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The future in the past: Victory, defeat, and grand strategy in the US, UK, Franceand Germany

van Hooft, P.A.

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Citation for published version (APA):van Hooft, P. A. (2015). The future in the past: Victory, defeat, and grand strategy in the US,UK, France and Germany.

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Summary

The central argument of this dissertation is that victory and defeat in war shape the post-war grand strategies of states, and specifically their willingness to use of force and diplomacy. The book examines this argument through the central case of the Second World War and the experiences and the post-war strategic behaviour of its belligerents. It focuses on four cases in particular: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.

War is often assumed to have a strong effect on post-war beliefs and behaviour, for both intuitive reasons as well as arguments found in existing scholarly research, yet understanding exactly how and why is difficult. The existing research includes the literatures on collective memory, on the use of analogies during decision-making, and on war-weariness and contagion. These point out that wars are invoked as lessons to highlight and dissect normative questions, to understand new crises and challenges, and they are used to attack political opponents. We are reminded that displaying weakness to authoritarian opponents is as morally wrong and ineffective as when Britain and France appeased Hitler in Munich. The Holocaust is the standard that to judge the evil of racism, and the National Socialism offers a warning of the dangers of where too great a belief in leaders will lead us to. Images of the trenches of the First World War connote the senselessness of war and how wrong-headed policymakers sacrifice soldiers for poorly thought-out plans, as do invocations of Vietnamese jungles. Similarly, to the anti-war movements, the more recent invasion of Iraq underlines that we should distrust policymakers. Past wars therefore become powerful symbols that echo in the present. They are considered to impact the national psyche and to transform collective understanding of the nation. They are reflected in and passed on through high and low culture. Wars become common reference points to demark eras into a before and after, where the lessons of the old era become the basis for the new era. They can either underline what we already believe about ourselves or cause us to question these beliefs. Victory in war shows that good can be accomplished through the use of force. In contrast, death and destruction are sobering, both for policymakers and societies. The costs of war will therefore make states more cautious. However, while such arguments about war make strong intuitive sense it is inherently difficult to study them due to the intangibility of ideas and their causal role in the calculations of policymakers. How can we show this role vis-à-vis multiple rival explanations? The book attempts to address these problems.

The Second World War offers an exemplary case to explore these ideas. The brutality of the war cast a long shadow over all belligerent states in Europe, America, and Asia. Yet, wartime experiences still strongly varied between states. Some states not only lost

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massive numbers of citizens, but also experienced the humiliation and shame of military defeat, surrender, occupation, collaboration, or even the responsibility for genocide. Other states, in contrast, neither experienced invasion or occupation, and their casualties, however terrible, were mostly military in nature. Moreover, the costs of war were more than morally justified by the need to defeat two powerful and genocidal regimes. For other states, most of them, the experiences were more mixed and ambiguous. They fought and came out on the winning side, but at significant costs, often suffering huge numbers of civilian and military casualties, occupation, and the moral ambiguity of collaboration.

This dissertation argues that the range of experiences explains a range of policy outcomes and it focuses in particular on the four major western states: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Since the end of the war all four states have been liberal democracies with considerable political, military, and economic capabilities, yet they have had strikingly different experiences with war in the first half of the twentieth century. The United States and the United Kingdom were the victors of the Second World War. Yet, Britain suffered high societal costs and the post-war collapse of its empire, while victory was nearly cost-free for the US and allowed it to become a superpower. Nominally one of the victorious states, France suffered a sudden military defeat in the opening stages of the war, and was forced to depend on others for the restoration of national sovereignty. Germany in turn was completely defeated militarily and discredited morally as the horrors of the Holocaust became known; it remained occupied after the war; and (West) Germany was rebuilt as a democracy by the occupying powers. Or, put in another way, the case studies allow variation through two extreme cases – the US and Germany – and two more difficult and ambiguous cases – the UK and France.

These cases are important in their own right: the policies of the four major Western states laid the foundations for the global multilateral order as we now know it. Yet, each of the four seems to have specific national patterns of behaviour that are widely divergent when it comes to matters of using military force and sovereignty in international diplomacy.

The book explores and tests the argument that victory and defeat shape post-war behaviour through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. This includes regression analysis using different measures of wartime defeat and loss together with various measures of the post-war use of force and diplomacy for all the participants of the Second World War. However, the greatest part of the research focuses on the four case studies – the US, UK, France, and Germany – through historical analysis, counterfactual thought experiments, content analysis of documents, and a series of fifty interviews with American, British, French, and German policymakers. From this variety of methods, the research produces the following findings.

