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TITLE PAGE

POLITICAL MORALITY IN RAWLS

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF ARTS (M.A) DEGREE IN PHILOSOPHY.

BY

TSAV MICHAEL K. PG/MA/08/48500

SUPERVISOR: DR F.O.C. NJOKU.

3

APPROVAL PAGE

This dissertation has been approved for the Department of Philosophy, University of

Nigeria, Nsukka for the award of Master of Arts (M.A) Degree in philosophy.

By

_______________ ______________________

Dr F.O.C. Njoku INTERNAL SUPERVISOR (Supervisor)

______________________ _______________ EXTERNAL EXAMINER

Dr F.O.C. Njoku ( Head of Department)

______________________

DEAN OF THE FACULTY

4

CERTIFICATION

I, Tsav, Michael K., a Master of Arts student in the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of

the Social Sciences, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, with Registration No:

PG/MA/08/48500, has satisfactorily completed the requirements (course work and

dissertation), for the award of master of Arts Degree ( M.A. ) in philosophy.

The dissertation is original and to the best of my knowledge it has not been

submitted in part or in full for any other degree of this or any other university.

__________________

TSAV, MICHAEL K. PG/MA/08/48500

(Candidate)

5

DEDICATION

To Barr. Geoffrey Iorvaa for his tireless support, and to Rev. Fr. Simon Akuha of blessed

memory, may God grant him eternal rest.

6

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My profound gratitude goes to all who in one way or another have contributed to

the completion of this work. May God reward them abundantly. I am particularly

indebted to Rev. Fr. Dr. F.O.C. Njoku, my supervisor, for his patience in supervising this

work and for his helpful suggestions. I am sincerely grateful to all lecturers in the

Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria, Nsukka for the knowledge they

impacted on me, amongst whom are Prof. Ben O. Eboh, Prof. Egbeke Aja, Prof. J.C.A.

Agbakoba, Dr. J.O. Eneh, Dr. M. Anyaehie, Dr. M. Chukwuelobe and Dr. Anthony

Areji. Without their intellectual assistance, this work would not have been a success.

I am very grateful to my loving parents-Mr. Peter Tsav and Mrs. Eunice Tsav-for

their support. I equally thank my brothers and sisters for their support, prayers and

cooperation. Special thanks to Rev Frs John Ikponko, Fabian Azatyom and Saawuan

Steve. (for being true brothers), Frs. Pius Uzaan, Malachy Anum, Augustine Otanwa,

Solomon Ukeyima, Igyese Titus, Agbecha Joseph, Mbanngun Richard, Omanga

Goodwin, Akaajime Frederick, Obichie Raphael, Ojotule Anthony, Gberikon Richard,

and Joseph Pilla, I appreciate the efforts of my friends amongst whom are Anjov Terfa

(best friend), Damian Anyam, Charles Eneh, Oliver Agundu, Dr Wang (a brother),

Richard Inyamkume and all my classmates. My sincere appreciation also goes to Philo

Pohol, Mrs Anaigba, Eunice Orshio, the family members of Ezeniobi, Priscilla O. and

Bills Shom, who have always been there for me. I cannot quantify the support of Paul

Haaga Terngu, upon who I pray God’s blessings. I must appreciate Solomon Apeku,

Peter Akunoko, Benjamin Nyam, Noel Buki, Frank Ewung, Chukwuma Arinze, Akunbur

Jude, Asan Terna, Shonwula Joseph, Atsue Isaac, Gloria Enobong, David Waya, Judith

Odoh, Moses Akuha, it has been wonderful having you all around me. To all who gave

me both material and moral support during this studies I say thanks and may God’s

blessings be upon you.

7

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page - - - - - - - - - i

Approval Page - - - - - - - - - ii

Certification - - - - - - - - - iii

Dedication - - - - - - - - - iv

Acknowledgments - - - - - - - v

Table of Contents - - - - - - - - vi

Abstract - - - - - - - - - vii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study - - - - - - 1

1.2 Statement of the problem - - - - - - 2

1.3 Purpose of Study - - - - - - - 2

1.4 Significance of the Study - - - - - - 3

1.5 Scope of the Study - - - - - - - 3

1.6 Research methodology - - - - - - 3

Endnotes

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW - - - - 5

Endnotes

CHAPTER THREE: TOWARDS THE FOUNDATION OF RAWLS’

POLITICAL MORALITY: EARLY RAWLS.

3.1 Preamble - - - - - - - - 19

3.2 Rawls’ Life and Works - -- - - - - 19

3.3 Initial Mutual Disinterestedness in Founding Justice - - -20

3.4 The Equality of the Human Person and the Principle of Justice as Fairness -20

3.5 The Idea of a well-ordered Society - - - - - 22

3.6 Civil Disobedience as a Justifiable Moral Action - - - 23

3.7 Primary Goods as Citizens Needs - - - - - 24

3.8 Constitutional Democracy and the Principle of Participation- - 27

3.9 Rawls on the Priority of Liberty in His Political Morality - - 29

3.10 The Implausibility of Rawls’ Early Work and the Need for his

Political Liberalism - - - - - - - 30

8

Endnotes CHAPTER FOUR: RAWLS’ POLITICAL MORALITY: LATER RAWLS.

4.1 Preamble - - - - - - - - 34

4.2 Political Liberalism and the Problem of Political Stability - 34

4.3 Pluralism and Overlapping Consensus - - - 36

4.4 Rawls’ Political Conception of Justice - - - - 38

4.5 The Principle of Reciprocity in Social Cooperation - - 42

4.6 Rawls on the Priority of Right - - - - - 43

4.7 Public Reason in Formulating Political Decisions - - - 44

Endnotes

CHAPTER FIVE: RAWLS AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL

MORALITY

5.1 Preamble - - - - - - - - 48

5.2 Those in Support of Rawls - - - - - - 48

5.3 Rawls and His Critiques - - - - - 53

5.4 Implications of Rawls’ Political Morality for the Nigerian Society- - 62

5.5 An Evaluation of Rawlsalian Political Morality - - - 65

Conclusion - - - - - - - - - 66

Endnotes

Bibliography - - - - - - - - 70

9

ABSTRACT

Political morality reflects on the nature of human community, government and the relations between the collective and the individual. It tries to understand the legitimacy of government in its different forms, the foundations of law, the powers and boundaries of state interference in the lives of individuals and their property. For John Rawls, political morality is toleration based on common agreement that arises from the conflicting views of the contracting parties, which he called overlapping consensus. In the opinion of Rawls, political morality is arrived at by the choice of the two principles individuals make in an initial mutual disinterestedness under the veil of ignorance. And those principles, for him, would further all other arrangements in the society. But the problem is whether Rawls’ principles chosen in the original position under the veil of ignorance can guarantee the transgenerational stability expected in the modern pluralistic society that has varying and even conflicting views on religion, morality, political conceptions and the like. It is in this vein that this research attempts, firstly, to examine the two principles (how feasible they are), secondly, to point out the limitation of the choice under the veil of ignorance in establishing what political morality will guide a pluralistic society and thirdly, to support and at the same time criticise Rawls’ political morality using various contemporary philosophers’ views. One discovers that Rawls’ idea of political morality is quite engaging, but he underestimates people’s interests in socio-political affairs.

10

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

A critical study of social institutions indicates a marked disparity between the

upper and lower classes in both means of life and the rights and privileges of

organizational authority. Each day one observes but to no avail as the culture of the

poorer strata is impoverished while that of the governing and technocratic elite is

securely based on the service of the national ends of power and wealth.

It is a truism that there are natural contingencies in humans and there exists

differences in modern pluralistic societies, such as varying moral doctrines, political

conceptions and religious views. How then can a just society be found where people with

different moral convictions will enjoy equal liberty? It is against this background that

John Rawls writes: For a problem of justice to arise at least two persons must want to do

something other than whatever everyone else wants to do 1. What a political morality will

guide a multi pluralistic society? It is to address this issue that John Rawls whose

political morality proffers the following solutions:

(1) That rational persons at the initial position give consensus under the veil of

ignorance “which principle to choose that will advance equal rights and liberties

of all;

(2) That political liberalism will, to some extent, handle the problem of pluralism

using the idea of overlapping consensus.

Rawls rejects intuitionism and utilitarianism and affirms strongly Kantian ethical theory,

the categorical imperative, which, ‘applies to everyone and in all circumstance simply

and solely by the virtue of the fact that we are human’2. It is from this Kantian tradition

that Rawls emanates with his own political morality as distributive justice. Rawls

observes that intuitionism and utilitarianism do not offer the kind of justice in the modern

pluralistic society. The former is an individualistic morality while the latter looks at the

greater happiness of the greater number of people. However, what Rawls is concerned in

his political morality is that there should be equality in assignment of basic rights and

duties, there should also be social and economic equalities such that inequalities of

11

wealth and authority, can be just only and only if they result in compensating benefits for

everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.

In tackling this problem of political morality, Rawls agrees with Kant thus: act in such a

way that the maxim of your will can at the same time always be valid as the principle of a

general law. Whenever human beings are in doubt, they must ask themselves what would

happen to mankind if everyone acts according to his maxim? 3 In actual fact, this

statement is a truism. If everyone acts in such a way that each would act giving the same

situation, the world would be a better place for all to live.

The principles agreed upon by the rational contracting partners therefore form the kernel

of Rawls’ political morality. And this is what strikes the researcher to write on Rawls.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The heart of Rawls’ philosophy is the stability problem. Early Rawls had felt that

the two principles of justice chosen in the original position under the veil of ignorance

would guarantee stability. This idea of his was original, powerful and elegant, but it has

opened to crushing objections. One of such objections is that, early Rawls did not strive

for absolute universality but abstracted from all that is characteristically modern. Hence,

the question, can a just society be founded on the principles of justice agreed upon under

the veil of ignorance in the initial position where contracting partners have no idea of

their place of value? The researcher, therefore, sets out to address this question and uses

later Rawls in harmonizing the pluralism inherent in the modern society.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

There has been worry as to whether Rawls’ principles will enhance equal rights and

liberties in social and political institutions, hence they are chosen under the veil of

ignorance. Whereas, “the best plan for an individual is the one that he would adopt if he

possessed full information”.4 The researcher therefore sets out to: (1) examine the concept

of political morality as this pertains to Rawls, (2) analyze the merits and demerits of his

views, (3) expose other philosophers’ views on political morality and, (4) apply Rawls’

concept of political morality to the Nigerian society.

12

1.4 Thesis of the Study

This work focuses on the thesis that political morality can be founded on

principles that people agreed on in the original position. This is so because, in the original

position people have no idea of their place of value, therefore, there will be grounds for

fairness in choice making. By implication there will be no bias.

1.5 Significance of the Study

A close study of John Rawls’ political morality will lead to the constant

appreciation of liberal socialism where each person enjoys basic liberty, rights, duties and

equal distribution of economic values. In this study also are the innovative answers to the

question of the nature of justice be they theoretical or practical. This work will also serve

as a guide to those who would want to further research in this area.

1.6 Scope of the Study

This work is limited to the study of John Rawls’ political morality as presented in

his works- A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism.

1.7 Research Methodology

Data for this work were sourced from books, articles, Journals and the Internet.

In order to explicate this data for readership and concomitant comprehension, the

expository method was used in x-raying Rawls’ ideas about political morality. With the

critical method, Rawls’ views were subjected to closer analysis, while at the same time

bringing to light the merits and demerits of his views.

13

Endnotes

1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 189.

2 Ben Okwu Eboh, Living Issues in Ethics (Nsukka: Afro-Orbis Publishing Co. Ltd,

2005),72.

3 Eboh, 72.

4 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 417.

