[valery v. tsepkalo] the remaking of eurasia

8/10/2019 [Valery V. Tsepkalo] The Remaking of Eurasia

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The Remaking of Eurasia

V sepkalo

FILLING T H E POST SOVIET VACUUM

R U S S I A S

P O S T - S O V I E T orientation toward Eu rope and the W est is

in serious trouble. W estern leaders decision to expand NATO eastward

w itho ut taking Moscow s objections into account has sidelined Russia

on matters that affect its strategic interests. Fellow former Soviet

republics seeking Western investment and sponsorship have spoken

out against Russia in international forums; within the country, some

groups even feel they mustle vethe Russian Federation to gain W estern

favor. Since nobody wants powerful neighbors, even when they are not

hostile, the W estern powers have been the natural lliesof all who w ould

break with Moscow. The West does not want to see any structure in

Eurasia that perm its Russian hegemony.

Bu t abetting the co ntinu ing destabilization of Eurasia is no t in th e

W est s interests, NATO enlargement has no t consolidated anti-W estern

forces in the region, as some Western experts had feared, but it has

encouraged th e division of Eurasia and the shattering o fth e Russian

Federation . The re will likely be farther attem pts at secession, although

not necessarily according to the bloody mode l of Ch echn ya. C entra l

Asia and the C aucasus are rife wi th flash poin ts that could ignite several

nations and draw in outside powers. A nd w ith regional destabilization

and the slackening of central control, the nuclear threat is perhaps

greater now than during the Cold War.

If curren t trends continue, Russia s clout in Eurasia will further

dv^dndle and that ofWestern powers and Western-dominated inter-

national organizations will grow. The United States, however, will be

VALERY

V.

T S E P K A L O

is Belarus Ambassador to the United States.


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Pa eryV

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unable to maintain control of the process. W estern allies like G ermany,

Japan, and Turkey will adopt in dep end ent policies in the region. T h e

jockeying ofWestern interests will exacerbate tensions between

and

w ithin countries. A nd the We st will confront the increasing power of

Chin a and, to a lesser extent, Iran, which will make extending W estern

influence beyond the Urals impossible. Eurasia will rapidly becomea

less predictable and more dangerous place.

There

is an

alternative. T h e U nite d States could begin supp orting

integration in the territory of the former Soviet U nio n rather than the

forces that divide

the

region. T hi s would limit C hinese and Iranian

maneuvering, introduce economic andstrategic equilibrium,and

improve America's relations with Russia.At the same time, Russia,

along v\dth the smaller countries of central and eastern Eurasia, must

workto develop values capableofuniting disparate elements within

statesanddrawingthebroader region together intoa more stable

system.A tour d'horizonofEurasia provides ab un dan t evidenceof

the costs ofthe current course of disintegration and drift.

BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO

T H E S O V IE T U N I O N became vulnerabletointernal fragme ntation

and external manipulation less because

of

its econom ic troubles

than becauseitwasa troubled society. After thesacrifices Soviet

workers madein theearly yearsofcom m unism , several gener a-

tionsofSoviet leaders wielded pow er and reaped th e benefits w ith

a cynical disregardforthe co m m un ist project. People lost faithin

the collectivist idealandRussia's historic pa th, andcomm unism

became loathsom e

in

the eyes of many. T h e ruling hierarchy w eak -

ened, and Moscow's partners

in

the Warsaw Pact and the Co uncil

of M utu al Ec ono m ic Assistance turne d away. In th e end the Russians

dismantled their own empire with barely

a

sho t fired. N ow Russia

is sick w ith self-dou bt and has bec om eaninternat ion al loner . N or

do Russia's current democracy and W ester n-s tyle consum erism ,

divorced from the Pro testa nt ethic that sustains theminthe W est ,

con stitute a value system tha t can unify and insp ire. T h e prob lem

isnot th at Soviet values have been jettiso ne d but that thereis


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The Rem aking of Eurasia

Russia actively contributed to the fragmentation of Eurasia. Its

secession from the Soviet U nio n for so its role in th e 1991 treaty

creating the Co m m onw ealth of Ind epen den t S tates can be regarded

resulted not only in the breakup ofthe U.S.S.R. but in enduring

disputes between neighbors. Many felt that Russia had abandoned

the union and was unm oved by the p light of fellow Russians left outside

the borders of the Russian Federation. Moreover, Moscow arbitrarily

began to refuse support to established allies, including both political

forces in the former Soviet republics and whole foreign countries, that

did no t mee t the new standards it had set for itself M oscow s verbal

attacks on neighboring peoples, its attem pts to teach everyone else how

to pursue political and economic reform, and its deprecatory attitude

toward other cis leaders combined to sour relations between what not

long ago had been parts ofthe same country.

Ofthe former republics, Ukraine and Belarus have the strongest

cultural affinities and some ofthe closest historical ties with Russia,

but that has hardly forestalled disputes between them since the

dissolution o fth e union. In fact, Russia s bitterest conflict with a former

republic is with Ukraine over the naval base at Sevastopol and the

Black Sea fleet, w hich has driven a political and psychological wedge

betw een Russians and U krainia ns. T h e strategic significance o ft h e

fleet cann ot compare with the dam age the runn ing dispute has done

to relations between the two states and peoples. W h e n Russia lost

Ukraine, it should have thought not about breaking off relations but

about learning to coexist and finding ways of building a strategic

partne rship. B oth th e fleet and Sevastopol could, under certain circum-

stances, serve to bring the two countries together rather than divide

them if national interests were less narrowly conceived.

