unreality of time

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The Unreality of TimeAuthor(s): J. Ellis McTaggartSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 17, No. 68 (Oct., 1908), pp. 457-474Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association

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NEW SERIES. No. 68.] LOCTOBER, 1908.

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGYAND PHILOSOPHY

I.-THE UNREALITY OF TIME.

BY J. ELLIS MCTAGGART.

IT doubtlesseemshighly aradoxicalo assert hatTimeisunreal,ndthat llstatementshichnvolvetsrealityreerroneous. uchanassertionnvolves fargreaterepar-ture rom henatural ositionfmankindhansinvolvedinthe ssertionf theunrealityfSpaceoroftheunrealityofMatter.So decisive breach ithhat aturalositionsnot o be ightlyccepted.Andyet nallages hebeliefntheunrealityf ime asprovedingularlyttractive.

In thephilosophyndreligionftheEast wefind hatthisdoctrines of cardinalmportance. nd ntheWest,where hilosophyndreligionre esscloselyonnected,e

find hat hesamedoctrineontinuallyecurs, oth mongphilosophersndamong heologians. heologyever oldsitselfpart rommysticismor ny ongperiod,ndalmostall mysticismenies herealityf time. In philosophy,again, ime s treateds unreal ySpinoza, yKant,byHegel,and by Schopenhauer.n thephilosophyf thepresentay he womostmportant,ovementsexcludingthosewhichre as yetmerelyritical)rethosewhichooktoHegel ndtoMr.Bradley.And both fthese chools

deny hereality ftime. Such a concurrencef opinioncannot edenied o be highlyignificant-ands nottheless significantecausethe doctrineakes uchdifferentforms,nd is supportedy suchdifferentrguments.

I believe hattime s unreal.'But I do so for easonswhichrenot, think,mployedy ny fthephilosopherswhom havementioned,nd proposeoexplainmy easonsin thispaper.

31



458 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART:

Positions in time,as time appears to us prima'facie,are

distinguished n two ways. Each position is Earlier thansome, and Later than some, of the other positions. Andeach position is either Past, Present, or Future. The dis-tinctionsof the formerclass are permanent,while thoseofthe latter are not. If M is everearlierthan N, it is alwaysearlier. But an event,whichis now present,was future ndwill be past.

Since distinctionsof the firstclass are permanent, heymightbe held to be more objective,and to be moreessentialto the nature of time. I believe,however,that this wouldbe a mistake,and that the distinction f past, present andfuture s as essentialto timeas the distinctionof earlierandlater,while in a certain sense, as we shall see, it may beregardedas more fundamental han the distinction f earlierand later. And it is because thedistinctions f past, presentand future eem to me to be essentialfortime,that I regardtime as unreal.

For the sake of brevity shall speak ofthe series of posi-tionsrunningfrom he far past throughthenear past to the

present,and then fromthe presentto the,near future ndthe farfuture, s the A series. The series ofpositionswhichruns from arlier to later I shall call theB series. The con-tentsof a position n time are called events. The contentsof a single position are admitted to be properlycalled apluralityof events. (I believe, however,that they can astruly,though not more ruly,be called a single event. This-view s not universally ccepted, and it is not necessaryformyargument.) A position n time s called a moment.

The first uestionwhichwe must consider s whether t isessential to the realityof time that its eventsshouldform nA seriesas well as a B series. And it is clear,to begin-with,that we never observe ime except as formingboth theseseries. We perceive events in time as being present, ndthose are the onlyevents which we perceivedirectly. Andall other events in time which, by memoryor inference,we believe to-be real, are regardedas past or future-those.earlier han the presentbeing past, and those laterthan the

presentbeingfuture. Thus the events' f time,as observedby us, form n A seriesas well as a B series.It is possible,however, thatthis is merely ubjective. It

-may be the case that the distinction introduced amongpositions in time bythe A series-the distinctionof past,present and future is simply a constant illusion of ourminds,and that the real nature of time only contains thedistinctionof the B series-the distinction of earlier and



THE UNREALITY OF TIME. 459

later. In that case we could not perceive imeas it really s,

but we mightbe able to think fit as it really s.This is not a verycommon view,but it has found ablesupporters. I believe it to be untenable, because, as Isaid above, it seems to me that the A series is essentialtothe nature of time, and that any difficultyn the way ofregarding he A series as real is equally a difficultyn theway ofregarding imeas real.

It would, I suppose, be universallyadmitted that timeinvolves change. A particularthing, ndeed,may exist un-changed through any amount of time. But when we askwhatwe mean bysayingthat therewere differentmomentsof time,or a certain duration of time, through which thethingwas the same, we find thatwe mean that it remainedthe same while otherthingswere changing. A universe inwhich nothingwhateverchanged (includingthe thoughtsoftheconsciousbeingsin it) wouldbe a timelessuiliverse.

