ussbs report 65, military analysis division, employment of forces under the southwest pacific...

8/7/2019 USSBS Report 65, Military Analysis Division, Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command

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,U63

n o .65 O l!""l{l·.... r, , . . . ,"1v·~ 1_.L L.

THE UNITED STATES .

STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

'{ tl~ 0000018

EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

UNDER. THE

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC COMMAND



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

is

TA BLE O FCONTENTS

It;mph'(L _Allied o(ron~l"c _

lvo In Solornons .• 'Batf.lo _

Th o flllul pia,,"W"odlark-1(id"J"lLN r,. \v O cor l! ;l n . ~ • • - - .

ll'lle·S:rllmnnllrlli"illflchhflrOlt, D u mpu, uur l 8io _~1l""~BJII"llIp_New Hrjl ~I,,_SnidOr _

1'lw Allied WlI". _Hono, t h(~delv« I U I lru Philippjlle,, __Prttljll:linnJ""~:p!l..i.llii _ _ _

ltenn rH _Thn Ad,nlrplllo,;,Item, IV _

Hulla"'II,, pin,,"Thu enemy .H . iLul l linllHourll: I l J l r i ( ; ' '' ' ll , r r n. 1 .Pncilic_~_~J 101l1l",llr, o I,,'rn II",,"n'(Hlr~nlli~lll..jml I)r euuunnnrln m , , >V _

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~) N ew G uinu.n.up~rtLLioJI_ _ _{+ PlmHl.illg t he l it ] i l ipplue ( ,""umpaig;n~_

10 ~,lnr{ )hlL_II LeyIu plnns _II :r;;,,~",yijl! "III lunII L,~ylc opeml,im,_1.1: LIIZO Il I'IIUl.K _12 ,\1i,](1ure.. _

1 2 ' 1' 1' 0 ' I,, "a p\ iv ~ p ln u13 PI.FlIUI:illJ;HU~l'llPril Philjppill(;!s cumpfLi~Jl.~_

'l i~ t}'al'n.w,fln invasiou1'1 I ' , , , , , . .y _14 N cg-rn~ _

15 C ;C h'L - - _ .IS ]lahuL_

11 : 110J1IS19

1 \ 1i l l( J a n n u _ _Sui" A ,c 11.11 ' "lngoMo,,, O o . .IL _K'{hibiir-Grtlpfllt'nl r(jjlIl'WlQIIU,ll{;lil of jllc IJrogr(~H.

uf t ho w ar I n t bu fa_me',

v



•

. . of the camplLigns i l l .theTheater i s composed princi,c ol lec te d fro m, th o historical

Headquarters, SouthwestWith the objective of il-play of for-ces and Inetors

un d outcome of eachhus been made of General. Plans: General Head-

Ins tL "II ctions, outlining in-or It series of related opera-

and Division llistoricalcompleted operations; data

commundors regarding theforces, and histories of tile

compiled by the Historical

study is essentially on theHowever, data reported

commandschn.!'ged w ith theaction have been included,

provides evidence upon. the over-all efleotive-

of certain lines of action. can

in tho Southwest Pacific gave-n ew c on ce pt s a nd L ed ul lqu es

revoluti onary 01 these-from previous methods-

which opened up II. news, It should be noted

and tacbicnl ideas regardi:ugwere dynamlo l " l l .~h() l 'than

considerably during the

signifi cance emerges from auearrrpaigns i n t be Southwest

aftor the enrly defensivethe prime objcc~iv(j of

in th e ir ,uLyanceair bases or ci f stra-

in which new air basesfor the purpose of e.~tIlDd-

range of Allled rurGfait. Itthat the choice of ground

o?icctives and the range of these objectives weredic~ated by consi de r at i O nof til I ISIIbseq uen t val u ew hi ch t hes e o bj ec ti ve s would assume as bllElcshom which to. e l\~eJld a ir power. I II attainingt~e general objective two impor tant eonsidera-nons governed the employment of the AWed airforces:

1. Tb aeus to!Il.ll..ryta.c~ic was to gain at leastlocal air super iori ty before launchingauy large-scale attack, and it was continuously the objecttoe1;"pand tIlc sphere 01 a ir su pe ri ori ty a s r ap id lyaa new bases could becaptured or constructed,

2. The air e:cbeloIlSwaJ·e depended upon toisolate each separate enemy objective prior to thefinal assault by tlle surface. forces, lIS well as toprovide air cover and direct support for thesesurface units as U U ' J y moved in for tbe kill.

During the campuigns inthe Southwest Pacificprior to Hollandia these tactics were Iollowed,malting use of lead-based aviat ion eJ! :c lusively.At Ho ll an di a, b ec au se o f d is ta nce s i nv ol ve d, c lo sesupport by eVE's an d f la nk support by the fastcarrier t -a sk fo rc es w as u ti li zed a ft er t he e ne my airhad been su fEdill! tly Tedueed by lan d-b a s e dair toallow f ree do m o f n otion b ythe eVE's .

In the invasion of Leyte, when intelligence esti-mates indicated II1l exeeptional Japanese air weak-ness, it was decided to· o mit the planned prainva-s io n o f M in da na owhere lend-based f ig h te rs c o ul dhave been deployed. It was planned to furnishall air support ftom carrier basas, except t hatwhich could be fut~ishcd by the Iong-range

bDmbers of tbe Filtb AF, until 5 November 1944when the required land bases would be availablefor sus tmned oper l l. ti ol l s.

BlndJJight shows that intelligence u po n w hi cht hi s p la n W!lS b ase r! u II d er es t ima t ed t he 011paci tyo f t he J np ll ll cs e air lind naval forces to react,Jupa!lCS!! D ! I . \ . a !g u n fi re an d K ami kaz e a ir a tt ack sred uc~d, to a drungerol:l s dc?"ree, the capacity ofthe II.vaill1.ble eVE's to furnish both cover for tbel an di ng s an d 010813 aupport for tb~ ground .oper~tion. On 27 October 1944 this reduction 11 1

c~ pac it y o f bh e eVE's necessitated the acceptanceby 33 P-388,of complete responsibil ity for air

1



cover and c lose support operations . F rom thatdate until aJequate land bas es w ere av ailable an dthe c arrie r forc es had re fu ele d an d re arm ed, thoroWIlS a de fi c iancyin air c ov er an d s up por t.

T Ile increasing ly extensive use m ade of airtran sport b y all the forc es d urin g the w ar,togetherw ith advanceB m ade-and still being m ade-inc ar go c ap ac it y a nd r an ge ,J ore sh nd ow th e im m en sepot .ent iali t iE '1l ofthis m edium in future w ars.N ew tec hn iques w bich w ere developed in cludedthe delivery of food, equipm en t, and rein forc e-m en te to g round force un ite fighting in jung leterrain, both by ai r d ro ps a nd f ly in g- into frontlin e airporu ; an d the b uildin g of air b as es throug hthe use ofair tran sport in loc ation s w hic h c ouldn ot be reached by jun gle trail, sea, or river,

T he m ilitary soundness of the use m ade of airpower in the S ou thw es t P ac ific is b orn e out b ytherelatively lQW c asualty rate atten din g theSouth-wes t Paciflecam paigns, and the large bodies ofw e ll -ar me d e ne my t ro op s is olu te d a nd n eu tr alis edto the point of im potence by air pow er along theaxis of advance.

J a pa n e8 6 w a rplan.t.-The Japanese CombinedF leet, on 7 November 1941, W IIS ordered to

com plete over-all preparation s for w ar w ith thnU n it ed S t al es ,Great B ritain , an d theN otherlauds.It w a s d ir ec t ed to s trik e the n av al forc es of thos enations and com bine w ith the A rm y and A irF orc e in a m an y-pron ge d offen siv e a.g a.in st theirterritories . T he target date(Of commencement .a t o pe rat ic ns w as8 December 1941, e as t lo ng i-t ud e t im e .

T he man o bj ec tiv e l ay s ou thw a rdwhere ther ic h n at un l resourcesof the Netherlands EIISLIndies an d M alay a w ere loc ated ,The Japaneseplanned to isolate this region b y d es tr oy in g A ll ie dn a .v al p ow : rin ~e Pacific an d b y c uttin g B ritis hand Amenca.I l linea o t c o m m un i ca ti on to tho

Orient . ':rhe u ns upporte d g arris on s ofthe FllorEast w 0 1 . l l dthen b e ov erw he lm ed an d the a.rc 'lISm a rk e d f D l: _' ue et quicklyseised. Air a.ttackslaunehed,lllft p ro gr es siv ely ad van ce d Il oir fic ld swould p Mp &re ~ w a . yf or a m ph ib io us a .s aa ul ta .

'ryle lint I ll il ;J ?r o pe ra tio ns w o ul dbe directed~t tim P hilippin es an d M alay a, an d B ritis h

m oo w >uld be invaded as !lO on8.8 possible.In . ~e euly stages ot t .b .C S 6 c am p aig n s o th erItrik i) lg fD rc es w ould s eize ob jec tiv llBin th eCelebes,D utc h B orn eo, !lO uthem S um atra T im or~ of:N ?luccaa, enabling the forw ard' eoncon :~~~ to s up po rt t he in v as io n01 Java

...~D~ ~ northern Sumatraw oUld b~

2

oc cupied an d operutions Ilg"uiust Buunn eurrout, a t. u u approprillto I ,i n l! ' t o('11L t lH~AUiml~II

·rou!.)) to Chinn . R in gn pO l'B ,SOOI'floj)ltyaManila W('l"l' ( lXIl l 'CLI ,d 1 ,0 become nu . jQI"' IH l~~8

In nlidiLio!l tu t l~killg l 'OlgI.L1I18 11rhkb .

nutura! I'CSOllrC'('gsuch us o il , L I lt 'JlIoplHI~SO

to c apture und develop curtuin outpost, posias bar ri er s ugniusL a n A U iH d c om l tl 'r of J" 1l 1~ i.Japo,nl'sl' f01 'O( 'SparLi('.ipaLt1flllloH'ol lsi I ' llcluHp,tiw hich look them as[Ill' nfield [Ill Lio n A Lou t' .

Midway Island, Fiji, Llll ' Solomons, New BI'i

am i New Guinea (with probnble intonLicnne t ime of Itl.tl\llking norUWl' l iAl!sLI'Il:l iu).ever, iL is likely that nil ofthl's!l w ore. not inoriginal war plan, hut represon t an expunsionconcept which enrne about I Il tol ' the una..'-:woolmosB of Allied opposition made rvances appear PL'Of tnblc. In lerrogation ofJapuucse military nn d n aval ElLI'n(,~gisLshu sserved to clmu' up this point, since Llw.irmony 11IIS disclosed n widl) divergence of opia mo ng L Il t' sl lmen.

AI , any rate, it seoms ev itlen t bh I: t t most , l rJoDll

sk&tegista hoped t o f OJ 'u r thoUnited StaL"~Ito Pearl Harbor, the B ri t.isb huck to Iudin,

to cu t China's lifl ' line. This w ould giv['J ap an es e e mp ire ' c on tro lO "fl'I1W m ate rin ls s uf fto P11l'S1lI' tile w ar for:several more yoars,which time a German victory ill Europe UI'

overwhe lming Jupunese uavul vic~o,'Y illPacific might B n g on d oJ ' s u c hwar WC!l,I'illoSSt he A l lie s L ha t t lw y w o u ld < ) o! is e at1 .0 !1 negopeuce leaving Japan in control o r bho spoi ls of

Oondi t irn /8 forJrq;an'8 wal'.-In (ml'lyhl'l' 1941, tile Japarll'Si1 struek Pearl Hu r!1tLacke(1 V V I1 Iw., G U Th m ,H ong Kong , M ilan d the Philippines. Tho !jime WIIS Mimichosen. When Lh o (-jrsbJ rr .p an m '! l b lo w s ( el lMalaya on the Asiatic ma inland to t l\ (l i s l! \1 1thl' C l'n tm l P ac ific , G erm anarmies WIJ,'r

into Russiu 011 It broad II'OL1L, and, in tho j \ , l idd

Ea.~t, Gonerul Irwin Rommel 's armored colorWPI'Caellking Lo d~:sLi"oy Lho BJ,jLish l,mopS

fnnding Egypt , 1'lws.' Il'eJ"O l if e - lt nd-d ." "LI , ,g l('8, R us Biapn,fl'J'l'llri not to c ng ng c inIwith .}I loPl t l l I tLth is t im p. Brif,ajn cOldd 1I0t

sLrong I ,t linrol 'c"ment.~ to ~nf(Jgu'trd hN' .~iQns in th.. O rit'n t. TJH\!JIlI 'den 0) ,sl,opP", }u pn tl L 's e I 'C Rt rd .1IlI'g{,ly npon Lho A lli("! ,already in tho SOlltIHlIl:St, Asin-p,)'cifie)"('gIOIl.

upon 1.111'nddiLionnl ~LI'{'ngLh tIll!.I. Lil" [Jill

Rtakl:l ('Q uid provi,it" ~T he U nite d S t a. tO R , 11 0W O V O l" ,II 'IJ.-S nolop r e P

the "f!'OI't which she could.. , eXQrtI IAH.anc-se " ',MfUl'jjJIO!" l im it !l d b ythe

Pl ,, 'B l f len t ROOseve l tand P I'-'U ., imeI '. m eeting m W nshir<g ton indecid( lc l to COIl(len~ro.tcfirst

Tb I' on, n ny did not J .uw e thoon both the widely S()])nl"ll.~(ldf f " O t l w

lH ~c es sn .ry to n chiev c dec is iv eG e rm n ny I Vl lS co Hs id el 'e rit. oho

m om d !1n g() l'ou s e nem y, R us singround forces ji"lthe Held agn il l .s~

be Sl(ppOl 'Uednnd kept in tile 11 '111 ' .

w on in Em'opec, operations inb~ ?ircctod at con tain in g tho

, pressu rcupon them byoffensive acsions as were possible

available.0011l..'Pa,ign8,-A~ Pearl Harbor

of tho Uni l ;ed Sl ;a tc~· P! l( "i fi~dame ge d. Two days late r the

P rin ce o j Wale san dL he bl l:~ t!osen t to the bo t torn of[ th e

, 'rhere r emained in Nether-water'S some A m o l" ic a n, D u tc h ,

destroyers , and submarines,supremacy was fissured. The

o v or w he lm in g s u pe rio l 'it yavui]able at wel l developed

to Fermosu end the1'he United States Air Force

WIIa almost, o om p le te ly d e st eo y od .. in the pa~h of a southwurd

Amerionn and Filipino (orcesof Gen. Douglas MacAI'Li.J"lll'inthe British Imperial TIL COI'PS

and tllo concllntl'a~iol1 ofThese were I\Ot capable of

action withou t substantin,l

"Alnl l1 , · j " ' , .71air strengbh located in i-almost entirely deg~l 'Oyedby

!'f'.,"O:[UUlS(I ail' at~Mlrs Itom bo~1land lo.nd plu.ncs based in

heavy bomhors o I GonGI 'u JflO\I'll to D anvi 11 w ith

lines 01 communica~iorL,the ]"hilippines, a n d c o op er at eAlliorl forces i n At l sk lL li v,II,I.\d

East Indin6,o f c on tr ol of WJIJ o ,i r, combined

in Im vu l s tr en gth , made r!l-

resupply toOlll' LILZonga!"riso

p r ohibi ti ve ly 'tl Fo:l:h. _eosif· l0 [" ~ hc J e pa ue s e, i so lu ti em: - e b fL t ~l el le k ll V n. sv~rtulllIyattained.fho d e fo n Ll oJ "8 IL c· .. '.J .. 0 - uzon wcro t hu a d oo m ed b1

mll.pnnll!lenl~merical au pcriority ill; every depnrt-lBent, T l _ I ? 1r Sll.CCe.~~ eould b~ measured hy heL'lgtll o f t un c ~heenemy WIl.B dolnycLiin taking

UZOI1,

Til? Japan~e air sLrength 011 Luzon WWl note X [J l? 1t o~ t o I I: >! fl ll le ~ till spite of its com pleto(:omrnllltlolLor tIle air, Fighter support of front-

lin e .~L"OOPS w a s u n c oe r di na te d andinefIoc livep re cis io n b om b !~ failed. to acccmplish resuJU:cOll1Jne.nsurn~wt bh effort. Only ar ea b om bin gFrom Iugh a l ti sudesachieved results because Alliedtargets wore necessarily c e nc e nb ra t ediUGeroo.inw e l l- d ef in e d a re as,

A s hostile COIl trd of the SCII, an d air WILS extended. 6 01 .1th ·Il~d east, Allied au pportof tho Ph iIi ppinas

b ec am e im po ss ib le b ec au sesupplies IH Id to c om ao ve r l in es o f c om m un ic n fi onthouSUIlds of m ileai n l en g th . FrOIll bnsoa intheir MlI,ndated Isll).~an d by U L e early c apture 01OUll;iI:I an d WILkeI sl an ds , t heJ upanese blocked the sea lan es of theO en hral P a e if w. 'I'roo ps III id s up pl i es s hi p pe dlr om t he United St f ). t cs l indto move through ~ he

South Pacific [;0 Aw,tralia, tllP.lJ011 the is lan ds tothe north and northwest; A ustra]i I!. thus becamean important A.mGricanbase.

By the e nd of D ec em be r1941, the defenders ofLuzon were wi~hdrf lw i l1g toB ntaan P en iusula an dCorregidor: To the s outh tllc Japll.n es e w ereestablished Illt Davno on j\lintlltuao and hadlanded in B rit is h Nortll B orn eo an d S arn wak,e nc ir cl in g th eManile, Billy ana. The Britishgarrison .a t H ongkong bad surrendered. InM ll ln yil . th e e ne my n dv an ceWILS unchecked an dalre Il;dyIV i ~hin 10 Q miles of Singapore,

4 I Ji e d d e js n si ve s tm / eY ljWild Qrganizaticn.-AIliud stratw w ns d ir ec te d a th ol din g th e!l!olayBa rrier, dsf ined a s :he l in e : N [a ln y P C ll in B U ]I I"SlImntra...Jnva-Northern Am; l.mti 11 , and nt re-establishing (lOmmuniclltions with Lllzon Mu'Oughthe Nctb ru- l l l. n c ls . En . s t IDcL ie s .Burrnn lind Aus-t)'Il.lio, Itssen~inlly werll s up po rt in g p os it io nl l, Illldthlll 'et(")J1~jonof t l t )}fon-ncr w as doubly i:ll1pOl'tant

.because through it flUl Lile supply l'O'1lt c to CIJina.In ord er to CIIU'Y ou l litis strnL~gic policy, tjlC

AllsL1"nlinn,B r it ,i sh , D u L oh ,! md A .m e ric nn Gov-O\"JIIDonts cslabliJlhcd a lilline d con I rolovcr tileu re ll " ' l' l. J c i l liLill1bOi rnul l ri e so I 1 .100.Al3DACom-m an d in clud ed ~ hcg~IleJ'OlI'egion Burmn, IIfnlllYs,Netherlauds J1 :n . s t In dies , an d U w P hilippin es ,Gen , Archibald P. W l 1 l' fl iIor t he B r it is h Army



.. a pp o im ed .Supreme Commanderwith bead-quvterB in h.va. Under bi a supervision. ~ere . allthe lind, -. and air forces of the pa.rt iClpa~nga o v e m m e ntB stationed in the area, end supportingf o t<AlBlocaWi in Australia. . .

The BUpport forces in Australia COnsISted of anexpeditionlll'Y forc e designa.ted Uni~d StatesMmy Forces in Ausbralio. which had disembarkedat Brisba ru on 23 Decembe r after having beendiverted from the Philippines because of the

P6IU'1Hador a tt ack end o ther init ia l Japanesemil ita ry · su~cesees . •

Th8le forees under Maj. G e n .'George H. Bretthad been direoted to establ ish a service of supplyin support of the philippines. Included alsowere the Iemna.nts of the heavy bomber forcecommended. by Major Genera lBrereton.

The mission of these American Forces in Aus-,tralia became twofold. While continuing effortsto get supp lies through the Japanese b lockade tothe Philippines, they also provided logistic supportfor United States .Anny units in the Netherla.ndsEast Indies. These United Sta te s f or ces wer elarge ly air corps units and inc luded the he avy

bombers d. the Far E8Bt Air Force which hadshifted i ts base of opera tions from Darwin toJava. General Brett le ft Austra lia to assumethe positbn of Deputy Supreme Commanderunder GeJl8ralWavell, and General Brereton Will!

appointedoommander ofthe United States Operat-ing Air FJrces in the ABDA area, Maj. Gen.Jul ian F. Barnes took command of the Americantroops a n e .facilities in Australia.

Jwpa'MU oJfflMive contimud.-The Japaneseoffensive continued to make r apid progr ess.MalaYll-,Singapore, and Sumatra fell. Burmawa s invaded. In the Netherlands.E8Bt Indiesthe enemy occupied Borneo, the Celebes, Bali,Timor, and Ambon. Java was v ir tual ly i so la tedc & i l dface1 imminent invasion. General Mac-A:rthui's Iroopsfought stubbornly on Bat;aa.n butreceived little ouWde support. At every pointthe A.lIi .edforees Wlll'& infer io r in s treng th , and it\WIllI that the Japanese seizure of thetlQlUei HDOll.· Burma to Aust ra li a, cou ld not be

On 23 February General Wavell's/.IlI!~uartjel'Bwas dissolved, and he departed to

y'~~~ ~l&dtefe lll1le!of India. Lieutenant Gen-_'.U~I;le~1ll'DE11l to direct the American Army.~"';)fu:~~lIt;rew.,.an d the command in Java

.til\'l~·<DJiItdt·who prepared for a final

4:

27 li'ebruary when an . Allied force o f -fiveand nine destr oyer s commanded by RKarel w . F. M. Doorman of the Roynllands Na.vy mov-ed out to in te rceptJapanese invasion forces. In the resul tingin the Java Sea, the All ied f leet suffe red l1; .

def6 ll t. The enemy immedi lb te ly proceededla ndings on Ja va where major resistanceon 9 Mareh. Tokyo annouucad that theof the Netherlands East Indies wesOn the preceding. day the J apanese out theline to China by forcing the British in Burmaevaeuate Rangoon.

Th.e far-f lung Japa,nese Domiuion.-Toeast the Japanese were established atKavieng, .and Gasmata in the Bismarckpelage, and in the norther n Solomons. Theyextended the ir control of the Central Pacificthe occupation of the Gilbert Islands, OnMuch enemy f or ces se ize d Lae and Salamauathe northeast coast of New Guinea. Frompositions and f rom the Nether lands Eastthe Japanese tbreatened the sec ur ity ofand the sea lanes through the South Pacific.

AUied estimate o f situatio:n-.-The Alliedmanders in Austr~.lia considere d that theeneIl ly moves would bs directed ogainsta nd Port More sby, both already under uir aThe occupAtion of Darwin might be dmerely to deny it to the Allied forces orstage in a general offensive againstAustralia and the Gulf of Carpentmi.!I.a tt ack on Port Moresby would s limiuate theit posed to the B a n k of a n advuDc e southRabau l aga inst the eas t coast of Aus t! ·nl iu orCaledonia on the sea and air routes to the

States.Intelligence indicated thl1t there were!l J

divisions in Du tch New Gl.linsa, Ambon,

Celebes, Timor, lind Java, At le ast 2 werB··able to seize Darwin and the attock couldsupporte d by a bout 4 aircl'an currle!'S nndshore-based p lanes f rom Koepang , A~bo] l,Na:mlea . An est ima ted 1 division WIth :0 ~aircra ft carr ie rs a nd about 90 aircra ft from I

Britain was ava il ab le for operl ttions ag n. i l 1 st

Moresby.· IAUied dejeMive . !orae6 .-Theforces wlu c

1

trilla possessed to oppose a [u:rtbe~ so~advance were weak, partioularly in aJr nn.elements: this weU,]rness l laa prov-ed. dto the Allied cause elsewhere in tbeThe commonwealth's Erst- line troOpS

the Austral ian Imperial Fo rM'dell E cesiu me . I Is t,2 of which were toan armored division already in

; and apprQxilIlately 7 divi-MilitllJ:y Forces-troops

defense. TIle civilian forcestrained and equipped, TheForce.had .apPl'OximfLtely 16

a s first line , ill some 01 whichof both p lanes and tl'oin ed

in general, with inferiorlimited its capubilities to

and r eeonna issunc e, Thethe Roya l Aus tral ian Navy

2 light cruisers.manpowe r and productive C!L-

expans ion of the Aus-and made suppor t f rom over-size of the air and ground

United Staoes could se nd w asby shortages in shipping--which

ser iousness-and by cri ti ca lwar fronts. The War De-

to bring to full strength the two, two medium bomber

group" and three pursuitand to provide addit ional

ehe exception of field arli.illerye lements, no American ground

in the theater, however, theWilli to a rr ive in April an d

be.en promised cootingentpe :rmittiog one of their

in the Middle East.American and AUS~l'alia..ll forces

r.mBUlnClellt for the protection ofCOll tinen t, a lmes t eq II nl in

States, with a. co.ast line 12,000The road. and rnil network of

limited capaclty and did notent of tr oops. Princ ip a lthe coast and were

attack. Darwin pos-with the rest of the

1Ir...,,.=.h~ and Tasmania dependedcommunicatiOll. Thesethe rapid concentration

a rea to oppose J 1J,1)!lillese

~'~f1.81)o8'i : t ton~,M a Tc h194£·--Thethe bulk of tbci:r forces

Brisbane-Melbourne where, the princ ipal Iood-pro-

~~cLng centers, ~d the best ports. wel'e located.e a rea ' ;r as a ll- importan t to the country' s war

I;\hffort ,.~nd Its defense was the first ccnsiderntion att e military planners,

Small forc~3 wete stationed in Tusmaniu andWestern Au.strali.aand a t D nr W ID Port MoresbvTil d I I 'c.,. ~ aY . sa~d,. and 'I 'ownsville. :Bec!LUSC01th~IX rillIt tl v e isolabien, the r et an b io n of thesepoin ts on the oute r per imeter depended large lyupon their garnsons, none of which WIlS strongenough to oppose success fu lly a major assaul t,The return of the Sixth a nd Seventh Divisionsfrom the Middle East and the expected arrivalof~nAmerican division would allow some strengthen-fig ofthe forcesat Darwin Western Austrll lia andTasr.narria; however, the Australians plann:dtoreturn two of these units to increase the reserve inthe Brisbane-Melbourne zone. .

A llie d o rg am za tio n , M a r ch1942.-000rdi.lI!'.-tion of the Amaricun a nd Au st ra li an fo rce s wlrichmanned the defenses was achieved through coop-eration and a sys tem of joint committees estab-l ished early in J anuary 1942. As long as thecontinent had not been di.rectly threatened, thiswas adequate , but no w the consolidation of the

Allied forces under a single directing aulliorityWIIS a matter ofUI'gnntnccessity. Eill'ly inMarch,

. negotiations began between the Austr!ilia.n, NewZealand, English, and United Stat-es Governmentsconcerning the organ izat ion of a new area COID-

mand. By 18 April the Southwest Pa cific AreaCommand was constituted with General Mac-Arth.ur at i ts h ead , General headquarters W8B

established at Melbourne : The forces assignedto General Ma(}Ar~hur's control were organizedinto five subordinate commands: Allied LandForces, Allied .Air Forces, All ied Naval Forces,United Stat~--sForces in Austral ia, and UnitedStates Forces in tile Philippines.

In tbe mea ntime, by agreement betlvMn thevR:riousgovernments concerned, the Pacific Thea-ter was de sig)l.a,te d an a re a of Unite d S tatesstrntegiC responsibility. 'The British and .Ameri-can Oombine(L Chie fs of S ta ff would w:e ro il ;ejurisdict ion over graod ~tra:egic policy .and thefac to rs necessa ry lor i ts implementat ion, !D-

duding aliocaMon of: forces aud mater ia ls. TheUui ted States Join t Chie fs o f Staff would havejurisdiction over all matters pe.rtiililillg to opera-t,ionaistrut.rgy 1).11d direct control of t .he Pacific

cO!lll1llJ.ncis.The Pucilio Theater was reorganized a nd di~

v ided iuto the Southel)st Pncific, Southwest



PaoIf I .c ,aDdPaci f ic Oceanarellll. ?nly th e la.ttertwo were direolJy concerned with operatIOnsepinst th e/ap an eB e. G e ne ra lMacArthur's com-m and the ;"uthwtlllt Pacific arca, included th eN ~ d i ElI8t In die a (l es sSumatra), th.!!P hilip pin es N e wGuinea, the Bismarck. Archl-pulago the'Solomon Islands, and Aus trali a. ThoPSclfi; O c ~ arc a, under Admiral CheswrW. Nimi tz , w as subdivided into t~ o N orth,South and Central P ac ific . H e bad direc tcom-

mand'in the N o rt h a nd C en tr al P ac if ic ,but w as toappoint a eommander, Soutb Paci fl e a rea, w~o ,ac tin g u nd erhis authority, would c on trol Itscombined {~rces.

Comp08it i)mo j SOuth'WM P ac ific A re a; C o m-mand.-ThIl Allied Lend F or ce s c om m an d ed byG e n. S irTllomas Blarneyconsisted o f e l em e n tsofth o AuJ!trnlian A rm y plus theForty-first UnitedStatcil D iv is ion , in all, a total of 12 divisions.In ad di tioo, the Tbirty-second United StateRDivision WIIS du e to land in Australia. in May.

Lieute na nt General Brett com m anded theAllied A ir Forces to which w ere 1 18 sig ne d foroperational control all United States i :umy Ai r

Corps taciical an d service units and RoyalA u s tr al iA n 8 J IdNetherlands ElUlt In dic a A rm yAir Forces u n it s w i th in the area.

All elen,ents of the United ' Stat( lll Navy and .operational control of t.he combat seetions of theRoyal Amtralian and R o yo l N e t he r la nd sNaviesw e r e 8 II iI ig n e dto A llie d n av al I or ce s,commandedby Vice Admiral Leary. The principal units weretwo Austmli lLnheavy and tw o light cruiaers,anAmerican heavy c ruiser, an d 8. Dutch lightorulset. These w eresupplementedby 0. numberof desbrorers, submarines, s ae or b, an d auxiliaryera.ft.

The A1l8traliAnAnny, t he R oy al A u st rn lio .nAil' F or ce , a nd the United StatelJ, R o ya l A u s tr al -ian, an d :Royal Netberlanda N o .v ie s w e r e r e sp on ai -bIe for be admillistrlLtion a nd s up ply of t.heirown uni:s 8IIiIigned to General MacArthur'soon trol . The a dm i ni st ra ti on o fDutch army andai r f or ce & lo me nt s w a sa.ecomplished by Americanlieneies. Administration and supply of theAmerieangr<lundan d a ir forces, except {or C1lrt l l inactivities oharged to the' a ir forC1l, were the

t!Dli.bilityof United 8to.tea Army Forces in

alia operating in IICcordance w i th p ol ie ie sult.ttd.by General Headqu a . r t e l ' B .

UnitedSta tea F~in the Phil ippines cons is tedoh.J)e ~t:I Annyan d Navye le m en ts i n t ho B eilIlIDl1Ia n d1 I D ' h a o fthe PhllippineAmly a nd P h il -

6

ippine Constabulary which had , been irinto tJw services of L it(larmed fOl'ces D rI ln it ed S ta LI 'S . I to sj st an coby uhese i so ln .. t cc l1I11dor Lt. Gen. JonaLhitli M. Wnimvrightnear cOJll~pBow hen tho Southwo~b PneiHuw as c Ml.ablis hc d. T he s urre nd ero r~h oBatunn, on 9 April, condemned tbl ) itre~Sl.g in M I~ nila B aY i on(3 May OSDon); lwfight surrendoretl at COl'l'cgidor.. Dulyguerrilla bands continued to f igbt tho J

A lli ed 8 tr at eO 'i c'j "J ol ic ll i nearly!!~rltLogicpolicy o.pp) 'oved Ior the Pltcif\c '1 :w as en tirely d efon siv o. althoug hthe intentaking more aggrossive uebion wns iuriicatadJoinu Chiefs of Staff d irec ted Goneral Mto h old tho klly m ilita ry l 'e gio n. s o f.lJ.U:ijWILIHII

bases for a . future oflonaive a nd checkJapnneae SOll\Jlwal,dadvance by destroyingshipping, airc raft, IL JIdbuaes in theMalaynrSoJomon Islands area. H edirected to maintain Allied posit ions illpines, protect eommunloariona an dsuppert the operations of fdondly forces inSouthwest Pacific area an d In dian T1U,(Ltilr,exert e co no m ic p re ssl ir e on the enemy by d .

illg vessela t.rMlsporting r aw l l111 tE w il li s f !"O mconquered terl'itoL'ies of Japan.

Admiral Nirnita W{lS di rected to hold the ipositions between the United Stalios anrlSoULllwcst Pacific ncc(J$su,·y Ior the .lines 01 cOlllmullic{!,(,ionu nd I ol .'sUPPol,tingoporutions ngo,.inst the .Japaneso. Otherassigned his cnm mand w ere to cnn taiu ,hoaid Ihn dO[!'11H1l ()f North America, protecLson and air rou tes, ami support the Opol'll,t,iG e ne ra l M ae Ar Lhu l"s [m ·( I( ls .B o th . G e M l 'n IArthur and Admiml Nimitz 11'01'0 totake tho offensive, theinl trnlstepe ofto be launched from Lhe South andPacific arcus.

{ }e 'fle ra l M a cA rt llfllr'8 a pp l: ic aliio rl, o f .policy.-Cencral MacArthur eOJ1sh:le'J'edIlthe thrce e loments of hisor b'TOund-lI.doqnate to ca!'ryl lSSigned. The mwal fOI'ce wue 1;00.

lack(.d 8uIlki! ll it ail ' SUpPOl ' t f),ombused 01' !'IlM'it'I'-lJnsorl(1il'ci"aft. It wus ,suitable only ful'O l l~ rl \t io n. B ( ,r 11JJ1.~norsiuillJ'y naturl'. 'I'])(l HOYI1IAljstralJ(lnwould re quira ma ny .months f or i t is dan d w o ul d b e ab so J'h (jdltl.l'goiyin L il eextenaivG Austmilitu con~t litle. The

• •• • 0'11' COl))an d tl ainmg of tIl{l n..<nal"lcn!1 w·

preeornmitmen L was bdow L h ! !

. FO .I1l'm on ths o filll~l1~iv"before It would rend' , a snl,i~-

for c om hat. 'I'heonlyoIT(J(lLiI'Gt h o S i l. .til an d S ev en t hAlIsLl'lI.l-

form er m iaus L wOb rig ad e!! I 1n dd ivis lons . O nenddit'ionn.1bl!!; comilltLOolldit,ion but

i II a, very inti iIIoren t SI;~L!l 01t an d c ould be j lr opa re d f or

a nd i nt en s iv e e f To l · L s .

il l c ll i!l f be li eved tI .n~ thein the P ac if ic d em a ud ed(J.

in the lorc ca alloc ated to hiscollapse of mlljo!' l"~sistallce in

least two au O J I 1 ydivisions u n c ie t r( !ngM'1 in~bo.qcj~hll1fls]weUHW

missioua.had soV'orely de f . a ated I;Iie All ied

alld wore pushing completentry, Tl le . t roops in Mnll1ya

ERst Jndies could he re-,ar,,,..,,,,g elsewhere since la.l'ge gal'-

req ui rnd ill those territories.witS as yet unchal lenged.

enem y thus w ould beoffensive moves w hic h w o ul d

launched in the 'Wcslcru.! """, T· . "" ,g t.Asht. III their so 11~lt·ualOlLllese had.usfablished asories 01

deemed it of tbe IItmosta de q u nt e SCCl1 ri ~y fo r

. 0 Ocean oren, thus m aln-fron tn l dcfenee and aflankther l !osWa ndvance. ' I' his ,be follow ed at the O l1rlies t

by olfensive action or' a sll.ffi-threat of sucr. It!l~iol!to afl 'cotand llispositioDS. .H e ngJ 'oed

held in W9shingt;oJl thlLt~hep re do m in un t i mp ol 't u. ll oean d

preven t i ti s m ax i m um 811 pport.aasistnl1co could bo trf lJ lspqrted

fo r a sl lcond ll 'OHt wa s se!f-MacAl'tlllll' beliel'ed tbl1t this

Pn4!ifio, bec llU Be ill his opinio~it be B e Sl le r c !~s ful l y l f ll l ll ched

By I·elen<ling the Pl'll6-

con(]onW'Cttiono f J a pn l lc s eit w o ul d p erm it bbc Soviot

Ullioll to'T, f . s · .. .I . .. 11,1 !:>Ie·IO l • Ibcrian l 'OSI)II roes in Europe

It ~vould IL !~Oe ff ec tiv el y p ro t~ c tAustruliu l indndia F I ' Q m :invnsion

t In order to develop the requiredstrcngth botho stop further J apan eseoffensive action ead to

deve.lop II. powerful oH(l!I! live,G eneralMacArthurco ~81 dered it essentin.L tha t ~ w o nir c r n f t c a rr ie e sb e I 1l 1u c lL L ee l t o p ro vi dea h ul no ce d I1IIVUI foroe·that ~ ho am Crlc nu n ir J orc e b e d ou b ledfrom 500to 1,0 00 l ro n t- lin e pl a n e s: u ndtllll.~ u n A m c ri Cl ll l

corps .~f three Iirat-class di visions he sent toA Ilstrl!hu. This would g ive l 'a ! lso r.mb lc a s su ruucoof u s ue ces sfu l d efen se an d s ec ureAlJBtrflliu81! ab as e f or c o un te ro ff en s iv eaction.

TIle nd d itionnl forces requested were not Forth-coming. 'rho decision made by Presiden t Roese-velt u nd P rim e M inis te r C hurc hill to defoatG e rm a ll yJiI'St a ll ow e d o nl yminimum forces 1;0 bee liverted fro I'll 0 pcmtioDs ugains t th e N aei s toprotectv it al in tc j· cs ts in o th er t ll Ca tc l'S .

7. 'heowpam.dedJaplJffteiJc Empire.-Whell theIn panese, fol lowing the ·cu:pturcof La c nr nl Sa la,malin, temporarily hal ted their advance t owardA us trnlia, th ey 00 n trolled tile eo ~ire c r. u i n ofislands which lie across i ts northem approuchas,w ith the s ing le exception ojsoutheastern N ewou in ea, 'P h e se Iorw a1 ' < . 1po si tion s I c rm e dIt iron t3 ,0 0 0 m il es l on g I l. xt !l ll c li ns - I ro m " Inva t o B o ug a in -vil le. Interior seu ami air l ines of communicationj'adIfI,ting southwurd from Japan through inter-mediate supporting buses from Form esn andSin gapore to'L ' ruk in . 1 1 1e Man da red Islands p 00'-

mi tted tho mu;yconcentnHioll of forcesfor furtherotT(lJlsive m oves. Th e J apan es e hn {Lth e great!idv!lntag£! of brong in t he p os i t io nto choose tllepoin t o ! a ~ tl lc k .

The departure point jor Allie{l ojJt1unve.-Gen-eral Mo:!lAl,thu!"'s c on ce p ~ for Iu tu re offen sivenetion in t he S ou ~ hw r ;s t P ac if icWIIBbas ed upon~he p rog ross ; iYe fo rwurdmovement of uireeholonsto provide fight~r an d bomber cover fo r surfacee le me nt s l in d u pou is oil ltio! lof each BC]lHJ'Il.Le

position prior 1. 0 tbe tinnl f~auH. Th!s ?onceptdepended U P O I l gillning locld ~Ir.supcnorltynn dexpaucliug L he s p bB rc of s upe nor!ty n ~ n ewbusesw e r o c o n st ru c te din euch cl1ptu:rcdarea.

