unlawful detainer

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Unlawful Detainer

In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges

a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract

with or by toleranceof the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to

defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and

deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the

property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment (Ruben C.

Copuz, rep. by Atty.-in-fact Wenifreda C. Agullana Vs. Sps. Hilarion Agustin

and Justa Agustin,G.R. No. 183822. January 18, 2012).

Ejectment Case: Forcible Entry or Unlawful Detainer

An ejectment case is a summary proceeding designed to provide

expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of

the property involved (Barrientos v. Rapal, G.R. No. 169594, July 20, 2011).

It is expeditious as it is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure, a

special rule where extra pleadings and motions (other than the Complaint

and Answer), otherwise available in an ordinary civil action, are prohibited

precisely to insulate it from unnecessary delays. The main issue to be

resolved here is the issue of possession or the right to hold possession.

If youre a lessor of real property, you may, if you havent already, have to

resort to the remedy of ejectment in cases where a lessee withholds

possession of leased property after the latters right to hold the same has

already terminated, as where lessee has failed to pay rental, or has failed to

comply with the conditions of the lease contract, in which case it is called

Unlawful Detainer.

It is also available where a present possessor has held possession of a

subject property at the tolerance of the owner or the one entitled to its

possession, and thereafter refused, after demand to vacate has been made

upon him, or continues his possession thereof. In this case, an inceptively

lawful possession has become unlawful, when the tolerated possessor

refused to return the property upon demand by the rightful possessor or

owner. Anyone, whose stay in the property is merely tolerated, is bound by

an implied obligation to vacate and return the same to, upon demand of,

the rightful possessor or owner.

Note that even the owner of the property may be sued for ejectment whenhe deprives another of lawful possession, as in a case of a lessor depriving

or ousting a lessee, who has been compliant with his obligations under a

lease contract, of possession thereof.

Another species of ejectment is Forcible Entry. It is the same special

proceeding as Unlawful Detainer, but the means whereby the lawful

possessor or owner of the subject property has been deprived thereof are:

Force, Intimidation, Strategy, Threat, and/or Stealth (FISTS). Anyone who

has been ousted of possession to a real property by a "strong hand" using

any of the means mentioned, may resort to this summary remedy to restore

him immediately to possession.

In both cases, ownership is not imperative in order for a plaintiff to acquire

legal personality to sue, as again, the issue is mere right to possession. In

unlawful detainer it is indispensable or jurisdictional that a demand to pay

rental or comply with the conditions of the lease and vacate is made before

an action may properly be filed. Accordingly, absence of such prior demand

could lead to the dismissal of the case. However, the same is not true in

forcible entry.

In both cases, resort to barangay conciliation is condition precedent,

meaning that the opposing party may raise as objection the fact that the

dispute has not been referred to the barangay authorities for conciliation,

and the same may be ground for the dismissal of the action. However, it is

not jurisdictional, meaning that it may be waived by such opposing party. It

is deemed waived when the opposing party failed to timely object to the

fact of its (barangay conciliation) absence.

Both actions must be brought (filed in court) within one year. The period of

one year is reckoned from, in the case of forcible entry, the date of actual

possession if the deprivation or the ground for the action is force,

intimidation, or threat; and the date of discovery and prohibition if the
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deprivation or ground for the action is strategy or stealth. In unlawful

detainer, the period of one year is counted from the date of last demand.

In the case of forcible entry, the possession is unlawful/illegal from the very

beginning, while in unlawful detainer, it is inceptively lawful until

the defendant refused and failed to vacate, after demand is made upon him

by the plaintiff. Demand is made upon the termination of the defendant's

right to hold possession of the subject property, either by expiration ofcontract, breach of terms of the contract, or when an owner who tolerated

the defendant's stay has manifested its intention to use the property

effectively ending the tolerance.

In both cases, the provisional remedy ofpreliminary injunction and/or

temporary restraining order (TRO) is available under the provision of Rule

70, on forcible entry and unlawful detainer, and in relation to Rule 58, on

preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.

FORCIBLE ENTRY & UNLAWFUL DETAINER

RULE 70 -FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Grounds for judicial ejectment

First. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the

ejectment case against private respondent considering that it aff irmed the

trial courts finding that private respondent had failed to pay the monthly

rental of P1,800.00 for more than three months.

The contention is well taken. Under Art. 1673 of the Civil Code, the lessor

may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes:

(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for

the duration of leases under articles 1682 and 1687, has

expired;

(2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated;

(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the

contract;

(4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or

service not stipulated which causes the deterioration

thereof; or if he does not observe the requirement in No. 2of article 1657, as regards the use thereof.

The ejectment of tenants of agricultural lands is governed

by special laws.

On the other hand, the Rent Control Law provides:

Section 5. Grounds for Judicial Ejectment. - Ejectment shall

be allowed on the following grounds:

. . . .

(b) Arrears in payment of rent for a total of three (3)

months: Provided, That in case of refusal by the lessor to

accept payment of the rental agreed upon, the lessee may

either deposit, by way of consignation, the amount in court,

or with the city or municipal treasurer, as the case may be,

or in a bank in the name of and with notice to the lessor,

within one month after the refusal of the lessor to accept

payment.

The lessee shall thereafter deposit the rental within ten

days of every current month. Failure to deposit rentals for

three months shall constitute a ground for ejectment. If an

ejectment case is already pending, the court upon proper

motion may order the lessee or any person or persons

claiming under him to immediately vacate the leased

premises without prejudice to the continuation of the

ejectment proceedings. At any time, the lessor may, upon

authority of the court, withdraw the rentals deposited.
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The lessor, upon authority of the court in case of

consignation and upon joint affidavit by him and the lessee

to be submitted to the city or municipal treasurer and to

the bank where deposit was made, shall be allowed to

withdraw the deposits

The trial court found that private respondent had failed to pay the monthly

rental of P1,800.00 from November 1992 to February 16, 1993, despitedemands to pay and to vacate the premises made by petitioner. Even if

private respondent deposited the rents in arrears in the bank, this fact

cannot alter the legal situation of private respondent since the account was

opened in private respondents name. Clearly, there was cause for the

ejectment of private respondent. Although the increase in monthly rentals

from P700.00 to P1,800.00 was in excess of 20% allowed by B.P. Blg. 877, as

amended by R.A. No. 6828, what private respondent could have done was

to deposit the original rent of P700.00 either with the judicial authorities or

in a bank in the name of, and with notice to, petitioner. As this Court held

in Uy v. Court of Appeals: 5 [178 SCRA 671, 676 (1989)] Misact

The records reveal that the new rentals demanded since

1979 (P150.00 per month) exceed that allowed by law so

refusal on the part of the lessor to accept was justified.

