From: '1'0;_1 Via:

• u.s.s. :aox;am._(pV'-21) c/o F1a6t Post ~~lea,

San Franeisco, bsiitorni~

DECLASSIFIED Commanding Officer Ohief of Naval ~perations (1) Commander Te.sk Force S:!!lnUTY-SEVEN (2) Commander S~~TH Fleet ( 3) Comnander No.vol Forces, Far East (4)- Commander in Chief, u. S. Pacific Fleet

CV2l/&-hl ,M.-3 Set 0 f 0~ . \S~\'\50

Subj: Action Report for tha period 14 September through 5 October 1950

Ref; (a) CNO rf3stricted ltr Op-345/aP. ser ll9'(l>34 dtd 3 A~ust 1950

Enol: (l) cvG-2 conf ltr ser 014 dtd 10 October 1950; Action Re~ort of' CE~rrier Air Grou-p T':'fO (15 September 1950--- 2 Octobnr 1950) with enclo s\ll"3S thersto. f• C'\~- \ (}...5" •

l. In comgliance with reference (a), the A.Ctinn rep(')rt for the poriod 14 Septanber through 5 October 1960 is hereby submitted.

Part I: Qormodtion of Qwn Forges i?AA MiS§j.o;.

A. In accordP~e with dispatch orders from Oomm~der Seventh Fleet the U.S,S. :BOXE1It. (CJl-:21), with Ca.rrior Air Group T110) enbt?rked, departed SASEBO He..rbor, Japan, 14 September 1950 in com)flllY with the u.s.S. }IJUqCit::ilS'EE (CL-83)- U~S.S. RADFOT\D (DDE-446~, l'nd_ the U.S.S. JJJ.8S E. !CDS {D:.D-787)-! Capt. L.S. Pe.rks, USl~, C"Jomrof'nding the U.S.S. MAlTCHESTER, WI'S OTC. Thh groUp a£ four ships ~roc?eded to the Yellow Sea where 1 t rendezvoused with Task Force 77 on 15 September, reporting. for duty to Rep.r Admirsl E. C. Ewen, Uffil!, CTF77 who 'tiAS also CTG77 .4 and ComCarD1v ONE. Ra~r Admiral J.M. aoSKINS, Oon~ander Carrier Division THRa~, in the U.S.S. VAIJ.iEY FORGE (CV-45), was second in eormell.d. The Tr>.sk Force Wfl.S operating in Mcordence with ConCarD1v 01'13 Operation 0r.d3r 1•50. TPsk Fol'Ce 77 consisted of thr~e carriers, two crutsers, end three divisions of destroyers EtS follows:

U.S. S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) U.S. S. PHILIPPI1131 SEA ( CV-47) U.S. S. :BOXEn (CiT-21) • U.S. S • '~:!OR® STEP. ( CL-144) U. S • S. MAJ.qC:E STEF. ( Ct-.83) Destroyer Divisiom 3l.. lll, ana. 112

:B. The mis-sion of tne Tetik'Foree WP.,s ·t~ conduct P.ir OJ?P-t"ati0ne in the North Korean a:l"ea in order toi {a) naintfdn P..ir supronacy, (b) isolfl te the

.j

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...

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• DECLASSifiED objective areR, Md (c) ::?rovicle Hir cover ~.nd support for op3r£>ti~ns of the AttP,Ck Force in its P..l!lphibious a.ssa.ult on IUCHOLJ scheduled to commence the eve~i~g of. 15 se,toober 1950.

Part II: Chronological Order of ]ven£&•

A. OperA.tions were cond.uctnd Pp}roxina.tely sixty r.11les west of Inchon,. Xorea. i~ the Yellnw Sea.with raplenishnent being a.OC0r.1Jl1shcd in an 8Xea inr.1edia.tely to the south-southwest of the scene of operations. For replenisn-nent '1urposes ·tho TP,Sk Force \'te.s divided into thrM gr0ups, \•tith t\to groups · CRrrying out flight o:perati ons while the third ro::.Jleni shed. Thus CP.ch group in turn hP.d. flight operA.tions for tw0 suocossiv8 oP,.YS ::;nd replenished on . the thir a..

B. Air operations during the perioC!. 0f this r~:\')ort c0nsisted. of tho follm·ring_types r.f nissi(•ns; Deep sup'}ort, close SUJ?'port, targets of op:;.)ortuni ty sweeps, coobat r:dr :1atrols, targ"'t conb~t Edr patrols, e.nti-subnE>.rine pe.trols, naval gun fire spotting, Pnd ph~to reconnaissP.nco.