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The first of the book’s findings is that experiences with war shape the propensity of victorious and defeated states to use force and diplomacy in their grand strategy, and that this effect takes place regardless of their relative material capabilities, alignments, and regime types. The results of the regression analysis for the experiences in the Second World War and post-war behaviour are clear. States that had experienced occupation and surrender, had aggressed, fought on the losing side, and had suffered high numbers of casualties, were significantly less likely to use force or threaten the use of force, and more likely to be a member of international organisations or use diplomatic representation than states that had been victorious and suffered few civilian and military casualties. In contrast, the states that had been victorious in war become more willing to again use force after the war, and less likely to use diplomacy. Moreover, a convincing victory in a total war is more important than a smaller defeat in a limited war. Victories and defeat also lead to different combinations of diplomacy and force, suggesting that to some extent policymakers see diplomacy and force as exchangeable alternatives. The case studies further support this first finding, and show that the beliefs of American, British, French, and German policymakers on force and diplomacy - and the relations between state, society, and the armed forces - reinforce each other in their effect on their respective behaviour.

The second finding is that the experiences with victory and defeat have distinct implications for the perspectives, legitimacy, and institutional influence of the actors involved in the development and implementation of national strategy. The actors within the nation-state involved in the making of grand strategy are grouped as follows: its civilian policymakers; its military policymakers; and its civilians. The relations between this ‘trinity’ of state, society, and armed forces define whose strategic beliefs can more heavily shape policy. This explains why beliefs are maintained over multiple decades, and why not every victory and defeat matter equally – blame and credit be accorded differently and some ideas therefore barely change. The combinations of beliefs and relations lead to nationally distinct patterns of strategic behaviour that endure long after the initial experiences, despite changes in the international environment and turnover in domestic governments.

As the two extreme cases, the US and Germany best illustrate how changes in strategic beliefs and domestic distribution of influence and legitimacy reinforce each other. The US victory in the Second World War strengthened the position of civilian and military policymakers. As it also came at relatively low costs - the US did not suffer civilian casualties or even, relatively speaking, large numbers of military casualties – American policymakers did not need to make a great effort at domestic mobilisation for the war effort. So, while American grand strategy had become ambitious after the war and made the use of force more likely by itself, American civilian and military policymakers also had greater autonomy to actually use force. Moreover, they used references to the past, such as Munich, to defend forceful policies in Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Iraq, and other cases. Vietnam temporarily undermined the legitimacy of the state in the use of

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force, but post-Vietnam victim narrative surrounding the armed forces de facto strengthened the US military’s autonomy, as did the victory in the Gulf War.

In contrast, not only had German total defeat in the Second World War already led to a drastic change in the post-war core beliefs of German policymakers and of the public at large, but the defeat also delegitimised the pre-war, traditional dominance of the German military and the executive. In post-war Germany, both the executive and the armed forces are therefore highly constrained within the national security institutions and this further limits the ability to decisively use force.

The two more ambiguous cases show more particular effects of experiences with war. The British victory in the Second World War, in contrast to that of the US, came at great social cost. The Conservatives were associated both with appeasement as well as with the successful leadership of Churchill, while Labour was credited with running the war at home, personified in the popular myth of the ‘people’s war’. The executive was therefore differently empowered, creating a populist myth with a central role for strong leadership. The victory in the Falklands ensured the continuation of Churchillian myth after the Suez fiasco, sustained an exceptionalist attitude towards the European continent, and reinvigorated the sense of a particular British moral responsibility in international affairs.

An even more complex experience was that of France. The humiliating French defeat in the Second World War was blamed on pre-war divisions between the political Left and Right that had impeded effective military innovation and integration with French alliance strategy. It was only the founding of the Fifth Republic and the return to power of De Gaulle that largely resolved the political tensions of twentieth century France. The post-war consensus that took hold after the exit from Algeria established the French President as the legitimate sole custodian of his ‘reserved domain’ of foreign and defence policy. That executive autonomy has allowed the French state to use force and diplomacy decisively and coherently in pursuit of French autonomy and security.

The third and final finding is that experiences with war shape not just the willingness to use force and diplomacy in general, but also what policymakers believe should be the specific composition of military and diplomatic means. These core beliefs have to do with whether policymakers believe they live in a balance of threat or a balance of power world, and how states rely on military capabilities (internal balancing) and alliances (external balancing). In this manner, they together shape the quality, direction, and cohesion of the nation-state’s strategy, as the four cases show

American policymakers suffered from a sense of vulnerability after the sudden collapse of Europe in 1940 and the surprise attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941. Maintaining the balance of power was insufficient as Europeans were unable to resist authoritarian states, or were prone to be seduced by extremist ideology. This created a state of

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permanent insecurity that led American policymakers to avoid a return to so-called isolationism at all costs. Instead they pursued US leadership and accepted entangling alliances. American policymakers established a permanent military presence in Europe and Asia, and maintained it after the Cold War. These beliefs guided decisions on not passing of the costs for European security to the Europeans and led to American involvement in peripheral conflicts such as Vietnam. As illustrated through counterfactual thought experiments, these choices were remarkable as this represented arguably a more costly and risky strategy for the US should the Cold War have escalated, but also once the Cold War ended, when the US was clearly no longer facing an existential threat.

