van reijen, willem - the crisis of the subject. from baroque to postmodern

8/10/2019 Van Reijen, Willem - The Crisis of the Subject. From Baroque to Postmodern

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T H E CRISIS O F T H E S U B J E C T

F R O M B R O Q U E T O P O S T M O D E R N

F o r

several years the concept of the sub

ject has been the object of a bitter polemic

between German and French philosophers/

Whoever

speaks i n

favor

o ftherealization

o f democratic relationships and greater so

c i a l justice should set herself the task of

preservingthe inheritance of the

Enlighten

mentso says Habermas, andwith h i m the

Modems. Thisis to saythatwhen it is a

question of truth andpractical(moral) prob

lems,we should make decisions

only

with

arguments and, thus,withthe help of reason.

Habermas thereby makes it

plausible

thatwe

can define what is reasonable not through

recourse tointuitionsormetaphysicalp r i n c i -

ples,

but rather

only

through the exchange of

arguments that f o l l o wa determinate proce

dure and,ideally,through consensus.

French

Postmodern philosophers l i k e

Lyotard hold,on the contrary,thatevery con

ceptiono freason based upon argumentation,

thus

conceived as procedural and generaliz

i n g

leads to the exclusion of non-gener-

alizable,but not thereby illegitimate,points

o f viewconcerning our existencethat is a

unity

suggests

itself

that

is not at all given,

but in the worst case is forced, and thereby

offends against its own basicprinciples.

Habermas responds to this chargewiththe

counter-accusation ofaperformative contra

diction: one cannot, wanting to persuade

without

arguments, support the thesis that

one should persuade without arguments.

Withoutmuch

difficulty,

one can seethat

the confrontation

here

is based on different

Willemv n

eijen

conceptions of the subject, of

thinking,

and

o f

language.

F o r Modernism,

the subject is to be

thought of as an autonomous,

thus

not other-

determined, individual.

i T i i s

subject thinks

universallyandactsin the assurance of le

gitimateindividual interests. For Postmod

ernism,

i nthe

often

citedpictureo f a

drawing

i nthe sand, Foucault has sketched the i n d i -

vidualas somethingthatis in each moment

transitory. Whatappearsagain and again is

not so much the complexity of the environ

ment and the unintended consequences of

our actions, but rather the

impossibility

of

substantiating the separation of reality and

f i c t i o n l ike

the undefinable tension between

structures and interpretations, which

puts

into

question the putative reliabilityof our

judgments and the legitimacy of the inten

tions and results of our deeds.

In

the

following

I

w i l l

try to provethatthe

uncertainty towhichPostmodernphilosophy

(and no less literature, architecture, and

painting)

gives expression is the conse

quence

o f

the thesisthatthe

self,

ourthinking

and speaking, is necessarily determined an

tagonistically.W i t hthis I contradict the cur

rent thesis that Postmodernism is nothing

other than a

pluralism,

a

manifold

of styles

and interpretations.

Such pluralism

istypical

f o rModernism.

Postmodernism,

o nthe other

hand, confronts extremes with one another

without

believing in the

possibility

of an

overarchingunity.

Self-criticism

and the emerging self-re

Translated yJulia avis

PHILOSOPHY T O D Y

31

WINTER 1992


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f lex iv i tyof the Enhghtenment can be seen as

typical

forModernism.But they are always

articulated

in the frame of

historical

teleol

ogy and against the background of the foun

dation

o f

rationalargumentation and

activity.

From the Postmodern point ofview, these

options'

claimto

exclusivity,

and especially

the

teleological

andlegitimizingprogram

for

the establishment of grounds, is thrown into

doubt. Postmodern philosophy regards real

ity

as thoroughly ambiguous because there

are no overarching

linguistic

or rational

standpoints from

which

existing contradic

tions

(practical

and theoretical)

could

be

uni

fied.Thisanalysis has consequences for the

question whether it is possible to make a

distinctionbetween reality and

fiction

thatis

supportable. For the question about the sub

ject means that thinking and speaking are

thought of, on one hand, as activities the

individualproduces and

controls,

and, on the

other, as structures determining us a tergo.

S otheself isthought, on one side, as autono

mous, and, on the other, as heteronomous.

I w i l l connect my discussion of this an

tithesis in the conception of the

self

withan

attemptto clearly showthatthe Postmodern

disposition

is an inheritance of the Baroque

not in order to cause a deja

v u

effect, or, to

draw,

however precariously, an historical

parallel,

or even to construct acontinuity,but

rather to support theclaimthatModemand

Postmodem

thinking have been systemati

cally

linked

together since the Baroque. My

thesis thus begins

from

the notion that

thinking,

speaking,

and the subject are

to be understood

only

as antagonistically de

termined

concepts. These antagonisms are

rooted in the rational determination of con

cepts as such. But if one adds the idea of

being-familiar-with-oneselfto the rational

determination of concepts, the antagonistic

dynamicthatthe Postmodems attribute to the

subject disappears. To the remarks of Frank

on

this theme, I, for my part,

w i l l

add below

the suggestion that being-familiar-with-

others be enlarged by being-familiar-with-

oneself.

I w i l lnow discuss the concept of reflec

tion,reaching back to L e i b n i zandLyotard,

then tum in section II to the theme of

lan

guage against the background of Walter

Benjamin's

analysis of the German Tragedy

and Lyotard's heDifferend and f i n a l l ythe

self in section III.

I Reflection

T he term reflection addressesa

twofold

possibility

of self-relation.

First,

there

is

naturally thinking about oneself in the hy-

postatizedpossibilityof immediateself-rela

tion,thenthereis

thinking

about oneself as a

self that,mediated through amirroring,is

related to the natural and socialenviron

ment.

