vancouver model united nations · the first topic, kurdistan, has to ... position paper policy ......

Vancouver ModelUnited NationsThe 12th Annual Conference bull February 1ndash3 2013

Background GuideUnited Nations Security Council

Zach Hauser amp Stuart Warren

Secretaries-General

bull

Eric LiuChief of Staff

Catherine ChouDirector-General

bull

Aliya-Nur BabulUSG Committees

Adam ChandaniUSG Conference

Parker NannUSG Delegate Affairs 1

Eden LeeUSG Delegate Affairs 2

Brian KwokUSG Finance

Andy LeeUSG Marketing

Catherine WangUSG Marketing

Kevin ChienUSG Simulations

Jennifer YoonUSG Sponsorship

Dear Delegates

My name is Liam St Louis and I am the director for the Security Council at VMUN this year I am a Grade 12 student at Gleneagle Secondary and I have striven to be as involved in the MUN community as I possibly can As your director I am looking forward to watching you work to solve some of the most pressing problems of the day

The two topics we have selected Kurdistan and conflicts in South Asia are both important topics of concern to the entire international community The latter takes advantage of the fact that both Pakistan and India are currently represented on the UNSC providing a unique opportunity to discuss South Asian issues with the presence of those who the conflicts concern most Be-cause a lack of dialogue is one of the largest reasons these issues are still un-solved the opportunity for direct conversation will be a boon to our efforts to find a resolution The first topic Kurdistan has to our knowledge never been done in the Vancouver MUN circuit and is very uncommon to see across the continent It is our hope that you will be able to solve this import-ant but hitherto-little known problem

If you ever have any questions or concerns please feel free to contact me at any time I look forward to reading your position papers and watching you find a resolution to these pressing problems and I wish you good luck in your research

Regards

Liam St LouisDirector United Nations Security Council

Vancouver Model United NationsThe 12th Annual Conference bull February 1ndash3 2013

Position Paper PolicyWhat is a Position PaperA position paper is a brief overview of a countryrsquos stance on the topics being discussed by a particu-lar committee Though there is no specific format the position paper must follow it should include a description of the positions your country holds on the issues on the agenda relevant actions that your country has taken and potential solutions that your country would support

At Vancouver Model United Nations delegates should write a position paper for each of the com-mitteersquos topics Each position paper should not exceed one page and should all be combined into a single document per delegate

For the United Nations Security Council position papers are mandatory

FormattingPosition papers should

mdash Include the name of the delegate hisher country and the committee

mdash Be in a standard font (eg Times New Roman) with a 12-point font size and 1-inch docu-ment margins

mdash Not include illustrations diagrams decorations national symbols watermarks or page borders

mdash Include citations and a bibliography in any format giving due credit to the sources used in research (not included in the 1-page limit)

Due Dates and Submission ProcedureAll position papers must be submitted by midnight on Friday January 18 2013 two weeks prior to the conference

Once your position paper is complete please save the file as your last name your first name and send it as an attachment in an email to your committeersquos email address with the subject heading as your last name your first name mdash Position Paper Please do not add any other attachments to the email or write anything else in the body

Both your position papers should be combined into a single PDF or Word document file position papers submitted in another format will not be accepted

Each position paper will be manually reviewed and considered for the Best Position Paper award

The email address for this committee is unscvmuncom

Topic A The Situation in Kurdistan

OverviewLocated in the Middle East modern Kurdistan is the homeland of the Kurds a 30-38 million strong people and the largest ethnic nation in the world without a state1 Since 1984 the Kurdistan Work-er`s Party (PKK) has fought and led insurgencies against the Turkish state claiming to fight for an independent Kurdistan Kurdish populations in Turkey Iran Syria and Iraq have been singled out for persecution but there is increasing global awareness of the Kurds as a people striving for independence

The tense relations between Iraq and its Kurdish population and the ongoing insurgency are both causes of instability in the Middle East While focus on the Middle East has largely been centered around the Israeli-Palestinian relations a solution to the situation in Kurdistan is necessary to bring about long-lasting stability to the region Only with this problem resolved can the Kurdish people begin to emerge from destitution and eliminate violent ethnic rivalry which has persisted in the region for many years

1httpwwwindependentcouknewsworldeuropethe-worlds-largest-nation-without-a-state-seeks-a-new-home-in-the-west-692440html

mdash 4 mdash

Vancouver Model United Nations 2013United Nations Security Council

mdash 5 mdash

Timeline1920 The Treaty of Sevres is signed dividing up the Ottoman Empire and creating

an independent ldquoKurdistanrdquo out of Turkish territory Turkish military pushback against occupying forces means the agreement is never ratified

1923 The Treaty of Lausanne is signed and ratified splitting up the Kurds between Turkey Iran Syria and Iraq

1937ndash1938 The Dersim Rebellion occurs in response to Turkish resettlement efforts prompt-ing military repression and 20000 deaths

1962 A special census serves to strip 20 of Syrian Kurds of their citizenship leaving them and their descendants stateless

1979 The Iranian Revolution occurs While initially promising to support Kurdish aspirations for rights and autonomy it fails to follow through with its word and the government kills 10000 Kurds in a response to a Kurdish Rebellion

1984 The PKK a Kurdish terrorist group based in Turkey launches its first attacks The resulting war has caused up to 40000 deaths since 1984

1988 The Iraqi government conducts the Anfal Campaign against its Kurds killing 100000 and causing millions more to flee in what has since been recognized as genocide

1991 The UN passes Resolution 688 which France the UK and the US use to justify no-fly zones over Iraq to protect Kurdish and Shia populations in the country until the Iraq War

1994ndash1998 Iraqi Kurdish political parties fight a civil war that divided the country in two The peace agreement ended the fighting but left the country divided under two administrations

1995 35000 Turkish troops enter Northern Iraq to attack PKK bases in the region1999 The leader of the PKK Abdullah Ocalan is expelled from his base in Syria and

eventually captured by the Turkish government2003 Iraqi Kurds fight with coalition forces against Saddam Hussein in Iraq2005 An informal referendum suggests 95 of Iraqi Kurds support independence

Historical AnalysisThe Formation of Modern KurdistanThe Kurds have existed as a distinct people for over a thousand years Descended from Caucasus mountain tribes they formed principalities and kingdoms in the medieval period While no sig-nificant ldquoKurdish Empirerdquo has ever existed large parts of Kurdistan enjoyed unity and reasonable levels of autonomy under the Ottoman Empire from the 1600s until its collapse during WW1

At the conclusion of WW1 the Allied powers of Britain France and Italy agreed to divide up the territory of the Ottoman Empire under the Treaty of Sevres The Treaty created an independent

Kurdistan consisting mostly of the Kurdish regions of modern-day Turkey2 Before the agreement could be ratified however Mustafa Kemal led the Turkish National Movement and fought back against the Allied forces then occupying Turkey3 The success of this mission gave Turkey a stronger position from which to bargain and it forced the creating of the Treaty of Lausanne This treaty was signed creating the borders of today and giving Iraq and Syria as mandates to Britain and France respectively thus ending the possibility of an independent Kurdistan

The PKK (Kurdistan Workerrsquos Party)The PKK a well-known Kurdish paramilitary insurgent group began as a student group in the 1970rsquos under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan in the Turkish city of Ankara The PKK moved into the Kurdish areas in south-east Turkey and Ocalan began to gather support from the peasants and farmers in the area

The organization faced its first major challenge during the Turkish military coup of 1980 where political parties were banned and the military instigated a severe crackdown on separatist groups The leadership of the PKK including Ocalan fled to Syria where the government used support for the PKK as leverage against Turkey and in other political disputes4

