No. 10-980

i I’4AY’ 1 5 2011

IN THE

~upreme ~ourt o[ the ~n~teb ~tate~

EVAN GRIFFITH,

DAVE REDNOUR, WARDEN,

Petitioner,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to theUnited States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

PAUL M. SMITHDAVID W. DEBRUINOf CounselJENNER & BLOCK LLP1099 New York Avenue,NW, Suite 900Washington, DC 20001(202) 639-6000

JEFFREY D. COLMANCounsel of RecordANNE P. RAYMICHAEL H. MARGOLISJENNER & BLOCK LLP353 N. Clark StreetChicago, IL 60654(312) 222-9350jcolman@jenner.com

Counsel for Petitioner

Blank Page

Table of Authorities ...............................................iii

INTRODUCTION ....................................................1

ARGUMENT ...........................................................2

Respondent’s Opposition IllustratesWhy This Court Should Grant Reviewto Clarify That State Law - Not FederalLaw - Controls Whether A State CourtPetition Is Timely Filed ................................2

Ao The Seventh Circuit’s Decision isInconsistent With Decisions of ThisCourt ........................................................2

Bo Illinois Law Is Clear - GrantingLeave To File Instanter is aRetroactive Extension of the FilingDeadline ...................................................7

Co Respondent’s Contention That Thereis no Conflict Among the CircuitsMisreads the Record and Misstatesthe Law ....................................................8

II. Supreme Court Review Is Warranted ToResolve The Circuit-Split RegardingWhether A Court Should Address TheMerits Of An Otherwise UntimelyHabeas Petition Where The PetitionerEstablishes A Credible Claim Of ActualInnocence ....................................................10

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III.Griffith’s Petition Is Not Moot ...................12

CONCLUSION ......................................................14

.ooIll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)CASESAdams v. LeMaster,

223 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2000) ..........................9Allen v. Mitchell,

276 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2001) ............................10Carey v. Sa££old,

536 U.S. 214 (2002) ..................................passimEvans v. Chavis,

546 U.S. 189 (2006) ..................................passimFriends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.

Services, Inc.528 U.S. 167 (2000) ..........................................13

Isral~l v. Russell,276 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2001) ..............................9

Jefferson v. Welborn,222 F.3d 286 (7th Cir. 2000) ..............................9

Jiminez v. Quarterman,129 S. Ct. 681 (2009) ......................................1, 4

Pitseh v. Cont’l & Commercial Nat. Bank ofChL,305 Ill. 265 (1922) ..............................................7

Sehlup v. De]o,513 U.S. 298 (1995) ..........................................12

United States ex tel. Griftith v. Hulliek,587 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N. D. Ill. 2008) ...............13

Walker v. Martin,131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011) ................................1, 4, 5

Wauconda Fire Prot. Dist. v. StonewallOrchards, LLP,214 Ill. 2d 417 (Ill. 2005) ....................................7

iv

Wilson y. Battles,302 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 2002) ..............................9

OTHER AUTHORITIESIll. Sup. Ct. Rule 315(b)(1) ..................................7, 8

INTRODUCTION

Like many cases governed by theAntiterrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct("AEDPA"), this is a case about federalismandcomity. But, as Respondent concedes, the SeventhCircuit ruled that it did not matter what the IllinoisSupreme Court did when it granted Petitioner EvanGriffith’s motion to file his petition for leave toappeal instanter. (Opposition at 27.) The SeventhCircuit concluded that - even in cases like this one -where the state court considered the PLA "timely,"principles of federalism and comity do not requiredeference to the state court’s ruling. (App. 17a.) TheSeventh Circuit’s decision is squarely in conflict withthe decisions of this Court in Carey v. Saffold, 536U.S. 214 (2002) and Evans v. Chayis, 546 U.S. 189,(2006) and the holdings of other circuits. It also runsafoul of this Court’s decisions in Jiminez y.Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681 (2009) and Walker y.Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011), which make clearthat the principles of federalism and comity requiredeference to state court procedural rules. This is -and should be - the case whether the stateprocedural rules help or hurt petitioners.

