ussbs reports no.56, effects of air attack on urban complex: tokyo-kawasaki-yokohama

8/8/2019 USSBS Reports No.56, Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex: Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama

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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEYn.

Effects of Air AttackONUrban Complex

Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohamat *.i-.V-

Urban Areas Division

June 1947

U


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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Effects of Air AttackONUrban Complex

Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama

Urban Areas Division

June 1947

PUBLIC


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U. K. Slt^RlfrrfNDENT OF 0OCUMNliJUL 19 t^

.fc*'

This report was written primarily for the use of the U. S. Strategic BombingSurvey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature.Any conchisions or opinions expressed in tliis report must be considered aslimited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretationin the light of furtlier studies conducted by the Survey.


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FOREWORDTlu' I'liiti'il Stall's Slnilc^ic IJonihiii;;- Sur\fv

i\st;il)lislie(l h\ tlie Secretary of AVar on :'>I'.'44, i)urHiiant to a diivctivf froiii tlii'

I'lesidt'iit Roosevelt. Its mission was to con-an impartial and expert stiuly of the effectsour aerial attack on ( iermany, to he used in con-

with air attacks on .Japan and to estaliUslihasis for e\ahiiitini>' I lie importance and poten-

of air power as an instrument of mihtaryfor iiianinnii' the future development of

Fnited States armed forces and for determin-futui'e economic policies with respect to tlie

defense. A summary report and somesupporting reports containin


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TABLE OF CONTENTSPage

Summary and Conclusions 1The Target Area 3Air AttacliS *jEponomie Effects of Air Attaclis ^Industrial Production 18Effects of Romtiing on Industrial Tokyo liSTable 1. Population and Density 3

2. Number and Type of Huil


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Page14-C. Labor Fonf. Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki '^^

15. Aircraft, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki '*'*16. Ordnance. Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 44IT. Shiphuildinpr and Repair, Tokyo-Yokoliania-Kawasaki 4518. Motor Vehicles, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawa.saki 4519. Electrical Products, Tokyo-Yokohania-Kawa.saki 4620. JIachinery and Tools, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 4621. lletal Products, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 4722. Basic Metals, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 4723. Chemicals, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 4824. Petroleum, Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki 4S25. Miscellaneous Industries, Tokyo-Yokoharaa-Kawasakl 4926. Public Utilities. Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki27. Total Plant Sample, Tokyo28. Aircraft, Tokyo29. Ordnance, Tok.vo ^'^30. Shipbuilding, Tok.vo 5131. Motor Vehicle.s, To.vko I- 5232. Electric Equipment, Tokyo '.33. Machine and Tools, Tok.vo34. Met.il Products, Tok.vo 5335. Tokyo Basic Metals Production 5436. Tok.vo Chemicals 5437. Tokyo Miscellaneous 5538. Tok.vo Hit Plants 5539. Tokyo Uuhit Plants 56(Bomb Damage Plots)

Map A. City of Tokyo Facing Page 56B. Kawasaki, .Japan, Bomb and Fire Damage o"C. City of Yokohama !: Facing Page 58

I - '

495050

o253

vl


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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONSTlic Area I'rior to Ah- Attacks. J5y tlie time theattack was seriously undertalveii afiainst tiie

home islands, in November ly-t-t, Japanbeen condnctin- military campaigns in Chinaseven years, and the I'acitic [ihase of Woi'ldII had been inider way for tlirec years. 'Tiie

r-tiung' activities of its ai'niy and navy hadtiie resources of the nation, the tigiiteningblockade and the sulnnarine menace iiadits sea-borne traffic, and its inept policy

allocating men and materials at home hada further strain on the already disintegrat-

economy. The great port city of Yokohama,hich had long handled a quarter of Japan'sreign trade and ranked second in importance

the shipping centers of the Empire, wasat a standstill, and its shipyards were given

to the repair of the few ships that coidd stillinto its harl)oi'. The enormous industrial con-

of Kawasaki was rapidly consuming itssupply of I'aw materials in a iinal

of forced production; and the vast assemblylants of Tokyo were suli'ering a critical lack of

j^arts, which could no longer be turnedin sufficient quantities to meet the demands ofwar machine. Although electric power wasabundant, the supply of coal had long been

short, and consumption of its by-prod-coke and gas, was drastically curtailed.a sufficient number of w^orkers was at allavailable to industry, the efficiency of theforce had been greatly reduced because of

administration's inability to achieve an equit-distribution of manpower between militarycivilian requirements; and the conscription

skilled workers for the armed forces had leftvoid that could not be adequately filled with un-

laborers, women and minors. Thus, de-the fact that industry by consuming its

inventories, had attained a ])eak ])ro-during the last months of 1D44, the decline

already set in before the first devastating in-raid, in March 1945, laid waste to almost

stjuare miles of the most densely jiopnlatedof Tokyo.

The P.sysiral Ejfcctn of Air Attark.s. Aparta few sorties against aircraft plants on the

of Tokyo between November 1944 and1945, which served chiefly to accelerate

dispersal progi'am in that imlnstiT, and seve-

lal intensive piecision allacks on the oil refinei-iesof Kakasaki in July and August 1945, which cametoo late in the war in iidlnence the over-all declinein the comi)lex, the entire bombing program wascarried out during three consecutive months in thespring of 1945. Foi- all strategic purposes, the airattack in this area of Jajjan was over by the endof May. ]n this short period, over 1S,()()() tons ofbond)s were dropped on the three cities, out of atotal of almost i!;5,()()() tons delivered to the com-plex. J^racticiilly all of the physical damage andmost of the casualties occui-red during the sevenarea raids in these three months. Altogether,over 70 of the 142 square miles of bult-up ai'eawere complclely devastated, and almost 863,000out of a total of 1,454,0()() liuildings were de-stroyed. Some 4.6 million of the H million inhabi-tants were evacuated, more than 3.4 million hav-ing lost their homes. The total number of killedamounted to nearly 1()(),000, and an equal numberwas injured. The physical effectiveness of thearea raids is demonstrated by the fact that anaverage of 300 tons of bombs were dispatchedfrom the Marianas to devastate 0.45 square mile,destroy 54 buildings and produce 6 casualties.The Economical Effects of Ah- Attacks. If the

mass incendiary raids against Japanese cities wereintended to disrupt the economic life of the com-numities, destroy their industrial potential, andtliereby weaken the will and the ability of thepeople to support the military operations of itsleaders, these attacks may be said to have beenhighly successful. The industrial sample of thecomplex showed a loss in Yen production of 66]iercent, the Tokyo sample 65 percent. Thesesamples, however, contained only those plantsemploying over 100 workers, which in Tokyo ac-counted for about 50 pei'cent of the total city prod-uct. Here it was found that production in plantsemploying under 100 workers, representing theremaining 50 percent of the total product, de-creased ai)proximately 75 jiercent. Thei-efore, ifone-half of Tokyo's production declined 65 per-cent and the other half 75 percent, the total declineamounted to 70 percent, which closely approxi-mated (he di'op of 74 percent shown by the over-all data for the complex in Table 19. The loss dueto bomb damage in the larger plant category inTokyo was found to be 32 percent out of a totaldecline of 65 percent : and almost all of the decline


