollowed by six d igits) and or th e vehicle name ca n be seen on th e rront pl a te. The 30 ca l. Browning machine gun is mouJ1led on th e tu rret LO p pintle ror anti -airera rt proteclion, but was in fac lmore o ftcn used aga inst ground ta rgets. The gunn er, wea ring standard piSLOI equipm eJ1l, tri es LO ward o£[ a girt or thrown a pples, whil e th e commander repon s progress; both he and the corpora l in th e White wear th e XXX Corps sleeve insigni a .

A Humber heavy utility and another Staghound a re in the background ; th e building-u p or racks and lockers on the roars or sta£[ ca rs and ACVs was common in NOl'lh- West Europe, and had caused headaches when such vehi cles were round to be tall er lhan specifica tion \vhen loading in to craft to cross th e Channel.

D Divisional Tactical HQ, Holland, winter 1944 In th e Icrt roreground is the Hum ber scout car of' th e CO , 5 th Bn . Co ldstream Gua rds, with the uni t tacsign an d divisional sign, but no o Lh er signs v isibl e on th e front. The lyre pressure markings oyer the wheels were standard arm y practice . As it was an infanLry unit th e o ffi ccr wears a khaki berel and the corporal a GS ca p, not the black beret, a lth ough the former wears a tank suit. The corpora l is spea king over th e car's No. '9 sct, the short 'B' set and lhe longer 'A' sel aerials of which ca n be seen.

Genera l Adair (centre, racing) wears th e simplified ' 943 pat tern ba lll edrcss wi th exposed buttons and unplea ted patch pockets, the only diU'crcnce between it and th e va ri ety worn by o th er ranks being the raced lapels. Even th e Gua rds were sometimes inform al in dress; th e command er of 32nel (In ra n try) G uards brigade on the Genera l's right wears th e armoured-type black berel, and the Colonel on th e Genera l's lert , a green scar r, paratroop smock, Am erica n pistol , corduroys and gUIll boo ts.

In th e righl foreground are a 'corporal of horse' (equiva lent LO a sergeant in othel' units) orthe Lire

Guards and a Wa rra lll Officer 1St Class or th e Welsh Gua rds. The Household Cavalry wore inrantry-style cloth unit-name ta llies at th e top or their sleeves, unlike mos t cavalry regiments who wore metal IcLtcring or coloured tapes on th e shoulder su·aps. (They had sta rted th e wa r as a mOtor inra lllry unil. ) The corpora l or horse wears an issue leatherj erkin over his ba ttledrcss, while th e WO 1 has a Canadian pa ttern ba ttledress, simila r to

the British ' 937 style with concealed bultons and plea ted pockets, but ora nea ter cul. G uards RSMs re tained th e large woven R oya l Coa l o f Arms on the upper sleeve even in ba ttl edress, and con tinued to wea r lea th er Sam Browne belts o n aClive service, w hile in o th er regim entS the small er woven or me ta l coa t o f arms was worn o n th e cuff, with a norm al webbing belt.

Behind the ogures is one or th e AEC Dorch ester Armoured Command Vehicles. The Royal Signa ls lacsig n with th e Di v isiona l HQnumbcr ca n be seen over the bridge circl e on the right mudgua rd , whil e the d ivisiona l sign a nd th e Allied a ir recognition sta r ca n be seen on th e Ii-ant and lOp or the raise bonn et respecti vel y. A canvas penthouse is rigged from the side to g ive ex tra wo rking space, and the absence ofw irclcss aeria ls ind ica tes th a t this vehicle is being used for offi ce rather than communication purposes.