Leibniz

T he

portrait of Postmodem philosophy

that

leads to the commonly held conclusion

thatit has no f i r mbasis, does not articulate

its analysis under generalizing perspectives,

but rathersituationally:according to it Post-

modemismrelativizes everything and hur

ries from one standpoint to another. This

protrayalcouldbe continued

in

the

following

way:

Inthe courseo f

this

intellectualmovement

views of things are changed:statements

thatwere pronounced about one and the

same thing

from

different standpoints are

likewise

transformed. To the same extent,

the meanings

o f

names

show

themselves as

mobileand

shimmering.

Thinking

turns out

to be a

development

and

an event, and the meaning of anyphilo

sophicalterminus becomesa

perfectexam

ple

of a history of aspects. Contradictions

therefore belong to the systematicpeculi

arityof

thinking.

T H E CRISIS O F T H E S U J E C T

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The philosopher whose

thinking

isbriefly

outlinedhere

at the end

o f a

detailed interpre

tation isL e i b n i z .I

w i l l

examine the system

atic

affinity

of the just mentioned contradic

tions

with

topoi discussed in Postmodern

philosophy. As concerns the philosophical

discussion

of reflection in the Baroque pe

riod,

I

w i l l l imit

myselfto a short portrayal

o f Leibniz's

position (1646-1716).^ The mo

nad, which windowlessly mirrors the

uni

verse, contains in

itself

both moments of

mirroring

and self-referential

thinking. C o n -

sider first the topos of the relation between

subject and

world.

L e i b n i z

proceeds from the fact

that

the

monad is a rational entity. Yet the monads

themselves do not have to be conscious of

a l l

ideas of reason in order to be able to have

control

over them.

L i k e

the painter who

sketches perspective correctly without ex

pressly having to know the rules, so,

Leibniz

argues, the monads have an instinct

f o r

rea

son,

which leads them both in regard to

knowledge and

morally.

(Something

similar

is

also

true

for speaking.)

Thus,

to use Freudian terms, the monad is

partially

unconscious; yet it also has in

itself

a l l

ideas of reason and, in this way, a funda

mental bond with the world: in activity, in

thinking,

and

i n

knowledge,

it represents

the

world.

The ideas of reason do not reside on

the surface, on the outside and among the

unordered multitude of appearances, but

ratherexert aunifying

function.

To a certain

extent, however, they refer

from

the exterior

to the interior of things. I say to a certain

extent, for it isw e ll

knownthat

a monad has

no windows. Its relation to the worldplays

itself

out entirely in the interior on the

level

o f

the ground of ideas of reason: the

agree

ment between the single monad and the other

monads and things is guaranteed by a pre-

established harmony. The monad thereby

represents

the

world

to

itself

by assuming a

''point

de

V M ^ ,

a standpoint. Through this,

P H I L O S O P H Y

T O D A Y

the term representation receives a double

meaning. On one hand, it means

that

the

monad depicts itself, its standpoint, as an

existing

and knowing monad, and, on the

other, it means the monad

represents

the

world.

What this reveals, according to L e i b -

niz,

is

that

the monad imprints

itself

on the

world.

It is active, and, to some degree, as a

rational self, it produces the world. In this

w ay

the new concept of an active, rational

subject, who

creates

the

world

from the

strength of its reason, is bom.

W e,

however, can see thatthis subject is

caught up in an

intrinsically

counter-rotating

movement. In one direction, it moves in

wards toward the ground in order to reach

fromthe exterior what is essential, to reach

the ideas of reason in itself. In the other

direction,

it moves from the inside out in a

movement directed toward the essenceof

things,

thus

toward the outside. This move

ment

addresses

us as a crossing and recalls

Lyotard's passage.

Here the monad is

reallyunintermpted in movement. The non-

spatial monad moves (a contradiction for

something in

itself

non-spatial) alwaysfrom

the inside (ground of reason) toward the

outside (world). Furthermore, it always

moves as perceiving activity in the

world

from

''point

de yue to

point

de

vue''

n

other words, it carries out a perduring change

o f

perspective,

which

constitutes the

indi-

viduality of the monad, and which, as we

shall

see, is theconditionfor the activities of

the monad, activities of representation and

depiction.

W e

can clearly see just how ambiguous

this conception of the monad is by consider

in g Leibniz's

interpretation of the monad,

and,

withthat

the subject, as a

l i v i n g

mir

ror.

Conceiving

the subject intermsof repre

sentation reveals it as an act ofdepictionand

representation. Depictionand representation

are to be understood as a mirroring not in

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terms

of the sensual-intuitive, for the monad

does not have any windows, but rather as

essential mirroring. The subject, moreover,

does

not merely play a passive role, but, as

we have seen, an active one. It crosses the

borders of the sensibleappearanceof things

from

inside out into the inside of

those

samethings. The subject, or more precisely

the ideas of reason of the subject, and things,

that

is to say, ideas

o f

reason, are

reciprocally

mirrored inside of one another.The subject

is

caught up in aconstantstateof transition.

It mirrors the inside of the outer

world,

but

by mirroring,it mirrors the

world

of

which

it

itself

is a partit mirrors itselfthat is, its

relation to the

world.

The rational subject

continually

produces images. What is ra

tional,

according toLe ibniz ,is characterized

precisely by the fact

that

it is not

f i r mly

established, but

rather

is continually in mo

tion.Mir r or ingis this movement. B yplacing

a mirror before itself, the rational subject

crosses its restricted spacio-temporal point

de vue.

The subject holds a mirror before itself; it

is

at the

same

time this mirror, the image in

the mirror, and the beholder of this image.

The idea of such a self-relationship is the

classical

metaphor for self-consciousness.

We

should, therefore, realizethatthe mir

ror

offers

us adeeperinsight into the

essence

of

things and into our own essence. The

mirror

image in the mirror, as an image of

reason,presentsa higher standpoint than the

worldofappearances,which knows no self-

relation.