Russia, as the on ly possible core of integ ratio n, behaves as if it does

not need integration very muchor at all. It competes childishly

w ith o ther repub hcs in signing bilateral political and econom ic agree-

ments, boasting that it signed, say, an agreement with NATO or the

International M onetary Fund before U kraine or Uzbekistan. M oscow

changes tariffs and regulations without the necessary coordination

with other Cu stoms U nion Treaty mem bers. Russia even som etimes

deprecates those countries and peoples tha t gravitate m ost toward it,


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Vakry V sepkalo

CIS,foritspart, does little beyond br inging leaders from 2of the former

republics together to talk. Of the more than 700 agreements reached

mthin the cis framework, none seems to work.

Within its own borders, in the separatist republic of Chechnya,

Russia has also followed a foolishly destabiliz ing course, justified by its

purportedly democratic standards. In 1993 the Kremlin dropped its

supp ort for a long -tim e ally, D oku Zavgayev, the former leader of the

Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet, Zavgayev was not, admittedly, a

dem ocrat, since he unde rstood only too well the chao tic consequences

for Chechnya of Moscow-style dem ocratization, bu t he was no dictator

either. Instead, Moscow backed General Dzhokhar Dudayev in his

struggle for power. Thi s led to R ussia s inept invasion in Decem ber

1994,more than a year of fighting, and a series of shaky peace agree-

m ents, all of which have und erm ined the R ussian Federation.

As Russia broke up the Soviet Union, it soured its relations with

the union s former republics and stopped treating m any no n-R ussia n

peoples in its territory with dignity. Thus the central government

incessantly duels w ith Tatarstan over tax revenues, Ing ush etia and the

Primorsky (Far Eastern) regions have demanded greater autonomy.

North Caucasia, the Volga Basin, and the Siberian republics speak of

secession, Tatarstan wa nts to sell oil inde pen den tly on w orld markets

and is building, with G erm an help, its own tanker fleet. Ta lk of a Rus

Republic that would include only predominantly ethnic Russian

areas is fashionable. The Russian parliament held two hearings last

year at wh ich self-determination for ethnic Russian and Muslim Turkic

populations was discussed, raising the possibility of the secession of

ethnic Russian areas from the Russian Federation, a process that

wo uld break up Russia itself in the same m ann er as the Soviet Un ion .

T h e very m entio n of such a scenario proves tha t the Russian elite has

forgotten how to coexist with other peoples and ethnic groups.

THE POWER NEXT DOOR

R U S S I A N W E A K N E S S has already allowed some newly independent

states to slip into the zone of Chinese influence. Kazakstan and

Kyrgyzstan, larger geographically than three Germanys and two


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Remaking of urasia

and partly nomadic people, worry about China s burgeoning power

and population

to the

east. President N ursulta n N azarbayev

has

moved Kazakstan s capital away from the Ch inese border, from Almaty

to

the

north -cen tral city of Akm ola.

A ltho ug h they fret about China s regional am bitions, Kazakstan an d

Kyrgyzstan look

to the

People s Republic

as an

economic role m odel.

Chinahas notonly avoided a Soviet-style collapse but hasfound its

own path

to

modernization.

The

return

of

H on g Kong last year will

add

to

China s economic m ight.

In

several Central Asian repuhlics,

China s growing strength could mean a return to power of com m unist

parties,

but

ones who se econom ic ideas

are

closer

to

China s than

the

Soviet Un ion s

or

P n c d - i I ri ccr^xM t^^

prese nt-da y Russia s.

Economics anddemographics may well re la t i o n s w i t h the old

determine developments

in the

region. S o v i e t r e p u b l i c s .

Russia s Far East and Siberia are dying. O nly

24 million people live

in the two

regions,

which comprise 60 percent of the territory of the Russian Federation,

and

the

pop ulation

is

falling.

The

region s huge enterprises, symbols

of hygone industrial power, are no longer com petitive, anditis too late

for them

to

mo dernize. Poor transportation and comm unications and

high energy prices

and

railroad tariffs help make

for a

considerably

worse economic situation than elsewhere

in

Russia. Across the border

in rapidly developing China, demographic pressures and the strain

on

resources

are

astounding and will only increase. Chinas current pop-

ula tion is 1.26 billion,

and the

annual num ber of births

is

triple tha t of

Europe andRussia com bined. In recent years, China, 80percent of

whose pow er comes from coal, has developed a serious energy shortage.

Coincidentally,80percent ofthe w orld s known coal deposits are in

Russia s Siberia

and Far

East. Siberia also

has

enormous manganese

and iron ore deposits and vast forests. All these resources are virtually

useless

to

Russia at present because people are needed

to

exploit them

and people areinsho rt supplyinSiberia. But inC hin a they arenot

Tra dition al W estern analyses of the Soviet U nio n assumed Ch inese

economic weakness

and the

W est s m aintenance

of

its competitive

edge,in

spite of China s dem ograph ic advantage. B ut with the collapse


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prevents China from gaining economic

and

political d om inance

in

Eurasia, including

the Far

East.