Three judges on the Seventh Circuit dissentedwhen rehearing en bane was denied. (App. la - 12a.)That dissenting opinion explains why the writ ofcertiorari should be granted. Three amicus briefs -filed in support of the Petition - also show why thisCourt should grant review.

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Strangely, in his Opposition, Respondentnever once mentions the dissenting opinion or makesany mention of the amicus briefs filed in support ofcertiorari. And, most striking, in his 34-pageOpposition, Respondent never once uses the words"federalism" or "comity," or attempts to explain howignoring the well-established timeliness rules of theIllinois Supreme Court can be reconciled with thosebedrock principles.

Instead of addressing these criticallyimportant matters, Respondent re-writes theQuestions Presented and repeatedlymischaracterizes the decisions of this Court and thecircuit courts. The Opposition itself demonstrateswhy review is warranted, or why this Court shouldconsider granting certiorari, vacating the SeventhCircuit’s opinion, and remanding for consideration onthe merits of Griffith’s habeas corpus petition.

ARGUMENT

Respondent’s Opposition Illustrates Why ThisCourt Should Grant Review to Clarify ThatState Law - Not Federal Law - ControlsWhether A State Court Petition Is TimelyFiled.

A° The Seventh Circuit’s Decision isInconsistent With Decisions of ThisCourt°

Respondent attempts to avoid the firstQuestion Presented by re-writing it and then

conflating the question of whether a state court can,under state law, retroactively make timely a petitionpending in the state court with the question ofwhether federal law permits retroactive tolling ofAEDPA’s statute of limitations. (See Opp. at 16.) Asnoted in the dissent, "the general problem - theproper calculation of the federal limitations periodwhen a petitioner has missed a deadline in the statecourts, but the state courts have excused the delay -is a recurring issue in the district courts and for us."(App. 3a.)

Under Carey and Evans, the question iswhether Griffith’s post-conviction petition was timelyunder state law. Governing principles of federalismand comity require that if the state court petitionwas timely - and here it was treated as such by theIllinois Supreme Court - then it remained pendingfor purposes of AEDPA’s statute of limitations for theentire time the "state collateral review process [wa]s’in continuance’ - i.e., ’until the completion of thatprocess. In other words, until the application hasachieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedures, by definition it remains’pending."’ Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-20.

Respondent never addresses the concept of thestate collateral review process as a complete entityand instead devotes the majority of his brief to theirrelevant question of whether retroactive tolling ofAEDPA’s statute of limitations is appropriate underfederal law. Respondent contends that the SeventhCircuit correctly determined that the AEDPA

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limitations period does not remain tolled "even if thestate court decides to treat the untimely appeal astimely for state law purposes." (Opp. at 16.)Respondent’s position is totally contrary to thisCourt’s holdings in Carey and Evans and ignores theimportant principals of federalism and comity. 1

Respondent’s position is also inconsistent withthis Court’s decisions in Jiminez y. Quarterman andWa]ker v. Martin, both of which deferred to stateprocedural law. In Jimenez, this Court explainedthat the state court’s order "granting an out-of-timeappeal restore[d] the pendency of the direct appeal,"which, in turn reset AEDPA’s statute of limitations.129 S. Ct. at 686. As the dissenters below explained,Jimenez "authorized an even greater retroactive ’re-set’ under section 2244(d)" and held that "the statecourts’ actions had the retroactive effect of makingwhat had once been a final decision by the statecourts no longer final for federal purposes." (App. 8a- 9a.) The dissenters concluded that "federal courtsshould give the same retroactive effect to th[e] statecourt decision when calculating timeliness undersection 2244." (App. 9a.)

Similarly, Respondent wrongly suggests thatWa]ker is immaterial here because Walker "was acase about procedural default." (Opp. at 24.) This

1 As the Amicus Brief of Academics and FormerState and Federal Judges explains, respect for statecourt procedural decisions is fundamental for ourdual system of government. (Amicus Br. at 10-12.)