If, then,a B series without an A series can constitutetime,change must be possible withoutan A series. Let ussuppose that the distinction f past, presentand futuredoes-not applyto reality. Can change applyto reality? Whatis it that changes?

Could we say that, n a timewhich formeda B_ eriesbutnot an A series, the change consisted in the fact that anevent ceased to be an event, while another event began tobe an event? If this were the case, we should certainlyhave got a change.

But this is impossible. An event can never cease to bean event. It can never get out of any timeseries in which

it once is. If N. is ever earlier than 0 and laterthan M, itwill always be, and has always been,earlier than 0 and laterthan M, since the relations of earlier and later are per-manent. And as, by our presenthypothesis,time is con-stituted by a B series alone, N will always have a positionin a time series,and has always had one.i That is, it willalways be,and has always been, an event,and cannot beginor cease to be an event.

Or shall we say that one event M merges itself into

anothereventN, whilepreserving certain dentity ymeansof an unchanged element,so that we can say, not merelythatM has ceased and N begun,but that it is M whichhas

I It is equallytrue, hought does not concernus on the hypothesiswhichwe are now considering,hat whatevers once nan A series salways none. If one of the determinationsast, present, ndfuturecaneverbe appliedtoN, thenone of them lwayshas beenandalwayswillbe applicable, hough f coursenob lways hesame one.




become N? Still the same difficulty ecurs. M and N

may have a common element, but they are not the sameevent, or there would be no change. If thereforeM changesinto N at a certain moment, hen, at that moment, M hasceased to be M, and N has begun to be N. But we haveseen that no event can cease to be, or begin to be, itself,since it never ceases to have a place as itself n the B series.Thus one event cannot change into another.

Neither can the change be looked for n thenumericallydifferent oments fabsoluateime, supposing such momentsto exist.

Forthe

samearguments will apply here. Each

such moment would have its own place in the B series,since each would be earlier or later than each of the others.And as theB series ndicatepermanent elations, o momentcould ever cease to be, nor could it become anothermoment.

Since, therefore,what occurs in time never begins orceases to be, or to be itself,and since, again, if there is tobe change itmustbe change ofwhat occursin time (forthetimeless never changes), I' submit that onlyone alternativeremains. Changes must happen to the events of such anature that the occurrenceof these changes does not hinderthe events frombeing events, and the same events, bothbefore nd after he change.

Now what characteristics f an eventare there which canchange and yet leave the event the same event ? (I use theword characteristicas a general term to include both thequalities which the event possesses, and the relations ofwhich t is a term-or ratherthe fact that the event is aterm of these relations.) It seems to me that thereis only

one class of such characteristics-namely,the determinationof theeventin questionbythe termsof theA series.

Take any event-the death ofQueen Anne,forexampleand considerwhat changecan take place in itscharacteristics.That it is a death, that it is the death of Anne Stuart,thatit has suchcauses, that it has such effects-every haracter-istic of this sort never changes. " Before the stars saw oneanotherplain" the event in question was a death of anEnglish Queen. At the last momentof time-if timehas a

last moment-the event in question will still be a death ofan English Queen. And in everyrespectbutoneitis equallydev6idof change. But in one respect it does change. Itbegan by beinga future vent. It became everymomentanevent n the nearerfuture. At last it was present. Thenit became past, and will always remain so, though everymoment t becomesfurthernd further ast.

Thus we seem forcedto the conclusionthat all change is




dnly changeofthe characteristicsmparted o eventsby

their resencen theA series,whether hosecharacteristicsarequalities rrelations.If thesecharacteristicsre qualities, hentheevents,we

must dmit,wouldnotbe alwaysthe same, incean eventwhose ualities lter s,of course,not completelyhesame.And,even if the characteristicsre relations, he eventswouldnot be completelyhesame, f-as I believe o be thecase-the relation fX to Y involves he existencen X ofa quality frelationshipo Y.' Then therewouldbe twoalternatives efore s. We mightadmit that eventsdidreally hange heir ature,nrespectfthese haracteristics,though ot n respect f any others. I see no difficultynadmittinghis. It wouldplace the determinationsf theA series na very niqueposition mongthe characteristicsoftheevent, ut on anytheoryheywouldbe veryuniquecharacteristics. t is usual,for xample,o say that a pasteventneverchanges, ut I do not see whywe shouldnotsay, insteadof this," a past eventchangesonlyin onerespect-thateverymomentt is further rom hepresentthan twas before. But although see no intrinsic iffi-cultyn thisview, t is not thealternative regard s ulti-mately rue. For f, s I believe,imesunreal,he dmissionthat n eventn timeWould hange nrespect f tspositionin-theA serieswouldnot nvolve hatanything eallydidchange.

Withoutthe A seriesthen, herewould be no change,andconsequentlyhe B seriesby itself s not sufficientortime, incetime nvolveshange.