Le ibniz

understandsthis self-rela

tion

as the continuous production of images,

imagesthat,of course, at thesametime con

dition the material existence of things. The

subjectwhichproduces images continuously

re-executes

what God, the central monad,

doesas he constantlycreatesthe world.

Leibniz ,

however,

speaks

not only of a

mirror,but of a l iv ingmirror.

A s

a

l iv ingmirror

I give the

manifoldo f

mirrored

objects unity. Now one could

think that with such unity the restricted

standpoint, the subjective point de vue, is

not yet overcome. But it is precisely in the

fact

that

the subject is related to

itself that

Leibnizseesthe

guarantee

thatthe subjective

standpoint is overcome,

for

it

is

the continual

self-reflection

in the enduring confrontation

with

the

other that

insures

that

no merely

particular standpoint is taken.

Interestingly, Le ibnizcompares this con

ception of the subject with the Copemican

revolution.

His philosophy aims to offer the

possibilityof drawing a distinction between

the deceptive, sensual intuition according to

which

the sun rises and the reality

that

the

Earth

turns. But the parallel to Copernicus

reveals a point of contrast asw e l l. Fol lowing

the discovery ofCopernicus,the

world

is no

longer the

centerof

the universe. But accord

ing

to

Le ibniz ,

the subject is always at the

sametime a point ofdeparture,thusa quasi-

centerfrom out of which everything is mir

rored, and

thus takes

a universal precedence

over the

world.

This ambiguity is charac

teristic of the Leibnizianconception of the

monad. On one hand, the monad mirrors

(according to the understanding) the empiri

cal

world.

On the other hand, it at thesame

time exceeds thatwhich can be understood

inthe way it moves toward inner reason. A

further contradiction lies in the fact that,

according to

Le ibniz ,

the monad is most es

sentially

itself

when it resides not in the

abstractions of reason, butratherin the con-

creteness

of the empirical

world.

The conceptiono fthe subject inPostmod

ernism can be connected to Le ibniz in two

respects.

With Le ibnizthe point ofdeparturewas,

as we have just seen, the thesisthatthe sub

ject (as energetic monad) imprints

itself

on

theworldandcreatesa unity. The recogniz-

abilityof the

world

is secured in this way. In

Postmodern philosophers andauthorswe can

T H ECRISISO FT H E

SU JECT

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likewise f ind

the thesis

that

the subject pro

duces the world.

W e

strive, whenever possible, to order

h s

and have the

world

make

sense;

and do

so

a l l

the more when we discover

that

order,

sense,

and meaning are not objective. This

attempt

to give the

world sense

must f a i l .

From

the Postmodern perspective, reason

creates

order by

simplifying

a

manifold

into

a

homogeneity. In this way the meaning we

give

the

world

is a product of our

o w n reflec

tion.

This

returns

us to our self-experience.

The representation ofthatself-experience as

a

stable, hypostatized, autonomous

self

is

shown to be the product of a circular proc

ess. ^

But did we not also

f ind

in

L e i b n iz

the

ideathatthe subject is led by an unrecogniz

able, in anycaseunknowable power the

rational

instinct? The rational instinct,

which

is

non-rational as an instinct, refers to reason.

Here

Leibniz's

trust

in

reason

appears

unbro

ken

but again

that

looks different when one

consults the metaphor of the l iv ingmirror.

The discussion of the

l iv ingmirror,which

is

at the same time mirror, mirror image,

relation of mirror image and

world,

and

lastly,

of

mirror

image and self, can probably

be correctly designated as ambiguous, even

as antagonistic. We are dealing

here

with

a

mirror

thatis simultaneously receptive, pas

sive,

and productive,

actively

producing. The

mirror

makes what mirrors

itself

in it, but

mirrors nothing other than

that

which

is

given

outside of

i t.

The mirrordoesnot only

mirror

something outside of it,rather it

also mirrors its relation to the mirrored ob

jectbut to

that

end, strictly speaking, it

wouldrequire another mirror. A further dis

cussion in German Idealism

w i l l

in fact in

struct us

that

this repetition must be

called

to

a

halt if one

does

not want, or have to (Post

modernism to the letter), permitthat

there

is

not secure foundation for our knowledge,

either in us, or outside of us.

The metaphor of the

l iv ing

mirror shows

PHILOSOPHY T O D Y

above

a l l

just how much

L e i b n iz

despite his

undisputedholdon the reasonability of real

ity

and, therewith, on the fullness

o f

being,

already had to take into account the fact

that

the transparency of the subject is not given

to

itself

to

the extent

compellingly

suggested

by

the rationality of the

world.

Lyotard

From

the

beginning, Lyotard's

philosophy

stands

under the sign of the question of the

unification

of what cannot beunified.

In

hisLibidinal Economy Lyotardrelates

M a r x

and Freud to each other in a non-dis

cursive

way. He sketches the picture (which

we know so well), of a young, beautiful

woman from the Rheinland

with

a bearded

head.

M a r x appears

not as the emancipator

of

the proletariat, but as a public prosecutor.

H e

indicts pleasure while he himself is a

vic i t im

of it. The book unmistakably paints

Lyotard's

own crisis in thinking,

which

he

later acknowledged in an

interview.^

What is

interesting

here

is Lyotard's

affinity with

those

philosophical reflections

(Marx,

Freud,

Nietzsche) in

which

an unresolved

tension between consciousness/unconcious-

ness,

or reason and

body,

is not

only

asserted,

but is positively introduced as the basis for

the critique of the one-sided perspective of

reason. Such an option, to

which

the cited

authors

among

othersattest,

cannot be articu

lated in a discursive way. Thus, they chose

narrative or poetic forms of depiction , not

from

a tendency to

s e l f - f u l f i l l in g

prophecy,

but as the most appropriate way to

criticize

academic disciplines.