Th o A m e s ' m os t I~ dI'flncecl p o~ itio n in t beOll8tcI'n

sectur WM Port Morcsby O l l t he ~ o ut bc ~ !I sL O f

I '. " G c n G r al M ac A rt liu rphUilled 1-0reinforce!tpu". -. ... . b P'

H and develop It liS a rn~Jol" rur . uso. .ortj \il or es by w o s e ss ent i f t ! lor m .roporatlon!! ngruils'b

R.b I n n d othor enen.l)' bas l l s to the north l 1 . n d .Il nil. • 1- Id

'- J ..s" A p ow e l 'f tl l b as ethere no t on Yw ou· .H O l',ICU •• -

7



blo i : Ikenemy penetration of Austr alia but a l s oprovide a startiDg point on the road bac k to the

Philippiies.. B ef or e i m pl em e n ti n gthis plan, however, pre-

I J i m i n a r Ys t ep s w e r e r eq u ir ed . Although protectedI on the l an dw a rd s id eby the 10,000 foot OwenI stanley Ratge, which formed a considerab leI barrier to overland movement , Por t Moresby

w as vulnerable to seaborne assault and its supplylines to interdiction by enemy naval action.

I • Frequent air raids made its limited ainlrometacili-ties virtually unte na ble for bombe rs e xc ept as aforward fueLog point; the nearest supporting airfields were 700miles to the south a t Townsvi lle ..A program ~f ainlrome construction was under-taken, first expanding the installations in theTownsville-Gloncurry area, thon building northa long the "YorkPeninsula with the objective ofplacing bombers in position for offensive raids.

J a p a: n eu r e ne w e d o j fe m i. !J t i n,th e SolomonJl.-This develo)}ment was in it s ear ly s tages when,in the la tte~ part of April, the presence of a largenaval force in the Japanese Maudsted Islandsand concentrations of aircraft in the New Britain-S olom on s rog ion in dic ate d thatthe enemy wasabout to renew his offensive. Allied A ir Forcesintensified i ts reconna isance and assembled fl

maximum Itriking force 011 the. Townsvil le-Glen-curry ainlromes. Allied naval forces dispatchedthree cr uisera to join Pacific Flee t units whic hwere operaLing in South Paci fi c water s. Paci ficunits mcluced the Laing.on and Yor.Houm.

The first Japanese move was directed at Tulagiin the s ou th er n S ol om on s where a c om p os it eforce Ianded on 3 May. The Yorktown, whichhad been lefueling n'orthwest of Espiritu Santo,DWie a. hWt-spfled run north and on 4 Ma.ylawtdled be str ikes against shipping in TulgaiHubal' before retiring to the south to join !J1C

Lszi;)gton.:I'M O tJ ra l S to . 1 U£ Wb4ttle.-Meanwhile, an

en ~ C01LVOY of approx imate ly 20 trausport swith a ttendant e sc ort ga .the red at Rabaul a nd

that baae on 6 M ay headed for the Jomard,""...... 0.. 'throughthe Louisiade Archipelago. TheI,IJ)]eotIV.B o f this force wu the capture of Port~ .. by.. OlO!l68upportWIi8 provided by a strongQdt'·'·.coIVEIlirur group. .A .str iking force contain . .

Sho/w.ku an d Zuikaku proceeded~"~tf.ij~;'Jf~rd.ated lsla.nds eut of the Solomons

Goral Sea after round ing San

~r~.t~" Fki~, o o m m a . u d e rof

Ii

the Allied fleet, dispatc hed a n atta ckcru iser s and des troyers to inte rcep tforces tha t might approach Port Moresbythe Joma rd Passage, then move d northcar rie rs to c lose with the ,J"apfHlcsc coveringOn tho morning of 7 :May, army planesan enemy carrier near Misima bland.front the u",i'llgton and Yorktown imtnattacked and sank the Sholto. A secondagainst ships in the Deboynp-Misimr. Islandwa s re adie d but not order ed aloft becauseexpec ted presence of o ther enemy car rie rshad not been looated , Actually, while thestr ike was being delive red, to themain Japanese carrier force hrt tb IJ, Am ericangroup mis taking the tanker Neosh» jOl' aThe Neosho an d a des troyer wore sunk .Fletcher d id not l ea rn tJlat th is aLtack wasby carrier aircraft, until dusk, too late tocounteraction.

The following morning after searchsighted the Japanese carriera, a strikeagainst them damaged the Slwkaku anddama ge d the Zuikaku. Enmny plan es hiLexinlJlon which became uncont ro flable and

to be sunk. The Yorktown was damaged,mained opera tiona] . Thi s exchangedestruction to ea ch e nga ging force that boJapanese a nd Allied naval commundersrespective forces elected almost eimulbaneot ermina te the encountor and withpraw,withdrawal of the Japanese force const i tuoedure in its purpose to seize Port Moresby,withdrawal provided a s trateg ic . -victoryAllied cause.

Land-based aircraft from uh e Southwesbarea, in add it ion W l 'econnaiSSI1J.lCeand preliraids against enemy air installat.iollS au d sbsupported the action of the naval fl!l1"CCs by

some 45 sor ti es against the enemy eOllVOY,the results were disappointing. Smallhigh level bombers Hying in tUlf(l.vol"fl.bl~conditions reduced the effectiveness 0:[ theA crui se r, a seaplane tander, and a largewere claimed damaged. Repeai. le(l efforts tothe ,crippled Sho/ta/tu, which retired ~o.N flfai led because of the bad wea the r condttJons.

F ir 8 t A ll ie d o ff mB iv e. -T he 1 'e pl ll so0 1 t ,haansae gave Port MOl'esby a noll ' lease 0 . 11

and the development of the nOl'thellSterJ1

New Guinea a[ 'eo.. rontinued. Th<l consof airdrome s at Oa i rns , 0001;:to 1 1') ) ,. , . .dIsland, an d Port Moresby was !Locele-r i lle

Fourteenth Br igadr, In addi-to mid L!L~and Salamaun

enemy lll 'eparation o r thosecapture an d hold ~ hl'.m Ior11

delaying further hostile oflen-t forces and a, ir t . ranspor t , l o r, lacking.

fo r the m is s io n We re d es ig -and cQn~i~tedof n . sr aa ll l or m u-

known as the N e w G uiRe aa reinforced Aus tral ian in -

Part were a lready a t Wau,center in the Owen-S tan -led to Lae and Salamll.uil..

flown to Wau from' POl"lpart ef May. B e f or e K a n gf l.

to str ike, however, intel ligencoJapanese a t Lae we re planning

Bulolo Valley. Since the com-FOl'M wa s responsible Ior the

a ir fi elds, he was unable to ern-for o ffens ive act ion. The raids

the e nd 01 J uae, an d no deci-gained although considerable

at Salamaua. Kauga, Force

, under almost prohibitiveand supply, in order to pro-

and secure the crest oJin that area.dejenscs.-Another unit, des-Forc e a nd c onsisting of a bat-

Brigade a nd the Papuanorgan ized on 21 JUIl e lor

n{)Kc>uaon the northern slopesnortheast of Port Moresby.evidence (;h",(; the JalllUlcse

the nat ive trai l f rom BWJtl.onKokoda to Por t Moresby, and

directed to prevent an enemy

mounta ins a long that ratite.Batt al ion , abou t 280 uubiveofficer'S, w as a ir e ll>dy I lor thof

of the Allfltrnl ian b I.t-in early July.

):erno.ined in the Portin the improvement of the

Kokoda t ra il , but re(tay todetachment if necessary.the ens t flank of the N ew

to provide ndditioJln,!fonvardair action, Genor!>lHead-

establish.men t of II-J1 ait'dromoBa.y. A reinforced infantry

c o m pa n y, p lu B lm g i .u e erand antiaircraft unitsOCC'l1Plee~ the site in the lat te r paf t of J UUG andbegan Its development , Unlike Kange a ndMaroubra Fcrces which were controlled by New~Iunea Force, the Milne Force was initially placedd.lfecny under Allied Land Forces . For protec -tion of the west flank, in addition to that affordedby air Iorces at Darwin and on the York Peninsulaconstruction of an a ird rome was begun at Merauk~on the south coast of Dutch New Guinen .A lthough the project wtl.~ temporari!ysuspended i~August when the e n g in e er e ff or tw~. srequired elsa-where , a gar rison of one in fant ry company plusauxiliaries was kept at :;'\,lerll.uketo deny it to theJapanese.

] J ( /. I tl e o fMidwa;y.- While the Southwest Pacificurea w as tbua engaged, in . th e Central Pacifica naval battle was fought t.l.:illtdrastically changedthe struge tic situntion. Soon after the retire -ment of the Japanese from the Coral Sea, apowerful concentration of enemy naval forces inhome wa te rs wa s re ported. The United StatesPacif ic F leet, acting on the bes t es, tima te of thesi tuation , p repared to meet an a ttack eas tward.OIl 3 June the e ne my was sighte d soubhwest of

. M i dw t ty , a ndcarrier aireraff

fromthe Yorktown,Enlfrrprise, and HQrTI . . f , trepea tedly bat te red the

Japanese ships, sinking fofll"ail'craft carriers andone heavy cruiser. One cruissr {tud severaL de-stroyers were damaged. Arnuricanlosses were theYorkwwn.and one destroyer.

The decisive victory Testm'ed' to the Allies su-periority in the air over the Pnclf ic . Therea!bcr,e;;:~eptfor the A1eut,iaDswere the Jap!1ll~e Iandedon Attu and Kiska Islands, enemy operatIOns wereconfinedto th e SOU!;]l a n d S o u th w e s t,P a ci fi c . .TheJOillt C hiefs ofStaff w e re i m il w li! ), te ly e na bl edto adopt a .m o r s a c ti vepo)ioy.

RelJised Allied Strategy,July 19.qD.-Gen. GeorgeC . M n rs h a ll , C hie fof Staff of the Army of the

Ulrited StaMs, and General MaeArthul: soughtto exploit the changed sitlla~ion by cOJ_l~l:Int1'fI,tJngsufliciertt forces in the SoujJJ.westPacific lIl:ea toMable it to drive t .heenemy back to Tnlk, )l1 .~he

C. ! ' . a nd We w ll .kon N ew Guinea. Ad.m. .iral!IJ'Ollles . ·'·th U· d

E. J Ki n g cornnlall(lm: ill chief of e· mternest . .!.>- , Oo .

S u ~osFleet and Ohief of Nav.u paratJOD6, pro-;a d two simult!lcllcoUS drives, one lAy General

~~:~.A.l"~l\Ur'sCOIllJDaJld to 'I'iruor QrESO~!lr : :ersuiLable place in the Netherlands as .. es,.

tl. to th-0 southern S ol om o ns u n de l.

dtheo Hjrlll - ran - R b ,t L Ghornlley commander 0V ic e A dm . 0 eJ· • , ,

tile So Iltil l~lllCific [H·.ea,.



-• S uch a divisioll of the A ll ie d e ff ort W fI BopposedIy G8I1eral MahArthur because he ~eeJIled the\vailable foroes sufficient only for a s in g le .offeD-ive. An operation against Timor, even if sue-l e s s f u l ,h e b el iE Ved , could not be suppor ted ~.trongly as one in the nor theastern secto r, and .I tV I I S doubtf ul 1fhether Timor could be he ld 10

; .jewof the nearby Japanese bases from which thel.nemy dominaled the sea. The situation wasrvholly different in the New Britain-New Ireland

\rea. which, if csptured, reMOno.bly could be he~d.l iB conception was 8; progressive movement ill-

~olving primary action against the Solomons and.,he north coast of New Guinea. to protect thelava.i forces and secure a ir fi elds for the suppor t') f the :fina l p htse , a n assa ult on Rubaul. Sinceurecess would depend' upon complete ccordine-tion of the land, sea, and a ir forces to be employedb .nd since a ll o b je c ti ve a were in the Southwest( "acme area, Gener ll l Mnc .A.r thur urged that hebe given direction of the entire advance. InWashington, Gen . George Marshall sopportedthis view.; The d irec tive is sued by the Jo in t Chief of Staff:on 2 July wns R compromise between the conflict-ing opinions of the United States A n n y and Navy ..ITbe offensive plan wu.s divided into three tasks:lthe conques t and garr iloning of the San ta Crull

Islands, Tulegi, and adjacent positions; the' capture of the remaining Solomon Islands, and·L ae , S alam au a an d M ad an gon the north coast ofNew Guinea; m d the seizure of Rabaul. Com-mand of the lint was assigned to Admirlll Ghorm-

! ley and the o the rs to General MlUlArthur. The· forces to be cooun itt ed were tbe ground, a ir, and·navalstrength ofthe Southwest Pacific area and atI Il!llBt two ILif,ll'ILftcarriers with accompanying: cruisers and dEStroyers,Marine amphibious forces,I a nd M a ri ne w squadrons, army air, and oecupa-I tional force s from the South Pacific are a. TheI boundary between the Southwest and SouthI Pacific areas VfIS shif ted to 159° east longitude inI or de r to include the .southern Solomons in the: latter, Theqat date f or the first oper ation: under Admire: Ghormley w as 1 August.

Following a conference at Melbourne GeneralMaaArthur BlldAdmiral Ghormley reco:nmended

i that the wt4tion of the offensive be deferred.E n e lJ l 1 a c ti vi tyin the objective area wns increns-

I iQg an d indicated a major effort in airdromed:#iIIopDl.entat KavieJlg, Rabaul, Lae, Slllamaua,

I ~,.uut ~~. This enemy preparation_ # W ~ Allied weaknees in t rained am-

lQ

phibious troops, s hi pp in g , s u pp or ti ng o .U :f l( ~ ld s,planes, they painted ou t, would probablythe success fu l prosecut ion of the drives. Ifsouthern Solomons alone were taken nndIldvll.l1cehalted leaving Rabnul inen(l]~ythe result would be nu e:<rposod snl ienfwhich the Japanese c ou ld b rin gst reng th suppor ted by lnnd-bnsed p lanes.adequats farces could b e p ro v id ad to oxthree tasks in one continuous movement,commanders urged tbat operations be .infiltration through the Ne w Hebrides andCruz Islands and nccelernted a irdrometion in New Guinea.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, howe ve r, felt\VIIS necessary to proceed without delay. Aenemy establishment in the T ulag i areasupport 0. further soubhward advnnc e, a ndfields on G u ud nlc o.n al w o uld s er io us lynot prevent, Allied occupation of Su.ntaEspiritu Santo. Admiral Ghor mleyaccordingly, and 7 August WIlS ss t ns Damphibioua n .ttucks on Tulag i end G1 1

The Southwest Pacific a rea pre pa red tothe operations by nil' interdiction ofhostile nil '

naval activit ies west o r the objectives nnd byparticipa tion of i ts naY!l] elements.

Southwest Pacific ,sctratcgy.-Plans lo rcontinuation of the offensive under Generlt lAl-thur wer e bused upon the progressivemovement of a ir echelons culmina ting in thetion of Rabaul prior to an assault upon it.drives were to be made with one tusk forceceeding generally along the north const 01Guinea se curing in suc cession Lne-SGnsmata, Cape Gioucest e r-Ta l ll s en -Ml ldong ,W ew ak-Lorengua, nnd theother along fheSolomons-New Ireland. 1;0 seize l~nisi-Kiea nd.Kavieng. Both tusk {Ql'CCB were t.o co .

for tbe capture of Rabnul. Since ~he Sou~hPacific aren lacked the trained nJll])hibiotisand speeial ized equipment necessmy fortile use 01 the Marine forces from tbePacific area was a prerequisite.

The first phase of · th e p J 'o je c te d advaDcevolved an amphibious a ttack onLae andSIn orde,r to provide fightel ' cover fol ' tilll ~noof the convoy and t he n s so .u lt ,It prelilll!llWM directed fo r the cOrlstnwtion of anat BUlla. A lighL forcll Q f fOUL' illlanptLnies WIlS to move overland hem pQ J·tvi a Kokodll. to oc cupy Buna prim' to thewaterborne elements including o.ntiw·cI'IIft,

ground unit s. The opCl! 'a tionundercover of tho landillgs

~as fo~estalle(1 by the Jupn,,an immediate o fl 'ens ive in ~l ewere laW away. 1

ojJensive for Kokodaenemy c onvoy ot sevcrul

ips wns sigLMdotT thCIlQrth

an d thl1t :nighj, 1andedGOM, s ev er ll ) m il es n or th -air I1 Ua~ ks s uc ce ctied in

These JapllUose trQOpsof t:b.eN a n le ai De tach-

c o rt ll D Ul ld o fMaj. G e n .quickly proceeded w i w ' .

area a nd sent a small spe ar-Kokoda, Alliedunits at that

Iufan tr;y Bat !lnlioli and all

of the Maroubra Force.air was planned, btl t only 30

before the Japnnese, in fightiug-Kokoda an d its lau din g

defenders back to Deniki.bra Force started forward

More sby to insure the reten-

the OwOn-S t I1111ays .In v iewd if ll c ul t ie s im posed by theit w as believed probable ~hat

t would be lim ited to th ebase enly, nlthough th eassu,ult on Port Moresby

QjJ8n~ve.-While Alliedas orig inally p lanned WIJ-S

steps. preliminary to tak-ordered. New Guinea

w as extended to inc lude a llNew Gnme1l" in addition to

to place a~ leas t tWQTrail at the earliest

recapture Kokoda nird rome.to infllt l'u ,t e a lo ng th enorth

overland movement fr omNelson. On late}' orders lindphase of the ofl'ens:ive,bothcon tinued to se i~e the Burin

with a pl'ojec~ed amphibiousForce wus .l1ugnl~llted to

it.s missio1l. '1 'he Se\<ellthmove forward f rom Allslirlllin

EighteflJl~ll Brigude goiog toIln d T w e.uty-lifth

MOl·esby.

S ou llt we RI P (t cij'w c drcl1 o'" TI '. .rth' All" . UP ' •.- Ie mlss!Qn 1'1e . led Air FOl'ce d urine tl· . d

d esLl'o U .. . g 119 POI'lO . was tol io: y t e e nC Jl lyair force, his nil' fieJd insta l,n,tlons nne! I L . . - . . " "t ' . li S S upvmg; to provid« close supportI) Iocn],ground force Qpel'llLions;nnd to provide

rceon lInl~SItUce I'l l b otil. land nn d sea areas, .Airf or ce u nit s w or emoving into t he Yor k PC )l N > _ . . - " ~nIl1SU a.~ ( < ,W G Lime ll lIS rapidly lIS t he c o m pl et io n ofal~'clrolTlOSand limi ted s hippin g res ourc es per~ruittsd. .

,PI'iQr to A ug ust 1 94 :2 , th e 'Scll,le of Allied airetl.Ol:t was restricted bv lJJ:6 av aila bility of oper-Ml? na l IlU St.rips wi III in range oJ enemy ins ta l-l auons , Strips had been cor..~ Lructed outhemainland of AlistraliR in - flllliicipll.Ll0nofa J Il,jJIL-

nese drive south lrom Rabaul. These stripswere not within lighter muge O f the zone otfig litin g in N ew G uille n. B om bers ,sta.rU.llg fromAus t l 'a l il 1 Io rthe task of striking ,Ja pa n os e f il !l d sin the Lae-Salamaua area in support of South-west Pacif ic troops DJl.J the Rabaul-NortbernSolomons IlTel.l.in suppnr t of S ou tn P ac if icactionon G um l aloan aI. fo un d it neces sary to s linga~IH'Ollgjl l'ort Morssbv 0.11 each run, To add tothe operating difficulties 01 tnese curly sorties

t .1 le n il ,v ig a uo na1 h az n r d 0 f crossing the O w e l l :Stanley moun tains was interposed between thes tl \g ing I ie ld and the objec tive n reas,

As of 19 August, foul' airfields bad beancom-pleted Ilt PQH Moresby-om for h~ltl'y bombers,Ol10 for medium bombers, and ~wofo!' fighters.T w o more heavv bomber fields and oue mediumbomber field W~l'O expected to be ready by ;;September. ALMilne Bny one field, ill operntioulor pursuit planes, was e,.>;;pectedto be rondy forhe nNY bombers by 25 August, and bwo QthorhGflVYbomber strips were under construction.On HIe York Peninsula two Iieavy bowber fieldsa nd o ne f ig ht er£j·el,] w e r e c o m pl e te d ,with tllHle!ldditional lieavy bomlJ!11' f ields expectc(l to be

l'emly ill SeptlJI l1bcr- Adequate fadlitie,s. hili!b e en c o m pl et e dill the Towl1svi lk , -Olol lCIHTY'area,

26 . Fv.Y! lwr I J rep{ /r a t io1 l8 .-TbeThirty-seconrlan d Forty-first Dj\TisiollS,:vhicll we re ~o tnkep!t l' t in !ihe offensivco]}erntlOl1S,were, ~nfted ~oBri sbane and R oc k hl J, m pL o n, r es pe c l; iv l. ll y, t ounMrgo (m illing an d tofOl'lll into n corp,~' . 101'

wllio-hl ab le r p ur J ?o S cL~. O ml Robert L. JMchel-

b. COITlIn on(ll,lg G(ll1('1'I11. I Ooq)S, am i loiSer"el, . .. , ,- - . I

stnff w~rosent from Ihe Unit,cd Stat!:!;. Geuera:Mllcru.thlll ' brtU1SJefl'ed llili hN'L~jduR.'tN'S. i rn~n

1 11 1 ." - L oTI",·obnnc w l , e r o ]t. wallhl b e . 1[1J "e'uo~U'IHlI _w _ ,.;I -, ' •

I'o,";]n I·'y to ~ be h Qad qU Iir ~ers 0 r A l b e dc QS~ pi .~ . u

11



-Ai r Forces an d . A l l i e dNaval Forees, and toAdvanced Land Headquarters, a forward eabel .onest.abliahed by . A l l i e dLand. Force s to deal withopera tional matters. Brig. Gen. . Richard J.Marshal l nplaced General Barnes ID c:omm~dof United States .ArmyForces in Australia, .whlebWII!I redesignated United States Army Servl~ ofSupply and Maj. Gen. George C. Kenney relievedG e n e r a iBrntt II!I commander, Allied Air Forces.By, early .August , plans and prepf\Tatio~ for the

offensive ba d pr oc eeded to such a poin t thatGeneral Ma cArthur a dvised the Joint Chiefs ofStaff he wculd be able to execu te the f ir st phase ,the capture of Buna, Lae, Salama ua , a nd G.as-mata, immedia.tely after the successful eonclusionof .Admiral Ghormley's operation if tb.e marineI Illlphibiolli f orc es and their equipment withcarrier support were available..

Allied ,)jJensiflfl in Solomo1l8.-The Allieda tt ack ink the southe rn Solomons was launchedon 7 .August when the First Marine Division,rein fo rced , went ashore on Tulag i and Guada l-canal, Three aircraft carriere were among tbeparticipa.trng naval units , which also includedseveral c ra iser s and des troyers tempora rily as-signed to Admiral Ghonnley's contr ol fromAllied Naval Forces. The Southwest Pacificarea supperted the landings by disposing sub-marines about Rabaul, flying reconnaissance,a nd by sending air s tr ik es a gain st enemy air-dromes and shipping. All pla ne s c apable of th erange wen direc ted to Rabau l, Buka , and Kie ta ,while others hit Lae and £&!smaua.

The enemy gar ri sons were taken by surpr ise,and at the end of the BIlCOndday the Marines werein complete control of Tulagi an d the airfield onGusdulC&l.a.l,the immediate objectives of theoperation. But the Japanese struck back stronglyby sea and air f rom the ir bases in the nor thern

Bolomons and Bismarck Arc hipelago. On thenight of SAugust undetected hostile surface unitsentered the area between Guadaleanal and FloridaIslands an d sank f ou r h ea vy c ru is er s,among themBMAS Oafl lJerra . Land-baaed planes beganbombing Marine posit ions and made the adjacentw ate rs al mo stuntenable during daylight hours.Submarines we re ac tive against the Americanlines of communieatlon, and. at night enemyw& l 'l J I iPabombarded shore installations virtunUyat will .

On 23 AugI18t a heavily gua rded con.voy oftlianspom W8» sighted.moving south from Rabaul.'The A l l i e df le e t t oo kpartial revenge fo r ita earlier

12

deteat. a s ca rrier aircra ft combined withbased planes from GundalCl1nal to inf lictdamage that the enemy turned back, Tbenese, however, were able to land addit ionalon Gulldnlcanal by means of the 'press"-mght runs by de stroyers from the nSolomons. Th6 Mnrines defending thefaced increasing pressure. ,

Th e campaign became a contest to SM

s ide cou ld bui ld IIp the greatest weight offorcements sud supplies, the outcomeupon con trol o f the se ll ;and n ir.

J(1;pa1!Me ()ffrm~i1leon Kokodataneously with their counte r blows ill.mons, the JnpauC! !tl develope d allNew Guinea tha t threatened Porf More sbyMilne Bfl .Y. During August they reinfbrcedtroops in the Buna area by landing theof the Nankai Detachment, almest two.Allied air IIittac ks s uc ces sfu lly _ , ..,_",~.,,,1

development of an operating air bnsebut the enemy s tead ily bui lt up the ir forcesKokoda Trail and continued to pushThey held the ndvan tnge in thnt theyto move up me n a nd supplies

than the Aus t- ra lians . Whereas the 0Range between Port }.i[ ol'esby andmade up of numerous precipitousing in mountains 8,000 to 9,000 feet'Kokeda to Buna the ground slopes gentlynorthe rn f oothills and the eousbal plain.August, when over 1,000 Japanese 11

Den:iki,the AustmliDlli l had only anbat ta lion in posi tion and were forced toto Isurava where they prepared to mnkenext stand.

On IS August, Lt. Gen. Sydney F.replaced Gen. Basil M. Morris inNew Guinea Fotce, and the SevenUh

under Maj. Gen. Arthur S. A.l leD. WIISresponsible fo r the operns ion on the KokodaThe troops nt Isurava, by 26 August, badreinforced by throe AuatralilLn, balitoJionS.tenance of these un its WIlS e ffe cted inm otor tran sport fromPort M oresby topack horse toUberi, thence !Ol 'Wllre!b y. .carrier. This wns supplemouted by the anping ofsupplies, a new technique ""Ilion baddeveloped under opcrabional eQnditions. nmnny difficulties such as the GXtl'eIDelynature of the tHrII'iu, the scarcity ofa irc raft, and the uni ,( l ;vOl"lLblewenti lel 'that frequently prevailed over th e 0

a.djunch to t he n or m al lTIeR.LlS

Japanese w e r e e s ta b li sh e df L ttho Kokoda T l" fu i] t h eycould

orcements from ~henorth Ilndn",rMJ I."l Tl" strength OVIli' Lhe mOll_ll~

couss, endanger Port lloresbyThe seeuLity of these. bases

siva to regain the crest ofand even tually to c lear ull of

for [{odoila.--8ince anecessari ly would he slowbe-

difficulties of supply, thefor three axes of advance:

the Kolwda Trail, a wideover the Owon-Stan leys eas t

·'IIJ>"!I.l1n~f,the enemy line of COID-

infil trat ion along the north coastGenera l he adquar te rs set theof the first two as the SCCUTing

rKummsi ' River f rom the Owalamcof tho Kokoda-Bnna Tra il

thir d as the occ upation

and the north coast of N c\V

.Al lwere to be continuedthe Bunn-Gona area.

to Port MOl'csby duringthe ecunteroffensive

Br igade and two regi .mentsDivision, the O n e E un drad

anda detachment ofTwenty-sixth InlantryBltnney arrrvedut Port

the ope.rations,nnd Lt. Gen .re plac in g G en eral R ow eJl -.

of n in e brigades n n e! r eg i-taxed 'the iiliipping resources

to the ntmosb, Base in-for hund l:ing ships, roads

of supplies to depots, andand the pl'otecliion of stores

heatan.d ra in Wel'B almostPOl ' t MOJ;esby, lJI'actically non-Bay, and 6ll ti l'ely laoking III

facilities had to be de-with the oflensive. Ship])ing

p 1).1' ti culm:ly ill the en,r\y; only units lIJ:ld stores

operations nglLinst tD.eenam!New Guinea. Under coudl-

n gre I1ter })IOportio II o f

service troops than the normal, there was aotuallyte\vel' than norm £I I .

In ord er to deal more eifecliively with logisticrro~lems, G e ne ral H ca dq uD .r te rs d ire cte d t hetor-maticn ofthe Combined Operational Service Com-mand under Brig, Gen. Dwight F., JoJ:ms, UnitedStates Army. This organization functioned di-rectly under Now Guinea force as D.coordinatingagency between tll .e AustraliD.Jl and Americansupply services. Its major responsibilities werethe receipt, s~orage, lind distribution of supplies;se a transport ill I il ie N e w G u in e aw aten 'S; operadonof the doe ks : c on stru c tien ofdocks, roads, andairdromes; and evacuationimd hospitalisation.Initially branches were established at Port Mores-by an d M iln e B ay .

The first drive to get under'way W!l.S that by theSeventh Division baek across the Kokoda Trail.The) advance began on 26 S ep tam ber nnd wa sspeerheaded by the Twenty-fut ;h Brigade rein-forced, The Sixth Division was retained in theP ort M ores by flrc ," for d efe ns e ag ain st s eab orn eatta ck, Ioribeiws fell to the Austrn1illJls on 28September nJter the main enemy body svaeuatedits (lefellslls and withdrew rapidly norbhwurd.

Pursuit was delayed by bhe bad state o rthe trailand weather conditions which interfered with air

dropping of s up pl ie s, b ut , b y10 October, forwardelements wore in eon tact with !ilia enemy on topof the range in tho Templeton 's Oross ing-EoraCreekarea. Here the Japanese fought toonciouslyfrom u. series o rwill-prepal'ed positions on highg.!. 'ouuddominating the trnil The lnst of t.hp~qewas not cleo.redunti l the end of the month whenthe e ne my f le d t ow a rdDin O n 2 N ov em b ertheSeventh Division occupied Kokoda without oppo-

sition, .' .Meanwhile, troops of the Thlrty.,sccoml D~Vl-

vis ion had been ass igned the tusk of operanngover the DlolUltainseas t o f Port M~resby. Tworoutes were considered, one f rom Rigo to JD.IU"O,the o ther f rom Abau to Ja1Jl'o. While the O ?eHlllldred und Twcmty-aightb Wan.try,. Oi l I ts

al'rival in N e w G u in ea ,was tempoI'II'!"ily1J;1lo~tedfor defellse of POl"t 1I,Ioresbyunder the S~th

D' . , the One Hun(h-ed aud Tweuty.aL,!ilin

'1S10n, ~; .

Inlantiry dispntohed!), reinlorced battuhon. over!:he rugged ta'!lilf rom Rigo. The problem of sup--1 JrevBnted the movement of a larger forcep y~-ll))ie route could be [urthel' devlllope(l andun L • blishad The) One H,mdred unddurnps es.a . ' b _I.' d fr. . . th Iu1l1Dtr\,WIIS to . e .....lppe omT\\.,~u.t.yli·sevllJJd't il i~ed ' along the ~eMnd rou te oAustl"ll .n an u

,

1 3



This plan wu abandoned because it was found1 1 0be e x o e s s i v e l : ytime consuming eompared to

I the devtlopment of a.third axis of advsnee,infiltraiion nerth from Milne Bay.

General :MacArthur ha d sought to obtaintrained M~e amphibious troops and suitable

I landing craft for OP8l'lLtiODSnor th a long the coastfrom Milne Eay, but ha d been to ld tha t none were

l a.vai1ab1e in the Pacific and that the first ship-I mant of landing craft from the United States

would not bs reedy for depar tu re un til somet imeI in Ocwbar. Another means WII$ a .t hand, how-ever, by whillh forces could be eetabliehed on thenorth COlI$t, At Wa .n ig e la , B O U t hof C ap e N elB O D,w ae s.n air strip which inveetigation disclosed to

, be adequate for l s.nding transpor t a ircraf t. N ewI Guinea Force issued instructions for its Occup&tion

by 0. b&ttaJi~n of the Eighteenth Brigade moving, by air from Milne Bay, General Heo.dquartere

approved, but directed that resupply must beI a.rranged by water because of the commitmentsI of the a ir force in suppor t o f the troops moving

over the Owen-Stanleya, The operations wassuooeeefully carried out on 5-6 October withoutinterference from the enemy,

During th e period 14.-18October two battalionsof reinforciIIg troops were f lown into Wanigela,These fol'Cll il s ta rted to advance overland toPongo.ni, 23milee from BUlla, but found the MusaRiver impessable. The plan was a ba ndoned inf avor of a colUltwiae far ry service employings m a I 1boau, and the first elements landed atpongani Ot 20 October, By 2 November theday on whieh the Austral ians recaptured Kokod&almost s .n enti re d ivi sion was ins ta lled in th~Pongan i a rea and IlD a ir st rip had heen c leareda nd made le ady f or use by transports. The rein-forced battalion of the One Hundred and Twenty-BixthInfamy which had marched overland was

in a n d .f O f " o l a r dof the Jauro area, At this timeOenenl Blameyrequeeted approval for the con-centration 01 the remainder of the two reg imen tsnorth of tte Owen-Stanleys in readiness to attack~ .~apanasa in con junc tion with the Seventh~~YB;IOD..

~ a dd it i. on to maintaining continuous attacksW 1 I i n a tJ a p a D e & eairfields in the La.e-SaJamaua.B A ¢ l B i a o l a r c kArdripelago-N orthern Solomons... _ ~~ abipping during the Kokodo.~ ~ , i tb e ..Allied . A i rForce was effective in '

to the ground tr oops on the tr ail..4e 'n1bombing atta.cka reduced~ point. ~tiJI,g the trail

a nd softened others, Tho great ( Iin 'o ro no e .abil ity of the Ja.panose to resupp ly audthe ir uni ts in the Owen 4 Stnilley MOllnta,ins!tllpared to that of tIle Allies is attribu table toair interdiction of the n at ive C Ar rie rpnrtylines, The J apanese d id not utilize ah drotensi.vely lind the na tives did not have thenor the intensity of purpose to ndvnncaface of All ied s trafere.

Allied c(] '1lture o f G oo de no uy hcurrently with the ndvnnce Iromreconnllissn.nce in force of Goodenoughwhich layoff the northeastem coast ofGuinoo, wus conducted to cle ar it ofJand to determine the suitability of thefor airfield cOnetmction, On the nigb t'October a sm all tll$k forcelanded at MuTaleha Bays, Ou the island near Killinwer e appr oxima tely 300 troops whostranded there in August when Allieddestr oyed the bal'ges in which the y werefrom Buns for the 1LS5!1l)lt o nMilneAustrnlians attacked, and Ilft.el 'indecisiveon 23-24 October the Japnnese evnolla~edisland, the ta sk forc e r emaining in

Although plans had env is ioned the OS&IJ,I)~ISllnof IlD a il: base there, a general shortage oftl ' t)Ops1l6cessitu.ted postponcmen t of theseveral months,

Enemy capabilities,~AUhough enBll lytion to the operationa along the north, cOIrst

limited to the minot' resistance at GoIsland, grave risks WGI'Oinvolved becauseJapanese, controlling the sea north ofGuinea , could c ut tho Allied Iinc oftiona at will and bring oVIH'l"hehning fOI '

bear against the newly 11'1311 bases, 'rhohad to proceed cau tious ly with t.bo .idel1ofwithdrawal. ] . < ' 0 1 ' this reason, ait 's tr ic leared in land a t &pia and K.iujult1dumps estab li saed a l each to aid in til eretirement of coastal troops if tho enemyin force,

The entire forwar d movement in N ewtook advantage of Japanese l)l 'ileCOUPthe Solomons whore Lho gl'eat6~ part of thesea, air, an d ground streugth w ius 'intense offensivo a ction n gaills tThe outcomo of thaI, sLruggle hnd avital bearing not only e n pl'ogr essbut aleo on the defonS(\ of the wbole Nowp oe it io n a .n d t hesecurity of Allstralia,

&'UtJr, pactfic actio n: BaU lao j G ape

tho ~ea 1)0 ttlo D ~ ti le .I' one ofen gag em en t had L alW II p luc eill

for uhou t 6 w e e ks ,bu t Illlllll"'OliS

bad O(WUl'i'ed which C O S L LheW a.81 1 and severn] do-

Jupunese [andnd minfol"CP-,:t.lrnost lIigbtly, nn d Ly

pu t !I shore 1 1 1 1 ) 1 ' 1 : 1thnn u IIh'isio,', . ~I,

w er e ng um Il SS CIT I. bliIlg to Uwtho night 01 11 O otobC!' n nand degtl'oysl' group intcrc.eptcd

Cape Esperance, sinking, 01'

of vessels [Iol' ldcausing the, Despi te this success

extremely cl'iticn.i.concoutrlLtiolls ill L b e R ab au l-

five or six battles hipswhile the; Amertcnns

ps and twc carders eom-tor, This navu] superiority

of surf ace movamonts u bm a rl n c I :L c ti vi ty s e ri ou s ly

Ilnd resupply to thoincreasingly eviden t thnt a

Immluent.

a roa wa s doing e ve ry-th e press u ra on G LIIt d ~ ,I -in New Guinea was, in

that purpose, Twelve sub-NavnI Forces wore assigned to

for Lampo!'Hry control.ing i ts long-range equip-capacity in strikes on

and s 11p ply ins talia ~iO'IIS

northern Solomons, tlsingonly in supPQrt of the Now

G(lliaml Mac)\:rbhur was illwit,hArlmirnl Ghonilley,

~y 11',\$ given his l'oques!s

n.ttaok.disastet' nt Guudnicllnnln!l(Lw hic h w ould then fnco the

, G (,OOI'a! :tv[ncAI'LbIll' urgedof the U nited Stn.tr s be

mod th ,l . \c) 'iLiwl si~ur.bioll ,b", made avnilablB from

corps b(1 dispahehtcl immedi-available heavy hom bers bo

at, onco, G c np ra i H e ad -outline pIlL!!for tho I'odistd-e v e l lt I)[ !1 J n,panese.viotory

Depl'nciellL I .I po n ( ,h el d eg r Mn .lld e stimI.LlCS o r his

CltpahimipJI roc If' ,P!l.Ctfio LI I'0 Oll il l,V~ n,etlOn ill the Sou~h\l'()9t

,Ie pan cnvls lOMd till' . I 'r'd"fonse n long tl u r-I eo p.l.RSOS, WIllto ill ~. ' Ie une 0 t 10 Olvan-Stanley RlLllge~t!l:f -011 t :vlth~rll.w(.land prepal'ation to with-

~l !I. m ajor eflort to knockAus~ralia ollt of "oeW!l.J'. .,1'

, B lJ it lr.,oj Suma Orua , -- O J , 18 .October Vioe\dm, Will III III F, Raise" re lieved Ad ~ 'I Gh1 . . . J ~. mlm' ortn-ey II! tho South Pacifle are a, On the nigh~ o f - 23

O c t? bc l' t l,o, Jo ,pnn es e b eg an a grOlu\d offensiven~nmst t ho Guadn lcnnn lD,i,.field,find21lighrn III.~er,II li en the assaul t r eached i ts pesk moved tl 'I\"~' I 't I s . lelr. ~ I ~a U 111 S 90 U t, lIV ard in foree. In the bit ~!J1l

wluch, Iel lowed on 26 October aircrart from. theAmcnCUllc~l'I'iers I IvJ '1 I I JLlim] E n t e r p r i s e put twoenemy earners Ollt ~f nubian, and lour enemy airgroups WI.\"U co t to p ie ce s, b ut t heH o r n ! : !WM sunkand ~bo E ' I l l e r 1 J r i . s cdamaged, [orcillg the AmBricanf le et t o r et ir e. A s ho re ,fer a b rie f pe riod t hat s nzn eday, the quostion of whether 01'- not the airfieldc ou ld b e r et ai ne dhung in L I L l ib alan ce . A c ou nte r-!],ttn ok, how ev er, res tored L besiluation an di nfl i c tc d h eav y c as ual ti es . Wh il e t hi s col1l3tiLutedthe lust serious thrcn,t by hostildgl'ound Iorces onG un dalc an al, t hoJap!1l1cses t il l exorc isedcontrol

over ths Mincent waters.B at tle o fGiwaa/(la1!(tl.-In &11 effort to breakb he d ea dl oc k, s ub m ar in es a ndmotor t or pe do b ou tsel lL in to h os til e c orn mn nk atl on a audreinforce-ments were rushed to G u ad u lc ll ll nl d ur in g6-12November, SimulLmlcouSlythe Japanese coacen-trated !t large fleet of transports in the R!l.bllul-B ull, are a an d b ag nn m ov in gSOli b h with reinforce-ments, In !I. 3 - d n . ybattle beginning the night of 12November, the Arnmricmls,ill spite o f l l cnvylosses,gained III decisivevictory, OV~[ half o f th e e ne myt l' l) :nBpol 't s were suuk, and. the ~1'{)Op3 which theJApaueso succeeded in Illuding wore minus much0'[ t he ir e qIIi pm en t n I1 d su p plies , C on tro I0 [ thes en s nd 'Ul'in t J l ! lsOll~hel ' l lSolOlnons passed to the

U l lJ tc d S t ll be s ,un d O il G U l ) l d n k M ' H l o It ho m a ri ne s' 11 I ( I' l I ( lw l yarrilrorl Milly un i ts b~"'!\nn strongerOiIOlls iveto e!irninlLt~the enemy gar"isoD, Thouri~icrdp~riod WA S sf.fely past, and tile J upanese,VNC n ot . .b let o se rious lyt hr c !1 t on u g r.i n,

} 3 > W I l I l . -6 ' o ' n a ,-lr1 Uhl) N ell' an iuea area,Amaric!l.1land Aus t ra li an ~1X)OPSw o re m ov in gintoposi~ion ( or n il nss!tl,lt 011 t,ho B[II1a-~OIlI).. al'e~,Gelleml J :vl l lcAl 't hu l ', de s ir ing to cs t ll b li s .ho .n aIrb n se (J J.efC hero1'0 bile en em y c ould IIm d s tron greinioTcemcnLs,on.dy i.n No"eD1b(lrhad mllo,da,Llle

decisioll to exeoute hile finnlPURSO of t]IC bllllt.cdoJllJusive and c l o u t 'Papul', 01 the Japanese,

J5



-Provided 8uftbient I!Uppliescould be placed behindeach column ofthe advance, an approximate dateof 15 November was se t for a coord~~~d a tt aekby the Sevenih and Thirty-second DlVlSlons. An

t advance ecl l! tlon of General Hc&dquarter s wasopened at Port Moresby, and General Mae~~ur

t arrived on 6 Novomber to effect close coordlllatlOnof the forces engaged in the campaign. .' .