The traditional British tendency to rely on off-shore balancing to maintain a continental balance of power, no longer sufficed after British policymakers failed to prevent the fall of Europe to Germany in 1940. During the Cold War, the UK committed itself to the continent through the NATO alliance and by placing permanently prepositioned forces in Europe, rather than relying on a national nuclear weapon. British policymakers still considered the UK as exceptional to the continent due to its unconquered status, though dependent on its ‘special relationship’ with the US, and especially after Suez. As a result, the UK overextended its forces beyond its financial resources and risked entanglement in American policies, despite the availability of less risky and costly alternative strategies.

The sudden and catastrophic defeat in June 1940 transformed French strategic thinking on diplomacy and force. Wartime experiences had cast doubts on the reliability of France’s Anglo-American allies. French policymakers had not adapted to the changes in military technology and prepared for armoured warfare. After the war, France therefore sought to avoid dependence on others at all costs, and specifically on the US. General De Gaulle specifically perceived the NATO alliance as merely entangling France without actually securing it, as the American nuclear deterrent could not offer credible protection. French policymakers therefore pursued an autonomous national deterrent at great cost. The resulting French grand strategy risked alienating the US and undermining the protection that the US- led Atlantic alliance provided for France, precisely when France needed the US the most.

Germany offers the greatest contrast between its pre- and post-war strategies. In both the First and the Second World War, German policymakers had avoided alliances and relied on an extremely offensive force posture to ensure German survival against encirclement by perceived threats to its East and its West. Germany’s total defeat during the Second World War reversed those beliefs. To avoid renewed isolation, German policymakers embedded Germany as deeply as possible in NATO and the European institutions, and adopted a highly defensive force posture. Even after the end of the Cold War, German policymakers did not pursue an alternative strategy in which they attempted again to become the preeminent power in Europe. Germany’s experiences

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with Ostpolitik, European unification, and the French-German bilateral relationship confirmed German faith in multilateral solutions.

In all four cases, these beliefs and others based on the national experience with the Second World War were and are reiterated in policy documents, speeches, and in interviews with policymakers.

Through its comprehensive methodological approach, the book can make two important contributions. The first contribution is to the literature on the legacies of wars, where wars are often assumed to have an impact – though collective memory, the use of analogy, or war-weariness and contagion – but the exact impact on policymakers long-term choices remains unclear. The book’s argument shows how and why such experiences shape the beliefs, and of which actors, as well as the manner in which they are reinforced or undermined by later conflicts.

The second contribution is to the literature on the origins of grand strategy and the role of beliefs in relation to domestic institutions, international structures, and material power. That argument constitutes an elaborated theory of neoclassical realism: experience-driven realism. Experience-driven realism theorises how the outcomes of wars shape both national strategic beliefs and relations between state, society, and the armed forces. The combinations of beliefs and domestic relations in turn shape the strategic behaviour of states within the structural features of the international environment. It offers an argument on when and why grand strategy remains consistent and when and why it changes.

The story of this book is therefore also more than a tale about how analogical thinking might matter for political life. It points to larger differences in beliefs on both sides of the Atlantic that derive from experiences with wars and that continue to persist.

The argument made in this book is important for anyone who cares about the perceived lessons of national experience and the implications for contemporary policy. While we are not bound to the past, how we understand it strongly defines our approach to the future. There is a real danger if policy is calibrated on some mythical sense of the past. Strategy involves matching ends and means; by definition there are no benign biases in strategic thinking, specifically if one is unaware of them. An unconsidered reticence or principled opposition to the use of force may be as troubling as an unconsidered enthusiasm towards war. Both ‘always Munich’ and ‘never again war’ are bad models of foreign policy. Overresponding to Iraq in 2003 was as poor an idea as not responding strongly in the Ukraine Crisis in 2014, or to the rise of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq in 2014.

In terms of international threats and challenges, the coming decades are certain to be more different for the US, the UK, France, and Germany than any era since 1945,

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whether due to a more and more unstable Middle East, a resurgent Russia, or a rising China. There is the danger of applying lessons from the West’s past too broadly, and of failing to understand that the world is different or not to accept the manner in which it is different. The roads not already taken will be overlooked, and the future might repeat the past for reasons both tragic and avoidable.