14

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

What political morality is all about is how rightness and justness, equality and

liberty characterize a behavioral pattern in a socio-political community. Bothered by what

should be the ‘ideal’ for measuring moral standards for all gave rise to diversity of moral

doctrines in moral and philosophical argument. Our literature review will take us through

some of the more notable philosophers of the ancient, medieval, modern, and

contemporary periods who pondered on the problem of political morality.

The Sophists (5th century) were the first to be associated with much argument,

although they were not the only people who took part in it. What they argued on political

morality “was a wide ranging argument over whether characteristic human institutions

such as language, law and morality were natural or man-made”.1 In other words, it was

difficult to have a morality that would suit all people to follow. To this end, they argued:

Among other things it became clear that much that one set of people believed to be right another thought wrong, and this led men with enquiring minds to ask whether all such beliefs were just a matter of opinion and convention.2

It is clear from the above statement that the Sophists do not have one coherent

view on what is political morality. For Hippias of Elis, what characterizes political

morality is in the equality that nature bequeaths on all. By implication, people are to treat

one another equally. Protagoras’ own political morality hinges on the observance of law

and moral codes. In his words, “It is in the interest of all men that laws should be

observed, because the state of nature where there are no laws is a terrible one.”3 Gorgias

of Leontini is another Sophist who taught no virtue, but only rhetoric. He holds that

wrongdoing is always involuntary. This goes to say that no one is to be blamed for his

misdeeds.

Generally, political morality, for the Sophists, is individualistic. Rawls does not

agree with the Sophists on individualistic morality, rather, he accepts a morality that is

distributive that benefits all. What they have to teach is what is held to be just in each

different state4. In the final analysis, the Sophists’ argument on political morality has

evoked further studies as we can see in what follows below.

15

Plato (427-347BC) was the first philosopher to write extensively on politics and

its relationship with morality. For him, justice is at the heart of political morality. In his

Republic, Plato celebrates the just man who has conquered the appetitive aspect of human

nature and lives according to the dictates of reason. The goal of the state is the creation of

a political family in which no one is oppressed, a family in which “the language of

harmony and concord will be more often heard”5. Peace will reign in such a state because

the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with one another. Plato believes that the

harmonious state will need the political dexterity of a philosopher-king. In pursuit of the

high ideals Plato sets before politics, he examines the forms of imperfect governments.

They include: timocracy – a government of honour and ambition which degenerates from

aristocracy, oligarchy- government of the rich to the exclusion of the poor, democracy-

government established on the principle of equality but which soon degenerates and

creates conditions of unrestricted freedom and desires, tyranny – government

monopolized by an absolute ruler or group who oppresses the ruled.6 Thus Plato’s idealist

and utopian theory of politics regards the reign of the philosopher king as a sine qua non

for the sustenance of political morality. Rawls’ political morality is pragmatic and not

idealistically utopic as Plato underscores.

While Aristotle (384-322BC) rejects Plato’s utopian conception of a harmonious

state ruled by an omniscient and righteous philosopher king; he is in agreement with

Plato that the state must be founded on justice. Aristotle’s political community (Koinonia

politike) as presented in his Politics accepts class differences and the inequality these

differences breed. Aristotle accepts slavery as a natural institution while firmly stating

that: “At the very least, a constitution being a form of community or communion, they

(citizen) must share in the single territory of a single state.”7 Aristotle severely restricts

the participation of peasants, workmen, and slaves in the common good. Aristotle’s

acceptance of political inequality vitiates the moral value he seeks to imbue politics with.

Nevertheless, Aristotle adopts a moral stance towards the practice of politics in fidelity to

his doctrine of the mean which equates the virtuous life to be made available to everyone.

Rawls agrees with Aristotle on the basis of the rationality of human beings coming to

play in politics. But he does not accept Aristotle’s class difference. Rather he believes in

fairness.

16

Epicurus (341-270) signals a departure from the elevated conception of politics

that we have seen in Plato and Aristotle. In his Ad Menoe, he rejects politics in its entirety

because, according to him, politics contaminates men.8 The man who pursues wisdom

has no need for politics. For Epicurus, politics influences men with negative passions and

is therefore useless in its entirety.

St Augustine (354-430) presents his political views in his greatest work, City of

God. In this book, St Augustine contrasts the celestial city which is an ideal state with the

earthly city which includes the universe of the evil and sinners. St Augustine approaches

the question of political morality from the Christian perspective. As such, he returns to

the positive conception of political morality of Plato. Peace is the supreme good of the

city of God, and by extension the well-ordered state. This supreme good can only be

achieved in the commonwealth on the foundation of justice. For the commonwealth is

necessarily united by the common knowledge of right. The knowledge of what is moral is

the basis of association of men; hence there can be no state without the association

established by a common sense of right. St Augustine states:

The peace of the body….is a tempering of the component parts in duly ordered proportion; the peace of the irrational soul is a duly ordered response of the appetites; the peace of the rational soul is the duly ordered agreement of cognition and action….peace between men is an ordered agreement of mind with mind….among those who live together.9

The laws of the state, for St Augustine, must be just laws in harmony with reason.

Like Plato, St Augustine identifies morality with rationality. Referring directly to Scipio

to underscore the moral imperative in the organization of the political affairs of the state,

St Augustine declares:

A state cannot be maintained without justice, and where there is no true justice there can be no right. For any action according to right is inevitably a just action, while no unjust action can possibly be according to right… the notion of justice… (as) ‘the interest of the strongest’ (is) false.10

17

For the state to justify its existence the rulers must bow to the moral imperative. Might is

not right. Only justice is. Rawls agrees with St. Augustine on his notion of justice and

adds that distributive justice in the society is always the right one.

St. Thomas Aquinas (1274) in fidelity to Aristotelian realism affirms that man is by

nature a political animal and traces the origin of the political organization called the state to

man’s social nature and the limitations of the single individual. He expressed his political

thought in his De Regimine Principium. Aquinas does not hesitate to endorse the notion

that there is a moral obligation in harmony with natural law to pursue the goal of realizing

the good life for all people living under the authority of the state 11. It is within the power

of the state and its rulers to make life worth living with dignity. Hence, he believes that the

best form of government, the one that will best serve the interest of the citizenry, is

constitutional monarchy. Law which is essentially moral and rational should guide both the

rulers of the state and the ruled. Human, natural, divine and laws as identified by Aquinas

contribute immensely to the moral foundation of the state’s political organization.

Dante Alighieri (1262-1321) in his work World Government seems to agree with

Aquinas that the monarchical form of government is the best. Dante is of the opinion that

the holder of power in a monarchy is able to make right decisions and take the right actions

as they are validated by justice.12

Niccolo Machiavelli (1512-1585) in his celebrated work, The Prince is of the

opinion that no single individual in the state should be above the law. The rule of law must

be supreme. Thus, a good form of government can combine elements of monarchy,

aristocracy and democracy. He condemns the exclusive monarchical state because the

princes pursue only their own interests and those of a few to the disadvantage of the

generality of the people. He insists that it is not individual prosperity but the general good

that confers greatness on the state. Machiavelli’s tone is more pessimistic in The Prince. He

realizes that ultimately, utilitarian considerations decide the organization of the civil

society and its control. The notion of might is right holds sway as the ruler uses force and

dishonest methods to keep power. The principles of morality give way to utilitarian

considerations in politics. Hence, his famous dictum, the end justifies the means. The

Prince, on which power rests can use whatever means to retain, maintain and expand it. In

his The Prince, he urges that political disorders can be quickly healed if they are seen well

18

in advance… when, for lack of a diagnosis, they are allowed to grow in such a way that

everyone can recognize them, remedies are too late13. To this end, he maintains that

whoever is responsible for another’s becoming powerful ruins himself, because this power

is brought into being either by ingenuity or by force, and both of these are suspects to the

one who has become powerful. Machiavelli believes that in a completely new state where

the Prince too is a new comer, the difficulty he encounters in maintaining his rule is more

or less serious insofar as he is more or less able. However, he affirms that it is politically

moral if the new Prince succeeds to do what he possibly can to destroy the family members

of the older Prince completely, but should not make haste in changing the existing laws and

leadership structures, if possible, the new Prince should live in the state with the people in

person hence, this will make the principalities under him soon love him as the former

Prince. Outrightly, Rawls will not admit of Machiavellian brutality in maintaining power

and order in the state, although, Rawls admits of civil disobedience, it is more or less a

non-violent one for the good of all and in particular, the least advantaged in the state.

Furthermore, Machiavelli opines that political morality can be achieved by the arm of

others or with his own, either by fortune or by prowess, while Rawls on the other hand,

holds that political morality can be attained through the consensus of the principles chosen

in the original position. In another development, Machiavelli appreciates the virtue that

goes on in the republic more than that of the principalities.

Jean Bodin (1530-1596) in his book Six Livres de la Republique, he embraces the

doctrine of absolutism in the belief that the absolute ruler is better placed to maintain law

and order in the state14. While allowing the sovereign maximum political powers, he

nevertheless subjects the sovereign to the demands of the natural law which is expressed in

just laws. Hence, Bodin permits the doctrine of political morality even in states controlled

by an absolute sovereign.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1671) in Leviathan outlines his views on the relation of

politics with morality. Like Bodin, Hobbes is more concerned with the practical necessity

of preventing anarchy in the state than the moral imperative of a truly just state. Hobbes

does not recognize the existence of objective morality. For him, morality is relative. The

notion of good stands in a relation with individual desires. This approach to morality leads

him to conceive social justice in terms of keeping or not keeping the social contract entered

19

into by men on the occasion of the emergence of the state. Injustice promotes insecurity in

the state because it means the non-performance of the social contract 15. According to

Hobbes morality arises from nature and its laws. Human nature is basically driven by

passions or endeavours. Hence, the real state of nature is a state of war where life is short,

nasty and brutish. Such a pessimistic conception of the nature of man and the origin of the

state cannot yield an elevated concept of political morality. The social contract between

subjects creates an absolute sovereign whose only duty to the subjects is the maintenance

of order. Hobbes ignores the truism that absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Baruch Spinoza (1632-1672) in his Tractatus Politicus walks the path of ethical

relativism taken by Hobbes. But he parts with Hobbes by insisting that power placed in the

hands of a single individual must degenerate, given that human nature is ruled by passions.

Men are driven by the force of self-preservation. And even among nations there is no

altruism. He writes:

Nothing can exist in a natural state which can be called good or bad by common assent, since every man who is in a natural state consults only his own advantage, and determines what is good or bad according to his own fancy and insofar as he has regard for his own advantage alone, and holds himself responsible to no one save himself by any law; and therefore sin cannot be conceived in a natural state, but only in civil state, where it is decreed by common consent what is good or bad, and each one holds himself responsible to the state 16.

In spite of this basic egoism, the limitation of the solitary individual compels men to

come together to form the political organization called the state. Thus, there is a move from

the natural order that emphasizes power and egoism to a moral order that emphasizes

rights. This means that men are not born for citizenship but must be made fit for it 17.

Spinoza vigorously espouses the idea of freedom, unlike Hobbes. The state can only curb

those powers of the citizen that are destructive and inimical to order. Order among men is

of prime importance because it expresses reason in politics just as in ethics reason

corresponds to the establishment of order among desires.

John Locke (1632-1704) in his Two Treatises of Government tows the Spinozistic

path that rejects absolutism and affirms man’s inalienable right to freedom for whom equity

is necessary in the political organization of the state. Reason which expresses the moral

20

imperative must be the basis of this political organization. Reflecting on the moral

underpinning of Locke’s political philosophy Nwoko writes:

The civil society is built on standing laws, promulgated and known to people and not on extemporary decrees. The laws govern even the supreme or legislative power. These laws are protected and employed by upright judges to decide controversies and to protect the good of common wealth 18.