W i t h he

Dijferend

however,Lyotardlets his

attempt

at an argu

mentative presentation

f o l l o w

the narrative

depictions

o f

the

Libidinal Economy

and

he

Postmodern Condition. I

w i l l

return later in

section II to the conception of lanaguage

that

stands

at the center

o f

this

work.A t

this point

I w i l l

briefly

explain the

theme

ofreflection.

A s

already in the

he

Postmodern Condi-

tion Lyotard

in

he Dijferend

attacks the

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concept

of

a comprehensive reason. So

while

Hegel

counts as the examplary repre

sentation of such a position,

Lyotard

also

sees

in Kant a philosopher who posed the

problem of the orderly arrangement of rea

son. Indeed, it is quite significant

that

Kant

wrote

three Critiques that

thematize

three

very

different forms of our knowledge:

that

of

pure (theoretical), practical (moral), and

aesthetic reason. For the heterogeneity of

language,

which Lyotard

often mentions, is

mirrored

in the heterogenity of our reason.

Thuswhile,according toLyotard,Kant first

believed,

as

i n heCritique of Judgment that

theoretical and practical reason could be

broughttogether,he himself recognizedthat

such a synthesis

could

not succeed. Rather,

the critiques of pure and practical reason use

an analogous procedure likethatof heCri-

tique of Judgment:

they proceed as-i f'

there

were another critique, and are mirrored in

one another. This

does

not mean, however,

that there

is no point of reference

that

they

wouldhave in common.Lyotard designates

this point as the tacit question, arrive-t-

il? does it happen? What can happen is

the materialization of a work of art orknowl

edge thatdoes

not

fo l l ow

pre-given rules, but

rather

itself creates

a new rule. The artist

refers to the sublime, the philosopher to a

phrase,

that

is, to a

sentence that

is not

verbalized.

ForLyotard,the sublime is

that,

l ike

infinity,

ofwhichwe have a concept, but

no

intuition.

The experience of the sublime

first

shocks us, then we recognize

that

sen

sual

intuition is

lacking,

then we realize,

according

to Kant,

that

we are

intelligible

creatures, and this

assessmentlifts

us beyond

the

sphere

of the material. To this we

f inal ly

owe our dignity. The feeling of displeasure

about the limitationof our sensual intuition

appears

simultaneously

with

a feeling of

pleasure (in

that

we are rational creatures). It

is

characteristic ofLyotardthathe interprets

the aesthetic experience of man in this di

mension,

which

is not intersubjective.

But

man is also isolated, or even objec-

tivized,

in his moralaspect:he

stands

eye to

eye

with

the moral law, not

with

his

fellow

human beings. The question whether man

seeshimself

led

to

moral activity,

dependson

whether he lets himself be seized by this

lawfulness, which is absolutely different

from

him

(does

it happen?)

Humanactivity can

thus

only succeed if

we adopt the idea

thatweactively control

our

own

actions, andthatwe, by carrying on an

argumentative conversation

with

others, can

agree

on thevalidityo fcertainnorms.Yetthe

main

reason for Lyotard's position

here

is

Kant's discoverythat thereexists unbridge

able contradictions between different forms

of

thinking.

From Kant's arguments for the

fact

that

our knowledge always refers to a

unity that it cannot achieve, we must draw

the conclusion

that

the various contents of

our knowledge cannot be synthesized^they

remain both antagonistic

with

respect to one

another and in themselves. There is at

best,

as Lyotards thinks, a ferry boat,

which

cre

atesthe ties (crossings,

passages )

between

the different islands

of

our

cognitiveabilities.

II

Language

Since,

at the latest. Strich's decisive essay

of

1916, Der lyrische til des siebzehnten

Jahrhunderts, the

viewthat

Baroque poetry

thematizes

particularly

antagonistic relations

and fashions

these

relationships

allegorically

can be regarded as secure: this century

[seeks]

dissonances and contradictions

(Strich,

1916-1975, p. 42), the poems fre

quently end up in an unfathomable antithe

sis

(p. 46).Strichfurther emphasizedthat

the vanity and transience of everything

earthly

stands

in the center of this poetic

work.

The interest

in

contradictions

that

are non-

Hegelian,

thatarenon-dialecticaland cannot

be sublated, or more precisely, in antagonis-

T H E

CRISISO F

T H E

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tic

relations, certainly also guided

Ben-

jamin's

steps

when he came upon Baroque

tragic drama. Benjamin's first intuitve in

sight is

that

the Baroque period lacked the

certainty of salvation

that

was

present

to

suffering people in theM idd leAges without

thereby

giving

up the hope for redemption,

an insight which later research has con

firmed.

This insight forms the background

against

whichBenjaminsees

tragic drama as

an interpretation of the

world,that

is, as the

linguistic

constitution of the

world.

In

agree

mentwithhis

linguistic-philosophical

reflec

tions, Benjamin distinguishes between the

materialofthe

theater

piece and the ideasthat

mark

it.A s

concerns material, he develops an

anthropological-politicaltypology of human

beings and conflicts in the absolutist

state.

The prince is apparently the most

powerful,

but in the moment in

which

he carries out a

decision,

he shows himself as absolutely

powerless. A n unbridgeable gap opens be

tween having the power to rule and being

able to rule. The absolutist prince, who car

ries cruelty against his adversaries to an ex

treme, knowsthathe himself

w i l l

f inal lybe

a

v ict im

of their cruelty. The tyrant is at the

same

time the martyr, for oppression neces

sarily

draws self-annhilation after it. And

from

this it

followsthat

the

courtly

nobleman

is

at thesametime he who has perfect man

ners

at his disposal and the perfect schemer,

who,

with

the next opportunity, betrays the

prince.

Thus,

in contrast to Greek tragedy, Ger

man tragic drama knows no cosmic order

that

reconciles human beings

with

their fate.