A l t e reapt'u:ing Kokoda, the Sc,:entb DJVls~onI continued to push forward aIter quickly readying

the landing s tr ip for use by t ranspor t aircraft. toease the SUWly s itua tion. The Japanese madea resolute stand on the high gr ound a t Oiva andCOM. Whle the Sixteenth B r ig ad e a tt ac ke d

, frontal ly, theTw~nty-fiI th Brigade moved QgaiostL the enemy flank- and rear. 00 10 November tha

enemy wae d:iven from his positions in lull retreat,having suffered extremely large easualbies. Thesurviving JUpIlllCSt' split up, thf' main body cross-ing the flooded Kumuse River by boat and mItand withdruwing rapidly to the Buna-Gone area.Part escaped down the river valley to the coast andeventually reached Gona, General Horil wasdrowned in th e precipitous flig\l.t. The Australiansquickly constructed a br idge a t Wairope and by17 N ovembec both brigades were across the river inpursuit of the Japanese. The Twenty-nfth.Brigade, mcving along the tJ.·o,t·k Jumbore-Gona,W B 8 held up en 19 November by enemy {orcusshout 1 mile BOUth of Gona. O il the following daythe Sixteer:th Brigade on the track Seputa-Sanananda encountered hostile positions Ij; milesnorth of Seputa.

Ea et of the Giro.River the concentration of theOne hundred and Twenty- eighth and One hun-dred and Twenty-sixth InfmWy Regimente fromPort More! 'by was completed by air t ranspor t tothe Wanigtla, Pongani, and Sapia landing strips.When the Austra lians de feated the Japanese a t

Oivi and COM and pushed across the Kumus iRiver, the American forces under Maj. Gen.Edwin F. Harding advanced as rapidly ae possibleagainst Billa. By 20 N ovembor this division wasin c on tac t w ith theJapa,nese on the Ango-Bunatrack about 1 m ile south of Buna an d south ofCape Endaiadere on a line running inland toSinomi Cr£ek.

It was hoped that the simultaneous drives of theAllied divisions would crush the J apanese and gainlUI .early~tory. In anticipation of this, shipping,loaded wdh troop units , supplies, and equipmentfor the C O l J !O l id 4 t i o na n d d ev el op me nt o fthe Buna.area1 I pQ n it s c a pt 1 lJ 'e ,was a t MilneBaY'and Port

16

Morel lby ready for anward movement .de~sr Jn inat ion of the Japanese resiatance andstrength of their defensive positions wereeatin18too. Elements of the Twell ty . .J ii thOIl 20 November pen.et rlL ted into Gonuwithdraw beclLuse of a shOl ' tage of food a ndmunition. A renewed assaul t made nosion, and the initia l efforts of the otherwere equally unsucc essful. A virtualresulted on all fl'ont-s.

Dur ing the opern. tion on tlHlKokoduJapanese remain ing in tho Bunn-Gonnprepared extremely strong anddefe nses, taking full advl1ntago ofAlmost every Allied attack wasnaITOWterrain eorridors along braeksenemy defenses frequently located on th6 onlyland in the vicinity.

Each enemy position was he ld with'determination u nt il d es tr oy ed . GOlla. \'I'lIS

c apt1ll'cd until 9 December. Buna is days ISananandu on 18 Jaauary, and the fino'! Jr emnea ts we re not cleare d from the I1 rc ! t .22d. The Forty-fust United StwtesDivision relieved the batt1e-weI1l.YAll$ .

Amel'icll.ll units and pushed slowly up theGuinea coast to Morebe Bay, which wasduring tho first week in Apri l 1943.

T he ji'T tfJ .l Jq,pames6 offtffl.SiveJapanese were not discouraged by I lhethis a ttempt to drive the Allie s from Ne wTb6Y c ould no longer move by wa.tei' f Tomadvauce buses at Lae and Salu,ffiaUI1sodecided to attack PortMoresby by anotherland route through the mountaias and .the interior of New Guinea. Wall, amining center 011 the Bulolo River, was .to control of inland routes from Lae an dmaua to Port Moresby.

The enemy began his se cond off ensivethe Papuan campaign WILS compl()ted. Tilehundred and Second Regiment of thoDivi sion arr ived n t Lac f rom l 't abau l on thoof 6-7 JIIJ l1uuy. Its nrl'ivv.llll!ll·ked .bha lnstthe Japanese were able to opcl'atll lingoconvoys within range of Allied.1end-b nsedwithout prohibitive IOS6. During 6, 7, «l:January 1943 the COllVOY had been att.ack.e I

transports were sunk and Lwo athol' ShipSdamaged from the convoy of two ligMfoul' destroye rs, a nd (our tL ' l1l1sJj lOrts .the troops had been saved. One b. '.'

L. nStcr)lsent to Nassau Bay to pro·tect tuo 0

began !l.. 50~m.ile.m~rch tiu'ollgh, on . t, he B l t C l R r ve :r , t o" I ' Va u .

AlJstI'1111l~ncomp~nies, 01)cratiugdefended tb !s posi tion butulinn B Tig nds w asflO\~Ll in

the enemy intention becamehind Bred t,h" m ov em e nt, 0 I) C

on 2Q JUnll!u.y, the other twowere deluyecl until the 28tb 1

began, 'broken on 30 January ami the

pushed baCk to Mubo by ant udvanoe. Headqum-ters

Division to ok o ve r the oporatiouFifteenth Australian Brigadealong MO tbel: trail toward

co River a bo ve S al um n ua .fron t of these posi LionsO!l.l'lyun til 01;1161.'troop s co uld be

a ttack upon Lito, Sala-and Madang.another enemy regiment of the

a:I1(1 supporting troops em -

to reinforce the garrison nit L!l.Othe assau lt on Wau, ROCOll-

opemting nor th of N e'" B Titainand escorting desbl'oyerS inth e a'f tcl'nooll of 1 March.

t4e n,e~t morning byAil· Force and hi ts were

cont inued on il;s path endVit il1~ Stla it on tho night of

an d medium b om be rs , e s-tes and Austral ian fighters,

on 3 March dispersing OJ '

.. Only one damagedin the !liI:eaOD 4 March; itbombers.

planes covering the movemen t

d were easily eh' ivcn awl 'lYbyThe dcstiJ.·u()f,iollof thede feat of the !l.ttack upon

anese o il B ll s i v e o ff oHin ,theFrom 1 Mar eb 1943 toenlmlY T~maillet! OLI the

and tootically, e-'l:cept JOI'

by sepn;raLoand isoln.todimmedia te impol' tum,e to theolusive d!'lIlloDstration ~hflJtthe

longer reinforce thei!' nd "Meedrange 01 I an d . b a sed!1iJ·cl'n.ft

and small craft !lit nigh t.offenBiv6.-'l'he course of th o

wa1 :b egan ~o change in the 0til e r t he a t ot sas wellas m tlie Soutluvest Pacific during ate 194211ind_eurly11143..ViceAdm. William F. Halsey, Jr. ,w as se.em·elyestl1blished in the s ou th er n S ol cm on sI1n~ his troops were cleaning up the peckets of)'~lStance on Guadaloanal . G e n . Dwight D.Elseuhow6l.· 's combined American and BritishIorce was threa tening the Axis hold OD NorthAfrica, an d t he Ru esi an s w ere d ri vi ng fro rn Stalir-grad. President Roosevelt, Prime MinisterChurchill, and their militar y ad visors met a t

Casnblauce in Junuary toplan for 1943 operations.Th e British acknowledged tha~ the United Stateshad a major commitment in this ! );I ·ee. and prom-ised full assistance once Germany was defeated.The President and tile Prima Minister agreed thatan offensive should be undertaken in the Pacif icThea te r, and the Combined Ohiefs of Stnlf werein st r u e t ed to allo t ud e lition nl iorces. '

The Joint C h ie f s o r S t ,a fton9 January 1 squestedGeneral :!I'IacArtl1Ul'to submit plans for thecapture of Rabaul. His reply stated that theSouthwest P ac if ic a re a c ou ld !not u n de rt ak e f ur th eroffen sive operation s w ithout arelatively longperiod of prepara tions . The Seventh Australianand Tl li J .- t y -secomlUnited States Divisions werebeing withdrnwn to Austra.1il1 fo r r econs t it u tl onafter protflwted nmployment in the Papunn Cam-paign: The Fir st Mar ine Div is ion was reeuper-atiua from the effeots of Guadalcanal , an d theAustr!Llian Ninth Division, which was to returnIrc m the M iddleEru;t e.ru:lyin Febrlllll':,[, wouldhave to be reorganized and l 'e-equipped before itcould be employed. .

General MlI.cA:!·thul"s tactical c on c e. pt io n h adnot been. aitel'ccl by the even ts ofthe precedingmonths. It wa s based still UPOIl the progressivefor \~al 'd movement of a ir eche lons t- o lJfovidefignte!' and bomber cover tQl' surface eiem.cnts a~du po n t he i so l! tt io nor encb sep!Y'a~e pOSltl~ll? n o ? ;to the final assault. ''It is I?Y firm CO;J.VlctlOn,he wr ote, "that an offenslve. fo~lowmg otherm e th od s o r I J. tt <l Il l} )t G dwith~u;~cl~nt:fOl'co andwithout sound pre.par!l.tionwill J]~ev~a~ly:ea~ ~disaster." Without cbanging this . o.SIO ue !ell.'d. ctmd combat bad taught the South'.l"cst) on, u. " ld c -tPacifiG Higll C0]111l1!Yldtha.twl(lrnpl. conq~~~.contemplated ill the early plans w as lOlPOSSlb

le.he ~emy hud proved to be It despernt~ and c~pa-

~l e Ii hter, and 1m had COllC('l1tl'l1ted.su[:!icJ(!Dtstl'OIl;tb to make tb(l planned Cll.ll1pl),lgnalong

"ad d if f icu ltone. , .. ' h h A .1 t' · hnndqll lutars ofthe Eig t· . .reI):

RabflJlll was n e ~

t7



- ~ - - -Ijnay,l)IlIDDl1P"ded by Lt.. GeD.lmam~ IDtsuki .IliIIamen'Cac d sb ; divisions and other unite were as-'aigned to Lt. Gen. Hyaku take Haruyesh i' s 17thIArmy in the So lomons , and Lt.. Gen. Ada.chiI lI ataze 's 18th JJnny in New Guinea. and Ne:":Britain. Their' tota l ground s treng th . was est r-

IDUi tOOto be h tween 79,000 a .nd 94 ,000 , w~chI colllllbe reinforced by approximately 60,000 with-I in 3 w eeks . 'T hre ehundred and eighteen comb~tI a . i ro l"af twere immediately available, and an addi-t ional273 could be fiown in within 24 to 48 hours.

IJapa.nese naval forcea based ~n Truk cO~Bistedof4 battleships, 2 aircraft earners, 12 crUlS~, ap-

I proxim!).tely 40 destroyers, and 27 submarines.In opposit ion to these forces the Southwest and

I South Pac ific are as ha d the equivalent of 15%I divisions with 2 more scheduled to a rr ive f rom theI United S ta te s d ur in g1943. Seven addit ional Aus-

trali an d iv is ions, 5 infan try and 2 armored , wer l',neither completely trained nor equipped, and were

retaine d for the defense of the ma inland and f orW Il l 1 18garrison and service troops in rear areas.

I The 2 Allied commands had approximately 1,850, combat airplaaes of all types of these, 350 carrier-

based and 500 land-based air craft wer e underAd1il iral Halsey; the other 1,000 were under Gen-e ral MacArtlmr. Naval units were lnrge ly con-

I centrated in the South Pacific area. AdmiralHa1Bey had ~ battleships, 2 carriers, 3 carrier6 X C O r t s ,13 cruisers, approximately 50 destroyers,and sUPPQrting surface and aubsurface vessels,while Generel MacArthur 's fleet consiste d of 5

I Cl'Ilieers, 1 armed merchant cruiser, 5 destroyerleaders, 10 dlBtroYer 8) and 23 submarines. .

T he A llied Com man ds poss es se doverwhelmingnumerical superiority in a ir and naval st reng th.

I In addit ion, ;hey held the initia. tive and were ableto choose t. \e locat ion for major engagements .The Ja.panEJllaforces were scattered, to hold partsAm i airdromes through an archipelago which ex-tended: over 90(1 miles from Manus in the Ad-mirIrlties to if ewGeorgia in the Solomons and 400miles from Kavieng to Lae. The Allies had thecapability 0 1isolating each Japanese strong pointf i ro lDthe ~ of, the enemy defenses and crushingor n8ll1a'ali2ing It through 8. concentration of su-perior forces. .

on th e other nand, th e heavy jungle forest.fu.ajt,ed the td fee t ofa.rtillery a .nd aerialbombard-~.w.hillh the AllieIIha d their greatest supe-~I.a!htlch ieokted Japanese ga.rrisoll could.~~ ~ untj], finally it was overrun byMJl¥ ~ ~ m ;I '1 t tara ' ,D l . lW h i n eguns,

:IS

r if le s, bayone ts and grenades-a cos tlythe attackera.

The Japanese were trained andjungle operations. Theil ' campaign iuto thewes t Paci fi c was carefully p lanned manyadvance, but none of the Allies hadpreparations. General Maaarthur'sincluding those which parLici])ated in bilecampaign, needed additional amphibiousbefore they could be employed effec~iveLyin

siveaction.

The shortage of la nding cra fl;o ther special equ ipment , which had impededtraining in the previous summer, was .by the assignment of tho Seventh AmpForce of ~h e United States Navy and th{)Engineer Spacial Brigade 0 -£ the Uni tedArmy to the Southwest Paci fi c a rea, Thesewere dl'signed for different tasks. Thecommand was designed lor mnjormovements, and was equipped withral'go vessels, aucllanding ('.m.ftof all b - y : p c s ,

the engineers had small boats. with It rangemore than 60 miles designe(l for 8]1Ol '6 tooperations.

Respons ib il ity for emphibloua t ra in ingg iven to ROllI' A.dm. Daniel E. Barbe)',der of the S~v(illLhAmphibious Foree, on 8ary 1943. Each task force assigned to aassault was given a complete rehel»l 's!Li,the unloading of supplies and oqdiately .belore the operation wasGround, air, and naval units also utilizedinterval between campaigns to oomplebestandard tFaining. Weakl1e!lSBS broughtcombat were overcome and uowly arr l vedmenta were taugh t tbe tcc lmi( lues of tropica1jungle war fare. As the se training missioll$undertaken by the individual Iorces,Hadquarters, 'SouthWt'st Pacific area pu

the basic plan for the offonsive.The Elkto'TIpla,n.- The genera! sGhoms oj

neuver of Elkton of 28 February 1943 wa ssame' as earlier plans, but no aUempt ':'!ls.to establ ish a daf in ite c ln .! .2 fOI" theend of the successive tlssa.ult ,. Thedivided into five separate but'opera tions. The in iti a! t ll- si l:was th~Las by a combined drive of nn airbornB

operating overland tbJ"Ough the Ml1rlthnlJ'lValley and a.n amphibious force moving Dlen!;coast insmall craft . Salamana w o . sto be by!'by both attacks, but Fins{'hhoieIl . l ind otilw'in the Huon Gulf -Vitiaz Strwit area \\'e.t'C

movements. 11 ' 111 , 111 ) ,all.ous nS Ru,ul~ WItS I·~ I'r

MadoJlg,WIlS to f0J1IlW thl 'SCt)lWr" tions

the N ew G eorgiaG"OUjl ill U wtwo commands, SUpporte([ hv

bn ae s t ak en ill the pmccdil1gsim ul t i1 tlBO l iS n,il'b 0 rn II an 0 1

upon Nl)W Britain ill till'

ill bh e onst , The succcss fu I

these tasks w ou ld p rep are Ll ll 'of Ko;vieng and ~11e isolntionit o f naval suppor t D nd 8111'-

. 'rhe Allias would hD\7e

to gni II uir supcriouity incould wcnkcn the J'LPOlll'SC

I II a n d aurin I bombardment.operations were completed,

would begin (,ill' culmiuating

had suffic ient st reng th for h istho Solomons, but each of Gen-operotional ecmmands neededwas believed that th~ Allied

an uddi tioua l 3 r rui sc rs , I}

motor patrol bon,t squadrons.chId 1,:816 combat and trans-

to these already assiguedand the Roya l Aus trnl ian

w hile A ll _ie d L au dForces

atiou of 5 divisions, This, and naval s tr ength would

commands to sbrike a majorenemy back to Trll It ill the

on New Guine a timing

snbordi]1ntillg their l'l'l'ort,sthe defense of Rnh,'wl, fln(iits

MacArthur's 0 1 )i1 1 1 0 ] 1, m i g b t

a~"lo of tIl{' Pncific. A dele-. Gen, Richnl'd K. Suther-th u r's Chief of Stnff, G nd

C, Kenny, Commnnd~1", nnd Brig. Gen. Sbt'phe",J,

Southwest Pncific H ('fi, w nsMilitaTv Con[~renl'e a,t Wnsh-

. ne c~sgity ror bhe ;nm'p usedJoinL C hiers ofS(ialr and (,I\eCo olher Pnrific nrNIS.

opl'lwd 01 1 12 ,,'llll'ch by A d"• Lh<' decisiolls mode by

of HJafT n,LCosoblnl lC'o.H~o f s hi pp in g Il nc i h ~n v) 7

bombers, Itn cl tho hig her priority as sig ned to tb eElIFop~finTheMe!', lim 'Ibed the forces which couldhe Sl'nt 10 Lhe Pnci fic, G{mernl Sutherland t henrend ~he proposed plnn lind the discussion cen-l ~re d a ro un d t ho provision of means lor I;be offen-Sive ugllinBt ~l1bllLlI. A committee \VIlS appointed1. 0 exarmne ltllr!o1l and to ascer ta in i[ its require-T?snts could be reduced, hut reported t he eouclu-SJQII tlmL the !OI'C~S set forth were th e minimumWi t h which tiJ~' Openltion could be suecessiully

undertaken, tlllOl'Uy a lt crw ard (l or Joint Chiefsor Stair announced the maximum reinforcementsfor! 043. Naval units, IlS needed and available,woulr] be provided by tile Pacific Fleet, 'n'L're que st ed 2 I ,H' 1] :1 7b omb ard me nt g ro up s a nd t ll r5 l l ll !LI lLryd iv is io ns co ul d no t; be s u pp li ed , an d t heincrease in other aircraft was limited to 860figh t(']".';, trensports, and light and mediumbombers,

The ofleusive, as planned, could not be under-tlllwn. GCll~rl}l utherlantl, with the COIlCUT-

renee of the other conferees, "OOcommended tho t

the task for 1.94; '1be red u ccd t o t he s ei zu re of theSolomons, bhe T10rLhellSL coast of N ew Guinea LoMadaug, aud wes te rn New Br it ain. He a lsosug-g cs to d L hat uirfields be coustruoted on K.il'iIV-rnan nd Wo od ll 1rk i ll t he Solomon, Se[1,to compensatefor tho shorbnge o rheM')' bombers. These twou no cc up ie d i sl a nds, 115 Ami 165 miles, respec-t iv el y, n ort b an d northeast of Milne Bay, providedlocl>tions from which medium bombers withfi gh te rc ov er c ou ld at tac k L ll xg et s on Now ~ritainand support tIle Soubh Pncif ic assaults I1 l theSol omons. Thll Joint Chiefs of Lolr acceptedbo t.lt re c o mm eI1(lo,~iO )l S, 1 1nd on' 2 9 March dire ctedGeneral 11111~Ar lh ll r t o conducetbese operntiens.

OrglJ1.izalioll rr f Iii. CQm.,~a,lId.-Th~ ,organi-lInt,ioll or LboSouthwest Pnr lhe "rea r. O J :this cam-pnign w us exceprul1gly compl~x. OpglU~!ly, th~v ar io us n n t i< ,r >1 1 1c o m po u eJ l t- ~ w e r euJuted. [mLrn.jping and ~acl.icltlemploY:Il1,ent but rsmaiuedsspa rute and dis tinc t rOI nil o th er pu rp os es " . T heAustralian First an d Second Arolles D,J,d tI,eUlliLed Stutes Sixth Army were utl(~er ~e epera -

, 1 ,. I o r All l'vd Lund Forees, which estab-(,JOun, "or>tro: . . NI' · 1, d t 18 k Ioreos fo r "n(·l., CflJl'lplllgll. Thp. .e wIS te I J T>

G'. ~ FOI'I'~ which ,·cndur.led t ic L ap ua n c em-

~J1lIl '1 I tusl- ror"~'it included bot hulgn, WIlS S\!U I '." ' ..

p . ]' (I 'mnril'ml bl·DOps. .I n the spllngAlISll"11 IIIll fill "'" ., dr· 19!5 h ow e vr r, t h" A I , W 1 0F orne. ,com~ose

o .' " . 't' ~ snt lip l IS I l.U mdc-. I 'I j'"1] l 'I 'l nUl UI II S , \1 U. ,.. . .eU('lrp j' ou· . d G I

.. '" tl'Oll dir~ellv 1$ N' rnernIl.dml Ol·gll.lll~n .•. ,pc _ '(IIOll! IllTl ontprrTlrdJlll4l erlle10n ofHeodqllar~('["SW' ' '



1 command. The New Guinea Force ~(\mai~C(1Wider AlliedLand Forces, which by this aCL10l]

was relieved of control of America ll troops exceptI a s t he y w er e a ss ig ned fo r sp ec ifi c o pe mt io nA ,

Th e U ni ted States Fifth AF and the RoyalAustrnlian .Air F orce Command were assigned toA ll ie d Ai r Fo rc es, w hi le t he United SLates SeventhFleet and un.ts of the Royal Australian and RoyalNetherlands Navies we re groupe d under AlliedNaval Forces. These two commands remained

united thco lghout a ll operations of nlP South-west Pacific area, but tht ' navnl unit s were dividedinto aepamt- task forces according Lo missionsassigned . The Australian Milita ry Forces, theRoyal Auso-alian Air Forces, and the UnitedStates, Royd Aust.ralian, and Royal N etherl!~ndsNavies were each responsible lor tho adrninistra-Lion and supply of its ow n nnsionals. For ad-ministration thev were responsibll ' to GenrralMneArlhul ' only in matters of broad policy, Til eUnited Stateb Army Services of Supply providedl og ist ica l s up po rl . f ol ' t he Aml'dCIlIL ground andair forces, but there was no major administrativeu111t for the United States N'lDY, General

Headquerters h ad a ssu me d this burden during1942, though its organiza tion had not beendesigned Ioi administrative function,

It was relieved of this administration duty inFebruary 1943 by the activation of the UnitedStates Arm\' Fortes in the Far East. The SixthA r m y, the Fifth AF, and the United StatesArmy Serv.ces of Supply were placed under thl'administrative control of the new headquarters.It was to p,r[Ol'm all staff duties incident to com-mand, except those relat ing to strategic or taetkaloperations. General MacArLhur, lUI Commanderin Chief So ut hwe st Pa ci fi c a re a, d irec te d t hl ' co rn -bat employment and training of the combinedarmies, navies, and air forces, but, at the sametime, as Commanding General, United StatesA r m y Forms in the Far East, he was the directc omma nd er o f t he American ground a nd a ir u ni ts ,

Other duplications oJ command made the pic-ture appeu even more ,'omplicated, Gen, SirThomfUI A. Blamey was the c ammander of theAustralian Military Forces and Allied LandForces, Vi'16 Adm. Arthur S, Carpender of theAllied Na~al Forces and the Seventh Fleet, Lt.Gen. Geolt6 C. Kenny of the Allied A ir Forces,8Ad Lt. Gm. Walter Krueger of the Si xt h A rmyan d the Alamo Force, In spite of this a.pparentcomplexity of command, channels were clear anddiatlnet. : 9 l a c hsubordinateechelon had definite

and sp..cific duties IWIl responsiblliuies,enordinated and f'OlltrnLllldby Generaland h is std.

T he fin nl plan8,-GeJl,oI'IL1 Hendquncterspllred the fina.l 1)11.ll1 foJ' tho ] 943E l k to ' fl J I I, und issued lleOCSS(tI'Y warningoperatiollsinstJ'uctiOlll! en.rly in May,Allied emnrnand devllloped its own plandesignated operation, hut WIIS in constantanl til rion with the othe rs , Liaison offierrll

maintained by eacu command at oil ie rcommands; joint s taff ( '. on f' 'l 'c n c( 's w e re I re qcalled, The rllJll proble m tha t couldsolved in t he se wa ys WM lnkel')' Lip by tile

manders involved, or if necessary, refGeneral MllCAl'thLl!'Inr final decision.

The general plan of E'lldo'T!,I Il, like itsdecosson!, projected the following l ines ofth(> estll bl isllment of airfields Oll KiriwinaWoodllU'k Islanda; advance nlong twolines-on the wes t, along the northeastNew Guine a to seize t l le Huon Penif n : r as Madang, then ncross the Viti!lczseize tile western New Bri ta in area, O J]thenorthwestward through the BolOlnons tosoutheastern BougainviUe. These objectivespreliminary to the seizure of Rnbaal ando eeu pa bi on o f t he Bi sma rc k A reh i. pe la go.

The establ iBhment of airfields on WIsland \VIIS considered 0 necessal'Y prelimitile s ei zu re o f t he s ou th eu st ern B Ol 1g ll in vi ll ei n o rde r t o p ro vi de wider o Jl lv loy me nt o f a irand obtain closer su p p0 1 't [ or opera tionsBuin-Faisi. The establrshment ofKiriwinu WIIS considered to be eomplemthe occupation find development 0 '1 Woand WIlS required for control of bh e air 01'

Solomons ~ea to assist t he a dv al lc ewestern axis , EU'I'ly oeeupntion ando f b ot h i sl an ds WIIS' considered mu.ndntiOl:Y,seale consolidation, however, would have tothe development oJ adequate flgb~el' covorGoodenough Islnnd. G(\ner!L11.[ac,Ar~bLlj'thll~ i n o rd er to linin tain tbe in i ti l1 ti vetain Japanese fOl'ces ill hhe SQ"llbbwestTheater, continuous oir nctivity on Il preH) ,scale and early i nfi lt rl 1t ion o .~ tl ld [S nlIXlll!, o-voiding, commitment of ilnportnntshou ld be star ted immedi lt te ly and -vigarous1;y .

The task of advancing along ohe westornrequired the successive seil~IU'oof ,tllc Laham Valley al'llll, t he O C l )U P,l 1I ti O Ilo f t \l e

a.6i:Z;1lI'eund occu pn tion 0rwith the 0 b jel )~ ivc o f0 '

, , "c"lIl'1ngfurther Hd Yo - n o e s , un II lhe

sunntaon o f Mad l :mg to protert Uw

Ope! 'n , tro ll s u lon ! ;t he e !l .S tm ' o a xi sn l ld consol ida tion , 01' ncutluli_G e?l'gi 0, l I il 'f ie lds , t hescizul '"

of aU'fields in ~he BlIill-I~iasiof Kietll" nnd th,s IWIII.J'lIl.i~ntlon

th n t the l I t lI'll n e en re o, u lon g tb e e as te rn n .) (is w as

pe nd in g iU lp J.e mc nt nL ion of011. Wood lll! !'k Is lan d t opro-

ent l \uddOsl) l ' support ofan d the impleml)ntation of uir-

11 . 11 < ]the L ac a re u to ne u Ll"ftlizonil' bases at B ukn, Rahau],

further believed L!wtoperationsthe western portion of Nowcould not prog res s prior to

nirfieldsJn ~ heLae ~.ndlora r e a ,

of maneuver w as to improveforward IIiI' bases j, occupy

bu se s w hic heould be secII re dlarge forces: employ nir forces

to soften up an d ta gain initialthe initial nt tnck cbjecti ye s

; neutmliz;e, with approprintehostile air basesuud destroyand shipping within r ange :

forward, covered by air an d.in first 0 bjocti I T O O (existing

nil' bnses) and consolidate theaviation forward onto cnptu:rpd

to be ~ 'epall .tc\d to SII ceessive, by (IiI' ao tien, 01 ' by II ir,

in te l'l lle (bn te on a mystrongement was to bOOOI'01'6d

':UII,UUnEl!le air llnd son b us e s a lo ngBuka, Rabaul, l[nv~eng,

object. ive of ill tm'j'uptiing IIUri

SUPPOI'C, a nd m in fo rc (l ll 1N l t o f

aeconw l ia llH l{ \J I~or 1,lm\)bjec-t i l< 'AlI.iud Air lrol'cl 'S rM~iv"rl

to dc s~ l'oy hosti 10II viM,ion,ping ill the gel lNal support ·

Solomo]]s , N<,w lmln.nti, NewtJl const o f N ow (l ui u! lu ; 10

", r t i l< ' So u I,hwest Puti-fk

!:itsk [0 "C!lS' toI'" _[' 'f ' ~1 lPport t he d ef en se of S outhwcsL

~C L l<' Olwnrd b 'I: ,- _ , Ilse,~; La provide kans po r t a,via-I (Q~ a u p po r t [01'Southwest Pllcilk opcmLions' and,0 l l .epl 'epaI'<!dto pmvidt, gener' l l. ] a i l 'SUPPOl: tfor

• OP_CIil ulOllS ,of till' South l 'n c il l .carea,

\)1t s deliaI I ,mpl an s e vol vu d, G e ne ralKreuger's, n lllO F ore!' W IL ,_ - '.. ,S ,0 11IItmtr the campaign on 15J U li e b y t il e o cc up at io n o f \ Yo od Ja rk a nd K ir iw i na .!_ IW II S [ ,0 be the f i rs t ; ma joramphibious movementII I th r S,OII th w es L P Il .Ci fio u re a lUI d roq uired th0

"?Opcl"!lLIOJl 0 r its l and , naval, uru l air forces w i LbLtIOS" of Adrnirn] Hulsey,

Tile garrison I1nll constructien troops for Wood.hu~ WCi'P Iurnisbed by b l l(>SouthPncificl1l'eaanda rri ve rl a t ' ro l \' n Sl I 'i ]] B i l lnortbwestern Austraiiubetween 21 May and 4 J une, The uni to; for Ki,.i.wma \:'PJ'P scatterud lrom ,Por~ MOl'~sby to variouslocaliLU'5 on the' mainland. of _\.1JStl·Q~'II, TheirCOllCGn.LI'!l-tiona ( Mi ln e Bu y w as de la ye d, a ct uu ll yno L belllg cOIll)lI~tcd un til 25 J uno. and th» t'l'I:getda Ie w as pos tpon ed un til 3 0June,

Ulider b i l e ol ' iginal pln n L he N ew G uin eaForceWIIS t o mak e a. di ve rs io na ry a ut ack t ow ard S al s-maua in June to d is trac t en em yIlttou ticn fromt be m o ve m ant to I ' loodlnl ' \,uud K ir iw in u, b u ~ w a s1,0 delay .iIs OSSItU It upon LIle until 1 A u gu st ,Large ship- to-shore ruovemeu ts in this region werei m pr ac ti ca bl e b G C !111 S eof restr ic ted waters and thec on s eq ue nt d an g erof uiajor losses 11'0rna ir a t tack .S ho re -t o- sh or e a dv un ee s w e re l im it ed b ythe short-ag e of small land iug C!'I1[t; overland II I,tackstil I'OQghthe meuntalns ware hindered by t he d if fl -eu Ity of su pply" Those bandic.aps I rOl 'H tobe 81L['-

mounted by a combiued amphibious, airborne, andoverlll l ld drive upon Lac [rom tl;e Mst nnd west,

A n in land line of c on un ullioation s from theL:d;;:pjmmu l 'i I' 6r O J1 the PapUHIJ c oas t ac ros s theO\vel1-S~Onleys L a Wa ll was to b e c ou st ru ct ed . an dL hr m a iu b ody of theS e "c n th A u s tr al ia nDivision

with ( ht , b ul k or ill>supplies nn d equipment w as tomove ovorlund t o t he JVhl' l ,hn.m "n He,Y, A s n hos oIorces nonrud(,ho objectivB,one ba~talio!l of UnitedS en te s p ar ac bu tc in f.an try w as to c ap tu re t; "b cn il"f ie ld n t -N'lI.flzll.b ou the Mndclwm River, al ld t !w" l! ll ll li ni I lg ~ I' O O pS 0f tho I1d""fillCl',~;c!1Il1011\I -e r~ t obQHOII ' l lin, W h N I t lJ P s e g r ou p s Jom ed, the N m tb. \ lIstl 'nlinn Divisioll WUSc lo ll 'mhn.r:kiL l , t , lw smaUboats. of the SeconllE n g il le n r S p cc m lB!'lg~d~ Illid

hInd on belldws eas!' of Lne, TIl« two dlv!slOnsWOlthl then begitl sinm )trunoous I1tt1lGllS.11P?ll Lb o

, ' !I 'i l' l" ng him from L, '11-0a m i o on l; in U ll lg o n('110m)" c - _

t 'j' SOl"m" lU I Fi l lschhafoJl, u nd !II udall Ivel'!'un,l_ "" " ,CI1phi 1 , ( '(1 ,

21



BeeaulI6t he o pe ra ti ng r an g e o favailable landingcraft WlLB CJ l ly60 miles, the New Guinea Forcew as directed to cap tu re Nassau Bay as a sui tabledepartur e point for the La e a ssault. Thls oper a-t ion was & substitute for tbe originally pla:pneqdiversionarr attac k on Sala maua. Tbe Nassa uBay operation would not only provide the neededstaging poilLtbut would also permit a junction tobe made betwe en the assa ulting troops and theSeventeenth Australian Brigade above Mubo.The supply of this unit and the Fifteenth Aus-tra lian Brigade near Bobdubi on the Fr anciscoR iv er w o ul d.thus be facil itated, and the combinedforces oould then mount an attack upon Salamaue,deeei~ the Japallese as to the principal Alliedobjective inthe area.

Existing airdromes !rl Port Moresby ' and nearBuna were incapable of furnishing adequatefighter protec tion for the a irborne assau lt in theMarkham Valley, so add it iona l a ir fi elds in theinterior were developed at Bena Bena, TailiTaili, and in the Bulolo Valley. Bases on thecoast at the month of the Ma mbare River and atMoroba BLY were oonstructed, and work was

begun on the road fr om the Lakekamu River toWau, Furt.her study of the capabilities of theuntried amphibious engineers indicated that theycould traruport only 1 stripped brigade, approxi-mately 3,000 men, which was insufficient for theplanned asaault upon Lac. The decision wasconsequently made to move the entire NintbDivision f rom its sta ging IITca a t Milne Bay inthe larger aaft of the Seventh Amphibious Force,The boats G f the Second Br igade were to be usedby the boa; and shore parties and for local supply,so the capture of Nassau Bay was sti ll required.

Changes were a leo made in the p ro po se d o ve r-land and airborne 8B8aUlt through the MarkhamValley. Const ruct ion of the road over the moun-tains was ~elayed by the di ff icul t te rrain, and i tw as soon evident that it would not be ready intime for the combined attack upon Lae. Theother two battalions of the Five Hundred andThird Pa rwhute Innmtry were added to the NewGuinea . F(.roo , and thi s phase of the opera tionmeluding;he movement of equipment and sup-~j was conver te d into the first oomplete ly~ assault in the Southwest Pacific area.f$l ~ date for Las was Bhifted to 27 August~ :lIIIte Ii ~4 Septemberto permit the ooncentra-~ »f ~ aircraft at Port Moresby the~ ~ of the division, and the ~_

ple tion of the IGrhvint \ and Woodlarkby the Seventh Amphibious Force.

In E l kl o 1h I I IAdmiral Halse.y's assaultNew Georg ia Group WIlS to have beenuntil after the New Guinea ForceHuon Gulf-Vitiaz Strait a rea. The SouthCommander had objected to this posbpof his init ia l a tt ack f rom the time. oj theElkton plans. Finally, he came to Brisbaneconference with the commander in chief and

his permission to launch the full-scaleinstead of the directed i n fi lt r a t ion ,withoutfor the New Guinea Force to comple te itsof Lae, Salamaua, and Finschhaiell.

In the Southwest Pacific, as the task forcespleted their plans a nd assembled then' troengineers and other units of the UnitedArmy Services of Supply and theMilitary Forces d ev elo pe d u nc iimprovedat Milne Bay, Buna, and Goodenough todose fighter cover and support fOT themoveme nts and assaults. Reconnuissan

t rois , aircraft, and submarines, gathered'tion conerning landing beaches,

and aerial coneenbrations, shipping, andmsta llations. The Seventh Amphibiousconcentrated its transports and landingTownsville and Milne Bay, Allied Nsurface and subsur face vessel s gun l'dedcommunication and supply convoys, amienemy shipping.