Locke’s liberalism is on affirmation of the moral basis of politics. However, this basis of

his political morality is built on natural law principles. The law of nature, which is reason,

governs the state of nature, obliging and teaching all not to harm another’s life, health,

liberty or possession, since all are equal and independent under one supreme omnipotent

sovereign Creator; all share with one another community, the community of nature without

any subordination to destroy one another.19 Political morality built on the individual

liberties nature confers on them, Locke observes that one may not be farfetched from it

when a man or group, through absolute power, attempts to hinder or deny another’s total

freedom. In order to avert this state of war, Locke proposes a political society through a

pact where the men put themselves under an authority. It is this kind of pact that influences

Rawls to formulate his principles of justice where rational beings who want to advance

their common good would agree and adhere to in a consensus.

Charles de Montesquieu (1689-1755) in his work The Spirit of Laws advances the

liberal trend already set by Spinoza and Locke. He recognizes the moral obligation of the

ruler to the ruled. The ruler must not diminish the political liberty of the state or citizens to

guard against absolutism. Montesquieu famously espouses the principle of the separation of

powers between the various arms of government. He writes:

When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty, because apprehension may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner 20.

The preoccupation with liberty and justice and the disdain for absolutism clearly

indicate Montesquieu’s firm belief in the moral basis of politics.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) in his work The Social Contract champions the

ideals of democracy, notably, equality, freedom, and justice. Rousseau develops a political

21

theory far more elevated than Hobbes. He is of the opinion that human nature is not

inherently evil. Man in the state of nature was innocent and free. All the same he enters into

the social contract to harness the strength of the collective in order to enhance the prospect

of survival. From Rousseau’s theory of the origin of the state in the social pact emerges a

political theory highly moral in character. As the first true philosopher of the Romanticism,

Rousseau brings his emotive morality to bear on his political theory and embraces the

notions of liberty, justice and supremacy of just laws over the ruler and the ruled; hence he

declares that “the worst government is one under which the people diminish and waste

away”. 21 Political morality for Rousseau is characterized in the government as an

intermediate body established between the subjects and the sovereign for their mutual

communication, charged with the execution of the laws and the maintenance of freedom,

both civil and political.22 In other words, the law specifies principles with which the civil

society can operate freely and equally. These principles that advance freedom and equality

are what Rawls proposes in his political morality as well.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) brings a decidedly vigorous ethical perspective to the

debate on the political organization of the state. In the “introduction to the theory of Right”

in his work Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant underlines the

status of freedom as a fundamental human right rooted in man’s nature and expressed as a

demand of pure reason. Right and freedom, including political freedom of the individual,

are linked. Thus, he says, “every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the

freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in

accordance with a universal law is right.”23 For Kant, the categorical imperative which

enjoins us to act as if the maxims of our will were universal laws24 holds true in the realm

of politics since the ultimate goal of politics is the maintenance of order and peace. Order

can only be attained under existing moral conditions. Rawls is from Kantian tradition.

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) underlines three characteristics that constitute the

basis of his political morality: the greatest happiness principle, universal egoism and the

artificial identification of one’s interest with those of others.25 These characteristics are

particularly evident in his work Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,

Bentham in this work is concerned with articulating rational principles that would provide

the basis and guide for legal, social and moral reform. Bentham’s political morality reflects

22

what he calls at different times “the greatest happiness principle” or “the principle of

utility”. What Bentham refers by this principle is not just the usefulness of things or

actions, but to the extent to which these things or actions promote the general happiness.

By implication, what Bentham is saying is that any action that promotes happiness is

politically right and anything to the contrary is wrong. Pain and pleasure are the yardstick

of measuring political morality in Bentham.

In addition, there are some advantages that Bentham’s political morality (utility)

has got: to begin with, it allows for objective and disinterested public discussion and

enables decision to be made where there seem to be conflicts of (prima facie) legitimate

interests. More so, hedonistic calculus gives room for human equality. To this end,

Bentham’s political morality can be described as “the art of directing men’s action to the

production of the greatest possible quality of happiness on the part of those whose interest

is in view”.26 John Rawls does not admit of utilitarianism in his political morality.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831) develops his political theory directly

from his main philosophy, metaphysics. The state, according to Hegel, ranks the highest

form of human society in which the spirit objectifies and actualizes itself. He accepts that

below the state exist the family and the civil society. He looks at the will of the state as

being a universal will; it is the will of the absolute and consequently the authentic will of

the individual citizen.27 Hegel outlines three powers in the state thus:

The legislative power, the executive power and the sovereignty. The function of the legislative power is to determine the universal will while that of the executive power is to see to the execution of the universal will in practice. The sovereignty is the monarch who symbolizes the unity of the state.28

In other words, these powers foster the constitutional order and ratify laws and major

decisions made in the state. Hegel admits of war in the state as being good and necessary

for social progress. He states: “It is necessary because it is part of the dialectical process of

history whereby the spirit develops itself and progresses towards its goal”.29 It would seem

that he advocates totalitarianism as his political morality. This is seen in his insistence on

complete conformity by individuals with the desires and demands of the society. In his

words: “The state therefore should not tolerate any appeal to one’s private conscience on

23

the part of the individual”. 30 This does not mean that Hegel rejects individual freedom in

his political morality. According to him, freedom does not consist in being able to do

whatever one wants; it is not the ability to act arbitrarily. This would be irrational and

therefore an evidence of lack of freedom. Hegel therefore identifies freedom with

rationality and this is where Rawls agrees with him, that rational and free beings agree on

principles that will advance their common good in the state. Rawls also agrees with him

that morality is part of the practical life in a society, and the moral behavior is part of the

common life in the state

John Austin (1790-1859) was a utilitarian and was closely associated with Bentham

and his principle of utilitarianism. Being a British philosopher of law, Austin associates

political morality with law. In one of his works on jurisprudence, he writes: “Law is the

command of the sovereign backed by sanctions; the sovereign is the person or institution

whom the people have the habit of obeying”.31 In other words, obedience to the law

regulates the conduct of the people in the society and fosters happiness for the common

good. The relationship between law and political power is central to Austin’s political

morality. Rawls objects to utilitarian tradition of Austin but accepts his rule of law in the

society.

J. S. Mill (1806-1873) in Utilitarianism sees justice as a fundamental political right.

Justice is that which everyone can claim from everyone as their moral right. In spite of his

conception of justice as utility, he, nevertheless, is of the opinion that this justice grounded

in utility is the binding part of all morality. Mill goes on to argue in his work On Liberty

that justice enhances political freedom. No one has the right to infringe on the liberty of

another. Mill advocates morality in politics because he notes correctly that human nature

tends towards egoism. Both the ruler and the ruled can become tyrannical. Even democracy

can become tyranny of the majority through the act of the public authorities. 32 Hence, he

trenchantly forbids the individual and state from interfering with a person’s liberty.

However, Mill, in his harm principle asserts that restriction on a person’s liberty can be

justified on the principle of harm to others. Besides, he argues: There is a limit to the

legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that

limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of

human affairs as protection against political despotism.33 Rawls seems to agree with Mill,

24

that an injustice to an individual liberty is justified if and only if a further higher injustice to

the common good will be avoided.

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) in his celebrated work, What is Property?

develops a libertarian socialism to address political exploitation. For Proudhon, property

simply means theft or robbery. He advocates an active morality in the political life of the

state for the realization of equality of rights for all citizens and the reign of law. In this

work, Proudhon does not call for the radical abolition of private property per se. Rather; he

seeks the participation of everyone in the control of the means of production for the sake of

fairness. 34 For him conscienceless capitalism and communism erect their political structure

as a way of controlling people. This destroys equality. He rejects all forms of coercive

government and shows great concern for the well-being of the individual as a member of a

state marked by social and political inequality. This equality is what Rawls projects in his

political morality.

Karl Marx (1818-1883) criticized Proudhon for espousing a reactionary or

libertarian socialism. Marx’s grounding of Hegelian dialectics in his historical materialism

yields fruit in the revolutionary political document, The Communist Manifesto. The work

denounces in the most stringent terms the moral decadence of the capitalist political

system. For Marx, a revolution is necessary to replace capitalist democracy with a

government run by workers.35 The highly utopian ideals of Marx seek real equality of

people in the state and the internalization of solidarity. The moral code of Marxist

socialism is “from each according to his ability and to each according to his need”. Given

the idealist conception of morality and the political organization of the state, it is not

surprising that Marx envisages a future classless society, in which there is in fact no

centralized government and whose members live for the well-being of one another.

Defending communism, Marx insists that “communism deprives no man the power to

appropriate the products of society, all that it does is to deprive him of the power to

subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriation.”36 Indeed, Marx considers

communism as the true democracy in view of its high ethical ideals of absolute justice and

the absence of the state, which are guarantees for true liberty. In his Economic and

Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx brilliantly outlines his ethical vision regarding

communism as

25

the positive transcendence of private property or human estrangement, the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man. The complete return of man to himself as a social being … genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature, and between man and man… between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species.37

In other words, man by nature appreciates himself as a social being in communion with

others by sharing their properties as free beings in existence. Political morality for Marx

will be the proletariat or working class’ political force that will destroy capitalism and

effect the transition to socialism.38 Rawls agrees with Marx on the grounds that capitalism

be destroyed and an equal social benefit common to all be enthroned.

Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) in his work Totality and Infinity considers ethics

the first order of philosophy and the dominant factor in the political organization of the

state as expressed in the relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ within the social

framework of institutions. Levinas advocates ethical responsibility on the part of the

individual. His ethical humanism translates into social justice in the political sphere. Social

justice translates into equality for all, that is, the ‘I’ the ‘other’ and the ‘third’ party. 39 It is

this kind of equality that Rawls is concerned about in his political morality; where social

justice will be to the benefit of the least advantaged in the society.

26

Endnotes

1. Pamela M. Huby Greek Ethics (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1967),9.

2. Huby, 7.

3. Huby, 12.

4. Alasdair M. Intyre, , A Short History of Ethics (London: Routlege & Kegan Paul

Ltd, 1967), 16.

5. Plato, Republic, trans., Benjamin Joweft (New York: Vintage, Books, 1991)

Book iv, 204.

6. Plato, Book VIII, 308-342.

7. Nwoko Matthew I.Medieval Basic World Political Theories, ed., Njoku F.O.C.

(Owerri: Claretian Institute of Philosophy, 1988), 27.

8. Epicurus, Ad Menoe, quoted by Dario Composta, History of Ancient Philosophy

(Bangalore: Theological Publications in India, 1990), 319.

9. St. Augustine, City of God, trans., Henry Bettenson with an introduction by Evans

G. R. (London: Penguin Classics,1984) Book, xix, ch.13, 870.

10. St. Augustine, 882.

11. Battista Mondin, A History of Mediaeval Philosophy ( Bangalore: Theological

Publications in India, 1991), 353.

12. Curtis M. ed., The Great Political Theories Vol. 1 (New York: Avon Books,

1980), 136-137.

13. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, (London: Penguin Books , 1961), 12

14. Nwoko I,Basic World Political Theory, 67.

15. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950), 20.

16. Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, quoted by Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 1926) , 208-209.

17. Baruch Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, quoted by Will Durant The Story of

Philosophy, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1926), 209.

18. Nwoko,Basic World Political Theories, 89.

19. Nwoko, 84.

20. Nwoko, 110.

27

21. Lowell Bair trans., The Essentials of Rousseau (New York: Mentor Books, 1974),

71.

22. Nwoko, Basic World Political Theories, 125.

23. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Moral. In Hans Reiss Kant’s Political

Writings, translated by H. B. Nisbet(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1970), 133.

24. Eboh Ben Okwu, Living Issues in Ethics, (Nsukka: Afro-Orbis Publishing Co.

Ltd, 2005), 70.

25. mhtml:file//c:/users/Mike Anyaehie/Documents/Jeremy Bentham at Internet

Encyclopedia of philosophy (accessed Jun. 04 2008)

26. Online Jeremy Bentham (accessed Jun 04 2008).

27. Joseph, Omoregbe A Simplified History of Western Philosophy, vol.2 (Lagos: Joja

Educational Research and Publishers Ltd, 1991), 136.