However, what the lessee should have done was to deposit

in 1979 the previous rent. This deposit in the Bank was

made only in 1984 indicating a delay of more than four

years.

From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the lessor was

correct in asking for the ejectment of the delinquent lessee.Moreover, he should be granted not only the current

rentals but also all the rentals in arrears. This is so even if

the lessor himself did not appeal because as ruled by this

Court, there have been instances when substantial justice

demands the giving of the proper reliefs.

Justice Mendoza, Second division, T & C DEVELOPMENT CORP.,petitioner,

vs.COURT OF APPEALS and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN, respondents. [G.R. No.

118381. October 26, 1999]

At the time this case was originally filed, the statute which governed the

right of a lessor to eject his lessee was B. P. Blg. 25. 8 [B.P. Blg. 25 was

replaced by B.P. Blg. 877 which took effect on January 1, 1988.] Section 5

thereof specified the grounds for judicial ejectment. The pertinent parts

thereof provide as follows:

Ejectment shall be allowed on the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Need of owner/lessor to repossess his property for his own use

or for the use of any immediate member of his family as a

residential unit, such owner or immediate member not being the

owner of any other available residential unit: Provided, however,

That the period of lease has expired: Provided, further, That the

lessor has given the lessee notice three months in advance of the

lessor's intention to repossess the property: and Provided, finally,

That the owner/lessor or immediate member stays in the residential

unit for at least one year, except for justifiable cause.

xxx xxx xxx

(f) Expiration of the period of a written lease contract.

In no case shall the lessor or his successor-in-interest be entitled to

eject the lessee upon the ground that the leased premises has been

sold or mortgaged to a third person.

A perusal of the above provisions reveals that certain requirements have to

be met before a lessee can be validly ejected by the lessor under Section

5[c]. Private respondent herein, however, questions only whether there was

compliance with the notice requirement. Consequently, it would be futile to

discuss further the other three requirements as private respondent does

not dispute compliance with the same.

Under paragraph (f) of the above-quoted provision, expiration of the period

of a written contract is a ground for ejectment separate from and

independent of paragraph [c], which requires the three-month notice. There

is an apparent inconsistency between the two paragraphs because

paragraph [f] makes expiration of the period, without any other condition, a


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ground for ejectment. Thus, regardless of the lessor's reason for wanting to

repossess the leased premises, as long as the lease has expired, there is a

legal ground for ejectment. Not so with paragraph [c]. Under the latter

paragraph, where the reason for ejectment is because the lessor needs it for

his own use, the lease period must not only have expired. There should be a

three-month notice to vacate as well. For reasons which will be shown

hereunder, there is no need for Us to dwell on this apparent conflict in

order to decide the case before Us.

The lease contract in this case was written and, although no definite period

is specified, there was just the same a term for the lease only until such

time when the lessor should need the premises for his own use. This Court

has previously held that where the agreement is that the lessee would

vacate the premises when the lessor should need the same for his own use,

the period of the lease is fixed, as the parties are fully aware that when that

time comes, the lease is terminated. 9 [Lim v. Vda. de Prieto, 101 Phil. 15

[1957].] When the lessor [the former owner] informed private respondent

herein on November 19, 1978 to vacate the lot leased because he needed it,

private respondent signed a written promise to vacate the premises within

three months from said date, i.e., on or before February 19, 1979. On this

date, however, private respondent failed to leave despite the demands of

the lessor. In Our opinion, even assuming that the lease fixed no term, the

aforesaid written promise had the effect of amending the original lease

contract by stipulating for a definite period when the lease would

terminate, i.e., three months from November 19, 1978. Thus, upon the

expiration of said period, the written contract of lease would expire, giving

rise to the lessor's right to file an action for ejectment against private

respondent. From another angle, said written promise can also be

considered as an admission that a three-month notice to vacate had beengiven by the lessor to the lessee. In either case, a legal ground for ejectment

would exist, the first under paragraph [f] of Section 5, and the second under

paragraph [c] of the same section.

Although private respondent claims that the written promise was secured

through misrepresentation, this allegation was not given credence by the

trial court, which based its decision mainly on said written promise.

Obviously also, the trial court did not find it necessary to discuss the other

requirements of paragraph [c] because private respondent merely

questioned the lack of due notice. Nevertheless, We note that the evidenceshows that petitioner was merely renting an apartment at that time, which

means that he owns no property on which a residential house can be built

other than the lot occupied by private respondent and which he has

adamantly refused to vacate despite the fact that his lease had already

expired. In any case, petitioner's case need not rest on paragraph [c], and is

meritorious under paragraph [f] alone. Whatever rights the former owner-

lessor had under Section 5 devolved upon petitioner herein when he bought

the property. Therefore, the right of the former owner to eject private

respondent due to expiration of the lease passed on to petitioner. And thelast paragraph of said Section 5 to the effect that in no case can the lessor

or his successor-in-interest be entitled to eject the lessee on the ground

that the leased premises has been sold, cannot help private respondent

because the lease had already expired before the sale. This last provision

applies only when the attempted ejectment is made while the lease period

has not yet expired. In other words, the owner's successor-in-interest must

respect an existing contract of lease. Where the lease period is still running

any attempt to eject the lessee would constitute a breach of contract. But

where the lease has expired, there is no more contract to breach.

We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' decision that a three-month

notice should have been sent by petitioner on his own behalf because he

was not a party to the lease contract. As We stated earlier, petitioner was

subrogated to all the rights of his predecessor-in-interest. The latter gave

the three-month notice which was accepted by private respondent, and

who in fact signed a written promise to vacate within three months. When

the latter period expired and the lessee failed to move out, the lessor's right

to judicial ejectment arose. This right was transferred to petitioner when he

bought the property and therefore there was no need for him to give

another notice. The mere fact that private respondent continued in the

premises despite repeated demands on him to vacate, does not change thefact that the lease had ended. Private respondent's continued possession

was merely tolerated by petitioner and his predecessor-in-interest.

However, even assuming arguendo that the appellate court's premise is

correct, petitioner did give notice on his own behalf. The trial court found

that soon after the sale of the property to petitioner, or on October 10,

1979, the latter wrote to private respondent that he vacate the premises.

After this and other subsequent demands were ignored, he again made a

demand on August 7, 1982 informing private respondent that he wished to

build his house on the property. After this last demand was again ignored,he brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman who, on September


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19, 1982, sent a summons to private respondent, who, not only ignored it

but in addition, refused to accept it when served upon him.10 [Rollo, p.