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Samenvatting

Het centrale betoog van dit proefschrift is dat overwinning en nederlaag in oorlog het naoorlogse denken van staten vormt met betrekking tot het gebruik van militaire en diplomatieke middelen, en daarmee een sterke invloed uitoefent op hun grand strategies. Het boek onderzoekt dit betoog door te kijken naar de staten die deelnamen aan de Tweede Wereldoorlog, naar hun ervaringen en naar hun naoorlogs strategisch gedrag. Het boek richt zich in het bijzonder op vier casestudies: de Verenigde Staten, het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Frankrijk, en Duitsland.

Er wordt vaak vanuit gegaan dat oorlogen een sterk effect hebben op naoorlogse opvattingen en gedrag, om redenen die zowel intuïtief zijn als gefundeerd in bestaand academisch onderzoek, maar het is moeilijk om duidelijk te maken hoe en waarom zij dit doen. Het bestaande onderzoek bevat de literatuur over collectief geheugen, die over het gebruik van analogieën bij beslissingen, en die over oorlogsmoeheid. Dit werk wijst ons erop dat oorlogen uit het verleden worden gebruikt om lessen aan te ontlenen over normatieve vraagstukken, om nieuwe crisissen en uitdagingen te begrijpen, en om politieke tegenstanders aan te vallen. We worden eraan herinnerd dat zwakte tonen aan de bestaande autoritaire leiders even moreel fout en ineffectief is als toen Groot-Brittannië en Frankrijk Hitler in ‘Munich’ tegemoet probeerden te komen. De Holocaust is de standaard die het kwaad van racisme definieert en een blijvende waarschuwing is voor het gevaar waar een overmatig geloof in leiders ons heen kan leiden. Beelden van loopgraven uit de Eerste Wereldoorlog roepen de zinloosheid van oorlog op, net zoals die uit de jungle van Vietnam. Op een vergelijkbare wijze onderstreept de invasie van Irak in 2003 voor anti-oorlogsbewegingen dat we beleidsmakers zouden moeten wantrouwen. Oorlogen uit het verleden worden daarom krachtige symbolen die doorklinken in het heden, die doorlopend opduiken in zowel hoge als lage cultuur. Oorlogen worden algemene referentiepunten om tijdperken af te bakenen in een voor en een na, en waar de lessen van het vorige tijdperk de basis vormen voor het nieuwe tijdperk. Overwinningen kunnen onderstrepen wat wij toch al geloven over onszelf of de wereld, terwijl nederlagen ons daaraan kunnen laten twijfelen. Overwinningen laten zien dat goede doelen bereikt kunnen worden met militaire middelen. Tegenovergesteld werken dood en vernietiging ontnuchterend, zowel voor beleidsmakers als voor de samenleving. De kosten van oorlog zullen daarom staten voorzichtiger maken. Hoewel zulke betogen over oorlog intuïtief zeer aansprekend zijn, is het inherent moeilijk deze betogen gestructureerd te bestuderen door de ontastbare aard van ideeën en hun causale rol in de afwegingen van beleidsmakers. Hoe kunnen we deze rol laten zien ten opzichte van meerdere tegenstrijdige verklaringen? Dit boek probeert hier een antwoord op te geven.

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De Tweede Wereldoorlog is een uitstekende casestudy om deze ideeën te verkennen. De bruutheid van de oorlog wierp een lange schaduw over alle deelnemende staten in Europe, Amerika, en Azië. De oorlogservaringen varieerden echter sterk tussen staten. Sommige staten verloren niet alleen grote aantallen burgers, maar ervoeren ook de vernedering en schaamte van een militaire nederlaag, van overgave, van bezetting, van collaboratie, of van de verantwoordelijkheid voor genocide. Andere staten waren echter niet bezet en hun doden bestonden vooral uit militairen. Deze kosten waren alsnog tragisch, maar werden voor de overwinnende staten weer moreel gerechtvaardigd door de noodzaak van een overwinning op twee machtige en genocidale regimes, Duitsland en Japan. Voor andere staten, de meerderheid, waren de oorlogservaringen meer gemengd en ambigu. Zij vochten aan de winnende kant, maar met aanzienlijke kosten. Deze staten leden vaak hoge aantallen burger- en militaire slachtoffers, hadden ervaring met oorlog op hun grondgebied en bezetting, en met de morele ambiguïteit van collaboratie.