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in the smaller category was due to the same cause.Thus, if a 32 percent loss in one-half of the city'sproduction and (conservatively) a 68 percent lossin the other lialf were due to bomb dama


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THE TARGET AREATlw h'liiito I'hdn. One of the iiio.st liif;lily in-

dustrialized and densely populated areas in theworld lies in the lowlands of the Kanio I'hiin, onthe eastern coast of tiie main Japane.se island ofHonshu. This plain, at the vertex of the angleformed by the island, covers an area of approxi-mately 2,500 square miles, or 5 percent of the totalarea of the homeland, and contains almost 20 per-cent of Japan's population. Twenty-eight of thecountry's 182 chartered cities lie within this dis-trict, approximately 85 percent of the 12,000,000inhabitants living within urban communities.Although some minerals are mined in the plain(particularly copper, at Hidachi in East Kanto),fabrication of tini.shed products represents itsmain contribution to the country's economy. Mostof the raw materials and semi-fini-shed productsconverted in its factories are shipped in fromabroad and from other sections of the Empire.Large ciuantities of rice are grown in the alluviallowlands and some wheat and barley in the morearid uplands of the plain; but tlie valley is oneof the least fertile of the country. Of the 13 per-cent of national food products contributed by theKanto district in 1940, all but 1 percent was rep-resented by the fish catch. In the same year, 25percent of all Japanese industrial workers wereemployed in this area, a percentage which prob-ably corresponds closely to that of its industrialproduction.The TJrban Complex. The industrial heart of

the Kanto Plain is the urban complex of Tokyo.Kawasaki, and Yokohama, which forms a con-tinuous built-up area extending 25 miles along thewestern shore of Tokyo Bay, on a jiarallel ap-proximating that of Los Angeles, California, andRaleigh, N. C. (35 N). The three cities com-bined cover 429 square miles, with a normal popu-lation of 8 million, or 11 percent of the nationaltotal. Prior to the destruction caused by air at-tacks, over .30 percent of the above area was thicklysettled, particularly along the water fronts. Thecongested wards of Tokyo, north and east of theImperial Palace, contained numerous small andmedium-sized workshops, while the larger indus-trial installations were situated on the outskirtsof the city, and south along the bay into the harbordi.strict of Kawasaki. The principal trading cen-

ters were east and soutli of the Palace, and occu-pied practically the whole of Yokohama. Ship-ping activities were conducted along the entirelength of the bay shore, with the chief port facil-ities in Yokohama.

Population. In tlie twenty years between 1920and 1940, the number of inhabitants in the threecities had doubled; and by the beginning of 1944,the complex was supporting 18,800 persons to thesfjuare mile, the more congested wards averaging80,000 per square mile. The most densely popu-lated area in the complex, Asakusa ward north-east of the Imperial Palace, had a density of 130,-000. Table 1 shows the population of each city forfour census years, together with the density basedon the 1940 censvis :

Table 1. I'opiilaiioii mid dr.si7;/Year


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Table 2.-^Xiinilii r (uul tiiiir of hnildiiif/sCity


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I'lec'tric power consuiiii'il in J;i|);iii, 7(1 |)t'r ci'iit ofthe local power being consumed in Tokyo. Morethan 80 pei-ccnt of this electi-icity was suppliedfrom hydroeh'ctric ])iants in the liifildanils, theremainder beinji; furnished by coal -powered sta-tions throufi'liout the urban iireas. Steam ])ower,wliich was used to some extent locally, was supplied1)V Kawasaki with this city alone accountiiifj formore than ^5 i)ercent of all steam power producedin Japan. Duriiifr the same year, the three citiesconsumed oxer 4()7 million cubic meters of gas,produced mainly by the large works in Yokohamaand Kawasaki. The water supply, like the gasand electric systems, was an integrated networkthroughout the (oiii|)le.\, Kawasaki lieing thejirime producer.

Imllistrial Ini fxirfdiice. It is estimated thatduring the war yea is Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Yoko-hama together accounted for about 20 jiercent ofthe total industrial output of .Japan. The numer-ous home workshops existing throughout the areaprior to I'.l-fO had been greatly reduced and theirowners and workers transferred to larger jilantswhere their labor could be utilized more efficiently.In Tokyo alone, the total number of industrial])lants of all sizes had decreased from 91,S70 inlO-fO to 41,548 in October 1944, while the numberof workers had increased from 7'28,09ii to 1,101,-507 over the same period. At the time of thenational census of February 1944, the three citiesemployed 1,542,7.35 workers, or 16 percent of the

industrial lalioi- I'on-e of llic nation. I^css than a(|uarter of a million were engaged in tiade al thesame time. The principal ))i'oducts turned out ofits factories and relineries weie aircraft and air-ci'aft engines, niacliinery and tools, iron and steel,munitions, chemicals, textiles, and oil. Tokyowas responsible for the greatei' |)oi'l!on of most ofthese proilncis, though Kawasaki possessed tlu^important oil refineries and a large share of thechemical i)lants. Yokohama's chief importancelay in its shipyards, although its industi-ial out-put was considerable.

Strateciic I in jKirtdhcc. The meti'opolitan areaof Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Yokohama, with thelargest city, the second lai'gest port, the highesttrade volume, and the greatest concentration ofindustrial plants in the country, was of the utmoststrategic importance to Japan's wartime economy.As the seat of all authority, l)oth civil and mili-tary, it was the administrative as well as the eco-nomic heart of the Japanese Empire. Its networkof land and sea transportation, which carried thematerials of war from its vital factories, addedfurther to its prime significance in the Japaneseeconomy. Any disturbance of its efficient opera-tion was, therefore, bound to affect to a great de-gree the essential activities of the nation as awhole; and it was inevitable that this urban com-plex should l)ecome the first and main target inthe air war against Japan.


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AIR ATTACKSTarget Location. In the iiiituniii of 1!.)44. wlien

air attacks were initiated aijainst the Japaneselionie ishmds the first raids were launched from(luani. 1,500 miles away. Before I wo .lima (600miles) and Okinawa (840) coidd l)e used as airbases, .Japan's larj^est cities liad already sufferedthe heaviest attacks of the canipaii^n. The urbancomplex of Tokyo. Kawasaki and Yokohama,located in the heart of the central island of Hon-shu, was the most vital and at the same time oneof tlie most inaccessible of the city tar months. By far the most eti'ective airatta


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Plujx'ii-dl I>iiiii'i


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Ca.sualfles. According to Japanese estimates,the number of people left homeless as a result ofthe air attacks on the three cities reached 3.4 mil-lion, or 43 percent of the total population. OfficialJapanese estimates also place the number of per-sons evacuated from the urban area at around 4.6million, or 58 percent of the population. Therecords of city police officials show that casualtiesin the area amounted to almost 199.()()0, or 40 per-cent of the casualties for Japan as a whole, ap-proximately 60 percent of the local figure beingthe result of the one raid of 10 March 194.5. Thenumber of missing persons was never determinedin tliis area. It is quite possible that many peopleotherwise iniaccounted for should luive beencounted among the dead. In like manner, manyof tlie severely injured proljably died later of tlieirwounds, wliile a considerable number of the slight-ly injured may never liave been re]iorted. In viewof tliese possibilities, tlie figures in Table 8 shouldbe considered as minimal.