T H E

ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE

C H I N A ' S R I S E

will throw its traditional rivalry with Japan into sharp

focus.

The

global standing

and

influence Japan has worked

so

hard

to

achieve could slip away all too quickly if not safeguarded. Since Japan is

militarily weak,

to

counter Chinese power

it

will have

to

strengthen

its

armed forces dramatically and risk implementing

a

more independent

and assertive foreign policy in the F ar East. T h e former is already und er

way.

According to the Inte rnational Institute of Strategic Studies, Japan

increased

its

defense hudg et from 29 billion

in

1985

to

50 billion

in

1995,

lifting

it to

third

in the

world

in

military spending.

The

unpre-

dictable consequences of the buildup

and a

newly tou gh foreign policy

could lead

to

confrontation with China and others.

If Russia's

Far

Ea stern regions gain more autonom y, Japa n will

have

a

real oppo rtunity

to

regain four

of

the Kuril Islands (annexed

by

the

Soviet Union after World

War

II), dominate

the

economy

of

neighboring Sakhalin Island, and operate more freely in the Far Eastern

seas.

If

that happened ,

the Sea of

Okhotsk would cease

to be an

internal Russian

sea

thus losing

its

strategic significance,

and all

difficulties with Japanese fishing rights would

be

resolved within

a

200-m iIe-wide zon e. Jap an w ill likely be able

to

expand

its

territory

considerably

in

return

for

promises

of

investment

in

Russia.

The

Kuril governor has already declared that the islands are ready to hold

a referendum

on

annexation to Japan. Such territorial growth, along

with

an

econom ically and militarily ascenda nt C hin a, is likely to urge

Japan

to

become

a

strong, indep end ent player

in the

region.

The United States will gradually lose influence

in the

Pacific if it

permits a Japanese

or

Chine se bu ildup

in

the political vacuum of the

Russian

Far

East. W ashingto n could return

to

splendid isolation

or

more likely, main tain its influence

in the

region by keep ing its forces

in Asia

for

some time, steering

an at

least ostensibly neutral course

between Ch ina and Japan. Alternatively,

it

could strengthen Russian

and Indian influence

to

keep Japan

and

especially China from

be-


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h Remaking of urasia

Bu t Russia wo uld require mu ch stre ng then ing . Its 13,000 milesof

border aredifficult to secure, particularly in the frozen Far East.

Condit ionsin Russia's once-mighty military are,asPrime M inis ter

Viktor Chernomyrdinput it outrageous. Soldiers andsailorsin

some regionsareliterally starving, corru ption isrife,60percentof

equ ipm ent is no t battle-ready, and discipline and morale are extremely

low.The Soviet Union wasfar more economically developed than

China ,butRussia has lost much g rou nd recently and is by no m eans

as dynamic; raw materials now accountfor90 perc ent of its exports.

It ranks far behind Japan, even with the current recession there.

M eanw hile, C hin a continues w ith its wise econom ic reforms, so m e-

times m aking use of Soviet advances th at go unexploited

in

the Russia

of today. Spiritually, Russiais inno way capable of com peting w ith

China and Japan, which have preserved traditional systems ofreli-

giousandcultural values.

GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE

T H E A B S E N C E

ofintegration will alsobefelt further to thewest.As

the culturalandeconomic leaderofan integrating Eu rop e, reunified

G erm any will dem and a more active role in European and world aflairs.

But since the burdenof

its

history willnotallowit to beassertivefor

some time yet, it will proceed throu gh the instrum ents of interna tional

law and its own careful bran d of diplomacy.

Germany has assiduously builton its already good relationships

with Eastern European countries

and the

former Soviet republics

w itho ut setting any political, hum anitarian,orother conditions.Ger-

man trade with

and

investment

in the

Czech Republic, Slovakia,

Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Belarus are comparable to

those countries' total combined trade and investment w ith other Eu ro -

pean countries and the U nited States. Britain and, to a lesser extent, the

U nited States have made determ ined effortstoincrease their trade and

influence in Eastern EuropePoland in particularto counter

German dominanceinthe region.

The three new

NATO

member-designates, especially the Czech

Republic and Hungaiy, gravitate toward and will

e

clients of G erm any


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comfortable position

of

expressing sym pathy

for

Russia

and pre-

tending they were

not

privy

to the

U .S. decision

to

enlarge

NATO

while watching

the

huge A m erican effort b road en

the

G e rm a n

sphere

of

influence

and

b r ing

the

U nited States noth ing

but

bills.

Ge rmany

is

likely

to

project

its

policy

in the

east

in the

medium

term , probably by using

the

European Union

(EU)

and

the W estern

European Union

in

specific regional conflicts.

THE TURKISH OPTION

T H E T U R K I S H factor

is

as signiflcant in the south as the G erm an fac-

tor

is

in E urop e. I n past centuries, Turkey, as the center of the O tto m an

Em pire, dom inated the Balkans and southeastern E urop e, the M idd le

East,

and

North Africa and was also

a

power

inthe

Caucasus.