C. Enecy op)osition was spotty. His ground forces P.ppet>.red to ha.Vf) little in thO \'Iff¥ of hoa.:vy equipnont or P..rnanen.t e..nd. his land tra.ns::>ort fp~ilities P.~d rolling stock were re~id.ly reduced to inoffoctivenass; the only vehicles observo(1. moving in the later ste.ges of the ,()p:ert~.tion were . prir.1iti ve hand .cP.rts Pnd ox cP.rts. Few 1 if p,;rcy- • cnony :plPnes W'3re seen in the Air, end flPk '\'IP.S uoager to nodere1tc in volw:te. Mines :posed the nost serious eneny threat to our· OlJGrt.'oti ons.

D. The following is an outline of the J?OnR• s enploynont during the period covered by this action report:

-' 14 Se>,t>teiJber - Departed. SP.sebo at 1826! for Task Force SEVENTY-SEVW~ off the \'test CO!'I.st of Koren.

l5 Se1Jter.1bor- A.t l238I, the BQX.T;]R suffered A. f;:dlure of the nu.tfoer four nain r0duction geP.r, necessi tPting thB securing of the nunber foqr ne.in engine and locking the .. pll'opoller shP.ft. It WE'.S oed of 28 knots for short pcri0d.s. Tho nw.1b~r f'l"\ur ne.in engine retlP.ined ino:;_ler?.tive for the rest of this OJ?erp,tiron.

At l4l5I • the BOXER re .. Jort'ea. to ConnP.ndcr TPsk Force SEV'l'.-mY-SE'I(!m-T end tcok stPtil'ln in forna.tion. At 1432, lJlPnes were -launched to conduct strikes ag~inst shore dofenses in tho Inchon ~rea in order to prop~re tho boP.C-1-J. for Arl)h!ibious P.see..ult. AJ.,l :plt>.nes were recovoroc't a.t 18201. Pilots repoJ'ted no eneey air Ol')~)osition end, Alt,hf'lugh sone flak W!".S encountered, nc d.AIJa.ge to BirCrPft 'fP.S SUst·pJ.ncd.

16 Septenber - Air o::;>erp.tinn$ e.geJ.nst KcrGP.n tnrgGts wnre C

DECLASSlflED • helicopter, received burns abnut the face f'nd ~.nds. Lt Cnndr. D. C, TAYLOR, USliT, in e.nother P4U, ne,de P. forced w~-ter lflllding in Inch1n Harbor ancl he, too, wgs rescued by e_ helico_;_)ter.

17 Septenber - Air strikes agdnst 2Torth Korean te.rgets '\'rere cnntinuecl. Two nore :BOXER pilots \vore rescuec. uninjured. by helicopters. Lt(jg) E.R. PA!NTEH, USN, was rescued when his F4U cr~she~ into the sea (turing take-off. PnCl. Ensign R.R. S.AUD3fi.S, umr t WFS rescued aft3r nf!king a forced landing in eneey territory snuthee.st of Seoul, tv-here his AD-4 heil. been d.PJ!l?..ged by eneey flak Pnd subsequently c1estroyed by gunfire nf acconp~~~g plane&.

18 Seytenbor -Received fuel oil, ~iatinn gesolinc, P.nd ~~unition fron the re?lenis~~cnt group.

19 Sc-_;?tcnber - ';'hila 0ur r-drcre£t ros tl.!!led their strikes egainst Koref1n targets, the :BO.:.JCEn lnst her first pilrt. An F4U piloted by Lt(jg) Tiwtrcr..IN S!'!ITH, JI-t., USH, scre"ped its wing along the flight deck f1nd struclt the barrier during a lsnding atterr2t causing the :!?le-no to crPsh into the sea in an in-vertet'l. position. The l)ilot, who ap~)ftrently cut his gun bcforA executing a wave-off, was net recovered.

20 Sc,ter.1ber - Dee1J strp~1ort nissi')ns were ::_)rec1oninnte in the :BOXEI.1 s P.ir o:pernti 0ns on the 20th. One AD--4 '"ms lost chiD to eneny ground fire when the plane, piloted by Lt(jg) C.E. S:IDEJ.WJ, USN, cr~shed in eneey territory north of Seoul. Lt(jg) SE.'Ji:.iAN Wf'.S not seem to leE\Ve the .lJlPne, w~ch exploded Ellld burned; he is considered ds sing in A.Cti0n.

~

21 Septenbsr - Received fuel oil gnct P.viati0n ge.soline fron ships in the r~2lenishnent group.

22 tmd·~23::Septenbor - Air strikes, consisting principally of c1eep support nissions, were continued.

24 Septenber - Fresh e.nc"'c frozen provis'i0ns, M well as fuel oil ~nd aviA.ti"ll e;aso].ine, were received frorJ the raplanishnent group.

