uribe's past vs the present regarding peace

7/28/2019 Uribe's Past vs the Present Regarding Peace

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Uribe’s past vs. present regarding Peace

By: Nicolas Rudas

Translated for La Silla Vacía by Matilda Villarraga

From his powerful Twitter, Alvaro Uribe has been insistently criticizing the"concessions" of Santos to the FARC, in the framework of the negotiations inHavana, contrasting it with his peace process with the paramilitaries. However,when it’s reviewed what Uribe initially proposed to the paramilitaries, before theConstitutional Court corrected the most controversial of the Justice and Peace Law,it comes to the conclusion that his offers are similar to these "concessions" which

are the subject of his relentless criticism.

1. on the cessation of hostilities

What is defended now

In September of last year, Uribe said it was a mistake to advance a peace process

with the FARC without requiring a cessation of hostilities. Although he did not makea detailed presentation of his argument, the ex-president said he felt it was a

mistake because the FARC 'kill the Colombians and continue dialogue ". Two weeks

after the finalization of the unilateral ceasefire that the FARC declared between

November 20 of last year and January 20 of this, the former president asked the

government to suspend the negotiations in Havana after separate attacks from the

guerrilla in southern Bolivar and Norte de Santander and Antioquia.

What was defended before

When negotiating with the paramilitaries in Santafé de Ralito (Córdoba), Uribe did

demand as a condition a unilateral declaration of cessation of hostilities on the part

of the AUC, which they accepted. After a year, Human Rights Observatoryof the

Government stressed the importance of the truce, announcing that the number of

massacres had been reduced by one third. However, in February 2004 a report

from the Government itself showed that, after 14 months of negotiations, the



paramilitary groups had committed nothing less than 362 murders, 16 massacres

and 180 abductions. Only that at that time the violation of the cessation of

hostilities did not make Uribe call into question the continuity of the process.

2. on Impunity


This is the point where Uribe has insisted the most. It could be said that it is his

fundamental criticism to the negotiations in Havana, as he made it clear on the eve

of the march of April 9: "Our opposition to the peace process is not to peace but toimpunity". The questions have been essentially two: that there is not going to be

prosecution of the heads of the demobilized FARC and that there will be no prison

for perpetrators of heinous crimes, by use of selectivity criteria and prioritization in

the judicial processes referred to in the Framework for Peace.


Uribe has said that his famous Law of Justice and Peace is shielded against

impunity, since it does not contemplate amnesties or pardons. Nevertheless, in

practice a wide margin allowed amnesty de facto since the combatants that at the

moment they lay down the weapons did not to have an openedprocess or a

condemnation against them, they could remain free taking refuge in the decree 128

of 2003. This way, very few had to pay jailtime (Indepaz has indicated that only 2

%). In addition, this demobilized group was not forced to testify before judicial

instances about other crimes of their knowledge, propitiating for countless atrocious

crimes to remain uninvestigated.

On the other hand, the alternative penalties contemplated in Justice and Peace,

granted to the demobilized with sentences, have five as minimum and maximum

eight years, "a disproportionately benign duration given the gravity of the crimes

committed, in some cases, tortures, disappearance, violation or massacre ”, as

observes the constitutionalist Manuel Fernando Quinche, author of a book on the

topic. In addition to this, the original project of Justice and Peace suggested that as

part of the fulfillment of the condemnation to count the 18 months that lasted the



“zones of concentration” of paramilitary, established while they were advancing the

negotiations in Santafé de Ralito. This is something that the Constitutional Court

eventually eliminated.

3. on the compensation to the victims

What is defendednow

The former president has also attempted to seize the spokesman role for the

victims facing the peace process with the FARC. As a development of his previous

criticismhe stated: "atrocious crimes will go unpunished, because selectivity andprioritization are not being investigated, leaving then the victims uncompensated,

abad example". For him, his process with the paramilitaries it is indeed a good

example of reparation to the victims.


The punishment of the murderer is one of the most important forms of reparation

to victims, but as shown, Uribe was in favor that the vast majority of perpetrators

and accomplices of crimes were not convicted or prosecuted in exchange for their

demobilization.

There are also other forms of reparation, among them the monetary compensation

for the harm suffered. In the case of the negotiation with the 'paramilitaries', it was

suggested that this repair would be funded primarily with the assets of the

demobilized condemned, what was already a restriction by the low number of

convictions that they were going to give. But in addition in the Justice and Peace

Law of Uribe, two additional conditions were included: that the condemned would

provide their assets for repair "if any", and that only would be taken into accountthe assets acquired illegally and not all their legacy.

In 2006 the Court knocked down both of these conditions, because according to

their concept they strongly limited repair possibilities.



4. on political participation


In a recent interview, Uribe expressed his disagreement with the offering of political

eligibility to the FARC after having incurred in "abductions, killings of children, drug

trafficking and other heinous crimes". As the former president believes that the

FARC are a group "terrorist", he incidentally also questions the political legitimacy

that they may have to discuss the future of economic sectors such as agriculture,

which is the subject on the agenda in Havana. "What if our government had done

that with the paramilitaries? ", has been asked.


In reality, discussing an agenda of reforms with the paramilitaries would had not

been in the same direction to do so as with guerrilla insurgents. Primarily because

the latter proposed the radical transformation of the State while the former does

not. The paramilitaries were born as a counterinsurgency initiative in favor of the

State to strengthen its military apparatus to combat the guerrillas, something that

in fact was already happening with the "Democratic Security" of Uribe.

Also, during the Uribe government he repeatedly stated that it should not be denied

the political offense to the paramilitaries, and even initially the article 71 of the Law

of Justice and Peace made it effective. As the political offense of sedition is

excluded from the scheme of disabilities to aspire to public office, that way Uribe

opened a door to the eligibility policy of the paramilitaries. Only that in the end this

was never realized because the Constitutional Court knocked down that article on

procedural grounds.

uribe's past vs the present regarding peace

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