Now

because of its relative economic success,

it

is

in a

position

to

extend

its

influence

to

the areas of Cen tral Asia and the Volga basin m ainly po p-

ulated

by

Turkic peoples, including

the

former Soviet republics

of

Azerbaijan, K azakstan, Uzbekistan,

and

K yrgyzstan,

as

well

as

Tatarstan

and

Bashkiria, part of the Russian Federation.

Its

potential

should no t be overestimated, how ever. Turkey s military capabilities are

limited, although

its

mem bership

in

NATO

adds some political weight

in

the

Black

Sea

basin

andthe

Caucasus. Problems with

the

K urds,

Greece,

and

Cyprus will continue

to

divert Ankara s a tten tion from

its ambitious plans

forthe

south ern flank

of

the former U.S.S.R .

It

remains to be seen what effect the E uropean Un ion s recent rejection of

Turkey s

bid for

mem bership will have.

Turkey is capable of playing

an

indep enden t role

inthe

Caucasus

and Central Asia,

but it

must offer

a

clear alternative

to the

W est.

Eurasia s M uslim Turkic peoples, som ewhat disappointed in W estern

values,

are

turning

tothe

traditional values

of

I s lam. Chechnya,

for

example, has introdu ced Islam ic courts and public executions, and

all

of Central Asia

is

seeing rapid growth

in the

membership

and

influence

ofthe

Wahhabis ,

a

M uslim sect. Turkey s

new

m ission

would demand

its

liberation from

the

W estern political, social,

and

cultural values of many of its elite

and

reanimation

of

the idea of the

pan-Turkic state.

The

1996 election of Islamist Welfare Party leader


9/21


/I?

^

away from the West,

a

geopolitical shift th at continu es even th ou gh

the arm y forced Erb aka n to step down last

year

Erb aka n has called for

the c reation of an Islamic

NATO

and United N ations, the introduction

of an Islamic dinar, and the liberation ofAzerbaijan, Ch echn ya,

and Bosnia. Turkey

is

likely

to

remain partially secular, however,

and will rema in more attractive than fundam entalist Iran

to

the less

observant non-Shiite Muslim peoples of the former Soviet Union.

In Central Asia, Turkey has forged strong economic andcultural

bonds.Ithas provided $80 millioninhum anitarianaidand openeda

credit line of some $700 million to countries of the region. It

is

involved

in 100 joint ventures inK azakstan and 22 in K)^gyzstan inenergy,

construction, mining, and sea cargo shipping. Turkey has also opened

cultural centers and T urkic schools

in

practically all the Cen tral Asian

states.

W h e n the Soviet collapse left a power vacuum in the Cau casus,

once in Turkey's sphere of influence, the governm ent in Ankara began

moving in; for instance,

it

invited former Ch ech en President D udayev

to visitinOctober 1993, and then invited himfor a second visit over

strong Russian protests.

HARD AND SOFT INTEGRATION

E I T H E R THE disintegrationinRussia will continueor anew system

of values will em ergetounite the nations of Eurasia.IfRussia m an -

ages

to

develop

a

new national idea capable of bringing together

its

people and urging

it to

leadership, and again displays

an

inclination

for integrating Eurasia, there

are

two possible scenarios: hard and

soft integ ration .

If the West does not support integration, Russia will implement

a

hard-line policy of land collection on its southern and western

flanks. It will also adopt

a

confrontational attitude toward W estern

nations and probably Ch ina; M oscow will again begin supp orting any

state that opposes U.S. interests.

It

will likely start with Muslim

nation s like Iran, Iraq, and Libya and groups like the Palestine Lib er-

ation O rganization, H am as, and the M uslim B rotherhood, as wellas

Cu ba and N or th Korea. T h e weakness of Russia's conventional forces

will probab ly lead it to rely on veiled th reats of nuclear blackm ail, using


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M oscow b ack into the neg otiation processinthe Mid dle East and on

the Korean peninsula, marking its returntoserious international po li-

cymaking. It wou ld also mob ilize and un ite Islamic elements

in

Russia

and the cis, cutting the ground out from under Muslim separatists by

casting Russia as

the

ally and friend of Islam .

At

one stroke,

it

would

counter both the W est and C hina, which is dealing w ith M uslim unrest

of its own in Xinjiang province and elsewhere.

Outside Russia, where there

is

still popular support

for the

t radi-

tional Russian andSoviet sta te, theidea ofreintegration hass trong

appeal. Fierce political rivalry

in a

n u m b e r

of

the form er Soviet

republics has pushed opposition forces and clans toward alliances with

Russia.Apolicy of hard integration bythe Kremlin could allow it to

regain some controlinseveral troubled states.

T h e o ther form Eurasian integration could take is thatofagradual

m ovem ent toward un ion, as in the

EU .

Th e cis , headed by a practically

powerless executive secretariat, cann ot be called an operating structure

for integration.The customs unionconsisting of Russia, Belarus,

Kazakstan,

and

Kyrgyzstanfunctions,

at

best,

as a

free trade zone.