Taking advantage of the freedom granted them by the Syrian government the PKK began to build support train fighters and gather arms In 1984 the PKK began launching attacks on police of-ficers5 the army and members of the Presidential Guard in the Kurdistan region At first the government ignored the attacks seeing the PKK as a fringe group that posed no significant threat

2httpwwwhistorylearningsitecouktreaty_of_sevreshtm 3httpwwwerkutaldenizcomthe-war-of-independence4httpterrorismaboutcomodgroupsleader1pPKKhtm5httpwwwrferlorgcontentarticle1060741html


mdash 6 mdash

However continued attacks ndashparticularly those on tourist resorts designed to hurt Turkeyrsquos major tourism industry - drew the attention of Turkish security forces

The first action taken against the PKK was an amendment of the ldquoVillage Lawrdquo instituted in 1985 The Village Law allowed for the creation and maintenance of village guards and Kurdish commun-ities were required to join the village guard system and submit volunteers to be trained and given positions on the guard This put Kurdish communities at risk ndash those who obeyed and joined the village guard found themselves targets of the PKK who saw the volunteers as traitors to the Kurdish cause Those communities that did not submit volunteers faced being seen by the government as PKK sympathizers and were then vulnerable to the Turkish military The situation was exacerbated by a government declaration of a state of emergency in 10 southeast provinces (pictured below) This gave the government wide ranging military powers over the region leading to a heavy mil-itary presence restrictions on civil and political rights and state powers to evacuate villages either permanently or temporarily In an attempt to avoid government attacks the PKK increasingly based its operations out of Syria where the government gave them a safe haven or in the Kurdish regions of Northern Iraq

PKK attacks reached a death toll of 5000 per year by 19936 The violence prompted substantial de-population of rural Kurdish areas of Turkey as villagers fled to the towns where protection could be more easily found The Turkish government did not help matters ndash it is estimated that over 3000 villages were razed and almost 400000 people were displaced from their homes in resettlements7 Turkish military actions were not confined to the borders in the late 80rsquos and 90rsquos incursions into Northern Iraq were common causing significant damage to the mountain bases of the PKK 8 and the Kurdish governments in Northern Iraq sometimes supported these operations

The war continued to take a substantial toll on fighters and civilians until 1999 when the leader of the PKK Abdullah Ocalan was captured by Turkish forces Until 1998 Ocalan had been relatively

6httpwwwunhcrorgrefworldcountryMARPTUR469f38e91e0html7httpwwwhrworgreports2005turkey03053htm_Toc970052238httpwwwtheagecomaunewsworldturkish-raids-kill-dozens-in-iraq200802241203788120188htmlpage=2


mdash 7 mdash

secure in his base in Syria but was finally expelled from Syria by the Syrian government because they were facing political pressure from Turkey Soon after leaving Syria Ocalan was captured by Turkish forces9 Following a trial criticized internationally for its corruption Ocalan was sentenced to death though the sentence later became a life sentence when Turkey abolished the death penalty in 2002

Speaking from prison Ocalan ordered an im-mediate ceasefire and a withdrawal of the PKK from Turkish territory10 The capture of Ocalan

coincided with increasing international support for Turkeyrsquos war against the PKK mdash it and its vari-ous affiliated groups were recognized as terrorist groups by the US and the EU in the early 2000s11 This included raids of PKK lsquotraining campsrsquo in Europe like a Dutch attack in 2004 that arrested 29 people in the city of Liempde12

The instability in Iraq after the invasion by coalition forces gave the PKK an opportunity to with-draw to their bases in Northern Iraq and rebuild their forces In June 2004 the PKK ended its call to ceasefire with Turkey and restarted regular attacks13 Since then there have been frequent attacks by both sides including suicide and car bombings by the PKK14 Turkeyrsquos forces frequently strike targets in Northern Iraq to root out the PKK bases stationed there Current estimates put the PKK as having approximately 10000 fighters with 20000 more volunteers and sympathizers assisting them15

Kurds in TurkeyThe Republic of Turkey at its establishment in 1923 was intended to be a free multiethnic state in which Kurds and Turks would be equal16 Unfortunately this did not come to pass and conflict between the Turks and Kurds has been continuous since the countryrsquos founding

The first major example of violence between the Turkish state and the Kurds was the Dersim Mas-sacre in the late 1930s In 1934 the Turkish National Assembly passed a Law on Resettlement aiming to resettle ethnic minorities throughout the country in order to Turkify the population The Kurds of Dersim staged an armed uprising in 1937-38 only to be put down by 50000 Turkish troops The death toll was estimated at around 20000 and the Dersim Rebellion stands as one of

9httparticlescnncom2007-10-10worldpkkprofile_1_osman-ocalan-kurdish-rights-pkk_s=PMWORLD10httpwwwturkishweeklynetarticle217chronology-of-the-important-events-in-the-world-pkk-chronol-

ogy-1976-2006-html11Ibid12httpwwwexpaticacomnlnewslocal_newsdutch-police-raid-pkk-paramilitary-camp-13898html13httpnewsbbccouk2hieurope1023189stm14httpwwwreuterscomarticle20120526us-turkey-explosion-pkk-idUSBRE84P0FZ2012052615httpwwwekurdnetmismasarticlesmisc200710turkeykurdistan1420htm16httpwwwinstitutkurdeorgeninstitutewho_are_the_kurdsphp


mdash 8 mdash

the first major backlashes to Turkeyrsquos assimilationist policies17

The rights of Kurds in Turkey have been in constant flux over the years but they generally lack many of the basic rights accorded to large ethnic minorities Most striking are Turkish policies on the Kurdish language ndash until 1991 speaking Kurdish (including the use of Kurdish names) was banned and punishable by fines and prison time A similar ban on broadcasting in the Kurdish lan-guage was not lifted until 200418 and a 24-hour Kurdish language TV channel was only launched in 200919 Even that action did not escape criticism as it remains under the control of the Turkish state-owned broadcasting station prompting accusations that it serves as a government propa-ganda tool

Restrictions on Kurdish cultural and language rights have extended to the political sphere In 1991 the first Kurdish woman elected to Parliament stated

I swear by my honor and my dignity before the great Turkish people to protect the integrity and independence of the State the indivisible unity of people and homelandhellipI take this oath for the brotherhood between the Turkish people and the Kurdish people

She uttered the last line in Kurdish As a result she was banned from Parliament and sentenced to 14 years of prison for lsquoengaging in PKK propagandarsquo20 While similar events have become rarer in Turkey Kurds can still face punishment for using their language Ethnicity-based political parties are expressly banned in Turkey a law that is often used to justify the imprisonment of pro-Kurdish politicians speaking on Kurdish rights Hundreds of associates and activists with the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) have been arrested under charges of having terrorist links and treason21

Turkish laws that seem to discriminate against the Kurds must be looked at through the Turkish context There can be no overestimating the effect the war with the PKK has had on the way Turkey views its Kurds It has prompted mas-sive public backlash against the Kurds as many saw and continue to see ex-treme PKK violence as an extension of the Kurdish community Furthermore Turkey came close to having signifi-cantly more of its land stripped away in the Treaty of Sevres and was only able to avoid that fate with strong national-ism and calls for unity Turkeyrsquos history

17httpwwwhumuunlmedewerkersmvanbruinessenpublicationsDersim_rebellionpdf18httpwwwguardiancoukmedia2004jun10turkeybroadcasting 19httpwwwhurriyetcomtrenglishdomestic10683033aspscr=120httprepositoryupenneducgiviewcontentcgiarticle=1115ampcontext=curej21httpwwwhrworgworld-report-2012world-report-2012-turkey


mdash 9 mdash

can be very much defined in that struggle for unity and the bonding of different groups wrapped up as it is at the crossroads between the East and the West between religion and secularism and between Turks and Kurds As such Turkey is often very sensitive to threats to its territorial integrity and national unity and takes extreme steps to protect its national unity and integrity