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Court in Walker, relying upon the principles offederalism and comity, stated: "Sound procedureoften requires discretion to exact or excusecompliance with strict rules, and we have no cause todiscourage standards allowing courts to exercisesuch discretion." 131 S. Ct. at 1130. Respondenturges the opposite - that federal courts ignore theIllinois Supreme Court’s exercise of its sounddiscretion.

Respondent’s arguments distract from the realissue, namely, when a state court determines that itis appropriate to retroactively extend the time duringwhich a petitioner is allowed to file his state post-conviction petition - rendering his state post-conviction petition timely - the federal courts mustdefer to that determination. As explained in thedissenting opinion, "to the extent that Carey left anydoubt as to whether state law controls any pendencyanalysis under the habeas tolling provision, Evansdispelled that doubt." (App. 6a.) Either the statepost-conviction petition is timely, or it is not. And ifit is, then it is treated as timely for federal lawpurposes and that should be the end of the inquiry.See Evans, 546 U.S. at 197.

Respondent’s attempt to reconcile the SeventhCircuit’s decision with Carey and Evans falls farshort and demonstrates why review by this Court iswarranted. Respondent pulls one line out of Careytoconclude that the Seventh Circuit’s decision isconsistent: this Court’s decisions "recogniz[e]§2244(d)(2)’s purpose of ’encouraging prompt filings

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in federal court in order to protect the federal systemfrom being forced to hear stale claims."’ (Opp. at 16quoting Ca.re.y, 536 U.S. at 226.) Respondent ignoresthe actual holding in Ca.re.y, the rest of this Court’slanguage and, most importantly, the principles offederalism and comity that motivated Ca.~’e.y andEvaYIS.

The point of Griffith’s request is that ;~o daysran untolled for purposes of AEDPA. BecauseGriffith’s post-conviction petition was treated astimely under state law, his post-convictionproceedings remained "pending" until the IllinoisSupreme Court denied his PLA on the merits.5’arey, 536 U.S. at 220. The import of Care.y and.Evans is that it was inappropriate for the SeventhCircuit to go back, after the fact, and dissect the timebetween the levels of appeal in state court, as thatdoes not respect the finality of a state court judgmentor a state’s own decision about what is and is nottimely. See id. at 220-21. As the dissenting opinionnoted, that can cause havoc for lawyers and thecourts. (App. 9a- 10a.)

The Amicus Brief of the McArthur JusticeCenter, the National Association of Criminal DefenseLawyers, and others explains that failing to defer tostate law creates a trap for petitioners and theircounsel. (Amicus Br. at 15-19.) Respondentattempts to minimize this trap by arguing that apetitioner who fails to timely seek post-convictionrelief may still exhaust his state remedies by filingan out-of-time appeal in state court. (Opp. at 25.)

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However, where an appeal is timely under state law,a petitioner must be able to rely on state law whencalculating his federal statute of limitations. Thetrap exists when a federal court changes the rulesafter the fact.

Illinois Law Is Clear - Granting LeaveTo File Instanter is a RetroactiveExtension of the Filing Deadline.

Unable to find support for the position that astate court may not retroactively extend the time forfiling a state court petition, Respondent contendsthat certiorari is inappropriate here because thiscase turns on a "disputed point of state law." (Opp.at 26.) This is flat-out wrong. To begin, it is beyondany doubt that the Illinois Supreme Court treatedGriffith’s PLA as timely and then denied it on themerits. Illinois case law is clear that when anIllinois court grants leave to file instanter, it is aretroactive extension of the time to file. See _Pitseh v.Cont’l & Commercial Nat. Bank of ChL, 305 Ill. 265,267 (1922) ("the order approving the filing of theappeal bond and permitting it to be filed [instanter]was in effect an extension of the time for filing thebond"); Waueonda Fire Prot. Di~t. v. StonewallOrchards, LLP, 214 Ill. 2d 417, 424 (Ill. 2005) ("[A]norder was entered granting the County’s motion [forleave to file instanter, the effect of which was toextend the County’s deadline for filing its petition forleave to appeal"). See also Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule315(b)(1). Respondent does not - and has never -cited any Illinois law to the contrary.