Dit proefschrift betoogt dat het scala van ervaringen de variëteit in beleidsuitkomsten in grote mate kan verklaren en het richt zich in het bijzonder op de vier grote westerse staten: de Verenigde Staten, het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Frankrijk, en Duitsland. Sinds het einde van de oorlog zijn alle vier de staten liberale democratieën geweest met aanzienlijke politieke, militaire, en economische capaciteiten, maar met opmerkelijk andere ervaringen met oorlog in de eerste helft van de twintigste eeuw. De VS en het VK waren de overwinnaars van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, hoewel Groot-Brittannië een hoge aanslag op de samenleving moest incasseren met daarbij het ineenstorten van het Britse koloniale rijk, terwijl de overwinning voor de VS relatief kostenvrij was en het daardoor een supermacht werd. Frankrijk, nominaal een van de overwinnende staten, leed een plotselinge militaire nederlaag in het begin van de oorlog, verloor controle over haar grondgebied en werd afhankelijk van andere staten om de nationale soevereiniteit te herstellen. Duitsland, tenslotte, was militair volledig verslagen en moreel gediskwalificeerd toen de gruwelen van de Holocaust bekend werden; het werd bezet en bleef dat na de oorlog, terwijl West-Duitsland gedwongen herbouwd werd als democratie. Met andere woorden de casestudies laten een duidelijke variatie toe op de onafhankelijke variabele – overwinning en nederlaag – door twee extreme cases – de VS en Duitsland – en twee moeilijke cases – het VK en Frankrijk – te behandelen.

Deze vier cases zijn ook om belangrijk om een andere reden: het beleid van de vier grote westerse staten heeft the fundamenten gelegd voor de mondiale multilaterale orde zoals wij die nu kennen. Tegelijk heeft elk van de vier specifieke nationale gedragspatronen die wijd uiteen lijken te lopen als het aankomt op de inzet van militaire middelen of de houding ten opzichte van soevereiniteit.

Het boek onderzoekt en test dit betoog door een combinatie van kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve methoden. Dit omvat regressieanalyse met verschillende metingen van nederlaag en verlies samen met metingen van naoorlogs gebruik van militaire en diplomatieke middelen van alle deelnemers aan de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Het grootste

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deel van het onderzoek richtte zich op de vier casestudies – de VS, het VK, Frankrijk, en Duitsland – door middel van historische analyse, counterfactual gedachtenexperimenten, inhoudsanalyse van documenten, en vijftig interviews met Amerikaanse, Britse, Franse, en Duitse beleidsmakers. Uit deze variëteit van methoden kwamen de volgende bevindingen naar voren.

De eerste van de bevindingen van het boek is dat ervaringen met oorlog de neiging beïnvloeden van overwinnaars en verliezers om meer of minder te vertrouwen op militaire dan wel diplomatieke middelen in hun grand strategy, en dat dit effect plaatsvindt ongeacht hun relatieve materiele capaciteiten, alignment, en regimetypen. De regressieanalyse levert duidelijke resultaten op wanneer het gaat om de ervaringen van de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Staten die bezetting hadden ervaren, zich hadden overgegeven, de oorlog waren begonnen, aan de verliezende kant hadden gevochten, of hoge aantallen burger- en militaire slachtoffers hadden geleden, waren significant minder geneigd om militaire middelen te gebruiken na de oorlog of daarmee te dreigen, en meer geneigd om lid te zijn van internationale organisaties of diplomatieke vertegenwoordiging te gebruiken. De overwinnaars waren daarentegen meer geneigd om militaire middelen in te zetten na de oorlog, en minder geneigd diplomatieke middelen te gebruiken. Overwinning en nederlaag leiden ook tot andere combinaties, wat suggereert dat beleidsmakers diplomatie en militaire middelen zien als alternatieven van elkaar. Bovendien is een onbetwistbare overwinning in een totale oorlog belangrijker dan een kleine nederlaag in een beperkte oorlog. De casestudies ondersteunen deze eerste bevinding en laten zien dat Amerikaanse, Britse, Franse, en Duitse opvattingen over militaire en diplomatieke middelen, en de betrekkingen tussen staat, krijgsmacht, en samenleving, elkaar versterken in het effect op hun gedrag.

De tweede bevinding is dat de ervaringen met overwinning en nederlaag duidelijke gevolgen hebben voor de inzichten, legitimiteit, en institutionele invloed van de actoren die betrokken zijn in de ontwikkeling en implementatie van nationale strategie. De actoren die betrokken zijn bij het maken van grand strategy binnen de natiestaat zijn gegroepeerd als volgt: civiele beleidsmakers, militaire beleidsmakers, en burgers. De betrekkingen tussen deze ‘drie-eenheid’ van staat, samenleving, en krijgsmacht bepalen wiens strategische opvattingen een grotere invloed kunnen uitoefenen op beleid. Dit verklaart waarom opvattingen in stand gehouden worden over meerdere decennia, en waarom niet alle overwinningen en nederlagen even zwaar wegen. Schuld en krediet worden anders verdeeld bij overwinning en nederlaag, en sommige ideeën veranderen daardoor nauwelijks. De combinaties van opvattingen en betrekkingen leiden tot nationale specifieke patronen van strategisch gedrag die voortduren lang na de oorspronkelijke ervaringen, ondanks veranderingen in het internationale systeem en tussen verschillende regeringen.