During this per iod of prepara Lion, elemthe Allied Air Forces were has tilypositions at the newly developed strips 0 1 1 .

by, Milne. Bay, and the BUlla area.March and Apr il many of the fighte r'obtained long-range fighter s, The P~Brived in the theater and had demons'enormous power and range. The rangepower of the B-25 medium bomber nndhad be en inc reased by the addition of extratanks and 8 forward .50 caliber m(whinoWith the cooperation of the South Pllei.ficnirthe.Allied Air Force dest royed and damagedthan 300 Japanese p lanes i ll aer ia l combl1tthe ground during June; total tOllllllgc ofdropped ontargetain this arun roee to morefor the month. The enemy WIlB deceiveding m a i o direction of the. offensive by blllloryOn Koepang , Ambon , Timor, end Tanim b

other bases in the Nethorland Ef)st Indios.signal traf fic in Dutc h code tJu'oi:lg hDarwin, Pe rth, a nd Morauke helped to

at least a diVersion!].!',}' l1~l!tekfrom llol'tllwestcl'll Austruliu.

~nrused by the sinudtulIcO!lSand were llllUble to con-

or naval I or co s a ga in s t

e initiul movom~n!. ofessen.tif~l]y IlS planned.

and COIlS tl' uct ion par Li( 'S

and Kir'l wina on 23 andfor the :arrival of the m ain1 J uly. G~oUlld !l.!lll anti-

",.ili f.."p n O n both i slands undc omple te d, Tbe Sil'ty.f rom the South Pacific

missions f rom Woo cU l1 rk o u-uinth Royal Austrflhall

adron from Kirrwina on 18

a. la rge per csn tRge oi hisof the Solomons.

formations of navyalsey's forces as they land-Gl'OUP, but 101 ware de-

R los s of 17 Allied l1ircmft.dai ly but with diminishing

were made nnteuable byd as ensmy losses mounted,

fightSJ 's and bombersact ion by 15 July , Euem y

were also thrown into thoand relllforcsm()ll.ts, but

cruisers 0\1 t of 20 were sunkKula Gul f OIl the nights ofTwo others were pro·bo.bly

an d Allied losses were llmisod

were strongly entreu('hedLUl. Tn'x,"' " Lilly 10,000 wero con-

da on N ew G uo rg j. a andbnngara, nn d 500 other!!

Irom, Vagunn to Vella La~landing WIIS made at SO~l

coast of N ew Georgia

on 2l ,Jllll(: but t1 'J. b " .1e OpBl'atloll proper beg an on30t~lne y1the seiz1ll'.o o~ Wicldll1l11An cherage Oil

e so tI t I~.nstctn ~IP 0-[ Vnc- U1 Ja I R ._,IT . b.' . ""''', II.nc_enucva~ ~ . ? J .Elolllen\is of the FOI-ty-tbird In:I'antry

DnlSlon captured beaches east of Mundn on 2~li ly: I1Tld~he assaul t on th is porL began six days

[],t~l. Rcmforcements fr om t heTweu~y-.fiJthandTlliI'ty.s:venth Divisions were brought in andMundn fell n;[tersevere fighting 011 5 August. Inthe monutunn United States Marines landed a t

RIce. Anchorage on 4 July and cleared the northernportion o r the island by the last week of August.~-l!i)nyof the enemy escaped to Kolombllllga.ra,

\\'~lch was already strongly garrisoned, but Ad-miral Halsey decided to bypass it an d a tt ac kVel la Lnvsl ln to the north. A small f orce w asput ashoro aL Vel lu Lavc ll a on 13 August whichcleared the beaches for the main J9.JJ,ding2 dnyslater. Small-scale nction continued fo t 8 weeksuntil the remaining JI],]lunese were evacuated onthe night o r6-7 October. Aiter New Georgiaand YcUa Lavelle WBre seized, Kolombnngaraw as o f l it tl e value to t he J ap en es e, They begun.withdrawing by barge , suhmurine , and destroyeron 28 S~ptcmliel' and by 4 October the southernporbion of tile islnnd, including the principal baseand airdrome at VilllrSULllIDom, was occupied byUnited States Iorces. Th e few remaining hostiletroops WB!"<l quickly dest royed and t .h (! NewGeorgia campaign WHS declared officially endedon 15 October,

La~Salmnaua.-New Guinea Force completedthe oc cu pation ofthe Huon GulI·Vitia.z Straitarea during !.his same period. The i ni tial at -t ack toward Su.lamlbilllwas directed by theThird AtlsurnliauDivision ttl, Wau. Th e FifteenthBrigade advanced toward Bobdubi on 30 Juneas n reiufDl'Gcdbu ttl11ion combat teum of theUn. itad St!J,bes 0ne I Iundred and Sixty -secoud

IU[l1n~I'Y made all unopposed. Illuding!l.t

Nm;sa.u]3!LY. Enemy resistance w as hghtand the .Amcrl-cn~s pushed forwai'd and t h rca tmIecL ~1ubo.fromthe rear while bl~eSC\TcntuClubhAustralilLn Brigadedrove down l,l1~ B itoi River. Allied air nctackson M ubo w eredevosting am i t he Ja pa ns se w el ,' Cdrivon out OIl 13July. Tlu ',}' retreated to defen-sive positions arOllIld MOt~llt 'I'ambu IVh~.re theAllied drive was t em po rl 11 :il y h al te d . . T "0 bat-

I· f the One Hundred aud Sixty -SMoud

tv. . 10US 0 .1. tInflLntry then beg,m II movement l,lp uu1\ coasI Nll,ssau to Tnrnbn B(I;Y,but were stoppedromI .f 'h Inh~91 ' by tb e dl1I : ieul t, tel'rain 0'1

norb I 0 uie I' ,Roosevelt Ridge. Tile Nipponese mes o. com-



I munication were cut by patrols and thei r front-line troops and rear installationa were harassedby aircraft and artillery, They tried to breakt he slowly developing encircleml:'nt by COUnLl:'f-att acks from Mount Tambu 01 1 16-17 August,but were unsuccess fu l. They were driven to

I retire to tho francisco river, The First Battalion,One Hundred and Sixty-second Infantry joinedthe other tw ? on the roast and the .Allied forcesbegan a eomamed drive on Salamaua. The final

assault started early in September. The Fran-I cisco River l in t' was breached on the 10th and 2

d ay s l at er t he a irf iel d, port, and town were cap-tured by the Allst.ralians,

So.iamaua was unimportant ill itself, Til"principal object of the campaign was t o d iv ert

, troops from 1.11( 'and to mislead the enemy as to the-main Allipd objective. The strategy succecderl.

lOver 4,000 Ja pa ne se soldie rs were killed andvaluable barges. small craft , and m at eri al we re

I lost in vain attl' mpts to hold a compa rativelyI useless positon.

The Fiftll AF ail led the deception sehomeby making buvy oil' raids upon ~all1JnallU, hutconcentrated upon the neutralization of enemy airstrength in preparations for the LIl~ assaults.Raids upon the 4 major airdromes at Wewnk wereinaugurated on 17 and 18 August by major s tr ikes .which destroyed over 200 aircraft in addition tolarge quantit ies of supplies and equipment andwhich inflicted heavy casualties to personnel.S mal le r ra id s u po n t hi s b ase , Hansa Bay, and otherposit ions in N ew G ui nea were continued dil ly,Enemy interception was light and the ir pilotsnew and inexperienced oiter the heavy losses suf-fered in this sector and in tM Solomons, Amari-can and Austro. lian planes attacked almost whenand where bey pleased,

During this period-a strong task force with car-

riers sortied from Espiritu Santo and Elate int?e ~uth Pacific area, and Admiral Halsey'sILll'crift began round-the-olock raids on southernBo ug ai nv il l» a s if an a ss au lt wa s c on te mp lat edthere,

I~ early September, Allied Ail' Forces attacksupon airdronee at Wcwak. Hansa Bay, Alexisha-fen, Madang, and New Bri ta in airdromes wereincreased in number and strength, and the NinthDi'vision embarked in the transports and landingcnft o f the Seven th Amphib ious Force a t Mil lieBay. The *&ult troops Ia.nded on 4 Septembera~ Ba1u plana tion and a .t the mouth of t he Bu suR ive r, _ tball 20 ~ eas t of Laf ; l , Mmor

opposition from (}I1!'luy snipers was quicklyDilled and the units moved inland, Pcaptured N udznb air field on 5 SCPairborne Iorr-os Irom Port Moresby nrr i verllift{'fwllrd, The combined operationduc tcd as p lanned and Lac was in Allied011 16 September, but approximatelythe enemy garrison escaped over the moto Saidor.

The absence or enemy air in te rven tron

series of operations is evidence of th" eflccof All ied im posed r teu srn li za ti on o f Japanair strips in ,Vewok and ill the Bismnrckpelago,

Finechhafen: Dum pu, and Sin. -N ell'

Force, according to Eikum; was to exploitlory by immediate assaults upon FinschhaUpOJl I\uiapit in tb." )'lnrkhu,]]] VaJley westLerou Rive r. AirdJ' Or nf 's we re to bequickly to support lur the r opera ti cnsMadang north of Huon Peninsu la andGloueester, Gusmatu, and AraWB in westernBritain, 'Pho targ . . t, date for theseoperations was 1 November, t it . . sumo !IS

assigned to the South Pacific area fOI' bheof Bougainville.

When General 1 'I 'lacAJ,tbuI' hadtll!' Ieasibility of these simultaneous umphiassaults early in August, the a tt ack uponNew Britain was p os tp on ed u nt il 20 Novcmthat the Seventh Aruphibious Force wouldplete its support of bhe N e wGuinea 0

before tJlll other was undertaken. On 3a high command oonfcreuce was called tothe advisability of continuing witb theoutline, It was concluded that thegreat strength of tho Madangcould be quickly reinforced to27,000 troops thraugh in land line s of C.olUIll

tions, made tbat oporution temporurily prohiThe final plans Iorm ulated at this conferenceissued lIS operations instrucLions,

TIll' New G ui nea Fo rce WIIS to seize 'sites at Kaiapit, Durupu, and FinsehhnfBllwas to secure, by infll trabion the I1orM\the Huon Peninsula, i t1clud;_~ Sio and 8!litladditional protection for General Kl'ueg C

sa ult upon Cape Gloucester, The atttlLckMadang was postponed indefinitely,

The preliminary opcrntions WN'~ II .,'

i mm('cliatoly, Elernonts of thl' Sevent h DIcaptured Kainpit on 20 Sopt~m])('l '; ftl1.d,tering very little opposition, occupiod D

:U

of tho Ninbh Division01 122 Soptembcr and

from bhis port on 2 OctOi)['i'

ted to Su,Lelbel'g,7~ milu~esbo.blishBd a stl 'ong clefell-deve1o·ped and Il]ailltllinect

(I'om Sio awl Gusiku' 11 . 1 .1'{)"inJoI'CCmOI\t.s were

The arlvuuce oL thothus WRS h al te d u nt il 2 "j N o -

a~tllck, Su.ppo,.ted hye li mi ua ted e nemy re si st an ce

Following this defeat, theslowly and pain fu ll y 1 11 0n goccupied l) y the Australian

Pacific Al'clt ami Alamo, completed t.heli' prcpara-

thei r sepnrate assaul ts , ' ri leHalsey's command after

ow GeOl 'gins were the captureof airfields ne llij_' Fl1isi in ih eand near Buill on southernthe objective 0' £ establishing

to support a further advuncccoast All'cl'!l.it from these

Buka to the northto

o . t

practicll,ble, bUL he objected to ~he postpenem ont

o f, t ~e a ss au lt u po n B O: lIg ah wi ll e. A ir fi el ds 0]]

this isl and, he believed, were ne c essary to en ablet!IC South Pacific air forces to assist in the neu tra-hza~j?1l o rRn.bo.ul1I,1ldthe support ofSouthwestPnclf]c ~ttl1cks upon.western New Britain, Rep-I'CS~II to.trl'~s of ~ h~ t wo c or mn an ds conferrerl Itt

Brisbane on 10 September. Tile Co-mmander-IIl-CI:ief mad e ( \ P I' Op O Sa lwhicll not only utilizedA dm U'lLI H !lIsey' s reeomm end ation B but also pro-

vided tlw SOli til Pu ci fi c ai .r ' s up po rt re g u ire d fo !'SOllthwest Pacific operations. General Mac-Arthur's aiI'CI'll.Ct,pro tectod by fighters fromKiriwinn, would attack airdromas and shippingat Rabaul and B uka fl'om 1 5 O cro be r t o 6 N o ve m-b el ', . Ad mi ra l H al se y, s up po rt ed by thesera.idswould oceupy TI'eIlSU:I'Y Island and northernCh oi seu l Is la nd a b ou t 2 0 Oc to be r for the purposeof establishing rad Ill ' and motor to l'pad 0 b 01 1tb as es , ' I' hi s pr el imi nar y mo ve would. be followedby u major attack upon the Empress AugustaBay region ou 1 November,

The plan wllsl1ccepted South Pacific airfOJ'CCSincreased the weight of theil ' regular attacksup Oll B 0 u gn in vills n nd 0 ther posit ions in thenorthern Solomons, and n lCSouthwest Pacificarea inisiated 'its assaults upon Raba ul on 12October ntter photogl'aphs disclosed 11s ud den i n-erease ill fighters there, Three hundred andthir ~y-eigh t Allied airplanes stru el l :tile airdromesand harbor the first day, One hundred enemyo. i l'C l 'a f t weredestroyed on the ground, 26 in com-b itt , Merchsn t mar ine I L I L dunval nnits in theharbor wel 'c severely crippled, Simllar raidsfollowed OD s uc ce ed in g d a. ys a nd t he eontinuonseflorts upon Rabaul achieved the same results asearlier om's at WIl'W ak , A~ fh'St the enemytlcw ill. repi!tCelUcnts, bu t grndunl ly, as his 10i>SCS

mounted, he kept onlytho barn minimum neo.os-So ,1 'Y

to harass bornh e r s

and Iuruish some protectIOnror his shipping, ail'd:t'oTnes,~Ild trc,op coucen ~rlt., H w a s e on fr onted With a tIifficldLchoice:

uons. e ! t t 'eit:ller to subjec t h is Jlgh~er st.re~gtl. n eel', a~l

losses on bh e g ro un d u nd ui the nil', or to ~eJ mitthe A llies to bo m b s el ec te d t i11' g' et s Without

intei'fm'QilCC. "hall- - ' , and naval forcesIII the :1 II orS .S,Jap811{lllC 1}1I' .. _ . t' b

nnd C]).r()JiI\eS were atMck~d ,IL thr saJl",~' nne rAdl1l iral Nimitz' a irp]!t ll t' s " ,~d . subl llaTIDfrS, .Al-

l' Is were in direct sopporl of theLhougb

ltplCS~/8J~•• n;ujts ill t he . G i lb er t Islands,

Q(mtrfl I IC II IC , ,_ I J -If th'e in pl'evool,ing t ie ap I>Des t'

t ,h ey w c . r~e a,G,. d "roulld reinrorcern.~llt~ soul!l-trow .ml )vmg all (1.11" .

2 5



I 4I.ItIiff- tht defense against the South PacifioI .-..aace$ill t he S o lo m on s .The I!.nemy's.at~n-

t icIow aa ftn!tllertdivertedfrom th e main objectiveI !> y 1&ndinga on Treasury and Choiseul Islands

onM an d 28October, and by naval bombardmentof Bilka , Sh()r t l81 ,d ,Bal le le , and Poporsng aftermidnighton l November. .

Th e deceptive value of these far-Hung operanonsI W1IIl 80 eft'oouv e that theassault of the Third, Marine Divi sion aga inst the- beaches of northe rn

EmpreIJS A 1 J € l I S t aBay were only l ight ly resi stedby loeslgarriJons. The Nipponese ground troops,estimated to number 2 8,0 0 0, w e reconcentrated at

I B um and B Um which were cu t off from EmpressAugusta Bay by mountains, swamps, a nd j un g le s.The Japanese h igh command had not anticipatedIUl attack at this poiut.

Immediate hostile reaction was l imited to l igh tair and naval raids. Three IllI. val task forces

, were intercepted oft' Bougainville on 2 and 24

November and wore dr iven back without the lOBS

I of a single Allied warship. During these engage-ments two enemy cru iser s and seven destroyers

, were sunk, probably sunk, or damaged. TwoI major ca.rr ierraids on Rabaul on 5.and 11Novem-

be r supplemented the regular Southwest Pacificstrikes on -,his base. The Japenese aircraft,

I shipp ing, and naval losses mounted s tendi ly andhannfully~

Th e SoloH.OI'Sc am paig n w a s c om ple te dby the, c aptu re of Empress Augusta Bay. The Mar ines

and the Thirty-seventh Infantry Division pushedI out b e yo n d a rt il le ry range of the airfields and

l1118UID.edthe defens ive, Thl 'l Japanese were un -able to base ~ft'ectiveair strength anywhere on th e

I island and were incapable of mounting a fullcounUlratta d! until 8 Ma rch 1944. Thls W1l&

definitely broken on 27 MarcI l when th e e ne my"Withdrew 1 ;0 the nor th , east, an d south. No

attempt 'Wa& made to conquer the entire Wandan d smal l seale fighting continued until the finalsurrender in 1945. The strategic aim of thoo pe ra tio n w a saccomplished by the emblishment9! South :Pac i t i cairfields within 2 50 m ile s ofRabaul to I W I i s tin its isomtionand neutrwation.

N6'IJJ BriIain.-As Admirnl Halsey' s l and-blliled fIghtn an d bombers began t he ir a tt ac k supon this mjor str onghold, the weight of theSouthwest ;Pacifio air offensive WIl8 shifted to the~ iA the wes te rn sec to r in wpport of~ Krwer's .llSQulta upon N I 1 . \W :Britain.

~ - fO f :toI iW f,lperationawall i e1medon 28~_~M~~W.oth

t arg! lt da te back ho m 1 to 20 Novemb~l·.plan \VIIS b as ed u po n the a ss um ptiou t ha tdrome s ill the Lac, Einschhafe n, a ndValley area would be fully developed andof providing close support a nd cove r.November, one regimenta l combut teamseize 1I11 a ir fi el d s it eat Lindenhafen Plr ] ;11the south c oa st of N ew Bri tai n. It wouldadvance by s hore -to- sho re mo ve ment and

Gusmata if Gasmnta. could llQt be ncutrother means. The main !!.!fortwas to be Inu6 days later hy a combined nmphibicus andhome atta ck upon Cspe Gloucester.

The engineers reported in late Octobers up po rtin g air dr om es in the Markhamarea would not be comple ted on schedule,quently the attack on Lindeahaleu wasuntil 2 December nnd tlllLt upon Cape Glo .until 2H D ecember. The purpose of theof the position on tho south coast wall touirfields for t,he protection o f A l li ed surfacement through the Vit iaz Strait. General Kl'believed that his Allied A ir Forces eou ldcompli sh t lr is t ask f ro m e xi st il lg fields 011

Guinea. His recommendafiou tL!Lt tIle 0])

be eliminated was overruled, for at thisintelligence rcporta indicated th!l,t the gar

in the Gasmatu nrea had been reinforced,was expecting an u tt aek. ConClU"J"G]1tLYJNaval Forces sugg,'stod the capture ofto the west of Gusmata, ns it meterboat base for protec tion of movsmenbs toGlOU,ocster. On 21 November plans WeT!; ch·Arawe was subebituted for Lindenhefenta rget date of 15December.

The t roo ps an d am ph ib io us m·an begl1llcentration at Milne Bay, OJ·oBay, an denough Island as the ail' forces began theirawry bombardment. During De

than 1 ,5 00 s ortie s w ere flow n oy erCapealone and 3,7 00 tons ofbombs wereGfLIIUla.taand other positions on t]16 soutbwere raided frequently, but to avoid p,iorbingenemy, A raw e w as nol, utL noked un til thepreceding the landing.

T he in it ia l IUIsault o f t he Q ue -h ur ,W ·e dCavalry on Atawe was rl 'pulsed. It wasat night without prdiminury IjavaJ:bomby 150 m en in I "u bb "t" b pn ts , n ot@llO ofr eac he d the b eae lt.The maiu la ndiJlg J

t oo k p la c eon the morning of 15 DCCclIlbal·ail"an d D Avale upp or t, w as s uc ae ss lu l.

G:folmdr es ie t& n c e w a e i ne fi ec tiV " oa·pd the

id !l ,t ~d . T ho A ll jc d ~ oi? 'u n'pll,n(.,soto ~ tr ik c b uc kwil,11

. h ushMull'ci ai r st,I·{"lIglh.al l·c l·af L a pp l'Itl "l 'e ! w it hin 3

, and ttl,olll,350 6oj"Lit'S\\ 'rl.t.lS lind 17 Dcoernbcl· but

in~"rccptod bMol"L" lboyThe raids s leekened . o r r

because i L b ec am e n :p pr l1 ·e nl ,.4.rawe ",US not the tnainraids upon Cape Glouc~s-

i~ s tm ~6g ic location onLite

of N ew Britain marked itobjec tive . L it tle could be

vital position which guardedthe line of communicationN ew G ui ne a. T h B A l li l' dblockade l·es~ricterl enemy

to s mn ll (ll"n ft u nde r c ov ero rthB c,mcentmtion 01' air

resis t a t tack. It "·IlS es ti~g£trxiSl ; l l la tO a pe G l ou ce s-

only 5,000 men.evidence of e ll smy weakness

Force to cancel the plannedoperation O. D 15 December.

of the First M ar in e D iv is io n,by naval nne! air born-

I H 'a (l hn ~ s ou t hw c s t a nd s ou th -on 1 ; ] ' 10m oruin g or2 5

c o n o e n t l·ate d. M iC h·T he se a ir sl lr ips w e re

w h enaif e c t iv e r es is t an c eWAS Q,'\:tended 2,500 yards

steadily deepened in spite.ized CO-Ul1tern. t tacks.

M acA rthuJ" ou 17 Decem -force t( ' /p ,· op nr e p la ns f or

as !W. ndvanccd ni l" and

N ow Guinea Force w as 001;(:) SiOI),Lld divert ntlient.ionand M ndang by vigorous

Rnmu Valloy.I I. Lh Ue d o n 2 J n nu nl "Y1944,

WIL<I d iroc bo tl a nc l 1 w e ekt upen Cape G1ouoester.

and lInpl·6pal'cr'. 8,1ido["tu I"! le l t ho n oxt dny." T.lJIl

t P " T nin nL ed o n I 0 I "~ bl "l In .r yAlamo nnd New G [linen

8 io am i S l) .id ot .c am pu ,ig n w n s f in is he d

w o n . Thl;l Japanese, w ho

;:~ U le be gin nin g of 11)43 hnd IH ,J d n n n dvuuc edHie I ro m I .. .~,n,:1Iluho,An d Bunu [tOI"OBS t he So lornon

S P it t o N ( 'w G e u l" gi a, w u )" ed riv en b ue k t o:: 'I[Il.dll.ngRrdjlLul ,1111<1KIl.vipug. T he m os tdecisive d"wl~O]J rneIt L 0 f lhe .1 'NU· bad be 611 the demonstrll.tionof Alli(,d. d,: r!Tl il ]( I~io!lof the air. The Japanesehad los t lrc cdom of m ov em en t b ec au ae the A lliesW"I"O ab le to c on ce ntrate g reate r n irstrength in

c~ntestBd ureas , thus overwhelming llrotccthtcau C0V:C1· fo r J upnnese movements. Conversely,~he All icsgained Freedom of movement engenderedby control or ~ he n it . On the ground, en em ylund forces wore s low ly forc ed b ac kin to bitter' jungle f ight ing both in tb e Solomons and in NewGuinea, On tho sen.Aliied naval luntis demon-slTatccl the ability to defeat the Japanese wherevert.hoy chose to give ba ttie, nod ~he capacity tolen d the required support to s uc h am phibiousope ration s n s w ere u nd ertak en . O verw helm ed onthe s ea u ,I1 (Lrn tl,e air, end wi th his ground forcesrobbed or t lw in i~ i a~ i .ve ,t ; "heenemy had li btleOffe llS i\ r epoten tin l r emain ing .

The J apunese suffered severe losses in theseopera tions . Over 35,000 enemy dead Werecounted. .An additional 40,000 were cut o ff and

isolated 011 Bougainville, Buks, Choiseul, and inthe Silort lands, Hcllldants of 2 divisions, whichhad been badly shattered !It La!" Salamaua,Piuselilisfcu, and other battles on the HuonPeniusula, were withdrawing boom Sio awl Saidortoward Madang, Wmvnk, und Hansa Buy, TheSixty"fifth Brigade and elements of t he S e ve n-tee nth D [ vis io n w e recu t to pieces and drivenback in to the jungle a t Ca pe G lo uc es te r; 5 0, 00 0soldiers remaining on N ew Britain and N.BW

I re in n d w e rethrcn. tGuedb y a n ci rc I emBut. .E ven mo re i mp ort an t w ere t he a pp ro xi mat el y

5,000 ene1l1y a.irm ·aft de stroy ed or dam ag edd uri ng t hi s si ll gi e yenr. The JlLpancl lemr armIlOVN" recoverGd. ' I'he Japanese lost D10l"e thu.n150 merchant vesse ls , 10 cruis<'L"S,50 desteoyers,

I IS su blllnrilles. Thll il" nflvl l lforces were ili·lvenao.c . .. I to W O " T a kan dto Tcuk Lll oUB dIJ"eotlon enc ...Hollnndiaill t.he ot.he l'. A sall r :cw Britainb rc al1 1c a f or w ard !ll"OII J thu 1{Il"mm;IS of t,he

t·· · 0 ,., from too north w as shil'ted.. fromSl lPPJIl" [ u.~' 1: b

. b I" 1 K nvienz Th e enemy \"I. 'ns lO oJ· e toRa ' n il anc "v",. 1 .J li', . t nd la~"'e carzo vosse s nnu o

risk lil·!1!ll1Por s 11. " " • 11 . . nI t.. 1· 1 loro llml more upon blllge.s,.S~fl ~ .'

1(, I l' ( ll_ 1'· H is loglstlc"l s,t(ar-d es ~ r oy l ll "s J a m [SllJm~l [l!!'S.

t·au W(l,S becomntg penlous. . . uJl., . w hilo w as rolhng m tor poe-

.A.ltWl"lcn m eal) . 1 . d.A. · m ., l D an p ow e r.ductio:u jJ~ 1I '! l ,!"I!11l,~erl!l8 IlII I

2 " 1 "



I Th e British and American armie s were firmlyestablished ill Italy, tho Russians bad pushed the

I G6l1llaDS across the Ukrauien plains, Heavybombe rs we:e striking de structive blows 011

Germany from their bases ill Grea t Br itain. In, the Pacific, Amer ic an Ioreos ha d c le ure d the

Japanestl from the Aleuti ans in th~ nor th , all{!Admiral Nimitz had struck his first blows at

I Makin and Tara wa. The Axis powe rs wer e hardhit and on tie run, but they were not be aten.

R e n o , th e iriv6 to the Phriz.ip-pillt8.-DurUlgthe campaigns of 1943, the Allied losses had not

I been proportional to those of the enemy. 110rl. '-over, All ied ground uni ts gained va luab le pxpe-rienee a nd training, and the air a nd na va l rore rsemerged f rom the s truggle s trong and conf iden t,with virtually complete control of the sea andair. The plsn of operations lor the e xploitationof these Inltial victories was set forth by theCombined Chiefs of Stl il l in December 1943. Thl 'separate IinI'S of advance in the Pa cif ic a nd ill.Asia were combined into II. coordinated drive"to maintain and extend unremi tting pressureagainst Japan with the. purpose o f continually

I reducing her military pow er an d attaining posi-

tions fr om vrhich her ultimate surrender can beforced."Within the Pa cif ic the moveme nts a long tho

, New Guinee-Netherlande East Indies-Phil ippineaxis were to be continued by thn forces of thu

I South and S ou th w es t P ac if icarea concurrentlywith the capture of th e Marshalls, the Carolines,

I and the Mariannas by the Central Pacific area,These Central Pacific area moves were designedto establish very long range bombers on GUIIJ Il ,Saipa.n, and 'I'inian for attack upon Japan. Allt h e s eopl!r8.tions were to be mutually supporting;naval forces were to be deployed from one opera-tion to anotler to cover an d support each series.Plans for th e North Pacific involved preparetioufor entry into the Kuriles and Sovie t t er ri tory inthe event of R U B 8 1 a ncollaboration. They calledfor sur face and submarino action , raids 011 Iheenemyf ishingfleet, and installation for very longrange s trateg ic bombing aga inst the Kur ile s and

I northerI1 Jal'an. The effort in Chino. had as itso.bjec~ve the intensification of laud and air opera-tions ill and fr um tha t c ountry a nd included theestablishment. of a. very long range bombing forceat Chengtu tD str ike vital targets within the innerZOIle, Uppe: Burma w as to be captured in ordel"h9t .b .to impIOve the air route frum India. and toe a t a b l i a h overlaud comm1lIlica.tions wi~ China.

The objeeb ivo of those fur Hung 0l,.lo.!'o,hlO

te rlest roy thr ('lIvmy lloet 1 t I , 1111r ar'ly dS(,('U1"C the maximum at~l"iti(J1l of Jajlo,nese

a nd to in te ns if y a ir ,SIIIJl !IIWill( "awl miJlin)tLies against hostile shippin g. Chin ." 1111

k('pt in tlll' war.l 'reiimin(lr)! Jllal/.~. -Tho f it ·s~ dt 'jj ,f t

pla!l Ior t .ho rsoccupubiou of the Philippinepelage, cllt,itlNI Heuo, WI\S prepared ill cadyalthough ·the r n m l ~ r W g l l"'!IS 110t anpossibility.

Genernl Ma('At>tilllJ" be lieved [,hat theAllied effort ill tho Pncific s ho ul d b <, c on eo nin. the Sout.hwost Pneific urea fOI' a drive thNew Guinea to Mindanao, the BOll'

island of the Philippines, because it was thees t (lilt! most pro tected rou te and the onlyalong which t iLt · lull strength 0- [ til(' air,naval tea m c ould II{' utilized. In his opiattack in til!' Centrnl Paeific t lirough the Mlind the Carolines would be 1 V, ) . s ~ l J r u . Land expinnavnl power and shipping', since i~ must bewithout land-base oil" assistance. Ftrl'Lhill',stead of striking directly at an impor tant v i talbeh ind the s trongly he ld Japanese outer d

it would Husu these formidable outposts firstallow defe ated Japanese uuval and 0,;1'

reLt'oal to ne w defensive posit ions artergagoment., lien» was bused 011 this com-eAllied strategy. It called for ~ IH I'

lines of communicuuion from 1I0l"

I ra li a and from the New Britain-NewHuon Peninsula are a to tho Vogelkop Pc niilLthe nort.hwestcru tip 0- £New G uiuoa intion for an assault UPOlt i'lIind.lM1ao.were to be seized along the northern andwester n wa ste by uirborue and am phi bioustions, while the fla nks were prote cte d bystrikes ag ain st the P nlau s011. the 110l"thcast,

by air raids upeu, bases in the Nethel'luJl.dsIndies on the southwest .

The Joint Chiefs 01 Btr,iT included ~hisplan fo r thocapture of Vogclkop intl",ir WrlshiConference report t o t Il l' O o mb in ed C J . l io · r s o ron proposed opemt.iolls in 1943-44, butmention of the Philippine s. Tbe st,:nte,gictive, as set forth on 2:~ ~1<1Y,wos the oxtl>I:~ithelinll or commlilliclltiollS tbrougb bhe Paclhctho Balmo.hern-nol'tb.Wt'st Celebes j·cg ia l.l, [~to be nccomplisitlld uLong two ax~S o[ o(l"uG on c ml MacA rthur w nsho move thl'Ollg h

Guinea while Admiral Nimit:>; eo.pttll·cd

Ma.ra1uUlaand Oarolinas. The objeotives of

to gai n c c ru ro l 0 r . .h e C I'I1LI'nl

the line of communicntions. to0,1"011., to gail] It IT! ajnr HI'ct.

to IlO'lill~n d ir ec t t ;hr ~nt. to Ull'

inlormod Genera! MflcArthm't hr ou gh t hi ' Centl"lll Pndfic

if the F ir st fwd Secondbe sparee! 11'0ru tit e SOl'th -

5 Novembe r for the utt~.ckIsla nds. The Southwest

replied th~.t becauso the Fil"Stw as s ch ed ule d to make the

. abo ut 1 N OVBm ber it couldl"l'itecl"ll.tcdhishelie] t hn t t he

be di rected tln-DUgh Newand tamt the Cenunl Pscifiea lls should. be r egarded as

pointed out the huzards ofpr otec ted by car rie rs alone,

experience a.t Midway.Division W<1Spermitted to

Pacific area, and Admiralpostponed unlit] February

Chie fs 01 Stnf I were seeking to

of advance u l @ n gboth axes.OIl 2 1 J ul y, suggested ~hu.t til e

11 . 1 ' 0 11is ol at e J 1a .iJ nu jhy t.hoand M an us, t.1Irrl move di ('ectly

ral j l . i(o.cAl"t i lul"I'('plied Um tcontemplate (In amphibiousbut J " !l t hc r i tsisolation by the

el y lightly held UI'OIlS n~B'lY to tho wes t. He

thl l, t s ince his moves to the Wl'S~

be: opposed by su rf ac e andas nil" uni ts, W 1 ( )csptur« of

Iishmenb of it m ajo r n av nlh e c O I. 1. [d b eSlip ported by

the fil'St logical step ill bhe

ific Al'e!! p ub li sh ed uI '(wised

II, on :1 A og ll s~ "'!l ie l! w as .tiol! of t.I II:. ' linnl pJlnse of

n I'd the o rig i [u tiell·ott.(IfRab,tul liS aIle obj"c~ive. The

to thoJ oin t. Chinf~ ot Stolrat I ' h t lQuob!'c CO!lrN'~nCI:' inntlutmlizl),biol1!"lltl,Pl', th im tho

e w B I'it nil J buso. B y spl'cinlOhiflis <Iil"f)(lted Gl'lwl"ul 'IVfM'-an d fo rw o.n l outil i .JJO plnl l l!_for

o,nd t he Ad! ll il " !l l1 ; ie s ,fiJtd

kfor ndvnnces as for west in New Guinea us Vosel

~. D

From the QlJ.ttll·~ of the m essages G eneral' V[~ eA r th Ul " h nd r ec eiv ed , I to f ea re d t Im t t beJointOhio!s of Stnfr intended t-o pinch h is -o pe ra ti on s o ff!II, Vog ol l( op . G e ne ra lMarshall ass ured him)'O\)'l'VC!", thnt ~he most logical step for the Sou th-W,QstPacificut ·(} I. was the captlll"!)of Mindanao anddirecLed tlmt plan s w ere to be bas ed all twon ss m np ti ol lS : 0 111l ,t hnt s t rong thwould be incronsedat tIl(' eurrent rate, and two, tha~ the mnin effortwOI,Idbe through the Philippines,

The disposition taken by tIle Japanese, GeneralMarshall continu ed, would have considerableinlluenco 011 ~be mtiml1te decision as to the mainAI:fol"tin the Pacific, bu t the rapid e xp an sion efA m er ic an s ur fa ceforces, including carriers, gavetho Allies a freedom of choice. If th e navalcarriur offensive made its nnticipated progress, itmight be more valuable to continue tb"iladvance oftl l e Ceu brn l P ac if c 1:t·om til e M ilrob alls, C I 1 TOlines"and Mnl 'in.uas to the Philippines, or to tum itnor til through the Bonins.

Rfma Ill. -Ad nrir s.l Hll.hey, G e n e ru lHarmon, and other officersarrived in Brisbane all

9 October t o e vo lv e t he p la ns f or c oo rd iu at io u a ndt iming fot till) offensives in 1944. Substantialngreement was ranched on the second dny, and theoutline plan, Beno III WIlS, completed on 20October,

'Thegenernl scheme of maneuver snvisicued thendvanee 0 f th e lan d- b as ed b om b e rIi ne w es tll'll.lxl

alon g N ew G uin eato ehe Philippines by s l lcce~si "eoceupal,joll of uhe m inimum buses reqluted ..

Hostile strength would b e h yp as se d whsmverp111t ' tic l lble touvoid costly and time-consumingoperations. The Allied flunks would be protectedccSseJ1biully b;rlLit·opemtions, an d .tll? necessaryn d v nn cc d u av al b as eswould bl' .est.ab~hecl '~mdert he p ro te c ti on o f h 1n d -b l1 S ed . a vi a~\Otl III Ol·~e.t·.~

Il<"tendtho I"lLUgC ofnavalaotwn. Destructive ".u·n.bt . l ) . [ : . la ;W~It' Lo be employed to softsn up and g~ma ir s l lpe ri or iLy over host il e .air bases olldongermgt JI O 1 1! )" "~u,rlvance, 1I081'lle naval " fo :r c e~ 1 Il l( ~. ,.' . '0 be destro"cd "Ioug th" 1l1w ofsillPl)mg W~)le • . of . I r

I , ,\~n l).I"O\'onting r em Ior ce me nt o f s uppy 0IH 'flt~, . 1.. of objet'

a'll' "I"td nllVi11 forces WIt Wll·n.nge· . .-NIPmy" ~ to bt"ve s und 0l" attl1Ck. G l"Oolld I OICilS w e:r~ . b e

t b t d oil" c ov oo :e d l ut he r. Ysenl. lorw m xl 'J' w a eT"nn . '. . . b '

1 . i1 "fOt"c~sto soi1.c Ill;d ostlLblish fur !lS~S~ln \ ' :11~1 r.3stl~cossi~e objedive. A ir .nnd TIa"alm "' jD ba eS~n blished, and the processrore!\~ WPI"C ".. .1 l1 " b

t d I " slIc<le!'siIfGO bjC(\UlVCS,l \o ul ll 1 2. lD gYI"('pen ~1 '~

2 9



~ lIO iilmOJ Qy la n d a n dBell action of any inter-mediate hoItile installations, The number ofobjeottv.W I ! 8w be d ec re ase d an d the radius, of~ ~ by employing carriers to providec l o s eair support. of landing operations byadvanc-ing the oJfeuive fighter line through inland f ie ldsestablishedan d mainta.IDed.by air transport,

Th e initial a.t.tackupon Hansa Bay, bypassing¥adang an a AIamhafen an d containing' hostiletroops at Wewak, was scheduled for 1 Febru~,while the s~ure of a ir a nd naval bases at KaViengand on Manus had a targe t date of 1 month later.Allier airfieldsand harbor facilities were developedat these pcsitions, General MacArthur's ferceswere to mo unt s imu lt an eo us d ri ve s ag ai nst H ol la n-di ll. o n Humboldt Bay and upon t he Aree, Kai, andTan.imbar Wands in the Andw'a Sea, southwestof New Guinea on. 1 June, Geelvink Bay, theVogelkop Peninsula and Halmahera or Moratajw ou ld t he n )8 seized on 15 August, 1 October and1 December, respectively, with the objective ofestablishing major air and naval bases for supportof the assault upon Mindanao,

T he p la n ha d a timetable which contemplated amove into ilie Philippines about I Fe bru ary 1 94 5,

but it could be e xe cu te d w it h g re at er s pe ed if moremeans were provided, General MIlCArthur, on 31Ocwber, in an attempt to obtain the requiredreinforcemeat to permit an attack in the Phi lip-pines befors the rainy season, again urged theJoint Chief~of Staff to concentrate the main drivein th e Southwest Pacific.