Turkey has come a long way from the days when politicians could be imprisoned for saying ldquoI am a Kurd and there are Kurds in Turkeyrdquo22 The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently apologized on behalf of the Turkish state for the Dersim Massacre He also declared that Kurdish language classes would be allowed as an elective after grade four23 mdash prompting less praise than criticism for continuing the ban on Kurdish-language schools and education While steps are being taken the ongoing war with the PKK continues to take its toll on Kurdish-Turkish relations The ldquoKurdish Questionrdquo remains one of Turkeyrsquos most difficult and most destabilizing internal conflicts

Kurds in IraqLike the Kurds of Turkey Iraqi Kurds have fought since the founding of the state to be recognized and granted rights and freedoms Kurdish rebellions against British and Iraqi officials were fre-quent throughout the 30`s and 40`s and has resulted in a decade long war between the Kurdistan region and Iraq 24 The fighting only ceased in 1970 when the two sides agreed to a peace agreement that recognized Kurdish as an official language and amended the constitution to include the Kurds as an Iraqi founding people25

Unfortunately another Kurdish rebellion was unleashed in 1974 when the Iraqi government failed to implement the peace agreement Though initially buoyed by Iranian support Kurdish forces collapsed a year later During these two wars over 100000 were killed and 600000 displaced from their homes

Iraqi Kurdistan since Saddam HusseinIn 1980 Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein invaded neighbouring Iran The war took Baghdad`s attention away from the northern Kurdish region and the Kurds saw it as an opportun-ity to assert their autonomy and independence With aid from Iran Kurdish forces began to wage a guerrilla war against the Iraqi army in the north

After years of Kurdish guerrilla attacks Iraq turned its military forces against the Kurdistan region In what was known as the al-Anfal Campaign (The Spoils) Iraqi forces embarked on a campaign against the Kurds using chemical weapons and gas attacks to kill indiscriminately In what has since been recognized as genocide Iraq dropped bombs containing mustard gas on Kurdish cities including the city of Halabja where 7000 people mostly civilians died in a single attack26

The total number of deaths attributed to the al-Anfal Campaign is approximately 100000 though hundreds of thousands more were evicted from their homes and resettled in an Iraq in an attempt 22httpwwwhurriyetdailynewscomdefaultaspxpageid=438ampn=the-scandal-of-the-kemalist-mind-2007-11-1723httpwwwhurr iyetdai lynewscomturkish-pm-unvei ls-kurdish-courses-at-schools aspxpage-

ID=238ampnID=23031ampNewsCatID=33824httpwwwhistoryguycomwars_of_iraqhtml25httpnewsbbccouk2himiddle_eastcountry_profiles2893067stm26httpwwwnytimescom20030117opinion17iht-edjoost_ed3_html


mdash 10 mdash

to Arabify the region27 International condemnation of al-Anfal however was slow to come large-ly because the Western world still favoured Iraq in its confrontation with Iran It took seven weeks for the UNSC to condemn the Halabja attacks slowed by American reluctance to take a hard line against Iraq28

World opinion turned against Iraq however during its invasion of Kuwait After Kuwait had been liberated President George HW Bush called for a coup against Saddam Hussein29 saying ldquoThere is another way for the bloodshed to stop And that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside and then comply with the United Nationsrsquo resolutions and rejoin the family of peace-loving nationsrdquo Both the Kurds in the North and the Shiites in the South took up his call staging a rebellion against the Iraqi gov-ernment Despite the initial success American and coalition troops refused to support the rebels and Iraqi troops were able to crush the rebellion As Iraqi forces rolled through Kurdistan over 15 million Kurds abandoned their homes in face of the onslaught Few made it across the border mdash Turkey closed the borders and hundreds of thousands ended up taking refuge in the mountains

On April 5 1991 the Security Council passed Resolution 688 The resolution recognized the re-pression by Iraqi forces and demanded that Iraq immediately allow international humanitarian organizations into the conflicted regions to help those in need30 Though it was not explicitly men-tioned in the resolution the US the UK and France used it as justification to establish no-fly zones over the northern and southern parts of the country protecting the Kurds from Iraqi air support while allowing humanitarian aid into the region Iraqi forces soon withdrew from the area leaving the Kurdish region to function as a de facto independent state A civil war between Iraqi Kurdish factions lasted from 1994 until the US sponsored a peace agreement in 1998 and even after that

agreement Iraqi Kurdistan was split between two sep-arate administrations31

The 2003 Iraq War sparked a complete change in Iraqi Kurdistan Kurdish Peshmerga military forces fought with coalition troops to take control of the North earning the approval of the coalition governments Elections were held in the three provinces under con-trol of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 2005 and led to the formation of a stable and relatively peaceful government In an interesting twist of fate the leaders of the two belligerents during the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War have developed a strong relationship since mdash one has become the President of the KRG and the other the President of Iraq a mostly ceremonial but

27httpwwwunhcrorgrefworlddocid47fdfb1d0html28httpwwwnytimescom20030117opinion17iht-edjoost_ed3_html29httpwwwcbccafifthkurdsbattlehtml30httpwwwfasorgnewsuniraqsressres0688htm31httpnewsbbccouk2himiddle_eastcountry_profiles2893067stm


mdash 11 mdash

nonetheless influential role32

The KRG and Iraqi Kurdistan have come far in the past years they now have their own official mil-itary force-the Peshmerga control over education language industry transportation and a host of other sectors accorded to Iraqi provincial governments They have even established their own Department of Foreign Relations33 and have begun establishing diplomatic relations with other countries and lobbying for recognition of Kurdish rights34 However the KRG still faces a number of major issues

Iraqi Kurds outside the KRGWhile most Iraqi Kurds live within the three prov-inces governed by the KRG many do not Particu-larly oil-rich Kirkuk Province and Nineveh Prov-ince (especially the area around the city of Mosul) are thought to have significant Kurdish populations Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution requires a cen-sus of Iraq and a referendum on whether or not these provinces wish to join the KRG The referen-dum has been delayed since 2007 because of inter-national pressure and political reasons35 The issue is complicated by the Arabization attempts of previous Iraqi governments wherein Kurds were resettled in southern Iraq far from their homes mdash a referendum will in large part depend upon how many of them have returned

Tensions with BaghdadWhile the KRG and Iraqi central government usually have a cordial working relationship oil rev-enues and foreign relations often create conflict Recently Baghdad has blacklisted companies such as Chevron and Exxon Mobil both with large developments in the south of the country for signing deals with the KRG36 For their part the KRG claims the deals lie within its constitutional authority Baghdad has begun to withhold payments from oil companies operating in the KRG37 and though under the Constitution the KRG is promised transfers of a certain portion of the national budget Baghdad has threatened to cut those payments if the KRG does not do as told The KRG President has stated that such an action would be taken as a declaration of war by the Kurdistan region38 though he has repeatedly stated that he wishes to find a constitutional solution to the problem39

32httpwwwdemocracynoworg200547iraqs_new_president_jalal_talabani_ally33httpwwwkrgorgarticlesdetailasplngnr=12ampsmap=04080000amprnr=267ampanr=1990634httpwwwtheotheriraqcom35httpwwwforeignpolicycomarticles20101008thank_goodness_for_iraq_s_census_disasterhidecomments=yes36httpwwwturkishweeklynetnews139339ankara-baghdad-relations-tainted-by-kurdish-oilhtml37httpwwwkrgorgarticlesdetailasplngnr=12ampsmap=02010100amprnr=223ampanr=4488838httpwwwaljazeeracomnewsmiddleeast2012072012728173833768598html39httpwwwkrgorgarticlesdetailasplngnr=12ampsmap=02010100amprnr=223ampanr=44888


mdash 12 mdash

Corruption and OppressionThe KRG faces its own accusations of corruption and oppression The two parties in control of government the PUK and the KDP are frequently accused of nepotism and corruption The Inter-national Crisis Group has warned that the widespread corruption threatens to undermine the sta-bility of the region40 In protests against corruption and government control in 2011 two people were shot and killed by police forces41 These concerns are thought to be the driving cause for the increasing popularity of the Change Party which took 25 of the seats in the last election