Table 8. Air raiil cuaiKiltiesCasualties


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ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIR ATTACKSI lit ri/diiction. Kroin (lie extent of physical

ilaiiiii>>e described in the t'uiegoinfj' seel ion it wouldseem that honibinji' must luive liad a treniendous mil-lion in 1944. The number of ships putting intoport dniing the same years was 5,88ii, 3,205 ajid2,()7r), respectively. Thus, long before the boml)-ing program was initiated against the area, ship-ping had suffered a sharp


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10. which shows the average monthly sliipmentsrecorded during the preraid period, February1944 through Janiuiry lU4r).Table 10. Monthly preraid averiujc of icater-bornccommodities

[Metric tons]

Commodity


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iiiovi'd l)_v (rucks could lie ohlMiiicd oidy I'rouiAujjfiisl 1'.I44; l>ul it is evident from tliesc li^^uiesthiit l)onil)iu^f had a drastic eiiect on lliis form oftran.sportatiou (Graph 4). From a peak of morethan (;;);>,()4.5, incomin;^ truckfrei


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of priorities, the i)r percent, and thereafter toonly 30 percent of allocations. Tlie use of coal fordomestic and public heating was prohil)ited afterMarch 1944: and many of the smaller industries,such as textiles and food jjrocessing, began to usewood as fuel. The principal reason for coal short-ages was the lack of transportation. Shipping-losses and the submarine blockade eft'ectivelystopped shipments into Tokyo Bay and threw theburden of transi)ortation on the already over-M'orked and inadecjuate lailways. After October19-13. 70 percent of the coal from Hokkaido camein by rail, the remaining 30 percent being shippedthrough Japan Sea ports. From March 1944 on,the movement of lignite from southern Honshuwas discontinued because of a shortage of railfacilities, and after May 1945 there were no fur-ther imports from Korea and Kyushu. Finally,the Xavy strike of June 1945 against Hakodateand Aoniori destroyed the ferries plying betweenHokkaido and Honshu and brought rail transpor-tation of coal into Tokyo from the noi'th to a com-plete stop.

Coal ConHiini pt'idii. Statistics for coal consump-tion in the three cities were obtainable only as farback as April 1944, but it is evident that the de-cline had set in long before that month. Coal con-sumption in industry, the major consumer, de-clined steadily during the entire period, there be-ing no marked fluctuations occurring at the timeof air attacks (Graph 5) . From a total of 420,800tons in April 1944, consumption in the areadropped to 134,600 tons in Jidy 1945. Table VIshows the average anioiiiil of coal consumed inthe various categories in the three cities duringthe preraid months. A])ril 1944 through Januai-y1945. together with the decline during the r.-iidperiod. Februai'v through .Inly 1945.

Coke. Highest piiorities in tiie use of coke weregiven to the aiiciaft parts and munitions indus-tries. Bomb damage to coking ])lants was ivla-tively light; consequently there v,as no decline in])ro(luction from this cause. Shortages, whichexisted pi-imarily in the low prioi'ities category of(onsumer. were due aliiio>l cxrhisix-eh' to the ilif-

Taulk 12. Colli i-iiiisiiiiiiitinn[Metric tons]

Period


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Tahi.k l.'i. -Ctikr (i'"i[Meti'ic lonsj


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during the winter months of liUii1:3 and I'J-iot-t.Hifrhest priorities went to phmts manufacturingproducts directly for the armed forces, while sec-ond priorities were held by those industries indi-rectly serving the military. Very few large in-dustries generated their own power, as mostprivate generators had been transj)orted to south-ern Asia by government order. At no time, how-ever, was there a critical shortage of electricpower: and even minor shortages ceased by theend of 11)44, when air attacks began to reducepower needs througii damage to consumerfacilities.

Electric Power Coihsmnption (Graph 8). Dur-ing the i)reraid period. October 19-1:3 through Jan-uary 1SH5. total electric power consumption for allcategories fluctuated between 2.i(l million and 310million kilowatt-hours monthly, the low pointbeing registeied during tlie sununer of 1944. ByJuly 1945. however, total consumption had de-clined to aroiuul li!3 million kilowatt-hours.Electricity for lighting purjioses was naturallymost affected, owing to diminished seasonal needsand the black-outs then in force. Consumption insmall industries was reduced first by the closingand consolidation of small plants and later bydestruction due to bombing. Evidence of this wasfound in Tokyo, where the number of small con-sumers decreased from 92,000 in October 1943 to78,()()0 in Jatuiary 1945, and to 25,000 by July1945, representing a decline of 15 percent prior toair attacks and a further decline of 58 percentduiing the laid period. Over the same period,installed capacity in small industries was reducedfrom 375,000 kilowatts to 354,000 kilowatts pre-paid, and to 118,000 kilowatts by the end of theraid period, or 6 percent and (13 percent, respec-tively. ]SIost of the decline in the second period wasdue to bomb damage to facilities, as a large portionof the small industrial installations were located inthe devastated areas. The larger plants sufferedconsidei'ably less from bombing, partly becausemany of them were located on the periphery of thecities, and partly because tlieir more solid con-struction was less vulnerable to incendiaiy attacks.The consiunption decline in large indu.stries wasdue to cui'tailed ])roduction caused by shortagesof coal and raw materials rather than to a loss ofelecti'ic ])ower capacity. In genera!, su])])]y ofelectricity was adecjuate for all demaiuls in allcategories of consumers. Table 15 shows the aver-age monthly consumptifni of electricity jirior to

air attacks, and tlTable 1.">.Elrcti le tlecline during the raid period.ic poicer consumption [1.000 kw.h.]

Period

TokyoPre-raidRaidPercent of decUne

Kawasaki andYokoliania :Pre-raidRaidPercent of declineTotalPre-raidRaidPercent of decline

Light

23,82015,889

33

4,2422,89232

28,06218,781

33

Power(under50 kw.)

16,3079,077

44

3,0131,929

3619,32011,006

43

Power(over50 lew.) Total

148,07.5 188.202SS,.o07

I 113,47.S40 40

74,53443,392

42222,609131,899

41

81.78948,213

41269,991161,68640

Source: Kanto Haiden (Distributing) Co.Gas. All of the gas used in Tokyo. Kawasaki,

and Yokohama was produced by eight plants inthe three cities, with a total pre-raid capacity ofaround 48 million cbm monthly, distributed asfollows

City


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llirt'c cilics was I'cdiircil liy aliiKist lialf, wliilt!()V(>r-all iiioiillily coiisiiniiil inn ilccliiicil .5.5 per-cent. Tlius, air attacks liad tlie eH'crt of rolicviiii^tlie gas shortage by destroying tiie demand, cliieflyin tlie domestic category.Gan Consumption (Graph 9). From a peak of

over 49 million cubic meters in Maich 1944, con-sumption dropped to slightly under 36 million inFebruary 1945, just pi'inr to the lirst damagingarea raid. Thereafter, the decline was greatlyprecipitated, reaching a low of ;">.() million cubicmeters in July, the greatest drop occurring be-tween March and May. As these were the monthsof heaviest air attacks, the decline was due to aphysical decrease in botli producer and consumercapacity, although production was still comfort-ably in excess of consumption during tiie last 4months of the war. Table IG shows the monthlypi'eraid averages of consumption, and the declineduring the raid montlis.