28. Omoregbe, 136.

29. Omoregbe, 138

30. Omoregbe, 141

31. Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1994), 29.

32. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. In Great Books of the Western World, Hutchins R.

M, (ed) (London: Benton W. and Co, 1952), Vol. 43, 267.

33. Francis O. C. Njoku, Philosophy in Politics, Law and Democracy (Owerri:

Claretian Institute of Philosophy, 2002), 140.

34. Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 297.

35. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, with an introduction

by Taylor A. J. P. (Penguin Books, 1980), 82.

36. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, trans., Samuel

M.(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 100.

37. Nwoko, Basic World Theories, 184.

38. Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 46.

39. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,

1995), 213.

28

CHAPTER THREE

TOWARDS THE FOUNDATION OF RAWLS’ POLITICAL MORALITY:

EARLY RAWLS.

3.1 Preamble

This Chapter focuses mainly on John Rawls’ master work- A Theory of Justice. It

shall attempt to underline the constitutive elements that would, for Rawls, serve as a

founding ground for a just society.

3.2 Life and Works

John Rawls (1921), a professor of Philosophy, was born in Baltimore, Maryland, to

William Lee and Ann Abele Stump Rawls. His contributions to political philosophy,

especially on the subject matter of Justice, continue to evoke attention by various

contemporary philosophers. Having completed service in the military in January 1946,

Rawls became a university lecturer where he did excellently well leading to a series of

meritorious awards. For instance, in 1999, Rawls was awarded a national Humanities

Medal by President Bill Clinton. In the same year, an award of Rolf Schock prize in

Logic and Philosophy was given him. He received honorary degrees from Oxford,

Princeton and Harvard Universities, which were the Universities to which he felt a

special attachment. A quiet, witty and modest man, Rawls conscientiously avoided a

celebrity status.

Rawls’ lifelong interest in Justice (Morality) arose as a result of his early concern with

the basically religious question: Why is there evil in the world and is human existence

redeemable in spite of it? This was actually what led him to inquire whether a just society

is realistically possible. As such, his life work is directed towards discovering what

justice requires of us, and showing that it is within human capacities to realize a just

society. Rawls has the following works to his credit: A Theory of Justice, Political

Liberalism, The Law of Peoples, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, Lectures

on the History of Political Philosophy etc, all these works of his centre on the question of

Justice. Rawls suffered a series of strokes and finally died on 22 November, 2002 at

home in Lexington, Massachusetts.

29

3.3 Initial Mutual Disinterestedness in Founding Justice

Rawls basically argues that the principles of justice would be chosen by rational

representatives of free and equal persons in an impartial initial situation; there the parties

know general facts about human nature and social institutions but have no knowledge of

particular facts about themselves or their society and its history.1 The impartial initial

situation is what he calls the ‘original position’. This original position of mutual

disinterestedness subject under the veil of ignorance leads to the two principles of justice

which Rawls describes thus:

First: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) Reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.2

From the foregoing, one notices that these principles would, for Rawls, constitute a moral

guide applicable to the basic structure of society. “They are to govern the assignment of

rights and duties and economic advantages”.3 No doubt, for Rawls, these principles

agreed to should be fair and “his idea is that the fairness of the original position transfers

to the principles agreed within it. To this end, Samuel Freeman observes:

The original position develops the basic idea underlying the liberal and democratic social contract traditions stemming from Locke, Rousseau and Kant – namely that just laws, constitutions, or principles are those that could or would be agreed to among free persons from a position of equal right.4

It is against this backdrop that Rawls begins to form his political morality built on the

principle of justice as fairness that “the general conception of justice imposes no

restrictions on what sort of inequalities are permissible; it only requires that everyone’s

position be improved”5. Having made this point, let us go to the next.

3.4 The Equality of the Human Person and the Principle of Justice as Fairness

Rawls’ central concern in the social arrangement in the basic structure of the

society is the human person namely, that persons should have equal rights and fair

30

opportunities. This argument stems from the belief that “each person possesses an

inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot

override”.6 This goes to show how important the human person is in the scheme of affairs

of Rawls’ political morality, to the extent that the rights secured by justice are not subject

to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. In trying to promote the

equality of the human person, the principle of justice as fairness must be taken into

cognizance; Rawls reminds us thus:

It must not be forgotten that the principle of fairness has two parts, one which states how we acquire obligations, namely, by doing various things voluntary, and another which lays down the condition that the institution in question be just if not perfectly just, at least as just as it is reasonable to expect under the circumstances.7

From the understanding of the above quotation, one notices that Rawls admits the fact

that there can be no perfectly just society. However, the question is at what instance can

inequality be tolerated? To this end, Rawls says, “an injustice is tolerable only when it is

necessary to avoid an even greater injustice.”8

Justice in Rawls would, therefore, mean “a proper balance between competing

claims from a conception of justice as a set of related principles for identifying the

relevant considerations which determine this balance.”9 In this sense, Rawls characterizes

justice as but one part of a social ideal that has distributive principles for the basic

structure of society. Rawls concurring to the more specific sense that Aristotle gives to

justice, and from which the most familiar formulations derive, he asserts:

Is that of refraining from pleonexia, that is, from gaining some advantage for oneself by seizing what belongs to another, his property, his reward, his office, and the like, or by denying a person that which is due to him, the fulfillment of a promise, the repayment of a debt, the showing of proper respect, and so on 10

What Rawls means is that, justice applies to actions, and persons are thought to be just

insofar as they have, as one of the permanent elements of their character, a steady and

effective desire to act justly.

31

3.5 The Idea of a well-ordered Society

As regards the sense of justice in society, Rawls says “a well ordered society is

designed to advance the good of its members as regulated by public conception of justice.

This is a society that every one accepts and knows that the others accept the same

principles of justice and the basic social institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy these

principles.”11 These principles seem to agree with Karl Marx’s idea of the society. For

him, “the well ordered society or the best society possible will be that which the

liberation of man from the exploitation, alienation and slavery to which the capitalist

system has condemned him”12

We must note here that the concept of justice is of paramount importance in

Rawls’ idea of a well-ordered society. He affirms that conceptions of justice must be

justified by the conditions of our life as we know it or not at all.13 This is so “since

principles are consented to in the light of true general beliefs about men and their place in

society, the conception of justice adopted is acceptable on the basis of these facts.14

Amidst the complexity of political, economic and social institutions, a well

ordered society is stable. However, Rawls noticed that “the stability of a conception of

justice does not imply that institutions and practices of the well ordered society do not

alter.”15 In actual fact, such a society will presumably contain great diversity and adopt

different arrangement from time to time. With regard to this, what then is the idea of

stability in this kind of society? For Rawls, in this context, stability means that however

institutions are changed, they still remain just or approximately so; these adjustments

being called for by new social circumstance.16 Mill, before Rawls, has written on the idea

of a well ordered society as follows:

The arrangements of a just society are so suited to us that anything which is obviously necessary for it is accepted much like a physical necessity. Indispensable condition of such a society is that all shall have consideration for others on the basis of mutually acceptable principles of reciprocity.17

32

Rawls then concurs to Mill’s idea of a just society. Having had an idea how a well

ordered society should be, we shall now see when and where civil disobedience in the

society can be justified in Rawls.

3.6 Civil Disobedience as a Justifiable Moral Action

In a well ordered society, where there seems to exist relative peace, equality, fair

opportunities and the rights of the individual are respected, are there grounds that are at

once necessary and sufficient to disobey the principles of justice already agreed upon?

Are there laws that are difficult to obey? If there are, what happens? For Rawls,

disobedience of the law is justified if and only if it would bring about justice to the

majority of the community. Thus, Rawls asserts:

It is a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government. By acting in this way one addresses the sense of justice of the majority of the community and declares that in one’s considered opinion the principles of social cooperation among free and equal men are not being respected.18

In justifying civil disobedience, one does not appeal to principles of personal morality or

to religious doctrines, although these may coincide with and support one’s claims; and it

goes without saying that civil disobedience cannot be grounded solely on group or self-

interest. Instead, one invokes the commonly shared conception of justice that underlies

the political order.19 In this range of possibilities, it stands for that form of dissent at the

boundary of fidelity to law. Civil disobedience, so understood, is clearly distinct from

militant action and obstruction; it is far removed from organized forcible resistance.20 In

sum, Rawls gives the following conditions for the justification of civil disobedience:

First: The violation of the principle of liberty is, then, the more appropriate object of civil disobedience. Second: We may suppose that the normal appeals to the political majority have already been made in good faith and that they have failed. Third: Two minorities are similarly justified in resorting to civil disobedience if they have suffered for the same length of time from the same degree of injustice and if their equally sincere and normal political appeals have likewise been to no avail.21

33

From the foregoing discussion, civil disobedience can only be justified if all these

conditions have been met. Since civil disobedience is a last resort, we should be sure that

it is necessary.22 Rawls further explicates that by engaging in civil disobedience one

intends, then, to address the sense of justice of the majority and to serve fair notice that in

one’s sincere and considered opinion the conditions of free cooperation are being

violated. We are appealing to others to reconsider, to put themselves in our position and

to recognize that they cannot expect us to acquiesce indefinitely in the terms they impose

upon us.23

The question, therefore, arises; who is to be blamed in the case of civil

disobedience? To this end, Rawls argues that “there is no danger of anarchy so long as

there is a sufficient working agreement in citizen’s conceptions of justice and the

conditions for resorting to civil disobedience are respected”.24 To further answer the

question as regards who to be blamed, Rawls asserts: “Yet if justified civil disobedience

seems to threaten civil concord, the responsibility falls not upon those who protest but

upon those whose abuse of authority and power justifies such opposition”.25 Having said

that civil disobedience is a justifiable moral act, we shall now see whether this act has

any good impact on the lives of the citizens. Hence, Kekes observes that “pluralists

believe that living a good life must be essentially concerned with coping with these

conflicts, but doing so is formidably difficult because the conflicts are often caused by

the incommensurability and incompatibility of values whose realization is regarded as

essential by particular conceptions of a good life.”26

3.7 Primary Goods as Citizens’ Needs

Kekes in trying to delineate the term values, says: “Values in general are

understood as benefits whose possession would make a life better than it would be

without them and whose lack would make a life worse than it would otherwise be”.27

Sometimes, we get distorted and we may regard something as a value and be mistaken

because having it would not improve our lives, nor would its lack affect us adversely. In

this regard, the essential point about values is that they are connected with benefits and

harms as well as the nature of their connections. Furthermore, the idea behind primary

values is that human nature dictates that some things will normally benefit all human

beings and, similarly, that some things will normally harm every one.28 It is from this

34

stand point that “we have referred to these universally human benefits and harms as

primary goods” and “primary evils.”29 Rawls’ concern is the primary good. What Rawls

regards as the most important primary value or good is self-respect and a sure confidence

in the sense of one’s own worth. According to him, they are things which it is supposed a

rational man essentially needs.30

Explaining the list of these primary goods and how they are weighed, Rawls says

these goods are fundamental basic rights and liberties, and one does not need to balance

these liberties and rights against other ones. However, he notices that the primary social

goods that vary in their distribution are the powers and prerogatives of authority, and

income and wealth. Yet this difficulty of inequality in certain goods is taken care of by

Rawls in the difference principle which permits the position of the best off contributing to

that of the worst off. Inequality in the distribution of primary goods is accepted if it

enhances “the situation of the least advantaged members of the society, for the good is

the satisfaction of rational desire.”31

Njoku, writing on Finnis enumerates seven basic human goods or values which

are not arrived at through the exercise of reason on facts but are self-evident to anyone of

the age of reason. These values in his words are:

Life……. The first basic value; knowledge….. a preference for true over false beliefs; Play…… performance for the sake of it; aesthetic experience….. the appreciation of beauty; sociability (friendship)……acting for the sake of one’s friends’ purpose or well-being; practical reasonableness ….. the use of one’s intelligence to choose actions, life-style, character etc. and religion…… the ability to reflect on the origins of the cosmic order and human freedom and reason.32

It is evident from the aforementioned that other purposes of human good are tied to these

as well. Rawls agrees with Finnis’ argument which states:

Since human good is as multiple as human nature is complex, the specifications will so direct choice and action that each of the primary, basic aspects of human flourishing (basic human goods) will be respected and promoted to the

35

extent required by the good of practical reasonableness. What does that good require? That each of the basic human goods be treated as what it truly is: a basic human reason for action whose integral directiveness is not to be cut down or deflected by subrational passions. The principle of love of neighbor-as-self, and its specification in the Golden Rule, immediately capture one element in that integral directiveness: the basic goods are good for any human being, and I must have a reason for preferring their instantiation in my own or my friends’ existence.33

Rawls’ agreement to this view stems from the fact that “something is good only if it fits

into ways of life consistent with the principle of right already on hand.”34 A close look at

what Finnis said above, especially from the first six lines, concurs with the response of

Rawls to the objections raised about the impossibility of any good on choice made in the

original position because of limited knowledge it requires. According to Rawls, “the

rationality of a person’s choice does not depend upon how much he knows, but only upon

how well he reasons from whatever information he has however incomplete.”35 Once it is

established that an object has the properties that it is rational for someone with a rational

plan of life to want, then it has shown that it is good for him. Rawls agrees also with

Finnis that “if certain sorts of things satisfy this condition for persons generally, then

these things are human goods.”36

In a broad category, Rawls brings in the idea of primary social goods to include

rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth.37 From this standpoint,

one can deduce that primary goods are things that men generally need in order to achieve

their ends whatever they are. Moreso, other primary goods such as health and vigour,

intelligence and imagination are natural goods; although their possession is influenced by

the basic structure, they are not so directly under its control.38 What Rawls is saying is

that every person has certain values as his plan in life and the fulfillment of such a plan is

a primary good that gives the citizen happiness. Everyone is assured an equal liberty to

pursue whatever plan of life he pleases as long as it does not violate what justice

demands. Rawls believes that men share in primary goods on the principle that some can

have more if they are acquired in ways which improve the situation of those who have

less. 39In this regard, as people pursue various plans in life, they should not do that to the

detriment of others.

36

3.8 Constitutional Democracy and the Principle of Participation

Rawls’ celebrated conception of political democracy develops within the social

contract tradition. As outlined in his A Theory of Justice, he was bringing to fruition the

social contract theory of J-J.,Rousseau,J.Locke, and I. Kant. Rawls sets out as one of his

primary aims to provide a conception of justice that constitutes the most appropriate

moral basis for a democratic society. In a democratic society, people regard themselves

as free and equal. It is against this backdrop that Rawls works out a conception of justice

that mandates a democratic constitution and government and an egalitarian account of

social and economic institutions. The form of democracy he embarks on is that of a

“constitutional democracy,” which is different from a purely majoritarian democracy. A

majoritarian democracy is that which there are no constitutional restrictions upon the will

of a majority and no judicial review of legislation.40 Rawls does not support majoritarian

democracy as a result of lack of restrictive laws. This implies that there is no offense

without a law’ (Nulla crimen sine lege).41 In this kind of society, the rights and liberties

of the minorities may not be respected. In contrast then, Rawls upholds constitutional

democracy as against majoritarian democracy. In his words, “a constitutional democracy,

by contrast, requires a democratic government with restricted majority rule: legislative

majorities are enjoined from laws that infringe constitutional essentials and basic

justice”.42 By implication, Rawls is saying we must take into account that a constitutional

democracy can be arranged so as to satisfy the principle of participation. What

participation implies, therefore, is that all citizens are to have an equal access, at least in

the formal sense, to public office. On this view, the chief merit of the principle of

participation is to insure that the government respects the rights and welfares of the

governed. In the words of Rawls, “constitutional arrangements compel a majority to

delay putting its will into effect and force it to make a more considered and deliberate

decision.”43 In effect, Rawls endorses a government that recognizes the rule of law. A

legal system, Rawls believes, is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational

persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the framework for

social cooperation. When these rules are just in a constitutional democracy, they establish

a basis for legitimate expectations. No doubt, they constitute grounds upon which persons

can rely on one another and rightly object when their expectations are not fulfilled. No

37

one can doubt the fact that no institution is perfect. It is to this end that Rawls believes

that “it is reasonable to assume that even in a well ordered society the coercive powers of

government are to some degree necessary for the stability of social cooperation.”44 By

implication, by enforcing a public system of penalties, government removes the grounds

for thinking that others are not complying with the rules of respect for persons and

political rights. These rules are not needed to be imposed but rather should serve as

security to one another in participating in democratic life. It is very clear in Rawls’

thought that without the conception of loyal opposition, and an attachment to

constitutional rules which express and protect it, the politics of democracy cannot be

properly conducted or long endure. In a like manner, he is not unaware too that the

liberties protected by the principle of participation lose much of their value whenever

those who have greater private means are permitted to use their advantages to control the

course of public debate. This is why Rawls believes that “historically one of the main

defects of constitutional government has been the failure to insure the fair value of

political liberty”.45 Bothered with these lacks of corrective steps to curb the problems that

are there in politics, Rawls asserts:

Disparities in the distribution of property and wealth that far exceed what is compatible with political equality have generally been tolerated by the legal system. Public resources have not been devoted to maintaining the institutions required for the fair value of political liberty. Essentially the fault lies in the fact that the democratic political process is at best regulated rivalry; it does not even in theory have the desirable properties that price theory ascribes to truly competitive markets. Moreover, the effects of injustices in the political system are much more grave and long lasting than market imperfections. Political power rapidly accumulates and becomes unequal; and making use of the coercive apparatus of the state and its law, those who gain the advantage can often assure themselves of a favoured position. These inequities in the economic and social system may soon undermine whatever political equality might have existed under fortunate historical conditions46.

In other words, Rawls believes that constitution is the foundation of social structure, the

highest order system of rules that regulates and controls institutions of social participation

38

and cooperation. However, it has to be borne in mind that not all are to take an active part

in political affairs. Constitutional democracy is, for Rawls, the overall balance of justice.

3.9 Rawls on the Priority of Liberty in his Political Morality

What Rawls considers very essential in his political theory is liberty. Liberty

constitutes the first principle, which assigns to each person an equal right to the most

extensive total system of liberty for all. Liberties, for Rawls, include those of liberty of

conscience and freedom of thought, liberty of the person and equal political rights. Rawls

believes that the political system which, for him, is constitutional democracy would not

be a just procedure if it does not embody these liberties. It is clear in Rawls’ explanation

that each of these liberties is important. The liberty of conscience and freedom of thought

assigns to the parties the right to choose principles that secure the integrity of their

religious and moral freedom; the liberty of the person characterizes the parties self-

respect as being free from harassment, movement, freedom of speech and the like;

political liberty gives the parties the right to vote and to be voted for and the right to

social cooperation that arises through public debate concerning constitutional democracy.

Commenting on the worth of these liberties as a whole Rawls says:

First of all, it is important to recognize that the basic liberties must be assessed as a whole, as one system. That is, the worth of one liberty normally depends upon the specification of the other liberties, and this must be taken into account in framing a constitution and in legislation generally. 47

Thus, persons are at liberty to do something when they are free from certain constraints

either to do it or not to do it and when their doing it or not doing it is protected from

interference by other persons. This defines what liberty is and the priority it deserves. The

priority Rawls gives to liberty is uncompared to anything apart from liberty itself. In his

words: “Greater economic and social benefits are not a sufficient reason for accepting

less than an equal liberty only if there is a threat of coercion which it is unwise to resist

from the standpoint of liberty itself”.48 This goes to say that liberty can only be limited by

reference to the common interest in public order and security by the government only in

accordance with a chosen principle in the original position, for justice is infringed

whenever equal liberty is denied without sufficient reason. Rawls is very emphatic that

39

“the liberties of some are not suppressed simply to make possible a greater liberty for

others”49. On the contrary, for example,

suppose that city-states that previously have not taken prisoners of war but have always put captives to death, agree by treaty to hold prisoners as slaves instead. Although we cannot allow the institution of slavery on the grounds that the greater gains of some outweigh the losses to others, it may be that under these conditions, since all run the risk of capture in war, this form of slavery is less unjust than present custom.50

In cases like these, Rawls agrees that even paternalistic intervention must be justified in

guiding protection against our own irrationality to license assaults on one’s integrity. In

line with Rawls, H.L.A. Hart “allows a partial paternalism on the basis of harm to

others.”51 Hart makes this very clear when he asserts:

If, for example, it could be shown that unrestricted freedom of movement over land would tend to reduce everyone’s food supply, whereas no bad consequences likely to affect everyone would result from the other alternative, then the conflict should be resolved in favour of restriction of movement.52

This has to be borne in mind that the interpretative example Hart offers bears much on

Rawls priority rule. Hart generally is more critical and interpretative of Rawls. This shall

be discussed in detail in another section of this work. Meanwhile, Rawls reformulates the

first principle of justice and conjoins to it the appropriate priority rule ranking it in a

lexical order in two cases saying firstly that a less extensive liberty must strengthen the

total system of liberty shared by all, and secondly, a less than equal liberty must be

acceptable to those citizens with the lesser liberty. In the final analysis, the priority of

liberty that best protects the self-respect and integrity of the human person should be

preferred over certain social goods or advantages.

3.10 The Implausibility of Rawls’ Early Work and the Need for his Political

Liberalism

The heart of Rawls’ Philosophy is the idea of the bargaining game, by means of which

the sterility of Kant’s formal reasoning was to be overcome, and a principle was to be

established that would combine the strengths and avoid the weaknesses of utilitarianism

40

and intuitionism. This idea of his was original, powerful and elegant, but it has opened to

crushing objections. The device of the veil of ignorance is ultimately fatal. It does not

stand the test of time in the modern democratic society that has varying and even

conflicting views on religion, morality, political conceptions and the like.Early Rawls did

not strive for absolute universality, for a contemplation of the foundations of social

philosophy, but it abstracted from all that is characteristically modern. Failure to take

care of transgenerational stability expected in the pluralistic society that is highly

diversified, Rawls implores the idea of overlapping consensus in his later work, Political

Liberalism. In overlapping consensus, the veil is removed and people see clearly and

agree on general things that benefit them, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Summarily, this Chapter has so far discussed the core idea of Rawls’ theory of

justice. Individuals willing to advance their good come to agree on certain workable

principles at the initial position, see themselves as equals; they also operate on principles

of fairness in a well ordered society. Persons can nonviolently protest when they observe

that the two principles that are supposed to erect justice are not met, bearing in mind that

this can make the government create a change in the law for the good of all.

41

ENDNOTES

1. Samuel Freeman, Rawls (London Routledge, 2007), 141.

2. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 60.

3. Rawls, 61.

4. Freeman, Rawls, 142.

5. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 62.

6. Rawls, 3.

7. Rawls, 343.

8. Rawls, 4.

9. Rawls, 10

10. Rawls, 10

11. Rawls, 453 – 454.

12. Joseph Omeregbe, A simplified History of Western Philosophy vol. 2. (Lagos: Joja

Educational Research & Publishers Ltd, 1991), 148.

13. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 454.

14. Rawls, 454.

15. Rawls, 457.

16. Rawls, 458.

17. Rawls, 460.

18. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 364.

19. Rawls,365.

20. Rawls, 367.

21. Rawls, 373 – 374.

22. Rawls, 373.

23. Rawls, 382 – 383.

24. Rawls, 390.

25. Rawls, 391.

26. John Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,

1993). 21.