IndependenceIn an informal referendum in 2005 98 of Kurds supported outright independence42 But while a nation of their own may be a dream for many Kurds senior officials remember that they have never before been so stable and so prosperous Independence could have negative ramifications on the relations between the Kurds and Turkey Iraq and the Western World Still even the most senior Kurds want to see an independent Kurdistan43 mdash so long as it doesnrsquot end up working against them

Kurds in IranAn estimated 12 million Kurds live in Iran forming most of the population in the north-west bor-der regions but also a large portion of the population in cities across Iran44 The situation of Iranian Kurds is similar to that of those in Turkey but is exacerbated by a more authoritarian government and state religious forces that discriminate against non-Shiites (most Kurds are Sunni)

Iranian Kurds who face abuse and oppression under the regime of Iranrsquos Shahs enthusiastically supported the 1979 Iranian Revolution The revolution however turned against them and failed to grant them the rights and autonomy many Kurds had expected Iranrsquos Supreme Leader the Ayatollah Khomeini declared that the concept of ethnic minorities was contrary to Islam and or-dered that Kurdish opposition be crushed Scores of Kurdish villages and towns were destroyed and over 10000 killed

While the conflict has since died down Kurds in Iran still live in the poorest regions of the country and seem to be specifically targeted for evictions and ex-propriations of land by government officials The re-building from the Iran-Iraq War is continually stalled in the Kurdish areas prompting accusations that the government is deliberately slowing down the process Political rights are weak mdash Amnesty International estimates that hundreds of Kurds affiliated with pol-40httpwwwguardiancoukcommentisfree2012may10corruption-scandals-destabilise-iraqi-kurdistan41httpwwwbbccouknewsworld-middle-east-1647562642httpwwweconomistcomnode976913243httpwwwjpostcomOpinionOp-EdContributorsArticleaspxid=26711544httpwwwamnestyorgenlibraryassetMDE130882008end140767b-5e45-11dd-a592-c739f9b70de8

mde130882008engpdf


mdash 13 mdash

itical groups are in prison or on death row after being convicted in unfair trials Similar to other countries the Kurds in Iran lack education and language rights Religious rights are also denied to the Kurds as Sunni Kurds face discrimination and government obstacles

Since 2004 PJAK an Iranian affiliate of the PKK has launched attacks against the Iranian gov-ernment (PJAK is recognized by the USA and EU as a terrorist organization)45 46 PJAK fights in a similar style to the PKK waging guerrilla war and targeting Iranian security and police forces47 However the stated aims of PJAK are not outright independence but a federal Iran with an autono-mous Kurdistan similar to Iraq The Iranian government has shown no sign of conceding

Kurds in SyriaKurds make up approximately 10 of the Syrian population about 2 million people and are con-centrated in the countryrsquos north-east corner The situation of Syrian Kurds is not unlike Kurds in other states ndash Kurds routinely face discrimination oppression and human rights abuses Restric-tions on Kurdish rights have included bans on the Kurdish language refusal to register children with Kurdish names prohibitions of materials written in Kurdish laws against Kurdish private schools and other limitations on basic human rights48

The light-shaded areas indicate Kurdish populations45httpswwwamnestyorgennews-and-updatesnewskurdish-man-imminent-risk-execution-iran-2010012246httpwwwjamestownorgprogramsgtasingletx_ttnews5Btt_news5D=34759amptx_ttnews5Bback-

Pid5D=26ampcHash=8c916b712f47httpwwwctcusmaedupoststhe-factors-behind-rebellion-in-iranian-kurdistan48httpwwwhrworgreports1996Syriahtm


mdash 14 mdash

Syrian Kurds face a unique challenge in that 300000 of them are in fact stateless lacking citizenship to any country49 In 1962 a census stripped 20 of the Syrian Kurd population of their citizenship on the basis that they were alien infiltrators Kurds in Syria had to prove they had lived in Syria since at least 1945 or be stripped of their citizenship mdash requirements that were ignored in favour of an arbitrary census with brothers of the same family or sons and fathers being classified differently Because the statelessness is hereditary the number of stateless Kurds has only grown Syria offers these stateless people special red identity cards and denies them the right to vote own property and to have legal marriages It is thought that the irregular census was an attempt to strip Kurds of their land and give it to Arab settlers and so to Arabify the region and decrease Kurdish influence

The ongoing revolution in Syria has important implications for Syrian Kurds Syrian Kurd organiza-tions and political parties have largely avoided supporting either the opposition or the government preferring to remain independent while still working with the opposition50 Turkish support and hints of Islamism in the opposition makes many Syrian Kurds skeptical about their future under any new Syria51 Despite that Syrian Kurdish groups have taken an active part in the revolution taking over northeastern villages and ensuring that they remain off-limits to both government and opposition forces Opposition forces refuse to recognize the Kurdish reality within Syria insisting on an identification of Syria as an Arab nation Few Kurds openly claim to seek full independence speaking instead of an autonomous region like the KRG Turkey however disputes this goal and has threatened to send troops into Kurdish Syria if it suspects the PYD (a Syrian offshoot of the PKK) is active

UN InvolvementExcept for Resolution 688 which led to the creation of no-fly zones in Iraqi in 1991 there have been no other direct resolutions concerning Kurdistan However UN agencies and organizations have been involved in the region for a long time including UNHRC UNESCO UNICEF the World Food Programme the World Health Organization and other UN bodies52 These groups help to develop the Kurdistan regions in various countries and publicize human rights abuses committed against them

Possible Solutions and ControversiesA number of obstacles halt resolution of the situation in Kurdistan chief among these is the con-flict with the PKK and affiliated groups and fear by nations containing Kurdish populations that they will lose territory resources and regional influence as a if they concede to Kurdish demands Resolution of these issues is essential to creating lasting stability in the region

In the thirty year war with the PKK there has been no sign that ongoing military operations are bringing benefits to either side Since 1984 40000 have been killed and hundreds of thousands displaced The continuing war with the PKK is the reason non-Kurds are reluctant to grant con-

49httpwwwrudawnetenglishnewssyria4003html50httpworldtimecom20120806how-the-kurds-have-changed-turkeys-calculations-on-syria51httpwwwmeforumorg3291syria-kurds52httpwwwekurdnetmismasarticlesmisc201111state5588htm


mdash 15 mdash

cessions and rights to Kurds Ending the conflict between the PKK and governments (particularly Turkey) must be a part of eliminating violence in the region and improving the Kurdish situation

It is also essential that the Kurdish people are afforded basic human rights Only in Iraq do Kurds have living standards and rights comparable to the rest of the general population In Turkey Iran and Syria Kurds face limitations on their cultural political and linguistic rights despite inter-national pressure to loosen control An International agreement that outlines the steps these coun-tries should be expected to take in support of their Kurdish populations in accordance with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic Religious and Linguistic Minorities would give legitimacy to the Kurdish rights movement

The goal of the UNSC is to preserve international stability In order to achieve this it may be helpful to set expectations for the evolution of Kurdish communities The KRG has been quite successful as an autonomous region of Iraq and that area may serve as a model for Kurdish populations in other countries While actual political changes must be left up to the countries concerned a UN recom-mendation on what would be most effective may be influential in what direction these countries decide to go