T h e A pril 1997 Treaty on the U nion of BelarusandRussia, however,

is a step in the d irection of real integ ration . T h e agreem ent s soft brand

of integration has

a

tremendous political advantage over

a

more rigid

formula

for

unification with

or

entry into

the

Russian Fede ration;

Belarusan sovereignty is not diminished, and Russia is not laden with

economic burdens

it

can no t afford

to

bear.

Such integration couldbepalatable tobo th theU n i ted S tates

and E uro pe , wh ich could provide moral supp ort and expert assistance

in setting up efficient stru ctu res of in ters ta te cooperat ion in the

areas

of

ecology, export control, non proliferatio n, com m un ica-

tions,

and transportation. Th e U nited States did the same forEurope

in

the

a f termath of W orld W ar

II

wi th

the

M arsha l l P lan

and the

creation of the European Econom ic Com munity. Am erica u nde r-

stood the n tha t it was setting up

a

major com petitor, but

it

put inter-

national peace and security before its own am bition s. A nd indeed , th e

policy

has

achieved tha t

and

more .

A

s imilar policy

in

centra l

Eurasia would involve at the outse t U S encouragemen t of a

quick se t t lement

of

conflicts b etw een A rm enia

and

Azerbaijan

in


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Remaking of urasia

the breakaway Abkhaz state in Georgia in Tajikistan and in

other areasofthe former Soviet Un ion .

A S H A R E D D E S T I N Y W I T H U K R A IN E

R E L A T I O N S B E T W E E N

Ukraine and Russia will

not

only determine

the destiny of other newly independent states but will show whether

reintegration in central Eurasia is a serious possibility. Ukraineis

hardly the monolithic entity Westerners believe it to

be.

The Ukrainian

people may havean independent history butthe territory doesnot

having been partitioned and divided up both by others and by

its

own

people changing rulers many times over the centuries. The present-

day capital of Kiev

was

from the ninth through the twelfth centuries

the capitalofKievan Rus the forerunner of the Russian state. Inter-

marriage has madeitimpossibletodraw

a

sharp line between ethnic

Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. There have been no serious conflicts

between the two peoples. Any friction was mainlyofasocial and not

a national character; moreover the twohave often joined inwars

against outsiders. Today Ukrainians differ onwhether they should

build a separate state or work toward union w ith Russia. As one goes

from west

to

east opinion moves from strong support

for

indepen-

dence to cultural identification with and economic inclination toward

Russia. This split national consciousness makes

the

search

for a

national identity rocky.

M oscow must jettison theprimitive Russian nationalism it has

been displaying and reestablish relations with its large neighborto

the west on flrmer ground.The material incentive is powerful.

Russian-Ukrainian trade

and

other economic cooperation could

help stabilizeand revive both economies.Themutual dependence

of the republicsis still high after thebreakupofthe Soviet Union

anditsintegrated economyTheclosingofenterprisesinUkraine

is painful forRussian industryandvice versa. Receivingthesame

amount of Western assistance it is currently getting Ukraine

would requirelo or 5 yearsofdevelopment tobringit up to the

level

of

Portugal

or

Greece. W ithout

the

Russian connection

it

will suffer constant political turmoil especially in the industrial re-

gions

of

the east

and

south.


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BETTER BALANCED BALTICS

R E I N T E G R A T I O N S H O U L D

also taketheBaltic states into account.

The Baltics

are

s trategically important

to

Russia

as the

keys

to its

accessto theG ulf of Finlandand theBaltic Sea from theenclaveof

Kaliningrad. After

5

years under Soviet control, Lithuan ia, Latsaa, and

Estonia want to become mem bers of

NATO.

B ut the W est, realizing their

admission could start

a

new Co ld W ar with Russia, has been reluctant

to make the Baltics too m any promises.

The Baltics have known onlya fewdecades of sovereignty,in the

1920s and 1930s and again

in

the 1990s.

A

large portio n of L ithua nian ,

Latvian,

and

Esto nian society rushed in to politics

in the

1990s w ith

the

aim of

ensuring

the

independence

of

their states.

One of

their

main techniques

was the

exclusion

of

their large Slavic, Russian-

speaking populations from politics. That avenue blocked, ethnic

Russians turned their energies

to

business, until p ractically all en ter -

prises there wereintheir han ds.

Es ton ia and Latvia are the only countries in Europe where

whole ethnic groups

are

denied citizenship

and

c ivil r ights . M ai n -

taining discrimination against the 700 ,000 ethnic Russians in

Latvia and the 300,00 0

in

Eston ia will only increase their econom ic

powerand the political pressure for change, but abolishing dis

criminat ion,

in

combinat ion with

the

financial clou t the y already

possess, will lead

to

rapid politica l gains

for

them . Ethn ic Russ ians

could change

the

foreign policy orientation

of the

Baltic coun-

tr iesthe more

so as

re lations am ong

the

three states

are far

from

ideal. Fromadistance they may appear toagreeon allmajor inter-

national issues,

but

they de tain each oth er s ships

and

quarrel

reg

ularly over min ing on the con tinen tal shelf because of dispu tes over

the demarcation of their international waters and even the common

useof a irspace. Former Latvian Prime Minister Andris Skele said

that Li thuania

did not

have

a

s ingle serious politician wi th w ho m

it was possibletowork.