Behind the ACV th e Genera l's 'Charger', a Cromwel l ta nk, ca n j ust be seen. I n add ition lO th e Di v. J-IQ tacsign, bridge circl e and di visional sign pa inted on a da rk pa nel on th e o'ont orth e tank, th e letters GOC are picked out in small holes in a box

Self-propelled Bofors LAA guns on ~ Iorris chassis firing in th(' ground role, a594th LAA RCgL did in support ofth(' Rhine er~ings. Like the SP anti-tank guns these proved more praeticalthan the lowed Borors and by the end of the war allthc: divisional LAA guns were either SJ> Bofors 01" multipk .50 cal. machine guns on halflnlcks. The nt'l rCSI vehide has its troop sign 'Fg' - on the mdialOr and the objccts like trays of eggs al"C in r. ... CI clips of 40mm ammunition secn 'cnd on'.

above the Di v. sign, with a light in it , and a smoke emiller is fiued above the tacsign o n the opposite side. Pennants and fl ags were no t generally fl own from aeri als in Nonh· West Europe, bUl somcsenior o ffi cers sometim es used them ; and General Adai r. at leasl on ceremonial occasions such as the o Ulcial entry into Brussels, new his divisional commander's flag (rrom wha t a ppears to have been a specia l sta U' rath er than an aerial) at the front of his turret, as shown.

E Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, Germany, spring 1945 The sa nd y hea lhland and pinewoods or the north German pla in in spri ng ' 945. In th e roreground is a 4.2in heavy mortar or the Independ ent Machine G un Com pany or the Royal Northumberland Fusi liers. The member or the detachmen t on th e len wca rs th e stand ard collarless fl annel shin issued to oth er ranks ror wear under battledrcss. The loa th er belt em bellished wi th regimenta l cap badges, if non-uniform , was a popular vari adon with old soldiers. The belt stra ps, ma p and fie ld dressing pockets ca n be seen on his trousers. The lance-corpora l in th e cen tre is cl ea rl y weari ng an old 'bes t' ba ttl edress jacket or t937 pa ttern downgraded lO ba tt lefi eld wear. ( Unlike th e

ron/mutd 011 pllgt ./0

37

TABLE 7

2nd HOUSEHOLD CAVALRY RECliVIE NT:

RHQ t X ACV 3 Staghound ACs (37mm) 1 SeouL Car

I rl-----------"-------'---"r----------,-,--------, HQ Sqlt 'A'S'I1t 'E' Sq/t 'C'S'I1t 'D'Sqn

t~mlcrACs 1-./) 12 Humber SeouL Cars !Io(..

4 x AA Humber AC (lwin Besa Ismm) 1 Daimler SeouL Car Signal LAD & Admin vehicles 4 Staghound ACs

Admin vehicles

I rl--------rl----rl---'I----.I----,I--~-----I

Reece Troop Reece Tp Reece Tp Reece Tp Reece Tp Hearl)' Tp Support Tp 2 Daimler SeouL Cars 1 Daimler SC 1 Daimler SC 2 Daimler ACs (2pdr. 2 AEC Mklll ACs 3 White SCS guns, t with Littlejohn (75mm guns) (Brens, P lATs Adaptor) & 2in mortat~)

I Tank Bn.

I HQ ACV 4 command lanks 3 x OP tanks 7 to 12 light lanks 12 SeOUL Cars

I Troop Troop

I TllUk BIl .

I Sqlt.

I Troop

6th CUARDS TANK BR IGADE:

I Sqlt.

I Troop

Brigade HQ 2 X ACVs 5 lanks 10 S eOLIl C,lrS 3 Churchill bridgelayers

I . I

Tank BII .

I Sqn

,JQ I x 7smm Churchill 2 x 95111m Church ill I x O P Lank t x ARV Churchill

I Troop 3 x Churchill 75111ITI or 6pdr.

. I Bngade Troops 6th Cds. Sigs Sqn. 6th Cds. Ord. Pa rk 229 Coy RASC t lth Light Fld. Amb. 6th Cds. Bde. & Troops Wkshps 261 Tank Delivery Sqn.

r

Below : ~I \ pical order of march ofa regimctllal battalion group ach:\tlcing on a single road axis, b~l.~ed o n tha t used by tht, Irish Guards:

t Tank trOOI) ,'l Tank troop, inlililln.' platoon ridin~ '.3 R ~ detachment ~ Tank troop 5) Sqn. lIQ, C.oy. HQ, FOO ,,6) Inrant!) piau)Qll$ 712 x 3in monar 8) 2 X opelr. 1\'1'9 ' C:trricr,ection 1(11