26.] Petitioner finally filed an ejectment suit before the MTC on December

7, 1982, or four months after his verbal demand on August 7, 1982. Thus,

even disregarding the previous demands soon after the sale, petitioner had

complied with the requirement of three-month notice.

It is clear, therefore, that whichever basis We use in this case, whetherSection 5[c] or Section 5[f] of B. P. Blg. 25, petitioner has a legal right to

eject private respondent.

A final point to consider is the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the MTC

had no "jurisdiction nor competence to pass upon the controversy at bar"

and that the RTC is "more competent to resolve questions concerning the

effects of the sale on the leased premises." We agree with petitioner that

this is an erroneous opinion. The complaint filed with the MTC clearly shows

that this is a simple ejectment case, where no issue nor allegation is made

involving any other question but the right of petitioner to oust private

respondent from the premises based on the expiration of the contract and

on the repeated demands made on the latter to vacate the property. This

Court has held that what determine the nature of an action and the Court

which has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations made in the

complaint.11[Ching v. Malaya, 153 SCRA 412 [1987].] Petitioner bought the

property because he needed a lot on which to build his house. Private

respondent, despite repeated demands, refused to vacate the premises. In

the meantime, petitioner was renting an apartment while private

respondent was making use of his property.

There is no doubt that B. P. Blg. 25, better known as the Rent Control Law,was enacted primarily to protect tenants, especially those belonging to the

low income group. However, this same law, as is clearly manifested by

Section 5[c], did not ignore the interests of small landowners or lessors. The

policy of the law is not to be interpreted or implemented in such a way as to

oppress the lessor when he needs the leased premises for his own use

because he has no other property, or when the tenant fails to pay the

rentals for an unreasonable length of time. In such cases, fairness and

justice demand that the lessor be given the right to resort to the courts to

aid him in asserting his constitutional right to abode. 12 [Tan Tok Lee v. CFI

of Kalookan City, 121 SCRA 438 [1983].]

Justice Campos Jr., Second Division, TEODULO GARCIA, Petitioner

vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and SANTOS

GUTIERREZ, Respondents,G. R. No. 88632, March 22, 1993

On the issue of jurisdiction, the firmly settled principle is that amunicipal court has jurisdiction over forcible entry or unlawful detainer

cases even if the question of the ownership of the property is raised by

the defendant.The exception is where the question of title is so involved

in the ejectment case that it cannot be decided unless the title to the

property is first ascertained.

On the issue of jurisdiction, the firmly settled principle is that a municipal

court has jurisdiction over forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases even if

the question of the ownership of the property is raised by the

defendant. 6 [Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 795 citing Lopez v.Santiago, 107 Phil. 668; De Gaerlan v. Martinez, 85 Phil 375; De la Cruz v.

Burgos, 28 SCRA 977.]

The exception is where the question of title is so involved in the ejectment

case that it cannot be decided unless the title to the property is first

ascertained. 7 [Luna v. Nable, 67 Phil. 340.]

That situation does not obtain in the present case. In fact, the defendants

do not even claim the leased property and invoke only a right of pre-

emption thereto under P. D. 1508. That is only an inchoate right that has yet

to be perfected. Moreover, they have acknowledged their status as mere

lessees and their obligation to pay their accrued rentals to the private

respondents. They have done this not only expressly in their

pleadings 8 [Annex B, Rollo, pp. 31, 32.] but also by their act of consigning

the said rentals before and after the period from 1984 to 1988. 9 [Rollo, p.

14.]

The question of default is factual and was decided by all the three courts

below against the defendants. Their findings are conclusive on this Court,

there being no satisfactory showing that they were reached arbitrarily or


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without basis.

Regarding the extension of the period of the lease, the view that this could

not be granted because the defendants were in default in their rentals is not

supported by law or doctrine. There is no such prohibition in Article 1687,

which reads in full as follows:

Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it isunderstood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is

annual, from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if

the rent as weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid

daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period

for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the

lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year.

If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer

period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months.

In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the

lessee has stayed in the place for over one month.

We sustained such an extension in the case of Divino v. Marcos 10 [4 SCRA

186.] although non-payment of rentals was the ground invoked for the

ejectment of the lessees. Through Mr. Justice Jose Ma. Paredes, this Court

observed:

The lot in question has been rented to the petitioner for about 20

years and his predecessor- in-interest for more. Even though rentals

had been paid monthly, still no period for the duration of the lease

had been set. The lease had been consistently and tacitly renewed

["tacita reconduccion"] until the ejectment case was filed [Co Tiamv. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672; Villanueva v. Canlas, 77 Phil. 381; Art. 1670,

N.C.C.; Art. 1566, Old Civil Code]. Having made substantial or

additional improvements on the lot, and considering the difficulty of

looking for another place to which petitioner could transfer such

improvements, and the length of his occupancy of the lot [since

1936], and the impression acquired by him that he could stay on the

premises, as long as he could pay the rentals, it would seem that

there exists just grounds for granting the extension of lease and that

the extension of two years granted by the trial court, is both fair and

equitable.

The petitioners herein are in a similar situation as they have been leasing

the property since 1979 and, as observed by the lower courts , have

introduced valuable improvements thereon. The Court also notes that the

validity of the extension was not appealed by the private respondents, who

thereby accepted the same. The issue was not even raised by the

petitioners in their appeal. We now come to the increase of the monthly

rental by the Metropolitan Trial Court from P100.00 a month to P3,000.00.

Since the stipulated rental was P100.00 per month, any increase thereof

should be in accordance with B. P. 25, the original law regulating the rentals

of dwelling units and lots, and all the succeeding amendatory laws. B. P. 25,

which was applicable to all residential units with monthly rentals not

exceeding P300.00, provided that such rentals could not be increased by

more than 10% every year. It had an initial duration of five years from 1979

but its effectivity was extended to June 1985 by B. P. 267, and again

extended to December 1987 by B. P. 877, with the following authorized

rates of increase:

Period Max. Increase

July 1, 1985 to Dec. 31, 1985 10%

Jan. 1, 1986 to Dec. 31, 1986 20%

Jan. 1, 1987 to Dec. 31, 1987 20%

On January 1, 1988, the effectivity of B. P. 877 was extended to December

31, 1989, by R. A. 6643, which provided a maximum increase also of 20%.

Another extension on the same terms was made for 3 more years or until

December 31, 1991, by R. A. 6828. On January 1, 1993, R. A. 7644 gave still

another extension from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997, but themaximum increase was retained at 20% per year.

