Croatia, United KingdOIDand European Union

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Colin A. Munro

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As far as bilateral relations between the UnitedKingdom and Croatia are concerned, one should con-centrate on the present and on the future. Indeed, thehistory of relations between the United Kingdom andCroatia casts quite a long shadow over ourendeavours to understand each other better today.

As for the past, it is not very useful to discussthe UK's role in the creation of the first Yugoslavia.Two events should be menitoned which, still cast ashadow on bilateral relationship. The first is the Brit-ish role in the repatriation of Croats, Slovenes andSerbs from Carinthia in 1945. And the second is thecircumstances of the recognition of Croatia whenYugoslavia disintegrated. The main point is that thereis absolutely no truth what-soever in the claim that theBritish authorities, civil andmilitary, deliberately sentpeople back to Yugoslavia,soldiers and civilians alike,in the knowledge that theywould be massacred byTito's partisan forces. Therewas no conspiracy betweenBritish and Tito's forces tothis effect. There were no at-tacks by British soldiers atB leiburg on defencelessCroatians. It is very impor-tant for a new nation suchas Croatia not to build up anational identity based on amisunderstanding of history,perceived past injustice anddiscrimination. This is allthe more important in thecase of Croatia, where beliefin British hostility to Croatsis combined with belief insome sort of instinctive ata-vistic sympathy for Serbs.

Why then Britishcaution over the recognitionof Croatia? Was not this in

accordance with the principle of self-determination?The key relevant principle in the Helsinki final act isthat frontiers can be changed peacefully and by agree-ment. This is the principle on which the reunificationof Germany was based.

In any event, British perspective was that thedissolution of Yugoslavia might not be achievedpeacefully. Therefore some form of confederalreorganisation seemed to be a worthwhile goal. Inthe event that proved to be impossible and UK ac-cepted that recognition was the right course. Twokey points flow from this. The first is that Britishhesitation over recognition was in no sense animatedby anti-Croatian conspiratorial motives designed to

maintain some sort of Brit-ish sphere of influence inSouth East Europe 19th cen-tury style. The second is thatonce UK had recognisedCroatia, that became thesole basis of British policy.It is no part of British policywhatsoever to recreate thepast. The basis of the rela-tionship between the UnitedKingdom and Croatia nowis one between two sover-eign independent states. It ishowever very important thatcountries which aspire tojoin the European Unionshould live in peace and har-mony with neighbours, whohave the same legitimate as-piration. It is necessary tofoster the development ofliberal democracy, a socialmarket economy, and soci-ety based on the rule of lawthroughout Europe. Theseare the essential precondi-tions ofEU membership forany country.

The United Kingdom has played asignificant role in the political

development of Croatia on severaloccasions since 1919. In respect to

the question of Croatianindependence in the 1990s British,apparently hesitating attitude, wasdue to the Helsinki act principles of

peaceful change and not aconsequence of anti-Croatian

motives. The change in the Britishpolicy towards Croatia and its

subsequent recognition occurred asan effect of a changed situation and

realisation that a peacefulreconstruction of Yugoslavia is nolonger possible. The current Britishpolicy is supportive of the Croatian

aspiration to join the Westernintegrations for which it would benecessary for Croatia to adopt a

more appropriate policy regarding itsinternational obligations and

domestic democratic practice.

Key words: Croatia,United Kingdom, European Union

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United Kingdom Presidencyof the European Union*

British diplomacy is not in the least shyabout acknowledging that British foreign policyis about the promotion of British interests. Thereis no British interest in creating in this part ofthe world a 19th century balance of power. Brit-ish interests are the maintenance of the securityand prosperity of the United Kingdom. Since1949 the cornerstone of British security has beenthe NATO alliance. As far as prosperity and, in-creasingly, security are concerned, the key insti-tution is the European Union. The greater pro-portion of UK trade is with EU partners. If oneincludes the associates and other European pro-spective members, the proportion is even greaterstill.

The fundamental lesson for British inter-ests which was learned from two world wars isthat the exclusion and isolation of defeated en-emies, especially inherently powerful ones suchas Germany, is a mistake. Exclusion, punitivereparations and the like lead to a desire for re-venge, a widespread sense of injustice, and allthe dangers of revisionism.