25 and 26 Sevtenber -:BOXER aircraft continued to senrch for, and hit, rPpidly d.ininish:ing tP.rg,ts in

• DECLASSlfl£0 • 28 Anc. 29 September - While f'.ir stdl~es cc;ntinued PgF~nst ·raJ;>idly

d.windling targets, the ship ~uf'far0d l:iet. tliftd, and las~ pilot OP.sunlty of . this 0peratinn w:Q.en an F4U, flown 'by ~tJ.dg!l OdJ~ HOl'T.ELL,USl~, .vas shot clown naPx Uijongbu. .Although Ensign H011T.IDL1 was seen to lje..tl?.ohute ciettr of the plane E-.nc1 ap.;;>ro-ontly 1Pnc1. sefel.y, it w~.s subsequcntl;r lero-ned that he diad later e£ter hnving been CPpturad, severel;r beaten, and shot in the back by the eneny.

30 Septcnber- R~coivcd fuel oil. aviRtinn gasnline~ Pnd PJ~Juni~ion from ships of the reylenishnent group.

l.October - BOXER aircrl'.ft ble.sted. p_nct destroyed a lP.rge _;_1ower :')lant loce.tsd. just east of Pyongyang. ~he bor:ibing P.lld rocket a.ttF'.cks were excoption-e.l.ly accurate. iVhen the ::_1lanes departe

-fourth dey's opere>.tions Wf'.s renezkt'.ble.

:a. No )ersonnel casut>J.ties were suffeJ'ed. by the sl:d.pj ses enclosure (l) for air group CP.su.alties. '

Part VI: Special CommeAt§.

A~ OneretioAel Readinas§.

l •. upon returning to SPn Diego on 16 June 1950 from a five-nonth ·cruise to the Ft'lr :ElP,st, the BO.ml was granted a 30o-d.ay' psriod for lee.va, liberty, end upkeep plus tender availability from 26 June until 15 Julr. The shilJ was scheduled to•.enter the Spn FrP.ncisco NavP~ ShipyP.rd on 30 August for a nuoh needed four~oonth overhaul pe~iod.

2. The Korean inci'dent, however, quickly chrnged ell plAns, I'I.D.IJ.t on 27' June 1950, the BOXER receiV'Gd orders to proceed to sea to qur:o~-ify Air· · Group ELEVElf, scheG.ulad to sr.il in the U.s. S. PHILIPPINE SEA. Personnel were rec~J.lod from leave Pnd air op~ati0ns were conducted 'in the S?n Diego area ~til returning to ~ort' on 2 July. On·8 July, the ship proceeded to Al.el!leda where she embP.rkod 145. P-51 fl.nc1 6 · L-6 Air Force aircrt>£t, 19 nFtVAl carrier e.ircraft • 1012 passc~ors • Pnd.' ap.:.>ro:dnP~tely 2,000 tons of CPrgo, P~l destined for the Far East KoreAQ thee,tre. Upon returning to San Fr~ncisco after U.: nrt'.eretl spocey round. trip to Y(lknsuka, Ja-~'an• the BOXER WP.S grantee'\. a ten &:y aVI",ile.bili';ty for urgent repP..irs F.1.t the Sfln Frl:'.ncisco Nf'.Vt'\l ShipyPrd. lJ::?on t0rmil:l&tion of this yP,rd }.leriod she r,>roceeded to Alameda for lo1:1.ding and et'lbPrka.tion of Ct'l.l'~er Air Grou;> ~vo.

3. On '24 August·, upon eon:}lction of enbP.rking the flir groul"• the ship proceedad to PeP.rl Harbor where gUnnery t CEII'que~s. P.nd refresher opcr.P.tions were co nc1.ucted durin!$ tho four and one-hPM dpys Pllowed..

4. The ship depP.rted Pc!'l.rl llPrbor on 4 September for Yokosuka w1 th ord~rs to arrive on 13 Se?tember. In addition to e full ~ir gr0up of 96 aircrP..ft, 14 Sl)P.re aircrP.i't for tho JI"A.sllon ELEVEli pool were CPrr1e-:1. "'which il!lnobili·za·d the flight (tack to the ext3nt thPt not even res:potting exorcises for the flight deck crew could be conduCted.

5. Between hl"lving the destiMtion but not tho :STA ch?.nged from Yoko suka to Sasebo, plewing t?-€; l'ti tq ~ ... .flhoon KEZ!A, P..nd attempt. ing to le.unch the spa;-e e.ircrt:tft for KisP.razu Air Foree BP.se A.S ordered or find an:· al.ternP.tG destination, the BOXIDR W~Ul dell'\yed in A.rri ving at s"'.sebo )llltil 14 September. ' "'toon Kharazu s~t Typhoon Condition II • c('urso WPtS r::>.dioally al terod to the south to cirQle typhMn KEZIA cloc..ltwiso. The ship than Ettter:rptod to enter Sasebo the evening of 13 SeptenbBr but found !(EZIA in 'tho SE~.sebo lE-nding circle aheP-

. · DtCLASS\f\tD e

p.nd. tho ship procecd.ed. up ·the r.iitio.ils~iop~ al\Pfuiel entering SP.sebo during the forenoon.

