u.s. naval forces vietnam monthly historical summary oct 1971

8/2/2019 U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam Monthly Historical Summary Oct 1971

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COMMANDERU.S. NAVAL FORCES

VIETNAMMONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY

October 1971

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Force Historian ..... ........................... LCDR George C. Womble_.Field Historianso................................. LT John P. Sudigala

LT Barnaby S. RuheLT William Y. Frentzel, II

Journalists. ....... .JOZ Don H. StephensonJ03 Michael L. Holt

.ONCLASSIFIED.. , .

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'A Table of Contents_____ _________ '\-Page3

FOREWORDCHRONOLOGYCURRENT OPERATIONSNAVAL ADVISORY GROUP SUMMARY "1* MOBILE OPERATIONS COMMAND (RIVERINE) and CTF 116 SUMMARYTRAN HUNG DAG IVTRAN HUNG DAO VITRAN HUNG DAO XVIIITRAN HUNG DAO XXTRAN HUNG DAO XXITRAN HUNG DAO XXIVTRAN HUNG DAO XXVTRAN HUNG DAO XXVITRAN HUNG DAO XXVIIRUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE -CATF 2UCTF 212

RIVER ASSAULT GROUPSSPECIA-L. WARFARECTG 116.7

* CTG 116. 8COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES (COASTAL ZONES)

* ~PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARYACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY4NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGONNAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES .

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CONFIDENTIALPag~e

THE DUFFLE BAG / TIGHT JAW PROGRAMAPPENDIX I - CHNAVADVGRP Task and Advisory OrganizationAPPENDIX II - Operational/Administrative Chains of CommandAPPENDIX III - Glossary of Abbreviations

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CONFIDENTIAL

FORE WORDEnemy activity increased sharply as expected throughout the Republic just

prior to the 3 October Presidential Election. Rockets fell on both Saigon andVung Tau during the early morning hours of the Election Day- however,fortunately, little damage resulted from the VC show of force.

U.S. Navy casualties rose slightly during October. One officer waskilled, two officers wounded, and five enlisted men wounded in enemyinitiated actions mainly in the Delta.

The VNN took steps on 1 October to strengthen its Coastal SurveillanceForce by a staff reorganization. The Coastal Surveillance Force wascentralized under command of the Mobile Operations Command (Sea), andthe Commander, Coastal Surveillance Forces became an Assistant Chiefof Naval Operations. This move considerably streamlined command andcontrol of coastal surveillance.

As if to test this newly revised command structure, the North Vietnamese "8'sent three trawlers to probe RVN defenses during the month. All threetrawlers were tracked by MARKET TIME Forces; two of the vessels werescared off without attempting an infiltration, while the third was still being.Xtracked at the end of the month.

While the North Vietnamese were not able to breach RVN coastaldefenses in October, the same could not be said for Typhoon Hester. Thisstorm, the worst in 27 years, struck the coast of MR 1 near Chu Lai on23 October and then veered north. The storm sank many small patrolcraft, destroyed the roofs of many dwellings throughout the First CoastalZone, and flooded many areas with heavy rains. The storm brought all militaryactivity virtually to a standstill. Salvage and rebuilding activities werestill in progress at the month's close.

On the administrative, logistic side, the VNN Supply System continuedits rapid improvement in October. During the month, the Brown Waterspare supplies were turned over by NSA, Saigon to the VNN Supply Center.Thus, the Vietnamese now control all spare parts for their riverine craftin their own supply system. Also, the Accelerated Overhaul Programcontinred to progress at a moderate pace at the various LSBs throughoutthe Delta. 1

In addition, during the month, U.S. Navy Seabee assets continued to -decrease as several details of the only remaining naval construction battalionin Vietnam, NMCB-5, finished up their projects and retrograded to CONUS. ."kThe remaining Seabees in Vietnam are now engaged primarily in civic actionprojects. _

CONFIDENTIAL

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of Overall Navy strength declined to 9, 775 officers and men, a reduction75 men from last month's figures.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

CHRONOLOGY1 OCT-- Coastal Surveillance Forces reorganized into Mobile Operations

Command (Sea).2 OCT-- RADM W. R. Dowd, SC, USN, departed RVN after serving as

special advisor to VNN Supply System.TRAN HUNG DAO XXV AO enlarged to include new Points ofenemy activity.