World-reality

is hopeless; beauty is transi

tory; values are corrupted;

salvation

is uncer

tain.In contrast to theMidd leAges,the Ba

roque man is denied any immediate way into

the nextworld(1:258-59 [8283]).'

Yetbecausehe cannot give up hope, his

experience

of

both

vanity

and the expectation

o f

salvation

that

has become uncertain

PHILOSOPHY T O D Y

plunge him into despair. This contrast in

spires Benjamin's conviction

that

a tension

reigns between the material of tragedy and

its idea. Benjamin

sees

this tension concre

tized

in melancholy. Sadness and melan

choly

make one speechless, but it

is

precisely

this speechlessness

that

can depict the es

senceof language.

Interms

of their

linguistic

form,

German

tragedies are allegories,thatis, concrete de

pictions

of

abstract

concepts. For

Benjamin,

allegory articulates the parallel tensions be

tween eternity and transience, idea and

intui

tion:

one of the strongest motives in allegory

is

the insight into the transitory

nature

of

things and the concern to eternally save them

(c f

1:397 [223-24]). This antagonism be

tween insight and concern determines less

the material than the ideaoftragedy. It makes

us sad, and this

sadness

is revealed as the

mother of allegories and their content

[1:403]. But according to the antique tradi

tion, which

was renewed in the Renaissance,

the relationship to

thatwhich

is creative and

saving

is secured precisely in mourning and

inmelancholy. The creative, genial perspec

tiveo f

the

worldfinds

its appropriate

form

in

theallegory.Thus, on the one hand, allegory

has the power to save the transitorythat, so

says

Benjamin,

is what the Baroque discov

ers but,

on the other hand, salvation can

only

take place if organic

l i fe

is destroyed

beforehand [1:669-70]. The

allegorical,mel

ancholic

perspective must smash the

world.

That

which

lies

here

in ruins, the highly

significant

fragment, the remnant, is, in fact,

the finest material of baroque creation.

(1:354 [178])

If

it

wants to save things, the allegory must

hold

the remains tight [cf 1:666]. It offers,

bydestroying things in trying to save them,

the picture of

rigid

unrest [1:227]. Baroque

isthus

shown as the fashion of antithetical

feelings about

l i f e (Hbscher ) ,

but is no less

itself

an ontological constitution: the anti-

3 6


8/14

thetical

nature

of melancholy corresponds to

the antithetical

nature

of

the

political

constel

lation

of absolutism as the constitution of the

silentand speaking creature. It

takes

formin

allegory,whichcorrespondinglymeansthat

the only pleasure the melancholic permits

himself, and it

is

apowerfulone, is allegory.

(1:361 [185]).

B ymaking a show of serving up corpses,

bowlswith

blood and hacked offheads,by

being

resplendent

with

pale corpses, the

bow of this period tenses to the sphereof

transcendence.

Even

seen from death, the

production

o f

corpses may be the meaning

o f

l i f e .

Thus, it becomes clear

that

mere tran

sience is not the last word. Yet Benjamin

certainly

denies the jump into transcendence.

O fcourse, theEpistemo-CriticalPrologueof

The Origin of German Tragic rama opens

confidently,

and it concludes

with

a

view

toward a ponderacion misteriosa, a possi

ble

intervention of God into history (as the

redemption from history^not in history),

but the middle of the book is

f i l l edwith

total

despair. At this point, however, we are not at

a ll

concerned

with

the speculative interpre

tation of Benjamin's philosophy of history,

but

rather

the meaning of his teaching on

allegory with respect to his philosophy of

language.

Benjamin

himself

d id

not establish

the connection between tragic drama and his

philosophy

o f

language. Rather, most

clearly

in

the letter

with which

he offers Scholem a

self-interpretation of the Epsitemo-Critical

Prologue,

he designates tragic drama as an

idea. Here

Benjamin

thematizes the notionof

form. Form

should not be understood as

the opposite of content, but rather as that

which

makes the verbalized text, or, gener

al ly,

the phenomena, legible as idea.

B e n -

jamin

explains the tension between phe

nomenon and idea

with

the help of a meta

phor about

stars

and constellations.

A n d

so

ideas subscribe to the law

which states:

all

essences

exist in complete and immaculate

independence, not only from phenomena,

but, especially, from each other. . . .

Every

idea

is a sun and is related to other ideas just

as

suns

are related to each other

(1:241

[37]).

Thus,

although phenomenon and idea stand

in

a certain correspondence to one another,

their difference is not

discursively

thinkable.

Rather it must be thought as an

origin

manifested in German tragedy, the science

ofthe

origin,

is the

form

which,i nthe remot

est extremes and apparentexcesses of the

process

of

development, reveals the

configu

ration of the ideathe sum total ofa llpossi

ble meaningful juxtapositions of such oppo-

sites (1:227 [47]).

This

meaningful juxtaposition refers,

on

one hand, to the destruction of a

rigid

order, and, on the other, to the production of

a climate of

true

humanity,whichcan only

be thought in the

form

of allegory and under

the

spell

of

melancholy.

Benjamin's philosophy of language is de

veloped from the irreconcilable opposition

between a

linguistic

and spiritual

essence

in

order to

escape

the paradoxofits

inconceiv

able identity. The linguistic and spiritual

essence

can be partly brought intoagree

mentinsofar as the spiritual

essence

is

even communicableonly insofar as the

spiritual essence

is revealed in the way it

articulates

itself

in language. Yet precisely

this way of speaking clearly points to the

question whether the spiritual

essence

com

municates completely,thatis, through lan

guage.

Surprisingly

enough, what

follows

from

thesepresuppositions is the apparently tau

tological conclusion

that

what language

communicates is the linguistic

essence

of

things,

thus

language

itself

[II:

142]. The tau

tologyis dissolved

when we see

that

the

word

lamp, as Benjamin says,

does

not some

how communicate the lamp, butrather the

language-lamp. What is

finally

revealed

here

is

that

every language communicates

T H E

RISISO F

T H E

SU JECT

317


9/14

itself,thati s its immediatespiritualessence.

