u.s. - iran conflict

45
Cultural values can Cultural values can affect conflict affect conflict resolution. This resolution. This presentation combines presentation combines face negotiation theory face negotiation theory with high and low with high and low context theory. context theory.

Upload: dr-chester-elijah-branch

Post on 09-May-2015

280 views

Category:

Education


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Cultural values can affect conflict Cultural values can affect conflict resolution. This presentation resolution. This presentation combines face negotiation theory combines face negotiation theory with high and low context theory. with high and low context theory.

Page 2: U.S. - Iran Conflict

The Atoms for Peace Program [1953] was The Atoms for Peace Program [1953] was partly apartly a

diversionary tactic. diversionary tactic.

Page 3: U.S. - Iran Conflict

While promoting atoms for peace we…While promoting atoms for peace we…

Page 4: U.S. - Iran Conflict

While promoting atoms for peace we…While promoting atoms for peace we…

- tripled our nuclear weaponry [tripled our nuclear weaponry [841 to 18, 638]]

Page 5: U.S. - Iran Conflict

While promoting atoms for peace we…While promoting atoms for peace we…

- tripled our nuclear weaponry [tripled our nuclear weaponry [841 to 18, 638]]

- installed a puppet regime in Iran [the installed a puppet regime in Iran [the Shah]Shah]

Page 6: U.S. - Iran Conflict

While promoting atoms for peace we…While promoting atoms for peace we…

- tripled our nuclear weaponry [tripled our nuclear weaponry [841 to 18, 638]]

- installed a puppet regime in Iran [the installed a puppet regime in Iran [the Shah]Shah]

- did secret nuclear testing did secret nuclear testing

Page 7: U.S. - Iran Conflict

After the Bravo incident in Japan, our secretAfter the Bravo incident in Japan, our secret

nuclear testing was revealed. nuclear testing was revealed.

We were losing face, internationally, and We were losing face, internationally, and decideddecided

to retrieve all nuclear technology. to retrieve all nuclear technology.

We reached a deal with Iran in the 70s. We reached a deal with Iran in the 70s.

Page 8: U.S. - Iran Conflict

In the 70s, both Iran and the U.S. cultures In the 70s, both Iran and the U.S. cultures werewere

dealing with politically charged intergroupdealing with politically charged intergroup

conflict. conflict.

Page 9: U.S. - Iran Conflict

In 1976, the Shah had worked out a deal In 1976, the Shah had worked out a deal withwith

Ford. Ford.

But during campaign season, Carter But during campaign season, Carter accused Fordaccused Ford

of being weak on proliferation policy. of being weak on proliferation policy.

Page 10: U.S. - Iran Conflict

In 1976, the Shah had worked out a deal In 1976, the Shah had worked out a deal withwith

Ford. Ford.

But during campaign season, Carter But during campaign season, Carter accused Fordaccused Ford

of being weak on proliferation policy. of being weak on proliferation policy.

The deal with Iran fell through. The deal with Iran fell through.

Page 11: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Carter struck a deal in 1978. Carter struck a deal in 1978.

Page 12: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Carter struck a deal in 1978.Carter struck a deal in 1978.

Then… an Iranian revolution removed the Then… an Iranian revolution removed the ShahShah

from power. from power.

Page 13: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Carter struck a deal in 1978.Carter struck a deal in 1978.

Then… an Iranian revolution removed the Then… an Iranian revolution removed the ShahShah

from power.from power.

Again, the deal fell through. Again, the deal fell through.

Page 14: U.S. - Iran Conflict

This led to the Iran hostage crisis that This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spannedspanned

from 1979-1981.from 1979-1981.

Iran’s message? Iran’s message?

Page 15: U.S. - Iran Conflict

This led to the Iran hostage crisis that This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spannedspanned

from 1979-1981.from 1979-1981.

Iran’s message? Iran’s message?

No more puppet regimes. No more puppet regimes.

Page 16: U.S. - Iran Conflict

This led to the Iran hostage crisis that This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spannedspanned

from 1979-1981.from 1979-1981.

Iran’s message? Iran’s message?

No more puppet regimes. No more puppet regimes.

Don’t infringe on our freedoms. Don’t infringe on our freedoms.

Page 17: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Our response?Our response?

Page 18: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Our response?Our response?

Sanctions.Sanctions.

Page 19: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Our response?Our response?

Sanctions.Sanctions.

Financially supporting Hussein’s attempt to Financially supporting Hussein’s attempt to taketake

over Iran throughout the 80s. over Iran throughout the 80s.

Page 20: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Hussein failed [81-88].Hussein failed [81-88].

He owed Kuwait over 30b and refused to He owed Kuwait over 30b and refused to pay.pay.

So, he decided to invade KuwaitSo, he decided to invade Kuwait

We stepped in to stop him. We stepped in to stop him.

Page 21: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Bin Laden objected to our involvement in Bin Laden objected to our involvement in thethe

Middle East. Middle East.

He began forming a global Al-QaedaHe began forming a global Al-Qaeda

network in the 90s. In 2001, they attacked network in the 90s. In 2001, they attacked the U.S.the U.S.