The B series,however,annotexistexcept as temporal,sinceearlier nd later,which re thedistinctionsf whichit consists, re clearlytime-determinations.o it followsthattherecanbe no B serieswherethere s no A series,sincewhere heres noA series heres no time.

But itdoesnotfollow hat, f wesubtract he determina-tionsoftheA seriesfrom ime,we shall have no series eftat all. There s a series-a series fthepermanentelationstooneanother fthoserealitieswhich ntimeareevents-

and it is the combination f thisserieswiththeA deter-minationswhichgives ime. But thisother eries-let us

I I am notasserting, s Lotze did, that a relationbetween X and Yconsistsof a quality n X and a quality n Y-a viewwhich regard squite ndefensible. assert hat a relationZ betweenX and Y involvestheexistence n X of thequality having he relation toY " so thata differencef relations lways nvolves differencen quality, nd achange frelationslways nvolves change fquality.




call it theC series-is not temporal,for t involvesno change,

but only an order. Events have an order. They are, letus say, in the order M, N, 0, P. And they are thereforenot n the order M, 0, N, P, or 0, N, M, P, or in any otherpossible order. But that they have this order no moreimplies that there is any change than the order of theletters of the alphabet, or of the Peers on the ParliamentRoll, implies any change. And thus those realitieswhichappear to us as events might form such a series withoutbeing entitledto the name of events, since that name isonly givento realitieswhich are in a time series. It is onlywhen change and timecome in that the relations of this Cseriesbecome relations ofearlier and later, nd so it becomesa B series.

More is wanted, however, for the genesis of a B seriesand of time than simply the C series and the fact of change.For the changemust be in a particulardirection. And theC series,while it determinesthe order,does not determinethe direction. If the C series runs M, N, 0, P, then the Bseriesfrom arlier o later cannotrun M, 0, N, P, orM,P, 0, N,

or in any way but two. But it can run eitherM, N, 0, P(so that M is earliest and P latest) or else P, 0, N, M (sothat P is earliest and Mi latest). And there s nothingeitherin the C series or in the fact of change to determinewhichit will be.

A series which s not temporalhas no directionof ts own,though t has an order. If we keep to the series of thenatural numbers, we cannot put 17 between 21 and 26.But we keep to the series, whetherwe go from 17, through

21, to 26, or whetherwe go from 26, through *21, to 17.The firstdirectionseems the more natural to us, becausethisseries has only one end, and it is generallymore con-venient to have that end as a beginningthan as a ter-mination. But we equally keep to the series in countingbackward.

Again, in the series of categories n Hegel's dialectic, heseries prevents us fromputting the Absolute Idea betweenBeing and Causality. But it permits us either to go from

Being, through Causality, to the Absolute dea, or from heAbsolute Idea, throughCausality, to Being. The first s,accordingto Hegel, the direction f proof, nd is thus gener-ally the most convenientorder of enumeration. But if wefound t convenient o enumerate n the reversedirection,weshould still be observing he series.

A non-temporalseries, then, has no direction n itself,though a person considering t may take the terms in one




direction r in the other, according to his own convenienceAnd in the same way a person who contemplatesa time-order may contemplate it in either direction. I maytracethe orderof events from the Great Charterto the ReformBill, or from he ReformBill to the Great Charter. But indealing with the time serieswe have not to do merelywitha change n an external ontemplation f t, but with a changewhich belongs to the series itself. And this change has adirectionof its own. The Great Charter came before theReformBill, and the ReformBill did not come before heGreat Charter.

Therefore, esides the C seriesand the factofchange theremust be given-in order ogettime-the fact hat thechangeis in one directionand not in the other. We can now seethat the A series, togetherwith the C series, s sufficientogive us time. For in orderto get change, and change in agiven direction, t is sufficienthat oneposition ntheC seriesshould be Present, to the exclusion of all others,and thatthischaracteristic fpresentness houldpass along the seriesin such-away thatall positionson the one side of the Present

have been present, and all positions on the other side of twill be present. That which has been present s Past, thatwhichwill be present s Future.' Thus to ourpreviouscon-clusion thatthere can be no time unless the A series is trueof reality,we can add the furtherconclusion that no otherelements are required to constitutea time-series xcept anA seriesand a C series.

We may sumup the relationsof the three eriesto timeasfollows: The A and B series are equally essentialto time,

which must be distinguished s past, presentand future, ndmustlikewisebe distinguished,s earlier and later. But thetwo series are not equally fundamental. The distinctions fthe A seriesareultimate. We cannot explainwhat is meantby past, present and future. We can, to some extent,de-scribethem, but theycannotbe defined. We can only showtheirmeaning by examples. " Your breakfast this morn-ing," we can say to an inquirer," is past; this conversationis present; yourdinner his eveningis future." We can do

no more.The B series, on the other hand, is not ultimate. For,given a C series of permanent relationsof terms,which is

1This accountof thenature fthe A series s notvalid,for tinvolvesa vicious ircle, ince t uses " has been" and " will be " to explainPastand Future. But, as I shall endeavour o showlater on, thisviciouscircle s inevitablewhenwedeal with heA series, nd forms he groundonwhichwemust eject t.




not in itself emporal,nd therefores not a B series, nd

giventhefurtheract that the terms f thisC series alsoform n Aseries, nd tresults hat heterms f theC seriesbecome B series, hosewhich re placedfirst,n the direc-tionfrompast to future, eing earlier han thosewhoseplaces are furthern the direction f thefuture.