6. During tho few hnurs the ship \tPS in SP-sebo, p"'rsnl-mel wete enge.ged in load.ins CP.rgo and anr1uni t'ion as well P.s in prep!".rntinns f·or gt3tting underwl?,Y prior tn d.P.rkness. Officers fr:-,n thG StP.ff of Connt>nc.er Onrricr Division THREE ro1)0rted. aboPrd wtth the nany eff~ctive Oper~tion Ord.ers P.nc1. the ;?erterient operA.ting instructions. '\11th thA limitccl tine nve.il~"blo P..fter sortie from SE>.sebo 'the evening of 14 Septenbof, r-. chrice hP.d to be nnde PS t0 whether the OporPtion Oro.Grs shnuld be rer-CI. first or Carrier . Division TJ:D?31: Officers c"ncluct their briefing. The lP..tter \>!t\S decided up0n -p.nd the services por:fornod by these 'briAfing officers \ltere r-f inestinPble vP~ue in preparing the ship for ir:medinte cnnbRt oper~tions U)on rend.ezvous with TPsk Force 77 off Korea. on 15 September. Study of the Opere.ti

DECLASSifiED b. The first conbe.t le.unch, nt'l.da l6.ninutGs p.ftGr rend.ezvous with

tho Tt\Sk Force, WPS Rn ex_pGrieltce fron which t1P~ lessons were lePrnccl in a

hurry. The 47-ninute launch for 24VF ?Jld 14 VA, brf'lu[:ht fl.b.s not yet been received. Despi ta tho A.bove,

Cl.ue to the ine;eninus work of the i3\'1 craw, AD-4tv P.ircrt>.ft were scld('\n in

an AOG status.

5. Mf.tcriel DP.na,;e e..ncl.. Cr:1sualties.

a. Dur int; tha :;_)eri nc. of this acti en re)nrt, the ship experienced

thrGe bl'lrricr crP.shes by FtJ:U-4 e.ircr~t ~mel none by the AD's. One of the

F4~1 1 s sustained 'but ninor crR.nage to its gropell~r, Pn~ther required a

propeller change, while the third barri~r crP.sh reo.uired changing the pro-peller, theene;ine, and·nne wing. · ·

'b. In addition to the above bRrrier cr~shes, two F4U-5Ns engaged.

late wires slightly off center to st~board, and. struck the after 5" turret.

The first one, lPndinr; After a dawn :)atrol, sustained d2.na,ee to its ri{",ht t;

wing. The sccond.one, a night lanC.ing, str~k the propeller cone, resulting

in engine an~ propeller changes.

c. The port catapult threw a rin-liner out of the taw cable feir-le~d sheave beneRth the flirht deck ~d w~s out nf coMnissi~n for eleven

hours. The starbo!".rd. CP.tapul t ex.1erienced n ft.dlure of the rivets in the

ritt-liner on the retriavine; ce.ble fe.i:rlN>.

• DECLASSIA£.0 • d. ~Tur.iber tw0 elev11.tor suffered the only other n~.tarial ce.sue~ty

worthy nf nnte. The interlock s~ritch on the deok-edt_~e elevator plFl.tforo

lncks fP.iled to close, thus rendering the elOVt\tor ino11er~tive electricP~ly

for three hours.

c. Air Intclli~enc~.

a.. During tm :SOXEI!' s stPy in the . .HawaiiM. area. the Air Intelligence

Officer, the Photoeraphic Officer ~nd three enlisted photoc.r~phers were

issued tenporarJ adcitional dut:r ('\rders tr. Conma.nder in Chief Pe.cific Fleet

StPif for intelligence briefing and photo interpretation instrnction, res-

pectively, which groE~.tly a.ssistecl in preparing the ship for C0n'Oe.t operP.tions.

b. It is understMd thP.t steps Pre being taken t'l fnrnish ships

bound for forward areas with essential intelligence mr.terial prior tt departure

fron the United StE'.tes. i'then this is acc.r areas and forces operfl.ting in the ter,wa.rd. areas

1s considered essential.

2. Material.

t=t. $one initial difficulty wc.s experienced with charts. Sone

were in s:1ort SUJ7~Jly; othors within the s~nE'l sct hf'ld the tr~.nsverse mercator

grid on. sene she8ts Pnrl. world ;?olyconic on othGrs. Even when cht=trts 1.1rith

prt::)nr t:;ririate coverflce \'lith the following:

r

(!".) Sevorp~ sheets of Us.bF 1•7orld Aeront:>.uticEJl Chnrt (l/1,000,000)

or US~, Piltt~e? Ch~t (l/500,000) were joinod together ' .

to fern a lPrc~e chArt for usc in nPvigPtine,. This chart

\1't>S c'l.ivided into sections nPrkod to in

......