3 OCT-- ENC William L. Alexander, USN. received multiple shrapnel :.wounds in both legs when the PBR on which he was riding as anadvisor was ambushed on the Lower Cai Lon River.Three 122mm rockets fired at Saigon during vre-electionterrorist activities. 'Three 122mm rockets fired at Vung Tau from Long Son Island.Presidential Elections held. -..

-- NVN SL-3 trawler detected by M /T forces and trackeduntil it no longer posed an infiltration threat.

4 OCT-- Convoy TP-34 departed Tan Chau for Phnom Penh.10 OCT-- US S KRISHNA (ARL-38), the last Landing Craft Repair Shipremaining in RVN, departed for the Philippines for turnover

to the Philippine Navy.12 OCT- EN2 Johnny Fred Baldwin, USN, was seriously wounded when

the truck in which he was riding was ambushed near RadarSite Six (Nui Chap Chai).200 pound watermine discovered at De Long Piers, VungTau, and disarmed by VNN EOD team.

13 OCT-- PC F 3905 ran aground near Bo De River mouth.14 OCT-- LCDR David P. Micalchuck, USN, relieved LCDR Paul S.

Gesswein, USN, as SA CTG 214. 1 and as CTG 116. 10,15 OCT-- A command detonated mine was discovered at NOD Vung Tau

and rendered safe by U.S. FOD team.CONFIDENTIAL -

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'-ONFIDENTIAL C

17 OCT-- NVN SL-4 trawler detected by M/T forces and tracked untilno longer an infiltration threat.

18 OCT-- Convoy TP-35 departed Tan Chau for Phnom Penh.U.S. Navy Sealord Helicopter 11 crashed in the vicinity of ,I.WQ 234 656 while trying to salvage a mortar from groundedPCF 3905.

19 OCT-- Seals of Seal Team One, Detachment Golf, Mike Platoon,killed two VC and wounded a third during a mission conductedin TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV AO.ACTOVRAD Site Six (Nui Chap Chai) turned over to VNN.Convoy TP-35 attacked at WT 264 620.-1CAPT Nguyen Ngoc Quynh, VNN, assumed command ofTRAN HUNG DAO XXVII. ...

20 OCT-- LCDR William J. Fogle, USN, received severe lacerations toboth hands from a booby trapped sensor while conducting aa sensor re-battery mission near Rach Gia. -HAL-3 Detachment 9 permanently transferred from ThirdCoastal Zone LST to Binh Thuy.USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-11 61) relieved by USS WASHTENAW L,COUNTY (LST-1166) as the Third Coastal Zone LST. tNNIMCB-5 Detail Bronco completed assigned tasks at ACTOVRADSite Nui Ta Kou and returned to Bien Hoa, in order to retrogrademen and equipment to CONIUS.

21 OCT-- RAC ambushed on Upper Saigon River (TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI).LT Paul R. Foltz, USN, killed by a B-40 rocket during an ,..ambush of his salvage craft on the Trem Trem River (TRANHUNG DAO XXI). ENS James H. McKenzie, EN1 MaxmillianM. Cook, DC2 Jimmy McGinnis, and FN Michael McVey woundedin the same action.

23 OCT-- Typhoon Hester devastated First Coastal Zone, bringing allmilitary activity to a halt.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CURRENT OPERATIONSVNN DsignaionsFormer USN Designations

TRAN HUNG D.AO IV (TG 214. 2) SO LID ANCHOR* TRAN HUNG DAO VI (TG 212.5) SEARCH TURN

TRAN HUNG DAO XV (TF 230) MARKET TIME(SEAOPS Command) (Inner Barrier)TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII (TF 218) NONE

TRAN~~~~~)j HUGDO X(G.1)NN

TRAN HUNG DAOI XXI (TO 219.) NONE2k TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV(TGF214.1 NONE A

TRAN~~~ ~~ ~ HUGDOXV(G22NNTRAN HUNG DA O XXIV (TG 214.7) NONETRAN HUNG DAO XXVII(TG216.) NONE

RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE (TF 228) NONE \J4CHI LANG I SEA TIGER

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CONFIDENTIAL

TRAN HUNG DAO IVEnemy activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO was moderately

heavy during October. U.S. Navy Seawolves flew 22 missions insupport of TRAN HUNG DAO IV assets and there were 13 incidentsof naval interest. Of the 13 incidents, two were friendly initiated and11 were enemy initiated. The enemy initiated incidents fell into thefollowing major categories: one booby crap, seven boat ambushes,and three attacks on security forces. The total casualties were twoVC and one RF killed: and one LDNN, one USN Seal advisor, onecivilian girl, and seven VNN wounded.'",