Applying these laws, We find the following monthly rentals to be

demandable from the petitioners for the years indicated:

The Metropolitan Trial Court held, after resolving the factual question of

default, that the petitioners should start paying the new rentals from

November 1990, when the complaint for ejectment was filed. Accordingly,

they should pay the increased monthly rent of P483.00 for November 1990

to December 31, 1990; P580.00 for January 1,1991 to December 31, 1991;


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P696.00 for January 1, 1992 to December 13, 1992 and P835.50 for January

1, 1993 to 1993, with legal interest. The two-year extension of the lease is

commuted from the date the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court

became final as to the private respondents, who did not appeal.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed except as to the

amount of the rentals to be paid by the petitioners, which should be

computed in accordance with the discussion in the body of this opinion.

HEIRS OF JACOBO BOLUS, Namely JAKE B. BOLUS, ELIZABETH BOLUS-NERI,

RICARDO B. BOLUS, EMMANUEL B. BOLUS, CORAZON BOLUS, CARLITO

BOLUS and ROMEO BOLUS,Petitioners vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and

SPOUSES RICARDO and GLICERIA JIMENEZ,Respondents, G. R. No. 107036,

February 9, 1993

As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by

the mere filing before the regional trial court (RTC) of another action

raising ownership of the property as an issue. As an exception, however,

unlawful detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on

considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners'

house would result from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial

court (MCTC) judgment.

In the main, the issue is whether the peculiar circumstances of this case

justify the suspension of the ejectment proceedings on appeal before the

RTC, pending the resolution of the action for quieting of title.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue: Suspension of the Ejectment Suit

Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 are designed to

summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one

who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the

settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in

appropriate proceedings. It has been held that these actions "are intended

to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their

hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession."7[Vda [de

Legaspi v. Avendao, 79 SCRA 135, September 27, 1977, per Barredo, J.] In

these cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and

pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature.

As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of

the same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment

proceedings. "The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the

actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto

possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial

Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding,

or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as

defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved."8 [Wilmon Auto

Supply Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 108, April 10, 1992, per Narvasa,

CJ. In this case, the Court also held:

"1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions

in the municipal trial courts or other courts of the first level (Nacorda v.

Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 (1966)) do not abate the latter; and neither do

proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 (1956),

citing Pue et al. v. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81, (1950)).

2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an ejectment suit against the

plaintiff in the former (Ramirez v. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 (1981)).

3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the principal

issue before the Regional Trial Court does not preclude nor bar the

execution of the judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where the only issue

involved is the material possession or possession de facto of the premises

(Heirs of F. Guballa Sr. v. CA et al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518 (1988)).

4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an ejectment suit

involving the same property (Quimpo v. de la Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 (1972)).

5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment


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actions (e.g., to compel renewal of a lease contract) (Desamito v.

Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184 (1966); Pardo de Tavera v. Encarnacion, 22 SCRA

632 (1968); Rosales v. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 (1987); Commander Realty, Inc. v.

CA, 161 SCRA 264 (1988)).

6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed of absolute sale

to one of sale with pacto de retro) does not suspend an ejectment suit

between the same parties (Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600 (1975)).

7. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria" also

has no effect on ejectment suits regarding the same property (Del Rosario v.

Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 (1963); Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz v.

CA, 133 SCRA 520 (1984); Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 (1987); Ching v.

Malaya, 153 SCRA 412 (1987); Philippine Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v. CA, 174

SCRA 108; Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 (1989); Guzman v. CA (annulment

of sale and reconveyance), 177 SCRA 604 (1989); Demamay v. CA, 186 SCRA

608 (1990); Leopoldo Sy v. CA et al., (annulment of sale and reconveyance),

GR No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991).

8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting

property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property

(Salinas v. Navarro (annulment of deed of sale with assumption of mortgage

and/or to declare the same an equitable mortgage), 126 SCRA 167 (1983);

Ang Ping v. RTC (annulment of sale and title), 154 SCRA 153 (1987);

Caparros v. CA (annulment of title), 170 SCRA 758 (1989); Dante v. Sison

(annulment of sale with damages), 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet

Consolidated, Inc. (annulment of document), 177 SCRA 288 (1989)"]

Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of thepending civil action. One such exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao,

wherein the Court declared:

"x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer,

as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of

the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in

issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable

and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of

physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience

and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legalpossession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought

to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be

filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the

unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment

in the more substantive case involving legal possession or

ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry

that as a matter of public policy the right to physical

possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the

prior possession regardless of the fact that the other partymight ultimately be found to have superior claim to the

premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to

recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and

without resorting to the courts."9 [Supra, p. 145.]

From the foregoing, it is clear that the mere existence of a judicial

proceeding putting at issue the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises

is not enough reason to justify an exception to the general rule. In Salinas v.

Navarro,10 [126 SCRA 167, November 29, 1983, per Gutierrez Jr., J.] the

Court explained that "the exception to the rule in x x x Vda. de Legaspi is

based on strong reasons of equity not found in the present petition. The

right of the petitioners is not so seriously placed in issue in the annulment

case as to warrant a deviation, on equitable grounds, from the imperative

nature of the rule. In the Vda. de Legaspi case, execution of the decision in

the ejectment case would also have meant demolition of the premises, a

factor not present in this petition."

Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the

demolition of the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of

reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of the ejectment

proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent's suit is oneof unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the

ejectment of petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a matter

that is likely to create the "confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and

expenses" mentioned in the said exceptional case.

Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision12 [In fact, according to

private respondent (Memorandum, p. 19; rollo, p. 477), the "RTC had

already rendered its decision dated 7 April 1999 affirming in toto, the earlier

judgment rendered by the (MCTC)in herein respondent's favor."] would

cause the respondent to go through the whole gamut of enforcing it byphysically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have


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been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming ownership only of the

land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts will be

wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the

outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent,

unjust and probably irreparable.

We should stress that respondent's claim to physical possession is based not

on an expired or a violated contract of lease, but allegedly on "meretolerance." Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for the quieting

of title, we deem it judicious under the present exceptional circumstances

to suspend the ejectment case.

The Suspension of Proceedings Even During Appeal

One final point. In Vda. de Legaspi, the Court held that "if circumstances

should so require, the proceedings in the ejectment case may be suspended

in whatever stage it may be found." This statement is unequivocally clear; it

includes even the appellate stage.

Justice Panganiban, Third Division, CONCEPCION V. AMAGAN, JOSEFINA V.

AMAGAN and DINA V. AMAGAN, petitioners, vs. TEODORICO T.

