vagueness and truth by convention
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7/26/2019 Vagueness and Truth by Convention
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Vagueness and Truth by Convention
Author(s): Dharmendra KumarSource: Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Mar., 1969), pp. 129-130Published by: on behalf ofOxford University Press The Analysis CommitteeStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3327826Accessed: 28-07-2015 21:55 UTC
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7/26/2019 Vagueness and Truth by Convention
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VAGUENESS
AND TRUTH
BY
CONVENTION
By
DHARMENDRA KUMAR
PROFESSOR
Kmrner
ays
in
Experience
nd
Theoty
hat two kinds of
universal
propositions,
open
nomic
and
closed
nomic ,
differing
n
the
extent
of truth
by
convention
may
be
expressed
by
sentences
con-
taining
inexact
predicates
like
swan , white ,
magnetised piece
of
iron .
He
also
speaks
of
mixed
nomic
propositions ,
but
they
must
satisfy
his
definition
of
closed
nomic
proposition
or of
open
nomic
proposition
and cannotbe
a third
kind.
But his
argument
or
admitting
open
nomic
propositions
and thus
for
distinguishing
two kinds
of truth-
by-convention
requires
an erroneous
assumption
which his own
observationsdo
not
support.
K6rner
says:
the sentence
All
magnetised
ieces
of iron attractron
filings
.
comes
to
express
n
open
nomic
proposition,
whenthe
predicate
x is a
magnet-
ised
piece
of iron
s modified
n such
a
way
hat
only
objects
which
attract
iron
filings
qualify
or
membership
f
the
class
corresponding
o the
modified
predicatep.
76).
He
contends
that
either use
of the
predicate
leaves
open
the
possibility
of neutralcandidates (p. 76) which can be ... correctlymade either
members
or
non-members
of the
class
(p.
28).
From
this,
he
thinks,
it
follows
that the
truth
of
the
proposition
expressed
by
All
Ps
areQs
may
not be
preserved
when the
neutral
candidates or the relatedclasses
are
considered
(p.
74),
if P
andQ are
related ike
magnetisedpiece
of iron
in
the modified
use
and
attracts ron
filings
(briefly,
M
and
A ).
Expressing
a
proposition
immune to
counter-instances
arising
from
neutral
candidates ,
therefore,
requires
a
further convention
. .
. for-
bidding
such
election
he
says
(p.
75).
The
assumption
required
for
K6rner s
conclusion
may
be
brought
out
by
considering
the three
situations
in which
one
may
suppose
the
termination
of an
object s
neutral
candidature
to
provide
a
counter-
instance to the
proposition
that all
Ms
are
As,
supposing
that
both
M
and A
admit
of
neutral
candidates. These
are:
(a)
the
object
x
is
a
positive
candidatefor
being
an M
(or
for
the
application
of
M )
and
a
neutral
candidate or
being
an
A;
(b)
x
is
clearly
a
non-A
or a
negative
candidate or
being
an A and
a neutral
candidate or
being
an
M;
(c)
x
is
a
neutral candidate
for
being
an
M and also for
being
an A.
The
notion of a neutral
candidate rules
out
(a)
and
(b).
There
will
be
no
point
in
distinguishing,
nor
possibility
of
systematicallydistinguishing,
positive
candidates
from
neutral candidates for the
application
of a
predicate
like
M
if
(a)
is allowed.
By
prefixing qualifies
to the
expression
corresponding
o A in
his
schema
p.
74)
of sentences
ntro-
129
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7/26/2019 Vagueness and Truth by Convention
3/3
130
VAGUENESS
AND TRUTH BY
CONVENTION
ducing predicates
ike
M ,
perhaps
K6rner
himself
means
to
rule out
(a).
An
object s
negative
candidature or
being
an A
is for the
same
reason nconsistentwith its neutralcandidatureor beinganM.Ko6rner s
statement
of the
relationship
between
M
and
A ,
regarded
as
the
state-
ment
that
every
positive
candidate
or
being
an M
is
a
positive
candidate
for
being
an
A,
should
be
equivalent
o the
statement
hat
every
negative
candidate
or
being
an A
is a
negative
andidate
or
being
an
M. K6rner
provides
a
deeper
reason or
ruling
out
(b)
and
(a)
by attributing
he
possibility
of
borderline
r neutral
candidates
o
qualifications
nd
disqualifications
or the
membership
f a
class
n
termsof
similarities
and
dissimilarities
o
standard
members
nd non-members
p.
26)
or
standardxamples ndcounter-examples.ince M admitsof neutral
candidates,
he conditions
or its
application
may
as
well be
given
ostensively,
f
objects
capable
of
serving
as standard
xamples
and
counter-examples
re
available,
although
K6rner
has
given
them
verbally
n termsof
N
( magnetised
iece
of iron n the unmodified
sense)
and
A ,
thus
attributing
n
object s
neutral
andidatureor the
application
f
M
to
its
neutral andidatureor
N ,
A ,
rather
han o
incomplete
ver-all
rgestalt
imilarity
o standard
Ms. Butthe ostensive
explanation
f
M
would
require
aking
as a
standard
ounter-example
of an M anobjectwhich s capable f servingasa standardxample f
an
N
and
a
standard
ounter-example
f
an A. It
is obvious
that
an
object
differing
rom such
an
object
by being
a
neutral
ather
han a
positive
N
is
even
more
certainly
negative
M,
and
b)
s thus
mpossible.
(a)
is
similarly
uled
out
by
the
necessity
f
using
only
standard
As as
standard
Ms.
While
situations
a)
and
(b)
are
simply mpossible, c) requires
an
inconsistent
way
of
terminating
n
object s
neutral andidature
or
M
and A .
If
neutral andidature
or
M
can
be
terminated ia
neutral
candidatureor N and for A , it cannotbe terminatedndependently
of the termination
f
the
latter. Since
an
object s
neutral
andidature
for
M
depends
n its
neutral
andidatureor
N and
A ,
and
not vice
versa,
t can
only
be
terminated
n the former
way.
But
the decision
o
regard
a
neutral
A as a non-A can
only
make
a
neutralM a
non-M,
supposing
hat
t
is
not a
neutral
N;
andthe
termination f
its
possible
neutral
andidature
or
N
obviously
annot
provide
a
counter-instance
to the
proposition
hatall Ms
areAs.
If M
is
regarded
s
applying
positively
when
both
N
and
A
apply positively,and neutrallywhen eitherboth N and A apply
neutrally
r
one
appliespositively
and the other
neutrally,
hen
M
is
an
abbreviation
or
N
and
A ,
and he
proposition
hat
all Ms
are As is
true
by
definition ,
s
Krnmer
nwittingly
ays
(p.
73)
of
an
open
nomic
proposition
which he claims to be
empirical
in
so
far as
it
allows a
conjecture
regarding
the
decision o treat
possible
neutral
candidates
as
members
p.
74).
Delhi
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