Page 22: U.S. - Iran Conflict

This prompted us to go back into Iraq andThis prompted us to go back into Iraq and

overthrow Hussein.overthrow Hussein.

For the first time in decades, Iran and the For the first time in decades, Iran and the U.S. hadU.S. had

a common enemy – Hussein. a common enemy – Hussein.

In 2003 Iran released the rest of their Iraqi In 2003 Iran released the rest of their Iraqi POWs. POWs.

Page 23: U.S. - Iran Conflict

In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal whereIn 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where

they…they…

Page 24: U.S. - Iran Conflict

In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal whereIn 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where

they…they…- admitted to proxy dealings like admitted to proxy dealings like

HezbollahHezbollah

Page 25: U.S. - Iran Conflict

In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal whereIn 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where

they… they… - admitted to proxy dealings like admitted to proxy dealings like

HezbollahHezbollah- admitted support for Islamic Jihad and admitted support for Islamic Jihad and

HamasHamas

Page 26: U.S. - Iran Conflict

In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal whereIn 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where

they…they…- admitted to proxy dealings like admitted to proxy dealings like

HezbollahHezbollah- admitted support for Islamic Jihad and admitted support for Islamic Jihad and

HamasHamas- offered nuclear program transparencyoffered nuclear program transparency

Page 27: U.S. - Iran Conflict

In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal whereIn 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where

they…they…- admitted to proxy dealings like admitted to proxy dealings like

HezbollahHezbollah- admitted support for Islamic Jihad and admitted support for Islamic Jihad and

HamasHamas- offered nuclear program transparencyoffered nuclear program transparency- agreed to the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002 agreed to the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002

Page 28: U.S. - Iran Conflict

In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal whereIn 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where

they…they…- admitted to proxy dealings like Hezbollahadmitted to proxy dealings like Hezbollah- admitted support for Islamic Jihad and admitted support for Islamic Jihad and

HamasHamas- offered nuclear program transparencyoffered nuclear program transparency- agreed to the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002 agreed to the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002 - agreed to a two-state solution and agreed to a two-state solution and

considered itself at peace with Israelconsidered itself at peace with Israel

Page 29: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Cheney’s Response ?Cheney’s Response ?

Page 30: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Cheney’s Response ?Cheney’s Response ?- ““We don’t speak to evil.”We don’t speak to evil.”

Page 31: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Cheney’s Response ?Cheney’s Response ?- ““We don’t speak to evil.”We don’t speak to evil.”- Elmer calls this ‘Negative Attribution’Elmer calls this ‘Negative Attribution’

Page 32: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Cheney’s Response ?Cheney’s Response ?- ““We don’t speak to evil.”We don’t speak to evil.”- Elmer calls this ‘Negative Attribution’Elmer calls this ‘Negative Attribution’

As a resultAs a result- Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009.

Page 33: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Obama attempted to take advantage of Obama attempted to take advantage of Iran’sIran’s

intergroup conflict with negotiations. intergroup conflict with negotiations.

But Iran withdrew from the table. But Iran withdrew from the table.

Page 34: U.S. - Iran Conflict

In 2010, the Obama administration sent a In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter toletter to

Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran.Iran.

Page 35: U.S. - Iran Conflict

In 2010, the Obama administration sent a In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter toletter to

Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran.Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran.

Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engagedengaged

in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran.

Page 36: U.S. - Iran Conflict

In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter toto

Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran.Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran.

Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engagedBrazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged

in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran.

And it worked! And it worked!

Page 37: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Obama’s response?Obama’s response?

Page 38: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Obama’s response?Obama’s response?- You’re two days too late.You’re two days too late.

Page 39: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Obama’s response?Obama’s response?- You’re two days too late.You’re two days too late.- It wasn’t fast enough.It wasn’t fast enough.

Page 40: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Obama’s response?Obama’s response?- You’re two days too late.You’re two days too late.- It wasn’t fast enough.It wasn’t fast enough.- We’ve signed more sanctions.We’ve signed more sanctions.

Page 41: U.S. - Iran Conflict

Obama’s response?Obama’s response?- You’re two days too late.You’re two days too late.- It wasn’t fast enough.It wasn’t fast enough.- We’ve signed more sanctions.We’ve signed more sanctions.

Hofstede calls this a flaw of ‘short-term’Hofstede calls this a flaw of ‘short-term’

orientation.orientation.

Page 42: U.S. - Iran Conflict

He says cross-cultural

negotiation is a process, not

just one meeting where

two sides exchange ultimatums

with each other.

Page 43: U.S. - Iran Conflict

In 1953 we responded to the nuclear threat by dominating In 1953 we responded to the nuclear threat by dominating and competing. If Gudykunst is right, increasing our and competing. If Gudykunst is right, increasing our tolerance for Iran’s attempts at democracy could have tolerance for Iran’s attempts at democracy could have possibly prevented the present-day U.S.-Iran conflict.possibly prevented the present-day U.S.-Iran conflict.

Page 44: U.S. - Iran Conflict
Page 45: U.S. - Iran Conflict

A more culturally sensitive approach, A more culturally sensitive approach, with less polarizing communication, could with less polarizing communication, could potentially resolve the conflict between potentially resolve the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. the U.S. and Iran.