Therefore the Baltic countries will soon see the emergence of

strong political forces prom oting ra ppro chem ent w ith

the cis

states.

Eventually economic necessity and demands for social justicevnH


13/21


East that will presupposethe political neutralityof the Balticsand

their deep involvementin the economic life of BelarusandRussia.

CENTRAL ASIAN FLASH POINTS

T H E P E R I L S

of

the post-S ovie t vacuum are starkly visible

in

Central

Asia. The region enjoyedalong periodof stability under Soviet rule,

bu t the dem ise of the U .S.S .R. has left an agglomeration of territories

in which the various peoples overriding ethnic attachments makethe

five new countries vulnerable to both internal conflict and meddling by

outsiders. Resu rgent religion has also becom e

divisive force. A tte m pts

by Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan,the United States,andChina

to influence events only upset the balance between clans and increase

the chances of conflict. Conversely, intrastate conflict and ethnic wars

have the potentialtodrag in outside states.

Developmentsin neighboring Afghanistan, tornby acenturyof

civil strife, m ay have particularly powerful reverb erations . So long as

former President Mohammad Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud,

relying mainly on ethnic Tajiks, and G eneral Abd ul R ashid D osta m ,

an Uzbek , held the n orthe rn p art of the country, with Russian bord er

guards protecting

the

frontier w ith Tajikistan

and

neutralizing

the

Tajik opposition,

the

situation

in the

region was unhappy

but

p re -

dictable.Butwhen the militant theology students of the Taliban,

backed by M uslim fundamentalists from Pakistan, overthrew D ostam ,

panic brokeout inbo th C entral Asia and Russia. T h en the Taliban

were driven o ut of the no rth , and everyone calmed down a bit .But

Afghan polit icsis an unpredictable seesaw.Ifthe T aliban findan

ally among the other armed Afghan groups and Russia further re-

ducesitspresenceinthe region, zealous and ba ttle-h ard ene d Ta l-

iban troops could invade Tajikistan or Uzbekis tan . W orse ,the

Ta liban could reach an agreem ent wi th Tajikistan s o pposition Islamic

Renaissance Party. Then Uzbekistan, withits historic Tajik centers

of Bukh ara and Sam arkand, would be

in

danger. If peace agreem ents

for Tajikistan areimplemented and theIslamic Renaissance Pa rty

gains power there,

the

Afg han-T ajik borde r will becom e m ore

porous, since

the

party still has bases

and

allies

in

A fghanistan.

In


14/21

T U R K - UZBEKISTAN

M E N I- >-.

\

Samarkand

Bukhan

J

RUSSIA

Caspian

Chechnya

|

COMMONWEALTH

O F INDE PEND ENT STATES

a direct route from Afghanistan

to

Europe.

It

may well be that silk will

not be the only commodity to travel

along this route.

Beyond the risk in one or more of

the region s countries ofa redistribu-

tion

of

power with foreign armed

support is the danger of ethnic warfare within a country or across a

border. Afghans and Tajiks

are

members

of

the Iranian ethnic

group, while Uzbeks, Turkm ens, and Kazaks are Turkic peoples. To

a large extent, this distinction

was

behind

the

civil wars

in

Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and

it

could be

a

problem

in

Uzbek-

istan. Iran or Turkey could well become involved. Violent conflicts

repossible between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks indeed, theyh vealready


15/21

h

Rem aking of Eurasia

deve loped in Uzbek istan s Fergana Valley,

where radical Islamist sentiment is

strong as well as between various M uslim

movements, orders, and sects.

In Kazakstan, half the population is non-

Kazak, mainly ethnic Russian, especially in

the northern and eastern regions adjacent to

the Russian Federation, and there has been

talk of secession and of union with Russia.

Moreover, any of the country s three largest

riv lclans or one of the political associations o r

coalitions, such sthe Com mu nist Party or the

Republican Strike Committee, could chal-

lenge Kazak President N ursultan Nazarbayev,

who is not as securely in power as he seems,

and initiate large-scale unrest. Supporters of

communist China inside Kazakstan among

the millions of members of the Uigur and

Kazak clans further complicate matters.

The political fate of Kyrgyzstan is tied to

tha t of ethnically and culturally close Kazakstan, which dwarfs its n eigh-

bor in size, population, and resources. Kyrgyzstan s central governm ent

may lose control of the m ountainous T ien Shan region in the south to

the powerful clans there. T he weakness of the armed forces unde r Pres-

iden t Askar Akayev as well as accusations of corruption and nepotism

at the highest levels have led to threa ts of intervention by bo th Islamist

populists and the leftist supporters ofa restoration of the Soviet order.

Kyrgyzstan may not escape a variant of the scenario in Tajikistan.

Despite the December 1996 peace agreement in its civil war,

Tajikistan could still see a complex, endless armed struggle similar

to that in Afghanistan. If the Taliban seize and consolidate power

in northern Afghanistan, the victory of the Islamic Renaissance

Party will become Hkely in Tajikistan, which could encourage the

republic s disin teg ratio n. Clas hes are likely to extend to adjacent

regions of Uzbekistan with substantial Tajik populat ions as well

as to some parts of the Fergana Valley. On the other hand, im-


16/21

Valery

V

sepkalo | ^

the radical Tajik Muslim opposition from

its

wartime base

in

Afgh anistan canno t be ruled out. T h us C entr al Asia may see

its

flrst

Islamic republic.