We believe profoundly that we made a mis-take in 1919 but that we got it right after 1945.Including (initially of course West) Germany inthe Council of Europe, the WEU, NATO and theEuropean Union transformed the country which,from British point of view, had been a factor ofinstability in Europe since the late 19th century,into a major factor for stability. Soviet Union wasinitially opposed to the inclusion of the GDR inNATO. I vividly remember Soviet diplomats tell-ing me that for their Generals this would meanthat the Soviet Union had lost the Second WorldWar after all. One ofthe factors which persuadedthe Russians to change their minds was the strongrepresentations made to them by countries, suchas Poland and Hungary in particular, that leav-ing the security status of the GDR uncertainwould create an unstable loose cannon on thedeck of Central Europe, storing up trouble forthe future. Inclusion of East Germany withinNATO on the condition that East Germany wasgoverned by the democratic state based on the

* This article was prepared in the first half of 1998 while UKchaired the UE.

CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW

rule of law established in the Federal Republicwould be their best guarantee of future security.Experience since 1990 shows that this was thecorrect judgement. This was the reverse of thezero sum game mentality which sometimes pre-vails in this part of the world: bad for myneighbour equals good for me.

This is the background to Presidency of theEU which the UK exercised last in the secondhalf of 1992. Let me set out briefly what our Presi-dency priorities now are. First of all the need ,and this is important also in domestic politicalterms, to demonstrate a more positive attitudetowards all aspects of EU business. We are at-taching high priority to economic reform of theEU, to boosting employment prospects, growthand competitiveness. We have signed up to thesocial chapter and have developed a clear effec-tive and positive approach to European MonetaryUnion. If and when it is in the British interests todo so, we shall join. Our objectives for the pe-riod ahead include a more effective Common For-eign and Security Policy in which the UK isrecognised to be a leader. In particular, UK aimsto pursue successful negotiations for the nextstage of enlargement. In this context the agendafor internal reform is extremely important for theEU's external relations. To take but the mostobvious example. If a country such as Polandwere to join the EU under the existing CAP,spending on agriculture would spiral out of con-trol to politically unacceptable levels. Indeed,present levels of subsidy to inefficient agricul-ture are a matter of sharp domestic controversyin the UK. So when you think from time to time,as perhaps you do, that we are paying insuffi-ciently urgent attention to enlargement, bear inmind this internal agenda.

What then are the problems as far as theUK is concerned? The first one is this. The Eu-ropean Union has been, since the beginning, apolitical project designed to bury conflict foreverbetween the nations of Europe. It used, initiallyat least, economic means such as the coal andsteel community. The economic means, it wasforeseen by visionaries such as Jean Monnet ,would make the project palatable in countriessuch as France and the Netherlands where bittermemories from the war would have sunk a purelypolitical project. One can recall that the French

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parliament rejected in 1954 proposals for a Eu-ropean defence community including Germany.In Britain which had not been occupied and wherethere was and is justified pride in its wartime rolethe political picture was different. UK kept thedistance from the European Community withseriously adverse economic, political and socialresults. Then it was sold to the British people inthe main as a matter of commercial self-interest.Edward Heath was one of the very few post-warleaders to explain honestly the political natureof the project. These problems persisted through-out the 1970s and 80s, resulting in the divisionsin the Conservative Party. It seems that the newBritish Government is the first which has nottaken office, burdened by an internal quarrel overthe place of the UK in Europe. The UK has greaterroom for manoeuvre and greater authority in theEU than in its previous Presidencies in 1992 and1986. It also helps a great deal of course that theeconomic outlook in the UK is good. Unemploy-ment is lower than in France or Germany for ex-ample.

European Union and Croatia

This then is the background to the relation-ship between the European Union and Croatiafrom the British perspective. The British Gov-ernment is committed to the UK's membershipof the EU and is in agreement with partners aboutthe priority to be attached to enlargement. Wealso agree with our partners that Croatia like othercountries covered by the Regional Approach hasa legitimate aspiration to membership, and, a keypoint about the Regional Approach: Croatia willitself determine the pace of its progress. In nosense will Croatia be held back by other coun-tries, although if by its own actions, in relationto Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia indicates, let ussay that it is striving for a relationship with theFederation that is incompatible with Dayton, thisin turn would hold up the development ofCroatia's relationship with the EU.

What then is the problem? Is it internationalpressure? Why is Croatia not yet in the same po-sition as Slovenia? There is no need to say toomuch about the economic aspects. Notwithstand-ing the economic difficulties, there is no doubt

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that if the political difficulties could be solved,Croatia could quickly have access to the PHAREprogramme restored, and a new mandate for ne-gotiations on a trade and co-operation agreementcould be agreed. Associate status would follow,as would then an invitation to begin negotiationsfor membership itself.