27. Kekes, 38.

28. Kekes, 38.

42

29. Kekes, 38.

30. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 92.

31. Rawls, 93.

32. Francis O.C. Njoku, Studies In Jurisprudence: A Fundamental Approach to the

Philosophy of Law, Second Edition (Owerri: Claretian Institute of Philosophy,

20007), 106.

33. Njoku, 111.

34. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 396.

35. Rawls, 397.

36. Rawls, 399.

37. Rawls, 92.

38. Rawls, 62.

39. Rawls, 94.

40. Freeman, Rawls, 213.

41. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 238.

42. Freeman, Rawls, 213.

43. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 229.

44. Rawls, 240.

45. Rawls, 226

46. Rawls, 226.

47. Rawls, 203.

48. Rawls, 207.

49. Rawls, 220.

50. Rawls, 248.

51. Francis O.C. Njoku, Philosophy in Politics, Law and Democracy (Owerri:

Claretian Institute of Philosophy, 2002), 154.

52. Hart H.L.A., Essays In Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Claredon Press,

1983), 238.

43

CHAPTER FOUR

RAWLS’ POLITICAL MORALITY: LATER RAWLS.

4.1 Preamble

In this Chapter, attention will be focused on the core ideas in Rawls’ Political

Liberalism. Having received intellectual attacks on his earlier work, A Theory of Justice,

as falling short of the moral demands in enhancing political stability in modern

democratic pluralistic societies, Rawls feels a need to adjust his theory of justice to suit

this age. However, in actual fact, doubts still remain whether he succeeded at all.

4.2 Political Liberalism and the Problem of Political Stability

Rawls’ aim in Political Liberalism is to uncover the conditions of the possibility

of a reasonable public basis of justification on fundamental political questions. The

prominent question he sets to address in modern democratic regime is that of stability.

However, he notices that the modern democratic society, due to pluralism of ideas with

regard to religion, moral doctrines and political conceptions, may not be homogenous,

and share in one comprehensive doctrine. To this end, he argues: “For political purposes

a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of

the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a

constitutional democratic regime.”1The point Rawls is making here is that the problem of

diversity and cultural conflicts are unavoidable in a pluralistic society; but the question is:

how are they going to be contained so that they do not undermine the unity, stability and

justice of society? This is the kind of transgenerational stability he intends to provide in

Political Liberalism. With this problem, he questions: “How is it possible that there may

exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by

reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines”?2

Rawls affirms of the fact that there exists this pluralism of ideas in modern

societies, but his focal concern is how people can agree on workable principles of justice

that will regulate their moral lives in this diversified society. Samuel Freeman is of the

opinion that “there will be reasonable citizens in a well-ordered society of justice as

fairness who can endorse the principles of justice and the institutions they authorize, but

yet, because of their religious views, cannot accept its public justification”3. However, an

44

important point that Rawls notices about pluralism is that to see reasonable pluralism as a

disaster is to see the exercise of reason under the conditions of freedom itself as a

disaster.4 For this reason, social unity and concord require agreement on a general and

comprehensive religious, philosophical or moral doctrine. However, this does not mean

that a single comprehensive doctrine has to be imposed on the citizens; for this will lead

to a state of instability, injustice and oppression. As regards the issue of stability, Rawls

points out two questions that are involved:

The first is whether people who grow up under just institution acquire a normally sufficient sense of justice so that they generally comply with these institutions, the second question is whether in view of the general facts that characterize a democracy’s public political culture, and in particular the fact of reasonable pluralism, the political conception can be the focus of an overlapping consensus 5

By implication, people that grow under just institutions acquire sense of justice and are

likely to act justly within a given democratic society. In answering the first question

above, Rawls says it has to do with moral psychology that enables the citizens in a well –

ordered society to acquire a sufficient sense of justice that enhances compliance with its

just arrangements. Answer to the latter is seen in the concept of overlapping consensus

and in handling the difficulties that go with such idea. In addition, stability generally

refers to the ability or motivations for citizens to abide by the dictates of the conception

of justice that regulates the basic structure of the society. How then can the problem of

stability be solved? Rawls states:

The problem of stability is not that of bringing others who reject a conception to share it, or to act in accordance with it, by workable sanctions, if necessary, as if the task were to find ways to impose that conception once we are convinced it is sound. Rather, justice as fairness is not reasonable in the first place unless in a suitable way it can win its support by addressing each citizen’s reason, as explained within its own framework.6

Attention will be focused on the idea of overlapping consensus which deals with this

issue in the democratic society.

45

4.3 Pluralism and Overlapping Consensus

Having discussed earlier conflict and strife as characterizing the pluralistic

society, Rawls introduces the idea of toleration as a reasonable consensus by reasonable

persons. He looks at “reasonable persons” as those “who want to cooperate with other

reasonable persons on terms acceptable to them”.7 It may seem that toleration of others’

ways of life required by the basic liberties is built into this definition. However, the main

concern here is how the idea of overlapping consensus is arrived at in solving the

problem of stability in a pluralistic democratic society. In this regard, Rawls asks:

What political conception of justice can provide the common basis of principles and ideals to guide public political discussion on which citizens affirming conflicting religious and nonreligious yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines can agree?8

How Rawls answers this question is by the use of the idea of overlapping consensus.

However, an overlapping consensus is not merely a consensus on accepting certain

authorities, or on complying with certain institutional arrangements, founded on a

convergence of self or group interests. Rawls, therefore, adds all those who affirm the

political conception start from within their own comprehensive view and draw on the

religious philosophical and moral grounds it provides.9 This, in effect, is the primary role

of the idea of overlapping consensus, namely, to solve the stability problem. Of

significant importance to the idea of overlapping consensus is the freedom of conscience

which Rawls uses two arguments to buttress. Religious beliefs are seen as subject to

revision in accordance with deliberating reason in the first argument. He continues that

there is freedom of conscience because there has been no guarantee that this present way

of life is the most rational and needs no minor or major revision. To this end, Kymlicka

opines: “This is the familiar liberal argument for basic liberties, rooted in the idea of

rational reversibility, which says that religious liberty is needed for us to rationally

evaluate and potentially revise our conceptions of faith.”10 Viewing this first argument

this way, one affirms the political conception because its religious doctrine and account

of free faith leads to a principle of toleration and underwrites the fundamental liberties of

a constitutional regime. This leads us to the second argument. This second argument

receives a plausible acceptance by Kymlicka thus: “Since we are all embedded in a

46

variety of different and competing religious groups, we need to accept a principle of

religious liberty in the form of freedom of conscience.”11 What Kymlicka has said seems

to agree with how John Rawls wishes to draw an outline which pluralism will converge

using public reason and common principles of justice. Commenting on public reason,

Charles Larmore says that it envelopes all the different elements that make up the ideal

of a constitutional democracy, for it governs “the political relation” in which we ought to

stand to one another as citizens.12 Rawls uses the difference principle as an example in

support of overlapping consensus. According to him, the difference principle can be

supported by different comprehensive doctrines. For instance, the Christian Gospel

account of the Good Samaritan and Kant’s Zakat (giving alms) support the difference

principle. Not only that, Rawls gives another example of overlapping consensus which is

all about the issue of democracy and non- discrimination. 13 Even though Rawls affirms

social concord built on overlapping consensus as being stable, modus vivendi objects to

this notion: “Modus vivendi”

characterizes a treaty between two states whose national aims and interests put them at odds. In negotiating a treaty each state would be wise and prudent to make sure that the agreement proposed represents an equilibrium point: that is, that the terms and conditions of the treaty are drawn up in such a way that it is public knowledge that it is not advantageous for either state to violate it. 14

What Rawls implies here is that such an arrangement aims only at protecting a selfish

interest. In his words, “both states are ready to pursue their goals at the expense of the

other and should conditions change they may do so.”15 From the foregoing, the kind of

political morality Rawls talks about is that which “each view supports the political

conception for its own sake, or on its own merits.”16 In contrast, “modus vivendi” is

viewed by Rawls as “a social order supported only by a necessary contingent equilibrium

of power between comprehensive doctrines.”17 Therefore, “the sense of justice that

should cause the citizens to honour the political conception of justice is not to be

understood as steming from prudential considerations, but rather from moral ones.” 18

This is because the sense of justice that is based on “modus vivendi” would go contrary

to the requirement that a liberal conception of justice must comply with. This requirement

Rawls refers to it as the “liberal principle of legitimacy.”19

47

It is very evident in what Rawls is implying, namely: that overlapping consensus

and “modus vivendi” are two opposing moral values. However, Rawls supports the

former to the neglect of the latter. In overlapping consensus, there have been workable

principles agreed upon that are supported by tolerance which in effect promotes trans-

generational stability. Whereas, in modus vivendi, the consensus arrived at remains only

so long as one group does not become more powerful than the other group. In “modus

vivendi”, the most powerful group can impose certain values on the weaker group, but on

the other hand, overlapping consensus holds that “reasonable people do not coerce others

to adopt their value system when they recognize others can reasonably disagree.”20

In the final analysis, establishing an overlapping consensus as required by the

political conception of justice is the main condition for enthroning the type of political

stability Rawls craves for in a liberal democracy. It is overlapping consensus that

enhances social concord among the different comprehensive doctrines held by free and

equal citizens involved in a system of fair cooperation. Summarily, one can conclude that

overlapping consensus can guarantee a stable society despite the inherent pluralism of

comprehensive doctrines if it focuses on political conception of justice.

4.4 Rawls’ Political Conception of Justice

The idea of the political conception of justice forms an essential part in the

amalgamation of various doctrines of a people in modern democratic setting. To this end,

Rawls asserts: “Political conception is a module, an essential constituent part that in

different ways fits into and can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive

doctrines that endure in the society regulated by it.”21 From this standpoint, the political

conception of justice can then serve as the focus of an overlapping consensus. 22 It has, as

observed by Rawls, three characteristic features, and each of which is exemplified by

justice as fairness.

The first of these features is that which focuses attention on the subject of a

political conception which, according to Rawls, should qualify as a moral conception. He

writes thus: “It is a moral conception worked out for a specific kind of subject, namely,

for political, social and economic institutions. In particular, it applies to what I shall call

the “basic structure.”23 To the extent that Rawls itemizes aspects of life that the political

conception will cover, it is clear therefore that it does not have to embrace the whole of

48

human life. However, members of the society who realize its ideals fit together into one

unified system of social cooperation in order to advance their good. This basic structure

for Rawls is the first subject of justice, this is very clear in his words as he says: “An

essential feature of the contractarian conception of justice is that the basic structure of

society is the first subject of justice.” 24 Moreover, Rawls bases his basic structure

argument on the assumption that it is a closed society, that is to say, it is regarded as self-

contained and as having no relations with other societies. Members enter into this society

only by birth and leave only by death. This, therefore, qualifies as Rawls observes

members to lead a complete life in that society they were born into. Another fact

observed by Rawls is that political conception of justice must attend to the just relations

between people in a particular society where they live. The second feature of political

conception of justice as outlined by Rawls is that which concerns the mode of

presentation. In his words: “A political conception of justice is presented as a

freestanding view.It is neither presented as a comprehensive doctrine nor as derived from

such a doctrine applied to the basic structure of society as if this structure were simply

another subject to which that doctrine applied.”25 It means that it is within a

comprehensive doctrine that political conception of justice is derived and justified. To

this end, Rawls says:

It is comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is of value in human life and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familiar and associational relationships and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole.26

As matter of fact, it cannot succeed unless it is supported by a number of comprehensive

doctrines. What this means is that there exists a network of concepts in the public

political culture from which the political conception can be explained and justified. It is

at this point that political conception differs from any other moral doctrine, in that these

doctrines are to be regarded as general and comprehensive views. Rawls uses the

principle of utilitarianism to distinguish between it and political conception thus:

The principle of utility, however understood, is usually said to hold for all kinds of subjects ranging from the conduct of

49

individuals and personal relations to the organization of society as a whole as well as to the laws of peoples. By contrast, a political conception tries to elaborate a reasonable conception for the basic structure alone and involves, so far as possible, no wider content to any other doctrine.27

However, Rawls implies here that, if political conception of justice is properly

integrated into the basic structure, human conduct will be regulated. The third feature of

Rawls’ political conception of justice is that its contents are derived from certain

fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the political culture of a democratic society. On

the basis of these fundamental ideas, Rawls intends to build an acceptable political

conception of justice for a constitutional regime. Among these fundamental ideas,

society as fair scheme of cooperation for collective value and that of citizen as free and

equal persons are central to this construction. Rawls declares: “This public political

culture is made up of the political institutions of a democratic society and the public

traditions of their interpretation, as well as historic texts and documents that are

common knowledge.”28 By implication, political conception refers to the notion of

reasonable citizens. To this end, Rawls argues:

Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of social cooperation and they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that others also accept those terms.29

Meanwhile, the core idea Rawls wishes to highlight is that for this cooperation to be

successful, the parties involved must be seen as free and equal, and without any undue

domination or manipulation coming from any quartre. This is what Rawls refers to as the

criterion of reciprocity. Furthermore, there is another aspect of being reasonable; this is

being rooted in the recognition of the results of the burden of judgment and the

willingness to bear the side effects of such burdens. After all, reasonable persons can

disagree without being prejudiced or biased. Rawls believes that reasonable persons

affirm only reasonable comprehensive doctrines and he outlines three features of such a

50

comprehensive doctrine as: moral, religious and political conception. Garrett explains

these three features thus:

It covers the major religious, philosophical and moral aspects of human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner. In this sense it is an exercise of theoretical reason. In another sense it is an exercise of practical reason, since it determines what values to regard as highly significant and how to weigh them against each other when they conflict. It tends to evolve over time in the light of what it sees as good and sufficient reason.30

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that political conception of justice can be

seen, therefore, as essential constituent part that can fit into and be supported by different

reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society that it regulates. In another

development, Rawls states that reasonable persons see it as unreasonable to use political

power to repress comprehensive views that are not unreasonable, though different from

their own. This goes to recommend that any person who is considered to be reasonable

should not forcefully dominate any religion, culture or philosophy that he considers

different from his own or which is not in consonance with his. To this end, Rawls says

thus: “Reasonable persons see that the burdens of judgment set limits on what can be

reasonably justified to others and so they endorse some form of liberty of conscience and

freedom of thought.”31 Rawls arrives at political morality by abandoning the veil of

ignorance as being too parochial in the pluralistic society. And he allows people the

freedom to see clearly those things that they detest and agree on common things that

benefit them all. In this political morality of his, varying views and even conflicting

issues are allowed to coexist in a tolerable manner. This he calls over lapping consensus.

In the final analysis, what Rawls proposes in this situation of great diversity is a form of

toleration and freedom of thought, religion, doctrines and the like, consistent with the

preceding reasoning.

51

4.5 The Principle of Reciprocity in Social Cooperation.

The idea of ‘reasonableness’ in persons who wish to work out principles of

operation is very vital in Rawls’ philosophy. In his works, A Theory of Justice and

Political Liberalism, he emphasizes the idea of justice upon which they will operate:

People are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will like wise do so.32

Meanwhile, the reasonable is an element of the idea of society as a system of fair

cooperation and that its fair terms be reasonable for all to accept is part of what Rawls

calls the idea of reciprocity. Rawls goes further to explain that “the idea of reciprocity

lies between the idea of impartiality, which is altruistic and the idea of mutual advantage

understood as everyone’s being advantaged with respect to one’s present or expected

situation as things are.”33 By implication, Rawls is saying that unreasonable people who

do not contribute their part to societal development either by refusing to propose or by

violation of the agreed principles, should be controlled by law or charged. It will be truly

reasonable and the society will be a better home for all if each cooperates and plays a role

by way of reciprocating what the society offers them. Herzen, in Rawls’ A Theory of

Justice, remarks that it is unfair for people to profit from others without paying the same

price, hence one recalls claim that “the principle of reciprocity applies when there is an

exchange of advantages and each party gives something as a fair return to the other”.34

Samuel Freeman opines that the centrality of social cooperation to Rawls’ account of

justice is tied to his definition of human rights in terms of conditions that are necessary to

engage in social cooperation of any kind. He writes: “Human rights are regarded as the

minimal freedoms, powers, and protections that any person needs for the most basic

development and exercise of the moral powers that enable him or her to engage in social

cooperation in any society”.35 This will involve imploring the principles of fairness since

it allows equal and free persons favourable grounds of social interaction. For Rawls, the

principle of fairness holds that a person is under an obligation to do his part as specified

by the rules of an institution whenever he has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the

scheme or has taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to advance his interests,

52

provided that this institution is just or fair, that is, satisfies the two principles of

justice.36In fact, “we are not to gain from the cooperating efforts of others without doing

our fair share.”37

4.6 Rawls on the Priority of Right.

In Rawls’ opinion, the idea of the priority of right forms an essential

element in what he calls “political liberalism” and it has a central role in justice

as fairness as a form of that view. Right, for Rawls, consists in the correct

expression of the conception of justice from a philosophical point of view what

results from the principles in the initial situation. These principles take care of

what is due to persons. Concerning what right is in itself and what it does in the

political society, Njoku defines it thus:

A right is a legitimate claim, be it on the part of the person or the group, to that which belongs to their persons, either by the sheer fact of their being as epicenter of existence or as what others are obligated to grant to their person as members of political society.38

Meanwhile, Rawls links his own idea of right with the ideas of the good as being

complimentary, affirming that no conception of justice can draw entirely upon one or the

other, but must combine both in a definite way. Rawls explains further the priority of

right in justice as fairness and how it incorporates the ideas of the good in comprehensive

doctrine thus:

In justice as fairness the priority of right means that the principles of political justice impose limits on permissible ways of life; and hence the claims citizen make to pursue ends that transgress those limits have no weight. But surely just institution and the political virtues expected of citizens would not be institutions and virtues not only permitted but also sustained ways of life fully worthy of citizens’ devoted allegiance.39

However, in order that individuals will have full realization of their self-worth, a political

conception of justice must contain within itself sufficient space, as it were, for such ways

of life. What Rawls is concerned is that rational persons have rights and there should be

limits drawn by justice in order to preserve their self-respect within a democratic regime.

53

Rawls notices also that justice as fairness alone cannot draw the limit without the

cooperative assistance of the good which shows the point of the limit.

4.7 Public Reason in Formulating Political Decisions

The intellectual and moral power rooted in the capacities of human members in

deciding plans in political societies is the domain of public reason. The idea of public

reason is very central in the democratic setting of a people. Rawls makes this clear when

he asserts:

It is the reason of its citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship. The subject of their reason is the good of the public: what the political conception of justice requires of society’s basic structure of institutions, and of the purposes and ends they are to serve 40

This goes to say, in other words, that public reason is the reason of equal citizens who, as

a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over one another in enacting

laws and in amending their constitution. Burton Dreben, distinguishing public reason in

Political Liberalism from A Theory of Justice, says: “Public reason is a way of reasoning

about political values shared by free and equal citizens that does not trespass on citizens’

comprehensive doctrines so long as those doctrines are consistent with democratic

polity.” 41 By implication, in A Theory of Justice, public reason applied to comprehensive

liberal doctrines but it does not take into consideration the reasonable pluralism that is

evident in modern democratic political conception that settles fundamental questions as:

who has the right to vote, or what religions are to be tolerated or who is to be assured fair

equality of opportunity or to hold property? These questions are what Rawls calls

“constitutional essentials” and are the special subject of public reason. What public

reason does to a pluralistic society where people affirm varying views on issues of

politics and religion is that it gives us a good sense of political power:

Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy.42

54

H.L.A. Hart concurs with Rawls that the ideal is that of a public spirited citizen who

prizes political activity and service to others as among the chief goods of life and could

not contemplate as tolerable an exchange of the opportunities for such activity for more

material goods of life and could not for such activity for mere material goods or

contentment.43 No one can deny the fact that public-spirit in social cooperation in

enhancing the goods of life by citizens is bad. Political dialogue or as Hart calls “rules of

debate” must grant freedom to communicate our thought in speech without interruption.

This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and a fair-mindedness in deciding

when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made. The political consensus

arrived at through this dialogue is not as a result of a modus Vivendi (an agreement that

endures so far as one group does not become more powerful) but it is from within their

own reasonable doctrines. The priority Rawls gives to public reason in a constitutional

democracy is enormous so much that he believes “the constitution is not what the court

says it is rather; it is what the people acting constitutionally through the other branches

eventually allow the court to say it is”. 44 When then can public reason be said to have

limits if it goes to the extent of deciding for the court as in adjusting the rules to suit

public opinion? To this end, Rawls argues:

…the limits of public reason are not, clearly, the limits of law or statute but the limits we honour when we honour an ideal: the ideal of democratic citizens trying to conduct their political affairs on terms supported by public values that we might reasonably expect others to endorse 45.

This goes to say that we are not to misuse our freedom in public reason. For Hegel,

“freedom does not consist in being able to do whatever one wants, it is not the ability to

act arbitrarily. This would be irrational and therefore an evidence of lack of freedom.”46

In public reason, citizens are free to engage in public dialogue in order to foster peaceful

coexistence but not to go out of the ideals of constitutional democracy. Today, as part of

public reason, “this dialogue is more needed than ever”.47 Hence a lot of political unrest

and other conflicts are not absent in our societies.

55

ENDNOTES

1 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press,1993),

xiv.

2 Rawls, xviii.

3 Samuel Freeman, The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2003), 30.

4 Rawls, Political Liberalism , xxiv-xxv.

5 Rawls, 141.

6 Rawls, 143.

7 Samuel Freeman, Rawls (London: Rutledge, 2007), 365

8 Rawls, Political Liberalism,xl.

9 Rawls, 147.

10 W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (New York:

New York, 2002), 232.

11 Kymlicka ., 233.

12 Freeman, The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, 368

13 G. Collste, ed., Possibilities of Religious Pluralism (Linkoping: Linkoping, 2005),

55-56.

14 Rawls, Political Liberalism ,147.

15 Rawls, 147.

16 Rawls, 148.

17 E. Rossi, Political Liberalism and Reasonable Pluralism. http://cts.

Unipv.it/Seminari /Rossi-pdf. (Accessed 20 June,2010)

18 Rossi . (Accessed 20 June,2010).

19 Rossi (Accessed 20 June,2010).

20 Roberto, Rawls’ Political Liberalism Achievable? Philosophy Times.

http://philosophytimes.blogspot.com/2005/02/rawls’political–liberalism-

achievable.html.(Accessed 05:February 2005).

21 Rawls, Political Liberalism,144-145.

22 Rawls, 97.

23 Rawls, 11.

56

24 Rawls, 257.

25 Rawls,12.

26 Rawls,13.

27 Rawls,13.

28 Rawls, 13-14.

29 Rawls, xlii.

30 J. Garret, Rawls Mature Theory of Justice: An Introduction for Students,

www.wku.edu/-jan.garrett/ethics/matrawls.htm#pcj. (Accessed 04 June,2010).

31 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 61.

32 Rawls, 49.

33 Rawls,50.

34 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 290.

35 Freeman , Rawls, 436.

36 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 342-343.

37 Rawls, 343.

38 Francis O.C. Njoku, Development and African Philosophy: A Theoretical

Reconstruction of African Socio-Political Economy (New York: Universe, Inc.,

2004), 129.

39 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 174.

40 Rawls, 213.

41 Freeman, The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, 332

42 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 217

43 Hart H.L.A., Essays In Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Claredon Press,

1983), 247.