De VS en Duitsland, als de twee extreme cases, illustreren het beste hoe veranderingen in strategische opvattingen en de binnenlandse verdeling van invloed en legitimiteit

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elkaar versterken. De Amerikaanse overwinning in de Tweede Wereldoorlog versterkte de positie van civiele en militaire beleidsmakers. Aangezien deze overwinning gepaard ging met relatief lage kosten – de VS leed geen burgerslachtoffers en een laag aantal militaire slachtoffers relatief gezien – werden Amerikaanse beleidsmakers tijdens de oorlog niet gedwongen veel inspanning te verrichten om de samenleving te mobiliseren. Niet alleen plaatsten zij na de oorlog een permanente militaire aanwezigheid op het Europese continent en Oost-Azië wat de vraag om militaire middelen vergrootte, maar Amerikaanse civiele en militaire beleidsmakers hadden ook een grotere autonomie om ze ook daadwerkelijk te gebruiken. Verwijzingen naar het verleden, zoals ‘Munich’, speelden daarbij een grote rol om assertief beleid in o.a. Korea, Vietnam, de Golfoorlog, en Irak te verdedigen. Vietnam ondermijnde tijdelijk de legitimiteit van de staat, maar het slachtofferaura dat de krijgsmacht omringde na Vietnam versterkte de facto de autonomie van Amerikaanse militairen, evenals de overwinning in de Golfoorlog.

Duitsland biedt een sterk contrast met de VS. De opvattingen van zowel Duitse beleidsmakers als de samenleving waren al drastisch veranderend door de oorlog, waardoor Duitsland na de oorlog overschakelde naar een hoogst defensieve en beperkte militaire doctrine. Deze pacifistische houding werd verder versterkt, omdat de totale Duitse nederlaag in de Tweede Wereldoorlog de vooroorlogse, traditionele dominantie van de Duitse krijgsmacht en de uitvoerende macht delegitimeerde. In naoorlogs Duitsland, waren zowel de uitvoerende macht als de krijgsmacht sterk institutioneel ingeperkt, wat het vermogen om besluitvaardig militaire middelen in te zetten verder verminderde.

De twee meer ambigue cases illustreren de specifieke effecten van ervaringen met oorlog. De Britse overwinning in de Tweede Wereldoorlog ging, in tegenstelling tot die van de VS, gepaard met grote sociale kosten. De Conservatieven werden geassocieerd met zowel het falen van de vooroorlogse periode en appeasement, als met het succesvolle leiderschap van Churchill. Labour kreeg daarentegen het krediet voor de wijze waarop het Britse thuisfront werd gemobiliseerd voor de oorlog, waardoor de populaire mythe van de ‘people’s war’ vorm kreeg. De overwinning in de Falklandoorlog verzekerde de voortzetting van de Churchilliaanse mythe na het fiasco in het Suezkanaal, onderhield daarmee het Britse gevoel van exceptionalisme ten opzichte van het Europese continent, en van een specifiek soort populistisch leiderschap in buitenlands beleid.

Een nog complexere ervaring is die van Frankrijk. De schuld van de vernederende Franse nederlaag in de Tweede Wereldoorlog lag in de vooroorlogse verdeeldheid tussen politiek links en rechts dat effectieve militaire innovatie had ondermijnd, evenals een goede integratie van Franse militaire doctrine en bondgenootschappen. Pas met de oprichting van de Vijfde Republiek en de terugkeer naar de macht van De Gaulle werden de politieke spanningen van het twintigste-eeuws Frankrijk definitief verminderd. De algemeen geaccepteerde naoorlogse consensus gaf de Franse president als enige de

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legitimiteit om binnen het ‘gereserveerde domein’ van buitenlands- en defensiebeleid te opereren. Deze uitvoerende autonomie maakte en maakt het mogelijk voor de Franse staat om besluitvaardig en coherent diplomatieke en militaire middelen in te zetten voor Franse veiligheid en internationale autonomie.