Table 16. Oas consuiiiptinn[1.000 cubic meters]

Period


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Table 17. liitlii.'itiidi hilior force

Period


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()l)l;iiii del ill It'll |)riHliic't ion sl;it isl irs lor I lie ril ya wliole, tlie over-all tiata axaihiltlc, Iroin .laiiii-

i'y l!t44 to August 1945, serve to point up I lietor inilustry in


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INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIONIndustrial Plant Sample. In ordei- to undertake

a more detailed analysis of industrial activity thanwas possible from the over-all data assembled forthe urban complex, questionnaires were sent tosome 1000 plants in Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Yoko-hama. Of these. 516 were returned with statisticscomplete enough to establish a valid industrialsample for the area. The following list gives the .industrial classihcations used throughout thisstudy, togetlier witli the number of plants com-pleting the questionnaire in eacli industry group:

Category


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for the over-all decline, in order of tVe(|Ueiicy ;iiidimportance, were : (1) hdior ditliciilties, (2) sliort-afj:es of raw niatei'iiils, and {?>) shortajivs of fnel.Bomb damage us a direct canse of produdionlosses was cited seventh on the list. .V word ofclarification is necessary, howe\ei', in order toundei'stand the sinilicance ol' these limit in"- fac-tors and their relationship to one another. Thelahor prohlem cannot he interpreted merely as ashortage of plant workers. It I'onsisted rather inabsenteeism, induced by the need of workers tocare for their families and repair their homes dur-ing the period of devastating area raids, and bythe necessity for seeking food in distant ruralareas after air attacks had disrupted the rationingsystem in the cities. Absenteeism was further in-creased by the disruption and inadequacy of localtransportation, likewise the result of air attacks,and the efRciency of the workei's was lowered andtheir productivity lessened as a result of the under-mining psychological eifects of frequent bomb-ings. Though shortages of skilled workers oc-curred in some industries, thei'e was at no time acritical lack of manpower in the plants exceptthi'ough absenteeism. Thus, air attacks may besaid to have been the primary cause, even thoughindirectly, of the decline in industrial productionafter the end of 1944. On the other hand, short-ages of raw materials, component parts and fuel(gas and coal) had been the principal limitingfactors prior to the raid period, and continued toplaj' an important part in reducing output duringthe succeeding months. As we have already seen,these shortages were due primarily to the Alliedblockade, and the antishipping program, and tothe inadequacy of the Japanese allocations andtransportation system. While air attacks de-stroyed numerous small worksho2)s and tempo-rarily disrupted production in many of the largerplants, the reporting industries escai^ed majordestruction of their facilities. The only otherlimiting factors WQrthy of mention were : officialorders changing the nature or model of end prod-ucts; changes in the requirements of customers,and dispersal.Periods of Limitation. Shortages of fuel ex-

isted as early as 1943, owing to drastic enemy-induced restrictions on shipping, and continuedto be the primary limiting factor on productionuntil March 1944. From April to October, al-though peak production was attained during this

))ei-iod. raw iiialerials were llie Ixill lencrk lintfrom November 1944 until the end of the war theeft'ects of air attacks ininiini/.cd tlie shortagesthi-ough an increase in :d>senteeism at the plantsand a Fiirlher slow-down in production ihroiighthe necessary use of untrained workers in skilledcategories. ]>oth raw materials and fuel, how-ever, renuiined short tliioiiLdiont the entire raidperiod. While official orders and changes in cus-tomer demands slowed production in almost everyindusti'Y prioi' to the jjei'iod of air attacks, thesefactors became less pronounced during the raidmonths. Dispersal was im])ortant only in theaii'craft industry, which iiegan its program asearly as August 1944. though early in 194.5. trans-fers of plant and e(iui|)inent began to take placeto a certain extent in almost every industry. Thefollowing li.st shows the relative importance of thelimiting factors of production in each of the in-dustrial groups in l)oth the pre-raid and raidperiods

Reasons given for decline in productionIndustry


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Reusuns i/in ii for decline in production (continued)Industry


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Tahi.k 20. Divl'.iK ill iiiitiinliiiil fiiihiis iluiiiiii iiiids[Units in 1,0001


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yen stiles per proiliu-tive hour. Table -I'l showsthe ratios for both tlie base period and the monthof July l!)4o. tooetJier witli the itercentages ofdecrease or increase.

Prudiictioti Losxex Due to Bdinh I>(a)i(ige. Inorder to isolate the direct etl'ects of air attacks(bomb damatre to plant and equipment) from theindirect etl'ects (absenteeism, worker moiale, etc.)and aenerul wartime conditions (shortages of rawmaterials, obsolescence of machinery, etc.), it isnecessary to compare the decline in productionfactors of damaged plants with that of undam-aged plants (Graphs 13 and 14). Table 23 com-pares the figures for the preraid period with thoseof July 1!)45. and shows the percentages of declineduring the raid mouths.Thus, the ratio of loss of damaged plants to tliatof undamaged plants is 70 to 47, or 1.5 to 1.0 forYen sales, ii.5 to l.i for jiroductive hours, and 1.7to 1.0 for electric' jiower consmnption. Assumingthat jiroduction in all plants, both damaged andundamaged, was influenced equally by prevailingeconomic conditions, including the indirect etl'ectsof air attacks, we find that the decline in yen salesdue to such causes would amount to 47 ]iercent,as shown in the midamaged category. Tliis samepercentage would also liold true for the dauiaged

plants; therefore, any loss in excess of the 47 per-cent in the damaged category can be attriljutedto the direct effects of bombing. As the decreasein yen sales of damageil plants was 70 percent,the difference between the losses in the two cate-gories, or 23 percent, represents the loss due tothese direct effects, that is, the destruction of plantand e


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ill |iri)(liicl ion (.illlscd iiidirci'I ly liy :iir r;ii(ls aii


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duction of motor veliicles was due to absenteeismand shortages of skilled workers.Electrkal Products (Graph 10). Deliveries in

this industry reached their peak in December1944. held above normal until March 194.5, thenbegan an almost vertical drop to June, levelingoff during the last '1 months of the war with a lossof 64 percent. Electric power consumption fluc-tuated only slightly until February 1945, when itbegan to decline sharply. In April the dro]) wasprecipitous, liut by June it had leveled otl' witli de-liveries, finishing the last '1 months with a totaldecline of lit) pei-cent. During the preraid months,the shortage of raw materials was the most ini-j)ortant factor limiting higher production andlabor was a secondary problem; but after the airattacks had begun, absenteeism and some lack ofskilled workers became primary cause of thedecline, in spite of the fact that the total laborforce had diminished oidy 10 percent by July.The shortage of raw materials continued, how-ever, as a secondary cause, followed by a shortageof fuel.