Bloc PositionsUnited StatesThe United States currently has two major goals in the Middle East to preserve stability and en-sure access to oil This desire to maintain stability is evidenced by the USArsquos relative reluctance to support Arab Spring revolutions Historically the US has hinted at support for the Kurds numerous times (such as after the Gulf War in 1991) but rarely followed through The US does not at present claim to support an independent Kurdistan53 but that may change if it considers autonomous or independent regions for Kurds as a path to eventual greater stability and oil sufficiency Human rights for Kurds and the USArsquos historic support for self-determination of nations and ethnicities must also be considered

Other Western NationsOther Western nations share the USArsquos concern for continued stability in the Middle East seeking to avoid another outbreak of violence in the region Some groups have been assertive in pressing Kurdish rights ndash the EU has made it a key issue for Turkey to resolve in accession negotiations54

Nations with Significant Ethnic MinoritiesBecause of the precedent an independent Kurdistan would set for other stateless ethnic nations some countries (China Russia and Pakistan among others) may be hesitant to support an in-dependent or autonomous Kurdistan These countries however wish to avoid being seen as ob-structing human rights and may support action taken on Kurdistan so long as it does not directly affect them

53httpfileinsightturkeycomFilesPdfinsight-turkey_vol_13_no_2_-2011_gunterpdf54httpwwwpbsorgwnetwideangleepisodesturkeys-tigersreport-card-turkey-and-eu-membershipthe-

kurds838


mdash 16 mdash

Discussion Questions1 What role should the international community take in the Kurdish question insofar as it

concerns international stability

2 What actions should countries with Kurdish populations take to ensure human and pol-itical rights are protected How can the UN influence the countries to take these actions

3 How can fighting between the PKK and countries in the region be stopped What role can the international community have in ending the warfare

4 In the event of future warfare or military campaigns such as Anfal what steps should the UN take to protect civilians

5 What political state (autonomy independence the status quo) would most improve the prosperity and stability of Kurdistan and the region in the long term

6 Would the instability of Kurdish regions transitioning to autonomy or independence be greater than the instability the status quo has caused and continues to cause

7 Should the UN take different approaches to Kurdish populations and aspirations in each country If so what should these approaches be

Additional ResourceshttpwwwunorgDocsschttpwwwunorgendocumentscharterchapter5shtmlhttptopicsnytimescomtopreferencetimestopicssubjectskkurdsindexhtmlhttpwwwrusiorgdownloadsassetsTurkey_terrorismpdfhttpassemblycoeintmainaspLink=documentsworkingdocsdoc06edoc11006htmhttpwwwctcusmaedupoststhe-factors-behind-rebellion-in-iranian-kurdistanhttpwwwamnestyorgenlibraryassetMDE130882008end140767b-5e45-11dd-a592-c739f-9b70de8mde130882008engpdfhttpwwwforeignpolicycomarticles20100517irans_kurdish_questionhttpwwwtesevorgtrUploadPublicationd947a015-9505-421c-ae1d-c1c058e7d4a7Re-port20on20Kurdish20Questionpdf


mdash 17 mdash

Topic B Conflicts in South Asia

IntroductionSouth Asia is comprised of nine countries carrying 17 billion people and a quarter of the worldrsquos population between them It is also fraught with ethnic religious and histor-ical rivalry is the home of two nuclear pow-ers and is a major producer of illicit drugs As such conflicts in South Asia can have a sig-nificant impact on global peace and stability

Two conflicts in particular cause recurring problems and have no resolution in sight the dispute over Kashmir and the Durand Line and the troublesome border between Af-ghanistan and Pakistan The former has been the cause of multiple wars and the subject of some twenty-three UNSC resolutions mostly calling for ceasefires in said wars it is also a flashpoint between two nuclear powers The latter is a cause of continuing instability be-tween Afghanistan and Pakistan separates tribes clans and families and contributes sig-nificantly to extremism terrorism crime and the illicit drug trade The resolution of these conflicts would therefore be a substantial improvement for the stability of the region and would improve the human rights situations of the peoples involved

Timeline1893 The Durand Line Agreement is signed between British India and Afghanistan1947 British rule in India ends and the subcontinent is partitioned into two states

India and Pakistan1947 Afghanistan casts the only vote against Pakistanrsquos accession to the UN largely

because of disputes over the Durand Line1947 The Maharajah of Kashmir signs the Instrument of Accession making the state of

Jammu and Kashmir a part of India War breaks out between Pakistan and India over the issue

1948 India brings the issue of Kashmir to the United Nations Subsequently UNSC Resolution 47 (S726) calls for the withdrawal of troops and a referendum in the region However the resolution is never implemented

mdash 18 mdash

1951 Elections held in Indian-controlled Kashmir back accession to India While the Indian government claims that this makes a referendum unnecessary the United Nations disagrees

1962ndash63 China goes to war with India and takes control of the Aksai Chin region of Kash-mir Pakistan cedes a small parcel of land to China as well

1965 A war is fought between Pakistan and India over Kashmir No substantial change in land occupation results from the conflicts

1972 After another war between Pakistan and India the two nations sign the Simla Agreement which turns the Kashmir ceasefire line into the Line of Control and commits both sides to resolving their differences through negotiations

1980 Along with other nations Pakistan supports the mujahedeen fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan The mujahedeen formed much of the basis for the later Taliban

1987 Disputed elections in Indian-held Kashmir give rise to a pro-independence insur-gency movement The insurgency intensifies through the 1990s but loses much of its power and influence in the 2000s

2003 Taliban sheltered in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) begin cross-ing the border into Afghanistan

2004 80000 Pakistani soldiers enter FATA to search for al-Qaeda operatives2010 Hundreds die in Kashmir protests against Indian forces during the summer

First Area of Focus The Kashmir Conflict

Historical AnalysisThe conflict over Kashmir has its roots in the 1947 partition of British India The region was divided into two coun-tries a Hindu India and a Muslim Pakistan each containing the territor-ies where their own religion was dom-inant At the time of partition much of British India was in the form of so-called princely states or states ruled by princes under the auspices of the Brit-ish Empire Theoretically these princes had power to decide which of the new states to join or to remain independ-ent In practice most princes followed the wishes of their people which were often expressed through violent pro-


mdash 19 mdash

tests if the prince hesitated in making his decision1

Religious Groups in Indian-Administered KashmirRegion Buddhist Hindu Muslim Other

Kashmir Valley mdash 4 95 mdashJammu mdash 66 30 4Ladakh 50 mdash 46 3

Religious Groups in Pakistani-Administered KashmirRegion Buddhist Hindu Muslim Other

Northern Areas mdash mdash 99 mdashAzad Jammu and Kashmir mdash mdash 99 mdash

The largest of these states Jammu and Kashmir lay on the border between India and Pakistan The state had a 75 Muslim population but was governed by a Hindu ruler who unable to make up his mind chose to try and remain neutral However aided by rebels from within Kashmir Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen invaded the state fearing that if left to his own devices the prince would choose to accede to India2 While India accuses Pakistan of sanctioning the invasion and sending in the troops on purpose thus violating a non-aggression agreement the degree to which the Pakistani government was involved is unknown3

Feeling threatened the prince of Jammu and Kashmir appealed to the Indian government for mil-itary support In exchange for help to defeat the invaders the prince signed the Instrument of Accession formally acceding the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India Pakistan declared the ac-cession illegal and in late 1947 war broke out between the two nations over the issue with direct confrontations between the militaries of both sides4

In 1948 India referred the issue to the UN which in Resolution 47 ordered the withdrawal of Pak-istani forces from Jammu and Kashmir ordered a reduction of Indian forces to the level required to maintain law and order contingent on the withdrawal of Pakistani forces and called for a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir to determine whether the people wished to accede to India or Pakistan5