If means were available, General MacArthurp oi nt ed o ut , it would be advantageous to attackfrom several directions, but to attempt a majoreffort along two axes with limited reseuree, wouldresult in a failure to reach the Philippines at theearliest date 4'oasibie. The attaek through NewGuinea.w od d l ea ve the base closest to the objee--tive and w'luld advance against the m O B t lightlyorganized ?Ortion of the enemy's defenses, Itwould be protected by l an d-b ase d a vi at io n, a nd by~ .Allied fleetoperating in t he o pe n reacheso f t hePeci1ic with the prin1a.ry mission of seeking outan d destroying the Japanese fleet,

T h e J oi nt .an d C om b in e d C h ie fs o f S ta ff , a ttheO a ir o C o n fe re n c ein December, deeignat ad a newItI'ategic objective in the Paci.6c, attack in theF~L~n-China Co as t a re a in the spring ofINS, Th e objeetives of this ca mp ai gn we re to~$!.tI;!.e li:neI o f c o m m un ic a ti on b e tw e e n J ap e. n'F- ~ ~ of mw :materials in the Ne~~ .. e .w :lt .b.ePhilippines and to establish

bases from which the Japnnese homeland cobombed,

This general concept direeted concurrantof the Japanese-malldatml islands b :vPacif ic Forces and continued advaneuNew Guinea-Netherlands Enstaxis by the Sa ut hw est Pa ci fi c Fo rc es,in t he C en tr al Pa ci fi c r ec ei ve d highfll.'cause they seemed to promise !l grea.tlll'of rapid advance toward Japan un d her 'litalof communication to the south and ea st, or

acquisition of air bases from which tostrategic bombing of the Japanese A_l'cband of precipitating a decisive engngem~ntthe enemy fleet.

In consequence of this, Generalfound that the planned allotment of amphishipping to his command would not I) .timing set forth in Reno II I wn ich lUl ,deated on the assumption thnt n.llmoground . . and naval forces of the Sonthwould be transferred to tlle southwest upconcl usion of tb.e Bismarck l ind Solomonstiona.

Revision of Reno III was necessary, but

question of timing allocation of Southwestoperations, and basing of Pacific FleetSouthwest Pacific waters had t o b e f irs t. d is cThe Pacific commanders and their stKi'fs

Pearl Harbor. in December 1943 and in J1944. to attempt to arr ive at a 'tel !taLive

At the latter conference, Admiral NimitzGeneral MacArthur agreed upon Lll(" 'of till) Pacific Fleet during the periodrnarck operation but postponedfuture operations un t il It Iater date,Nimitz presented his plan for operation1944 which projected nn assault U1)0[l KwojAtoll in the Marshalls on 1 Februflry to blowed by ~e capture of Eniwetok ahollL 15Following that, there were two lines ofsu gg est ed . O ne e nv isi on ed tile sa isu re o f15 June, the southern Marianas on 1 S .and the Palaus on 15 N ovember, while 1,11called for the bypassing of Truk to th e norassaults upon the Marianas on ).5 ,JIl'1)e,Wthe Ca.rolines on 15 .July, , !ml tho l 'alauBOctober. Together they 1"('( 'ommouded toJoint' Chiefs of Stuff a seq uance of opel'~w h ic h b eg anwith an ILI,Lack upon .Jllpn,lland naval Iorees at Truk, on 26 March, by ~.force consisting of all avnilable Inst CIlI'f](lI'O

bat tleships wit h attached light f OI 'C os . ' [, ,, '0

b e (Le La eh cd a ft er t hi s st ri keH alse.)' to Support the soizul'c

_w in ch w aspostpoacd fl'om,]~he other IUlVll1 u:oits would

as IL c ov er in g Io rce u nt il thesec ll d the n the c01l1biLl~d

for (J,e a tt llcks Upon Eniwotoli :the JOil',t C!llSfs oJ SLHfI', in C9t1~s tm t eg l C c o nd \ Je tof operations, req nested the cornm en L of

upon trlB al lo ca ti on o f So ut h

the ca])tuI 'e (if K nv icn g, t hefor the Pacific Fleet in the

8.I'(>&', and the effective employ.range bombers ngainst the

in chief took 1J1is o p·Lieutonunb General . Ric}l llni

of Stl lf l' , to WasbingtonMlleArthU1"S views to the

d pressed Ior combinationl in es o f a dv an ce in the Pacificup the N6W Guinea Coast to

He advo cnted u tilizl1 ti Oil 0 ra major fleet b as e, b yp ns sm g '

and transferring the Sout hSo ut hw es t Pac if ic Co mma nd

He claimed that this decisionwar ill the Pacific by placing

6 montbs before the3 months in I'e!t<lhing

the Philippines, a nd t ha tby ex ec ut in g t ho PhiIi1J-

the dry season.t lmt IO UvllI:Y long J'!IJ'lge

to the Sottthwest Pacifict would be available,. JUt\J(-

tl.lrg a(.s divera if ed I1mI 1tI.~

at It minhnum. Soon

w er e c on cl ud ed i n W lISh in g-decision aerial reconnais-Lo s N eg )' Os Is ln nd s, 011

to elir.it any response airdenemy gll.lTison had heeD re-

~=tl'i~on 29 FebIlla:r,V. 'fna l an di ng w as ma de" oug t II. narro IV harbor entrance under adverse

~~thOl', colldHions but met little opposition,1(I ~ ~"lP was quio kl y se iz ed a nd a p erims t er

establIshed,

SL~hours after t ilo ini tial landing General Mac-Arthur came ashore and ordered' the task JOToec ol ll Jl !u ude r t o h o ld wh at w as t ak en . De te rmi ne dJapanese infil tration efIortso,ud 'COUll terattaekswere repulsed during the next 2 days, and OD 2M~ rc h ! ;h e su pp ort in g Io rc e a rri .ve d, A dd it io na l~Ullts w ere broug h tin !ID dby 30 Ma rc h t he f ig ht -mg on Los Negros was over, In WH I meantimet he a tt ac k u po n M an us co mme nc ed on 15 Mo,)"chwhen an Allied combat team embarked at. HayneHarbor witb the mission or seizing the Lorengauarea, Tbe town w as eapttu ed on 17 March andenemy strougpoint at Rossum was overcome on2 5 M ar ch , e nd in g n il o rg an ize d re si st an ce.

For many weeks prior to the operation, hCjtvybomber r uid s h R. dmade the Momote strip in-operable for the J Il.p;UJese, Wben the airstripw as s ub se qu en tl y t ak en , t he e ff ec t o f t hes e b omb err ai ds c lea rl y w as i nd ic at ed by t he a lmo st co mp le tedestruction of the f ie ld installations sad the strip

i tself. The absanca of !In!lIlly n il ' l ll tq rV l an b ie nd ur in g t hi s p eri od a tt est ed t o t he d eg re e of n eu tra l-izntion 0 1 enemy air ' bases . achieved throughoutthis area,

Th B S u ceess 0 [ the 0 pel ' ll . t ion eomple t ed ther ing of nil ' bases surrounding Rabaul an d virtultllysealed off all of New Britain, The enemy WIIS

compelled to rely upon submarines and riskydestroyer ' runs (;0 bring in bare essentials, Inaddit ion, his supply route (;0 Hollandia was pushedfltl'(.horwest and all of the wa te rs b et wee n Tru kand tlill New Guinea mniuland were wit hi n airra ng e. Mo re i mp ort aat , it pr es en ted a n o p! )o r-~Ullity f or u ra pi d mo va men ] a lo ng t he N ew GumBI!.

canst.Reno IV,-On 2 March, shortly after

G en era l S ii th el 'l ru ld 's re tu rn f ro m WIlS~t(lD,tilieJoint Ohiefs of Sl .J l ffissued It new directivew hiell lns t l 'l lcLed .bo th G eua..rnl IIIIL~A.rthur an dAcimirfJ.] Nimil lz to d raw p la ns co ve l' ~l g a U p ro b-able' oPQm~io118l l r i tbintbeu· .rospective ,fit'eIIS of

I 10 gain thr IJUlmn-For.:Dlosll-OhinacoastcO bi l l . 'I~a!l( Tbe ne w p la n p ub li sh ed by General0, jCC,lVll, " ,1..: "} ' n rMucAr[.hor j J l l 'CSpO!lseto uw S raquess, ,MO.rm- '

. dl 'n ft o f t he p la n t lu \t , G el le ra l S ut her lan dWIIS 11 ,re L' "I t W~sb_iflgton, G eu erILl Mars ballhfld presen B e a ihl L (' ]

( J thm~ it migl,t be pOSS[ 0.0 ueu 'I'll.-lmd sugges eu ld 1. -

I ( b 1 C!~T>t'(lreJapltnllSc·Jw" nasos Inize 1 ' 1 ] ) 1 , 111 . 1 ' ,al' 'L-

31



-the Arafura. Sea. while operations along the New

I Guinc& coast were in progress; but, plenners ont he So ut hw oe l. Pa ci fi c s ta ff re nso ue 'd t ha t b ec au se

, the eDemy could continue replacement and supplyto these bases from tho resources in the N e ther-lands East Indies, capture WIlB more advisable,

, However, since the allotted assault and transportshipping would not support concurrent action in

I both areas, the entire series of operations wasI st ag ge re d i n t ime s eq ue nc e.

Reno H' wa s b use d up on the assumption that, the Centmll'nc.ific Forces would invade Palau not

later than lJ Se pt emb er 1 94 4. It outlined theisolation of Rabaul by the capture of Manus andKavieng. 'The staggered dates for operations inthe New Grinee coast-Ara.furu Sea urea were:15 June, Humboldt Bay; 1 August, Tanimbar ; 1Stlptembcr, Kn i j 15 September, Aroe, The natureof the planned assault on Mindanao was changedfrom a mp hi bi ou s- ai rb or ne t o a mph ib io ua ; t he d at eWIUI fixed 16 November. ThE' objective areaswere extended further by the inclusion of plansfor the seizure of bases on Palawan, North Borneo,WI d i n t he Vi sa yn s b eg in ni ng ill January 1945,

General lIacArthur, in presenting his plan,

stated that the line of actions proposed wouldse cu re a ma jo r s tra teg ic victory, the invasion ofMindanao in November 1944, This, in turn,provided £ 0 1the seizure of Luzon before the onsetof the heavy rains in July 1945, the initiation ofvery long runge bombing of Japan sooner thanwould he o .h er wi se p os si bl e, a nd t he o cc up at io nof bases for t ill' advance into the Formosa-Chinacoast art'll. t} a n ea rl y da te .

Iltlliarnlw plan8,-Reno III had provided £01'

assault on Hansa Bay but Reno IV substitutedHumboldt Bay, Hollandia, This decision wasmade because the groat IIllISS of enemy troops inthe area were eoncentmted around VI iewak an dMadang; r'llatively weak forces garrisoned Hol-la.n~. I~was apparent [rom enemy act ivity andfro~ intelligence sources that the Japanese did not~nsl~er Hollandia within range of amphibiousmV~lOn or damaging air aseault. The situationproVided all opportunity fo), the isolation of some40,000 Ja'p~ese, the easy access to a v it al Ja p-ILIlCIIC 1ogist1C~nter, and tlle seizure of an air-drome I,rom which the Vogelkop Peninsula couldbe donuna:.ed,, Because of the eIUIe w ith which the operationsm the Bismarcks wore progr(!!l8ing, General~U1 requested permiss ion to retain thecamenI a m other f teet unite allotted to him for

32

t hi s a ct io n to covel' and support anatt ,a f'k upon Hol lundia ,

Th « Joint Ohil'fs of StuJf , on 1 2 M ar chon t,hl' busis of mounting f'viilf'nI'P ofand naval superiority, decided to spoer]sohedule for opt-ratione in 1944, They't 'StabLished th(· Formosll-Luzoll-Chinua s _ L Il af ir st s tr at eg ic o bj t! c~ iv l! a ndstu.most feasible approach WIIS by way ol80UIUI and Mindanao. They directedMacArthur to cancel the assault upon Kaand t o c om pl et e the isolation of easternBritain and New Ireland with thecommitment of forces. He WIlS to completeoccupation of Manus as early as possibledevelop a major fleet and nil' base there.assault upon Hollandia was authorisedApril with the specific objective ofheavy air bases tor preliminary bombardmof the Palaus and the neubralizabionNew Gui nea and Halmahera,

The tasks assigned to the Pacific Oceanwere the isolation of Truk, the seizure ofsouthern Marianas 011 15 JUllc,and of tllflon 1.5 September. The purpose o f t hes e

Lions WI.\B to estlLblish se a an d a il' bases forl ong range bomber uLtacJ,s upon Japansuppert the Southwest Pacific (WOa

Mindanao ill 15 .Novomber. A l l' f or ce sthen reduce and contain the Japauese inPhilippines in preparabion for n Iurtheron 15 February to Formosa either directvia Luzon.

The directive was a eompremise betweelleral MacAJ'Lhur'~ strategic eoneepuen anrlwhich held that the main rll'orL should be el i

through the Centra! Pacific. The Jointof Stair, believing that Amcrienn stl'ollgtLt

great enough to mou nL s im u lttL11!lQUS

both theaters, decided to bypass andTruk and the remaining Cnroli ncs fromnorth and south, and conduct preliminarywIiich would threaten the enemy in allt he Pa ci fi c. Till' V(lI'Y 10llg-l'angc bombnew wrapon, woulrl strike JaplLlI from tlll~anus. The reCo.ptlJl'C\ of the Ph il ippi I,,~S

(lut the line of rommllIliclLtioll tJo~weellhome islands and Lh(' N c L b ~ rl il .m l s E l lg ~and provide a staging 111'1'11,for subsequentupon China, Formosa, or Japnll. H alsoimportant for .rIl&SOIlS of fltl' t'!}Sbvl'II peliLi,';prestigC'. H tho enf'my J!e,~t wu.s ~·)'ippkd dany of these opel'ation~J and if sLrn,t,<,gic

W!lS ~UC('l'ssflil, I ;h o p lo ll 'J!, I lh fil lg rd , AlIil 'd forr, 's

I' OI'nJO,SH, t),n Bonil,," II

»,11.Ii'am ( 'h ( ' H m n e Islanrls,

AfLl'l' two y eu rs 1 )1 LII(', :ho l' lI c tC' l' is t ie o ftho , l lIpn nr- s r-

II·s InPi;:, of b nl nn c· l'. '1 '1 ",",.ere J.'elativeJy UiHd[I'I'L,>cl

LI'alJ~('d naval htnding p!ll'lic~f ro nt -l in e I ,w op s b ad I'I'PII I'( ,

0 .'1 ' l8"WuL estill f?rmidnble, no longel'

C' proseeuon of his 0 u tposts;ed Pl 'os ll lu ab ly l or protcetiou

~s air arm no long("r w ase su PPOI ' t t o h is g ro un d

his long l ines o f c om m u n ie n ,forces nnd A lliedEU b m ur : n e s

, me rc han t s hi pp in g to suchenemy wns forced to rrnploy

vessola, barges, uml smnil

and Sou th P ac ifi c a re u Iti]' nudpressure on the enemy

FCi bma ry 1 94 4, while futurosettled. 'I'he raids upon air-

an d lin as of comm unica tious atAle;.cisbar~)J, TNowak,

tcnsificd. Appl'oxi.111atelywere d ustJ'tlycii am ! tI;n

10ssC$nt the advancednil' stl'eJlg~h WIIS CO! )-

at H ol ln nd ia b ey on d Allied.range, and he witbdrew

f ro m th e S ou thw e st P ne ific .mnintained an Itltnost

co nt rol o 'fI' Ne w Br it ai nnot olinllengud by surfaceOOll\'OY of JapalJCSe mer-

brought into ~ he a re a du ri ng

of i I. WM d es ~t'QyBe lPacific. - 'r ile , J11,pl l.n~Se ( ' i~LLUI'I'ffuoLiv,' n'Sis.~!uW'e 01' hnrl

f in yL hiu g ,w c opbRl1baul,Guhwa from WewuJ, to Lltr

' s S <, jl lLl I' C o f Gn lc il Islllnd,ew Irulalld, on 15 l!'1'brwLTYtee! as 11 mal,t01' of (IOllnll ' .lig ht n nd lobe s m nllgnl'l'iS01I

rl'infOI'(Wrl. SiJTlihu,ly, ~I]('Tn I lls el l [) n 11\ [' II0 ['tit

u.n,t movt'd 011 to Co,po

t of the elLemy b nd w i. th -Penillsula ,t othe east,

Although 101·(,~t! 10 f' ht : .PI'II insula 11.11(1in 1IIC,l~~al'lgCl~0IlSly, 011 P H 'HuonJ )" c l' mi Je - l' . ..I J n u " tlllp;V,III N o ve m h er

,~II,( ''']lllU'''' All' I I ' 'O ui'I' . I, '' ' , 1m, roops I II ;\"I"r

(,tl, WI'H' U most, I I")d>LITI. '}'I " ' l II Op pO S ,'! mFehruarv nwl

I, . ue v l IJ o\ 'c '( 1 . .t B I·' .\J

' I ., III 0 . ognc ] Il TI ( 111 'j \ ,'1" It( '!llK un LIt"'2Ml 1 - . 'J pr: ,

'['I ' .' ,_1,IIII( Alcxlshufru 2 days lalpl'II' O",'uplJ,Llonof Emil ' r I ','

cOmplf>l,.tJ I h ' J .. au i1 unr] 011 21) l\I,tI'I'h

K'. 'C ,Isn atton and ('Ill 'irel,~menl of

IlVIPIl" and R"II 'I A . '", w· ILlI, . gain lhe enemy witlnlrewb~rOl:n ~]w j~l~ding, unrl the H l l ie s ga inedIt strategicQ']edn'~ Without cost. In LJwmea u ' 'G, ]Iv[ l' J .' .' ~n Il1P >titlC'I'UIJ.CfIt 1II I Jssllrd Ins~nJr·tionsfe l l 'the att .kHoll, li TI. I~( upon

, . 'lLlf~I1:. u s co nt omp la t e, 1 as sa ul t by twoAlhrd dlvlslon.s :\TfiS lhe IIl ]'g' !S\operat ion and thelangl'sL am phibious m ove YP ! planned bv theSouthwest Pacific nrea, .

. :hr, ,obj.~di' ·~ was 98,5 miles f rom Goodenough,th~ prllleljll11 slngmg iJ,!'pu "I')" "81 mil f1 • ~., "OJ" U 7 '_ I ·:P:'; ,rOUl

Onp~ OI'plHl, ~OI,ILh of Finsrhhufell, t h r- I1rlvlI.nr.es l ng wg P Om L ,. r11 t he C ('J I L l 'I IJ Pa cif ic , A ll ie d f or ce s w e re m ee tin gineffective resistn ne e r.1U!'i~lgtheir ad'l"a ne e throught he J ,[a rsh nl k Kw nj al ei n A~ol l wus secured 0.11 6F c br u .l 1 ry. I 1f L er5 dnys of fighting . A iI' oppositionWIlS n eg lig ib le b ec a u seof bhv disru ptiou ofair-

drornos and communications by preliminary landa nd cu rri er b ns ed bombing and straf ing 1 '8 ids nndnaval bomhardmout, The J')ptllH's1' nil' ~Ifol'l inthis :neu was ill sharp ( '0 11(,rust t o t lr o d ef en s iv ea ct io n L o ( '1 ]( 'S ou I hand Sou t hw e st P n eil ie!lI'HH

attacks u po n R !I ;b l1 l1 L If the 1I0 w of air rein-forcem ent to N ell'Britain airdromes was tnkanus 11 eri t eriou, thure would be reason to believetill1t t he e ne my 's , ()l Lp au it y t o re pl ne e w! )st ag ea nd I H ft iu L nj11 strong I),irdefense fl t important busesw n s a lm os t in Q xl nJ ll st ih le - T he c ap tu reof Kwaja-Jain, hewever, s l lg g ! !S l ;( l d U U l. tR aba ul p res en ~ ed II

• d ec ept iv e p ic tu re o f h is o ve r -a ll s t re n g th , IJ.mL11]11.1,~bll enomv's d e t('rlIliIlI1I.ion to hold this posil ionWl'lli{('lle<l-his ubilit\' to d~f'Hld elsewhere. .

' fLoiuilial victory W~ISrapidlv l'xpioilof'd,Ordersw e rr is su ed Oil 4, Fnhru!lry to prepa co rpln n s for theimmediule sciMll'I' of Eni\\'cLok to ~Iw nortbwest,'1 '1 '1( 'initinl 1'1lJ(1in!,,>; \~~Ie made on 17 FebrulJryami the ell ti,'o [I loll w as C011,q lIeI'L,d by the 22d.T iJ t' s( ' n s sl Lu !t s \ re '' {'"ov('I'ed by II. HlUjOl' ~"'TiorsLrike ugllinsl '['l'uk O il 16 mId 1 7 F e br ua ry illl I' iJ ic h 2 0t !,ir('rrtfl am i H I ~bips weJ'l ' destroy~clw it .l I a l os s o f 1 7 H il i I t' d Hilitr~ airplanes. SI'\'lHl

dllYs 11~tN t he ""U.,.i~I' Ifisk fO"':(1b iI nipnn nl,dTillinn eliminaLing nl1olli('I']OO !lIn'I'nn and furlbl'l'dJsI'upting J&PlOllCSO COll1JlI UJucali.ons, .

Hollandi(/,Qperations,-IlollandwWIl:S ~he prlll-



dipa l ,Tapauesa rear supply b.1ISein New GuineaI U J . d bad an estimated garnson of 14,000. It

w as loca ted on Humboldt Bay, a sheltered butundeveloped harbOJ;:. The airfield area WIIS near

I Lake Sentai, i t.bout 12 miles from Humboldt andI midway to Tanahmera.h Bay to the. west , Slid

con ta ined thr 'e l arge a irdromes , on which most o fI the remaining enemy air strength WIIS based. TheI Japancse ground troops were concentrated atI Wewak and Hansa Bay to the ellSt, at Wakde,

Ssrmi ,and the Gee lvink Bay region to the west., The plan ea1Ied for s im u lt an e ou s a ss au lt euponHumboldt and 'I'anahmereb Bays and upon.Aitape, 120 miles to the east. The object of theoperation w as the establ ishm~nt of a .malor b?-Bewith naval facil it ies, and an intarmediate stegmgarea at Hellaadia to support further operations up

J the New Guinea coast, to Vogelkop, Halmahera, orMorotai. The forc es at .Aitape were to protectthe east frank of the assault and prevent inter-ference by the Japanese from Wewak.

The Commanding General, Alamo Force, wasmade rcsporu ible for the coord inat ion and p lan-ning of the ground, air and naval forces, and theSeventh Amphi.bioUllForce, strongly reinforced byships from the Central a nd South Pacific areas,had charge of the over-water movement. Theprimary objective of the Fifth Air Force was thedestruction ofenemy air forces along the northerncoast o fN ('"II" Guinea. Large formations of heavybombers with f igh te r cover commenced a tt acksupon Hollaodia on 30 March and con tinued unt ilenemy a ir instlilla tions were destroyed, whileattack and medium bombers neutralized air-dromes from Alexishafen to Aitape. Of the 288enemy aircrdt a t Holla ndia on 30 March a ll hadbeen e it1ie r des troyed or permanent ly d isab ledafter the Itrike on 3 April. The continuedneutral ization of Raba11l, KlLvieng, Truk, and

other airdro:nes in the Carolines with the assistanceof Third fleet ca rrier' a nd land-baaed planesremained a ma.jor task. The Roya l AUlltralianA n- Foree Command, operating from north-wMtern A.ustralia, attacked hosti le airdromes inthe Arafura aea and near Gee lv ink Bay. It alsoconducted long-range bombing and mining raidsin the e1.herlands East Indies, end har888edI I I I8 lnYiJultaIlations bordering on the Tintor Sea.

Pacific Fleet car rie rs s truck Pa lau, Yap, an dWoW OD 80 March and 1 A.pnl in preparationf6 r the l I o 1 I a : n d i a .a tt ac ks , an d t he n m ov edsouthfJw ~ i ! I1PPor t .The ground troopa and am.~~ua~ W 6 N Ic o nc e n tr at e d a t G o o de n l> u g h

and Cape Cretin, and assault groupwere held on 8 April. Steps wereClLt£ 'to tho enemy that the lI; tt ,wk upenor Wewak was projected. Tho ships III

north from Vitil lZ Strai t to the Admiraltythen wesL,and finlllly SOllth t o 1 .111 'landingWhile thi s rou te WIlS 200 miles longerdirect line, it gave less chance 01 elld:vand prevented t.he enemy from definitelying the objective. The COIlVOYS woreby the r einf orc ed Seventh FI~eb nnd hycarriers from the Central Pnoific. On 21the 10l1t carriers str uc k the Wa,kcle a nda ir fi elds whi le the F if th and Thi rt eenth Ail:concentrated on Wewak, Ra usa Bay, AHoUandia . The ne xt day Allie d force sTa,nalunerab and Humboldt Bays, whileAllied combat team captured Aitapo.

The assaults wer e made under c m<~l"ofan d air bombardment a-nd complete tactiC1t1strategic surprise WIIS achieved, No moretoken resistence WIlS met at ally point,hnstile naval or air a ttacks in forcro cameallY di rection . At Ai tapr. the Tad ji a irdromeseized on the f ir st day. A pe l' il ll et el ,' de fenseeStabl ished and the pos ition conso lida tedme-diate ly. The troops nL Hollandiavirtua lly unopposed marc h to tho airdl"Omeinstead of the f '~ '(proLedcostly enmpnign.Sentan i and Cyc lops st rips were seized I;~forces from Humboldt and the Holle udiaby others from To.nabmorah. Actionwas l imi ted to hunt ing down scat te redremnante.

By 17May, !light,f ighter squadrons, onebomber squadron, and one transport sqwere opera ting f rom the Hol land ie , Cyc lops,Tami strips. Fighters and atta,ck bombersa lready s ta rted the sof tening of the

Wakde-Biak ill preparation 'for th.e nextRtorganvizafti.onC !fcomma1ul .-D1.lr ing . o b uper iod, the Navy was dovoloping R majorrepair a nd supply base n. ~ Manus, .P ROmc Fleet was to opeeate out oj' thiSAdmiral Nimitz- recommended tha~ it beover by the South Pac ific. Gpnceal:M o .opposed this suggestion nnd agnin propo~ndthe forc es of the SouLh Pacific, - be yond.requi red for local de fense and for the opnecessary bases, be l"( 'aUocatod to ~he Sou·

~o!=:the Joint Chiefs of StuJr daoided

the South Pacif ic Command would be b-ro

t fOI'Qc~ divid(ld hetw(:eu l:hePacific. The m ain n avn ]

to was I.e b e : c l os e danr] itsto ~he Adlnini lLics a 11d

A ir Force, the IVLhe Twenty-fifth, Thilty-

FOl"ty-tIlirtl, Ninety-thinl n ; l L !. s , plus the F iJ 'sL and fl~ c'lnd

an d serviceand supportingc on trol ofGetWI'a! NIacArt l l ln -_

loss some rnajoe units whichthe Southwest Pacif ic to JillSeventh Fleet , ! ib o I 1 Ia ri ll ~

the naval air forc es ofthe Southt o t he O ~ n ~ 1 '1 l1P a c if ic .

United States ail' an d g roun dP ac if c III 'ea and the n atu re

caused General 1\'iacArlhUI" to. , 'l 'he F ar E U$ tc rn Airunder General Kenney

of t .l le Fi ftl i nnd ' I' hi r-The XIV Corps, commandedW. Griswold, was sot lipas 11

the control of General

ew Britaiu-Emirau axis,Force WIt-8 given the Slime

Guinea eas~ ol the Ramue che lon of theEighuh A r m y

on 21 June to thke OV9r pattand tactical duties of the

not formally establisheddid not assume com-

with tlJ G J 0 i ll tof March 1944, G Cll(\1"DI

revision of his RCllO Plan,in June after Hol laud ia

plans WOI'~ b ein g c om -

operations necessary forN ow G nincn COHS~. Therevised time~ltblolfol' the

IPJ"11 o pe ra ti on s, s eL tiJ lginvasion date 101' MOi"ntll.i,

incl U t ie the gelleral plans fO IPhilippine lslf1llCls. It wns

that til!) rcoccupntion ofall attack on Pormosa andof ilia Pacific would suppnrt

scheme of maneuver 10J'

from hlitinl attnck on

t he is la nd ! lin d $ l l -b se qu ~ "t

3~

~~Tl~ol~d3. l~onof till' whole to one IDrgc-scale attacklu: -31!lJJgl .Buy SCb'lcluludfor 25 O c tober. T his

[10 of IlCllOil o ff el "u d g r· ea te r p os si bi li ty of thec > t l" iy e s ta b i t'011 ~ ., r '. b. ~ mont 0 _ I Ll r ' .nsesfOI' tile support ofLila next op . ,. ' ] G .. et n uon , "ey te ul], s uL w ! u lc d f or15Nov(]mber S I ' t '.. ,., . U)Sl'qU6U operatrons includsrl: nland III!; !It A pn rri by Ce n tl'al P ac if ic F orc es ill

.Ja1l.IJIlI'Y 11)45, occupat ionof t he R iP 'l l P ro vi nc eb"gl.llII'f1g I , lip same month, s oizu r« of air buses on).[olldoro in F!lbrllIlI"Y, unci It m a jo r a m ph ib io us

assaul], IL l LingltYBIlGul f 011 1 A p ril supported bysecondary operations oJ Baler Blly, ham bales,B utan gn s, an d T ay ab ns .

Tilt NWI Guinea operaJjl)ns.-Th .. steady ad-ranee along the N " " "G ui ne a c oas t continuedwhile rcorganizntion of the com m and w as beingc om pleted . S ix days nT:ter the lundings aLHollandia, Gfllwl'nl:MacArthw' informed the WarDepartme nt thnt he would atta ek Wakde a ndSarrni, over 10 0 miles w est ofHollandia, about 15: ;" ' I I1Y_His objective was to capture airfields fromwhich to c ov er hi s f ur th er m ov er ne nt in to theGeelv ink Bay reg ion in Jai l! ' l ind subsequentoperations in the Yogelkop Peninsula region.W u k de , B ia k, N o er nf oo rIslands, an d Cape San-sapor of the northwestern tip of Vogelkop wereassaulted in rapid s ue ce ss ic n -e -b he f ir ston 17.Hny an d the la st on 30 JUlIO. Elich was an in-

d eps nrlc ut o pe ra tiol l; 1 10 a tte mptwas made tocomplete one balers beginning the next,

.Ja pl ll le s e a i_ r'and JUINIIL r es is ta nc e W I lSvirtuallyIl one:l.-1lltanh, and ground resistnnce was spotty.Wakde WIIS eaptured ill 4 day s, Nocmlcor in 5 , audSI\I~a})OI' 01' 'UIB day of Iill~ ntL!Wk. but majorb nttles d e v ii oped in Biak Ielaud and be tWBC II

'P oem an rl S n rm i011 H I e m ain Iand . T hese in -v ol ve d l ar ge[lumbers of ground Cl 'OOpSsUPP.ol'tcdby planes, tanh, naval gunfire, ~nd ,!rtllleTY.The enemy garrisons, isolated an d cutoff us they

w ere, f oug ht vig orou sly an dwell, ~ThB initial landing on Bink was made on 21, \iny. Eff~cti"~ l 't 's is L a ll G I ' e n d ed 0[1: 21 Junew he n I. hl!JlI.paJ_\usecomnHu"I~I bum! the col~">I,d is ~rib uL e< J han d g re llu de s [ or "h es(JI[-(J~sl·NchonOf tho wounded , o rd er ed o ne f in alattack, an d t~lBIJ

c.ommitl.edh,u'u-kmi Snrmi neve!' \\'II~ occupied,T he p os it ion lo st itsimportftnce HE; the line TIlQ:,eri

"I b ' 'Yllktle and T ocm w erecomrellllllItfOIWIH(, 1I" . - id J. . t tul an'" I o! t,JlOse "1Ill1~ , !I 'O Yl estllglllg pow gil' --'" " _

Iu l tTllilllug[lJr subsequent opernt1ouiO.Ils~ht\ So"tlJ\\ '~s~Pacific forces .'llh·RIl~~dIll?!::

. 600 m iles IIDd renched POS)tlons Iln'eatel1-l!lb

t lH H1 ' .. P l 'u " A ID(l.Jor~ e H lIl mah en sIIntl .the u ppm es . .

.,



. beavy bom ber base w as establis lw d atB~ak, an d, f ig l r tc r s and m ed iu m b om be rs w ere s tatlO ,n edat: Wakile, NOellJfoor, an d Seasapor, oompleting ~ll'

, i solation of N ew G uin ea. The Central Pacificrorces eap tu red the Marianas during the same

I period, and the Japeneee air am i n av al I orc eswere driven hack to the Philippines, tile N ether-linda East Indies, an d the Inner Zone. The Fill'

I E astern A ir j 'orce neutralized the airdrom es atTruk, Woll'si Yap, and in the Palaus in support

, of these advances by the Central an d SouthwesternPacific area. It covered the amphib ious move-

, m enta up the N ew G uinea coast,daily attackrdenemy dofenees and concentrations ill fr ont ' of t heassault ing ground troops until resistance ceased,and destroyed t he f ew c on vo ys w hi ch a tt emp to <l dto br ing in reinforcements and supplies, TheR oy al A u st nl ia n Air Force Command inter-di cted the Aldura, Banda, an d Ocram Seas lindadjacent land & r CI lS s o successfully !llat thepl anned amphibious assaults an d airborne lit-

tacks in this region Were unnecessary,Planning ihe PhiUppine Campaign,-ShorLIy

a lt er the SonLwest Pacific's Reno "t plan ha,l

b ee n f or w ar de d to W ashin gton the JointChiefsof Staff subnitted proposals to the commandersin th e Paeifi; f or r ad ic a ll y altering th e strauogyof the w ar in an . attempt to aecel( 'rlLtl ' its progress,These proposals included ad va nc in g t il e da't.es of

I currently pl an n ed operation s, b y pas sin gthe

Philippines end other selected objectives in f av oro f m o vi ng direc tly l in F orm os a, o r c an ce lin gallcontemplated assaults a nd s tr ik in g ne w targetsen tirely-tilt Japan ese A rc hipelag o il$lf, T heywere based ('0 intelligence reports indicating thaten em y forc es w ere building uprapidly i n o pp os i-tion to Genera) Ma.cArthur's forces in the South-wes t Pac if ic and that Iorces in Form osa andChina woulc hI' greater in )945 1J1Il,ll i n 1 94 4" Itw a s p :r em i sl 'l ialso upon the conclusion tha t the8uccesslul c~ pture of !Jle Mananas by Cen trlll,Pacific Forces had changed tbe strategic picturein t he P a ci lb .

Both c ol ll JD lIl 1d er s u rg ed t ha t ! .b er e s ho ul d b en o c ha ng e in t he b as ic s t~ at eg ic c on ce ptof opera-tions previoosly outlin ed by !.be Join t C hiefs ofStaB. It 'W as A dm iro.l N im itz's opin ion thato pe ra ti on s } lr op os e din ReM V were f l 'l I lI i bl eand!hat G e ne ral M ac A rt hu r's m e! .b odof attac k w aslI?"nd, H e c on sid er ed s ho rt .- cn tsand eKploita-tion of fav(I'able s itu ation s to b eof g re at i mp or -tiulce, but jelt that offen sive ope ration s m uet becou du ct ed eo11 8 to m . \ lfecon trol of seaand air

during major assaults" He fel(,Wlnt 1£111(1a ir s h ou l d 1 ) 1 'used to Lilt,m axim um ex ten tble, IIl1d that. the lise ofIlfll'l'i()lIS t o s up po rtL raeted fig h L ing ashure should be n \'oirJe d.riers could h... used Io hptt{'r advnntatrategic missions, t .1w Admirnl snid. 'I'llpmo nt i nt o FtlI'1l10SIl, 11. 'pointed (rut, would dopon the noutral isution of hosti le ll,i!'

Luzon by land-based planes.G e l lt )r al M u c A rt b ur WIlS opposed to

of the Joint Cbiefs of Stllff. He cousidererlit was impracticable to UciVll,HCt' the schdates for Q"pt'raLiolls becauso logistic 111'0

already were straining. facilities in the Ptit.. II tmost, Ho strenuously obj (lilted tothe Philippines on the grounds that suchw ou ld c re ate III\ ad ve r so renctiou amongpeoples of tho Far East. Bypnsaing uthe Philippines would 'result illre st , t hu s causing II rnujor lamin«, Oc'nPl"n l

Arthur added.In July 1944, COlI fel'CIICl'S were b eld bo

the Ce ntral Pacific comm l ind er in Pearl Band the Southwest Pacific commnnder inA t B risban e, A dm i ral N im itz an dhis stuffout thl' detailr-d pi ans [01' the assaul ts uponYap, and Ulithi ; uctivities against, Pnlauhe simultaneous wiLh Ul ~ seizure of £\1101'01,11

Geuerul 11aoArthur's Iorces, At Brisbane,Central Pacific representatives made tellplans for providing fleet support fur SouPacific operations outlined i It tho lattel'of Reno v .

I t originally had been C O l ]templated t J .u lLwest Pacific Jorces would move di.rrcLlyMorotni to Sm-angun . Bay, suppocted byborne aircraft, o[ Lhl' PRoirk F leet. 'l'hu011 Saro.ngalli , ('spl'ciully in l"efcl'{'nCIlLo r~thl' t 'uemy hil lel mrfie 'lds ,w ( lu ld i ll ,' ol v( J Mil'naval el'afL in rcs( , l ' icLNIwalul's !Inri would I..ttack against ILlI a l' PI t w l l( 'I 'o ] 1( }s L il H[ore,'Spresumably we)) pTepI lJ '"d. TJv,'rdol'(\ il . w asgested th at tJl!' Slll'flnga.ni OlJAl'lLtion b~ . 'I l l l c l that tbe Talnud Islllnds, midwn.y ·b eM O J'o tl li a ll dMimlMulO, 1) ( ' l , ll .ke :1 lil)skll{J.eVer, it w as not des i. r t\ ( l L l l ll~QPI'l"ntinlls inIlIlO b e c B Il ~ pl t' dalld, ~ijlce ail' filllds o.v .Morotai Werl l i ns u ff ic ie n t L o " '\ lJ l l~ o T ~ l o, nl laircraft lleecled 10 cnVf'r Lht' ~' nLI'fU1CIl iJltos ou the rn P hilippitw s, 1 ,11 <>'I'nluud np("'A~jO(l

scheduled to t ake pInel) O il 16 OctoLwr J 94'1-,to the landing lit Sarongani. In O.dN tofor the in ch.IS ion of the' l ' f l l a .u .uopel'aloio11

SouLIJWPS( , Pac if icn10VeUll ' lIls

C on tm l P ltC ific , ~ h!i S nm ng ul litid to 15 N01 'emlwl ' l(l44.