DECLASS1Ft£0 3. Pcr@,Onnel.

ao This OOI:lr1t'..nc1 concurs wtth the cor.mcnt r:uite in l)!'eVious action

· re.)orts concernine; the neeo. for non-flying air intolligence officers.

b. It is felt th~.t the pee..cetine CV air intelligertce orgAnization

consistillb of an Air Intelligence Scheol grad.uate (A. lJilot who hE',s hAd. 3

weeks SlJecial training) in ePch so.uedron fine!. on ePch CV with only C911Rteral

rtuty as AI officer is entirely inAr.equate for· wi:trtirne o:x~rE>.tions. It is

reali2:oc1. thA.t ;_Jar-;cetirne o:.JCrPtions woulcl. :,,ro'bably not warrant the e.ssignment

of officers to these 'billets as ~)!'in?.ry allty nor l'lould the maintenance of all

~ir intelligence naterial including target dossiers and chart folders on

'bo?~d aircrp£t carriers be justified. Therefor is is reconnended that a

~ool of Air Intelli&ence officers f~iliPr with close .support end caTrier

tP.Sk force strike :procedures pnr'1.. reouirenrmts be naintP.ined E1.t a central

· intellic.;ence ACtivity. Fron such t>. pool E>n Air IntelliG

• OECLASSIFI£0 • f::>ct the.t the BOXSJ( had stemed. 62,400 niles since 10 JanuP.ry 1950 with no ~ctUP~ upkeep period in port.

E. Ship ilandling.

' 1. Good stP.tion kee:;_Jing, r.te.neuverine; on three engines l'rhile drf1,gging ~n unfoP.therP.ble outboP.rd screw throll€)l the WP.ter, presen~ed Ft. challenge .. :_:;ew ruc1cl.er Elllgles, varying . between port t'l.nd sterbof'!.rd. turns as 1trell e.s for speed, had to 'be deternined; 'but slowe.. It 1rra.s found that this circuit we.s not satisfPctory when this vessel WP.S on o.ehehed Cl.uty proc~:>d.ing to Yokosuka • .A. continuous gu,ard. is not reoo;:~mended under those conditions.

z. l1J,TT Circuits.

a. The Comm~.nc1er ~!P.val Forces F?r Et:'l.st !i.ATT 'broE-.dc:>st hPnc1led. R very large volm1e of traffic successfully. The ;?ere~leling over Guan Georee Fox of operational imnedie.te end higher precedence nessa.gas was \helpful. ~~'hen a Jilessage we.s nissao. end. other hoF:vy ships also did not !eceive it, there were times t'lhen a. considere.ble delay resulted in servicin,g the mGssaga to Ladio Tokyo.

b. P.ecommende.tions: (1) thP.t a.deq_ude Drintanence personnel 'be e.ssig:ned to guardships in order to insure proper operF'.ting conditions of the equipnent. Hone P.re currently ~.ssie,ned, (2) thrt nore I>crso~nel trAined in the operP..tion. of taletY::;>e equipoert~ be e.ssignad guP.rdshi~1s. .Ap-;-;roxinP.tely 4 should be considered P.s r.tinimun for conbe.t and 3 for noroP.l operl'l.tions.

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• 1)£CtASS1f\EO 3. UHF RATT.

a. The Ultra. High Frequency RATT Cireui t ar.1ong th~ heFtvy s:Q.ips was employed quite successfully. rfuen circuit eonditions were good this proved to be P. most expeditious neans for delivery of traffic.

b •. There were tiues when fading P~nd poor circuit conditions re-sulted in unsatisft=tctory connunica.tions.. Since the MANCHESTER (CL-83)

• continually had better results, it is believed that this condition was due to p.ntennae problems peculi~.r to the CV type.

4. UHF Voice.

UI1F voice cor1nunicetions employing TDZ/RDZ ~qnipnent were considered excellent. It was p~rticularly eff~ctive for CIC connunic~tions and for use on the bridge during Generl'~ Quarters. It was found thP.t constant

· attention to the equipment helped grently in the proper perform~ce of the equipocmt,. Some trouble with the ftU.to-tune feature of the TDZ/BDZ WI\S experienced.

5. VHF Voice.

a.. VHF connunica.tions, pf'l.rticularly on the TilS, were generally considered excellent.

b. A need for constant training in voice procedure and. indiviclual training in articulA-tion was indicated.

c. On a few occasions names of ships were heard to be given in the clear over VHF circuits.. Security indoctrination is aiwP¥S oandatory.

