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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSEJOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO

GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBAAPO AE 09360

JTF GTMO-CG 22 Apil 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,Miami, FL33172.

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country forContinued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9PK-0000015DP

JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment1. (FOUO) Personal Information:

o JDIMSAIDRC Reference Name: ZiaShao Aliases and Current/True Name: Zia Ul Shaho Place of Birth: Karachi. Pakistan (PK)o Date of Birth: 5 Janua4v 1976o Citizenship: Pakistano Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9PK-000015DP

2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health and is not on any chronic medications. He hasa lactulose allergy. He has no travel restrictions.

3. (S/NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends detainee be Transferred to theControl of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD).b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Release or Transfer tothe Control of Another Country (TR) on 20 November 2003. Based upon informationobtained since detainee's previous assessment, it is now recommended he be Transfened tothe Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD).

For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a member of the Taliban with closeties to the Harakat Ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI). Detainee possesses institutional knowledge of

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCESREASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)DECLASSIFY ON: 20300422

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JTF GTMO-CGSUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer Control to Another Country for ContinuedDetention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9PK-000015DP (S)

the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), Harakat-ul-Mujahidin (HUM) and Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LET).(Analyst note: HUJI, JEM, HUM and LET are described as Pakistani Militant/ExtremistGroups and are designated a Tier 1 Terrorist Target by the IICT Counterterrorism TierListing. Tier 1 Targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support,that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests.)Detainee admits supporting the Taliban against Coalition forces on the front lines bytransporting food, supplies, weapons and personnel. Due to detainee's extensive knowledgeof Taliban, HUJI, JEM and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID)operations as well as his placement and access to key figures and front line positions, it ismost likely detainee was an active participant against US and Coalition forces. It is assessedthat detainee is concealing his true affrliations with Pakistani Islamic extremist organizationsand his support of the Taliban in Afghanistan (AF). It is assessed this detainee is aMEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the followingparagraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.

a. (S) Prior History: Detainee has a certificate in general studies from the Anglo UrduSchool.

b. (S) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee left Karachi, Pakistan (PK), where he wasliving and traveled through Quetta, PK, to Khandahar, AF. After a short stop, he went toKabul, AF, where he found a Taliban operated drug store and met a Talib (Analyst note:Taliban member) that told him if he went to Konduz, AF, he could start driving a truckimmediately for the Taliban. The Talib wrote detainee's name on a piece of paper allowingdetainee authorization to board a plane to Konduz, AF.

c. (S) Training and Activities: Upon aniving in Konduz, AF, detainee was met by twoarmed members of the Taliban and began driving for the Taliban immediately. He drovefood, supplies, weapons and personnel from Konduz to Tangi, Bangi, Khawadjager, andKhanabad, AF. (Analyst note: Above locations are also the locations of Talibanencampments.) Detainee also drove Taliban scouting parties consisting of thirty to thirty-fivemen that would scout the mountains looking for Northern Alliance troops. During detainee'sTaliban service he acquired knowledge of the JEM and HUJI terrorist organizations, Talibancommunication security procedures such as codewords and simple encryption techniques, aswell as observed Taliban and Al-Qaida leadership to include Senior Al-Qaida CommanderAbdul Hadi Al Iraqi. (Analyst note: Abdul Hadi Al Iraqi was the leader of Usama BinLaden's (UBL) Arab Brigade in Konduz, AF, region. The Arab Brigade was UBL's primaryformation supporting Taliban objectives.) Additionally, detainee interacted with what he

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believes to be Arab members of the Pakistani ISID that would spy against the NorthernAlliance and report to Taliban/HUJI commander Sajjad and Taliban commander Ayubi.

d. (S) Capture Information: He was ordered to surrender to the Northern Alliance by hisleader, Qari Saleem. Detainee drove a truck full of Taliban soldiers to surrender to GeneralDostam's forces. A Northern Alliance soldier boarded detainee's truck and told him to driveto a prison nearMazar-e-Sharif, AF. Detainee escaped, but was recaptured by NorthernAlliance soldiers. Detainee was tumed over to US forces on26 November 2001.

e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 13 May 2002f. (S/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on thefollowing:

. Punjab foreign fighters from the Punjab region who supported the Taliban operatingnonh ofKonduz

o Punjabi leaders, Commander Qari Saleem and deputy, Bayee Moogheerah. Punjab recruiting practices, to include madrassas used as recruiting places in Pakistan

5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose athreat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:. (S) Detainee admits to working for the Taliban before and during the US invasion ofAfghanistan.. (S) Abdul Sedar Nafeesi, US9PK-00001lDP (ISN 011), identified detainee as amember of the HUJI.. (S) Detainee's direct supervisor, Qari Saleem, who was identified as commander ofthe Taliban Punjabi forces in Konduz Province, AF.

o (S) Qari Saleem is the head of a madrassa used by HUJI leader Sajjad who wouldfrequently attend and hold meetings at the madrassa.o (S) Qari Saleem is possibly Qari Saleem Ahmed that was reportedly arrestedaround 1999 for being a member of the HUM, HUJI and LET with connection tosubversive elements of the Pakistani ISID. (Analyst note: This information amplifiesQari Saleem's connection to the HUJI and suggests detainee was likely providingassistance to the HUJI forces operating in northern Afghanistan as well.)