O ne

can, according to

Benjamin,

name this

magic.Benjamin firstelaborates theexplica

tion

of the magic of language against the

background

of the Romantic philosophy of

language and the story of revelation. What

communicates in language is not only the

thing, but man as w e l l . Yet in contrast to

things, man communicates in words. Man

communicates his spiritual essence in nam

ing a l lother things [II: 143]. In sodoing,man

communicates his

linguistic

essence. But

things l ikethe mountain and the fox

also communicate. To whom do they

com

municate? To man: they communicate be

cause man names them.Thisnaming should

not beconfusedwithan ordered

activity

that

is undertaken to estabUsh.ontic access by

instrumental means. We are concernedwith

the communication of a spiritual essence in

language.

W i t h whom, Benjamin then asks, does

m an

communicate? The answer cannot be

given i nthe

framework

o fcommunicationor

o f

aninformationtheory,

i n

otherwords,with

the help of a sender-information-receiver

schema. Rather, according to

Benjamin,

the

sole authority who can become the ad

dressee outside of the ontic order for

com

munication

o fthespiritual, linguisticessence

o f

man is

G o d .

That may besurprising,but a

closer

discussion of thenatureof language

shows

that

its innermost essence is not the

word,

but rather the name. The language of

the name is the mostoriginal language and

cannot be adulterated, for it is in the name,

rather than in words,that trueknowledge of

m en

and things is established. Adam's nam

in g of things completes God's creation: in

names, the essential law of language ap

pears [11:145].This essential law of

lan

guage means that the essence of language

must not be seen in thecommunicabilityof

the contents ofinformation,but rather can

only

be grasped as a communication of

P H I L O S O P H Y

T O D A Y

communicability per se [II 14546]. The

self-reflexive

character of this relationship,

whichBenjamindoes not botherwithin his

later works, makes it clear

that

we are con

cerned witha metaphysical discussionthat

emphasizes theclarificationof thecondition

o four

speaking.

The concept of

revelation

is

decisivefor this, asBenjaminarticulates in

conjunction

withHamann (who says:

lan

guage, the mother of reason and revelation,

their A and O ) and the Romantics [11:146].

H edoes not concedethat thereare thingsthat

are unpronounced or unpronouncable. The

more spiritual this unpronounced thing, the

more

linguistic

it

w i l l

be, for, after all, its

validity in terms of its spiritual essence is

completelyknown not in the word but in the

name. Clearly,Benjaminjustifies this con

ceptionof language as magic, as immediate

knowledgeof existing things in the name,

from

the Biblenot, however, by under

standing it as the codex of a determined

religion, but rather as a document of the

conviction

that language is the last . . .

inexplicableand mystic reality [11:147].

A c t u a l l y every

attempt

to constructively

thematize human reality and the knowledge

o fhuman reality leads,

into

a

form

ofself-re-

f l e x i v i t y

th cannot be gis^sp^analytically

and can, therefore, be rightlycalledmagical

ormythical.

It

is

however, important to keep

i n mind thatthis magic^ets its elucidating

power not

from

determined content, but

rather only from the determination of its

form.

This

formal determination isindiffer

ent to its materialindifferent just as the

originalact of creation (and the creative act

o fthe artist

whoimperfectlycopies

it) is

indifferentwithrespect to its material.B e n -

jamin

gives a significant example of this

indifference

when he, explicating thedeter

minationof

formi n

reference to theallegori

ca l formof tragic drama, remarksthatin the

extreme case the matter of tragic drama can

be happy without damaging the character of

3 8


10/14

tragic drama. This questionable indifference

doesnot mean

that there

is no relation be

tween name and creationon the contrary,

there

reigns between them a magical non-

sensuouscorrespondence thatenables man

to know things. This non-sensuous corre

spondence is founded in God's leaving the

language of creation to humans as the

lan

guageofthe name

[II:

149].However,human

language, not only the language of the word

but also the language of the name, can never

reach the

level

of

God's

language: it remains

a reflection of [God's creative] word in

names. Yet it is also

true

forBenjamin

that

the name of a man

guarantees

his community

with

the creative word,

which,

in turn, guar

antees a simultaneity of reception and

spontaneity [11:150].

Lyotard

Jean-FrangoisLyotard, likewise,develops

his critique of the

philosophical

tradition on

the basis of a philosophy of language. In

itially his thought aims at the

great

narra

tives of the Enlightenment, Idealism, and

M a r x i s m .

This is especially

true

in

he

Post-

modern Condition.

The intentions

that

un

derliethesenarratives, whichare to free hu

manity

frompolitical

repression, uncertainty

and poverty, have over and over again led to

more terror

in

practice.

L i k e

Habermas,

L y o -

tard also thinks it is not advisable to again

bringinto play someprincipleor overarching

ordering system. We

would

do

better

to see

and accept

that

our

world

is heterogenous.

That is, we should not try, l ike traditional,

theoretical philosophical systems of which

Hegel's dialectic is paradigmatic, to do away

with

contradictions and to destroy heteroge

neity with

homogeneity. In his

subsequent

major work.

he

Differend Lyotardsubjects

this historical-practical option to a

philo

sophicalline of argrumentation. He thinks he

canassert that

language,

which,

according to

popular

opinion,

is the medium whose regu

larity

reflects

that

of reality, is

itself

to the

highest

degree

heterogenous.Lyotard distin

guishes between differing

genres

of dis

course

l ike

the

philosophical,

the scientific,

and the

juridical,

and different

phrase

regi

mens l ike questioning, commanding, de

scribing,

and so forth. Of course Lyotard

thinks

that

we must always react

in

some way

to

thatwhich

another says and does, but

that

doesnot determine whether we do so in the

way

initiated

by our partner.