The C series, owever,s as ultimate s theA series. Wecannot et toutof anythinglse. That the units of timedoform series, herelations fwhich re permanent,s asultimate s the fact thateach of them s present, ast,or

future. And this ultimateact s essential o time. For it

is admittedhat tisessentialotime hat achmomentf tshall either e earlier r ater han ny othermoment;andtheserelations re permanent.Andthis-the B series-cannot egotoutof heA series lone. It isonlywhen heAseries,which ives hange nd direction,s combined ith heC series,which ivespermanence,hat he B series anarise.

Onlypartof the conclusionwhich have nowreachedsrequired orthe generalpurposeofthis paper. I am en-deavouringo base theunrealityftime,noton thefact hattheA series s morefundamentalhantheB series, ut onthefact hat t s as essential s theB series-thatthedis-tinctions fpast, present nd future re essential o time,andthat, fthe distinctionsrenever rue freality,hennorealitys intime.

Thisview,whethertis trueorfalse,hasnothing urpris-ing nit. It was pointed ut abovethat ime, s weperceiveit, alwayspresents hesedistinctions.And it has generallybeenheldthat his s a real characteristicf ime, ndnotan

illusion ue tothe way n whichweperceivet. Most phil-osophers, hether hey idordidnotbelieve ime obetrueofreality, ave regarded hledistinctionsf theA series sessential o time.

When the oppositeview has been maintained,t hasgenerallyeen, believe, ecause it was held rightly,s Ishalltry oshow ateron) thatthe distinctionsfpresent,past andfuture annotbe trueof reality, nd thatconse-quently,fthe reality f time s tobe saved,the distinction

inquestionmustbe shownto be unessential o time. Thepresumption,t was held,was for herealityf ime,ndthiswouldgiveus a reasonfor ejectingheA series as unessen--tial totime. But of coursethiscouldonlygivea presump-tion. If the analysisof thenotion of timeshowed hat,byremoving he A series, ime was destroyed,his ine ofargument ouldbenolonger pen, nd the unreality f theA serieswould nvolve he unrealityftime.




I have endeavoured to show that the removal of the A

series doesdestroy ime. But thereare twoobjectionsto thistheory,whichwe mustnow consider.The first eals withthose time-serieswhichare not really

existent, but which are falsely believed to be existent,orwhich are imagined as existent. Take, for example, theadventuresof Don Quixote. This series, it is said, is not anA series. I cannotat this moment udge it to be eitherpast,presentor future. Indeed I know that t is none ofthe three.Yet, it is said, it is certainlya B series. The adventureof

the galley-slaves,forexample, s later thanthe adventureof

thewindmills. And a B series involves time. The conclu-sion drawnis that an A series is not essentialto time.

The answer to this objection I hold to be as follows.Time only belongsto the existent. If any reality s in time,that involves that the reality in question exists. This, Iimagine, would be universally, dmitted. It may be ques-tioned whether ll of what exists is in time, or even whetheranything really existent is in time, but it would not bedenied that, if anything s in time, it must exist.

Now what is existent n the adventuresof Don Quixote?Nothing. For the storyis imaginary. The acts of Cer-vantes' mind when he invented the story, he acts of mymind when I think of the story-these exist. But thenthese formpart of an A series. Cervantes' nventionof thestory s in the past. My thoughtof the story s in the past,the present, nd-I trust-the future.

But the adventures of Don Quixotemay be believed by achild to be historical. And in reading them I may by an

effort f the imaginationcontemplate hemas if they reallyhappened. In this case, the adventures are believed to beexistentor imaginedas existent. But thenthey rebelievedto be in the A series,or imagined as in the A series. Thechild who believes them historical will believe that theyhappened in the past. If I imagine them as existent,shall imagine themas happening in the past. In the sameway, if any one believed the events recordedin Morris'sNews fromNowhereo exist,or imaginedthemas existent,he

would believethem to exist in the futureor imagine themas existent in the future. Whether we place the object ofour belief or our imagination n the present, he past, or thefuture,will depend upon the characteristicsof that object.But somewhere n ourA series it will be placed.