On 5 October at 0016H, a possible probing attack on ISB Nam Canwas thwarted. An alert VNN mortar crew and watch tower personnel ..directed mortar fire on 25 to 30 people moving in the treeline north of Sthe base. Seawolves and Black Ponies were called in for support. Boththe ISB and the support aircraft received small arms fire. The enemybroke contact at about 0200H. There were no friendly casualties, and .-..enemy casualties were undetermined.

On 6 October, a CBU-55 drop was made by Black Ponies in thevicinity of WQ 042 652. The drop was conducted in a mangrove forest.The terrain was flat, and there had been repeated contacts with the VC,The evaluation of the drop was made by one company of VN Rangers insertedby RID craft, with no U.S. personnel accompanying the sweep. Eightsecondary explosions were observed that were probably booby traps,but the source of the secondary explosions was not confirmed. Thecovering over eight fox holes and spider holes collapsed. Three hutsand two sampans were destroyed. Finally, the CBU Drop cleared thedensely foliated area with restricted visibility to a radius of approximately100 meters. 1 This drop and subseq'.ant evaluation was conducted to con-tinue the development of more effective weapons, and clearance for thedrop was closely controlled.

The one U.S. casualty was sustained on 15 October, during woodcuttersecurity operations. A force of 27 LDNNs and two U.S. advisors wasattacked with B-40 rockets and AK-47 fire in the vicinity of WO 108 677.One LDNN and one U.S. advisor were slightly wounded by shrapnel dur- --.ing the attack. The force suppressed the attack and continued the Datrol. .A bunker complex was discovered and destroyed during the operation.

A RID 47 ATC, on routine patrol, was ambushed with launch bombs onein the vicinity of WQ 7Z3 087 at 1710H on 18 October. The ATC returned."suppressive fire, beached, and inserted troops to sweep the area. The oneknown casualty was a young girl who was standing on the river bank. She1 SA THD IV Confidential message 061525Z OCT 71 CONFIDENTIAL6

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received slight shrapnel wounds and was taken by the ATC crew to ISBNam Can fo r treatment. _.-Also on 18 October, Sealord 11 crashed in the vicinity of WQ 234 656

while engaged in salvage operations of PCF 3905.1 At 1335H, after in-serting salvage personnel, Sealord 11 attempted to lift a mortar from thePCF using an external sling, lost power, and crashed. At 1600H thatday, the force salvage offficer and a U. S. EOD team departed for thecrash site to recover weapons and communications equipment, and to'inspect the salvage operations. Sealord 11 was eventually lifted out of thewater by a Chinook helicopter and taken to Binh Thuy.

On 19 October, COMCOSFLOT Five, with four PCFs, departed ISBNam Can enroute to the site of the PCF 3905 grounding. At 0855H theforce was attacked with B-40 rockets, launch bombs, and small armsfire by an unknown size enemy force. The PCFs beached on the southbank of the Song Bo De (vic WQ 220 687) and returned suppressive fire.-..-Seawolves were scrambled, and the enemy broke contact. Enemy casual-ties were unknown, and the VNN suffered six wounded, one seriously.PCF 3929 received one B-40 hit, sustaining hull damage and destructionof one engine. PC F 3901 received three B-40 hits, sustaining only hulldamage. All six wounded VNN were aboard the PCF 3901. Both PCFsreturned to ISB Nam Can under their own power.

On 20 October, the first attack on a PGM occurred since the commence-ment of CTF 235 operations in August 1971. At 2040H, PGM 600 was am -bushed on the Song Bo De in the vicinity of WQ 215 695 with small armsfire. The PGM was transiting to its assigned patrol area, and had nodifficulty in suppressing the hostile fire and clearing the area.

On 21 and 22 October, Seawolves conducted psyops broadcasts in thevicinity of WQ 15 70. The broadcasts were designed to support the .Vietnamese Government's Chieu Hoi program.

1. See the Fourth Coastal Zone section of this Summary for the PCF 3905 4grounding incident. ; -S7 CONFIDENTIAL

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L CONFIDENTIALTRAN HUNG DAO VI

October. There were two ambushes, one terrorist incident, and onebooby trapped sensor incident. U.S. Navy Seawolves of DetachmentEight flew 38 missions in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO.