Marlihiei'i/ (111(1 Tools (Graph 20). The erraticfluctuations in this industry during the pre-i'aidmonths were attributable to shortages of rawmaterials and government orders effecting changesin end products. Peak deliveries were reached inNovember 1944. with maximiun electric powerconsumption occurring at the same time. Thouglij)roduction fell off' sligiitly in January 1945, thereal decline did not set in until March of thatyear. In May, the drop in both electric powerconsumption and deliveries was slowed down,ending in July with los.ses of 45 percent and 5.spercent, respectively. The labor force in themeantime had decreased only 20 percent. Ab-senteeism was cited as the main cause of thedecline in production during the raid period, withshortages of raw materials and fuel as secondand third causes.Metal Products (Grajih 21). After an erratic

preraid production ascribed to labor difficultiesand official orders effecting changes in end produc-tion, this industry reached its peak of deliveriesin October 1944; thereafter the decline was rapid.Electric power consumption, on the other hand,attained its peak as early as December 1943, withthe final decline beginning ju.st 1 year latei'.Thereafter, the two factors showed a paialleldecline, yen sales dif)pping (>S pei-cent and Kwh

74 percent by .lune 1945; though both registeredslight rises in July. The labor force had decreasedonly 18 percent at the end of the raid period; butabsenteeism was still cited as the main cause of thedecline in production. Shortages of raw mate-rials wei-e secondary.Basic Metal Production (Graph 22). During

the entire period under survey, the causes givenfor difficulties in the production of basic metalswere, in order of importance, labor, fuel and rawnuiterials. The decline in both deliveries andelectric power consumption began in December1944, continued gradually until March 1945, thendropped sharply in April. After a temporaryciieck in the downward trend in May and June, thegradual decline was resumed, yen sales ending inJuly with a loss of 59 percent and electric powerconsumption declining (i6 percent. The laborforce had diminished only 5 percent during thesame pei'iod.Chemicals (Graph 23). In this industry, rawmaterials and fuel were at all times criticallyshort. For this reason, production was fairlysteady, with no e.xtreme i)eaks or tioughs duringthe pre-raid period. A gradual decline in all fac-tors set in after November 1944, electric powerconsum})tion decreasing (U percent and yen sales56 percent by June 1945. The labor force hadrisen 4 percent by the same month.Petroleum (Graph 24). As the raw materials

for this industry liad to be imported, criticalsliortages existed in this factor throughout thewar. Labor difficulties were a secondary cause oftlie erratic fluctuations occurring throughout thepreraid months, while dispersal played an import-ant part in the decline during the period of airraids. Finally, in June and Julj' 1945, precisionattacks further reduced oil production in the area,though physical damage occurred too late in thewar to permit an attempt at recovery. The laborforce increasecl steadily until July 1945, endingthat month at 236 percent of the preraid average.The downward trend in both yen sales and electricpower consum])tion began in November 1944, andthough fluctuation in both factors continued to beextremely erratic, deliveries registered a total de-cline of 94 percent and kwh a drop of 82 percentby July 1945.

Miscellaneous Industries (Graph 25). Labordifficulties were the chief cause of productiondecline in the leather, textiles and paper indus-tries, \r,\y\ of whose output was intended for civil-

24


33/83

iiiri consiiiii])! ion. Oliicial ordcis n'(|iiiriiij;- pi'o-(liiclioii cliaiijjji's wcri' also ri'S|)oiisil)l(' I'oi- lliict na-tions eliii'in


34/83

EFFECTS OF BOMBING ON INDUSTRIAL TOKYOIntrvduction. As the iiulusti-i;il statistics for

Tokyo are more complete and in greater detailthan those for the complex as a whole, especiallyin the matter of physical damage, an analysis ofthe decline in production in this one city gives aclearer picture of the industrial activity of theentire urban area under survey. According to theJapanese national census of February 19-1:4, Tokyoaccounted for 85 percent of the industrial workers.80 percent of the industrial buildings, and 84 per-cent of the industrial building area in the threecities. It likewise consumed 68 percent of theelectric power and 72 percent of the gas used byindustry in the complex. It is significant that thecapital, depending to a great extent on small shopsemployi}ig a large proportion of hand workers,recpiired only 27 percent of the coal and 4(i per-cent of the coke consumed Ijy plants in the area.Of the 51() plants sampled for the over-all anal-ysis. Tokyo's 337 accounted for 58 percent of thej-en sales. 54 percent of the i)roductive labor hours,50 percent of the labor force, and ;>7 i)ercent of theelectric power consumption. Thus. Tokyo itselfrepresents a fair sample of industrial activity inthe complex as a whole, while its great variety ofindustries and the wide range of its plant sizes lendadditional validity to the analysis.

Industrial I'lant-s Prior to Air Affarks. Thetotal number of plants in Tokyo in li)40 was 91,-370, the workers numbering 728.092. The processof amalgamation and combing out of smaller in-stallations, and the resultant shift of workers tolarger plants, had reduced the total number ofplants to 98 percent of the above figure by 1942.and to 45 jiercent by October 1944, just prior to thefirst air attack. The number of workers, on theother hand, had increased to 100 percent and 151percent during the same periods. The changes innumber of plants and workers, by size of installa-tion, together with the percentage loss or gainfrom 1942 to October 1944, ai-e shown in Table 24.The over-all increase in labor force came aboutchiefly thrf)ugh the closing of wliolesale and retailestablishments and the transfer (d' their emi)lovees(over 8(1(1.01 to in V.iU)] to factory work. By Octo-ber 1944. there were oidy 190.000 persons engagedin trade. Category 2 shows the major gain ininiinber of both plants and workers, some of theincrease ha\ing ijecn ar(|niicd from Category 1.

Table 24. Xiniihcr of ijltnit.s uiul irorkcrx prior to raids


35/83

Table 25.Dccnuxi- in ni(iiili


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October 1944, and it was not until January 1945tliat deliveries dropped below the monthly aver-age for the pre-raid jjeriod. At the end of April,the sharp decline was arrested somewhat andsales even rose slightly in June, but in July thetotal decline had reached 65 percent. Electric])()wer consumption continuetl at a fairly steadylevel thn)ugh November 1944. then declined grad-ually until February 1945, and fell otl' sharply thefollowing niontli. The downward trend in thisfactor was also checked momentarily in April,but continued thereafter, registering a total dropof 54 penciit by .Inly. Productive labor hoursbegan to decrease slightly in November 1944, liutdid not drop ])elow the pre-raid average until Fel)-ruary 1945. In spite of an accelerated decline inApril, productive hours rose temporarily in May,only to fall again thereafter, showing a loss of49 percent by July. The lalmr force was normaluntil May 1945, and had lost only 19 percent by theend of the war. Evidence of the drastic etl'ects ofthe area raids is seen in the precipitous droj) in allfactors during March and April.

Decline in Production Ratio--:. At the enil ofthe raid period, yen sales per worker had decreased57 percent, and productive hours j^er worker haddropped 87 percent. Thus, not only was the pro-ductivity of active labor reduced; inactive laborhad greatly increased and absenteeism had becomethe most serious factor in the labor problem. Thefact that sales per productive hour had also fallenotf '.Vl percent indicates a growing inefficiency onthe part of workers. This is further borne out bythe decline in sales i>er kilowatt-hour, of 24 per-cent evidence that machine efficiency was reducedbecause of the employment of untrained workers.Kilf)watt-Iiours per worker had (lro])])ed 4;^) pei'-cent and kilowatt-hours per productive hour 11l)ercent (hiring the raid months.