6. CIC and Aircraft Control Circuits.

• l4 Several frequencies of the .AJ:I/ AP..o-1 crystali2:Fttion were in close proximit~. This interfered on aircraft control circuits. For exPxrple channel #7 (1•12.02 MC), chAJUlel :/1:2 (142.74 MC), channel :/1:5 '(143.28 MC), channel #6 (143.64 MC), were less than 1 MC P~art. Sinilarly, channel #9 (140.94 MC) and tho G~~d channel (140.58 MC) were ver,y close together.

b. Recor~T!lendation: The.t fl. wider spreP.d on .. JarjJJtc-1 frequencies be used, prGferably at le-ast 3 neg~e~ apart.

7. Cr:rntoboard.

a. A large nuob~r of ness~~e were A-ddressed or readdressed to this -vessel in cry>,t>tochA.nnels not held. This continued cluri:ng thP operP.tion in spite Of services Which st~ted the pp.rticul~~ cryptochannel WA.S not held Md reencypherment WP.s reouirea..

c. A considere.'ble delAU wr.s experience-d t>t tines in obt~> .. ining answers to services on the e.bove oessages•

-11-

• • d. Recornnendations: Maintaining an adequately stnffed Rnd trained

coding boPrd is me..nda.tory •.. The large nunber of crypto errors is indicPtive of unseasoned personnel itt~ this vital phase of comunications.

8. Vipual.

a. A very lP.rge volUI!le of traffic was handled. Flag hoist WP.s enployed.extensively for tPctical signals dUring daylight. Nancy we.s used successfully w1 th the heavy shil:lS; some difficulty WP.S e&:perienced with destroyers.

b. This carrier operated with a peP.cetine conplement of 21 signal-nan \..rhich is far below the WPX time complement. This placed P. more thml

. considcre.ble strain on signalnen to naintain visual guards.

c. Recommendations: The assignment of additional personnel, e.t lePst up tha we.rtir.le conplement, is consirlered nandatory for successful combE>.t operations.

9. Personnel.

a. A m~ed for nora trained signalmen ancl. radior.1en was appP.rent. Operating under war conditions without a wartime com~lenent of trained personnel h~dicaps the execution of reliable, secure, e~d speedy comnunications

G. CIC.

l. Doctrine.

a. CTF-77 Operation Order l-50 was the most conplete operation order this CIC has he.d to work with. It wr

• OECLAS..~tfl£0 • to clear the circuit• Too many known friendly eonteets were eontinuea to be

reported as raids when therG was no necessity for it. ,

eo. Returning StrikG: Groups were picked up and d

/

• • 1. During the p~st opcrP.tion T.1MY ships hPving cor.muntcP.ti0ns

fa.ilure on CI Net Prtxt~ary switched t0 Screen Connon rrther thl".n CI Net iecon&!r7,. A racUo check P.t tho "oeginnlng of GE~.ch saP.· WP.tch shoulf!. be con-d~cten on CI Net Secondary.

H. Gunnery Depe.rtrnent.

l. 1rnsh,Disposal.

a. TrReh disposal WP..s a mP.jor problen. '11th the incinertotor burning P.round the clock, it was bP.r~ly possible to keep up with the shi:p

1 s nornal production of trash. No tine WRS e.VE'.ile.ble for periodic coC>liD.tc1 rlown of the firebox, with resultant clcterioration. The grePt aoount of wooel.en boxes P.nd. pressed peper connected. with currant pnck;eging of belly tnnks, rockets. and other ar.lr.luniti.on presented an ad1litionAl loP.d with which it wr.s ir.Ipossible to cope by burning.

b. After the first dRy's operations during which nuonrous floating orates and boxes \'tere dodged, orders were issuqd to 'tireek up P~l erP.tes and, boxee into flat surfaces, flatten P~d. puncture all cnns, ft.nd to stow sel'!le until appropriate disposp~ could be effected.

J

c. Throughout. the period the ship was plngued with.countless false reports of mines, periscopes, e.nd just plain- 11 sma.ll unidentified floating objects", which could not be ignored in view of' the floating ene~ nines reported.

a. The ship was constantly unaer great p~essure i~ loading for

this latest trip to Ne.vFE. During the ti:r.1e in which the ar;mnmi tion was being procured and shipped, severP1 ohP~ges in Pllowance were made. D~e to the rather hecti~ circumstances of trying to completely lJO;;ci.'the ship in record til'!le, it WP.s not feasible to make. e.n orderly adjustnent of the ~uniti0n t:tctually loe.d.ed, to the.t of the new changing iulowanee. Severel boxoP.rs of . " rockets ha(t to be l;'eturned to the Annunition Depot sinply 'becp.~se there we.s not tine to sit down P.nd figure out ho\t to j~le the various nagazine~:.. ~o take nora of' e. load.