Currently Uzbekistan seems stable, but the stability is illusory.

President Islam Karimov

s

boosted somew hat

by

his country's ind us-

trial potential,

oil

gold,

and

uranium.

But

while

the

authorities

are

keeping

the lid on

conflict

for

now, intrigues

are

brewing. Instability

in Tajikistan

and the

specter of the Taliban, along w ith

the

weakness

of Uzbekistan's armed forces, m ay aggravate tensions inside U zbek istan.

Foreign veteran troops would probably have anedge overtheUzbek

army, wh ich hasmore m ilitary hardwarebut no combat experience,

and leaderswho have been chosen for political reasons.In caseof

turmoil, Uzbek clans

and

outside powers could reach

a

compromise

resembling

the one at the

turn

of the

century, when

the

emirate

of

Bukhara

and the

khanates of Khiva

and

Kojand suited everyone

for a

t ime,

even

the

Bolsheviks.

Turkmenistan isbest considered last since undertheflrm han dof

President Saparmurad Niyazov, father of the Tu rkm ens, this

Cen-

tral Asian republic has m anaged

to

build som e sense of nation al u nity

based

on

state cap italism

in the

economy, social rathe r tha n national

values

in

p olitics,

and the

idea

of

transforming

the

former republic

intoaC entr al A sian Kuw ait. Niyazov ho lds relatively balanced views

on socialand religious matters.Inspite of mild W este rn criticismof

his domestic policiesand helpedby the na t ions oil its mineral

deposits,and itsnatura l gas reserves, w hichareamongthelargestin

the worldhe wields

his

authority shrewdly, keeping

the

leading

ethno-regional clans content by dividing oil m oney, pro jects,

and

jobs

among them. Abroad ,

he

maintains reasonable relations with

the

Taliban in Afghanistan, and his

flexible

policy toward the Un ited States,

Russia, Turkey,

and

Iran attracts foreign investm ent

in

his country's

gas

and oil industry. Unfortunately, the construction of strong national

identities, wh ich seemsto be theroute m ostofthe region's leadersare

taking,caneasily leadtorivalry among nationalities w ithin countries,

and possibly to jingoism andfriction between countries.

Turkey

or

Iran could become

a

stabilizing influence

in

Cen t ra l


17/21

h

Remaking of urasia

Minis ter Eldar Inonu s ta ted that Ankara wantstoinstitutionalize

relations with theTurkic-m ajority C entral A sian republics in a

commonwealth . Already Turkey hasprovided thefive repub lics

with more than 80million in aid and 700 million in credits.

Uzbekistan received

54

million

in

assistance, while

the

much

needier Tajikistan got only 400,00 0. Therationale is c l e a r -

Uzbeks, Turkmens, and Kazaks areTurk ic peop les. Tajiksand

Afghans , on theother hand , are ofIranian e thnicity which is

why Iran,aregional pow er w ith sub stantial growth pote ntial,can

countonexp and ing its influenceinCe ntra l Asia .

CAUCASIAN TRADITIONS

A s INC entral Asia,the Caucasus* emancipation fromthe statusof

Russian protec torate will mean resurgence of influence for both Iran

and Turkey Thepopulation of the Caucasus is extremely diverse,

and hostile relations between some of its peoples areacenturies-old

tradition.In addition, eachofits p eoplesis divided into clans that

jockeyforpow er a m ong themselves. Historically, religion

was

the

basis for the differences in the region. T h e O rth od ox A rm enia ns,

the

Georg ians, and the majority of Ossets were Christian, oriented toward

the nearby Christian empires of Byzantium and Russia. The peoples

of the North Caucasusandwha t is now Azerbaijan were Muslim

and received moral, economic,

and

m ilitary sup port from either

the

Ot to m a n E m p i r eorPersia. M oreover, therelative im portan ceof

religion differed inthe various cultures.TheG eorgians were more

religiously observant thanthe Ossets,the Chechensand theAzeris

more

so

than the D agestanis

or

the In gu sh. S om e nationalities held

on to their ancestral cults and pagan rituals and professed a Christianity

or an Islam that was merely formal.

Conflict in the region is aggravated by Russia's unsuccessflil military

venture in Chechnya, although Russian troops were subsequently

withdraw n. Th e wars in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkh azia,

and Chechnya m ay notbethe final chap ters in the escalation of conflicts

in the Caucasus. The many reasons for division among the Caucasian

areprecisely whythe anexternal arbiter.The


18/21

lery V

Tsepkalo

in

any

Caucasian conflict,

as the

po tential

for

casualties

is

high

in

mountain warfare against local militia

and

troops could

not

ensure

contro l of territory.

T H E

BEGINNING OF HISTORY

RESTORING THE

Soviet Union

to its

former self

is

impossible.