]>p(Tnie in Imli ridiial I iidiixtriex. Table 27shows tlie avei-age monthly Hgui'es of each prii(hic-tion factor in each industry fV)r the pre-raid period,October 194:1 through Septembei- 1944. and thefigures foi-.Iuly 1945, together with tlie percentagei-elationshi)) which each industry bears to the totaland the percentage of decline oi- lf)ss during theraid period. We find that the ])iedominant in-dustries during the base or pre-raid period wereaircraft, maciiinery and tools, basic metals, andmiscellaneous, these four categories alone account-ing for fi8 percent of yen sales. The gi-eatestlosses occurred in the aircraft and miscellaneous

industries, with shipbuilding, electrical products,and metal products each registering the next high-est losses. Monthly fluctuations in each industrymay be seen on Graphs 28 to 37. The most erraticactivities are found in the aircraft and shipbuild-ing industries, while the motor vehicle industryproved to be the steadiest. Production in almostevery industry had dropped below the base periodby the end of 1944, but the production level inordnance and electrical pi'oducts was maintaineduntil March 1945. Aircraft registered the mostprecipitous drop prior to the heavy area raids,production falling from 58.4 million yen in Octo-ber 1944 to 19.4 million in February 1945, a lossof 67 percent in 4 nu)nths. The miscellaneousindustries (textiles, leather, paper, etc.) alsoshowed a marked decline prior to the incendiaryattacks, production dropping from 55.5 millionYen in ()ctol)er 1944 to 19.(1 million in January1945, a loss of (Hi percent in ;') months. Of the 10industrial groups, all except airci-aft, sliipbnildingand the miscellaneous industries registered theirsharpest decline during the months of heavy incen-diary raids on Tokyo. Table 2S compares thedecline in each industry with the total decline forall industries. Here it is seen that the four groupsaccounting for 68 percent of the yen sales duringthe pre-raid period were also responsible for 75percent of the loss during the months of airattacks.

Decline in Production Ratios of IndividualIndustrie^!. Table 29 shows the decrease in pro-duction ratios in each industry, in both absolutefigures and ])ercentages. In all sales ratios, air-craft and the miscellaneous industries showed thegreatest drops, wiiile the other two nnijor groups,machinery and tools and basic metals, closelyparalleled the average decline for industry as awhole. In the last mentioned group, sales perkilowatt-hour actually increased dui-ing the raidl)eriod which indicated a nmre etlicient use ofelectric power, and although there was also adecline in kilowatt-houi'S per productive hour thisindustry had less need of skilled workers than didthe others. Examination of the figures showsthat in almost every case the loss of productionwas due (1) to absenteeism (decrease in produc-tive hours ])er worker) and (2) loss of efficiencyamong the ])ro(liictive woi'kei's (decrease in salesper productive hour) : and at least a portion ofthat inefficiencv is due to a lack of skilled labor.

28


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Tahi.k 27. Decline in production factors, hif itnlusiri/[All units in lOOO's, except Labor ForceJ


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Decline in Individual Labor Crruups. Table oOshows the average monthly figures for each pro-duction factor in each labor group during the pre-paid period and the figures for July 1945, togetherwith the percentage relationship which each groupbears to industry as a whole and the percentage ofdecline or loss during the raid period. "We findhere that the larger groups have the larger laborforces and are responsible for the greater produc-tion prior to the period of air attacks; althoughGroup 2 (100 to 250 workers) shows a relativelyhigh rate of sales. The high percentage of electricpower consumption in Group 4 (500 to 1,000workers) is accounted for by the fact that it con-tains most of the basic metals production industry,the main industrial user of electricity. Grouj) (i(2,500 to 5.000 workers) showed the greatest de-cline in all production factors, while Group 4actually registered an increase in number ofworkers. This latter phenomenon is attributableto the chemicals industry, which had almost dou-bled its labor force in this group by the end of thewar. Production in all groups began to declinebetween October 1944 and January 1945, the

larger groups beginning later than tlie smaller.The most erratic was Group 7 (over 5,000 workers),which contained the largest aircraft plants andshipbuilding yards. The steadiest productiontrend is foimd in Group 4, a large proportion ofwhich was the basic metals production industry.ExcejDt for Groujjs 2 and 7, major declines occurredduring the months of heaviest area raids on thecity. Table 31 compares the decline in each laborgroup with the decline for industry as a whole.Here it is seen that the two largest groups accountfor the greatest proportion of the decline in allfactors except electric power consumption, and inthis. Group 4 contributes the greate.st share. Thesesame groups also registered the highest percent-ages of the same factors during the preraid period.It is of significance that the extent of decline inproduction factors bore no relationship to thesize of the plants; and it may be concluded thatthe indirect effects of air attacks and the influenceof the disintegrating wartime economy of the citywere felt equally l)y all plants regardless of size.Decline in Production ffat/oy of Labor Groups.

Table 32 shows the decrease in production latios inTable 30.- -Decline in production facfots, by labor group

[All units in lOOO's, except Labor Force]


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Tahlk 32. Dcrtilic in jiiikIiicI iaii idlius, hit I'lliiirfiriiitiJ


40/83

Table 33. WorkKfiDii.s dcntroiied in air attacks

Industry


41/83

utable to the direct etTects of bombing would be by the indirect effects of air attacks ;iiid of lier war-around 55 ])eicent. Tlie remaining 15 percent of time econoiiiif conditions,the over-all decline would then be accounted for

33


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PERCENT

160

SHIPPING-GROSS REGISTERED TONNAGETOKYO- YOKOHAMA- KAWASAKIBASE period: OCT. 1943- SEPT. 1944

100

60


43/83

AVERAGE DAILY CARLOADINGSPERCENT140

TOKYO DIVISION -JAPANESE GOVERNMENT RAILWAYBASE PERIOD : OCT 1943 -SEPT 1944


44/83

COAL CONSUMPTIONTOKYO - YOKOHAMA - KAWASAKIBASE PERIOD-. APR.I944 -SEPT. 1944

140


45/83

CHARCOAL CONSUMPTIONPERCENT


46/83

PERCENT

GAS CONSUMPTIONTOKYO - YOKOHAMA - KAWASAKIBASE PERIOD OCT. 1943 -SEPT. 1944

140


47/83

PERCENT

40

ZO

PRODUCTIONTOKYO - YOKOHAMA - KAWASAKIBASE PERIOD: JAN.1944-SEPT.I944


48/83

TOTAL HIT PLANTSTOKYO-YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI

OCT I943-AU6 1945ISO


49/83

PERCENT

PRODUCTIONTOKYO-YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKIOCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945li!b


50/83

ELECTRIC POWER CONSUMPTIONTOKYO-YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKIOCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945

125

1 00


51/83

LABOR FORCETOKYO-YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKIOCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945

li!5


52/83

AIRCRAFTTOKYO - YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI

OCT. 1943 - AUG. 1945

(Inij)li 15.

ORDNANCETOKYO-YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI

OCT 1943-JULY 1945


53/83

SHIPBUILDING a REPAIRTOKYO-YOKOHAMA- KAWASAKI

OCT 1 943-JULY 1945150


54/83

ELECTRICAL PRODUCTSTOKYO - YOKOHAMA- KAWASAKI

OCT. 1943 - AUG. 1945 rir'^

Gidjili li>.

