U.S. PERSPECTIVES U.S. PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE SECURITY*ON SPACE SECURITY*

Joan Johnson-FreeseJoan Johnson-FreeseNaval War CollegeNaval War College

Newport, RINewport, RIApril 23, 2007April 23, 2007

*The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the official position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Primary ConsiderationsPrimary Considerations

2006 US National Space Policy2006 US National Space Policy 2007 Chinese ASAT Test2007 Chinese ASAT Test

Shaping the U.S. Security Shaping the U.S. Security PerspectivePerspective

Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, also known as the Rumsfeld to the United States, also known as the Rumsfeld Commission, after its chair, Donald Rumsfeld. Commission, after its chair, Donald Rumsfeld. 19981998

Commission on U.S. National Security and Commission on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, also known as the Cox Republic of China, also known as the Cox Commission after its Chair, then California Commission after its Chair, then California Congressman (Republican) Christopher Cox. 1999Congressman (Republican) Christopher Cox. 1999

Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization, also known Space Management and Organization, also known as the Rumsfeld Space Commission, again after as the Rumsfeld Space Commission, again after its chair, Donald Rumsfeld. 2000its chair, Donald Rumsfeld. 2000

Threads of Policy from Threads of Policy from CommissionsCommissions

Missile Threat to the US (Missile Defense)Missile Threat to the US (Missile Defense) China Threat (Relating to Space China Threat (Relating to Space

Technology)Technology) Inevitability that space will become a Inevitability that space will become a

battle ground, therefore the U.S. would be battle ground, therefore the U.S. would be remiss not to prepare for that.remiss not to prepare for that.

Because 95% of space technology is dual-Because 95% of space technology is dual-use, and because restraint is not in the use, and because restraint is not in the best interests of the U.S. – arms control best interests of the U.S. – arms control explicitly rejected and a focus on explicitly rejected and a focus on technology implicitly supported.technology implicitly supported.

Military DoctrineMilitary Doctrine Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, published by Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, published by

the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 2002, states that, “The United States must be 2002, states that, “The United States must be able to protect its space assets and deny the use able to protect its space assets and deny the use of space assets by its adversaries.”of space assets by its adversaries.”

The 2004 U.S. Air Force Counterspace Operations The 2004 U.S. Air Force Counterspace Operations Doctrine document states that, “US Air Force Doctrine document states that, “US Air Force counterspace operations are the ways and means counterspace operations are the ways and means by which the Air Force achieves and maintains by which the Air Force achieves and maintains space superiority. Space superiority provides space superiority. Space superiority provides freedom to attack as well as freedom from freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack.” attack.”

2006 National Space Policy2006 National Space Policy

““The United States is committed to The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful space by all nations for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity. Consistent with this humanity. Consistent with this principle, ‘peaceful purposes’ allow principle, ‘peaceful purposes’ allow U.S. defense and intelligence-related U.S. defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national activities in pursuit of national interests.” interests.”

2006 National Space Policy2006 National Space Policy

““The United States considers space The United States considers space systems to have the rights of systems to have the rights of passage through and operations in passage through and operations in space without interference. space without interference. Consistent with this principle, the Consistent with this principle, the United States will view the United States will view the purposeful interference with its purposeful interference with its space systems as an infringement on space systems as an infringement on its rights.” its rights.”

IssuesIssues

Is the difference from past policies tone or Is the difference from past policies tone or content?content?

AmbiguitiesAmbiguities Do rights stated to accrue to the U.S. also Do rights stated to accrue to the U.S. also

accrue to other sovereign nations?accrue to other sovereign nations?• At least in the case of “rights of passage” – At least in the case of “rights of passage” –

yes; to be guaranteed not by international law, yes; to be guaranteed not by international law, but by force if necessary (capabilities)but by force if necessary (capabilities)

Reception outside the USReception outside the US

Military Space MissionsMilitary Space Missions

Space support (e.g. launch and satellite Space support (e.g. launch and satellite maintenance); maintenance);

Force enhancement (capabilities to Force enhancement (capabilities to increase the advantages of the warfighter, increase the advantages of the warfighter, such as precision guided munitions and such as precision guided munitions and C4); C4);

Space control (the ability to use space Space control (the ability to use space when needed and deny to the adversary); when needed and deny to the adversary);

Force application (space weapons). Force application (space weapons).

China & the USChina & the US

The view of the heavens from Beijing and The view of the heavens from Beijing and the view of the heavens from Washington the view of the heavens from Washington are very different. From Beijing, the view are very different. From Beijing, the view is largely obscured by U.S. assets, assets is largely obscured by U.S. assets, assets still rapidly expanding in number, type and still rapidly expanding in number, type and potential lethality. From Washington, the potential lethality. From Washington, the space assets which facilitate a strong and space assets which facilitate a strong and dynamic U.S. economy and the most dynamic U.S. economy and the most powerful military in the world were placed powerful military in the world were placed in jeopardy on January 11, 2007 with the in jeopardy on January 11, 2007 with the successful Chinese ASAT test.successful Chinese ASAT test.

US Concerns About China ThreatUS Concerns About China Threat

Cox Committee ReportCox Committee Report ShashoujianShashoujian TaiwanTaiwan ASAT Test January 2007ASAT Test January 2007

US Reaction to Chinese ASAT TestUS Reaction to Chinese ASAT Test

TemperedTempered Admiral Fallon & General Cartwright: not Admiral Fallon & General Cartwright: not

surprisingsurprising Delay in Statement from Beijing Delay in Statement from Beijing

Complicated the SituationComplicated the Situation Space Arms Race?Space Arms Race? Calls for More Technology Development; Calls for More Technology Development;

More Emphasis on Space as a Security More Emphasis on Space as a Security issue (Senator Kyl)issue (Senator Kyl)

Senator Kyl’s Suggestions* (not Senator Kyl’s Suggestions* (not U.S. policy)U.S. policy)

Implement the 2001 Space Commission proposals Implement the 2001 Space Commission proposals [management and organization][management and organization]

Hold hearings to assure that the Chinese ASAT Hold hearings to assure that the Chinese ASAT technology was not based on U.S. technology, shared or technology was not based on U.S. technology, shared or stolenstolen

Assure the military has access to operationally responsive Assure the military has access to operationally responsive space – meaning, the ability to launch and quickly space – meaning, the ability to launch and quickly activate--militarily useful satellitesactivate--militarily useful satellites

Support the "Space-Based Test Bed," to include both Support the "Space-Based Test Bed," to include both kinetic and directed energy components to destroy kinetic and directed energy components to destroy missiles in their boost phasemissiles in their boost phase

Increase the budget for “space control” programsIncrease the budget for “space control” programs Make “space security” a conservative priority again.Make “space security” a conservative priority again.

*January 2007

Options Beyond TechnologyOptions Beyond Technology

ReconstitutionReconstitution Decrease vulnerability due to Decrease vulnerability due to

reliance on technology reliance on technology (learn/remember other ways to fight)(learn/remember other ways to fight)

Include arms control in policy optionsInclude arms control in policy options Encourage partnerships on peaceful Encourage partnerships on peaceful

uses of spaceuses of space

ConclusionsConclusions

Space Security currently defined in Space Security currently defined in primarily military termsprimarily military terms

Policy currently focuses on technology Policy currently focuses on technology fixes to perceived space security issuesfixes to perceived space security issues

Space debate is being encouraged by Space debate is being encouraged by those who feel that space security, in the those who feel that space security, in the U.S. and elsewhere, would be better U.S. and elsewhere, would be better served by use of broader policy options.served by use of broader policy options.