Elites,

old and new in the

newly independent states

are

intent

on

preserving their nations' sovereignty. Every former Soviet republic

has held presidential and parliam entary elections

and

adopted

a

new

constitution. Everywhere

the

search

for a

national identity

is

under

way, and people increasingly th ink of themselves n ot as Soviet citizens

but as Ukrainians, Kazaks,orA zerbaijanis.

T h e scramble for the spoils of the Soviet heritage could cause serious

conflict between major geopolitical players and threaten the very foun-

dations of established security systems. W h e n

a

tenant in

a

build ing falls

ill

or

dies, if the tenan ts

in the

other apartm ents begin knocking dow n

walls

to

expand their

own

space, they could

end up

destroying

the

entire building. Any world order is stable only when everyone knows

his place in

it

and there is sufficient collective and indi^^dual power,

and

the willingness

to use it to

maintain

the

whole.

The

challenge

for

Eu rop e and the world in the post-Soviet space is averting further disin-

tegration

and

keeping disorder

and

conflict from spilling

out of

the

region

and

setting th e globe ablaze.

I t

is

clearly

to the

W est's advantage

to

prom ote certain kinds

of

regional integ ratio n in E uras ia. T h e rapid rise of any player, especially

Ch ina

or

Iran,

or a

radical Islamic revolution could ha rm W este rn

interests. Western unity would

be

shaken

if

one

or

more

of

its

own

w het her G erma ny, Turkey, or Japan , tried

to

secure

its

own zone

of

influence.

The

interven tion

ofNATO

forces

in

future conflicts

in the

region, probably

at the

request

of

the parties involved, could cause

further disintegration, perhaps resulting

in

loss

of

control over

weapons of mass destruction.

The West has levers that

it

can p ush

to

help shape politics

in

Russia

and o the r cis states today, includ ing influence over opposition leaders.


19/21

heRemaking of urasia

on

the

West economically, Western influence

is

likely

to

grow.

Econom ic integration supported by the West would be a powerful

stabilizing factorinthe region.

Having lost faith in its guiding principles, Russia may descend into

chaos and destroy

itself

long

with the region, unless

it

discovers new

values that can sustain

it.

Nations, Hke people,

do not

live by bread

alone, nor

by

sophisticated

weaponry.

They

need bove

all,the spiritual

foundation that a great ideal and

its

related

set ofvaluesprovide Large states and

empires

E lec t io ns hav e fail ed t

h ve lw ys beenbuilt on anidea;theMonroe

Doctrine and U.S. global leadership would t u r n R u s s i a in to

a

not have existed but for the American belief s t a b le d e m o c i' a c v

in manifest

destiny.

The state should deploy

such

an

idea with care,

and

citizens

are

right

to

regard

it

cautiously

But with its deep emotional appeal,

it

fireshe disparate members of

a society to work for the comm on interest rather than for selfish gain.

One need look only at the monumental plants and public works built

in the early decades of communism by workers laboring not for wages

but

for

a better future.

W hat ideal will Russia choose for itself? W hat course will it take?

The comm unist ideal can still bring

people

into the streets, but the

current brand ofcommunism has compromised itself and lostits

mobihzing character, and itissappedbysquabbHng between factions.

The monarchical-Orthodox value system harking back to the days of

the czars

and the

Holy Russian EmpireMoscow

as the

third

Rome has the support only of smallgroupwithin the intelligentsia.

Moreover, traditional religions

and

cultures

can

compensate

for

economic pain,butthey tendto divide rather than unite peoplein

countries with mixed heritages. Businesspeople

s views

are reasonable

and intelligent,butbeing wholly material, they lacktheforceof

universal ideaand so failtogenerate much supportatelection time

or any other time. W estern democraticide ls h vebeen badly tarnished

in Russians'eyesas elections and other trappings of liberal democracy

have failed to turn their country into a stable democracy Instead

it

is

becoming, according

to a

1997 report from

the

Center

for

Strategic


20/21

iery V Tsepkalo

and crooked businessmen who accumulate vast wealth by exploiting

the vulnerabilities of a society in tran sition .

The best idea for former Soviet lands today would incorporate

both the best of Russia's past from the fifteenth through nineteenth

centuries and the achievements of the m odern age. It m ust also envision

a jus t society based on fairness and int ereth nic co op eratio n an idea

ultima tely more attractive and powerful than any purely national idea.

The United States has united peoples from all corners of the globe

with the promise of equal opportunity. Something of the sort in

Kazakstan, for instance, could well defeat Russian nationalists with

their dream s of secession and at the same tim e check the rise of K azak

nationalism. It would also reawaken the m em ory of the peace and sta-

bility tha t prevailed und er the Soviet-era friendship of peoples and

encourage closer integration in Cen tral Asia and the cis in general.

If the region cannot come up with an idea that embodies the aims

and aspirations of its many peoples and draws th em closer together, and

if the major pow ers continue to jockey for influence and thus exacerbate

divisions, the international security system could be destroyed and

international rules of conduct undermined. An order would once again

have to be built, n ot on principles of law and justice, but aro und the

balancing of interests and forces. That would mark a new and inaus-

picious begin ning of history.


21/21

[valery v. tsepkalo] the remaking of eurasia

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