PERCENT

MACHINERY & TOOLSTOKYO-VQKOHAMA-KAWASAKl

OCT 1943JULY 1945ISO


55/83

METAL PRODUCTSTOKYO-YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKIOCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945

100 w


56/83

PERCENTISO

CHEMICALSTOKYO-YOKOHAMA- KAWASAKIOCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945


57/83

MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIESTOKYO- YOKOHAMA-KAWASAKI

OCTOBER 1943 TO AUGUST 1945lU


58/83

I 50

125

100

7 5

50

25

TOTAL PLANT SAMPLETOKYOOCTOBER 1943 TO JULY 1945


59/83

ORDNANCETOKYOOCTOBER 1943 TO JULY 1945

125

100

78

80

8

1


60/83

MOTOR VEHICLESTOKYOOCTOBER 1943 TO JULY 1945

I2S

100

75

50


61/83

MACHINE a TOOLSTOKYO


62/83

TOKYO BASIC METALSPRODUCTIONOCT 43 JULY 45150


63/83

TOKYO MISCELLANEOUSOCT 43JULY 45

ERC


64/83

TOKYO UNHIT PLANTSOCT 43-JULY 45PERCENT160

IZ5

100

75

9


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CITY LtMITSAA RAIDS^^ NWEW8CR 29,1944 - OECEhER 30, (944 -JANUARY 28J943

APRIL I3.t943 -APRIL 15,1945MAY 23.1945-MAY 25,1945MARCH 9.1945

S STWTEOC 0i


66/83


67/83

57


68/83


69/83


70/83


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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEYLIST OF REPORTS

foUdwiiiK is a bihliography of reports resulting fnmiSurvey's studies of tlie Pjuropeaii and Pacific wars.

reports marked with an asterisk (*) may be pur-from the Superintendent of Documents at tliePrinting Ottice, Washington, D. C.

European WarOFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Tlie United States Strategic Bombing Survey : Sum-mary Report (European War)The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Over-all Report (European War)The FItYects of Strategic Bombing on the GermanWar Economy

AIRCRAFT DIVISION(By Division and Branch)

Aircraft Division Industry ReportInspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Report)

Airframes BranchJunkers Aircraft and Aero Engine Works, Dessau,GermanyErla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Heiterblick. GermanA T G Maschinenbau, GmbH, Leipzig (Mockau),GermanyGothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, GermanyFocke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany

Over-all ReportPart APartBAppendices I, II, IIIDornier Works, Friedrichshafen & Munich, GermanyGerhard Fieseler Werke GmbH, Kassel, GermanyWiener Neustaedter Flugzeugwerke, Wiener Neu-

stadt, Austria

Aero Engines BranchBussing NAG Flugmotorenwerke GmbH, Bruns-wick, GermanyMittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke GmbH, Taucha,GermanyBavarian Motor Works Inc, Eisenach & Durrerhof,GermanyBayerische Motorenwerke AG (BMW) Munich. Gei manyHenschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany

Light Metal Branch

Messerschmitt A G,Augsburg, Germany

20 Light Metals Industry f Part I, Aluminumof Germany ) Part II, Magnesium

21 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Hildesheim, Ger-many22 Metallgussgesellschaft GmbH, Leipzig, Germany23 Aluminiurawerk GmbH, Plant No. 2, Bitterfeld,Germany24 Gebrueder Giulini GmbH, Ludwigshafen, Germany25 LuftschifTt)au, Zeppelin (! ni b H, Friedrichshafen

on Bodensee, Germany26 Wieland Werke A G, Ulm, Germany27 Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Solin-

gen, Germany28 Lippewerke Vereinigte Aluminiumwerke A G, Lunen,Germany29 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Heddernheim, Ger-many30 Duerener Metallwerke A G, Duren Wittenau-Berlln& Waren, Germany

AREA STUDIES DIVISION*31 Area Studies Division Report32 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing

on Hamburg33 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing

on Wuppertal34 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing

on Dusseldorf35 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing

on Solingen36 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing

on Remscheid37 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing

on Darmstadt38 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing

on Lubeck39 A Brief Study of the Effects of Area Bombing onBerlin, Augsburg. Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, Dort-mund, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen

CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION*40 Civilian Defense DivisionPinal Report41 Cologne Field Report42 Bonn Field Report43 Hanover Field Report44 Hamburg Field ReportVol. I, Text; Vol. II, Ex-

hibits45 Bad Oldesloe Field Report46 Augsburg Field Report47 Reception Areas in Bavaria, Germany

59


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EQUIPMENT DIVISIONElectrical Branch

*48 Geniian Electiioal Equipment Industry Report49 Brown Boveri et Cie, -Mannheim Kafertal, Cieriiiauy

Optical and Precision Instrument Branch*50 Optit'al ami I'ret'ision Instrument Industry Iti'imrt

Abrasives Branch*5t The (Jerman Abrasive Industry52 Mayer and Schmidt, Offenbach on Main, Germany

Anii-Friclion Branch*5S The (ierman Anti-Friction Bearings Industry

Machine Tools Branch*o4 ila


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118 Ruhroel HydroKciiation Plant, Rottrnp-Boy, Ger-many, Vol. I, Vol. II

119 Khenunia Ossaj; Miiicraloehverke A (!, llailmrK Ue-finery, Hamburg, Germany

120 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, GrasbrookRefinery, Hamburg, (Jermany

121 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A (i, WiibelmslmrgRefinery, Hamburg, (iermany

122 Gewerksclinft Victor, Castrop-Itauxel, (iermany, \(i\.I & Vol. II123 Europaeische Tanklager und 'I'ransport A G, Ham-burg, Germany

124 Ebano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg Refinery, Ham-burg, Germany

125 Meerbeek Rheinpreussen Synthetic Oil I'lantVol. I& Vol. II.

Hanau on Main,Rubber Branch

126 Deutsche Dunlop Gununi Co.,Germany

127 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany128 Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant129 Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry

Propellants Branch130 Elektrochemischewerke, Munich, Germany131 Schoenebeck Explosive Plant, Lignose SprengstofE

Werke GmbH, Bad Salzeman, Germany132 Plants of Dynamit A G, Vormal, Alfred Nobel & Co,

Troisdorf, Clausthal, Drummel and Duneberg,Germany

133 Deutsche Sprengcheniie G ni b H, Ki'aiburg, (iermanyOVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION

134 Over-all Economic Effects Division ReportGross National ProductKriegseilberichteHerman (ioering Works.Food and Agriculture . .