WIIS to be riclaYf'ri 1111til 20t Il l' f l111 l.Lha~ th,' nmpJljbious

would also h II vr I<) beLoyte nssMllt, nnd I lI I' l ur n,

\ll5 wee-ks.I lgreed to support Ct'Iltml

P1~II1I1, Y np ,l1 Jld U lit hiwithwhile f l ls i. carr ier tnsk fOl"t{'s

for the Southwest Puciflc i!l-f in d L ey tu , Fas, c a rr ie r

ail' power ba se d in lilt'\VN'C to be mndo ill o I'd,'-I· to

stl'lttegi.c support to~bl' ill VII.-

, a nd ' rnl ll .l l(] II .l1d to reduceair po tell1.ial ill th e P h Uippi n e s ,

foresaw tl ll l; t tl lO seizure' nnde M ! L1 '1an IIIs- Pill]!I·U8,,\ Jo 1"0 tai-

clP8J· th e eas tern sen appronehcsIt wo uld , ,1$0 provi d e !l ,e

t ra l P ac if ic f01'l:W8 with basesMindunao am i tht, Visayae

a nd Lu zo n wilJJ carrier-proposed tlln ~ O en bral P aoiffj

Sarangan i and Leyt~ invasionsbomber nttucks on 1 1 w

strlOtpgi.c strikes by fnstth e Lu zen and Ire rm os a

s tri ke s a gai ns t the objectiveinvnsion d ates.

did not cons ti 1.u ttl firITI direc-with Southwest Pacif ic sl,an'

and Ley to operationsof Genl'l:nl1l1ILCArt,bll.( 'un d

(,11c in Lti01 i u v n si 0 11of t.11eIIUII!:ln~SLWlls '1'01'(' to bc lIsar! 01lly

J l ' i ! l !11decisions awaiteddireGtiV6 from t,]", Joint

! l . ) Jp ( l lw ·ecLO il 9 3ept61l1bGI'MnllAl' thul ' ~ooccupy

S tl'ail I tl "e l\ . 0n 20 D !lOOm br I'

hi m to soize nlld t l lweiop

Philippillt'S l l o c e s s o J " . l '.to]" tlw. 11 of iOl'lllOSn bJ ' Centml

'Manlh 1114501', ILlte!'llllolivdyby So u ~hW l 's t P ac if ic t ro op s

11)45. III o;ddit io n, O en -inst,l'udl'd to submit plnns

r(' .du cl io n o f LJ os!. iI(! Ilil"

in BUppor t o f th o Fonnosa

Qt. p ~ I I ' n U . O ] 1sl~ollILl theI n L t e ! · b e u n de rt ak e n prioro clr IOVOHlonof L' 11t ... U~OJ1. -.P. a.laoWItS IWj ups.ted

;1 ~~~·OPILI' ' 'plans [or t he o cc u p ation or tho n~rUwJ ll\ 'pplIles, tlJ,l·geI , d nt Q 1 1'1 0r ch I n 4 .5 ,

: At the snm(' t ime', th~ J oin t C hie fs of St.alTlII~tl·llcltd\dlJl·· L N' " t f . . .f ; .: J.,. '~ n ~IIlIIMlO ; l l~msh fh ,, ,t suPPol 'Lor S ou t!IWest Pacific o pe ra bi on s p re li mi na ry to

u~ J. during the i~lvas ion of the C en tr e. l P h il ip -J l I l l r :S. He was dJJ"Pct ed nlso to make floet uuitsII ':'Llll1hlc t o a ssi st i n I·h e c ens ol id at io n of tho

Visayae, FinuUy, he w as requested to submitstudios for the oceu p ation mUI dsvelcpmen ~ ofFo rmo so a nd Io r L l l esupport ofa possible Iuvas ion011 Luzou by General Mad ..rthur's forces priorto Llll'Formosa oparation.

No firm derision was made at this time by theJ oi nt C h ie fs of S ~arr regard.i l lgthe priori t;y of theLu zo n a nd Formosa as sa ul ts , H ow ev er, G en om)Mll-cA r'thur already had beg un som e of [,lieplan-nir!g they directed. Derived from R ( I" IiO Vwasfl n ew se ri es o f p la ns d esi gn at ed .~t!l-!Jkl!jee", thefirs t of w hic h w as pu blis he dat G e ne ral H ea d-q u nrt crs of 1 JIt' So u thwes t Pacific nrea on 10 J Illy

1944. The scheme of maneuver outlined ill.M ' 1 .L I lk /J /e er Iw as b ns ed all ~b e a ss ump ti on t hu tulr bases on Luzon would b,' necessary 101' thein vas ion o f F orm os n. T l. w c on ce pt o f o pe ratio nsprovided for n n advance (TOm south to uortha lo ng ~h e ea st er u SlIOJ"CSof ~he Ph il ippiues ill

order to , 'sLitbH$h bases for a f inal aotack on

Lueou.It was planued thnt nny uir forces which might

be redeployed [rom Europe. would be employedto nuginent laud-based ail" support of scheduledg r ou n d o pe i· at io J 1Saud to destroy hostile ins tal-IGt.iOIlSand sh.ippillg in the urea trom p.Tor[.bB or ne o t hr o u g hthe SOli ~l l Cb i" a S eu .

Major problems wore g",tbel·i.ng:Il.nd orgllniz.i.lJgforces from th e s (mttjJ:rodllnd senu-l.Oolr,t-(l{jIll'cns

of Hill SOli t hw c s t P u ci ficatHl ohtailliD.g.nlLditiollaiforce.;; from hh e Uilited States fOI"t lW.llH·9.S10n 0-[t ho Ph il .i pp il l es . OrigillJ11.1yit . , ,"u .s mte!)ded to

II A u·s"I'ti1liftnd ivisiOJItor' f ; i11 ' ['{'ytt' usslllll~lise n. . , .. ...IIml IIlIot.iwl" on Luzoll. B..Ust)"HIUIIl pnilhc OPlll~O[l

consid{ll"cclita jl oin i, o f 1 ~~ Jl o~ · f orAUS~'·1L1J~I11;1'QOPS to be lls{,d ill Lhe PllI.lJpPlIlCS,ill Iwkno,ll-CclgtllNl t of the h~lp g iV~II LIIII~~ollnl.I"Yby th"U . 'd Statpg. BN~ntlSCGen. SII'. Tllum.1tS A.

]3.J I1 lL .O, COllllllunder of A J l iN I L ! l, Il t l}?urccs 81ld

t11I1€1',. I· '·[··I··t "'oret', I .." ol :upfof Alls tnl. ' lUnlV 11' ar.v J' ",com lllft!lC C( 1l1~ .. . . .. Jo b ~ e d c d lO Atlsl ,r ll li fl ll ul.IJI is bell lg sp,hL I 1P · P ~I lS

] J'. I fOI · thc em pJoy m(m 1; of t il eI 1\IISb·IlJUl1.1Wl'i"e nl( . ..• " , 'c ·

" , .. g of L W O d1I'1610D5a .L J. parn.Corps, cons·\soU]

3 1



~er thi! opera.tion 8ubsequently WIIB foundfA ) baun ;e tJ8SUll 'Y. Later p lans coD~pla ted theuse ff the C3rp8 in the Cen~ Pl&ins.area ofLuzon or in mopping-up opera.tlons on Mindanao,

I but both of these were cance led nIter the enemyw as found weaker than expec ted and ~cu1 ties

r were encoun te red in obta in ing the sh ipping f ,o ran early moreme nt of the c orps from ~ustraho.,

I .A sa. result ,nomajor elements of Australia.n forceswere u s e d in the Phi lippines, instead, they wer t'

prepared for opero.t ions in the Netherlands EastIndies, .

It was antbipo.ted tho.t operations in the CentralPlains area c f Luzon would present excellent op-portunities fer the use of major armored elements,

I and as eo.rlJ' a s June 1944 General M8.CArth~requested th&t Iloll armored d iv is ion be sen t to his

I a rea. The War Department pr oposed, ' inste ad,that the So'lthwe st Pa cific ac cept an armor edgroup cons ia ting of four tank ba tt al ions , Thisa.ctually would allot to operations in the Philip-pines more tu:iks thllollwould an armored division.However, General Ma.cArthur felt the latterwould bet te r su it the type of war fa re l ikely to beencounter ed in the Philippines and he pr essedfor the full divi sion. But the War Depar tmentwould r e l e & B Bo .n a rm o re d division to the South-w e s t Pacific only if that D.reo .would release aninfllolltry division for use in the Centr al Pa cific .This wa s a condition with whic h Gener al Mac-Arthnr was unsympo.thet ic , The armored groupof fonr meCium tank battalions nltimately wasaooepted by the Southwest Pacific,

Most early plans fur operations within thePhilippines called for e:mmsi.ve use of a irbornetroops. Additional elements of that type f romthe United States were requested under both R eMan d Mmketreroutlines, and one airborne divisionW&8 sent to Southwest Pacific during the middle

of 1944.After theJuly conference in Brisbo.ne and Pearl

Harbor, it b e ea m ~ n e c e s s ar yto revise the M1l8ke-.fur pIan in accordancewith arrqements madefor the allocation and use of amphibious shipping,~ted fue t suppor t, and the ava .i li l.b ili ty ofground forcee. In Mmkdur III , published on2 9 A 'Q g U Stt944, the strategic objective of opera-tioDawas tl.e prompt seizure of the eentral Luzonuea. in order to provide b_ fOil further op(lr-a t ic m sagaiut JApan. The basic seMme of ma.-:D.8\l,,:,eroutlinedinMU8kdu7'I remained ~~J

~~t:w ... l imedthat full support of t h e -U~sw. P - t l O l ei '! e et ' Wo l ,l ld .b e . .. .a i l a l ! l tIlIlt *

to secure II- Iootllold on bhe aa stern coastPhilippine Archipelago, huj RIllO to aid ininvas ion of the cen tral Luzon urea.

The plans outline d in lvlusketeel' and ~hefive arrangements made at the Julyfor f leet support fo r the final invasion ofPhilippines were never realized. On 9 O il

September, Admiral Wi lli am F, Halsey' sFleet carrier-borne aircroft hit Mindanao,strategic support to impending landings 01 1

t o . iand Pa lau, ach ieving the desi redand disclosing unexpected enemy weakness inarea, The extent 1 )f damage to euem.y airby land-based bomber attacks of SouthwestAir Forces opera ting f rom bases in Newwa s f ound to be greater than had beenSupr is ing ly few Japanese planes woreoffer resistance.

Promptly, ef forts were made to onpitalithe enemy's surprising unpreparedness,con tinue s tr ikes aga inst Mindanao wereand carrier task forces of the Third Fleetnorthwa rd to hit the Visnyas Islands on 12Sep tember. Aga in host ile react ion w as foube meager, Therefore, an Immediatetion and a drastic change ill the sohPa cif ic operations appeared feasible ,Se ptembe r, Admir al Halsey r adioed toMacArthur, Admira l Nimitz, and Admira lJ. King, Chie f o f Nava l Opera tions, hi sthe possession of the Westel'1l Oaeolines,Palau, was not essential to tbe occ upation o!Philippines. He suggested that Leyte beimmediately and cheaply if all pro]actedtions in the Carolinas, with thelllithi, were canceled arid tbe Leyte landcovered by carrier-borne aircraft l .mti lland-hair could be established ashore.

Admiral Nimitz considered the pl'oposnl to

pass Yo.pfeasible, but directed tllat the PalnnUlithi operations be carried Ol . l t as scheduled,forme r being ne eded aa an ail' bsso and theas a fleet anchorage, He then .inIol'llledMa cArthur that three divisions audt roops were loaded and would deplu'tGuam, 8.8 planned, for YILp, but if tJ)H,t oP,ewas cance led would be ava il ab le to Gxp]Olt

able eondit ious in the Phil ipp ines"The next da y General MllicArthtlr, on (;hc

of further reports from onrrier nttacks, I~)

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Ninl 1tz,Admiral Halsey tha t he ~as p l' epn, redtothe Leyts OperatiOIl with a ta,l'get date

moving tho origi ll!LlLyschcJul-two months,

_ W ( )J '( )m,ndo il l tl1 ~next 24

Chiefs of Staff !lmthol'izcrlto laun ch tlle LilYtil assault

Palau, Mm'o·tllii,lind illithied scheduled, but other pre-

the seizure of Talaud, Yap,, and Sarangani, were can-

divisions in transit fol' Yap,were m ad s aV !L ilobl ll for

use.Morobai IlJlCL Palau opsrations

planned, 'I'he garrison onted at 300 men, but the

of rein fo rc ing tbe i sland withHnlmehera within 48 hours,

f rom the Phil ipp ines within It

these considerations the ta skof the 'l'hil'ty-:lirs& Infl1u~ry

Dna Hundred Twenty-six thTeam of the thirty-second

....,~ -,~ .. '''~ com bat en d servic ethe XI 0011)8,.

Allied air JWIITe:J ;w as t hr ow nill SUppol't of the bw o opera-

Pacific Force eontainsd enemyby' harassing missions in the

.Army Air Force s ill ChinaQ ;_the sou til coast o I For-

heavy 1 10 m be IS o fthe 8 0 1 1 1 i l 1 ·airdromes on i!.liudnnno,

etherlands EHst Indies, nndfighters st:rll,fed and bombed

shipping, and troop con-, ers hit Cll ichiJimaalld

and Mindaneo nurl thees with repon tl lc i r aids14 Sep t;embel', Hostile

alimina t ed from tho.W(ll'(I confined to the norbh-

the southern Celebes.voys WOl'O protected by esco!'t

, fighters as they movedbut they were no t at-

on 15 Septembor worenaval bombm'c1:l'nent of

Morotai und w e r e U l lO P p os e d,Wete reached on 16 Sepuornber

thereafter consisted oJ IJ10P-

Japo.llllSe and rxtendil1,g, bheThe opel'abion was oj11lJmllybel' O il the day till"t Wawfl,

a il ' s W ' il l O P C :1 le ,j " ti ·'1 r ~_ 'Th .'. U opera ·10llu,1y.OI' fighter aircraft., e Oelltmj Pacifio assaults also were successful,

bu~the Japanese held these posit ions with morestrength and the ground fightillg continued 101 ' alDU ch longer pe rio d .

L e y/ e p la 1 !. s, ~T h e capture of Morotai wasthe final task of ! ,he Alamo Force which hadchl'llctod~lleoperations of Amer ica.n : Comba tunitsfrom the spring of 1943, General M ac A ,t hu ;r , o n25 Septe mber, ordered the Sixth Army to take

ol'er, the . ini tia l Phi lippines campaign whichpreviously had been assigned to the task force.No actua] change W1lS jnvoLv~d,since the AlamoForces consisted or units assignad or attachedto the Sixth Army. and headquarters Sixth Armya l so func tioned1lS heudquarters Alamo Force, Atthe same tim~ the Eigh th Army WIIS ordered totake COllt ro] of American c om b at u n it sin . DutchN ew Guinea, the Admiralties, an d o n M o ro ta i,while the li'irst Australian Army assumad theco mhilt gur risou re sponsibility on Gree n a ndEmirau Is lands and in the northern Solomons, onNew Bri tain, an d in the New Guinea F,orce eastof Wewa.k, During September, joint conferenceswere held by the Southwest and C e n tr al P a ci fi crepresentatives to solve the problems created bythe grcl1t acceleration ill plans . For a ir suppor tof'tho L ey tc lan din gs , the U nite dStates ThirdFlee~ carriers w o u ld o pe r at epossibly as far northa s O ki naw a, h i tt in g e nemy i us tcl la t io ns then', onFormosa, aud in . uorthern Luzon prior to theassault. on Lcyte. For a few days immcdla te lypreceding the iuvasion, the floot carriers wouldconduct strikes aguinst Luzon, the Bicols, Leyte,Cebu an d NegJ'O$" They would also provide11eces~azy direct support to the amphibious .at-tack, A( ~er tho t roOps were ashore, the f leetwould again opcrale in s w : n te g ic s U ,P ? or t o fGon-oral MncA_ftJnu"sIorees. In addit ion, Central

Pac if ic shore -basedoircraft from t he P al eu s w o uldstrike \Jt(l BicoLs, w h i le a irforces of the SouthwestPac if io l I 'o< il c lcontiltue their assigned tasks, By2 1Sept(llnbel', enough details hnd been arrllJl~ed(,lwt g<'llBl'llllle1l<Jq un~ 'tel~ofth~ S?uth:vl lS~Pacific

able to publish ) III O"Gl'!ltlO. ns IllstlllotlOllSaroaW IlSu ~ . - l' ,_'

cov(Jrillg t J IC.illitiallanding in the Philippiues.,Air bases on Palau and lI{oI'otlUII'IlTC,I'ushed

I t' to "ive S~I'Oll'" \!l;nd-basedaIr SIlP-to eom p e .10[1 ." . e b'ons The all"port to t the fOl'thco!llUJ.gopel'a I '. Pal

hor a~ Kossol roads, north of . the . all

.~ .O~lngcWIL~cle! l . l' edsimu:haneollslywith the l and; ; rop, P 1'1' , Um,hi w as cap tursd on 23nl!!'S 011 e I Ill,

Se;uernber,

89



Enemy s 1 l1 u ul oo ,- A t t histime, th e JapaneseEighth Arrirson New Ireland and eastorn NewBr it ain, the Seventeenth A r m y in the Solo-mens, t he E i gh te e nt h Army between Hanaa Bayand Aitape, and other garr isons on New Guineawere bypass.....d and lost to the Japanese becausefreedom of movement by water and air had beenlost, Their estima.ted strength w as 100,000; thisadded to the 100,000 killed during the previous2 years of f i!{h ting le ft a conside rable gap in theo u te r p e ri m et erdefenses, The Japanese had lostover 7,500 airplanes and many experienced pilotsand crews. Naval forces had suffered senousdamage, IUl'! thousands of tons of irreplaceablemerchant slipping were destr oyed. Their mainarmies were lef t un touched but i t was 'impossibleto move them at will . During tIl is period thetotal CIlBU8.1ticssuffered by t he A llie s in dead,wounded, and t nissing was approximately 30,000.

Leyt,e Ilpe"UtiIJIl.-Thc advanced data for theLey te opera tion was poss ib le because the forcespreviously sssigncd to make the Yap assaultwere available to the Southwest Pacific. For theLeytc ~uJt, naval forces were ready to proceedwith a landing between Sa n Jose and Dulag on theLeyte coast on 10October.

Northern Attack Force, a newly constitutednaval force reinforced by elements borrowedfrom the Central Pacific, had the mission of land-inll' the ground forces on beaches between Palo andSan Rica rdo on Leyte , These ground forces werepa rt of the Sixth Army commanded by GeneralKrueger wh o had thus far l ed the A l lie d G r ou ndF or ce s w ith e on sis te nt s uc ee ss .

Logistic !>Upport for the Sixth Anny was to bemain ta ined by the newly «rented Army ServiceCommnnd, a subordinate ec he lon ofthe UnitedStates Army Services of Supp ly commanded byM ajor G eneral Casey , G eneral M acA rthur's

former chid engineer. To General Casey also~ellthe responsibillty of establishing and develop-IIlg new blU!CBon Leyteand in the Philippines.

In adclition to Task Forces 78 and 79 AdmiralKinkaid, commander of the Allied Nav~ and theSeventh Flfllt, organized 'rask Force 77 which hehimselfeonnnanded f or t he L e yt !!Operation" T helatter w as a striking force contain.ing ships withgreat fire power and support capabilities. AdmiralKinka.id's IUlval forces, by the provisions ofOperations Instructions No. 70, were cfuected to:

(a) Tramporl and establish the lttnding forcesII8hore.

(71 )BUPPGr lthe ope rations by pr oviding a ir

40

protection r or convoys a nd nuva l taskdin'rt nil' SUPI)oT~ fOJ ' tho ln lld in g pllu semented by support of the Thin] Fle et.

(c) Deny ,JOpRIlOS6 reiufQl·e(\ment. of theoren from Sam m -, w estern V isayns, ande as te rn M in da na o n ra n.

(d ) Clea r thl' adja cent Surigno Stutithostile navul forces.

(e) Transfer to the AILied Air 1<'0)'(\06 ~hoof direct air support when Innrl-bnsed fil ig ht b or n b el 'swern ostabltshed in ~11QLej.ta

T'he Third Fl r-et , o rgan ized tlLetic,dJyLeyte invnsious as 'I'ask FOI'c(l 38 IIml~'rMitscher, was dire cte d to give stmtegic SII

prior to landings and dose SUPPOI'C (luJ"il'lgings. Admir al Mitsc he r hnd [OU)' powerfulin g forces, each consist ing of fust, carriers, endesuroyel's, and the. newest AmsricanThese runged from the Ryukus to J).U) ldMstrateg ic s trppor t o f t h O }Leyte hading,-Inpnnese installation, planus, nrid sand crippling the Japanese capabil ity toand S11pport his Leytn ga rrisons, Andtb e L eyto beaches were outside the I 'l tnge ofland a nd bused plane support, Ta skreturned to the area PT101' to 20 Oetob~,r toin the direc t a ir support of ussuulting t1"001)$was tho primary responsibil ity or Seventh .

G e ne ral K en ne y's Fit I' Eas te rn i}i reluding the Fiftb and 'I'hu-tcenth Air Forcesthe Royal Australian Ail' Forues received "heof protecting the l"!!'ar an d s ou thern Ilan ks .missions included:

(a ) Neutraliai ng, in coordination with theFIt'et, hostile nnvnl und air' Iorees withinth(~ Philippines AI ' (' h ip (>Lago , theweBtN'lI

and Mindanan areas, a nd from D-dIl.Y mincovering the movement of nnval forces andlauding and subsequent operations . .

(b) Assuming d ir ec t S UP PO J ·t o fop'orHio'lsLayt{'~'-lamar 111',,1i. n t, L he enrliest ·pl"ll.C~idl '

afte' r the eslttbl ishmon t of figbLl.Il"sIJ,ndbombers in the area.

(e) C on tin uin g tl llldestrLlction o f ho s~ iJ a .and ail" forces ItJld shippilll; in tl,e 11.1'101'0["11C cll ,b es S eaan-a l tn d d l'n y in g use 0'( I,]w II

faeilities in tbt , SuIt) Al'chipelllgo te ~be(d) Destroying has~il~ i ns L u ll n t, jm l f o .! l~ 1

of raw m nterinls in EastiOll'n Netl l6r ifHldsIndie$.

During t .h . . .period fl'om Hi SeptornbOI 'October the A l lie d A i l' F or ce sdosl!'oyod Jinstallations in tlw Cel'!1m Mea n nd Q ole iw s

t l1 pl1t~ 'ol" o ve r ~ b os l' I ll '~ n s; t heth 11 . [1 'Ji'OlTes " om plc te ly d e-

ctiOll, !urili~it's lit. Bn,likp~p"nt J" il hz ll d; n n'd mm n s, c om m un i_harbor l in t! port fUf'ilitil's inVisa,yna 1\'01'0 parolyzed, T he

Allier! A i: F or,'(j effort uponr or lu ce d th e N ip .p on ('s (' c ap u-

but also m isled tlw enr-m vto. in tbn t region. .

POWSI' WUS unl eush erl w lu-n thefrom lrurri NlIy prepared fieldsstruck tlll"getS ill th{' Birol

and flew seurches ill It w id n H eLhe Palnus, Chinn-hnsed nil'-

1.11Air Force flew dnmagings~al"chOY«1" Forrnos i an d

a coast .. es of nil bhese nil' am i navnl

It one objMtivc-ost l1bl is ioingtroops ashore at Leyto

assignedthe Iauding forces wasthe I.Jcyto Guli-Surigno Stl"lli t.

n av al, an d log is sic b us es forSoutlrwest Pacific operations

lippinea, The firs t phase ofg p n ta ih "d c Juarin g t.llj. i sl en ds

til the main nssnult i U order tofOI' shipping. The main

to seize airdromes II ml baseplain of Loyts a ud to open Sa n

Stmi [8 !I,t tI, , , ,n orthern an dof ~htl i al an r l , J "e sPGc~ iv ( ) ly.

nlly planned totnke30 d;),ys,0'1'' '1'1and 11nd shorc-to-shoJ'c

hostile forces Irom sou thrumuindor oI Leyte, f in d b ot hSI,mit, be~wo(!n Ley! 'o and

the seheme of maneuver beganof 17 October 1944 when 01 1t

mliug ~hlU:I' ~ppl"Oll,eh cameb en ,l 'in g t hHSixt.[, Rallgor

ww:a rd Dinga~, Bullion, andill L f 'Y L e C u lt . IIl~('nigcn?('

lihat Lhcst' islands mig'ilL{:ontaLn

antiairc,I'nH guns, a mi rndn, 'landingll W(',,'e lU!tde OJl

thtl J nh and 011 liorno]l.homislunds wore clC'>l.f"cdquiokly

mil:I' nrC!IBon

JshLl1~1 b""" 'l l i01 1 18 0" ~ b I .'". c ro er BIlC continunelu Tl lt bn tc d ~ ll I'Q lI gh t he I 9th o O il 20 Octobe- theln l'g es t ... f ~~ ..~ .. m ai>sm g0 n aval as sault shipping andwarships e."~I· co 11c en ~ !'a.t cd u p to t hat d al e intheI'ntu'(j Pacific "WILl"sailed boldly i.nto Leyt!) Gulf.Preceded by intsnsified naval nud canier-basedILIl"Cl"UJtbombat"(Lmonl;of the beaches, this forcesent ashore in th~ Philippines ~Ile Six~h United~ ta .t es A r m y,Lw o corps OJ' (OIIl"di'\Tisiol1lllbreust,rhe hll31 step 011 the long 1'0fl(1back had boontaken.

Th e ]J1'01Il is e "1 s hall re t urn ,"p ronouricsd byGCll!·I·u.1MacArthur so llluny IUontl,s earlierwus hLlfill~d.

Tile main IISS!wJt b ega n a L 1 0 00 OJl Il,U 18 milafront b et w ee n D ula gami Sail Jose. tw o smallvillages OJ] t he e as te rn coast of L oy to. A bou tallhour earlier a combat t ef lm l an d edau b ot h s h or e sof P au oa a S tr Utt, to the s ol.l th .

opposition I1t t he land ing baaches was negli-gible" F i rs t d ay c a su al ti esresulted p ri m ar il y f "o mIL few well-placed mortar nnd ar~illery pieces tLlR~

rcmuinud unsileuced by the preliminary air ILndn av al b o mb ard mont" B y midafternoo» 'I'aclobnnairfield, the most important early objective, hadb ee n s ec ur ed , IImL them had been all advanceinland about 1 ,800 yards against minor opposition,

In other sectors, the United States. Jorcesadvanced ag a inst little or no resistance. On 21October, Dulag airdrome was taken nJtsr repellinga minor llncmycQuntera.ttnck.

III tho 6.00tOl 'o f t he fll"sLiandillgs,uuloading w ass om e w ha t d el ay edby iSwnmpy te l" l "l t into t ho r ea ro f o n e b ea ch . S po ra dic e ne m y m o rl 'l l) " an d l tl "t il l€ ryf ir e hampered the fnst discharge of LST c ar go a ndm.til lery. However, assault echelons compte tedt .he unlcad ing the f il~h day Hftel' tbc landing..Beach CODclitiQUSslscwhore w e re " Hie d, but lad:of un load ing pel's(ll111cl,suipers, an d ,~n(lmy mort.al"HI'G W(,II'e I ;b e m a jo r deterrents to speedy dis -umbarimliion of m en an d m ute rial. N on e ofthe sedeln yc d the q I l . ick ( ' s tnb Lish.men1 . of bcaclili.!.llulsa nd on dy ILtbHI;)lCCS illin Lid . ..

' 1 '110attftok CO)l Li.n\ l~da H o Tconsollllat,on of Ll w

Ii. t d!l,y'~ !1ohi"·vcm.~llts. : i\ ![ .n n y I O M I e ne m yllS ~ " f" 11 ~2coun~e.I'aLtuoks\V()rob~[lku a l. ill a Itl"CpS on ~

I ~ ~ D c,o be r ! }s U[Jibed Statos forces Hl~"cryn,ll( "'~ • j·o n... th~ZOlW l 'cpo rLcd sL i lTen il l g enomyrGSls .. ~nce.. " du nd 'o f th olilird day nlmast 2,00.0 NIPPOl lQSSlIa

b k'llc 'l 'fllO n ex -Ldilly a d l" lv ebcgo,n up t!!Ge {1 Il , ~,~ . S ' I'] tl I' II 0 I ts

L" ~ s ic io of Sail J Ul J. n ic O . ..tl"l);lt,W ~H ,,0 10 ~C J () ,. I into Lllo Lel'to Y nU cy n ll !L

p t ls lwd lI'OS"WlI,j( '. 11I, t~ 10,"'·"1-8 nOr(,bwurd olld ","p,stwllI"d. e!1vy

( , J J !CC ·e{, L l'V {_ l; . ... - "" .

41



~~on ~ met at fortified ~osi~ions on&bOn Ilill, a terrain feature dommatmg thed i ' t ia J o D silblI8 of action a nd giving protection to

I e D i I I Il 1 'mot'tus lobbing shella toward the assault, a b! ip pi Dgin lJlyte Gulf. Catmon Hill ini tial ly WII8

byPaa8ed, neu tral ized by naval guns and f ie ldarlii1Thry, tbro finnlly cleared on 29 October.

By 23 October it WII8 c lear to all higher com-manders tba\ the enemy planned to la unch a fullaoale naval attack and c ounter-landing ef fort

against Alli«l. forces in the Leyte Gulf area.Ground ac~ty slowed down to awai t thisJapa)lCS6 effort. .

Relying UrOD the support of land-based aircraftin the Phil ippines, the .Japanese Navy launchedII. determine:! three -way attac k toward LeyteGulf. The enemy's ~uth6ffl wiug, ste.uningnorth through Surigao Strait, WII8 defeated soundlyby destroyers, cruisers, and old battleships of theSeventh FleEt. I n the c ente r, of f Samar I sland,

1 the situation became much mor e gra ve from theI Allied point of view. A high-speed JapaneseI battleship tllSk for ce, swe eping south fr om Sa nI Bsmerdinc St ra it , threa tened the success of the

enti re Leyte opera tion . For hours this group WII8

opposed onl! by planes, f ive-inch gIUJS, and tor-I pedoes of SeTenth Fleet escort carriers, destroyers,

and destroyer escorts. The major portion of theAllied Third Fleet had gone north to batter a

, Japanese carrier task force offnortheastern Luzon,an undertaking most successfully accomplished.The JapalUlllebroke off in the center of the en-gagement because of erroneous intelligence whichdescr ibed a more lucrative All ied targe t force offnortheest S Il D. UI J" . B yevening of 26 October thebattle C o r1.)ytc Gulf w as over and Japanese sea

. p ow e r c om p: et el ybroken.Despite fueir disastrous deCeat in the Leyte

Gulf naval. lIattle, the Japanese elected to make Q .

strong attenpt to hold the Philippines by turningLeyte IslaM into a major battle ground. Tothis en d they planned to land ground f or ces onthe eas te rn ~as t o fLey te a ft er a v ic to rious navalengagement Failing this, they began to feedcombat reinforcements through the ba ck doorOrmoc. , D1ring October these reinforeemenU:were insufficientto produce a significant change inth e tactical situation, therefore an initial s t and onthe par t ~ 1 b eJap&IU!8ewas wel lnigh impossible.~1I1Ii"~lIUperior forces American troOP! drove

~ If h ro 1 !g hthe Leyte Valley in a two-pronged~ ~ :envelopment. &cept for isolated~(Wtih88 Oatman Hill , seri01lll opposi-

t ion was no t encountered a l tho1. lg j l i llgOI

enemy appeared more determined.For the first Iew days of the invasion,

from Mcort car ri er s o i the Seventh FleHt Iu. the a ir su pp ort of United St.o.tes groundOn 24 October, however, all availablebecame absorbed in the de fense of thearea and in the attac ks tha t turued buck thenaval forces. Heavy aircmft losses anddamage to tho escort carriers in thisdic ta ted that the oarr ie r-beeed p lnuesshould be e mployed only to dllfend thll

ar ea and not to f ur nis h d ir ec t s up po rttotroops. Although land-based 11gh. te l' · .menced operations from Tucloban Fie ldOctober, Navy carrier aircraft continuedthe are a we st 01 Leyte until 29 October.tho period 20--29 O ctober, theseaircraft in a erial c ombat destroyed 200a ircraf t whi le losing only 10.

Close support during the fust severa lthe operation was excellent . Soon,threat of Kamikaze destruction topresent demanded so great a proper 'mitment of a irc raft that none \V1tS ac lose ground suppor t. FurtheT, bment, iogi.st ic support , a nd ai ra tri psbased aviation were slower e ven thanenvisioned, virtually no close support toIorces WII8 available un til after the decisiveof thQoperation bad passed.

The Commander, Allied Air Forces, assmission of direct support on 27 October,after the commencement of the acrion.this t ime heavy rains began and theof airfields wns severely hindered by poorand u ns at is fac to ry s oilbuses. Only 31ha d oe eupied Tac loban a irstrip by the I lndmonth. With this small [OZ'CB thc' 0 :

was 80 well defended tkat tbe Japfl llese

force d to confine the ma jori~yof then: uirtion s to night a tt acks . Howevervthenot large enough to defend the objectiveto g ive dose support to t lr e f igh t ing troops lUI

By the end of October United States (0

secureda rougb square bounded by TtIIlll

Dulag on the coast and Duga mi and Burthe western edge of Loytc Valley. In thethey ha d moved weat 15 miles inland fr omcl eared both aidea of the Rail Juanico Str ll ,ihad insti tuted extensive patroling inSamar. An advance jo Crigara l'I'iIS

Failing to hold, and in an effOl't to stavO oIT

of the re forces, the Japanesewcst\varcl. to the Orrnoc~

The ir determined rein fo rce-one high point on 1

c O n VO Y ll rr iv ed a tOrmocthe ir Ley te forces bud con~

Mindanao and from thethrew in l1 veteran division

Luzon to Leyte, which hadthe Philippines from 'Mon.

or the enemy had moved atinto Leyte as rejnforcements.

him enormously in men,On 10 November he

bulle of a division fr~man €'DtiroJapaneso convoy

wi th !UI, 0. 5tim It ted loss 0 Iair intervention of enemyJ apsnese I;{) set lip 11 hllrie

Cebu Island and Ormocin alas t desperate

reinforce his Loyte garrl-of Philippine guerrilla

units dissipated his lost

delay in d!lv.el.opll16n~

Leyte area,' Ge ne ralto raques t the roten MOll

in Philippine waters,almost en entire mouth

planned. The flees Iln.t"dersair raids on llDemy-hsld

25 November; i t sharedenemy !lODV OYSintelld~d

the a tt ack o.nthe 25th,Fleet steamed Qut or tbe

the only method Ganemlthe enemy's reinforce-

er harass the Japanese

c l on tv oy s a ..n d i nt er -is la nd . s 11 ip pin g : d es tr oy er sue s royer e se o ,. ,. I ., ,S, .. . . rts OJI( motor l{)rpedo boats of the

~venth Fle6t :vere ~t into _O!l lI lOLesSeo., west ,~!L oy te . ~ es ld es mterc~pting IIJ l( l eliminatingcmy shrppmg, the American nuval craft shelled

Or111.oeand other important ~!l:ehly c{)neentratiom;and mstllllatioDSalong the westcoast. t I -r e ll . nwb i! e~con finuous rains we~e hampering

ground actLVlty and enemy opposition stiJ:l'enedeverywhere 3S further additions to Japanese

ground forces werem u d e ,

TheJUPllJleSB

strangth-enad the defense of the Ormoe Corridor thusobtaining time to regroup their forces and e~cn to '1)l'CP1l1'o II. countorattack ngainst American troops.The enemy's reinforcement program continueddespite heavy losses both en route an d whileunloading. He W!lS determined to hold Leyteundlhe Phil ippines a t a ll cos ts , His tac ti ce l intent onLe yt e w as to retain the Ormoe Corridor and tbeapproaches thereto.

I n the face of this determined enemy effort,General MlloArthur also found i t necessary I;{)

bring reinforcements into Leyte,United States ground forces reached Pin81DQ-

pocan, at t he northern end of the Ormoc Corridor,~8J'ly in November, s e iz in g C ar ig 8 J' atown an dCnpaoean on the wny. After consolidating theirpositions, the se f or ces be ga n to atta ck southtoward Limon, Valencia, &nd Ormc e. A re in-forced United States cavillry div ision began aconcerted uttack southwest from the Jaro-Cari-g ara r oad to wardthe O r m oc C o rr id or. JlllDpingoff into mo un t ai no us t erra in e qu al in difficulty to!tDY in bbs Southwest Paoif ic , the caval ry had toreckon with both torrential rains and a wellplanned enemy d ef e: os e. A : rt ~.l~ ~o.vembor,another United States cavalry division joined thearduons drive through Iill~ wild, mountainouscountry, which COlltinucdwell into December.

UnitedStates

infll,DIlry reached Babay, on theCametes Sea, cady in November ... ~th~ ele-

ments contin lied ('0 probe ellemy pOSItIOns III themoun tiline west of Dagallli and BurD.nell. B y t ll e25th of the same mont~ the nt.lackIII the ellllt~81

movinO'wllS~ward III a SeJ'WS of strong pat! 01areta, b.• : r run into deeply il ll re no he cl t 'U N DYall ions, ·.m -. ld . dforces. ' I'he J lLpnucsewcre t l"Yl~g to ho in oruer, couIl~er{l.ttllck. 'Hey gathered allto pr(lpl1re a .. u i - ,

·1 b' 1 i nl 'n nt ry t ern nn nt s a nd pl ac ed theDJ.m.IlV!tl Ite. d - II' tern. . 11 chosen to gum' so u uwes·posltlOns we - A .t tl O r m oe C or ri do )' . Due men-apprOIl.~~e:nt~lIo~;ednorthwestward {rom DagomiCI1l1 r~~ .1. omv posilJons and to secure mouu-to OUWJ8Jl l ien~ ~ ,

43



1 e.ding to thetain passes in the Alto peak area. e ad allwes t. Heavy combat pat ro l act iVi ty mark

action. di . . .ved onA Uni.ed Stal.es· airborne VISIon.: :; ;. almost

Leyte late in November and ~~ COlIUll1t . canimmediately. This new additIOn to ~e Amenforoes had to change alm.o~t.oVe.rlll?ht fromnn~a irborne to a mounta in d iv is ion as It a perso. fmoved into the rough mountains to the wes" 0

Burlluen th . borneA westward drive to the coast by . e. ~ .

division would ultimately bring the diVl;BlOnmtoCOlI tact vith an infantry division, adv~cmg northalong ti e coast f rom Baybay, which reachc~Damula on 15 November. It W~l! the .en~y B,

intenuiou to hold tho Palanas River Line , Justnor th ofDamnla , whi le he counterattacked e8S~

ward toward Burauen, hut later in November thisen~mv offensive failed. The United States forcesconsolidtted 011 the Pa lanas River and preparedfor a major drive northward.

Contiuued Alnencan pressure on all fronts keptthe enemy off ba la nc e and pr evented him frommounting any well-coordinated counte.rattack, HeWIiS forced to commit reserves and reinforcem~nts

that he was still bringing into Leyte every timebad weather gave him the opportunity. So suc-cessful ' " _ R Ethe reinforcement program that by theend of November tilieenemy, despite heavy combata tt ri tion had 10,000 more troops on Leyte thanhe had ~t the end of October. His determinationto hold Leyte remained firm and on 26 Novemberhe launched a small scale airborne attack.

This dfart WIiS aimed at disruption of Americana irdrome fac il it ie s p rior to a p lanned Japaneseground ,> ff cns lv ( ". I tprobsbly alsowas an attemptto protrct a nd dra w attention away from a n in-coming reinforcement convoy. The venture, how-ever, was completely abortive. Nonetheless, theJ a pan os e er mt in ued a vigorous defense of all O r m o cCorridor approaches, strengthened the delenses indepth, and consol idated and reorganized the irforces. In early December they still were maltingII strOll!!;bid tohold Ley te and fed in troops whichpreviolBiy gar ri sonned Bl lt angas Prov ince onLuzon.