But Croatia accepted a number of obliga-tions when it joined the Council of Europe inrelation to human rights, democracy, the rule oflaw, the free media, and indeed the protection ofmembers of national minorities. It also accepteda number of obligations when it signed the Erdutand Dayton peace agreements. These take pre-cedence over domestic legislation. We haveample experience ofthis in Britain because manycases have gone to Strasbourg.

What the EU is essentially asking Croatiato do is to implement international agreementsinto which it entered freely. Editorial indepen-dence for the electronic media TV is particularlyrelevant. Establishing a framework for it wouldnot be costly. Given the importance which poli-ticians everywhere attach to the media, this is astep which could be taken quickly and whichwould immediately command favourable atten-tion. Even if Croatia's arrangements are inspiredby models elsewhere, e.g. in countries such asAustria, Germany and Belgium, the results arenot the same in Croatia.

Particular attention should be paid to thequestion of the return of refugees and displacedpersons. The international community will notaccept the proposition that the Serbs who left dur-ing Operations Storm and Flash are all rebelswho, on departure, renounced their citizenship.All of us recognise how difficult and painful thisis, and how costly. But there is simply too muchevidence that discrimination on ethnic grounds,and not cost, is the problem. It is relevant to quotethe example of a Serb who wishes to return tohis home who has confirmation from the Croatianauthorities that he has every right to do so. Allhis paperwork is in order but his house is beingoccupied by a Croat who has recently returnedafter living in Switzerland since 1970. It has beenmade clear to this refugee that the only waythrough the logjam is to pay handsome bribes.There can be no lasting peace and security in thisregion unless and until there is a sincere serious

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and effective effort to tackle the problem of refu-gees and displaced persons, and a genuine effortto banish corruption and discrimination. That iswhat the EU means by its calls on Croatia to makeits own positive contribution.

Croatia and BosnianFederation

The relationship between Croatia and theBosnian Federation presents particular problemsfor Croatia's aspirations for a closer relationshipwith the ED. On the one hand, we hear thatCroatia is a Central European and Mediterraneancountry which is constitutionally committed notto entering into any Balkan associations. Whereone would ask does this leave Croatia's relationswith Greece, a Balkan country which is alreadya member of the EU? On the other hand, Croatia'sinitial proposals for special relations with theBosnian Federation would have involved a cus-toms and even a monetary union with part of asovereign state. The latest proposals are muchbetter. But in any event, it has seemed as ifCroatian policy is facing in mutually exclusivedirections. On the one hand, the strategic goal ofEuro-Atlantic integration; on the other hand a re-lationship with a neighbour which is incompat-ible with that goal; and again domestic arrange-ments which in terms of implementation fall shortof obligations already entered into as a memberof the Council of Europe. So this was what For-eign Ministers Kinkel and Vedrine meant whenthey said that Croatia had the key to Europeanintegration in its own hands. One might be addedthat the position as regards Croatia's prospectsfor partnership for peace and NATO are basicallythe same as those in relation to the EuropeanUnion.

To concluded with a word about leadership.After the Second World War, Monnet, Adenauer,de Gaulle, de Gasperi, Truman, Marshall and in-deed Churchill all saw, far ahead of the embit-tered refugees and others who had suffered somuch during the war, that even if they could nei-ther forget nor yet forgive, the peoples of thissmall continent would have to live together asgood neighbours. They took decisions that wouldnot have been popular with the voters if they hadbeen put to a referendum. That is why, for ex-

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ample, Milosevic's latest ploy of a referendumon 23 April on Kosovo is so hopelessly irrespon-sible. De Gaulle had to employ a number of strata-gems which might even have seemed unworthyto cut the gordian knot of France's role in Alge-ria. Is there a parallel here between France andAlgeria, and Croatia and Herzegovina? De Gaullesaw that France could not at one and the sametime become a modem European democratic stateand remain entangled in Algeria, with Frenchdomestic policy effectively determined by theFrench community in that territory.

More recently the leadership of O'Hemeand Tony Blair - is it not striking that John Ma-jor has joined forces with Tony Blair to advocatesupport for the new agreement on Northern Ire-land - may produce a settlement acceptable to amajority on both sides of the divide, albeit forfundamentally different reasons. We hoped bothin Britain and in Ireland that our joint member-ship of the European Union would enable thishistoric division, every bit as acute and in someways similar to the divisions which exist in thispart of the world, to be overcome.

The question for Croatia therefore iswhether "a nation forged in war" and a winnerand which has achieved very significant suc-cesses in terms of nation building and of theeconomy can now go further, implement a lib-eral democracy, and make a contribution to sta-bility and reconciliation in this part of the worldin line not only with its obligations but also withthe aspirations of the overwhelming majority ofits people. •