Pakistan however ignored the UN mandate and did not remove its troops thus violating the terms of the agreement6 In 1949 the two countries signed a ceasefire drawing a boundary between those regions controlled by Pakistan and those by India

In 1951 state elections in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir backed accession to India While India claimed this made a plebiscite unnecessary both Pakistan and the UN disagreed saying the UN requirement for a referendum would only be fulfilled by taking into account the wishes of voters

1httpwwwtelegraphcouknews1399992A-brief-history-of-the-Kashmir-conflicthtml2httpwwwkashmirlibraryorgkashmir_timelinekashmir_referenceshtmfn17 3Ibid4httpwwwaljazeeracomindepthspotlightkashmirtheforgottenconflict2011072011727134530154224html5httpswwwmtholyokeeduacadintrelkashun47htm6httpnewsbbccouk2hisouth_asia1766582stm


mdash 20 mdash

throughout the former princely state7

In the 1960s another player entered the Kashmir dispute China In 1962 China and India went to war over a number of boundary disputes including a mountainous section of Kashmir China quickly won the war annexing the northeastern territory of Aksai Chin A year later Pakistan ceded to China the Trans-Karakorum Tract a section of land made up almost entirely by inhospit-able mountain range in exchange for Chinese withdrawal from other territories in Kashmir

War broke out yet again in 1965 after 30000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the boundary line in Kash-mir8 The war ended in stalemate after five UNSC resolutions calling for a ceasefire and the two countries agreed to return to their pre-conflict positions and to solve their disputes peacefully in the future9

The peace did not last long though with a 1971 war between the two nations resulting in the surrender of the Pakistani army in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and in that region gaining its independence While Kashmir was not at the centre of this war fighting did occur in the region The Simla Agreement signed in 1972 put an end to the war and explicitly declared the ceasefire line as the Line of Control a de facto border but not a legally recognized international boundary The Simla Agreement also bounded the two to ldquosettle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiationsrdquo10 though the provision has not stopped the outbreak of conflicts since

Since then conflicts and cross border shootings have been common as an example in 1999 the Kargil Conflict broke out after Pakistani troops occupied unmanned watchposts on the Indian side of the Line of Control11

The last 20 years have been marked by a growth in insurgency and militancy in Indian-held Kash-mir Disputed elections in 1987 led to the formation of pro-independence and pro-Pakistan guer-rilla groups which terrorized the local population and caused an exodus of the local Hindu popula-tion12 India accused Pakistan of sponsoring the insurgency with weapons and training but Pakistan claimed to only be providing the militants with ldquomoral and diplomaticrdquo support13 The insurgency reached its peak in the 1990s with insurgents training in Pakistani Kashmir and India deploying hundreds of thousands of troops in the region14 Since 1990 the conflict has caused 60000 deaths15 and accusations of human rights abuses by both militants and Indian forces run rampant

Current SituationBoth countries claim Kashmir in its entirety though Pakistan no longer includes those territories controlled by China in its definition of Kashmir16 Positions in Kashmir have changed little between

7httpwwwbbccouknewsworld-south-asia-160690788httpwwwglobalsecurityorgmilitaryworldwarindo-pak_1965htm9httpnewsbbccoukhienglishstaticin_depthsouth_asia2002india_pakistantimeline1965stm10httpwwwstimsonorgresearch-pagessimla-agreement11httpwwwglobalsecurityorgmilitaryworldwarkargil-99htm12httpwwwtelegraphcouknews1399992A-brief-history-of-the-Kashmir-conflicthtml13httpnewsbbccoukhienglishstaticin_depthsouth_asia2002india_pakistantimeline1989stm14httpwwwbbccouknewsworld-south-asia-1606907815httptopicsnytimescomtopnewsinternationalcountriesandterritorieskashmirindexhtml16httpwwweconomistcomblogsdailychart201105indian_pakistani_and_chinese_border_disputes


mdash 21 mdash

India and Pakistan since the ceasefire of the 1947 war with the border remaining mostly the same and UN resolutions for a plebiscite still going unheeded Tension between the two countries how-ever has decreased since the beginning of the twenty-first century though periodic acts of terror-ism serve as a considerable damper on diplomatic relations

The insurgency in Indian-held Kashmir has declined dramatically in recent years largely as a re-sult of two factors improving rapprochement between India and Pakistan and declining Pakistani support

2003 saw a restoration of diplomatic ties between the two and since then India and Pakistan have engaged in frequent diplomatic talks attempting to resolve the Kashmir conflict as well as other matters of bilateral concern17 While this progress can be derailed quickly mdash as in 2008 when India accused Pakistan of supporting the bombings in Mumbai by a Pakistani terrorist group18 mdash the two countries are generally getting along better than before In July 2012 the Indian foreign minister praised Pakistan for its ldquonew mindsetrdquo toward India which he described as ldquofrank and candidrdquo19

In addition Pakistan historically supportive of insurgent groups in Indian-held Kashmir has taken significant steps to end their continued activity In 2006 it declared that it had ended all funding for militant operations in Indian Kashmir despite protests by highly influential groups In 2012 Pakistan also slashed in half the administrative funds it grants these groups to pay for items such as transportation and office rent These actions combined with an Indian offer of amnesty for fighters who give up the militant lifestyle and return to their homes have resulted in thousands of militants abandoning fighting and a corresponding decline in insurgent attacks20

These improvements in situation however do not change the basic conflicts surrounding Kashmir Opposition to Indian rule in Kashmir remains strong as hundreds have been killed by Indian forces during protests over the past few years and citizens grow increasingly disgruntled with curfews and stringent regulation of the media21 While the situation in Kashmir has been improving the conflict is far from resolution and continues to be a potential flashpoint for another war in South Asia

UN InvolvementThe UN has been involved in Kashmir since India first brought the matter to its attention during the First Kashmir War Numerous resolutions on the topic were passed during that year but the most important was Resolution 47 which called for a ceasefire a withdrawal of troops from the region and a UN-supervised plebiscite in the state to determine the fate of Jammu and Kashmir22 Other resolutions around that time created the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) which was tasked with mediating between the two countries observing the ceasefire and developing an implementation plan for the plebiscite

The UNCIP suggested numerous proposals for the plebiscite including giving a Plebiscite Admin-

17httpwwwbbccouknewsworld-asia-india-1870090418httpnewsbbccouk2hisouth_asia8528204stm19httpwwwbbccouknews1053728620httpwwwbbccouknewsworld-asia-1827005821httpwwwbbccouknewsworld-south-asia-1155369522httpwwwcountercurrentsorgahmad270808htm


mdash 22 mdash

istrator quasi-sovereign powers over the state immediately prior to the vote in order to reduce bias and holding the plebiscite on a regional basis (potentially partitioning Kashmir) all suggestions were rejected by either India or Pakistan however Eventually the UNCIP was disbanded and re-placed by the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) which was tasked with monitoring the ceasefire line UNMOGIP maintains its presence in Kashmir today

The last meaningful resolution passed was Resolution 122 in 1957 immediately after the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir adopted a constitution ratifying its accession to India The resolution reiterated earlier resolutions and its support of a plebiscite noting ldquothat the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nationsrdquo23 Effectively it deemed any constitutional or legislative changes made con-cerning Kashmir irrelevant to the resolution of the conflict and reiterated the UN requirement of a free and fair plebiscite in the region

No resolutions have been passed on Kashmir since 1971 largely because India has been resistant to international involvement and to the idea of a plebiscite

Second Area of Focus The Durand Line

Historical AnalysisThe Durand Line is a 2700-kilometre-long unrecog-nized boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan It was drawn in 1893 after the Amir of Afghanistan and representatives for Great Britain agreed upon a boundary fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence24 The line removed from Afghan control a number of territories it had previously governed most importantly it arbitrarily divided the Pashtun population in the region between Afghanistan and British India separating tribes and families that had been together for generations