De derde en laatste bevinding is dat ervaringen met oorlog niet alleen de bereidheid bepalen van beleidsmakers om militaire dan wel diplomatieke middelen te gebruiken, maar dat ze ook bepalen welke combinaties daarvan beleidsmakers denken dat het meest effectief zijn. Overwinning en nederlaag zijn namelijk ook doorslaggevend voor de centrale opvattingen van beleidsmakers. Deze opvattingen hebben te maken met of beleidsmakers geloven dat ze in een machtsbalans- of in een dreigingsbalanswereld leven, en hoe staten vertrouwen op militaire capaciteiten (intern balanceren) en bondgenootschappen (extern balanceren). Samen bepalen zij zo de kwaliteit, richting, en cohesie van nationale strategie, zoals naar voren komt uit de vier cases.

Amerikaanse beleidsmakers beschouwden de VS als onzeker en onveilig na het plotseling instorten van Europa in 1940 en de verrassingsaanval in Pearl Harbor in 1941. De machtsbalans in stand houden was niet langer voldoende, aangezien Europeanen niet in staat leken om weerstand te bieden aan autoritaire staten en gemakkelijk te verleiden waren door extremistische ideologie. Amerikaanse beleidsmakers probeerden tegen elke prijs een terugkeer naar het zogenaamde Amerikaanse isolationisme te vermijden. In plaats daarvan joegen zij Amerikaans leiderschap na en accepteerden zij verstrikkende bondgenootschappen. Amerikaanse beleidsmakers kozen voor een permanente militaire aanwezigheid in Europa en Azië, en hielden die ook na de Koude Oorlog in stand. Deze opvattingen speelden een belangrijke rol bij de beslissingen om de kosten voor Europese veiligheid niet door te spelen naar de Europeanen, maar leidden ook tot Amerikaanse inmenging in conflicten zoals Vietnam. Zoals de counterfactual gedachtenexperimenten illustreren, waren deze keuzes opmerkelijk aangezien zij een meer kostbare en risicovolle strategie vertegenwoordigden voor de VS, niet alleen als de Koude Oorlog daadwerkelijk was geëscaleerd, maar ook in de periode daarna, toen de VS duidelijk niet meer tegenover een existentiële dreiging stond.

De traditionele Britse strategie waarin vertrouwd werd op off-shore balanceren om een continentale machtsbalans in stand te houden, voldeed niet langer nadat Britse beleidsmakers faalden om de val van Europa en de Duitse overwinning in 1940 te voorkomen. Tijdens de Koude Oorlog verbond het VK zichzelf met het continent via het NAVO bondgenootschap en door de permanente plaatsing van troepen in Europa. Dit was een opvallende beslissingen aangezien het hadden ook had kunnen vertrouwen op een nationaal kernwapen. Britse beleidsmakers beschouwden het VK nog steeds als exceptioneel ten opzichte van het continent, ook al was het tegelijkertijd afhankelijk van de ‘speciale relatie’ met de VS, zeker na de Suezcrisis. Als een gevolg daarvan zijn Britse troepen constant overbelast en riskeerde het VK verstrikking in Amerikaans beleid,

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hoewel minder risicovolle en kostbare alternatieve strategieën beschikbaar waren en zijn.

De plotselinge en catastrofale nederlaag in juni 1940 transformeerde Frans strategisch denken over diplomatieke en militaire middelen. Ervaringen tijdens de oorlog lieten beleidsmakers twijfelen aan de betrouwbaarheid van Frankrijk’s Brits-Amerikaanse bondgenoten. Haar militaire strategie had gefaald, aangezien vooroorlogse Franse beleidsmakers die niet hadden aangepast aan veranderingen in militaire technologie. Franse beleidsmakers probeerden daarom tegen elke prijs afhankelijkheid van anderen te vermijden. Vooral Generaal De Gaulle geloofde dat het NAVO bondgenootschap Frankrijk slechts verstrikte zonder het daadwerkelijk te beschermen, aangezien het Amerikaanse kernwapen Europa geen geloofwaardige bescherming kon bieden. Franse beleidsmakers kozen daarom voor een autonoom nationaal kernwapen en de grote kosten die daarbij hoorden. De Franse grand strategy die het resultaat was van deze beslissingen riskeerde dat de VS zich zou vervreemden van Frankrijk en Europa zou verlaten, precies toen Frankrijk een Amerikaanse aanwezigheid het meest nodig had.