'b. In ac.1U tion, in an obvious effort to keep us a'b:rea.st of a _. re.pidly cha.nging forwP..rd f'!.rea ·situation, verbal instructions tfe~e given 'by Co~rPac staff .officers to load to c~pe~ity on certain types of bonb~~en at Pearl ~xbor enroute. Additional lOQ-lb GP 'bombs, end Tiny Tin rockets were lop.ded. Bf the tim~ the ship reached the operP.ting area, the piet~re had changed and we found ourselves choked. wi 1;Jl. lOQ-lb boobs which ha.d to 'be shuffled nany tines in order to get at the sore~-needed and m~ch used 50Q-lb GPs. The crowning touch to this sitUF.tion lay in tho fACt that extra 500-pounders were P.vailable at Sasebo enro~t~ but could not be loaded b>3CP.~se , there wets not time to break outand. of£-load the 1()0-.;l.b GPs. .

: ,.,.

• DEGLASSlflED • c. The mrral to this tale seems t0 be th2~ ships being deployed

to forward araas should be loe.ded with the standard :BuOrd allowance, giving

due c(")nside:t"e,tion to limiting overEiii weight. Then there will be lMwey avE'-11-

able to the forward area commp.nders to m$e any special addi tic,nal 1 ading

~equired.. for prospective operati0ns. These opAra.ti0ns P..re often so classifi~d

the.t the reat echelons could n0t possibly anticipate them in individual ship

loading. Furthermore, if a Task Force Commander knows that ships reporting to

him have a certain standsrd ammunition loading he is enabled to plan his strikes

and resupply more effectively than if he has to determine individual ship

loadings.

d. Stmrrage of 511 HVA?.' s !?resented a serious problem. The magadne

stowage plan provides a total racked stowage of 3,290 rocket mo~ors; 3;a5n and

5~e..,,. \'lith an allowance of 5000 5.0" motors alld 900 3.SStr motors, this leaves

2,610 motors to be stored in boxes, in magazines normally assigned to 40W~

or lOQ-lb bombs. Such stowage presents not only' en ttunboxinglt problem, invol-

ving multiple handling of the motors and boxes; out an additional fire hazard

both in the· megaiine and in the empty box stowage topside. The difficulties

of disposin5 of this large amount of l~b8r have been previously mentioned •.

Some pro51'am to increase the :Proper stowf.lge facilities for rocket motors should

be initiated at the earliest possible time, and a serious effort made to br.ing

aoout an agreement between·ellowance and stowage facilities.

Compartment l~o. o-301-L, frame 150 to 159, was isolated e.nd used

as a reE~dy service room for ~tssembling rockets. :B"ire hoses wr::re kept connected

and a minimam of eEmUnition broken out consistent with the strikes being

prepared.

4. &mmMi tion Replenishment.

a. During thiS period, the BOX!mi reamed at sea from U.S.S. MT.

~~ (AE-16) three_ times. Rapid and efficient service was rendered and.. the

pPrsonnel of the MT. l~Tl~ were most cooperetive in fulfilling our needs to

the best of their ability. The only suggestion for improving this procedure

would be to provide the .AB' s with a w1d.e1" assortment of fuses '"hich are not

normally stocked in ships' allowance.' \

. b. :Belted .so Cal. anunun~tion supplied took a 15ree.t load off the shouldGrs of the aviation ordnance crews. This service should be ex

panded to

include 20Mt-i, belted with M8 links.*

*Sec enclosure (1), ~.ragraph 3. (h) 2(e) for a.dditi0nal comments on ge links.

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\

·;·

•• I. Sllp1>1Y J2epartmeat.

1. _Load\ng.

,:

DECLASS\F\£0 • a. Despite the brief loading period, a l8D-daf stock level in

nearly all classes was achieved prior to departure from the United States on 24 August. Aviation supplies placed on "board averaged nee.rly 90%. Topping off and the filling of some shortP.~s were accomplished during the approximately 48 hours available at Pearl Harbor in early·September.

a. Since lee.viDg Pce.rl on 4 September, few major supply problems have "been encountAred. A -current problem we..s the neer-exhaustion of Mark

. '

12 drop tanks due to heavy expenditure for napalm use. 200 stock spares (in addition to l pP-r aircrP£t) were on bop.rd upon entP-ring the action zone. The full allowance of some a.viation.items, suQh as tail hooks and teil wheel lock-ing pins for F4U-4 aircraft WPS issued almost ~t once because of the heavy· opert>ting schedule. Replacements in large o..ua.ntities luwe been or~ered. Initial short~ges of certain items, such as cowlflap motors and fuel transfer pumps have bP-en felt sharply, out the problem bas been met by temporizing methods such as exchBnge between CP.rriers of the Task Force or between planes on board. The actUal number of operPtional ADG lu>.s averaged about one.