The Line has been a major factor in Pakistani-Afghan acrimony since Pakistan gained its independence in 1947 While Afghanistan tacitly accepted the Line as a de facto border with British India at its independence in 1919 it renewed its objections when Pakistan was created in 194725 Afghanistanrsquos objection to the line is based largely on three arguments

mdash Pashtun regions of British India should have had the option of joining Afghanistan at the 23httpswwwmtholyokeeduacadintrelkasun122htm24httpwwwcfrorgpakistantroubled-afghan-pakistani-borderp1490525httpwwwbueduaiasreportsdurand_conferencepdf


mdash 23 mdash

The Pashtun and Baluch populations are in blue and the Durand Line is in red

time of independence rather than only a choice between India and Pakistan

mdash Agreements between Afghanistan and British India were not transferable to successor states like Pakistan once the British Empire left the region and

mdash Because Afghanistan had been coerced into signing the agreement the Durand Line was illegitimate regardless of whether or not it was passed on to Pakistan

Because of these beliefs none of Afghanistanrsquos widely varying governments (monarchical repub-lican Communist Islamist democratic) has ever accepted the Durand Line Tension between Af-ghanistan and Pakistan can largely be attributed to this conflict as it forms the basis of relations between the two

Notwithstanding diplomatic disagreements however the Durand Line has had very little relevance on the ground Running through rugged mountains and populated mostly by subsistence farmers who often have friends and family on the other side the Line has scarcely ever been policed and people cross the border at will The result has been that even as the governments of the two coun-tries publicly spar over the border it generally has had very little actual effect on the residents in the region

Current SituationThe dispute over the Durand Line continues today However the conflict is not limited to sim-ple disagreement over the boundary ndash it is also closely linked to extremism and poor economic development in the region Because the ongoing dispute precludes discussion of further issues that affect both Pakistan and Afghanistan a resolution of the Durand Line conflict is essential to improving the economic situation and limiting extremist violence in the area

Central to the issue are the Pakistani Federally Ad-ministrated Tribal Areas (FATA) The FATA refer to a semi-autonomous region on the border with Af-ghanistan that is populated mostly by Pashtun tribes where national Pakistani law does not apply and the central government only has indirect control over the citizens The region is known for being a hotbed of international terrorism and jihad as the tribes often provide protection from international and Pakistani authorities notably both the Taliban and al-Qaeda have major bases of operations in the FATA26 27 This in turn contributes to significant extremism among the local population making them ideal re-cruiting and training grounds for militant groups The stability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan is threatened by insurgent groups based in the tribal areas

The FATA are descended from British policies over the region which sought to give the tribes au-

26httpcsisorgfilesmediacsispubs081218_nawaz_fata_webpdf27httptribunecompkstory200204al-qaeda-safe-havens-in-fata-still-pose-threat-us


mdash 24 mdash

tonomy and to provide a buffer between British India and Afghanistan28 Pakistan continued these policies and takes very little responsibility for the area This arrangement raises questions about the legitimacy of the Durand Line as one observer notes ldquoWhy should Afghanistan recognize a border for which Pakistan refuses to take responsibilityrdquo29

The Linersquos arbitrary division of Pashtun populations forms another problem As mentioned pre-viously the Line is often irrelevant on the ground and locals frequently cross the border without obstacle as they have for hundreds of years This complicates any eventual enforcement of the line as instituting tight border security would have damaging effects on the cross-border economy of the region

The insecurity of the border however means that smuggling and crime runs rampant in the re-gion Afghanistan produces 90 of the worldrsquos opium supply a third of which is transited through Pakistan30 The drug trade in addition to being a major source of income for extremist groups and warlords on both sides of the border is also a cause of regional instability Arms trafficking across the Durand Line is yet another concern as it gives insurgent groups like the Taliban and al-Qaeda access to weapons31

Finally the ongoing dispute over the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan is a factor in regional conflict and instability Cross-border fighting is common as attempts to target militant groups on the either side often result in the death of civilians32 Furthermore because there are sim-ilar conditions on both sides of the border economic development and anti-insurgent campaigns require comprehensive cohesive strategies by both governments to be effective mdash something that is nearly impossible while the very legitimacy of the line is still being debated

Possible Solutions and ControversiesImproving border security and eliminating conflicts in South Asia requires a two-pronged ap-proach both comprehensive solutions that will have positive effects throughout the region and specific solutions aimed at particular disputes are needed A successful resolution of the problems will take into account the reasons UN intervention has had limited effect in the past and will ad-dress the varied diplomatic political economic and humanitarian facets of the issues

Pakistan at the centre of both major issues examined is obviously a source of concern Its internal instability and domestic policies especially those with regards to the FATA have effects that ripple throughout the entire region While the UN cannot directly alter these realities it can provide a framework for Pakistan to do so by way of offering incentives or disincentives or both for the actions the Pakistani government takes

There are a number of actions Pakistan could carry out First and foremost are those affecting the FATA Asserting governmental control over the region would be a step towards eliminating ex-tremism instability and crime in the region With that however must come substantial economic 28httpwwwcfrorgpakistantroubled-afghan-pakistani-borderp1490529Ibid30 httpwwwnbrorgpublicationselementaspxid=41031Ibid32httpwwwundispatchcomcivilians-trapped-in-undeclared-afghanistan-pakistan-border-war


mdash 25 mdash

development The UNDP has been involved in the region since 201133 but little progress has been made The need for economic development suggests the role other state actors could play already the United States has given over 18 billion dollars in aid to Pakistan from 2001 to 201034 Suggesting target programs and initiatives for international aid to Pakistan would serve to direct aid money to where it is most needed

Jihadist and extremist groups also play a significant role in South Asiarsquos conflicts and finding ways to decrease their influence will be important in defusing the tension in the region Pakistanrsquos sup-port of these groups is a hindrance to better relations with its neighbours and greater international understanding of its dealings with these groups will be essential to limiting their strength Indian control and oppression of Indian-held Kashmir has led to violent protests and insurgent attacks35 and international involvement in the region may be able to play a role in lowering the risk of de-stabilizing events

KashmirThe Kashmir dispute has avoided resolution for over fifty years All sides have shown little propen-sity for deviating from their original positions Pakistan holds that there must be a plebiscite for the entire region and India declares that Kashmir affirmed its accession to India in state elections However in the wake of improving relations between the two and a declining focus in the region in favour of other problems alternative solutions may be more successful

One possibility that has been largely ignored thus far is that of independence Support for independ-ence has been growing among Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control One poll found that almost 90 of people in the Kashmir Valley supported independence the same study found that almost half of Pakistanis supported Kashmiri independence36 While many pro-independence groups exist in the state there are concerns as to the viability of an independent Kashmir The new state would be landlocked and reliant on India and Pakistan for access to the rest of the world That said the UN principle of self-determination may support this outcome if the people so desire it

There are a number of other possible futures for Kashmir as detailed in this BBC report Many of them are variations on partition mdash that is splitting up the region Support for accession to India Pakistan or for independence vary throughout the former state of Jammu and Kashmir and recog-nizing these regional differences may lead to a compromise all sides can accept

The most important consideration in determining Kashmirrsquos future is what would be acceptable to India and Pakistan Both states wish to avoid a solution that could be construed as a surrender and will be averse to any situation that would reflect poorly upon them Thus any potential resolution will have to be fair and equal or else compensated for in other ways

Durand LineWhile the actual recognition of the Durand Line as an international border is a bilateral issue