Duitsland biedt het grootste contrast tussen voor- en naoorlogse strategieën. In zowel de Eerste als de Tweede Wereldoorlog vermeden Duitse beleidsmakers bondgenootschappen en vertrouwden op een extreem offensieve militaire doctrine om Duits voortbestaan te verzekeren ten opzichte van de vermeende dreigingen die het omcirkelden aan de west- en oostgrenzen. De totale nederlaag zorgde voor een complete strategische omschakeling. Om hernieuwde isolatie te vermijden, verankerden Duitse beleidsmakers Duitsland zo diep mogelijk in het NAVO bondgenootschap en de Europese instituties, en namen een hoogst defensieve doctrine aan. Ook na de Koude Oorlog accepteerden Duitse beleidsmakers de inperkingen op Duitse macht. Duitse ervaringen met ‘Ostpolitik’, Europese eenwording, en de Frans-Duitse bilaterale relatie bevestigden het Duitse geloof in multilaterale oplossingen.

In alle vier de cases werden en worden deze en andere opvattingen die gebaseerd waren op de nationale ervaring herhaald in beleidsdocumenten, in speeches, en in interviews met beleidsmakers.

Door deze veelzijdige methodologische aanpak kan het boek twee belangrijke bijdragen leveren aan bestaand academisch werk. De eerste bijdrage is aan het werk over de erfenissen van oorlog: de literatuur over collectieve geheugen, die over het gebruik van analogieën door beleidsmakers, en die over oorlogsmoeheid. Dit bestaande werk laat zien dat oorlog grote sociale gevolgen heeft en belangrijk is op crisismomenten, maar maakt vaak niet duidelijk wat het exacte effect is van overwinning en nederlaag op de lange termijn beslissingen van beleidsmakers. Dit boek gaat in op hoe zulke ervaringen blijvende lessen opleveren en hoe die belangrijke strategische keuzes beïnvloeden. Het biedt een systematisch betoog over de oorsprong van zulke lessen en waarom ze in stand gehouden blijven, ondanks latere conflicten.

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De tweede bijdrage is aan de literatuur over de oorsprong van grand strategy en de rol van opvattingen met betrekking tot binnenlandse instituties, internationale structuren, en materiele macht. Het betoog vormt zo een uitgewerkte versie van neoklassiek realisme die ik ervaring gedreven realisme noem. Ervaring gedreven realisme theoretiseert hoe zowel nationale strategische opvattingen als de verhoudingen tussen de staat, samenleving, en de krijgsmacht bepaald worden door de uitkomsten van oorlogen, en op hun beurt het strategische gedrag van staten bepalen binnen de structurele beperkingen van de internationale omgeving. Het biedt een betoog over de oorsprongen van opvattingen over strategie, wanneer en waarom die constant blijven, en wanneer en waarom ze veranderen.

Het verhaal van dit boek is daarom meer dan een verhaal over hoe analogieën gebruikt en misbruikt worden. Het maakt duidelijk dat er grote verschillen bestaan in zienswijzen aan beide kanten van de Atlantische Oceaan en dat die hun oorsprong vinden in ervaringen met oorlog. Het is ook niet te verwachten dat die zienswijzen snel zullen veranderen.

Het betoog van dit boek is belangrijk voor iedereen die geeft om vermeende lessen uit de nationale geschiedenis en de implicaties voor huidig beleid. Terwijl wij niet gebonden zijn aan het verleden, oefent het een bepalende invloed uit op ons denken over de toekomst. Er is een duidelijk gevaar dat beleid gebaseerd zal zijn op een mythisch begrip van het verleden. Strategie bestaat uit het afstemmen van doelen en middelen; per definitie zijn er geen ongevaarlijke vooroordelen in strategisch denken, vooral als die vooroordelen onbewust zijn. Een niet of nauwelijks overwogen terughoudendheid of principiële oppositie tegen het gebruik van militaire middelen is even verontrustend als een niet of nauwelijks overwogen enthousiasme ten opzichte van oorlog. Zowel ‘altijd Munich’ als ‘nooit meer oorlog’ zijn slechte modellen om buitenlands beleid op te baseren. Overreageren in Irak in 2003 is een even gevaarlijk idee als het niet coherent reageren in de Oekraïne Crisis, of de opkomst van de zogenaamde Islamitische Staat in Syrië en Irak in 2014.

In termen van internationale dreigingen en uitdagingen, zullen de komende decennia beduidend anders zijn voor de VS, het VK, Frankrijk, en Duitsland -dan de hele periode sinds 1945, hetzij door een steeds instabieler Midden Oosten, een revanchistisch Rusland, of een opkomend China. Er schuilt groot gevaar in het te breed toepassen van lessen uit het verleden van het Westen, en in het falen om te begrijpen dat de wereld anders is of niet te accepteren op welke wijze het anders is. De paden die onbegaan zijn, zullen over het hoofd gezien worden, en de toekomst zou het verleden kunnen herhalen om redenen die zowel tragisch als vermijdbaar zijn.

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