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Energy Energy Use of electronic seals and remote data transmission to increase the efficiency of safeguards applied in a static Plutonium store L. Persson 1 , S. Synetos 1 , A. Ozols 1 , K. Ruuska 1 , R. Leslie 2 , H. Du Preez 2 , C. Martinez 3 , K. Payne 4 , A. Polkey 4 , M. Beaman 5 , 1 European Commission, DG ENER, Directorate Nuclear Safeguards (EURATOM Safeguards), Luxembourg 2 SGOC, IAEA, Vienna 3 SGTS, IAEA, Vienna 4 Sellafield Ltd, Cumbria, UK 5 Office for Nuclear Regulation, UK 11/26/14 Using electronic seals together with remote data transmission (RDT) can significantly reduce the need for the physical presence of inspectors at static Pu stores. A Pu store jointly inspected by EURATOM and the IAEA was equipped with special covers for the channel locks. Electronic (EOSS) and Cobra group seals were applied in such a manner that minimal loss of knowledge will occur in the event of individual seal failures. The use of RDT to transmit EOSS and FAST surveillance data makes it possible for the inspectorates to replace monthly inspections with seal data checks, supplemented by periodic design information verification. The modified approach has increased the operational flexibility for the operator and initially reduced the inspection frequency by 50 %.

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EnergyEnergy

Use of electronic seals and remote data transmission to increase the efficiency of safeguards applied in a static Plutonium storeL. Persson1, S. Synetos1, A. Ozols1, K. Ruuska1, R. Leslie2, H. Du Preez2, C. Martinez3, K. Payne4, A. Polkey4, M. Beaman5,

1European Commission, DG ENER, Directorate Nuclear Safeguards (EURATOM Safeguards), Luxembourg2SGOC, IAEA, Vienna3SGTS, IAEA, Vienna4Sellafield Ltd, Cumbria, UK5Office for Nuclear Regulation, UK

11/26/14

Using electronic seals together with remote data transmission (RDT) can significantly reduce the need for the physical presence of inspectors at static Pu stores.

A Pu store jointly inspected by EURATOM and the IAEA was equipped with special covers for the channel locks. Electronic (EOSS) and Cobra group seals were applied in such a manner that minimal loss of knowledge will occur in the event of individual seal failures.

The use of RDT to transmit EOSS and FAST surveillance data makes it possible for the inspectorates to replace monthly inspections with seal data checks, supplemented by periodic design information verification.

The modified approach has increased the operational flexibility for the operator and initially reduced the inspection frequency by 50 %.

EnergyEnergy

11/26/14

Safeguarding direct use NM• Basic principle: verify material upon receipt and place the material under

appropriate Containment & Surveillance (C/S).

• Two independent C/S techniques approved as dual− only review the C/S as long as the review is satisfactory− Any discrepancies would result in additional assessment and verification activities.

• Sensitivity and amount of Nuclear Material (NM) deciding factors for how often the inspectorates must satisfy themselves that all material is accounted for.

• Direct use material, such as Pu, has a timeliness factor of 1 month which means that all material must be accounted for on a monthly basis

− Traditionally inspectors on-site monthly for verification activities.

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EnergyEnergy

11/26/14

Static Pu Store at Sellafield• Store reached its capacity years ago, i.e. static store!• Seals applied on all channels containing NM and on the perimeter of store• Surveillance systems, FAST with QDIS as backup• Operator obliged to enter the store at regular intervals for safety and

maintenance checks in order to fulfil the Site License Conditions

Old approach New approach

Conclusions

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EnergyEnergy

11/26/14

Static Pu Store at Sellafield, old approach

• However: PIV requirement was verification of seals at random medium detection probability. • High number of seals involved -> perform the verification required for PIV over the material balance

period e.g. do one twelfth per inspection. These seal verification activities and the requirement to restrict the valid attachment time for seals to three years resulted in verification of a high number of seals each month.

• Restricted the flexibility of operator access to the store and required a monthly presence by the two inspectorates. The monthly verification activities consisted of seal verification/replacement, video review and monthly accountancy updates

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• Fast surveillance system with QDIS as backup• Electronic seals applied on perimeter of store• Requirement: a monthly positive review of at least

one of the • components of the C/S systems which consisted of

surveillance • review or seal verification (replacement of seals) on

channels at • random low detection probability.

• All channels containing NM were sealed using Copper Brass Common (CBC) seals.

ConclusionsNew approach

EnergyEnergy

11/26/14

Static Pu Store at Sellafield, new approach

• Special covers for the channel locks were developed and attached to the channel charge face. • EOSS and Cobra group seals were applied that ensure minimal loss of knowledge in the event of any

individual seal failures.• Remote data transmission of electronic seals data and surveillance data, monthly conclusions drawn.• Increased operational flexibility for the operator.• Significant decrease in inspection frequency.

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EnergyEnergy

11/26/14

Conclusions

The new arrangements rely on group sealing using EOSS and COBRA seals on store channels containing NM and EOSS seals on the perimeters of the store together with a FAST surveillance system using a QDIS as backup.

All EOSS seals and FAST data are remotely accessible from Luxembourg and transmitted further to the IAEA HQ according to agreed procedures. These modifications make it possible to remotely verify that the continuity of knowledge of NM at a static store in Sellafield is maintained both from the EURATOM and IAEA HQs.

This has made considerable savings in manpower requirements possible and reduced the need for physical presence of inspectors to initially about half.

Also for the operator considerable savings have been possible as they no longer have to plan resources in order for the store to be open every month solely for replacement of seals. Also the operational flexibility for the operator has increased as they can now plan safety checks and maintenance outside inspection weeks.

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