D('wchmellt, Pioncer platoon. tt CO~. lnf. Un. & Annd. 8n. Il 12 X Stuan tank. .. ' :1 \\' irclC",

Inlcks, rcar link. I I COs'S' CO) " ' 13' Baule Gp, & specialist platoons 15 ' l'iol1('(.' r

platoon less detachment 16 1 Troop SP I7pdr, AT ( I 7) Carrier sec tion 18 '~ x :sin mort;.\\' 19 :.! x oJXlr .. \ r 10: Armd. Btl . R .. \P.

·nu.' war 0\ cr, \ chi(,"\( ... of thc GreniHlicr Guards enter Berlin ror th(' \'jelOry j)aradc. Ajeep leads a Humber armou red seOUl car and a linf o r Ullivc~al carriers. Thc vehicles have been much spruced up si ncc coming OUI of action; whilc webbinR ii> being worn, and a L'nionJack ha3 \wcn .1ddcd 10 th., markin~.m the SCOUI car.

,1 1 'bllk sqn :2:2 Inl: CO)'. in lorries, :23 Artillery roo 1!4 RE detachment :25 1 lC 3in InOrl<tr 16

C".rricrSCClion :17 l)ioneerdC(achmcnt 28 2 X 6pdr.AT :29 Tank sqn. '3Q, Inr. CO}, in l()rri~,

(3 1' 4th Inr. e(l}, ill IC)ITi('s 32 , MaiTl Bn , HQ .. -20 vchicles 13:~1 Troop towed 17PClr. ,\T 11+ Inf. Un , RAJ' 35 Ficici ambu)aJlte st'oioll J6 ',\' E<.:hdon InL Bn, 15 vehides '37 1I.Iedium MG pl<lll.lon jR 'F' Echelon Annd, UII . 2510 30 vehidC'S.

' A' Coy, Sqn.Baule Group I

'7 •• I ' Ruerve' Gp, l I

... ..,,..~ 1~~~~ ~3' /

rl-------l-- 'C' Coy. '''In .Raul.Cp . ---1----'1

~3'~~'9~"

• a . ' ' Reser ve' Gp, I

I

-.. ... ~~ • .- • a • • '--. 3. / 34 35 3' 37 33

39

Germans, British troops did not genera ll y wear a ll uleir badges, decorations etc. in action. ) On it can be seen the ri bbons of the Military M edal, a nd Africa Star (with the 8th Army digit ) over the breast pocket; on the sleeve he has the white-on-red infan try unit name flash a t the top, then the divisional sign, the red infanlry ann orservice slrip, his lance-corporal 's chevron, a mortar skill-a t-arms badge, two good conduct badge invertcd chevrons (five years each ) and a gold vertical wound stripe. H e also wears th e floppy tam -o' -shanter-type GS cap (not to be con fused with the neater one-piece beret) wi th metal regimental badge in place a bove his len eye. The 'dog tag' identi ty discs of punched fibre, worn by all servi cemen, can be seen a t his neck.

Notes sur les planche s en coule ur

Ins ignes d e vehicules divisionnaires et d e ca s quette A Ce tablc. .... u mOlllre les signcs de reconnaiS$ancc t3Cliquc portO; :i droitc ;i I';tvam ct it I'amere des \-chicules de" la Division . La couieur indiquait Ie Iypt" d'unile, alaI'S que Ie numho indiquait I'unite exaete. II montre egalement les in~i8m:$ de c:tsqucu c pones par It'S soldalS de ces unil l:s. L'insignc de 'l'oeil toujoun ouven' elait porlc SUf In panic 5uperieurc de 1:\ manche par lOllS les rangs, $auflo:-'9u'il etail cnkve pour des raisons de securite, et il elnil pcim sur Ie cOte gauche i I avant el ,i 1',lrrihe des vchiculr:s.