3. t{eplenishn\eQ$•

a. Replenishment has consisted entirely of fuel, aviation gPsoline, ammuni~ion, fresh provisions P~d a few items of GSK. ~l r~plenishment except the GSK end some provisioning P.t Sa.sebo h,fl,s oeon accomplished at sea, and has proven qu~te satisfactory. Exchenge of VP.rious tn>as of material a.mong many ships of .the Task Force on a "when-available" bP.sis, though small in quantity, has produced e. heartening effect on all conce~nea.

J. RecaRitu1a.tion of Recommen4ations.

l. Air Qperations.

(1) That effective Operation Orders and pertinent Operating Instructions be made available to ships ordered forward. earliest practicable, and, not less than one (l) full day. prior to involvement in actual operations.

2. Air DepA.fiment.

(2) ThP.t in similar circumstances carriers going into combat should carr;v approximate 5-10 percent more aircraft than the normal complement. (5% is, the optimum for operationa\li' the' availability of replacement aircraft aboard be the deciding :f'act.or)

(3) T.hat the laminated wood constructi~n of universal airplane wheel oho~s be improved to prevent parting of the glued join.ts.

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1 - t ,,~ _ -~ • ,_- ~ -.:'>=--: ~-=.,..-··"'~.~~-~:-?,·~~~-~;::..;~ i. -r·.- .-~-~,~:~~·.w~. L-"~;r-~

. '

• DECLASSIF1ED • (4) ThPt action be initiA.tod tojbring ail cv•s Up to their full allowance of AEW racks, test equipment• etc,

(5) That the supply of maps and chart~ available ·to cv•s be increased and that the use ~ one type of grid be ste~dardized, at least within sets,

(6) Th?.t gridded charts for close support work be issued in booklet form using a scale of 1/25,000. · '

(7) That emphasis be placed.(a·.pilot training in the use of mapse.nd charts, particularly with reference to grid coordinates.

(8) That AI end PI personnel be issued TAD orders to CinCP~leetts staff for briefing in advance of de~.rture for combat.

(9) That All possible intelligence materie~ be furnished ships prior to arrival in the forward areas.

(10) That a pool of non-flying AI Officers be es_tabliShed e.t a~central .. , I. t. · activity 130. that=. they can, be~ supplied ·to the· fleet iaS needed.·. ·'"'- • G· ' .. ~··· ..

. (11) That non-flying AI Officars be supplied to carriers going fnto action in the following quantities: 3 for the ship, one for the Air Group Commander, and one for each squadron aboard.

(12) That AI Officers receive thorough training as Photo Interpreters during peacetime.

4. Cornr1unications.

{13) That the TF common CW circuit be not continuously guarded when the ship is proceeding on detached duty beyond effective operating range.

(14) That the conmunications personnel assigned be brought up to the full wartime complement for CVls going into combat operations, and that this measure be given the highest priority. Special consideration should be given in this regard to assigning trained coding officers as the disparity bet"1een peacetime and combat operations is greater in this section than in any other.

(15) That steps be taken to improve the UHF antennae features on a CV.

(16) That personnel be continuously trained in (a) voice procedure :and articulation, and (b) security over voice circuits.

(17) That channels on .AN/.bRC-1 frequencies be spread at least 3 1-10 apart.

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• D£CLASS1f1Ef' • 6. CIC.

(18) That .AE\'1 aircraft should be separated from each other by 30 to 50 miles. (19) That the method of utilizing individual ships daily to control C..iU', strikes, and ASP be made standard doctrine.

(20) That the Task Force CIC Officer eve~uate raids reported by other ships before designating them as such, and 1£ subsequently discovered to be friendly that they henceforth be referred to as "Green" instead of 11Red", using the same number originally as signed.

(21) That steps be taken to insure proper use of IFF by all friendly planes in the area. of operations.

(22) That the prF>ctice of using TOMCATS be revived.

(23) That Task Forces be separated by more thrul 50 miles; or one overall Force CIC Controller be established.

(24) That the Force CICO pass formetion informP.tion and station assil§>nments immediately to a Carrier Group. joining or rejoining the force. (25) That for opert'1.tions of this type a LOC.AP as well as a HIC.AP be employed. (26) That the CAP be held on station until relieving CAP is on CAP Controller's channel.

(27) That more than one FAD frequen•y be assigned.

(28) That the CI Het S~c~ndary be usod as such.

7. Gunneg.

(29) That better trash disposal facilities be provided.

(30) That ships be loaded with standard ammunition loading.

(31) That proper assigned stowage be provided for all aro~unition on war allowance list, especially rockets. ,.

(32) That belted .so Cal. and 20MM aircraft machine gun ~munition be provided for supply to ships and \~~adrons. ~··-; , r---.......

Copy to: CNO (advance•2) CinCPa.cFlt

\\ ,, ~\ \ ~ \" : ., \\ i •\ \ _\ \ ' \..).) J ""}JL~ '~· J\A c., \ _. ) CAMERON BRI oos I ')

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