MARAYAG, respondent [G.R. No. 138377. February 28, 2000]

Ejectment cases are summary in character and . . . the judgment in an

action for unlawful detainer is immediately executory, and may be

stayed only if the defendant-appellants (1) [perfect] their appeal, (2) f ile

a supersedeas bond, and (3) periodically deposit rentals falling due

during the pendency of the appeal. . . . The defendants failure to comply

with these requisites entitled the complainant to the immediate

execution of the judgment

The civil case assigned to respondent Judge is one for Unlawful Detainer and

is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Section 6 of the Rule on

Summary Procedure is explicit. Thus:

SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer.Should the defendant fail to answer the

complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on

motion of the plaintiff, shallrender judgment as may be warranted by the

facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein;

Provided, however, that the court may in its discretion reduce the amount

of damages and attorneys fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise

unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4,

Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.

As clearly stated in the Section above-quoted, when the defendant fails toanswer the complaint within the period provided, the court, motu proprio,

or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by

the facts alleged in the complaint. Defendant has ten (10) days from service

of summons to file an answer to the complaint 1[SEC. 5. Answer. Within

ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer

to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and

negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for

lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-

claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall

be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims

shall be filed and served within ten (10) days from service of the answer

in which they are pleaded.] and it is not disputed that defendant in the

aforesaid civil case failed to answer the complaint.

Respondent Judge contends that the Urgent Manifestation and Motion to

Render Judgment by Reason of Failure to Answer dated December 23, 1997

has not been set for hearing and is fatally defective as the notice of hearing

is not addressed to the parties but to the clerk of court and hence, the same

is a mere scrap of paper.

The contention is untenable. Section 6 expressly provides that thecourt, motu proprio, on its own motion or initiative 2[p. 400, Moreno,

Philippine Law Dictionary, 1982.] shall render judgment on the case. Thus,

even without a motion filed by plaintiff, the court has to render judgment as

may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what

is prayed for therein. Clearly, respondent Judge has failed in this respect.

Admittedly, he has not rendered a decision from the time herein

complainant filed the Urgent Manifestation on December 23, 1997, and the

Motion for Early Resolution on January 21, 1998 until the filing of this

administrative complaint on June 11, 1998, or for about six (6) months. The

fact that respondent Judge has rendered a decision in the ejectment case on
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December 14, 1998 will not absolve him from any administrative liability.

The rules require courts to decide cases submitted for decision generally

within three (3) months from the date of such submission. With respect to

cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure, first level courts are

only allowed thirty (30) days following the receipt of the last affidavit and

position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within

which to render judgment. 3[Raboca vs. Pantanosas, Jr., 245 SCRA 293.] Westated in Cruz vs. Pascual 4[244 SCRA 111.] that the Rule on Summary

Procedure was precisely enacted to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive

determination of cases and failure to observe the 30-day period within

which to render a judgment subjects the defaulting judge to administrative

sanction.

Justice Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division, ALBERT R. SORDAN, complainant,

vs.JUDGE ROLANDO B. DE GUZMAN of the MeTC-Br. 2,

Manila, respondent[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1296. October 5, 2000]

Respondent Judges Responsibility and Liability

With respect to the Order denying the Motion to Quash Alias Writ of

Execution, respondent judge incurred no liability. The denial of the

defendants motion to quash and execution of the judgment against the

defendant was clearly proper, considering that a supersedeas bond had not

been filed, and periodic deposits of a reasonable value for the use of the

property had not been made in accordance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the

Rules of Civil Procedure. As stated by the Court in Fernandez v.Espanol: 1[289 SCRA 1, 5-6, April 15, 1998.]

. . . *E+jectment cases are summary in character and . . . the judgment in an

action for unlawful detainer is immediately executory, and may be stayed

only if the defendant-appellants (1) [perfect] their appeal, (2) file a

supersedeas bond, and (3) periodically deposit rentals falling due during the

pendency of the appeal. . . . The defendants failure to comply with these

requisites entitled the complainant to the immediate execution of the

judgment.

Furthermore, considering that the Motion to Quash Alias Writ of Execution

was the second one, which merely reiterated grounds already previously

ruled upon and disposed of, respondent judge was right in immediately

denying the same. Under the circumstances, waiting for defendants reply

was clearly unnecessary and would have served no other purpose than to

unjustly delay the necessary subsequent court processes

WINNIE BAJET, petitioner, vs. Judge PEDRO M. AREOLA Regional Trial Courtof Quezon City (Branch 85), respondent, [A.M. No. RTJ-01-1615. June 19,

2001]per Justice Panganiban, Third Division

In its first assigned error, petitioner argues that the decision of the MTCC of

Lapu-Lapu City had become final and immediately executory in view of the

undisputed failure of the private respondents to post asupersedeas bond as

required by Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.

We do not agree. Since the private respondents had seasonably filed an

appeal with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, the judgment of the MTCC of Lapu-

Lapu City did not become final. And for reasons hereunder stated, the

perfection of the appeal was enough to stay the execution of the MTCC

decision.

Under the former Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,8 [Now Section

19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.] if the judgment of the

municipal trial court in an ejectment case is adverse to the defendant,

execution shall issue immediately. To stay the immediate execution of the

judgment, the defendant must (1) perfect his appeal; (2) file

a supersedeasbond to answer for the rents, damages, and costs accruing

down to the time of the judgment appealed from; and (3) periodicallydeposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the

appeal.9 [Chua v.Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 437, 444 [1998];

Fernandez v.Espaol, 289 SCRA 1, 5-6 [1998].]

As a rule, the filing of a supersedeas bond is mandatory and if not filed, the

plaintiff is entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the

judgment. An exception is where the trial court did not make any findings

with respect to any amount in arrears, damages or costs against the

defendant,10 [1 FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM

797 (1997).] in which case no bond is necessary to stay the execution of thejudgment. Thus, in Once v. Gonzales,11 [76 SCRA 258, 261 [1977].] this
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Court ruled that the order of execution premised on the failure to file

a supersedeasbond was groundless and void because no such bond was

necessary there being no back rentals adjudged in the appealed judgment.

Similarly, in the instant case, there was no need for the private respondents

to file a supersedeasbond because the judgment of the MTCC did not award

rentals in arrears or damages. The attorneys fees ofP8,000 and the

litigation expenses of P2,000 awarded in favor of the petitioner need not becovered by a bond, as these are not the damages contemplated in Section 8

of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The damages referred to therein are the

reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property which

are generally measured by its fair rental value and cannot refer to other

damages which are foreign to the enjoyment or material possession of the

property.12 [See De Laureano v.Adil, 72 SCRA 148, 155 [1976].] Neither

were the private respondents obliged to deposit the rentals falling due

during the pendency of the appeal in order to secure a stay of execution

because the appealed judgment did not fix the reasonable rental or

compensation for the use of the premises.13 [Lunsod v.Ortega, 46 Phil. 664,

674 [1921].] Hence, it was error for the RTC to order the execution of the

judgment of the MTCC.