On 6 December 1944 the Japanese undertook anairborne assault of greater e.mbitions than the oneof 26 November. The enemy intended to holdboth Dulag and Taclobsn a ir s tr ips for 30 hoursan d to seize throe airdromes in the Burauen area.The e.i taeks were completely unsuceessful. Thebulk of the paratroopers descended into the vicinity

of San Pablo and Burl strips near BunLwn pr~.ceded by b om h in g a tt nc k sand 11Sl110kltscree.n. Alluncoordinated attack by enemy ground 11'0011;;,moving (lllStwnrd towurd Buraucn, w as als ol n n d ~and on 10 Dece mber anothen Japanese i n fHJ l l l " l

group to the south .II-tto.ck(,flto .aid Gnemy l r nnp i

holding out 011 Buri strip. Both of these g r Q u u d

opera tions proved to be of no import, bu t !ll!' lisl

e lements of the enemy pll.l·alrooprlTS lit Buri WP1~

not mopped up until 12 December. -ThQ rl\('llIY

failed to achieve IlIly m aj or obi eetiV(l and did n~ l

succeed in protecting ilia convoy sciletiuh,d 10

arrive uear Ormoc on 1 Dece mber. TIn' or j , ' f

offensive d id cause some damage and it upset , 10

a minor e.""tent, the s m oc th f UJ _l ot io 'l lin g o rr e a r

a rcas.Meanwhile, American Iorces were fnrthsr r~in·

forced. A f resh infantry division landed 011 j-"')'t~

on 23 November an d _engagedin some minor pntrol

activit ies. Another major offensive SGOI! \I'a,planned in order to force a rapid (loll~lusioll.l~ lh, '

Leyte ca mpaign, and the newly ar rived dllm~rr

WIlS assigned to land in the rear, of 1;]11' rnn.1II

J apanese strength. in order to split: the hostileforces by disrupting their defenses find s l lPply

routes in the Orm0C pocket. For t11is purpose.!shore-to-shore movement with light naval ~I~l.~r.

tion was organised. On 7 De cembe r, the dll"lSIOIl

landed just south of Ipil 011. the west rO A .1 o f

Leyte. It moved inland O V O Ibea~l\m; : 1 1 R tUu 'enemy had expected to use for Jand.mg his 11O'1p>

on the sa me day. The c onvoy car rying til!'c n e r n ) '

troops was wrecked by Allied air power nndnl'puiI:tion t- o the American amphibious opGl'atJOJJ WII'

negTligih.bldie:.. . di t 1 . ':"ute(1 a r ap ide vision imme II. e y ins"'"

. O roce 011 9advance up the coast, captamng ~,. l l ndDec ember. Anothe r United Sta tes dl VlSI OU II I

begun a coordinated drive northward r~r.,

dtl tw o 1I111~

Damula-an on 5 D('( lemb~J" a n 18. Tillestablished contact at Ipil on the llthd J~

enemy, unable to stand agllinst the- n,'.nJ11rted b t l r r l~ ( . 'and cut oft to the north, rotrea 0 , '

. " h -~J-eastward into mountain Iastncss w _ere . jIIIIIother remnan ts . UniLed Sta tes jo rees ~hel ;Cl l jOIUcommenced an attack to the e ast in order ° ' , '1" '

. . 'U rn a '"forces with the airborne division stt , N)1rl'. 'fhl swestward through the mountome- .

t ac t was made on 22 December. '.1 V nil~1On 16December the enti .renewly OJ'nVCI Ii (I

States division initinted !IJl ILttack !llong Ilcl :nll),li Its J'€the w~t of Hig~:ray ~o. 2 '~nl of Q r l ] ) O l i

consolidated' POSitIOns Ju~t nO Ith

The oQjeet ive was Valencia , ODd the advancewa s the firSt instance of free maneuver in theSouthwest Pacific area, Valencia, about 10miles no;r th of Ormoc, was taken on 18Decemberan d authority was requested to cont inue theattack 'further in order to gain contact withAll ied forces in the nor th before the enemy couldregroup scatteredund b-roken forces. Permissionbeing gronted, tlie advance was again taken upalong and on both sides or the highwny. On 21December, physical contaot was made withUni ted Sta tes caval ry e lements moving south onHighway No.2. This highway was clearedfrom Palo to Ormo 0 an(1 orgauiz ed enemy resist-ance in Ley te 's mos t f iercely contested strong-hold-the Ormoo COITidor-wns at an end.After Highway No.2 WI!!! c leared the enemy hadno choice but to re t re a t in. to th B mounteins westand northwest of the corridor, losing contailltwith remnants of his forces still holding out inthe rugged te rr ll: in be tween the Ormoc and LeyteValleys. General. MacArthur declared Leytesecure on 25 Dece mber 1944 and for the Ame 1' i-cans, the arduous tusk of mopping-up beganagnin.

The General's attack at Leyte had been un-

expected. The enemy "had been waiting, r eady,and prepared, forthe Allied troops on Miudanao.In a vain abtempt to redeem the situation thcenemy attempted a mujor offensive, wi.th theresult o j! Iosing his naval strangbh, He tried toreinforce Leyte but succeeded only in prolongingth e ultimate defeat. From the Allied point ofview, although the 5,500 .American lives lostwas no t light, the Japanese attempt to hold a,tLeyte WIIS most profitable. The enemy lostapproximately 55,000 troops, the majority ofwhich bad been members of first line combatunits. He could never recover his losses inshipping, Still more impol'tlmt,the r einforc e-ment program at Leyte had dra ined the southe rn

Philippines of combat strength and had cern-promised the IlD!UIlY's Luzon defense plan, thusmaking the conquest of tp!l remainder of thePhilippines f), less imposing task fox GanarulM lLCA fthur's forces. '

I t is pe rhaps fOI :~unll tB that the enemy 's psy-chology die~!lted tbat dur ing the Ley te campaignhewould not employ his ail :forces in It concertedIUl.dsustained efi'ol:tto prevent the dsvslopznont ofAllied air suength on the isla nd. He 'already hadb e e n beat-en everywhe re he had committed hisair arm. It is assumed L il a ~ this fact promptedhU nto commi t h is a irplanes in weak, small sca le

attaeksthat did little damage. During the fir st~vee~ that the Allied Air Force was develcpingIts a irdromes an Ley te tbe Japanese had over 100fields within s tr ik ing di stance of the objee tivea rea, Because or their dispersion it vir tuallywas impossible eith<'l"to neuhruizc them 01' tokeep themneutrnlized. It is conceded t.l:Jatduringth is per iod the bold and aggress ive employmentof a ir s tr ength would ha-ve pro longed the Ley tecampaign. As it was, the vas tly numerica lly

inferior air strength of the Allies preven t(fdreinforcement of these a ir fi elds excep t dur ingperiods when weather prevented flying, andwrested superiority in -the ai r f ro m th e enemyover his own airfields whe ne ve r t1tey chose toconcentrate effort.

The unpleasant job of clearing l'emaining enemyremnants from Leyte fell to tbe Eighth Army,commanded by Lt. Gen . Robert L. Eichelbarg-e:r,a v e te ran of Sou thwest Paci fic wmiare sinee theBuna days of the New Guinea campaign. Hismissions were to a-ssume control of combat unitsin the Leyte-Samar area, to complete destructionofall remaining hostile forces, and to prepare othertrocps to assist future opsrations of the Sixth

A r m y.In spite of intense fighting f rom 20 Oc tober

through 25 December, the i slands of Ley te andSamar were far f rom cleared of enemy when. theEighth Anny took over. Estimntes of hostileremnants in the eres ranged all the way from 3,500to ·25,000., One thing WI!!! certain, that theremain ing Japanese, wha tever thei r s tr ength,were d isposed in the roughes t, wildes t t cr ri t-orythey could find.

The largest c-oncentration of enemy forces IIbYin the mountains wesf of the Orznoe Corridor.Most ofthis area had.been originally in the zone ofthe Uni ted Sta tes forces which moved over landfrom Highway No. 2 toward the coast late in

December, lind also undertook amphibious opera-t ions around the northwestern peninsula of Leyte,These combined attacks had secured all principalobjecl1ives by 30 December. Shortly thereafterthe forces involved we re J:eliel'sd of comba tmissions on Lo.yte, and began to move int-o rea rnrBIL!I to 800ge future operanions,

Enemy concentmtions in rnountains near Ormocwere broken up, forcil lg the Japanese to movewestward. The Cnmotes Islands were cleared, I!!!

well ss the road lrom Palompon eas l; to HighwayNo.2.. When this was completed nt the end ofDecember, hostile resistance, southeast, of Villab!l

45



on the west coast was wiped out. protectivemissions in rear areaS and patroll ing in the moun-tains wes l of JIll'O and Dagami were continued.

After l j February United States forces took theoffens ive in the Vil laba area, l eaving the enemywho remained east ofthe Onnoc Corridor to starvllr

t ion and the tender mercies of Fil ipino guerril las.Late inFebruary a new orgRDization,the Eighth

Army Area Command, lI2SUlUedresponsibility forfinal mowing-up activit ies on Leyte· and Samar.it s major componenent forces were the AmericalDiv ision , the Fi rs t Fi lipino Infan try Regiment ,USA, and the Ninety-first Division, PA, the lat termade up of Ley ts gueri llWl . On both Leyte andSamar, scattered minor engagements continueduntil by S}Iay 1945 and troops operating underEighth J.nny control had killed or capturedapproximately 25,000 Japanese.

Meanwhile, events in the Philippine Campaignhad moved rapidly forward . Other Eighth A r m yuni ts had . a tt acked south from Leyte into theVisayils and Mindanao . On Luzon, since ear ly inJanuary :945, the Sixth Army had been engaged ina bit ter struggle against a fanatical enemy.

LUZI;T!. planll.-RevisioIlll in plans for the

Luzon campaign began soon after the Joint Chiefsof Staff had authorized the date of the Leytsoper atiot to be moved forward 2 months. Withthe suc cesse s of Allied air operations in thePhilippines and intelligence indicat ing a weakenedhostile ai r defense capabi lity in mind, Genera lMaeartbur proposed a move d ir ec tl y f ro mLeyteto Lingayau Gul f, Luzon , bypass ing most inte r-mediate objectives. The main assault at Ling&yanwould need the support of the fu ll r e sou reesof thePacifie Fleet, augmented by land-based &ireraftestab li shed on the southwest coast of Mindoro.Ooordinstion of all Pacific forces, to exp lo itenemy weaknesses, would make possible theinvasion of Luzon within the t ime schedulepreviouay projec ted for Ley te , on or about 2{)

December 1944.Up to this time, the Joint Chiefs of S ta ff had

made no decision in regard to the pr io ri ty of theLuzon a nd Formosa operatiollB. Washingtonnaval opin ion he ld tha t Paci1ic Flee t support o fthe Lu.wn operatioilli would tie up AdmiralNimitz's warships for at least 6 weeks. This wasso bl'callse continuous neutralization of FormOSAairfields and protection of the supply line to Lin-gayan Gulf was an absolute necesaityuntil South-~eat PMific land-based air could be firmlye a t a . b -l ished onLuzon. It appeared impractical for the

fleet to be m~tained in position :for this PCI ' i od

To counter thia argumen], General ~'hcAI"1 .• 1.. . 'lll.r

wrote that mfl8~UCll us resupply would be rOil te dthrough the VlSayns and 1 . l . 1 ) tJle west C O I I s l ILuzon under t .hoprotection of land-b!l,$cd pi 0

. . di t I 1 . Ulltlfrom Mindoro im m e 111 ey II tel'~he initial "S' I. ~",lIlIl

a t L ingnyan , only escor t car ri erend ligM 1}00""'i 'lgships of the Seventh }i'leet need remain ill ('10

suppor t. Thus the la rge r sh ips of the Pnci fi c l? lr :~would be freed to c on tin ue s trateg ic m is siolls . Halso pointed out that, in his apin i on , the l 'Hl ' t f J :Fleet would be committed or It longol' p~l'iociillsupport ofan assaul t OIl Formosa thll;U on rJillg!~Julibecause of the absence 0 1 land-brtsed ail' 6(lpporl

at Formosa.To G e n er al : M o, cA l 'n m r,the adval1tage~ o f t h e

Lingayan move were manifold, He ~slimftl"dthat it could b e c om p le te d before tho Navv ooul t leven undertake !1 Formosa !tURd" In h is opiu -ion, it would eliminate also the long lind p r e c a r i o u ssur face li !t to a p oin t beyon d t J J ,B r l1ugo or l a n d -based a ir support , it would pr ovide bases fo rlogistic suppor t of a direct move to the soulhenI sl and of Japan 3 or 4 months b!lfer() a Fnrmossoperation could be expected to do so , and il w o u l d

obviate thr necessity for 11 . suhsequent assault 0FormClso., He felt that it could be conquerrd WI(

less loss and could be held easier. Service 11 ' 0 0

were scarce in both the Central Pacili'c a n d S OUth -west Pa.cific thea ter s. Ho pointed Ollt thai "hilan operation conducted ill the Southwest I'Qcificould e xpe ct the Ioyel ussietence 01 Fi li pino laboin this capacity, it would be impossible to IlJIlllservice troops to Admiral Nimiliz fOJ' his opel'ntioll

O n 3 'October 1944 the Joint Chiefs of gt~[ma de their dec ision. Gener al MacMLhur W B

instructed to occupy J..u.zon,targllt date 20Decc~i. ber 1944. He also was to establish buses O l l t l J l

northern Philippine island to support furth,,!, o d

vances, including a .move by Central Paci1io foraga inst the Nanse i Sheto in March 1M;;. A t illsame time Admiral Nimitz was or;lero(l to proddth e necessary fleet cover for the invasion of 1ut O

and to undertake npr- mtlons a ga illst the N p n8~oto,.20 January 1945, and the N ~ : l 1 s a i~ll~~"lDirectives for plans for possible opeJ'aLl0TI5 IIgnFormoso. were left t.Q nD lUlc letm 'mjl lp .tL fu 1 . 111 ' 0!lnl

Anticipating this direcLivc nut! in cO)1lpli>lnwith carli!' r instruetioDs fl'on; Lhe Joint O l l ie f .0

Staff, Genero. J MacArthu l' had nh'eMly bBll~formal planning for t ,l le adva!ll l1l to LU'i: OIl- •

26 B e b - Ol'cflllptero er a third }'1'lb8ketc~rpJ l l>n c

( (; (J f ~movements of Southwes t Pacif ia forces II

~ed sucoussful IIssault O J]Leyte WIl:Sissued,~~U8kete6r !II the first ?PW'o.liOllSfollowing the

, ix ! i f , iaLentry m t o the Philippines wa s Love IIIso lJ thwest Mindoro , scheduled for 5 Decmnbe :'1$W:4. Mike I the m ain Il;BSll.'ult on LUzon !l~

Lip ,gayan Gulf , was scheduled for 20 Decem-bel'.P.I:\)":ision.Wa-I; made a lso to BU pport the Lingayaul B A d i n g ,If necessmy, by a n a ssault in DingalanB a ron the east central coast of Luzon" This~posedope. ra tion was des ignn ted l.lik c II andW89 scheduled to take place during ~lle period10 to 20 January 1945_ It would be undnrtakenomy if hostile str ength in tits Centra l Pla ins-M811ilnarea w n s s uc h that the JaplI.nesllIQftflankwould have to be burned, Moreover, Mtkc 11would become Il certainly only if reconnaissaneuproved it feasible f or a In rge body of troo ps jopene trate the Si erra },Iadre ).1 oun tains betweenDingalen Bay and tho Centrul Plains. Concur-rently with these op era biollS, all oLlte1'av!]jla'bJeIoreeawere to under take the ccnsol idas ion of theVJSII,yas,Mindanao, Palawnn, and the Sulu Arehi-pelago. In MuslEeteerIII tho consoli c Iation move-ments wllre given no name, nor were specific targetdates suggeste d for any 01 the m, It was planned

that the Eight ,1t Army would conduct the O-PPrIL-tiona in t,l'G southern Philippines Il' i( ,h such helpu .smight be obtained f rom guerr ill a forces, TheSixth Army would be responsible lor t.he actionIII Luzon.

Mirnioro.-Ojl 13 October, General Mac-Arthur issued Operations Instructions No. 74whieh assigned to Sixth Army t.heresponsibili tyfor conducting a ll a ss nul t on Min doro on D Decem-her. The purpose oIllie m is sio n W Il .. 5to estabiishair forces for direct support of operations in theManila-Centrlll Plains area of Luzon and fOI'

protection 01 sea routes shrough the Visflyauwaters. To Ca..l'IY out ground operations GeneralKrueger constituted the 'Yestern Visaya.11TaskForce commanded by Brig. Gen. William C,Dunckel .

' f !1eor ig inal scheme of maneuver d irec ted 11 .

colilbined amphibious airbcrue assnult. However,h I l o a u s cof the delay JJJ the deveiopman t 01 nil'~ b i P son JJ ry te lind the re snltun t shor tage of~~ort ail' {'ru.fL of all kinds, th(l final planseli:o;dnatedtho itirbome p_h.nse,and .the I ' o g i m e n La!C O I l l b a tteam of p,lJ'llcilli ~ists prAplI.rl~d to jOill inthe . I I o 1 n I J ! i i b i o u aattack.

' the delay ill airdrome ( 'o 'nskudioll on Leyt~ha4 .afarther t 'Cu-cilll ;g elled tblUl cbllJlgjng the6 C h & m eof Inllneuver. Facil it ies wer6 so lilllil;ed

that t 11 eJ . l' if t b Ai r.Porce on Lcyte \1'11$ u nab le tocover .thll t,rllJ1spo~~lind landing pb us e o f p ro j actedoperanon ill addition to IT!ain ta in ing air supportof the pro~l'~SllingTJeyte battle, Tho Nil vy couldnot co:rnrnJ~rts carriers on .5 Decem ber to supportt he o pe ra ti on b ec au se tlley 1II1d been rctu ined in~uppor~ of the Leyt~ operation (or a month beyondtbe eatimeted requirement. They lleucll ldrepairand resupply. General Macartbur' was com-psllsrl to delay the Mindoro Il.Uact; until lll!' 15Lhin order to give thn naval units t ime to refuel ami10 permit th e Jurther expansion of ll.il'lIrome.~ onLey 1 .6 .

T he la,n di llg II t Mindoro I ol lo w ed L lH ' w e ll-estab li shed Southwes t Paci fic pat te rn . The am-pb_ibious att1J.cks hi pp in g o :f the assuult force wascovered by olamen ts of the F ifLh Air Force ILTld

nccompaniad by escort earriars, destroyers, cruis-ers, Imd old battl eships of the Seventh Fleet. IIIstrategie suppart , the Third Fleet combined withthe All ied A ir Force to neutralize enemy air

instnllat ion in the Philippine Islands and the SuluSeas urea within hostile supporting range and tod isrup t enemy communiea tions to preven t rein-forcernen L and resupply. Tactical surprise was

secured and immedin te control of the air overLuzon was g ained an d hp]d un til duskof t he 1 6L l! _Scheduled Third Fleet strikes had to becanceledaft.er· tbo . t .dnte because of typhoon wea ther, butthe Allied Air Forces CQ!1ti l111Cd their neutrali-zl1(ion of Luzon on a restricted seale. FollowinglL preliminary bombardment, troops of lim WesternVisuyan Task Force poured ashore, unopposed,nesr Sa n Jose ill southwestem Mindoro. Workwas commenced immediately on air strips, tw o o.fwhich were completed by 23 Deeember. To gUIl,rd

the airdromes, a per imet-er defense was establishedaltOl' the fashion set aL 'I'orokina, Bougainville, inN ov emb er 1 94 3. During the Sixth Army pllrlodof eon trol , which lasted through 31 December,gr o I.IJ1d op e l' ll -t j on s c on si sted only o -f p a t ro ll iD g.Contact with the enemy was primarily a battlebetween naval Blll"IILCO vessels, supported by aircover, aud the Japanese su ic ide p lanes, EnemyS II icide bomb 01'S seriously in ted el'ecl IVi tb. resupplyconvoys, producing, at Jeo.st temporarily, a grllveaituation in uviation gasoline ILTH.I oilier ail' forcema ter ia l. Troops a shore were su bf~ot{ld to ~po-j'adic nig1lt attacks fmm hostile airrl1lJt and Oll t.b('nigh~ of 26-27 December It sfnnll JllpfI.llcse navo.lforce locffect. .ively bombn"cled the bench area.DW'Ulg !;h.isJ !tpanl}S sortio, tho Inlld-ba:;ed bombersaDd fighters 01th!l FUth Air Force from ~lindol'o

41



shuttled over the convoy with landing lights on ;they sank one dest royer and damaged one heavycruiser and two destroyers.

TIll, deceptive plan.-The p rim !L I" Y p ur po se o fth e Lore III operation WIIB to establishairfieldsIrom w hic h lan d-baaed airc raft c ouldbomb se -lected targets 011 Luzon and g ive protection to

shipping moving to th.e next objective, LingayenGul f . Bat coupled with thi s t angib le a im WIIB

an extensive deception p la n d es ig ne d to confuseand bewilder Japanese military leaders as to thelocation of G s n . .r al :MacArthur's subsequent tar-get . Th:s plan had two major parts. First,there WIIS 1111 ov er -e ll P ac if ic p la n w hic h d ir ec te dJ apan es e a tt en tiO ) lto Formosa and northernJapan. The local Southwest Pacific aim was tounderteks such deceptive measures lIB wouldcreate 1111anemy belief that 8Jl o ff e ns iv e w o u ldbelaunched aga inst the wes te rn Bico l o r Ba tangasP ro vin ce s o fLusou prior to the Liugayen opera-tion. Ground operlLtions in Iurtherance of theplflJl were to be d irec ted b ythe E ig hth A rm y,whic h took over con trol of Mindoro from th eSi"th .Army on 1 January 1945 .

The first s tep in the loca l decep tion campaign

w as de$lP ln ted theL o v e IT operation . O n 1JlI lluary a small [01"00 of U nite d S tatesinf8Jltrymoved 011 Bongabong on the east coast ef Mindoro.O the r troops of the s am eregiment t he n a d va n ce d ,by shore-to-shore jumps, to Calapah, main townin n or th ea st er n " M in d or o.Meanwhile,o th e r u n it so f t he Western Visayan 'I'ask F o re e c l ea re denemy-held villages on the n or th w es te rn p en in s ul a.Allt he se ac tio ns w e n>aided by guerilla forces.

LotJB Ir'", operation for clearance of MarinduqusIsland, WIlS the next action taken. It was carriedout on 3 January without o pp os it io n . • C on c ur -reniJy with these ground o pe ra ti on s A l li edaircraftstruck C8.Tef nlly sell'cLed targets on L uzon andflew photographic a nd r ec on n ais s au ce m is s io nsinUte Bicol-Batangas region. Seventh Fleet motort or pe d o b o a. ts p a. tr ol le dthe southern 8lld south-westem coasts of Luzon as far north as ManilaBay from newly establi!!hed bases on Mindoroand gU!lJ il l l lS i l lsoutbern Luzon were directed ~illtCIJ~ifytheir activities. In addition to provid-iug a bllSc for d ec cI ,t io n o pe rat io ns a ndai.rlieldsthe invasion of Mirlcloro bad inr the r effects :The mar.euver, togetller with the subsequllnt seiz-ure o f M a ri nd u qu e island, was th e fin&!blow toJapanese con trol of tbe Visayas. No longercould t he y r ei nf or ce the area BubBtan.tiaily, an d

no longer could their in te r- i s land shlpll['ng. - mireely.

In mllllY ways the Mi~ldorQ opera~ion \1'~,

unique in the annals of Pacific wal"fl),!"" A 1~. J~l'~

chute regiment .engnged in an ruupllihio\l~ ! l ! lnckinstead of making a J limp; some 1,200 wl"rllllinilllltrymCll wore employed n~ the bll>lc]Jlwud rt he s ole purpose o f n nl oad in g s hip pin g;tJ\(·flll'('~~

ashore w ere in re al d a ng el"of enemy COUlltMIl tllIl 'kfrom the s ea ; an d beach con(~it.ionsWOl"O id['!)1d u~to hard saud that supported th'!) h()l ) .v il ' sl \ II

vehicles .Laud-based aircraft of the Allied Air 11'01"'[', ill

conjunction w ith the Third Fleet , Ivett' t n " r! ).linus the destruction of hosbile ground, Da"~i, !lllt!

air forces a nd de fenses in tho Luz on erc a in "~I"lto pro teet the movement of umphi bious (0)'l'l's

toward the objective a rea; deny moYcJtWll1 flIHI

destroy hostile reserves moviog overlnnd [rom 1.l lf

Aparri, Central Plains, and Manila firMS I"''-fi,.1the Lingayen Gulf ure a; and provide dil'cd SU]I-

port of the landing a s r eq ue st ed by UIl' com-mander of the Allied N aval Forces. Tim.\"wl'r~

to assume the fuji responsibility Ior direct supportof ground operations in tbe Lingnyen 1)1"[ '<1flIld

Central Luzon at full curliest ] J l" n et :i u ft bk ( I at !after the establishmentof fighters aud l ighl b n m u ·ers in the Lingayen area. The mJtll ami 1'J.ir·teenth Air F orces w ere to continue thedQsll 'IH'1i O I l

of hostile n a v al and n il ' I or ce s n nd s hipp in gill Ill 'northeastern Borneo, Su lu ATeb ip fl l ago ,1·Jin!l'lIIH~,Palewan, westem VisnyllS, and A l'( Lf m'n an d

Celebes Sea area an d deny movement of lwslilcnaval Iorees and reinforcemente am"! supply il1l~the Luzon area, in addition to desti'!lIyillg!l,eenemy sources of w ar m ntc riuls inc lUJ N ",!)!"r ·lands E as t I nd ie s.

In many respec ts the planned schenw ofmaneuver and orguuisabiou for the i l .l V l lS i ol 1 o f

LUzon exact ly parall ed those of t Jts Ley te oprrn·tion . N aval forc eswere £ t g fl ,i n d i v id e d i !l ~ ot h r c< ltack forces w ith A dm iralKinkaid ill. OVllf·I•

U

co=and. The Third Fleet w as to rallg e ~~ .tensively in strategic support of the op~rIlLlo~;and to be prepared to give dil'cct snpporL I

necessary. As at Loytl', the Sixth AI'my w~s I~

lan d tw o c orpsabreast. . .' . r tA s planned, the Thlrcl FlelJt stnwk Ita I~l

bI . . @I

ow ill support of th6 Lingn ;yol1 op6)" l1ibWn IJ . .. " S6 ~I lU

anua. ry 1945. Comple t6 tac tlCa l !!lU f.H1'k ~d . "h str)!~m o crate SUCCCSseswere achieved W IU ' If!. F N . ,i Silo,

ag8Jll8t onnOBa and the sou thal' ll f l, 11 9U ) Il O ,t ,

The next day inelement "'\'lather halted

carrier operutions, but on 6Janun;ry t he T hir dFleet was ready, ns scheduled, to hit hostileinstallations 011 Luzon.

During October, N ovem ber, and December,Japancoso air strength ill bh e Philippines IVIIS

almost completely destroyed. T he 'I'hirteenthan d Fi fth A.i r Forces combined uo d eat .r oy o rdlI.mnge almost 1,500 en~my v.ir cr af t; t he ThirdFleet, 2 ,000 . Ouly by conccn tJ .· a~i llg his re-maining fOTC8 could L he enemy b id o ff eo ti ve il T&pin fo r local SUPl"PJ.llIwy in Lbo ail'. By In!~-uary t he . A l li e. dAir F orc e had accomplished th eincredible reM 0' £ virtually ueutraliaiug 120 enemyaird rom es in the L uzQ u,V is aY lIs.f I. l" O! L from a

dozen or so opcrutionnl airdromes extending fromLeyte to Morotai.

.As the jump of f time approac he d, ibbad be-c om e e vid lln t.t hl lt th o e ne m yWDS geing 1.0 throwell his ILvai1ableu.ir POWOT against t.lw All iedinvasion of LUI\Oll. It was plain MSO that suicide"Kamikaze" .1u·cruft would eoustiuutethe majorportion of the J l~paneso effort.. r., 'Ioying north.ward through tho 8ulu Se ll -and Mindoro Pnssegeto Liugayen GuI !, thobom blll:dm en t and [iresuppor t o f ships of the Seventh Fleet, oogeLheT

with accumpanying escort carriers , w ere sub-jected to numerous suicide nttaoks.Un 6 January .Allied warships arrived at

Lingayen Gull only to encounter such a detl-l:r-mined air force thlLt no bombardment of t,heb eac hhe ad a. re n. w aspossible. T h e 'l 'h i: rd Fleetstrikes on Luzon that da.y w r. : t · ether:..Ioro e x-tended to include enemy installa t:iOOSIlS Ittr south11 8 Manila Bay. Northam LUzon had been th eo ri gi n a l Largotare IL b II t Gen oral :1\,1acA .rtb\11'

req_uested!J10 additional covernge because ueutral-ization by laud-bused nU'()J'llIt had not been as6'Tll&tlIS ex pe cte d an dit appenred 11~ (.hilt timothat t,he m ttjority of ~ lL e,Tu:pa.noBOplanes11~tuuk-in g th e Seveubh F il le t. w e re I ro mLuzon fields.

.Ann ttempt was made to rna intniu n eonbiuuousair plLL]"olover all MOroy stl"ips during ~he (Hh,but a s ol id o ve rC Q stprcventcll blauketing th emore Ilo1·thedy al'(las. Esoort olUTier!! of !JIO

S e vo nt h I .' le e t ( li dtLll~ir best t o p roLaot the SeventhFieet wal"!iliips, bul. th(lir covel ' was not ndcqunteIl!ld Allied air Bup(\l'iol"i ty did not exist in I.hoLingaYlIl larea oitber ou. the litlJ 01' the pr6viousda.y. It is doubtful. ]JOII'ev,er. ~h!);1.tho shillScould hfl.ve bel'll prolected. RaJa!" equipmentWq n o~ as u se fu las it w ou ld l1 Hov ubeen ill. Opllll

reaohcs of the o co nn b ec au se ib wn. ' lblocked byhiRb. hills It short distuuce ! Iow· t ty.1n addition,

the inclement w e at he r t og et he r w i th L h a r el at iv el ylarge oren to be c ov er ed p re ve nte d 'l'h ir dFlecLand A~l i. ed .Ai r Foroe p lanes f rom comple tl 'l yneul;f!11IzmgItU the Jnp!l l l¢~enirdromea o n L u zo n.

As C Ir e su l t o fcontinuing JnpnllGseuir oppositionA.dmiral K . in k >L id ! ,( lq ll cs t ed t hn t L h oTbiI'd Fleotp la ~e s r ~p en tstrike~ n g u in s t L l ll lo nall 7,Inu1I4ry.' I'h is a ct lO l l n ec es s iL !1 L et ! o an c el at io n o [ aplanuedsortie It.gn.iust l ! 'o r ll 1osf I ., .bu L tho new111 i as to n w a scompleted SI~Lisfll.ct,ol"i1y,r lospite bl' ll ! weather.

D urin g L he day S even th m eeLbombunimsn t nn dlire support missions were Ill1hnmpol"od. O n th eBt h as the Third FlellL retired t o m f 1 l6 1,few enemyaircl'tLft a.ttacked tho Li:ugltyon Gull areu, 'rhobulk 01the r61I1lI<iningenemy suicide, .ti)"rrAift uowappeared to bccoming from Formoea, To counterLhia continued t.broat, tw o steps were tnken,General : M ,w A r ~ hl .l l" r eq ue st ed t hl ltthe Ohinu-based Twentietil Bomber Oommand shi1t its ~rrOl.tfrom K es lun g H arbor to F orm osa.It w as de-titled also ~ho;t 0; oarrier-borue ai rt·raft attackagainst the snme island would bo pre fe rable tothe continued presenee 0:( the ' l'hinl FIQet in [ ,h,e

Lingayen region. Admiral Halsey's COIDllllilld

t.hereupon moved to the north 1111dwest while

Seventh lrleet es('ort !lIl.l"riol"S look up the burdenof dire lit SllP port of the landings, 11iiied by avai l-able lund-base d air f oreas ,

The heavy l{um.ikaiU!ILttacks employed by thoJapaA CS 6 at L in gay en seem ed to have m orefar-roaching purposes thllll destruction of .Alliedshipping. H ere tofore, the c tlom :v hn d s en t m an ysuicide planes agninst LTlLllSports,bill a.t Luzonhe s ing led 01 1t warships fOI" speeinl ati-eutiOLl.If { ,hesuicide p lanes had beeu more successful,the enem y might lmve f ou n d I L cc ep ll l: bl o t hecostly cousequences of another naval engagement.No heavy Jo .par lOse sur face unit s ,,'Ol"() in thevicinity of t .he Gul], but a potential ly dangerousnumber ware located, both to the llol"th and tob it e s ou th, so thn· t Lhoy e o ul dth re a ta n b ilesec ur ityo f A J li od { O J 'c e sIl.t Lil1gll.ynnwith.ill24 ho'Ul"!)usingmlllili L h" snmo Jl inc(lJ"tactics t,hey hilt! t riod a tLeyte.

No i l1unec li l1 , \ena .vM at tackWl\S ro.:pcott'd, how-eV<;)l",bee,tllSe of t.he o"erwlw!ming s(:rcngth of IJwc om b il lo d T h ir d1I1 l i iSpI I' en th Io 'l e el .muts. ' 1 '110real l.in-cnl. w ou ld c om eIIftIU' A.lJiari f or ce s w e l" 1Jost,,1bJishe d 11 9h ol "e ,til e T h ir d lrjoflt had depILI'L edfo r groater fields, u .n d t .h eSevollt!l Fleet, WI\B Cllt

dOW'll to its u su !) .lsmull size by (lie wi(,!Jdrll .wal oft.be roinlorciug ele,lllenls bOlTolI'ed f l "Om the Paoi li cFloet fOI" Lho op()l"tlLiol1.

49



. was ready to takeend of Jalluazy the.Army arr arm dover the ob of giving direct support to t~~~timl.un

. airoraft At IJIlJ<I II,troops from Navy support . I tJ became comp e e .~;r supremacy over tht" apsnese

,~ ~. . v r the 15 re-The most minute reeonn81ssa .nCe 0 ~.. illsmaining enemy airfields in the P~pp1lles -closed less tbau 100 opera t iona l aircra ft. Onlyone-half of these were on Luzon. . L

Two more amphibious operations ngalOstf

;:onwere undertaken in Jo.nunry. The first 0 Il!!e''''1'ke ' "}1 was conceived for the purp~ o f s e eu r-

'> :I ', .B the baying an air bast' close to Subic nY,operungfor sbiPI 'ing, and denying to the enemy ace .css ~the Bata an Peninsula . The landing ope ration mthe Sail Felipe-San Antonio area on the Zam~alescoast WIlS made on 29 J lUluary under the Eigh thArmy, ceutrol passing to the SixthArmy the,nextdllY. No air or ground .o~pOSltiOn was en-countered dur ing the amphibious p~ ~:~operation and the forces moved ra pidlyagainst Subia Bay and Olongnpo.

A third invasion of Luzon was made .o~}31January when 11 Uni ted Sta~ a irborne d iv is ionwith one regiment of paraehutists replaced by twoinfant ry ba tt al ions estab li shed a beachhead. a t

Nasugbu, Batangss Prov ince. This landing, l ikethe one at Zsmbales, was undertaken by theEighth inny, cont ro l passing to the Sixth AI:nyon 10 February. No opposition wa s met duringthe amphib ious phase of the assault. ~~use theenemy had jus t p revious ly sen t a divi sion northfrom ·Bfi. tangllB,leaving the western b~h68 un-.de.fendeJ. The landing forces pushed rapldly eastto mom; the detached parachutists who haddropped on Tllgaytay Ridge along th~ northshores oiLake TIla1on 3February. Thereinforceddivision thereupon pressed northward towardNichols Field and Manila.

In ear ly February sof tening up of Oor reg: idor,Bataan and Oavite began, coupled with close

gr oup ~upport for the Sixth .Army's ca pture ofManila. and mopping up operations in the BambanHills 01 Cent ra l Luzon. United States infan tryand cavalry alre ady was moving on Manila. On3 February the cavalry, driving BOUthand makingn wide enveloping movement which encounteredneg ligible oppos ition , ente red the c ity f rom thenortheast , Infantry elements entered M&nila. thenex t dnr f rom the nor th and 3 days la.t er p ressedacross the P3BBigRiver. Meanwhile the Airbornedivision which had establiBhed the Nasugbubridgehead , d rove and pushed sca tt ered E I n e l n yforces back on Nichols Field and.Fort McKiuley,

O 11 Februa.ry the nirborne troops and tbn . h. I

cavalry establishod C{lu.tac t m ~ e vicillit" Q(

Nielson Field. The e nc irc lemsnt of MIl,L'iI~"'lIS

complete, but the Japsnee e def ense wus to ) l rOVI

bitter and desperate. What w as not dereutl~dwas destroyed as the enemy fought stuh1JOI '1111'f rom build ing to bui lding and f oor to fiool '. ' l 'b'lJapanese defenders, mainly neval pCI"SOUlld, h e l dtenaciously to the 300-yea:r-old InLrnmuros s( '~tionand to the modern l ·eiJlforced concrete s~J'urLU!rlS

in the district of the city and O O I l l l l lO l l w c o l tb

government buildings. H ,,:us not . l. ll lt il 3~ r u r c hthat all organized resistance ill the c ity hnd e c o E e d .While Mani la was being libe ra ted o ther l' lu lc l

States forces under took to open Mani la Ba y a n ddear Bataan Peninsula. An infantry l 'c~imcn(moved south a long the eas t coast o fBatuan ,lul'iogthe period 15 to 20 FebrllD.lY.. P il ar an d L i!n u) "were quickly se iz ed and patr ols dr ove to Rngn

on the West coast. .A .regimental combat l~ulll

made an overwate r movement f rom Subie Bay (0

Mariveles on 15 Februar y, destroye d seattegroups of the enemy, and soon established conlae

with United States forces on both sides of ti lPeninsula, O n tho 16th, a :t"egimell~nlcombatteam of parachuhsts dropped on Cerregidor I s l n m l ,

supported by an amphib ious landing ~n.l.lwpB

of a. .battll.1ion of the 'I'wenty-fourth Division. Iwas estima tcd that abou~ 800 Japanese w e r e.0 1

Corregidor, but this was f O l L D d .( ; . 0 be c o n s e r ~ ' \ t l vand after 1 2 days ofbit ter ~ghtl llg l ihe e~cmJd e atota led a lmost 4 ,500 . Smaller i slands rn ~ :D~l ljBay were cleared during Maroh and ApI ,

sou thern shore f rom Dante to Manila hlINILlg brcsecured in February by a irborne t'l·OOJ)~. d w e

Skirmishes in the Kembu sector con~lll!le...!l" -e d II . (0[.01 0into April until the Ja!lOOCSe sunei .

almost 15,000 casualties in t Q , ( IIhrea.. f ;\.[~nilnIn the Shimbu defense sec Lor, e!l:Bt 0 •

the eoi d duous The enemyPgoing prove more ar uous, • !ro• 1. - I" hi Ion" iron,aented a tri ple tw:eat a ong s . '" .•

ld l . . ci t I I .C O H l l 'Antipolo lo aIpo Dam. He ooull1t;n lelt il~attack against the extended AmencaD . P l l h '0

. h f h flttor SH •he could gain control of teres. . -" I ·_1. J OJJ!;""the ent ir e Mani ln. a rca,anc i, Wlb 1 .c • Lui ri

arti lle ry, he could lob s ll l; lls into ~l:L,e.~:lSt,,1itael.f. For these reasons one UUl ' In toll'cavalry'brigade turned 008~ from MaD!Antipolo late in February. U " 't d S U i

On 23 February 11 ecacsrted JJ l~:J l .rattack into the Shimbn dcfens.es be". cd~"strongest part was the mount,ainous terl'l}l~b~nIing from Antipolo north toward Mon l

about 10miles . Along this f ront the .enemy, sup-ported by rocket artillery, dug himsulf deeply intothe hillsides, improving natura] defenses andbuilding new positions. The drive continuedthroughout the remainder of February and by ISMareh a ll objec tives had been secured.