Thus the answer to the objection s that, ust as a thing sin time, t is in theA series. If it is really n time, t is reallyin the A series. If it is believed to be in time, it is believed




to be in the A series. If it is imagined as in time, t is imag-

ined as in the A series.The secondobjection s based on the possibility,discussedbyMr. Bradley, hat theremightbe several ndependent ime-series in reality. For Mr. Bradley, ndeed, time is only ap-pearance. There is no real time at all, and therefore hereare not several real series of time. But the hypothesishereis that there should be within reality everal real and inde-pendent time-series.

The objection, imagine, s that the time-serieswould beall

real, while the distinction of pasf, present, and futurewould only have meaning withineach series,and could not,therefore, e taken as ultimatelyreal. There would be, forexample, many presents. Now, of course, many points oftime can be present (each point in each time-series s apresent once), but they must be present successively. Andthe presentsof the differentime-serieswouldnot be succes-sive, since they are not in the same time. (Neither wouldtheybe simultaneous, ince that equally nvolves being inthesame time. They would have no time-relationwhatever.)And different resents, nless theyare successive,cannot bereal. So the different ime-series,which are real, must beable to exist independentlyof the distinctionbetween past,piesent, and future..I cannot, however, regard this objection as valid. No

doubt, in such a case, no present would be thepresent-itwouldonlybe thepresentofa certain aspect oftheuniverse.But then no timewould be the time-it would only be thetimeofa certainaspect of the universe. It would, no doubt,

be a real time-series, ut I do not see that thepresentwouldbe less real than thetime.

I am not,ofcourse, ssertingthat there s no contradictionin the existence of several distinctA series. My main thesisis that the existence of anyA series nvolvesa contradiction.What I assert here is merely hat, upposingthattherecouldbe any A series,I see no extra difficultynvolved n therebeing several such series independentof one another, andthat therefore here s no incompatibility etween the essen-

tiality of an A series for time and the existenceof severaldistinct imes.Moreover,we mustremember hatthetheory f a plurality

oftime-series s a merehypothesis. No reason has everbeengiven why we should believe in their existence. It has onlybeen said that there is no reason why we shoulddisbelievein theirexistence, nd that therefore hey may exist. But iftheir existenceshouldbe incompatiblewith something lse,




for which there is positive evidence,thentherewould be a

reason why we should disbelievein their existence. Nowthere s, as I have triedto show, positiveevidenceforbeliev-ing that an A series is essentialto time. Supposingthereforethat it were the case (which, for the reasons given above,I deny) thatthe existenceof a pluralityof time-serieswasincompatiblewith the essentiality ortimeoftheA series, itwould be the hypothesis fa pluralityoftimes whichshouldbe rejected, nd not our conclusionas to theA series.

I now pass to the secondpart of mytask. Having, as itseems to me, succeeded in proving hattherecan be no timewithout an A series, it remains to prove that an A seriescannot exist, and that therefore ime cannot exist. Thiswould involve that time is not real at all, since it is ad-mitted that,the onlyway in which time can be real is byexisting.

The terms of the A series are characteristicsof events.We say ofeventsthattheyare eitherpast,present, rfuture.If moments of time are taken as separate realities, wesay of them also that they are past, present, or future.

A characteristicmay be either a relation or a quality.Whether we take the terms of the A series as relationsofevents (which seems the more reasonable view) orwhetherwe take them as qualities of events, t seems to me that theyinvolve a contradiction.

Let us first xamine thesupposition hatthey re relations.In that case only one term of each relationcan be an eventor a moment. The othertermmustbe somethingoutsidethe time-series.' For therelationsoftheA seriesare chang-

ing relations, and the relationofterms of the time-series oone anotherdo not change. Two eventsare exactly in thesame places in the time-series, elatively o one another, amillion years before theytake place, while each of them staking place, and when theyare a millionyearsin thepast.The same is true of the relation of momentsto each other.Again, if the moments of time are to be distinguishedasseparate realitiesfrom heeventswhichhappen in them,therelationbetweenan eventand a moment s unvarying. Each

event is in the same moment n the future,n thepresent,and in thepast.

I It has been maintained that the present is whatever is simultaneouswith the assertion of its presentness, the future whatever is later thanthe assertion of its futurity,and the past whatever is earlier than theassertion of its pastness. But this theory nvolves that time exists inde-pendentlyofthe A series, and is incompatible with the results we havealready reached.




The relationswhich form he A series then mustbe rela-

tions of events and moments to somethingnot itself n thetime-series. What this something s might be difficult osay. But, waiving this point, a more positive difficultypresentsitself.

Past, present, nd future re incompatibledeterminations.Every event must be one or the other,but no event can bemore than one. This is essential to the meaning of theterms. And, if it were not so, the A series would be in-sufficiento give us, in combinationwith the C series, theresult oftime. For time, as we have seen, involves change,and the only changewe can get is fromfuture to present,and frompresentto past.