The 20 boat saturation blockade of the lower Cai Lon River begun in .pSeptember, continued through 8 October. Both ambushes involved boats Lof this blockade force, and consisted of B-40/41 and automatic weaponsfire. All personnel casualties sustained during the month were taken inthe 3 October ambush. At 0645H, PBR 7716 received multiple B-40/41hits in the vicinity of WR 406 740. The boat caught fire and was a totalloss. One USN and six VNN sailors were wounded in the encounter.ENC William L. Alexander, USN received multiple shrapnel wounds inboth legs and was medevaced to the Third Surgical Hospital in BinhThuy.

The HAL-3 detachment at Rach Gia conducted a sensor recovery andbattery replacment mission on 20 October. A magnetic intrusiondetector (MID) sensor that was utilized for base defense was found to bebooby trapped. A hand grenade with the pin pulled was located beneath 2' the sensor. The sensor was pulled from the ground by a long line, afterthe area was cleared. The hand grenade failed to detonate, because itsspoon spring was badly deteriorated. The grenade was destroyed and themission continued. Two other sensors in a string of ten were missing.

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CONFIDENTIAL

TRAN HUNG DAO XVIIIThree Mekong convoys successfully transported vital POL and Military

Assistance Program material to the Cambodian capital city, encounteringonly token resistance on two occasions.

The first convoy of the month, TP-34, departed the Tan Chau stagingarea with a convoy and escort typical fo r the month. The escort wascomposed of one VNN LSIL, one MNK CCB, 18 VNN and 11 MNK PBRs,five VN N ASPBs and six MNK LCM-6s. The convoy, transporting1, 959, 520 gallons of POL, was composed of three cargo ships, six tankers,and four tugs towing five barges. The convoy left Tan Chau at 2300H on4 October, and arrived at Phnom Penh 16 hours later, after an untroubledpassage. The return convoy, similarly unharassed, left Phnom Penh at1215H on 6 October and arrived six hours later at Tan Chau. The returnconvoy was composed of six cargo vessels, five tankers, and four tugswith one barge, and was attended by the upriver escort. A total of 68sorties were flown fo r TP/PT-34 convoy air cover, with the USN Sea-wolves flying ten night sorties. i

Due to inadequate POL storage facilities in Phnom Penh, a situationbrought on by the 20 September attack on one of the city's POL farms, th esecond convoy of the month was delayed three days in departure. Convoy

.TP-35 departed Tan Chau on 18 October at 2350H, transporting 1, 915, 712gallons of POL. Two cargo vessels, six tankers, and three tugs with fourbarges were escorted by the standard combined VNN/MNK escort force.At 1000H the following morning, the convoy came under attack 18 milesfrom Phnom Penh at WT 264 620. The enemy fire consisted of four B-40rockets fired at a cargo ship, with no friendly damage or casualties re -"ported. The nearby escort craft responded with suppressive fire with un-known results. Air clearance was not granted due to FANK troops andfriendly civilians in the area. At 1515H, the convoy arrived at its destina-tion without further incident. As there have been six attacks since 3September in the same general vicinity, the VNN recommended that the"63rdFANK Battalion be reassigned and replaced by a new Battalion. IAt 1Z00H the following day, the return convoy departed Ph.aom Penh,escorting two cargo ships, seven empty tankers, and three tugs 1owingfour barges, arriving at Tan Chau after an untroubled passage of five %hours duration. There were 76 sorties flown fo r TP/PT-35 convoy, in-cluding six night sorties flown by USN Seawolves.

The third and last convoy of the month also came under a harassingbarrage of fire. TP-36 departed Tan Chau at 2300H on 28 October, witha convoy composed of five cargo ships, four tankers with 886, 224 gallonsof POL, three tugs towing four barges, and three LCM-8s, attended by the