For

example, we

can react to a command

with

irony or also

with

a discourse about hierarchies. In other

words, language

itself

does not contain a

metadiscourse

that

governs in a comprehen

sive

way all other discourses;

rather lan

guage itself

is heterogenous through and

through. For Lyotard, this has the conse

quence

that

all comprehensive ideas,

l ike

human rights, education, and emancipation,

cannot be legitimized

philosophically.

This

doesnot mean, however, as is occasionally

implied

of him,

that

such ideas would be

worthless or should not be practiced.

Lyotard

only

cautions against their being held as

uni

versally

va l id

and rationally justifiable,

which wouldlead to the suppression of alter

native ideas and ways of legitimation

that

cannot be so

justified.

III The

Self

If we want to bring together the above

considerations

with

the

following

discussion

of

the self, then we must

stress thatreflection

and speaking have revealed an analogous

structure insofar as they can be understood

in

reference to something

which itself

cannot

be understood

linguistically

or in

terms

of

reflection.Thus in Le ibn iz the instinct for

reason designates

thatwhichis

inaccordance

withreasonas

instinctwithout being it

self

reasonable. In

Lyotard,

the different

ways in

which

we are able to know refer to

something

which

cannot be depicted, or the

sublime,which

cannot be caught up

with

and

which,

of course,

does

not serve our

T H E C R I S I S OFT H E S U B J E C T

319


11/14

different ways of knowing as a goal, but,

so to

speak,

as a guide. In Benjamin, the

notion of the form or reality-content of the

world

understood as linguistically consti

tuted goes back to the Baroque idea

that

precisely the undeniable disaster gives the

hint that everything is related to salvation.

(Shakespeare: Readiness is all. ) And in

Lytoard's philosophy of language theques

tion arrive-t-iW

alsostandsin thecentero f

an expectant readiness: all discursive

speak

ingis related to a phrase which cannot be

verbalized,

something

that

cannot be de

picted. If we

l imit

ourselves in this context to

the

self

as something constituted through

reflection

and language

(thus

if we do not

want to discover the

self

byway of the

theme

ofthe body), then we can isolate an element

common to

these

sometimes very different

perspectives. I would like to illustrate this

moment using the work of Manfred Frank

and the problem of

self-reflection

as a back

ground.

Against

the background

of

neo-structural-

ism,

as

wel l

as in reference to the

attempt

of

German

idealism and hermeneutics

(espe

cially

Fichte and Schleiermacher) to

estab

l isha ground for the self, Frank has given a

detailed analysis of the

topos

of the

in su f f i -

cient subject from different perspectives.

(Frank, 1977, 1983, 1986). To the heirs of

Saussure, who advocate the heteronomy of

the subject and whoattributetostructureall

power and the capability of self-reflection,

Frank

responds

by

claimingthat

they give in

to an anthropormorphizing of structure. One

isonly shifting the problem, so says Frank,

when one denies human beings self-reflec

tion

and then

addresses

structure, or

grants

being.

But more important is recognizing

that

the problem of self-reflection has no

philosophicallysufficientsolution if one de

fines it as the ability to simultaneouly think

something (the subject) as the object and as

the subject of

thinking.

Aga inand again this

PHILOSOPHY T O D Y

unavoidably leads into a logical circlethat

does

not offer the possiblity of establishing

anything or only offers an endless repetition

of

the

steps that

would lead to the

estab

lishment of something.

Frank

sketches

the path of the develop

mentofself-reflection

from

Kant to Heideg

ger and Derrida. Kant's I think ( that

which must be able to accompany ) marks

the beginning of the history of a confusion

immanent in the concept of self-reflection

itself. The self-reflexivityof the I think,

whichKant took fromLe ibn iz ,is expressed

in the doubling of perception in general

and self-preception (thinkingthatis

itself

aware of

itself)

(Frank, 1986, p. 28). Fichte

then saw, according to Frank,

thatKant

could

never reach a val id explanation of self-re

flection

with this doubling. If, in order to

attain consciousness of myself, I must pre

supposethatI must make my own conscious

ness

the object of a new consciousness, then

I

wi l l

never reach the end of such a process.

Fichte does away with separation without

further ado:

there

is a consciousness in

whichthe subjective and objective cannot at

allbeseparated,butratherare absolutely one

and the same. Such a consciousness therefore

wouldbe what we need in order to explain

consciousness in general.

(Werke,

1, p. 527;

quoted by Frank, 1986, p. 33) Butbecausehe

thinks it necessary to put an eye into the

active I of active

deeds,

Fichte also

does

not

escape

from endless repetition. A solution,

whichhelps out of the perplexity of the dou

ling firstemergeswith Schleiermacher.

Schleiermacher speaksof an immediate

self-consciousness or

feeling

in his

D i a -

lectic. According

to Frank, immediate

means

here

that the relata, which are re

flected upon, and the relata, which perform

the r ef lec tion, no longer

f a l l

apart

(Schleiermacher,

Dialektic

286-87, quoted

byFrank, 1977, pp. 93-94). Schleiermacher

turns this analysis into something positive

32


12/14

when

he lays the basisf o rwhat Frank under

stands

as the solution of the problem: self-

consciousness should not be understood in

terms of non-identity between thinker and

thought, but rather as being-familiar-with-

oneself'(Frank, 1986, pp.62-63).W i t hsuch

familiaritya pre-reflexive, conscious self-

experience is addressed that depicts an

unanalyzable ground of thatself-experi

ence. Iwishto further this approach, adding

to itthatthis being-familiar-with-oneself'

needsto include a pre-linguistic, but con

scious

experience of being-familiar-with-

others.