Far to the north of the Shimon !trait the hattieon the outskirts of the Sho/1u sec to r s ti ll mgedagainst au enemy determined (; .0 hold allapproaches to the Cagll.yltn'VaDey. United Statesinf antry forc es move d north along the Must tocontact guerril la forces at San Fernando, Wl10 bythis t ime held all the west coast ofnorthern Luzonexcept for enemy pocket;s just north or Vigll;U.This contact was established on2Q 11Tarch and twodrives toward Bagnio were begun westward fromAringay and Baunng. Bngu.io, summer c apitalof the Philippines, was nt this Lime the head-quarters of both the Japanese Army and. the'Philippine collaboraticnist gove rznne nt. Theenemv had turned the mountain c ity into a c it adeloonsidcl'cd almost impl'eg~ble, but air and aI·til-lery bombardment :finally crumbled the defenses.O n 26 April, .American infantry entered the c ityvirtually unopposed, Patrol s nor th and east soon

disclosed that 1 l ;1 Io rgan ized reei s tancein the a reawaa ended , a lthough mopping up con tinued wel linto .!\Illy. This mopping up WIl& conducted byone United States infan try divi sion and Fi lipinoguerril las while anether american division movedsouth to join the ' at tack in the BalMBPass urea ,

In January this attack had hegnn lIB a 2-prongeddr ive on Belote Pass fl\Om San Jose and Risal,By the e nd of February both wings of IIms drivehad contacted a str ong enemy position at DibdigblllTio, 10 har d-f cnglrt miles north of San Josealong Highway No.5. Meanwhile, It veteranUnited States infantry division had arrived 011 theLuaen scene late in January and, athwkiug north,s l;rove to f lank the enemy 's Bruete Pass defensesby driving up the Villa Verde Trail. TlID e nemychose to defend this pass because i~ was the gate -lVay to the str ate gica lly importa nt ClIgll:.vanValley. He defended the Villa Ver de Trnil withaU means at his disposa l bec ause it wa s hl s mainlineof communication between the various sectorsof hi s defenses. All during Ma rcll nod April theUnited States d iv is ion a ttmnpt fld t o e li mi na .C B .eneJnypocket s a long the t ra il and in the Sa lacsacP I I S sar ea, west of the j unc tion of the Vil la Verde' r rauand Highway No.5. Other eleme nts of. thedivieion patrolled northwes t toward Beguio, hutfound the terrain to be. Ii, most diffioult ro II te to

5 2

that city. Ther efore the main e ffort continue dto he aimed at Irnu gan , a barrio at the easternterminus of Salaceac PIISS.

Sou th of Balete PI ISS, United Stat-es force sstruggled on throughout March and April alongboth sides of Highway NO.5. Even late in thela tter month the enemy was able to rep lace h islosses rapidly u ud c ou ld call OIl almost 15,000troops to defend tb.etriangle formed by BaletePass on the sou th , lmugan to the nor theUllt , and

Santa Fe, just north of ~be pass on bhe main mad.Ealete Pass finally w a.s taken on 13 May andshortly therea !te r' Imug! 1Jl and Santa F~ fell.After long, weary " 'eela! of flushing the J!lpan8Sefr om their undergr ound bur rows, se aling shutenemy caves, bui ld ing new roads , improving oldtrails, aud COping with the roughest terrain

imaginable, American forces bud opened the gate-way to the Oagayan Valley.

Dur ing thi s d rive into Oagayan Valley, other.AJneriean fOl'CCS drove into the Shimbu sector eastof l .1anila to establish a line from Antipolo on thesouth to WawlJ, Dam on the north. Movingsoutheast, United Strutes infaIltry outflllllkeri thllsouthern end of ·~hedam lind attacked around theeas te rn shores of Laguna deBay to make contac twith friendly force s on 6 April. The attack e ast-ward feRded i ts objec tives, Mount } .fataba andivIount Pacllwagau, by the end of April. Thefall of Mount Pacawagan opened tbe entire WawaDam area to direct assault , an attack undertllli.eDon 30 April. WaWll.Da m was seized undamagsd,Oll . 29 May, a nd Ute .Americon fort:es then gavetheir attention t o Ip o Dam, northern anchor of theShimbu defenses and source of 30 percent o f theManila. water supply. The attack toward Ipobegan. on 6 May. Aided by a guerrilla attackfrom the north, the drive continued day and nightwith unremitting pressure unjil the dam W.1lS

cap tured intact on 17 Mny. The Japanese had.placed demolition charges at the dam but thes wiftn es s ofthe !l~tllck, ubeU-eriby searchlighti llumina tion of the bat tle a reas during the bournof darkness , p revented tho enemy from accom-plishing the planned destruction. Instead, thisc riticallv needed water supply was r estored toManila'and the last important . stronghold of theShimb« sector WIlS seised. By the beginning ofJune all operations wcre reduced ~omopping L l p .

In . the offensive against .BIll'IDy remnants Ul

southern Luzon, by lute in March the f ront linestretched from Laguna de Bay southwest to ~ukeTnal, and thence to Batangaa city. A United



States raHUry d iv is ion moved to the a rea la~e in~I8Ich, ILtta~king south and east into Bat.a.Dgasand TaynbllS pro,inel's. The eastwa rd drive ofthe c !w 'a lry produced con tact , on 6 .Apr il , withothe r Arr_er ic an force s near PlI Sanjan, at theeastern sboro of Laguna de Bay. Both cavalryand a ir borne troops re ached Lamon Bay, on theeast cons; of Luzon, on 10 April. Then t~ecaval ry pushed I lo rLheas t into the Panta ManaRiver ,a~j and 011 to Infan ta , nor thward on thecoast. Q",jectiv6l! of these latter drive s were to

turn the south eastern flank of the SMmbu de-lenses, p revent sca tt ered enemy t roops f rom re-organizing, and deny the enemy tbe use of lufantaa s a concentration or cvac ua tion point. Thesetasks wen accomplished after valuable assistancehom guerril la forces. Infanta was seized withoutopposi tion on 25 May, and d lsorgani sed cn?mygroups withdrew to the nor th and northwes t intorugged mountains.

Orga nised r esistance in Ba ta ngas Provinceended on 3 1I1ly and the liberation of the BicelProvinces was next on the agenda. Already greatstr ides had been mnde in this direction. On 1 Aprilno a mplr bious a ssault bad be en under ta ke n at

Legaspi, ontbe southeastern tip ofLuzon. Oppo-sition, except at one isolated pocket, was negligible,beCUU5e early in February the Japnnese hadmoved tile division defending the Bieols out to thenorth. }lthough many prepared defenses werefound throughout the provinces r ela tively fewe nemy were encountere d, Those met, and dis-pensed with, c onsisted of army ba se a nd navalservice tTOOPS, together with 'a few combatremnents from the Leyte-Samar bat .t legrounds.On 2 Yay, contact was established with anAmerican cavalry division, which had been drivinginto the Bieolsfrom the northwest , delayed only bypopr TOadS. Further combat patrolling disclosedonly seat.ered enemy groups and vacated defensivepositions-the Bicol campaign was over. By 31Maya ll a reas in sou thern Luzon had been c learedof large memy units a nd the next day orga nizedresistance in his sector was declared to bea t an end.

In the north, however, operations against rela-t ively strong enemy forces were continuing. O n . edrive W8S begun sou theast f rom Bagnio towardTebbe while other United State s units movedagainst Tebbo Crom the south. Both wings ofthis pincer established contact at TebOOon 9 Mayand patrolling WW! insti tuted into mountains to theeastward,

More spectacular opera tions took p lace in the

Cagayan Valley. A United. Stn.tes inf"Hh'division sped north from the Balete Pnss ' l J. B . n ~virtually uncontested driva. y 1O Juno 13. . ' ~ , l!gU.L A O "abeut 4 mi les north of th.f JBhle to Pass II I

': '" ' .. . O o gHighway No.5, fell. A .t this town r;not,llel'h i' I

th Cg! .

way, No. 4, entered e. ngn,y!:D.} 'all(l ;Y from th enorthwest. The capture of this Junct ion cut oI Tt he J ap nn e se escape rou te t,o the eas t, lc!!.vingth ~enemy in a t ight and powelflLl pocket c~ntcl'o(10Kia ngan, Thre e drives wer e immedia tely in'l~tu ted to reduce this secto r. One ' inlan t ry uh'ision

after moving nor th from central L uzon into lit;Gagayan Vo.lley, turned left, or nortllll 'OoL,nL

Bagabag and pushed a long Highway No.4 I I g a i t l S \

heavy enemy opposition. By 30 June this ul i \ "chad carried to within 5 miles of Kiang~ll i(s~lf,Another column of the same divi sion mOI"'e(1 froUiBambang to outflank thelGa.rrgal.1pocl~et f ro m t h~southwest and to establish contact wieh i l' iendh'forces nt Kayapa. The third drive on Kiung;!~came f rom Oervantes, whence Philipp ine A r m yunit s, ex-guerr ill as , a tt empted to cut the K i a n g t i l lpocket in two, and meet the Sixth Division, Il}the end of June this latter drive had progrr",!'11over 10 miles to the sou t h-east and lwd r~nrh~dMankayan.

Me anwhile, the United State s division whirl,had taken Bagabag con tinued northward w i t bil;r at e of edvance governed o n:l .y b y logistics. O~18 June the division crossed the Oagayan TIi I '1 rsouth of Ilagan and next day secured the ( 0 \ \ " 1 1 ,

On the 21s t o f the same month , American a i r b o r n etroops made an airborne landing near Apnr!'i ,w ddrive south to effect a junction with this division,Between these two forces guerr il lns held 'Iugue-garao against determined Jo.pausse u.ttacks. Tbe• . . Iinfantry reached 'I'uguegamo on 25 June am

. pressed onward to meet the airborne troops ~D

27 June.This c ontact marked the end 0f organized J ~ p "

anese res itanca in th( l Caga .yan Valley and OIlJ !

General Yamaehita's lost stronghold, bhe Ki'H~~Upocket, held on with any slllublnnce of Org'1~1!2~'tion. To the United Stlttes I nf antry l\;)ld FihpUlIguerrillas fen the task of red ucing tho Ki.ulg~

. l · q · mreeietanee, and mopping up e nemy raml'~~e Sierra Madre M011~tains. ?n I JU~~Olli;;SIXth Army, heretofore III operatJOJlol COll I_II Am . .. . L' ' 011 w e l lIlU enean and Filipino forces on uz , I• . for 111into a per iod of train ing and pl'el)[],!'n,tlOlJ on

t. bi . , OJ! VIZnex 0 jectlva-Japan. Op~r~~~o)1S o Eight]'thereupon became the respons!blilty of M L .1in.Army,which until this time had been eng~g8(

M

clearing the JlI>pallesc lrom thl) southern Philip-pmea.

All hlstitu ted drives continued uuabatcdUnited Stutes forces pushed on aga inst stubbornenemy resistance aloug Highway No.4 and reachedKiangtlJl on 12 July. To the northwest somaPhilippine army units W[tIO t ied down, Unt il themiddle of July, in reducing Japnnes.o -fofti-Jiedpositions in the Msnkayan area, Howoverothel'Filipino forces moved east from CeJ'vantes toseize, on'10 July, both Sabnngan end Bontoe.FJ :om Bontoc t lle se . forces pressed sou th a longHighway No. 4 toward Bnnnuo, which town WHS

taken by the Sixtl1 Division on 20 July. Threedays later con tact wns established between the.!meriolll) and Filipino units, thus splitting theKiaJlglln pocket into two sectors. Isolated enemystrong points maintained a determined defense9f the mountain posit ions wel l in to August , butthe eastern half o f the Japanese defenses it se lf wasdivided into two parts when Philippine guerril lascoming in f rom the northeas t, seized l \In-YQYI1~and met slements 01 the Sixlili Division movingeast from Bauaus. West of Highway No, 4

pressure continned against the other hull of the

Kiangan pocket,It

aemiorganized defense in depth.Oonourrantlj-, United States forces drove northalong Highway No. 11and Philippine Army unitspushed south along ~hesenre roud from Sabangcu.These advances met on 20 Je!ly, euttillg thoenemy 's l as t nor th- south l ine of corumunica tinnin the Kiangan sector. The same forces thensmashed eas tward b 'om the highway to secure theUpper Agno River volley. A United Statesbattn.l ion depurted fnom Kablan, which ha d beencap tu red lute in JIUlII, and pressed nor tl rward inthe sa me valley. At Ba guius, Oll 8 August, con-tact WIIS estab lished with F il ipinio t roops , whohad moved d O W J l~e valll lYfrom the north. Withthe v lll l~' so secured a fum foo thold was ob ta ined

on the wes te rn s lopes of tho mounta ins defendedby the enemy, It could only be a ma ttaro] timebefore Lhe three-pronged drive from the east,t rom the south and west, and from the north andwes t , des troyed the Iaat remnents of Gener alYQruashita's forces.

To the nor th and eas t o f LheKi( l! lg tl Jl pocke t,?vel' ill tho Cagayall Vnlley, combat act.ivity dur-~g July and August c onsisted largely 0- [ patrolsinto th e Si erra 11, '1adro : 1 \ 1 0LUl ta lns, ens t of th eValle y. The enemy was concer ne d mostly withthe problpnls of physicnl survivnl Mi l his criticalcondition was lunch in evide nc e a s tr oops of the

'1'b.irty-seven~h found rn Illly of the In.pnnesa deadf rom 8ta r~a.! ,lOn. By 15 Augus t, excep t [or theJfI,pll.l.leseIII tho Kin.ngon area, enemy dO[011S6 onLuzcn was diserganissd and in effcctive. Thesca~tored Japanese had no choice other thltl l s tar;vatJOn o-rsurrender. However, the announcementof , lapan's ucceptanes of the unconditional 81.U'-

re nd er te rm s d idDOb bring tho Luzon campaign toan end. No dramatic parade o{ surrendered.tro~p9 tool~place. O n Luzon th e enemy gave noindicntion of knoll'ledge of the capitulation forsome days, and it wus not until almost the endoJ August that Ganeral.Y urnashita 'ssur.rend'erappeared imminent.

On 20 August, tho Eighth Army turnad overcommand of the Philippines to the CommandingGenera l Al'my Forc es West&m Pacific. Thillheadquarters, pro;iollsly responsible Icr th.elegis-tIC suppor t o f United States Forces iu tlie South-west Pacific, undertook tobring about the promptsurrender of all Japanese,

The Luz on campo.ign was typicul of most ofthe ground ligh ting in the Pacif ic Th~te r. Therewere engagements on level ground, In. mcuntains,in jungles, aglti lls- t armor, and against fortified

towns, a nd against the Iltl"ge modern city ofManila. The tasks assigned to air power through-ou t tho en tire camp II igu IV (Ire nurn 1'1"0us andvaried. In this campnign alone, the Fifth AhForee flew 57,663 support sorties, dropped 38,844tons of bombs plus 6,565 tons of Napalm. Itaverugcd 2,240 sorties with ru bomb an d Napulmtonncge of 1,764 a week. Throughout thecampaign , infan try uni ts down to regiments andbn.tt11lionsrequestad maximum available air powerto support impending strikes. Bombing andstrafing by the WI arm was repeatedly usedtoget.her with artillery to sonrn L!P 11IUillly strong»poiuts in towns and fortified posit ions in the hil lsand mountainous coun try, In jungle and wooded

areas, I1S dillicu1t and impenetrable as lLlly in theSouthwest Paciflc area, Napalm was dropped Dotonly to destroy strongly dug in Japanese, hut alsoto burn of f vege til>lion III d jungle. The boos t tomorale in !.heground forces given by supportingplanes was enormous beeause it provided n con-St-nllt reminder of t,he size and varied power of[ ,hete11mbehind the doughboy. The demomliz-ing e ll ec t on the Japan GSO of United S til.tes closeail' support and repeated air actacks on theirinstillations was horne out in the en~my dial'J anddocument trans la tion made by various G-2sections,

55



From 13 to 19 May the grea.~t thweighSo tth °l

d . 1 aream e u-N apalm ever use on a S lD g e ~..+_, t P ifi 854 tons- wa s dr opped on 8UPl"'-'"·

" es ac c- This followedof the Ipo Dam operations. was aimthe nex t weekwith a to ta l o f2 ,354 tons ofNapdropped, half of it in the Cagayan V~ey = ~Fighter bombers Hew most of the sorties .heavy bombers struck strategic targets at AJ ~Tuguegamo, and Eschague dromes on or ofLuzon. Throughout June hundreds of tons anN apaIm were dropped in the North Cag1l;y

Valley p lus hundreds and even thousands of tonsof explmives. The ~d -w:eekin June ~arkedthe first us e of gliders ill this theater .. U s w g 14C--46 6 an d 54C--47sa reinforced ba tt al ion ~de a

. tri thesuccessful jump near CllIl lalall lUgan s P mNorth Cag-ayan Valley. .

P '-nn' ;nn souihem. Philippines campa1{l7l8.-w. "-J Philin..

Planning fo-r operations in the so~thern ..pines-the western Visayas and :Mindanao-wascarried en concurrently with planning for theatt-a.cks {]D Leyte and Luz on. The fir st Musketeeroutlines han provided f or the initia l en.tranceinto the Phi lippines a t the southe rnmost is land ,Mindanao. However, when General ManArthur's

forces moved in to Ley te and on to Luzon, a newstrategical concept for operations in the southernislands w as evolved and 8 new direction of attack,from north to south, was planned.

The first formal plan under this c once pt wasPrincetO'll-I da ted 31 October 1944. It set upthree series of operations: the Vict<Jrgroup, to bemounted in Leyte, scheduled invasions ofPanay on10 Janu~ry 1945, Cebu and Negros on 20 Feb-ruary, and Pa la wan and the remaining VisayanIslands after February; the Oboe se ries, to beunder taken by the I Aust I"Sl ian Corps, out linedan amphib ious a tt ack into the Cotoha to a rea ofMindanao on 1 March, invasion of the 8uluArchipae go area beginning 1 Apr il, and NorthBorneo subsequen tly; and the Pe te r ser ia s pro-vided ftr the reoonqnest of the Netherlands EastIndies. At the time of the Luzon operations, itbec ame e vident tha t the employme nt of force sbetween bhe various operations must he dictatedby the requirements of the Luzon force , c0nse-

quently, the plan for the invasion of the south.emPhilippiaes was made more flexible. WhenPrin uto o, II was published on 20 Novembe r,a lthougl it was bas ieal ly sinUla r to the praviousp lan, n~ in i ti al dates for the var ious opera tionl lwere speci fied and no uni ts o ther than A r m y t O O lcorps headquarters were designated to p & r t . i e i p a w, .

In Pebruary 1945, Geneta.1MacArthur a"pPi.O\'~da new concept of operatious .lll the S()UUI~rn

philippines. The ne,: Idea 8 1_ n 't _ Sl Ig e d t w o s c ri e;of maneuvera, the Vwtor operat~ollS to l"MCC\lp\ .

enemy held territory on tho V.IsayllS, P a l u ~ .m ; ,Mindanao, and the Sulu Arclupeillt,"O, n n d IililOboe operations to seize Borneo, Javu, tIIl<i th~remainder of the Netherlands East In_di~s_ Anew plan, Montclair was pl"omulglfrted late inFebruary 1945 embracing the mo·vc~. '~hc Vici",operations were to be-under the dltectIOn of (h~

Eighth A r m y with Unit(ld~tates troops Oil!)'The proposed use o~Amrtralm?- troops , IU ~jill.

danae, as outl ined ~ the Princeton: pl an s, w uscanceled and Austra. ll llu forces WGI".e to C~J·I} OQ

the Oboe phase . The ent ir e p lan invo lved promptcommitment of means n vailable after l'l'(1uiIll-

mants for the Luzon oper ations wer e met. A d .mittedly, timing wa s to be dependent on t lw p r~ g .ress of the fighting -in Luzon, but a trUlulll'e

schedule and de signa tion of troop t~t~ \ \ : . ,1>~Iforth. In addit ion to t he S( ) ll t he - rnPhilippines.nw as alee planned by General Mac.A.rthw- 111MFilipino guerrilla forces should be used to . I D I

ma.rimum possible extent, F01' these oporntiois

the princ iple jobs g iven the AUied u ir forces Wrfe

to protect the convoys on their approach to lil1

objective areas and to deny ~llC movement 01hostile reinforcements and supplies.

Palawan in!1a8Wn.-As planned in the .lionl·clair outline the first operation in the cn.mp,llglito libera.te' thesouthe.rn PhilliPJ)incs \l1I$

begun on 28 February 1945. On tbut date Oil!

infantry regimental combat tea m lande d u n-

opposed near Puerto Princes.: '! t, ~alawo;u I s I_ :~ t ·The airfield area, primary objective, lY~s qU i, ~

secured . Thase f ie lds had once been all ullPorwld t ort rO L lI~ vl ink in the Japanese ferry an ~·ansp' db ' 'u

the Nethe rla nds East I ndies and hotm' ha }~•. eJJB.llly,.I I[ I'used as a base for aircraft protecting .... er

. . th So th China Sea, Now, bc\\~\. :p m gm 6 U • .. _ tbeI lI1bllilDlportant Japanese-held installatious ill. lI ' i tbiltand on the Indo-China . coast were broug M I 0 1 J geTeasy striking distance of Allied planes. N~ Setcou ld Japanese shipp ing in the South C~111~VC\1'

b e Insuredof any safety. Flu,therl llOl 'O, l:'l~iU'ern exit of the Visayas was sealed-bile ~ Do d

ing Japanese forces on Palmy, N~1"oS, C~~ir!lnBohol could only await tho COllung of

troops. , _te d IM W ,I !·Operations ashore on Palawan COUSIS , '~siMl

of eleariog the Puerto PrincCSSQ; a rC f t. ( ) 1. l~ r ln t \~ ~ 1~ was evidence of hasty Japanese M'.

md no s izeable enemy group was con ta .c ted uo ti l2 M arch. From that time 0]] SCll.tt"redeuernj- onP alaw au w erehunted down with ! :. he a id o forgan-ired guerril las. In mid-April United States patrolscleared Basuanga Island, to !:.henortheast, an dBsla ba c a nd Pandanan Ielands at the southerntip of Palawan. Meanwhile, air and naval baseswere rapidly established. Allied a ircraf t wereBOonconducting searches O Y O I " the South ChinaS e a and bombing Japanese installat ions from Bcr-neo to Indo-China. Motor torpedo boats of theSeventh Fleet pat ru lled tho eas t and west cnnstaof Palawan, extended their activit ies to adjacentsmall islands, and reachsd as Jar sauth lIS BritishNorth Borneo.

Paooy.-Next of the Visayan Islands to fallbefore the fllst-moving onslaught of the Eigh~hArmyw-as Panay, invaded 011 18 March. Noenemy air 01- ground opposition was encountereddur ing the landing opera tions ; 2 days later i lo ilo,largest city QU Panay, WIIS cap tu red. Li ttl etrouble had been expected at Panay because aIllghly eff ic ient gueri lla o rgan ieatinn had longbeen in control of most of tho island. Wi.th thea id of these guerr ill as o l-ganized res ist ance wasbroken - b y 22 Mru·ch. Minor pa I ;rol IIC tivitiesaccounted for remain ing i so la ted pocket s on thenorthern and wes te rn coast s, Alter tho.t date,the division readied itself lor a mOVB across Gui-roams Strai t to Negros Island.

Negros_-Some conc ern was felt ill GeneralHeadquarters about the Negros operation becauseof the relat ,i1'ely strong enemy garrison, perhaps10,000 men, tJ1a t was estab lished on the i sl and.The initial landing force for the operatiou wasiODlewlutt less than 3 full regimental combat teams,conceivabJynot enough strength £01· a quick cam-pll ign, However, the Ieeling was that it would bebetter to take a longer time to cQnquer N egrosthan to divert troops from more pressing assaults.

O n 29 MOTeb, the landing took p lace on Pulu-~lUldun, N egros, Init ia l' oppos it ion was weak,

d 3 days after the invuaion Bac olod town and·rdrome, "Ilrnt divisional objectives, were taken.OweveI' , it soon became evident tha t the enemy

. t tlnded to make n s tJ :ong suic idal s tand ill thegged high ground in the north C1IDtral Negros,rtbwest of the Bacolod area. On 8 April a

u te reg iment , I Iof te l"au overwater move-ant, took over activity 011 tIte 18ft flank 0,11([ aneerted attack against the onemy surongholda

• The ground .in the nor thern i sland areaad been well chosen and developed by tl!(l Japll-

nese and it WIIS not until mid-May tbat operationsin tlte hills passed int-o the mopping- up sta ge .].i[eanwhi(e, reconnaissance elements swung aroundthe north COlIStof Nsgros and down thp ea!1tcoastalmost to Damaguete, ncar which city a regimentof the Americal Div is ion landed on 2'6 April. Inthis scuthcaetern area no organized enemy resist"ance could be found and by I June it becamec·vident that only s traggler s were to be encoun-tered a ll o ve r the i s l and .

Otbu.-On 26 Marob the Americal Division,uiter hll.ving s taged .a t Ley te , l anded just sou thof Cebu Ci ty, Oebu Island, Again, the enemym ad e n o atte.tnp t to meet the Un i ted S t a t e a f or c esll.t the beachhead and the lle....t dllY the Amerioalentered Cebu City. However, north and west ofth.eoi ty, tbe moste labomta defens ive pos it ionsfound in the Philippines to- that date were encoun-tered. A. . l l reads were sprinkled liberally w:iuhmines and booby tra ps, whole tops of hills wereblown off, demolit ions were !lr llJt ily placed andelectrically detonated, and mutually supportmgpill boxes denied routes to the northwest. CebuCity itself was reduced to a shambles by theenemy lIS he e va cuate d to institute strong de-

fens ive action nor th of the town_ Never theless ,by2 ;Vrny, the major enemy posit ions on ridges inthe Cebn Oity area had be en ove rrun" The re-mnin.tng Japanese were drive n to the northernl lJ( tr emi ti es of the i sl and and were subsequentlybunted down by combat patrols .

Eo/tol .-Meanwhile, the Ameri (la I Div is iondiverted some of its strength to another Vis!l.ymI sl and. On 11 Apr il , e lements landed 011 Bohol.By the end of the month only sca ttere d, ine fle e-ti ve res is tance was to be found and opera tions onbhe isla nd wer s mme d over to guerrilla forces.This operation extended AmeriClmcontrol over allof the ma jor Visayan Islands, a nd tbe Ja pa ne ses ti ll r emain ing in ! il ie cen trul Phi lippines cou ldlace one future=-hopeless, last-ditch stands from:isolnted pockets. Only Mindanao now remainedto. he secured.

. l1i i rnianaQ.-Priol" to 15 September 1944Mindanao had been the ini ti al IiIlrget area of the.Allied forces moving uorthwastward liP tbe NewGuinea coast toward the Phi lippines. However,the sudden change in plans that preceded theinvasion of Layte in October 1944 postponed enattack on Mindanao "foralmost 6months. Duringthis time tbe Japanese defense plans and troopdispositions .hadchnnge d wany time s. Someunits had been sen t forward to the Ley te ba tt le -



ground and others had shifted to meet newlyantieipatel directions of attack. By the end ofJsnurary 1945 the largest remaining J~paneseforce was being assembled in central Mindanaoa long the Sayre Highway running from DavaoGul f in tha south to .Macajola.r Bay in the north.

Late in February the Japanese plan appeared tobe to hold the Cotabato-Parnng coast ofIllana Bay,defend tlie Davao and Zamboanga areas, andmain ta in a mobile rese rve in central Mindanao;Mindanao's lengthy coast l ine remained lightly

held. Gueri ll as were in con t ro l o f l arge por tionsof the island.

The enemy situation had Dot changed when,on 10 March 194.5 IlD American infantry division,le ss one reg imental combat team, landed aga instlight opposi tiou near Zamboanga Ci ty. By ear lymorning the next day the first objective line,including an important airstrip, Willi reached andlater the same da y Zamboanga City was taken.The beachhead was e xpanded rapidly a long themist and west coasts of Zamboanga Peninsula butto the north of the dty progress wasslower becausethe enemy had set up 8 strong defense protectingartillery smplaeements.

The drive to the mountains in the ce nter of theZamboanga Peninsula was slow and difficult but i tgained. v.gor when the absent regiment of thedivision Ilegull to a rr ive in tbe l ine late in March.Organized resi st ance ceased ear ly in .Apr il ande nemy opposition degenerated into pocket r e-sistance hy small uncoordinated clements.

&tlu tl.T~hipelago.-Operations of the divi-sion then were expanded to the Sulu Arthipelngo.On 2 Ap: il r econna issance pat ro ls l anded on JoloI sland and on the same day an infan try bat ta lionundertooc an amphibious assault on 8ang&S a n g o .Island, southwest of Tawi T nwi . Objectives onSa ng u Sw ga were secured against minor opposi-tion a nd the operations we re exploited acre ss anarrow channel to Bangao Island, where allorgo.nized. rosistan e e was eliminate d by 6 April.Guerr il la s were able to take care of the few Japa-nese present on Ta wi Tawi leland. Jolo was at-tacked ia force on 9 April and by 10 MayallJapanese on the i sl and were e ithe r k il led or cap-tur ed. Ba silan I sland, south of the Zamboa ngaPeninsuh, had been invaded on 16 March andSibago, in i sle~ just to the nor theast of Ba:ailanwas taken on 26 April. With all major i s l an&in the Sulu Archipelago secured, Seven th Fleatmotor torpedo boats, based at Tawi Tam pa.-t ro ll ed tbe remainder of the chain, and e l : k n d e d

the ir ~pera tioDs to nor thenstern Borneo . In COIICUrl"l·[l!.ly witi, the driv« 01' Davao, tLwtion, air strips along the archipelago were re)ln· north along the Oiayr.c Highwuy fro-

a nd enlarged for the US B of Allied p1ll.ues. B C.OIItil, tI~'d. TI~e ""('my :fought a d'~Sp{.I~

on the Zamooanga Peninsula act ive patroUi dI'Ia~ II.1g(WL'OIl, d('s'gllG''] to purmit Jl']OVcml'llt

c on tin ue d u nt il ,on 20 June, the OPGfntion rernm m ng com bat un its in to thpMnh,yboluofficially dedared closed. However, the drive l"f'l<ehc'd Mlll"nmng aiJ~

Mora Gulj.-On 17 April a rein.rorced Uni 01' i i\{!I.Y and continued 011 the n01;tI... OnStates infantry division landed near .l\JaJllbQag the 15th of the mon th a determined banzad cou n ter-Parang on Mindanao at the ens tern edge 011 a.tta.ek took place ~11 the vi[lini~y of th e airstripGulf. Preliminary bombardment of the. Fa but was repulsad \~ILh .l:iea~y loss [\8. This provedare a was ve ry e ffective and the landing was to be th.e last major Japanese. action along the

without opposit ion. By shore-to-shore Highw 1l .Y. From then on, tor rent ia l rainsfrom Parang on 18 .April, both the north and the main dotelTent to the advance. Val~mouths of the Mindanao River wets secured fell 011 113),I[a;y and Mala;ybulay, capital of

Cota ba to town, south of Parang, was taken Province, was s~ized. on the 21st. Atsame day. With the beach area secured, I~ Impuluta o, on 23 May, conta ct \'I'lIS establishedpronged drive across the island to Davuo ith an infantry regimental. combat tenrn whichwas begun; the first , by gunboat and landing c landed ne ar Agusa.nOll Ma cajalnr Bav OJ]

up the Mindanao and Pulangi Rivers, and [he and made nn advance down the Sll.yrt'ond, overland along Highway N o. L TIle OIJI",~au.q;u.", oy to Impulatao. This contaet markedtivll was Kabacan at the [unction oft il i.e eas [ end of all .Ja pa ne se resistance along theHighway No.1 and the north-south Sayre HighProgress on . the water continued as f!l.l" us ' tlw Sayre Highway opunorl wad the Du\taoPikit on the Pulangi River. At that POUlt, 01\ liberated, the campaign IVflS ended sLrategi-April, both wings of the division met an d d , · o r , I .. , I W V TIH're remained, 1 1owcver, the task oJon to the Ke.baca.n r oad junction, seizing the down tbl' Japanese ill the mountain rnst-area late on 22 .April. Control of this I which t,hey ha d fl"d. The enemy heldplaced the American forces in p os it io n t o to his mountain positions, especiallynorth along the Sayre .Highway to I\lIala~' Ollst, of the Sayre Highway ill the 11alay-and southeast to Davao Gulf. By the same 01"1 . "11 . . Her!' United States forces instiL~ltrdthe main line of communica tions between the l sO\lth~ll..~t down the 'I'a lomo urail f1"ODl

principal Japanese cLe.follse sectors was severed. . A bridgehead was forcod ulong fheThe initial target of the drive to the norUl Riv..r OJ) 30 Mfl.y~ml moved on lo

the town of Kibawe. At that point the which was taken on 30 Juno. O UPt rail , running northwest from Davao Gulf 0 SLates battalion moved, late in June, tomountains, met the Sa yr e Highway. The shores o f B u b ua n Bay an d O fhi nnecd south lipWWl used by the enemy to evacuate his Agusan River valley 10 Malee. This mn-the Davao Gulf area to central Mindnnao- was ordered to deny the valley to remnantsline of r etreat was denied to t.he Japanese on 3· ,Jupa,wsc fO"('l'S cast of the Sayre .Highwnywhen United States infantry seized Ki destroy any ('IWIllY who might be moving

established a road block Il,t the· from tbe SlIJ"igll0 Paninsnla, By tho cud ofjunction. the ha t.lalion hod reached ::.vrnlo(,'1l1d[Jill

Meanwhile, the advance oVI1J·Ia.ndfrom I, disorganized '· II N ny g ro up s fled into Lhl '

can to the western shores of DaVo.Q GuLfdelayed mostly by the condition oibridgcsthe many s trea rna tha t c rossed tbe Kahroad. Despite the e xtensive Japanese .olit.ions,the TWBB.ty-fourMl Di v i s io ] ) l "B lI . abedon27Apr il . Thence tho d iv ision moved on IJan.d secured that; city on 3 Mfty, c 1 i J J l p ; < ; J U g

drive t~at cove~ed 14.5miles in l5 d [ l ; Y Sfill.] oldDa ted m the seIZing of the last jarl':"B eM ~the Japanese in the Philippinos.

1 i8

t llP Dn~ao nrr-a Lh~ Japanese c lung s tub-to pes : LIons ne ar tho western te rm i nus of

o 'frail. TIl<' battle [or these posibionst J u' I lu n k 0 f tlw 1"011 te to D n I' ao raglld LIHough-

1I!1d on int.o ,June. N o t u nt il hbe middled il! U ip e ne my 's rp .s iEl tn l1 re 1 l1 oJl g· Lb o

Trll.iI beg in to disilHegrute. From Lhentheft' :r~llluin('(l only lih~ tediousTh o Qdv.\uct'· ll.orthwesL I'>longthr

Tlllo~10 Trail "onLhluN.IOilto Kib1ll.1g11Y,cnptun.d?I1 2" .JII'.II'. Beyond. this point LlIP road br-earlmjlll.ssablp and show!'II no signs I neTil,. J.n.ptmese . llod 0 enemy II~Q.

• .. again nc ~ l.L.r mountnins, lind ],ytlu e nd of .Ju~c no orgamzo d res is I n 11c~ II' as [0 h rIouud from Krbangay to Davao,

Operations Oil. ~lindanao ll~.d bern und er thoc~ntl"ol of the Eighth Army, which also hadrJu.'Bct~d the cam paig n to Iibera tci L• 'IV' -",- - ~ l lc c-I 'nora

rsayns, On. 1.. J Il ly 1 94 5 the urea of E ig h t hAr~y ,·e~p.ml~lbility was exprulded to incJud" theentIre PbillpPlJlc A,·ch.ipelngo. On 5 .Julv General~rneArthl.lr d eolared the Philipp.inos to h "lib _

, I" H . e era.~( . ow~ve!", as the commander inchi~rpomtNl 011 t, isolated actions 0" ( Il guerrilln naturew er ·e. t o be e xp sc to d i n th e mountains throughoutthe islands, Thus, for the Eighth Army forces,the wur W US 11< )& y et o ve r,. On Mi nd an ao , mu ch of this una voidable f ight -mg. took ~be form of II steady combat patrolnction agauist the Jopanese in pract ical ly unex-pl?l"cd country east of "Malnybalay 011 the S8.yr~Higb way. In add it ion to" thi s eontinuiug moun-tum act ion, a battnlioncom bat team I\"aS laudedat . t he l ,e o\ l of ~le S ra ng an i Ba y 0)' 12 July, Inthis "rea, where rt was once planned tha t Am~rica II

fo""()eswould first set loot on Pllilippine soil tIll'enemy was ~;oOI) driven back into the bills asguerrillas, movingO\7crlal ld Irom Davao Gulfesrnhlishod contact witJl the Twenty-Iourth Divi~siorr's battalion. Drives from both ends of the'I'alomo 'frail were also maintained against ani so la ted, b tl t tl etel"'nioed, Japunese poc ke t ofresistance. Activities in ull 3 areas ccntinusduntil 15 August. d.atc of tho Japanese acceptanceof the Po tsdam terms. The combined strengthof sc nttert'd enemy groups on Mindnnae W11~

reduced to approximately 9,500 troops.Further north, in the Visayas, the only major

opposition was Jound 011 Negros and Cebu Islands

w her e t he . Ia pan ns e l in d to bs I lushed out of moun-tain caves . On Negros, regimental combat teamo f p ara ch ut ist s, w it h e xce ll Rl lt el os « su pp ort f ro mThirteenth Air Force bombers and reinforcedg nl 'l "l 'i lI n t ro ops , p re sse d s lo wl y o n i n t he b il l ma sswest of Fabrica . Thi s contin uing uction pre-VCIl t~d the enemy from disrupting ~frorts to sreurebudl)' needed 111mb!',·from the Negros timberlands"'lfl, by J 5 August, all hl l&. . .liou t 1 ,60a of tl"e OIlCl'

s trong Jnp"neso glll 'rison hnd be(>11nmuhiln,tea.At the SfUl1P t un e, o ye r on Cebu, oombot patroln~tion 00 tlH' pnrt of tllO A m e d c al D i yi :; ;i on,le-

COWl ted JOI most enemy sti'ugglOl'8. A f ew s ca l~

5 9

1945



tered groupewereencountered when, on 2 Al lg I lB t ,elements o f the div isio n landed not f ar f ro mMedellin ou the n orthw est coast. Such finalopposit ion to complete American control of Oebuwas eliminated as the infantrymen c r i s s c r O S B

ed

the northern portion of the island,les.viDgappro:xi-mate1y 1,200 J ap an e s e , r e m n an t sof th e originalga.rrison,to starv e or surrender.

The Eigbth Army's ClI.DlpaigDs in the VlS&yasan d Mindanao w e re f in is he d. A llthat remainedwas to accept. t he sur render o f Japanese f o r c e s .Such capitllation w as due to come slowly and

1945JAN FEB

Ute Eighth Army was not destined tomany surrender ceremonies. Onunits of the United States andin the s ou th er n i sl an ds p as s edtothe Commanding General ocutm ... ..C om m a nd , a n a re aBui}or.rlino.t.e

ing General.ArmYForQ6SEighth ArmY bad conducted apaign with relatively light forces.in th e Philippines w as finishedquarters prepared for a newa . por tion of the Japanese home

7005120 - <7IF". P. 10)~---.;;...- ...

ussbs report 65, military analysis division, employment of forces under the southwest pacific...

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