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Moreover, Respondent embellishes what isconsidered "state law." Respondent’s argumentrelies on the Seyent_b Cireuit’~ statement that underIllinois law, the granting of leave to file instanter didnot amount to a retroactive extension of time andinstead was just the court accepting a late appeal.(Opp. at 26-28.) But, the Seventh Circuit’sstatement that "state courts’ decisions do not haveretroactive effect" and the suggestion that the Illinoiscourt considered Griffith’s post-conviction petition"late" is simply incorrect. (App. 17a.)

Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(b)(1),which Respondent ignores, the court, "or a judgethereof, on motion, may extend the time forpetitioning for leave to appeal . . in the mostextreme and compelling circumstances." That isprecisely what happened here. Accordingly, the 14days at issue were treated exactly the same as thepreceding 35 days, and thus were days during whicha properly filed application was "pending."

Co Respondent’s Contention That There isno Conflict Among the CircuitsMisreads the Record and Misstates theLaw.

In an effort to minimize the conflict among thecircuits created by the Seventh Circuit’s decision,Respondent asserts that Griffith’s post-convictionpetition was an "otherwise untimely" appeal that thestate court chose to treat as timely. (Opp. at 23.)Again, Respondent’s argument confuses and

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distracts from the real issue. Each state has its ownrules on timeliness and procedure. Under thegoverning principles of federalismand comity,federal courts should defer to state courtdeterminations of their own rules.The SeventhCircuit did not do that here.

Contrary to Respondent’s contention, othercircuits take the approach that "federal courts mustaccept a state court’s interpretation of its statutesand rules of practice." Isral~l y. Russe]], 276 F.3d768, 771 (6th Cir. 2001). Prior Seventh Circuitdecisions recognize that state courts are the"masters" of their own rules and whether a statepleading was "timely" is governed by those rules.Wilson v. Battles, 302 F.3d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 2002);Jefferson y. Welborn, 222 F.3d 286, 288 (7th Cir.2000). The Seventh Circuit abandoned theseprinciples in Griffith’s case.

That Respondent - or the Seventh Circuit -says that Griffith’s post-conviction petition was"otherwise untimely" does not make it so. Griffithfollowed an established Illinois procedure for seekingan extension of time, and he was granted theextension of time within which to file his post-conviction petition. Under Illinois law, his petitionwas timely as a result, and it was treated as timely.In the cases Respondent cites, the federal courtsdeferred to the state court’s decisions on timeliness -indeed, the interests of comity and federalism sodictate. Adams v. LeMaster, 223 F.3d 1177, 1181(10th Cir. 2000). In the cases cited by Respondent

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except Allen g. Mitche]], 276 F.3d 183, 185 (4th Cir.2001), the court concluded that the state court wouldhave considered (or did consider) the state courtpetition untimely and therefore dismissed the habeaspetition.2 The same deference, however, must holdtrue if the state court would have considered (or didconsider) the state petition timely. That is, thepetition must also be timely for the purpose offederal habeas review.

Every other circuit to have considered thisissue has concluded that deference must be given tothe state court decisions on procedure, includingtimeliness. The fact that the Seventh Circuit did notdo so here warrants review by this Court.

II. Supreme Court Review Is Warranted ToResolve The Circuit-Split Regarding WhetherA Court Should Address The Merits Of AnOtherwise Untimely Habeas Petition WhereThe Petitioner Establishes A Credible ClaimOf Actual Innocence.

The issue of whether a petitioner whoestablishes a credible claim of actual innocence isentitled to review on the merits of his federal habeasclaim even where he fails to meet the timeliness

2 The issue in Allen was whether there was an

"unreasonable delay" under North Carolina law,which did not have a fixed appellate deadline. 276F.3d at 186-87. The Fourth Circuit remanded to thedistrict court to make that determination. Id. at 187.

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requirements of AEDPA is ripe for review.Respondent does not dispute this. The dissenters inthe Seventh Circuit said precisely that.3 (App. 12a.)Instead, Respondent argues that this case is a poorvehicle for deciding the issue because, according toRespondent, Griffith cannot demonstrate hisinnocence. (Opp. at 29.)