Chief Justice Davide, Jr. Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Court of Appeals,

G.R., No. 128102, March 7, 2000

The Court also held that the word vacate is not a talismanic word that

must be employed in all notices. The alternatives are clear cut. The

tenants must pay rentals which were fixed and which became payable inthe past, failing which they must move out. There can be no other

interpretation of the notice given to them. Hence when the owner

demanded that either they pay or a case for ejectment would be filed

against them, the tenants were placed on notice to move out if they do

not pay. There was, in effect, a notice or demand to vacate.

Petitioner belabors the fact that the letter is not categorical and precise in

seeking his eviction from the property. He misses the point. It must be

stressed that courts and quasi-judicial bodies, in the exercise of their

functions and in making decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to restrictthemselves to literal interpretation of words, phrases and sentences. A

complete and wholistic view must be taken in order to render a just and

equitable judgment.11 [Philippines Today, Inc. vs. NLRC, 267 SCRA 202, 215

(1997).]A case in point is Golden Gate Realty Corp. vs. IAC.12 [152 SCRA 684,

691 (1987).] The tenants therein defaulted in the payment of rents.

Accordingly, the owner notified them to pay and failing to do so a case of

ejectment would be filed against them. The tenants argue that the notice

does not make a demand upon them to vacate the premises. In resolving

such issue, this Court ruled that when the lessor demanded payment of thedue and unpaid rentals or a case for ejectment would be filed against them,

the owner was giving strong notice that you either pay your unpaid rentals

or I will file a court case to have you thrown out of my property. The Court

also held that the word vacate is not a talismanic word that must be

employed in all notices. The alternatives are clear cut. The tenants must pay

rentals which were fixed and which became payable in the past, failing

which they must move out. There can be no other interpretation of the

notice given to them. Hence when the owner demanded that either they

pay or a case for ejectment would be filed against them, the tenants were

placed on notice to move out if they do not pay. There was, in effect, a

notice or demand to vacate.

In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the appellate court cannot be

said to have erred in finding that the written demand is sufficient to eject

petitioner from the property subject of controversy.

Now, insofar as the second assigned error is concerned, we hold that the

doctrine of res judicata does not apply in this case. There are four essential

conditions which must concur in order that res judicata may effectively

apply, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction overthe subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a

judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first

and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and

identity of causes of action.13 [Bachrach Corporation vs. Court Appeals &

Philippine Ports Authority, 296 SCRA 487 (1998).]

The first ejectment case had for a cause of action based on the need for the

premises. The second ejectment case involved a different cause of action,

that is, for non-payment of rentals up to February 1982. In the third case,

the cause of action was the need for the premises and non-payment ofrentals from November 1987 up to May 1988. In this latest ejectment suit,


12/16

the cause of action is the non-payment of rentals from December 1987

accumulating to P17,064.65. Clearly, the cause of action and the

circumstances present in the instant case are not the same but differ

markedly from those in previous suits cited. Reliance on the doctrine of res

judicata by petitioner is sadly misplaced.

Justice Quisumbing, Second Division, Siapan v. CA and Hon. Sayo, Jr., [G.R.

No. 111928. March 1, 2000]

Nothing is more settled than the rule that ejectment is solely concerned

with the issue of physical or material possession of the subject land or

building. However, if the issue of possession depends on the resolution

of the issue of ownership which is sufficiently alleged in the complaint,

the municipal trial court may resolve the latter although the resulting

udgment would be conclusive only with respect to the possession but

not the ownership of the property.

First. Petitioner Tala Realty contends that the municipal trial court has no

jurisdiction to decide the issue of ownership in an ejectment case.

Nothing is more settled than the rule that ejectment is solely concerned

with the issue of physical or material possession of the subject land or

building. However, if the issue of possession depends on the resolution of

the issue of ownership which is sufficiently alleged in the complaint, the

municipal trial court may resolve the latter 10 [Refugia v. Court of Appeals,

258 SCRA 347,366 (1996).] although the resulting judgment would be

conclusive only with respect to the possession but not the ownership of theproperty 11 [Sec. 18, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.].

In the instant case, the issue of ownership was not even addressed, there

being no need to do so as the ejectment case hinged on the question

concerning the two (2) lease contracts of the contending parties.

Justice De Leon, Jr. , Second Division Tala Realty Services Corporation v.

Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank [G.R. No. 129887. February 17,

2000]

A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the

withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without

necessarily employing the terminology of the law.

Petitioners now assail the jurisdiction of the MeTC contending that the

failure of the complaint to allege the character of the sublease or entry ofthe Jimenez spouses into the property, whether legal or illegal,

automatically classified it into an accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria

cognizable by the RTC and not by the MeTC;8[Petitioners cited Munoz v. CA

where the Court held that when the complaint fails to aver facts

constitutive of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, as where it does not

state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the

action should be accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria in the Court of First

Instance (now, Regional Trial Court), as basis for their contention.(G.R. No.

102693, 23 September 1992, 214 SCRA 216).] thus, the action should have

been dismissed.

The rule is settled that a question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time,

even on appeal, provided that its application does not result in a mockery of

the tenets of fair play. In the instant case, the jurisdictional issue was

raised by petitioners for the first time only in the instant Petition for

Review. However, it should be noted that they did so only after an adverse

decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals. Despite several

opportunities in the RTC, which ruled in their favor, and in the Court of

Appeals, petitioners never advanced the question of jurisdiction of the

MeTC. Additionally, petitioners participated actively in the proceedings

before the MeTC 9 [Refugia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118284, 5 July1996, 258 SCRA 347, citing Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-29264, 29

August 1969, 29 SCRA 419; Navoa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 59255, 29

December 1995, 251 SCRA 545.]and invoked its jurisdiction with the filing of

their answer, in seeking affirmative relief from it, in

subsequently filing a notice of appeal before the RTC, and later, a Petition

for Review with the Court of Appeals. Upon these premises, petitioners

cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by

attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted

themselves voluntarily. Laches now bars them from doing so.

Be that as it may, we find no error in the MeTC assuming jurisdiction over


13/16

the subject matter. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it

alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is

unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the

law.10

[Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108817, 10 May 1994, 232

SCRA 372; Pangilinan v. Aguilar, No. L-29275, 31 January 1972, 43 SCRA

136.] As correctly found by the appellate court, to which we agree, the

allegations in the complaint sufficiently established a cause of action for

unlawful detainer. The complaint clearly stated how entry was effectedand how and when dispossession started - petitioners were able to enter

the subject premises as sublessees of Purisima Salazar who, despite the

termination of her lease with respondent, continued to occupy the subject

premises without any contract with it; thus, their stay was by tolerance of

respondent.