The characteristics,therefore, are incompatible. Buteveryevent has themall. If M is past, it has been presentand future. If it is future, t will be present and past. Ifit is present, thas been future and will be past. Thus allthe three incompatible terms are predicableof each event,whichis obviously nconsistentwith heirbeing ncompatible,and inconsistentwiththeirproducingchange.

It may seem that this can easily be explained. Indeed ithas been impossible to state the difficulty ithout almostgiving the explanation, since our language has verb-formsfor the past, present, and future, but no form that iscommonto all three. It is never true, the answer will run,that M is present,past and future. It is present,will bepast, and has been uture. Or it is past, and has beenfutureand present,or again is future nd will be presentand past.The characteristics are only incompatiblewhen they are

simPltaneous, and there is no contradiction o this in thefact thateach termhas all of themsuccessively.

But this explanation involves a vicious circle. For itassumes the existence of time in order to account for theway in which momentsare past,present nd future. Timethen mustbe pre-supposed o accountfortheA series. Butwe have already seen that theA serieshas to be assumed inorderto account fortime. Accordingly he A series has tobe pre-supposed n order to accountfor the A series. And

this s clearlya viciouscircle.What we have done is this-to meet the difficultyhatmy writingof thi,sarticle has the characteristicsof past,present nd future,we say that it s present,has been future,and will be past. But "has been" is only distinguishedfrom "is'" by being existence in the past and not in thepresent,and "will be " is only distinguishedfrom bothbybeingexistence n the future. Thus our statement omes to




this thatthe event n question s presentn the present,

futuren thepast,past inthe future. And t s clearthattheres a viciouscircle f we endeavour oassignthe char-acteristicsfpresent, uturend pastbythecriterionfthecharacteristicsfpresent, astandfuture.

The difficultyaybe put in anotherway,in which thefallacywill exhibit tself ather s a vicious nfiniteeriesthan s a viciouscircle. If we avoid the ncompatibilityfthe three haracteristicsyassertinghatM is present, asbeenfuture,nd will be past,we are constructing secondA series,withinwhich the first

alls,n

the same wayin

which eventsfallwithinthe first. It may be doubtedwhetherny ntelligible eaning an be given o theasser-tionthat ime s in time. But, in anycase, the secondAserieswillsufferromhesamedifficultys the first, hichcan onlybe removed yplacing t insidea thirdA series.The sameprinciple illplacethethird nsidea fourth,ndso on withoutnd. You can nevergetridof thecontradic-tion, for, by theact of removingt fromwhat is to beexplained,you produce t overagain in the explanation.And so the explanations invalid.

Thusa contradictionrisesif theA series s asserted frealitywhenthe A series s takenas a series of relations.Could it be taken as a seriesof qualities, nd would thisgiveus a better esult? Aretherethreequalities-futur-ity,presentness,nd pastness,and are eventscontinuallychanging he first orthe second, nid he secondforthethird

It seems o me that there s very ittle o be saidfor he

viewthat hechanges ftheAseries rechanges fqualities.No doubtmy nticipationfan experience ,the xperienceitself, nd thememoryf the experience re three stateswhichhavedifferentualities. But it is not thefutureM,the presentM, and the past M, whichhave these threedifferentualities. The qualities are possessedby threedistinct vents-the anticipation f M, the experienceMitself, nd the memory f M, each of which is in turnfuture, resent, nd past. Thus this gives no support o

the viewthatthe changesof the A seriesare changesofqualities.But we need not go furthernto this question. If the

characteristicsf the A series were qualities, he samedifficultyould arise as if,theywere relations. For, asbefore, hey re notcompatible,nd,as before,very venthas all of them. This canonlybe explained, s before, ysayingthat each eventhas themsuccessively. And thus




the same fallacywould have been committed s in the pre-'vious case.

We have come then to the conclusionthat the applicationof theA series to reality nvolves a contradiction, nd thatconsequently he A series cannot be true of reality. And,since time involves the A series, t follows that time cannotbe true ofreality. Wheneverwe judge anything o exist intime, we are in error. And whenever we perceive anythingas existing in time-which is the only way in which we,everdo perceive things-we are perceiving t more or lessas it really is not.

We must consider a possible objection. Our ground forrejecting time, it may be said, is that time cannot be ex-plainedwithoutassumingtime. But may this not prove-not that time is invalid, but rather that time is ultimate?It is impossible to explain, forexample, goodness or truthunless by bringing n the termto be explainedas part of theexplanation, and we therefore eject the explanation as in-valid. But wedo not therefore ejectthenotion as erroneous,but accept it as somethingultimate,which,while it does not