B Soldatsd'inrnnteric dell Welsh Guardssoutcnus pilr UII char Churchill IV de la 61h Guards Tank Brigade, dans Ie bocage nonnand, juiUel 19-14, Les $Oldacs d'inralHerie portelli des 'deniffi$', C't51 a dire unc salOpellC de combat, et parmi leun annes on pcut citer Ie rusil·mitrailleur Sten, Ie rusil NO.4. Ie projccteur ilnticha~ PlAT et Ie mOrlier '2in. L'C<luipement en loile:i. s.,nglcs c,<;t typique de l'annec 1944.

C Des \'oitures blindccs Staghound et un c:lmiOIl blind.: White M3A 1 du lind HOllilChold Cavalry Regiment accueilJiJ p.,rl:l population ei \·j[ed·une ville beige liberee. Le While est un vehicule dl! service medical du regiment il porte LOujou~I'insigncdu 8 Corps. quoiqu'a eeueepoque lc regiment sc batta;! avrt' lc 30 Corps et lcs hommes porlenllts ilmgllcs du 30 Corps ~ur leun manehcs. Lc 1000'\nge blanc de I'esc" dron de commandement est pcint ;\ gauche sur Ie pare­..:hocs avant. 1.n Smghound elail utilisee [ant par les uni[6 de r~iment que par 10 esc.adron.~ de commandcment.

o lie pani(' de I'ctat-major dh'isionnaire, Hollande, hin:r 1944. A g-auche. I .. voilUre de rewnnaissancc Humber de l'offici('r commandanl du 5th Sn. Coldslream Guards. Au centre, Ie Gi:ni:ral Ad;lirse lieHt devanl son vi:hicule de collllllande blinde AEC Oorehcstt'r, :ICcomp.1gne de deux de ces officien, dont un porte un mi:lange tres ba.riolcdc vi:temenl$d'unifonnc! A droitc, UII 'oor]>?ral or hone' des Lire Guards tl'equivalent d'un scrgent dam 11::11 aUln:s uniles) el Ie Regimental Sergeant ~'I aj('lr (I'adjlldam chel) des \Vebh Gua.rds, A I'arrii:re­plan ;\ droilc se lrouve Ic char Crolllwell pcnonncl du General Adnir.

E RO)'31 ~onhumberlalld Fusiliers, Allemagne, prinlelllps [945. l.cs soldalS de celie uniled'armesdcsupport portent 1a tenuede(,ampagne typique. uneehemise sans col ct Ie ocret GS adopti: en 1943 par I'inr.,nterie britannique. Les insignes porte. au bnu parle penonllagecenlrnl50nt, de haUL en bas: Ie nom du regiment en lettres blanches sur rond rouge; I' insigne divisionnaire ; la myure rouge d'un soldat d'inranlerie ; Ie chevron de rang d'lIn Lanee-corpordl; Ie '~r entourc d'une guirlande d'ull expert equipier de mortier; deux chevrons de bonne conduite pcndarlt cinq nnsel unc rayure gansecd'or. Le mOrlier cstl'nrmc lourdc 4,11 utili!« par Its compagnies de support.

The corpora l despatch rider on the right wears normal battledress, in place of the breeches some limes seen, and has the RNF tacsign painted both on his metal helmet a nd his machine's petrol tank. Motorcycles returned to favour to some ex tent, having been largely superseded in the Middle East by jeeps and light trucks, due to the conges ted roads of North-West Europe. In the background a Bedford MWD ' 5cwt truck , typical of those used by almost all units within the division, leads a Wasp f1 amethrowing carrier of the Royal ~orthumberl a nd Fusiliers. These looked like the normal Universal carri er a part from th e flame gun in the front sponson and a large cylinder (obscured here by the motorcyclist) mounted transversely across the back of the vehicl e.