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. (S) Detainee admits to interacting with possible Pakistani ISID spies working forTaliban and HUJI forces that reported to HUJI/Taliban leader Sajjad. (Analyst note: Thisidentifies detainee was trusted within the Taliban and HUJI organizations and addsvalidity to the likelihood of detainee's affiliation to the HUJI.)

o (S) Detainee has also provided information on ISID leadership, training facilitiesand cooperation between the ISID and Taliban. (Analyst note: Detainee has notprovided justifiable, if any, means of acquiring this in-depth information. This levelof knowledge suggests detainee was likely affiliated with this type of activity.)

o (S/A{F) Detainee has acquired significant knowledge of several Tier I targets asdefined by the IICT Counterterrorism Tier Listing.

o (S/A{F) Detainee possesses significant amount of detailed institutional knowledgeregarding the HUJI and JEM terrorist organizations as well as descriptive informationregarding Taliban leadership in the Chickeh, AF. (Analyst note: Detainee'sknowledge of HUJI, JEM, and Taliban surpasses what is expected from a simpleTaliban driver. It is believed detainee is down playing his true affiliation with theseterrorist organizationso (S/AfD Detainee also claims to know of the HUM and LET terroristorganizations without rationale for this knowledge. He has yet to provide detailedinformation on these organizations.

. (S) Detainee describes sightings of Senior Al-Qaida commander Hadi Al Iraqi andTaliban former Northern Afghanistan and Kabul Corps commander Mullah Dadullah.(Analyst note: This demonstrates detainee was able to identifu top Taliban/Al-Qaidaleaders and the his ability to access areas where senior leaders were operating.). (S) Detainee has been referred to by the title Mujahidid by his family mailcorrespondence. Detainee claims his family was under the impression he was traveling toAfghanistan for jihad although, in actuality, detainee claims he traveled to Afghanistan tofind work as a truck driver. (Analyst note: Mujahidid is an honorific title that isbestowed to Mujahideen (Holy Worriers) that have participated in jihad.). (S) Isaka K Bannu, ISN US9PK-000023DP (ISN 023), has reported on a conversationbetween himself and detainee. ISN 023 reported detainee stated he was a truck driver forthe Taliban and had made several trips from Pakistan to Afghanistan delivering jihadfighters. Additionally, detainee stated he had four brothers, who were Taliban truckdrivers as well. (Analyst note: This information adds validity to the assumptiondetainee's family supports jihad and likely provides insight as to detainee's true motivesfor going to Afghanistan.)

c. (S/NF) Detainee's Gonduct: Detainee's behavior has been assessed as mostlycompliant and cooperative. Detainee has had six incidents of failure to comply with orders

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given by the guards. The "failure to comply" incidents consisted of failure to take hisblanket off his head in violation of camp rules.

6. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.. (S) Detainee may be able to provide funher information concerning Senior Al-Qaidaleader Hadi Al Iraqi and other Al-Qaida figures. Detainee had placement and access tosenior Taliban, JEM and HUJI personalities. Detainee is likely able to provide furtherinformation on Taliban, Al-Qaida and Pakistani Islamic extremist groups operating inPakistan and Afghanistan to include JEM, HUJI, HUM and LeT. Detainee has alsoprovided, and may possess, further information on Pakistani Inter Service IntelligenceDirectorate (ISID) connections to the Taliban and Pakistani Islamic extremist groups.Finally, detainee has provided information on radio procedures, code words and armedencampments used by the Taliban, which may indicate deeper knowledge of OPSECemployed by Al-Qaida and its terrorist network.

b. (S/NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:o High-level Taliban/Al-Qaida leaderso Taliban/Al-Qaida

o Personalitieso Transportationprocedureso Communicationsecurityprocedureso Safehouses and operational locations

r Operational, institutional and leadership information on HUJI, JEM, HUM and LeTo ISID connections with Pakistani Islamic extremist groups

7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 17 September 2004,and he remains an enemy combatant.

zr?LJ&( IAY W. HOODVBrigadier General, USA

Commanding

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