-admit fexplanation,does notrequire t.But this does not apply here. An idea may be valid of

realitythough t does not admitofa valid explanation. Butit cannot be valid ofrealityf tsapplicationtoreality nvolves:a contradiction. Now we began by pointingout thattherewas such a contradictionn the case of time-that the char-.acteristics f the A series are mutually ncompatible and yetall trueofeveryterm. Unless this contradiction s removed,the idea of time must be rejected as invalid. It was to

remove this contradiction hat theexplanationwas suggested

IIt is very usual to presentTime underthe metaphor f a spatialmovement. But isit to be a movementrom asttofuture,rfrom utureto past? If the A series s taken s one ofqualities, t willnaturally etaken s a movementrom asttofuture,ince hequality fpresentness-has elonged o the past states nd will belong o the future tates. Ifthe A series s taken s one ofrelations,tis possible o take the move-ment itherway, since either f the tworelated erms an be takenasthe onewhichmoves. If the eventsare taken as movingby a fixed

point of presentness, he movements from uture o past, since thefuture vents arethosewhichhave not yet passed the point, and thepast are thosewhichhave. If presentnesss taken as a movingpointsuccessively elated o eachof a seriesof events, he movements frompast to future. Thuswesay that eventscomeoutofthe future, ut wesay thatwe ourselvesmove owards he future. For each man dentifieshimselfspeciallywithhispresent tate, s against is future r hispast,since hepresents theonly ne ofwhichhehasdirect xperience. And-thus he elf, f t is pictured s moving t all, is pictured s movingwith-the oint f presentnesslongthe stream fevents rom ast to future.




that the characteristicsbelong to the terms successively.

When this explanation failed as being circular, the con-tradiction emained unremoved, nd the idea of time mustbe rejected,not because it cannotbe explained,but becausethecontradiction annot be removed.

What has been said already, fvalid, s an adequate groundfor rejecting ime. But we may add anotherconsideration.Time, as we have seen, stands and falls with the A series.Now, even if we ignore the contradiction which we havejust diicovered n the application of the A series to reality,was there ever any positive reason why we should supposethat theA serieswas valid ofreality

Why do we believe that events are to be distinguished spast, presentand future I conceive that the belief arisesfromdistinctionsn our own experience.

At anymoment have certainperoeptions, have also thememoryof certain other perceptions, nd the anticipationofothers again. The directperception tself s a mental statequalitativelydifferent rom the memoryor the anticipationof perceptions. On this is based the belief that the per-ception itselfhas a certain characteristic when I have it,which is replaced by other characteristicswhen I have thememoryor the anticipationof it-which characteristics recalled presentness,pastness, and futurity. Having got theidea of these characteristicswe applythem to other events.Everything imultaneouswith the directperceptionwhich Ihave now is called present,and it is even held that therewould be a present f no one had a directperception t all.In the same way acts simultaneous with rememberedper-

ceptions or anticipated perceptions are held to be past orfuture, nd this again is extended to events to which noneof the perceptions now rememberor anticipate are simul-taneous. But the originofour belief nthewhole distinctionlies in the distinction etween perceptions nd anticipationsor memoriesofperceptions.

A directperception s presentwhen I, have it, and so iswhat is simultaneouswith t. In the first lace this defini-tion involves a circle,for the words " when I have it," can

onlymean " when it is present . But if we left out thesewords,the definitionwould be false,for have manydirectpresentationswhichare at differentimes, ndwhich cannot,therefore, ll be present, xcept successively. This, however,is the fundamental ontradiction f the A series,which hasbeen alreadyconsidered. The point I wish to considerhereis different.

The directperceptionswhichI now have arethose which




now fall withinmy " specious present . Of those whichare

beyond t,I can only have

memoryranticipation. Nowthe " specious present" varies n length ccording o circum-

stances, and may be different or two people at the sameperiod. The event M may be simultaneous both with X'sperceptionQ and Y's perceptionR. At a certainmoment Qmay have ceased to be part of X's specious present. M,therefore,will at that moment be past. But at the samemomentR may stillbe part of Y's specious present. And,therefore,M will be present,at the same momentat whichit is past.

This is impossible. If, indeed,theA series was somethingpurely subjective, there would be no difficulty. We couldsay that M was past forX and presentforY, just as wecould say that it was pleasant forX and painful forY. Butwe are consideringattempts to take time as real, as some-thingwhichbelongsto the reality tself, nd not onlyto ourbeliefsabout it, and this can onlybe so if theA seriesalsoapplies to the reality tself. And if it does this,thenat anymomentM must be presentor past. It cannotbe both.

The present throughwhich events really pass, therefore,cannot be determined as simultaneous.with the speciouspresent. It must have a durationfixed s an ultimate fact.This duration cannot be the same as the duration of allspecious presents,since all specious presentshave not thesame duration. And thus an event may be past whenI am experiencing it as present, or present when I amexperiencingt as past. The duration f theobjectivepresentmay be the thousandthpart of a second. Or it maybe a

century, nd the accessions of George IV. and Edward VII.mayformpart of the same present. What reason can wehave to believe in the existenceof such a present,which wecertainlydo not observe to be a present, nd which has norelation o what we do observe to be a present

If we escape fromthese difficulties y taking the view,which has sometimesbeen held, that the present n theAseries is not a finiteduration,but a merepoint,separatingfuturefrompast, we shall findotherdifficultiess serious.