Special paperswhich togethercomprise theabove report

134a Industrial Sales Output and Productivity

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION ,134b Physical Damage Division Report (ETO)13.5 Villacoublay Airdrome, Paris, France136 Railroad Repair Yards, JIalines, Belgium137 Railroad Repair Yards. Louvain, Belgium138 Railroad Repair Yards, Hasselt, Belgium139 Railroad Repair Yards, Namur, Belgium140 Submarine Pens, Brest, France141 Powder Plant, Angouleme, France142 Powder Plant, Bergerac, France143 Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgiiim144 Fort St. Blai.se Verdun Group, Metz, France14.5 Gnome et Rhone, Limoges, France146 Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, France147 Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans,

France148 Kugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Germany149 Louis Breguet Aircraft Plant. Toulou.se, France150 S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France151 A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulou.se, France

1.52 V Weapons in London1.53 City Area of Krefeld1.54 I'\il)lic Air Raid Shelters in Germany1.55 (ioldenberg Thernjal Klectric Power Station, Knap-

sack, Germany1.56 Brauweller Transformer & S\vit


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UTILITIES DIVISION*205 German Electric Utilities Industry Eeport206 1 to 10 in Vol. I "Utilities Division Plant Reports"207 11 to 20 in Vol. II "Utilities Division Plant Reports"208 21 Rheinisehe-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A G

Pacific WarOFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Summar.v Report (Pacific War)1*2*3

*10

*11

Japan's Struggle to End The WarThe Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima andNagasaki

CIVILIAN STUDIESCivilian Defense Division

Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and AlliedSubjects, Tokyo, Japan

Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and AlliedSubjects, Nagasaki, Japan

Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and AlliedSubjects, Kyoto, Japan

Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and AlliedSubjects, Kobe, Japan

Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and AlliedSubjects, Osaka, Japan

Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and AlliedSubjects, Hiroshima, JapanNo. 1Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection andAllied Subjects in Japan

Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection andAllied Suljjects in Japan

Medical Division*12 The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical Serv-

ices in Japan*13 The Effects of Atomic Boml)s on Health and MedicalServices in Hiroshima and Nagasaki

U

*]0

M7

IS

19

Morale DivisionThe Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale

ECONOMIC STUDIESAircraft Division

The Japanese Aircraft IndustryMitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

Corporation Report A'o. /(Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK)(Airframes & Engines)

Nakajima Aircraft Company, Ltd.Corporation Report No. II

(Nakajima Hikoki KK)(Airframes & Engines)

Kawanishi Aircraft CompanyCorporation Report Xo. Ill

(Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushikl Kaisha)(Airframes)

Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc.Corporation Report No. IV

(Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo KabushikiKaisha)

(.\irframes & Engines)

*20

*21

*23

*24 Jap,

*26

*3i)

*31

*3l'

*33

*34

*2S I

*20

Aichi Aircraft CompanyCorporation Report No. V

(Aichi Kokuki KK)(Airframes & Engines)

Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller DivisionCorporation Report No. VI

(Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, PuroperaSeizosho)

(Propellers)Hitachi Aircraft Company

Corporation Report No. VII(Hitachi Kokuki KK)(Airframes & Engines)

Japan International Air Industries, Ltd.Corporation Report No. VIII

(Nippon Kokusai Koku Kogyo KK)(Airframes)

n Musical Instrument Manufacturing Conipan.\Corporation Report No. IX

(Nippon Gakki Seize KK)(Propellers)

Tachikawa Aircraft CompanyCorporation Report No. X

(Tachikawa Hikoki KK)(Airframes)

Fuji Airplane CompanyCorporation Report No.

(Fuji Hikoki KK)(Airframes)

Showa Airplane CompanyCorporation Report No.

(Showa Hikoki Kog(Airframes)

ikawajima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd.Corporation Report No. XIII

(Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo KabushikiKaisha)

(Engines)Nippon Airplane Company

Corporation Report No. XIV(Nippon Hikoki KK)(Airframes)

Kyushu .\irplane CompanyCorporation Report No. XV

(Kyushu Hikoki KK)(Airframes)

Slinda Engineering CompanyCorporation Report No. XVI

(Shoda Seisakujo)(Components)

Jlitaka Aircraft IndustriesCorporation Report No. XVII

(Mitaka Koku Kogyo KabusliikI Kaisha)(Components)

Nissan Automobile CompanyCorporation Report No. XVIII

(Nissan Jidosha KK)(Engines) iArmy .\ir Ar.enal & Navy Air Depots

Corporation Report No. XIX(Airframes and Engines)

Underground Production of Japanese AircraftReport No. XX

XI

XII?yo KK)

62


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Ba$!r Materials Division*36 Coul and Metals in .Tapan's War Mcuiioiny

Capital Goods, Rqiiipmriit and Construction Division*37 'riit> .Japanese Const ructidii Industry*3S Japanese Electrical Hquipinent*30 The .tapanese Machine UtiildinK Industry

Electric Power Division*40 The Electric Power Industry of Japan*41 The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Plant Re-ports)

Manpower, Food and ('ivilian Supplies Division*42 The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utili-

zation of ManpowerMilitary Supplies Division

*43 Japanese War Production Industries*44 Japanese Naval Ordnance45 Japanese Army Ordnance

*4fi Japanese Naval Shipbuilding*47 Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry*48 Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding

Oil and Chemical Division49 Chemicals in Japan's War50 Chemicals in Japan's WarAppendix51 Oil in Japan's War52 Oil In Japan's W^arAppendix

Over-all Economic Effects Division*53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War

Economy (Including Appendix A: U. S. EconomicIntelligence on JapanAnalysis and Comparison ;Appendix B : Gross National Product on Japanand Its Components; Appendix C: StatisticalSources).

Transportation Division*54 The War Against Japanese Transportation, 1941-

1945Urban Areas Division

Effects of Air Attack on Japane.se Urban Economy(Summary Report)Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama

Effects of Air Attack on the City of NagoyaEffects of Air Attack on ( )saka-Kol)e-KyotoEffects of Air Attack on the City of NagasakiEffects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima

*56

5960MILITARY STUDIES

Military Analysis Division61 Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War

Against Japan62 Japanese Air Power63 Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics64 The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army

Logistics65 Employment of Forces Under the Southwest PacificCommand66 The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bom-

07

68

6970

7879

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

88

89

90

91

929394

95

96

hardnu'iit in tlie War Against Japan (TwentiethAir Forc(!)

Air Operations in China, Burma, India -World WarII

The Air Transport Command in the War AgainstJapan

The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against JapanThe Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the WarAgainst Japan

The Fifth Air Force in the War Against JapanNaval Analysis Division

The Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols. I andII)

Campaigns of the Pacific WarThe Reduction of Wake LslandThe Allied Campaign Against RabaidThe American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap,Mille, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II and III)

The Reduction of TrukThe Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against JapanReport of Ships Bombardment Survey PartyFore-word, Introduction, Conclusions, and GeneralSummaryReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure A ) , Kamaishi Area

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure B), Hamamat.su Area

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure C), Hitachi Area

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure D), Hakodate Area

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure E ) , Muroran Area

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure F), Shimizu Area

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima-Saki Areas

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure I), Comments and Data on Effectivenessof Ammunition

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure J), Comments and Data on Accuracy ofFiring

Reports of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure K), Effects of Surface Bombardments onJapanese War Potential

Physical Damage DivisionEffect of the Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan (aReport on Eight Cities)

The Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb onJapanese Targets (a Report on Nine Incidents)

Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, JapanEffects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, JapanEffects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japa-

nese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents)Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and FiveHundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Targets (aReport on Eight Incidents)A Report on Physical Damage in Japan (SummaryReport

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C-2 Division7 Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence8 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive Report99 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part II, AirfieldsEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb Plotting

Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part IV. Urban Area Analysis

Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part V, Camouflage

103 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping

104 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part VII, Electronics

lOo Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part VIII, Beach Intelligence

*10G Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery

*107 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part X, Roads and Railroads

105 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis^U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1947 736?25

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