Respondent improperly conflates the burden ofpleading with the burden of proof. Griffith has madea strong threshold showing of his innocence. As setforth in his habeas corpus petition at great lengthand summarized in his Petition for Certiorari, allthree "eyewitness" inmates who testified thatGriffith was the initial aggressor during the fightrecanted their trial testimony during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. (Pet. at 30-31.) The"eyewitnesses" also attributed their false trialtestimony to repeated pressure, coercion, andpromises of benefits and leniency from the State,none of which was disclosed by the State. (PCR. 156-64, 183-84, 215-16, 222, 232, 244, 255-61,279-83.)

Respondent dismisses the recanted testimonyas unhelpful and incredible. (Opp. at 29-30.) But,Respondent ignores the fact that the state appellatecourt used the wrong legal standard with respect towhat Griffith was required to show (Pet. at 30) andthat the forensic evidence at trial was far from

3 As further explained in the Amicus Brief filed by

the Innocence Network, the circuits are in clearconflict on this issue. (Amicus Br. at 4-8.)

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conclusive. (Seventh Cir. Br. at 9-10.) Mostimportantly, Respondent completely ignores theevidence corroborating the recanted testimony,namely, the records from the IDOC master file of oneof the witnesses - Bernie Cleveland - confirming hewas released early from prison despite his perpetualdisciplinary problems (PCC. 1167) and theuncontroverted affidavit from Cleveland’s counselattesting to the fact that there existed a quidp~’o quoagreement between Cleveland and the prosecutor inGriffith’s case. (JA163-64.) This new evidencepresentedby Griffith had sufficient indicia ofreliability and raised "sufficient doubt about[Griffith’s] guilt to undermine confidence in theresult of the trial." ,Sehlup v. De]o, 513 U.S. 298, 317(1995).

Because this issue is ripe for Supreme Courtreview, this Court should grant review and resolvethe conflict among the circuits.

III. Griffith’s Petition Is Not Moot

Respondent also contends that this caseprovides a poor vehicle to decide either questionpresented because there is a chance it may becomemoot before a decision is reached as a result ofGriffith’s successive post-conviction petition pendingin Livingston County in which he seeks re-sentencing.4 Respondent’s argument is yet another

4 Griffith’s sentence was enhanced by a prior

conviction in Chicago, which was vacated by a

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diversion from the real issues in this case.Respondent does not contend that this case isactually moot. (Opp. at 33-34.) This is notsurprising, as there indisputably remains a case-or-controversy. See, e.g., Friends o£ the Earth, Inc. v.Laidlaw Envtl. Services, Inc. 528 U.S. 167, 189(2000). Moreover, Respondent does not concede thatGriffith is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.5

Essentially, Respondent argues on the onehand that Griffith’s habeas petition should not beheard on the merits because it was filed too late,while simultaneously arguing that it should not beheard on the merits because it is premature.Respondent cannot have it both ways.

district court in 2008 based on egregiousprosecutorial misconduct. United States ex tel.Gri££ith v. Hullick, 587 F. Supp. 2d 899, 912-13 (N.D. Ill. 2008). The State did not appeal.

5 The double-standard with respect to the statute of

limitations issue is apparent here as well. Griffithfiled his successive post-conviction petition inLivingston County on March 17, 2009. The State’sresponse was originally due on November 4, 2009.After obtaining a number of extensions (some a£terthe deadline had passed), the State’s response wasmost recently due on March 1, 2010. The State hasnot responded or sought another extension.Griffith’s Motion for a New Sentencing Hearing iscurrently pending.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for awrit of certiorari should be granted.

PAUL M. SMITHDAVID W. DEBRUINOf CounselJENNER & BLOCK LLP1099 New York Avenue,NW, Suite 900Washington, DC 20001(202) 639"6000

Respectfully submitted,JEFFREY D. COLMANCounsel of RecordANNE P. RAYMICHAEL H. MARGOLISJENNER & BLOCK LLP353 N. Clark StreetChicago, IL 60654(312) 222-9350jcolman@jenner.com

May 16, 2011