For thenthe objectivetime n whichevents re will be some-thing utterlydifferent romthe time in whichwe perceivethem. The time in which we perceivethemhas a presentofvaryingfinite uration, nd, therefore, iththefuture ndthe past, s divided nto three durations. The objectivetimehas only two durations,separated by a present which hasnothingbut the name in common with the present of ex-perience,since it is not a duration but a point. What is



THE UNREAIJITY OF TIME. 473

there n our experiencewhich givesus the least reason to

believen such a time s thisAnd so itwould eem that hedenialofthereality ftimeis notso very aradoxical fter ll. Itwas calledparadoxicalbecause tseemed o contradicturexperienceoviolently--to compelus to treat so much as illusionwhich appearsprimda acie to give knowledge freality. But we now seethat ourexperience f time-centring s it doesabout thespeciouspresent-wouldbe no less illusoryf therewereareal time nwhich herealitieswe experience xisted. Thespecious resentfourobservations-varyings itdoes fromyou to me-cannot correspondo thepresent fthe events,observed. And consequentlyhe past and future f ourobservationsouldnotcorrespondo thepast andfuture ftheevents bserved. On either ypothesis-whethere take.time s realoras unreal-everythingsobservedn a speciouspresent, ut nothing, oteventheobservationshemselves,can everbe na speciouspresent.And n that ase I do notsee thatwetreat xperiences muchmore llusory henwesay thatnothings ever n a present t all,thanwhenwe

say thateverythingasses through omeentirely ifferentpresent.Our conclusion, hen, s thatneither ime s a whole,nor

theA seriesand B series, eallyexist. But this leaves tpossible hattheC series oesreally xist. The A serieswasrejected or ts nconsistency.And tsrejectionnvolved herejection fthe B series. But we have foundno such con-tradictionn theC series, nd its nvalidityoes notfollowfrom he nvalidityfthe A series.

It is, therefore,ossible hattherealitieswhichwe per-ceive s eventsna time-serie?oreally orm non-temporalseries. It is also possible, o far s we haveyetgone, hattheydonotformuch a series, nd that hey re nreality omore series hanthey retemporal. But I think-thoughI have noroom ogointo hequestion ere-that heformerview, ccordingowhich hey eally oform C series,sthemoreprobable.

Should t be true, twillfollowhat nourperceptionf

theserealitiess events n time, herewillbe some ruthswellas someerror. Throughhedeceptiveorm f ime,weshallgrasp ome of their ruerelations. Ifwe saythat heeventsM and N are simultaneous,e saythat hey ccupythesamepositionn thetime-series.And therewillbe sometruth n this,fortherealities,which we perceive s theeventsM and N, do reallyoccupy he samepositionn a,series, houghtis nota temporaleries.

32



474 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART: THE UNREALITY OF TIME.

Again, if we assert that the events M, N, 0, are all at

differentimes, and are in that order, we assert that theyoccupy differentositions in the time-series,and that theposition of N is between the positionsofM and 0. And itwill be true that the realities which we see as these eventswill be in a series,thoughnot in a temporalseries,and thattheirpositions n itwill be different,nd thatthe positionofthe realitywhich we perceive as the eventN will be betweenthe positionsof the realities whichwe perceiveas the eventsM and 0.

If thisviewis adopted,the resultwill so farresemblethosereachedby Hegel ratherthan those ofKant. For Hegel re-garded the order of the time-series s a reflexion, hough adistortedreflexion, f something n the reat nature of thetimeless reality,while Kant does not seem to have contem-plated the possibilitythat 'anything in the nature of thenoumenon houldcorrespond othetime orderwhich appearsi-n hephenomenon.

But the questionwhether uch an objectiveC series does

,exist,must remain for futurediscussion.And

manyother

,questionspress upon us whichinevitably rise ifthe realityoftimeis denied. If there s such a C series,are positions nit simplyultimate facts,or are theydeterminedbythevary-ing amounts, in the objects which hold those positions,of.somequalitywhich is common to all of them? And, if so,what is that quality,and is it a greateramount of it whichdeterminesthingsto appear as later, and a lesser amountwhichdetermines hemto appear as earlier, r is the reversetrue ? On the solutionof thesequestions t maybe that ourhopes and fearsfor heuniversedependfor heirconfirmationorrejection.

And, again, is the series of appearances in time a serieswhichis infinite r finite n length And how are we to dealwith the appearance itself If we reduce time and changeto appearance,mustitnotbe to an appearancewhichchangesand whichis- r time,and is not time, then,shown to be realafter ll ? This is doubtless a seriousquestion, but I hopeto show hereafter hat it can be answeredin a satisfactory

way.

unreality of time

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