1. SA CTF 218 msg 210200Z OCT 71 CONFIDENTIAL9 . .

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CONFIDENTIALstandard escorting force. At 0103H early the next morning, SS PROSPERITYwas forced to return to Tan Chau due to engine trouble which permitted .;: -:only a two knot headway. At 0930H, 20 miles from Phnom Penh at WT .235 661, the convoy came under small arms fire from an unknown sizeenemy force, with no damage or casualties inflicted. Fire was returnedby the escorting units with uncertain effects. Air cover was not utilized *'..due to a 600 foot ceiling. The convoy continued on to Phnom Penh, ar-riving at 1530H without further incident. The harassing attack occurredduring the passage of the stretch of the river patrolled by the 63rd FANK 'Battalion, despite the augmentation of two FANK companies into the area.Convoy PT-36 departed Phnom Penh at 1Z00H on 30 October, escortingthree cargo ships, four tankers, and three tugs. The convoy arrived in-Vietnarp six hours later w.thout incident. Sorties were flown for TP/PT-36 convoys on 41 occasions. Inclement weather did not permitfull participation by USA /USN aircraft during the night portion of TP-36.Seawolves flew four escort missions, two of them at night.

Phnom Penh POL stowage facility problems continued throughoutOctober, as the damages incurred during the 20 September attack on theRussei-Keo Tank farms could not yet be repaired. Each convoy deliveredan average of 5, 000 tons of POL, exceeding stowage capacities. However,Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodiawanted to increase the numberof convoys per month for MAP material, but there were the following restraints:1) scheduled maintenance and overhaul for escort craft had to be conductedas the convoy duty could no longer be considered short termed; 2) there werealso other operational commitments for craft assigned to CTF 218; and finally,3) air assets were being used on an average of 210 sorties per month, alreadytaxing the air assets. The extreme cost of escort support for an additionalconvoy was the greatest prohibiting factor. ,".

As the high water increased on the Mekong, the ratio of escort craftto merchant vessels (EC/MV) per upriver convoy decreased. The ratiofor the first 12 convoys was 8. 1, while the middle 12 -convoys (the low ,-water phase) was 7.0, and the final ten convoys (the high wateriphase)..-\was 3. 1. It was apparent that as VNN expertise in running convoys in-creased, there was a decrease in the ratio, and that as high water limitsthe molility of the enemy, a decreased number of escorts could be ac- -cepted. By mid-November) the level of the river drops rapidly, as doesthe counter-fire effectiveness of the PBRs. On about 15 December, the"historical" (based on the one annual cycle) 4nemy threat period commences - ..and lasts until mid-July when the river has risen considerably. The lastserious attack against a convoy occurred against TP-Z6 on 14 July. Since [that time there have been only minor B-40 and B-41 rocket attacks.

The scheduled plan to turn over Mekong convoy operations to the MNKon 1 November was questioned by COMNAVFORV, with a recommendation _that the turnover be delayed one month. The suggestion was due to several rfactors. Convoy TP-34 had 18 MNK craft out of 41 escort craft employed.

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Six additional PBRs for the MNK from the FY 72 Military Assistance Pro--4 ~gram were at Vung Tau in October. Eleven more MNK PBRs were at .- ~

NAVSHIPREPFAC Subic being readied for turnover. Considering that aminimum of 25 craft are generally required for proper convoy escort,it was evident that the MNK would not be able to assume the Mekong* . ~convoy operation until at least November.

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CONFIDENTIAL

TRAN HUNG DAO XXContact with the enemy in the TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO was very

light during October. There were reports that insurgents had stoppedcivilian buses on the Ha Tien - Kien Luong Road and warned the civiliansnot to travel that road. This was probably a harassment tactic to exertcontrol over the local populace, because no significant mining incidents-or ambushes were reported.

During a CG 44 Reaction Team sweep on 1 Oc ober, a small cachewas uncovered. Near the cache a flagpole was discovered. Attached

to the flagpole was a VC letter addressed to the Ha Tien VNN and RF/PFforces at the Tra Pho Outpost. It urged the government forces to notonly dispute the elections and cease to support the U S. forces, but alsoto desert and join the revolutionist ranks of the VC.

Throughout the month, sensor activity continued to be heavy, andreports of infiltration were received. Sweeps of suspected enemrcrossing sites and artillery response to sensor activity were employed. 3The results of these artillery responses and sweeps were generallynegative, often uncovering trampled grass and other signs of theenemy's crossings.

On 5 October, Commander CTF 234 ordered the withdrawal of allCG 42 junks attached to TRAN HUNG DAO XX. CG 42 reinforced thenorthern U Minh coastal operation under operational control of CTU234.3. 1. Before detaching, COG 42 released one team leader and a IZman reaction team to TRAN HUNG DAO XX.

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u.s. naval forces vietnam monthly historical summary oct 1971

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