O nl y

this combination sufficiently ex

plains

how, accordingtoSchelling,(andwith

this phrase I quote the title of another book

by ManfredFrank), an

infinite

lack of be

i n g can be ascertained in consciousness,

while

we also understand others and can act

communally(at leastinregard to theiractivi-

ties).

This lack legitimizes speaking about

the crisis of the subject.

On

the one hand, the

self

is determined

through the consciousness of thelack,of the

inabilitytocomplywiththe demand for self-

grounding,whichat the same time produces

a

real content. On the other hand, the self

establishes itsabilityto transcend the borders

of individuality. The general individual,

which,according to Schleiermacher's thor

oughly

paradoxical formulation, combines

the singularityo fthe general and the

univer

salityof theindividualas theindivisiblemo

ments of aunifiedwhole (Frank, 1977, pp.

156-57), constructsin an intersubjective

perspectivethe analogy of arift whichdi

vides

theself reflexivelyandlinguistically.

The rift and the consciousness of thisriftare

equally conditionedby the

form

ofsocializa

tionthatcan be concretized as the paradox o f

modernization

(v, d. L o o / v . Reijen, 1990).

We simultaneously see ourselves confronted

withtheformationo fparasiticallyproliferat

in g organizations and a growing number of

minute activites. On the one hand, rationali

zationcompels the generalization ofcriteria,

and on the other, demands

pluralizing. Indi

viduals see themselves as more than ever

thrownback on themselves, yet we are more

and more becoming objects of guardianship:

we establish more than ever beforethatwe

controlnatureand

social

conditions, yet we

are everincreasinglylosingcontrol over our

activities.

Walter Benjamin expressed these par-

doxes, which perhaps we only now have

massively

before our eyes, in the

formula

of

the mythologization of our consciousness.

Capitalismtherefore

represents

for him the

consequence of antique mythology. The

whole of Benjamin's

striving

is aimed at

rupturingthis

mythicalspell,

and at

waking

up

from

the dreamo fthe nineteenth-century

(see N . B o l z A V . v.Reijen,1991).

In

fact it can be assertedwithgood reason

that,since itsorigin, bourgeois society has

held

its members under the spellof a para

doxical

constellation.

On the one hand, indi -

vidualsfeelthatsocialrelationships are un

just and unchangable; on the other, they see

that bourgeois culture offers them instru-

ments to bring about apositiveUtopia or at

least to improve their livingconditions.L i t -

erature gives us many examples, Anton

Reiser, the young Werther,

Niels

Lyhne.

They

articulate

thatstate

which

one can de

scribe

as melancholic.This teachesusthat

the Baroque, no less than the Postmodern,

shouldnot be confusedwith

pessimism,

res

ignation,ornostalgia.Insofar as it takes into

account the antagonistic constellation of so

cial conditions, it forms the foundation for

the insightthatthe f in a lgoal of ourthinking

and acting cannot be rationally grounded

withouthavingthatmean, in turn,thatwe

shouldnot practice such thought and action.

T H E CRISIS OF T H E S U J E C T

321


13/14

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ENDNOTES

1. See, among others: Habermas,

Die

Neue Unbersicht

lichkeit

and Der

Philosophische Diskurs

der

Moderne ,

Lyotard, The Differend , Manfred

Frank,

What is Neo

Structuralism?

(1990);

and van Reijen,

Verstndingung

berdie

Grenzen

der Verstnd igung and Verstnd igung-

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

sprozesse, both published in Sozialwissenschaft-Liter-

arische-Rundschau.

2.Mirror

and Trompel'oeir'-effectsplayedanimportant role

inthe

Baroque.Justthink

ofthehallofmirrorsinthe

castle

of

Versailles

and of

the fountains

in

the

park

with theirlarge


14/14

and

lavishly fashioned figures, which are reflected in the

water.

T he

central meanings of

mirrors

and the phenome

non ofmirroringinourculture,andespecially inBaroque

culture,is excellently portrayed inHartNibbrig's study

(1987).We

will

see that the phenomenon of

mirroring

also

played an

important

role

inLeibniz's

discussion of reflec

tion.Also in postmodern art, which thematizes what has

become the precarious

relation

between

reality

andfiction,

mirroringis a

medium

of experience.

3. In the following I amreferringtoKaulbach

(1976),

whose

continuation of reflection philosophy withFichte,the

Ro -

mantics and hermeneutics can here only point to the ex

hausting analyses of

Manfred Franck,

which are cited in

the

bibliography.Duringa

conference

inBarcelona,Alain

Renaut called

myattentionto thefact thatmy

interpretation

of

Leibnizshowed a certainparallelto that of Deleuze in

Le Pli

4. The self is determined through unknowable, uns way able

forces in reference to therationaldeterminacy of

man

as

suspected by Nietzsche and Heidegger, the masters of

suspicion.

5. Die Aufklarung das Erhaben e Philosophie Aesthetic.

Gesp rch mit W.v.

Riejen

und D .

Verrman. (Lyotard,1988)

6. The reference here is to Walter Benjamin, Gesammlte

Schriften. UnterMitwirkungvonTheodorW.Adomo und

GerschomScholem, herausgegeben vonRolfTiedemann

and

Hermann

S c h w e p p e n h u s e r

I, I, Abhandlungen,

Frankfurt a .M.

1974.

Pages204-430

comprise the

Ur-

sprung desdeutschen Trauerspiels which has been trans

lated

by

JohnOsboume

and

introduced

by

George Steiner.

I

cite this translation,

but

willalso include theoriginalpage

references in brackets. The author also refers to, but

does

not cite, latersectionsoftheGesammlteSchriftenthat are

not yet translated. These references willalso apprear in

brackets.Trans.

UniversityofUtreclit

TheNetherlands NL

3707

T H ECRISIS

OF TH E SUBJECT

van reijen, willem - the crisis of the subject. from baroque to postmodern

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