33httpundporgpkimagesprojects_factscpruFATA-CPRpdf34httparticlestimesofindiaindiatimescom2010-02-23pakistan28138643_1_civilian-aid-counterinsurgency-cap-

ability-fund-civilian-assistance35httpwwwreuterscomarticle20070813us-kashmir-poll-idUSDEL2917962007081336Ibid


mdash 26 mdash

between Pakistan and Afghanistan the UN has a role to play in framing the conflictrsquos successful resolution With NATOrsquos impending withdrawal from Afghanistan within a few years maintaining Afghanistanrsquos stability and cohesion is of the utmost importance The border is too long and ragged to be fully policed along its entire length but areas where insurgents are particularly active may benefit from UN assistance in whatever form that may come The Linersquos current status as a gateway for illicit drugs further indicates the need for greater clarity and security on the issue

The UN may also wish to consider the populations that the Line is dividing and provide a clearer definition of the Line A hard border desirable for some security and crime related reasons would have severe negative implications on the cross-border economy and lifestyles of the region On the other hand a soft border would make transit across the Line for militants and smugglers simple Methods of addressing both these problems must be found in order to provide a clear resolution of the issue

Bloc PositionsPakistanPakistan clearly has strong positions on the issues facing South Asia Pakistan strongly supports UN calls for a plebiscite in Kashmir and disputes Indian claims that Kashmirrsquos accession to India was ratified by state elections37 On the Durand Line Pakistan has always taken the position that the Durand Line is a formal international boundary and resists Afghan claims to the contrary38 Pakistanrsquos relations with the West have been shaky for some time now39 but offers of aid and as-sistance have proved persuasive in the past Pakistan may be willing to make needed reforms and compromise on important issues if it can be done in manner that does not make it seem as if it is backing down mdash as much to keep its own people happy as to avoid international embarrassment

IndiaIndia argues that by voting in successive state and national elections Kashmiris have confirmed their accession to India40 and that those elections left a plebiscite unnecessary For India the dis-pute must be seen as part of its ongoing rivalry with Pakistan and it too seeks to avoid losing face with both its own people and in the international community Seeing stability in Afghanistan as key to both the prosperity of the region and its own regional influence though India has expressed the belief that Afghanistan should accept the Durand Line and respect the borders41 Indiarsquos economic growth relative stability and much larger population give it a stronger starting position than Pak-istan affording it greater flexibility in the actions it can take

United StatesThe USA has two main concerns in South Asia influence including its access to quick-growing markets and the preservation of regional stability Generally it tries to take a balanced approach

37httpwwwpakunorgkashmirhistoryphp38httpwwwhollingscenterorgwp-contentuploads20120407-2007_Durand_Linepdf39httpwwwbbccouknewsworld-south-asia-1339828140httpwwwbbccouknewsworld-south-asia-1169367441httpwwwaspenindiaorgpdfdurandpdf


mdash 27 mdash

to the Kashmir question supporting the principle of Kashmiri self-determination but in practice maintaining the status quo and the sanctity of the Line of Control42 The USA is also concerned about the future of Afghanistan after its troop withdrawal and will look for actions that will help preserve that countryrsquos fledgling government Illicit drug trafficking is another major concern of the US and it has been putting significant funds towards fighting the practice43 Combating the Durand Line drug trade is an important objective for the USA

ChinaThe two giants in Asia China and India have had a tumultuous relationship fighting numerous wars and skirmishes and claiming territory under each otherrsquos control China of course maintains that the Kashmiri territory it controls belongs to China44 but appeals for restraint from both sides aware of the effects a potentially nuclear Indo-Pakistani war would have on its own stability and economy Pakistani-Chinese relations however are among the best in the world China will be intent on maintaining its influence in Pakistan without harming its growing economic relationship with India

RussiaRussia has long been a friend to India and supports its position that Kashmir is an integral part of India45 One of Russiarsquos main concerns in the region is the growth of Islamic extremism which poses a threat to Russia in areas where Muslims make up the majority of the region Thus Russia will look to actions that will provide stability in the region though it is always wary of growing US and Western influences in South Asia

European Union amp Other CountriesThe EU has long held the position that India and Pakistan should work towards reconciliation and that the Kashmiri people should be involved in the conflictrsquos eventual resolution46 Human rights violations and violence in the region are another major concern and the EU urges both sides to take steps to find peaceful solutions to the dispute This stance generally sums up the positions of most other countries though all nations must keep in mind their own economic and political in-terests in the region

Discussion Questions1 What actions with regards to the Durand Line would be both effective and acceptable to the

Afghan government

2 How can the economy of the trans-border Durand Line region be protected while simul-taneously improving security

42httpwwwgatewayhouseinpublicationgateway-housefeaturespresent-situation-kashmir-favours-india43httpwwwhuffingtonpostcom20090627us-announces-shift-in-afg_n_221826html44httpeditioncnncom2002WORLDasiapcfeast0524aksaichin45httpcsisorgfilesmediacsispubssam59pdf46httpwwwarticlesbasecompolitics-articleseu-calls-for-kashmiri-peoples-involvement-in-resolving-kashmir-

issue-3898762html


mdash 28 mdash

3 What actions can the international community take to combat crime and drug trafficking over the Durand Line

4 What role can the international community play in combating extremism in South Asia

5 What steps can Pakistan and India reasonably be expected to take on Kashmir What should the United Nations do if anything if the two countries fail to implement the actions called for by a resolution

6 Short of a formal agreement on Kashmir what actions can be taken to improve the human rights situation in the area

7 How can long-term stability in the region be improved

Additional Resourceshttpwwweconomistcomblogsdailychart201105indian_pakistani_and_chinese_border_dis-puteshttpwwwbbccouknewsworld-south-asia-11693674httpwwwgatewayhouseinpublicationgateway-housefeaturespresent-situation-kashmir-fa-vours-indiahttpcsisorgfilesmediacsispubs081218_nawaz_fata_webpdfhttpwwwbueduaiasreportsdurand_conferencepdfhttpwwwusiporgpublicationsresolving-pakistan-afghanistan-stalematehttpwwwcfrorgpakistantroubled-afghan-pakistani-borderp14905p3

httptopicsnytimescomtopnewsinternationalcountriesandterritorieskashmirindexhtml


mdash 29 mdash

Zach Hauser amp Stuart Warren

Secretaries-General

bull

Eric LiuChief of Staff

Catherine ChouDirector-General

bull

Aliya-Nur BabulUSG Committees

Adam ChandaniUSG Conference

Parker NannUSG Delegate Affairs 1

Eden LeeUSG Delegate Affairs 2

Brian KwokUSG Finance

Andy LeeUSG Marketing

Catherine WangUSG Marketing

Kevin ChienUSG Simulations

Jennifer YoonUSG Sponsorship

Dear Delegates

My name is Liam St Louis and I am the director for the Security Council at VMUN this year I am a Grade 12 student at Gleneagle Secondary and I have striven to be as involved in the MUN community as I possibly can As your director I am looking forward to watching you work to solve some of the most pressing problems of the day

The two topics we have selected Kurdistan and conflicts in South Asia are both important topics of concern to the entire international community The latter takes advantage of the fact that both Pakistan and India are currently represented on the UNSC providing a unique opportunity to discuss South Asian issues with the presence of those who the conflicts concern most Be-cause a lack of dialogue is one of the largest reasons these issues are still un-solved the opportunity for direct conversation will be a boon to our efforts to find a resolution The first topic Kurdistan has to our knowledge never been done in the Vancouver MUN circuit and is very uncommon to see across the continent It is our hope that you will be able to solve this import-ant but hitherto-little known problem

If you ever have any questions or concerns please feel free to contact me at any time I look forward to reading your position papers and watching you find a resolution to these pressing problems and I wish you good luck in your research

Regards

Liam St LouisDirector United Nations Security Council

Vancouver Model United NationsThe 12th Annual Conference bull February 1ndash3 2013


















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kurds838


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Afghan government



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kurds838


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Afghan government



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kurds838


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