The fact that the complaint failed to state that respondent was in prior

possession of the property before it was unlawfully withheld by petitioner

spouses is of no moment. Prior physical possession is indispensable only in

actions for forcible entry but not in unlawful detainer.11

[Javelosa v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 124292, 10 December 1996, 265 SCRA 493.]

Petitioner spouses, as mere sublessees of Purisima Salazar, derive their right

from the sublessor whose termination of contract with the lessor

necessarily also ends the sublease contract. Thus, when the contract of

lease of Purisima Salazar with respondent was terminated the contract of

sublease of petitioners with the former also necessarily ended and

petitioners cannot insist on staying on the premises. Petitioners can invoke

no right superior to that of their sublessor.12

[Duellome v. Gotico, No. L-

17846, 29 April 1963, 7 SCRA 841.]

It is not correct to say that petitioners could not have occupied the property

by tolerance of respondent as their entry into the premises was inceptively

illegal, the sublease being entered into without the consent of the

owner.13

[Sec. 4. Assignment of Lease or Subleasing.Assignment of lease

or subleasing of the whole or any portion of the residential unit, including

the acceptance of boarders or bedspacers, without the written consent of

the owner/lessor is prohibited (Batas Pambansa Blg. 887).]Petitioners argue

that tolerance is only available in cases where entry was lawful from the

start and cannot be asserted where entry was illegal from the start. It

appears however that respondent did not expressly and equivocally prohibitthe subleasing of the property. Although the attached contracts of lease

state that the lessee cannot sublease the property, none of those contracts

pertain to the contract of lease between Purisima Salazar and respondent

PATRICIA.14

[Attached Contracts of Lease pertain to those between Patricia,

Inc., and Renato Establecida, Patricia, Inc., and Augusto Tortosa, and not

Patricia, Inc., and herein petitioners; Rollo, pp. 109-114. ] In any event, the

fact that PATRICIA sent a letter to the Jimenez spouses informing them of

the termination of the lease of Purisima Salazar shows that they recognize

and acknowledge their stay in the premises as sublessees ofSalazar. However, after the termination of the

contract of lease of Purisima Salazar with PATRICIA, any right of the

Jimenez spouses to stay in the premises, although previously recognized,

then and there ended. After the termination of the contract of lease of

Salazar the continued stay of the Jimenez spouses thereat was merely by

tolerance of PATRICIA and it became unlawful after they ignored the lessor's

demand to leave.

The status of petitioner spouses is akin to that of a lessee or a tenant whose

term of lease has expired but whose occupancy has continued by tolerance

of the owner. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's

forbearance or permission without any contract between them is

necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand

failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against

him.15 [Vda. De Catchuela v. Francisco, No. L-31985, 25 June 1980, 98

SCRA 172, citing Calubayan v. Pascual, No. L-22645, 18 September 1967, 21

SCRA 146; Yu v. de Lara, No. L-16084, 30 November 1962, 6 SCRA 785.] The

present action being for unlawful detainer, it is well within the exclusive

original jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts.

Justice Belosillo, Second Division, Sps. Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc., [G.R. No.134651. September 18, 2000]

The present action, although termed as one for "reconveyance of real

property" is actually one for recovery of the right to possess or accion

publiciana.This is an action for recovery of the right to possess and is a

plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a regional trial court to

determine the better right of possession of realty independently of the

title.Accion publiciana orplenaria de posesionis also used to refer to anejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of


14/16

the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the

realty. In such case, the regional trial court has jurisdiction.

The "jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is

determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or

not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims

asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court can not be made to depend

upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, forotherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon

the defendant." 9 [Serdoncillo vs. Benolirao, G.R. No. 118328, October 8,

1998; San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, 255 SCRA 133 [1996]; Boleyley vs.

Villanueva, G. R. No. 128734, September 14, 1999.]

The present action, although termed as one for "reconveyance of real

property" is actually one for recovery of the right to possess or accion

publiciana.This is an action for recovery of the right to possess and is a

plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a regional trial court to

determine the better right of possession of realty independently of the

title.10 [Aguilon vs. Bohol, 79 SCRA 482 [1977]; Desbarats vs. de Laureano,

18 SCRA 116 [1966].]Accion publiciana orplenaria de posesionis also used

to refer to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the

accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of

possession of the realty.11 [Bernabe vs. Dayrit, 125 SCRA 423, 425

[1983].] In such case, the regional trial court has jurisdiction.12 [Bernabe vs.

Dayrit, supra.]Here, the parties admit that the subject real property is

registered in the name of respondent Alfredo Torres. In the regional trial

court what respondent sought was to recover possession of the subject real

property alleging that he owned the lot on which he had allowed his father

(now deceased) and sisters, petitioners herein, to erect their houses. Sincethe complaint alleged that respondent Alfredo Torres was the owner of the

subject lot and that he merely allowed his father Simplicio Torres and his

sisters Amelia and Primitiva to construct their houses thereon, and that

since 1972 respondent pleaded to petitioners to remove their houses and

such additional constructions thereon as respondent needed the lot for his

own use, the action is plainly one for recovery of possession of real

property, or accion publiciana, filed on October 7, 1987, more than one year

after dispossession or when possession became unlawful, which is within

the jurisdiction of a regional trial court.13 [Javier vs. Veridiano, 237 SCRA

565, 573 [1994]; Medina vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 837 [1990];Bernabe vs. Dayrit, supra; del Castillo vs. Aquino, 212 SCRA 553 [1992].] As

heretofore stated, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the

allegations of the complaint, not by the answer nor by the evidence

adduced at the trial. Thus, the jurisdiction of the lower court is not affected

by the fact that petitioners asserted in their answer to the complaint that

the subject lot was truly owned by the estate of their father, also the father

of respondent, or that the last written demand to vacate was given on

September 2, 1987, just more than a month prior to the filing of the action.

Since initial demand to vacate was made in 1972, petitioners occupancybecame unlawful. Subsequent demands were merely in the nature of

reminders or reiterations of the original demand, the one-year period to

commence suit is counted from the first demand.14 [Pacis vs. Court of

Appeals, G. R. No. 102676, February 3, 1992, min. res., cited in Summary of

1992 Supreme Court Rulings, Part III, by Atty. Daniel T. Martinez, p. 1847;

Desbarats vs. de Laureano, supra.] When the dispossession lasted beyond

one year, the proper action is accion publicianafor recovery of possession

of the subject property filed in the regional trial court.15[Desbarats vs. de

Laureano, supra.]