Fa rbtafe.ln

Divisions fah_rzeu g- und Kappen-Dienstgradahzeichen A Diese Tabellc vcranschaulicht die ' taklUchClI Abuichell', die von den Divbion.srahn:eugen vorne und hinten aurdcr r«h[en Stcitr gdilhn wurden. Die Farbe be:zcichnetr die Katcgorir der Einheit, dir Nummer identifizierte die gcnaur Einheit. Ebenfa1l5 gezcigt sind die Kappcnabzcirhen, wie sic vl)n den Manllern dieser EinhcitclI getrngcII wumcn. Das '5IC\5 oHent' Augc'-Abzeichen der Oivi!ion wurde von allell Dien.s[graden aur den oberen Amleln getragen­mit Aumahme, ..... cnn es aus Sieberhcil.Sgrundcn elltlem[ wurde - und es wurde aur die linke Seilt' der voruercn und hintercn Fahrteugsobernachen gcmalt.

B Inranterir def Welsh Guards. untentuLZl von cinelli Churchill IV Panzer def 6th Guar~ Tallk Brig:ldc:. bt-i cler .:\?nnandy ~Q&,r, Juli [944. Die inr~nte~e trug 'delllms' grober Baumwolldnlheh und bc-I den Waift'il befindell sieh dlr~ Siell Ma.schincllpistole, dns NO. 4 Gewehr, der PlAT Panzerab ..... ehrprojeklOr und def '.lin .\-iom:r. Webbing Ausrusumg ist Iypisch liir 194,' .

C Staghound Panze~'agen lind ein White M~AI Panzerlast ...... agell des ~md Household Ql\aJry Regimelll ..... erden vall Zivihm~n ciner bcrrt:iten bclgischcn Siadt bcgrul3t. Ocr While ist cin rahrtcug der !\.It:dizinischcn Ableilung des RCglrnelllS-es ruhrt Iloch immcrdas Abzciehrn drr 8 Corps, obw()hl 'w dicselll Zeitpullkt das Regim':;lII$t':holi mit 30 Corpsdientc und die M'lnnerdat 30 Corps Abzciehcn aurihrrn Amlcln trugell _ Das wt:~ Karo des HQ Sataillons is[ aur dic Hnke Vordeneite det SehUlzvorridnull$ gemah. Der Slaghound wurdc von den RcgimcnUl- und Bataillons- HQ.Einhelten bcnutzt.

D Teil des Di\,isions-i'lQ, irgend ..... o in Holland . Winter [944' Links, )'Iumber Spahwagcll des Kommandiercndcn Offiziers. 51h Bn. Coldsueam Guards. Mille, General Adair, welcher vor scinem AEC DorchcslCT Pa nzer­Kommandor.,hrtcug mit 'lwei scinl~r rangahcstell OffizierclI Stell!, von wclchem ei ner eine hocl15t kunterbunt~ Anzahl von Unironntc.i len trigt! Rcclm, ein 'corporal of hone' der Lir~ Guards (elll5prichl eine.m Fcldwebel bei anderen Einhei[en) und der Regimcnlal Se.rgeanl Major Regimentshauptrcldwebel­cler Welsh Guards. 1m Hintergrund rechls bcfindc[ sich Cenrral Adairs penOnlicher Cromwell Panzer.

E Royal :-":orthumberland Fusiliers, Deutschland, Fruhjahr [945, Die Manner di('Ser \\'aifenvrnlarkungseinhe.il [ragen norma Ie Feldunifonn, kragenlOSt' Hemdcn wld dir 'GS cap', wie sie. 1943 von der Britischen lnf:lllterit· ubcrnOllllllcn wurde. Die Ab1.cirhen, wie sic auf dt'1ll Ann der mittlerell Figur getragen .... ·u rden. laulen \·011 oben: Name des Re.l$imenlS in .... ciBcn Buchstaben aur rotem Fleckell j das Abzcichen der Di\-islolI ; der rOte SlTI:ircn cines FuI.!Mllda[cn; das R:utg.Winkelabzeichen cines lancc-corpoml; das umkranzte '~ I ' ci no !o.·!oner BCSilizung5uperlcn ; z ..... ei ffinr-jahrige \Vinkcl:th1.cichcll rur gute Ftihrung ; und cin goldelles Vt:rwundetenabzcichcn. Der Moner is[ die schwen: '1>2 7.011 Waife ..... ie sie von Utlle!'S[utzungs-Komp.1nicn bcnull.t wird.