Justice Pardo, First Division, SPOUSES ROMAN & AMELITA T. CRUZ and

SPOUSES SEVERINO& PRIMITIAVA T. BAUTISTA,petitioners, vs. SPOUSES

ALFREDO & MELBA TORRES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, respondents[G.R. No. 121939. October 4, 1999]

Anent the ejectment case, the one-year reglementary period under

Section 1, Rule 70 for filing an unlawful detainer case is counted from

the time of the "unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession". Such

unlawful deprivation occurs upon expiration or termination of the rightto hold possession. And such right legally expires or terminates upon

receipt of the last demand to vacate.

Anent the ejectment case, the one-year reglementary period under Section

1, Rule 70 22 [The 1964 Revised Rules of Court] for filing an unlawful

detainer case is counted from the time of the "unlawful deprivation or

withholding of possession". Such unlawful deprivation occurs upon

expiration or termination of the right to hold possession. And such right

legally expires or terminates upon receipt of the last demand to

vacate 23 [ See Sy Oh v. Hon. Garcia and Lim Chi v. Hon Garcia, 138 Phil.777]


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In this case, although possession by petitioners (other than Villaluz) lasted

beyond March 31, 1988 (the date they were supposed to vacate the

premises in accordance with the agreement between petitioner Villaluz and

private respondents),24 [ Rollo, p. 232] nevertheless their continued

possession from April 1, 1988 up to the time they received the demand to

vacate on February 23, 1989, 25 [ Rollo, p. 234] is considered as possession

by tolerance. Said petitioners are not lessees but their status is analogous to

that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whoseoccupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. Their right of possession of

the said property stems from their being employees of petitioner Villaluz

who only allowed them to occupy the premises for a certain period. As such,

their possession depends upon the possession of petitioner Villaluz. Having

merely stepped into the shoes of the latter, said petitioners cannot acquire

superior rights than that of petitioner Villaluz. It has been ruled, that "the

person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or

permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an

implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand," otherwise the

remedy of ejectment may be availed of to oust him from the

premises. 26 [Refugia v. CA, 258 SCRA 347 (1996); Yu v. De Lara, 6 SCRA 785

(1962)] In such case, the one year prescriptive period for filing the

appropriate action to remedy the unlawful withholding of possession is to

be counted from the date of receipt of the last demand to

vacate 27 [Calubayan v. Pascual, 215 SCRA 146] because it is only from that

time that possession becomes illegal. 28 [ See Vda. de Prieto v. Reyes, 14

SCRA 430; Canaynay v. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36] Accordingly, since the

complaint for ejectment was instituted on July 12, 1989, 29 [Petition, p. 26;

Rollo, p. 33] or a mere four (4) months from the time of the last demand to

vacate, the same was timely filed within the prescriptive period.

Finally, petitioners (other than Villaluz) argue that the civil aspect in the B.P.

22 case constitutes a prejudicial question to the ejectment suit because the

ownership of the premises subject of the latter suit is allegedly being

disputed in the former case. The argument is not meritorious. The

ejectment suit can stand on its own regardless of the outcome of the civil

case in B P. 22. The resolution of either is not determinative of the other.

This is so because private respondents were already the owners of the

properties subject of the ejectment suit by virtue of the Deeds of Sale

executed between the former and petitioner Villaluz. 30 Rollo, pp. 71-72;

228-229. The certificates of title issued in private respondents' name furtherconfirm their ownership. 31 [TCT 127633 and 127630, (Rollo, pp. 73-74)] As

owners, they may initiate legal action to recover possession thereof from an

occupant who can show no right to occupy the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in

the assailed consolidated case is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Justice Francisco, THIRD DIVISION, TERESITA VILLALUZ, CHIT ILAGAN,

Spouses ADOR and TESS TABERNA and MARIO LLAMAS, petitioners, vs. THEHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and SPOUSES REYNALDO AND ZENAIDA

ANZURES, respondents, [G.R. No. 106214. September 5, 1997.]

A co-lessee or sub-lessee of the property. Thus, it is still bound by the

ejectment suit even if it was not named a party thereto.

Moreover, petitioner admits that it has been the actual occupant of the

leased premises since 1980 and it has authorized Constancio Manzano to

pay the rents for and in its behalf. In fact, it claims to have been paying the

rent religiously, effectively implying that it is a co-lessee or sub-lessee of the

property. Thus, it is still bound by the ejectment suit even if it was not

named a party thereto.6 [Bataclan v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 764

(1989)] It is well-settled that a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not

only upon the defendants in the suit but also against those not made parties

thereto, if they are:

a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant

fraudulently

occupying the property to frustrate the judgment;b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the

permission of the defendant;

c) transferees pendente lite;

d) sublessee;

e) co-lessee; or

f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the

defendant. 7 [1 Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law

Compendium 793 (1997)]

Consequently, the appellate court did not act with grave abuse of discretion


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in annulling the trial courts order granting the writ of preliminary

injunction.

The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order;

as such, it cannot by itself be subject of an appeal or a petition for review

on certiorari. 8 [Saulog v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 590 (1996); Arabesque

Industrial Philippines, Inc. v. court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 602 (1992)] The

proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinaryappeal from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the

grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party concerned

may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently

erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious

relief. 9 [Salcedo-Ortaez v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111 (1994)] In the

instant case, the trial court issued as writ of preliminary injunction enjoining

the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 13040, in spite of the fact

that the right of petitioner to occupy the leased premises has been declared

by final judgment to be inexistent. Having no clear legal right, petitioners

plea should not have merited the favorable action of the trial court. The

order granting the writ of preliminary injunction was thus clearly erroneous

and must be set aside. As the appellate court succintly explained:

We are mindful of the ruling of the Supreme Court that

where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter,

the orders or decisions pertaining to the cause are orders or

decisions within its jurisdiction and however erroneous they

may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari.However,

while certiorari is generally not available to challenge an

interlocutory order of a trial court, the Supreme Court

allows certiorarias a mode of redress where the assailedorder is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford

adequate and expeditious relief. Petitioner would be made

to suffer unnecessary waste of time before it could proceed

with the ejectment of its lessees and all persons, including

private respondent Oro Cam claiming under them if we opt

to dismiss the petition and ignore the patently erroneous

granting of the writ of preliminary injunciton and unduly

impose upon petitioner the burden of going through the

proceedings with respondent court which had evidently

taken a patently erroneous view against herein petitionersvalid stand.10 [CA Decision, p. 9; Rollo,p. 29.]

Justice Mendoza, Second Division, ORO CAM ENTERPRISES, INC.,petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, former Fourth Division and ANGEL CHAVES,

INC., respondents[G.R. No. 128743. November 29, 1999]

unlawful detainer

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