44 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 237

45 Rawls, 253.

46 Joseph Omoregbe, A simplified History of Western Philosophy, Vol. Two

(Lagos: Joja Educational Researchers and Publishers Ltd, 1991), 141

47 Ben O. Eboh, Living Issues in Ethics (Nsukka: Afro-Orbis Publishing Co. Ltd,

2005), 120.

57

CHAPTER FIVE

RAWLS AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL MORALITY

5.1 Preamble

One last philosophical reminder1 is the sledge hammer of criticisms that are

eminent in every philosophical enterprise. In this Chapter, attention will be focused on

those contemporary philosophers’ political thought system that would at once offer

necessary and sufficient backings to Rawls’ political morality and at the same time

bringing to light those who do not support him as well. Cognizance shall also be taken of

Nigerian political situation, and a proficient evaluation of Rawlsalian political morality

shall also be considered.

5.2 Those in Support of Rawls

It would seem that no contemporary political theorist has influenced the field of

political philosophy the way John Rawls has. His master work, A Theory of Justice both

raised normative analysis to a new level of analytical precision and introduced innovative

answers to one of the most important questions in the field; the question of the nature of

justice. To this end, no serious theorist concerned with justice can ignore Rawls;

moreover, theorists can learn from Rawls’ methodology no matter the specific area of

interest. Owing to this fact, so many supportive views of Rawls’ political morality have

been discovered.

2a Thomas Nagel’s Argument on Liberalism

It has been observed that with the recent spread of democracy, liberalism has

become politically important in countries throughout the world. And for Nagel, Rawls

occupies a special place in this tradition. Supporting Rawls’ liberalism, he argues:

He has explored and developed its philosophical foundations to an unprecedented depth and thereby transformed the subject of political theory in our time and he has defended a distinctive, strongly egalitarian view that is at odds with many others in the liberal camp, although he sees it as following the basic ideas of liberalism to their logical conclusion2.

58

Even though, Rawls’ political theory has been attacked, Nagel still supports it; as

he says: “the importance of a political theory is the vehemence with which it is attacked

and the need its opponents feel to explain their disagreements and situate themselves in

relation to it.”3 Nagel further argues that Rawls’ theory is the latest stage in a long

evaluation in the content of liberalism that starts from a narrower notion, exemplified by

Locke, which focused on personal freedom and political equality. An expansion of the

liberal social ideal and a broadened conception of justice is seen in Rawls’ theory. In his

words: “Rawls’ liberalism is the fullest realization we have so far of this conception of

the justice of a society taken as a whole whereby all institutions that form part of the

basic structure of society have to be assessed by a common standard.” 4 By implication,

Rawls has attempted to describe a form of liberalism that can claim the allegiance not

only of secular individualists but also of sacred individualists. To buttress further, Nagel

says: “he has identified a source of moral conviction and motivation that does not depend

on religious skepticism or an ethic of individual autonomy, and that has an important role

to play in the justification of liberal democratic institutions.”5 Nagel insists that Rawls

believes that a wide range of views, forming the plurality typical of a free society, are

reasonable and can support the common institutional framework; hence Rawls’ claim

about an overlapping consensus in a liberal democracy, which permits all views to

coexist.

2b Scanlon T.M on the Justificatory Role of Rawls’ Original Position

The idea of the original position Rawls purports is to set up a fair procedure so

that any principles agreed upon will be just. He assumes that the parties are situated

behind the veil of ignorance, and so the choices they make in a situation that deprives

them full knowledge of their positions must nullify the effects of specific contingencies

which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their

own advantage. In his words: “They do not know how the various alternatives will affect

their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of

general considerations.”6 This view is supported by Scanlon. The task of the parties to

Rawls’ Original position is to choose principles of justice which will play a central role

on what he calls ‘Social cooperation’ in their society. The principles in the original

59

position that foster the kind of social cooperation Scanlon talks about had been

mentioned earlier, but just to put it in a way that explains his position. They are:

First principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Second principle: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.7

No doubt, for Scanlon, abiding by these principles would be to conform with the duty of

social cooperation which Rawls speaks about, for example, of the duty of mutual aid,

“the duty of helping one another when one is in need or jeopardy, provided that one can

do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself.”8 This goes to explain that as people assist

one another in their society, especially as they do that to the least advantaged they should

not do it so as they would become the worse off themselves. There should be a fair

sharing. This concern for the worse-off is taken care of when Scanlon argues further

thus:

The basic institutions of society are a cooperative enterprise in which the citizen’s stand as equal partners. This notion of equality is reflected in Rawls’ particular original position construction in the fact that these parties are prevented by the veil of ignorance and the requirement that the principles they choose be general from framing principles which ensure them special advantages.9

What Scanlon is trying to say is that we should be motivated to accept choice

behind a veil of ignorance as a procedure for selecting principles of justice. But the

question is why would anyone agree to such a restriction in the first place or to abide by it

once they discovered their true talents after the veil of ignorance was raised? To this end,

Scanlon answers, “that agreement on these principles especially the second (known as the

difference principles) presuppose a Rawlsian idea of social cooperation. Social and

political institutions, especially economic institutions, are viewed as reciprocal

arrangements which operate to the mutual advantage of those who cooperate, as equal

partners, in them.”10 Where objections are raised by Nagel that sacrifices by the best-off

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for the worst-off reflect a bias in Rawls’ original position, Scanlon sees an ideal of

cooperation between equals, not a bias against the best-off, as the source of agreement on

the difference principle.

2c Rorty’s Pragmatic based view on Rawls.

Rorty’s support for Rawls stems from a pragmatic point of view. Pragmatism on

its own evaluates things not in terms of some remote and abstract standards, but rather in

terms of some more obvious ‘ends” built into the very natural functions of organisms.

Human life in this view reveals a close relationship between the functions of human

nature and the various simultaneous functions of the larger natural environment, which

provides wide choices of ends and values. Rawls, it seems, would concur to this view.

However, it is this Darwinian approach to knowledge that influenced Dewey in the

direction of pragmatism, which later has influence on Rorty as well. Rorty, formerly an

analytic philosopher, sees the limitation of it in providing the pluralistic view of truth

opened wide to philosophical discussion for a just society, a truth that works. This is why

he insists that it is philosophically important to recognize that contingency and chance

characterize such fundamental aspects of our experience as our language, our idea of our

selfhood, and our conception of human society or community11. In order to understand

the point Rorty is making here, allusion has to be made to his article “Priority of

Democracy to Philosophy” where he depicts citizens as free and self-creating for the

promotion of shared values. The kind of democracy Rorty underscores is that which

persons are allowed to pursue their goals freely provided they do not intrude into matters

of ultimate importance such as religion, individual liberty and the like. It is only at this

point that they must abandon or modify opinions on matters of ultimate importance if

these opinions entail public actions that cannot be justified to most of their fellow

citizens. This is the same pragmatic argument that Rawls strongly brings in as a

justification “to restrict liberty only for liberty’s sake”12.

Commenting on the moral basis of a society, Rorty disagrees with Plato’s

connection between “the essential human nature” and the social and political arrangement

of the community. Plato thought that the three classes of society were necessary

extensions of the three parts of the human soul or self. The artisans for Plato embody the

physical element of the person, the guardians express the spirited passions, and the rulers

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are the incarnation of the mind, reason. For any harmony in the society to be arrived at,

Plato believes that first these three classes of the society alongside with the three parts of

the person must be in harmony as well. Reason is, therefore, for Plato the highest faculty

that governs all the other elements. If this occurs, for Plato, a just society will be

achieved. This whole arrangement is dictated by the structure of the human person. Rorty

in contrast, does not believe that a moral basis of a society can be found on this account

of the human nature. It is in the light of this that Rorty agrees with Rawls in his Dewey

lectures thus:

What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable theory for us.13

Rorty concurs with Rawls that “the central value on which to build a community is the

value of freedom and equality, which is the ideal of liberal democracy.”14 For Rorty, the

preference for freedom and equality and the desire to eliminate suffering are not

discovered by reason but by chance. Rawls gives similar preference to liberty and

equality in his two principles of justice. Rorty further agrees with Rawls when he asserts:

“The social glue that holds a liberal society together consists in a consensus, in which

everybody has an opportunity at self-creation to the extent of their abilities.”15 For Rawls,

“everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and the

basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these

principles”16 in a consensus in the original position. Rawls also talks about the benefits

that accrue from in listening to people’s views, political freedom (right to vote and to be

voted for) and the like. Rorty affirms the same thing when he says that what matters most

is the widely shared conviction that “what we call good or true [is] whatever is the

outcome of free discussion”, for if we take care of political freedom, “truth and goodness

will take care of themselves.”17

Both Rawls and Rorty are pragmatic in their political theory. The present writer is

also in support of practical problem solving solution of theirs.

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5.3 Rawls and His Critiques

No other work has received as much attention and raised as many criticisms in

political philosophy today as Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and the later writings that led to

the volume on Political Liberalism. One would like to consider some of his critics.

3a Rawls’s Self-Critique and Brain Barry’s Critique of him

Rawls himself has got one thing right at least that there was something wrong with A

Theory of Justice that needed fixing. This idea is strengthened by that fact that in a

constitutional democracy one of its most important aims is presenting a political

conception of justice that cannot only provide a shared public basis for the justification of

political and social institutions but also helps ensure stability from one generation to the

next.18 This is an important task. Rawls believes that since the diversity of doctrines –

the fact of pluralism – is not a mere historical condition that will soon pass away but a

permanent feature of the culture of modern democracies, stability and social unity are

threatened insofar as unresolved disagreements may perpetuate and intensify the deep

divisions latent in society. It is obvious to Rawls that A Theory of Justice contains

comprehensive philosophical doctrines that surely cannot be the yardstick for stability in

a modern democratic society that is highly pluralistic. This is an error that Rawls

attributed to his earlier work. The modern society for him is therefore characterized

by pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is affirmed by the citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly all citizens.19

From the foregoing, some philosophers have argued that Rawls has toiled in futility since

the stability and social unity he wishes to establish is only expressed in a matter of

linguistic difference. One of such philosophers considered here is Brian Barry. He argues

that there is no difference between Rawls’s idea of a well-ordered society in the A Theory

of Justice and in the Political Liberalism. For instance, in the A Theory of Justice, Rawls

argues:

In a well-ordered society citizens hold the same principles of right and they try to reach the same judgement in particular cases. On the other hand, individuals find their

63

good in different ways, and many things may be good for one person that would not be good for another. Moreover, there is no urgency to reach a publicly accepted judgement as to what is the good of particular individuals. In a well-ordered society, then, the plans of life of individuals are different in the sense that these plans are given prominence to different aims, and persons are left free to determine their good, the views of others being counted as merely advisory20.

It is a clear fact that each conception gives rise to at least one comprehensive view, this

surely makes it clear that the theory of justice is compatible with a variety of

comprehensive views21. Barry points out in clear terms that if we compare what Rawls

says about the specification of a well-ordered society in Political Liberalism with what he

said in A Theory of Justice, we discover that they are identical.22 If we look at Political

Liberalism, for example, Rawls presents three criteria for a well-ordered society.

“Firstly, it is a society in which everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts,

the very same principles of justice. Secondly, its basic structure is publicly known, or

with good reason believed to satisfy these principles. Thirdly, its citizens have a normally

effective sense of justice and so they generally comply with society’s basic institutions,

which they regard as just”23. In a like manner, the idea of a well-ordered society is

defined in the A Theory of Justice as one

in which everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and basic social institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy these principles. It is also regulated by its public conception of justice which implies that its members have a strong and normally effective desire to act as the principle of justice requires.24

Rawls cannot deny the fact that his ideas are the same in both works at least as regards

his conception of the well-ordered society. And the present writer concurs with Barry that

“verbal details aside, these are manifestly the same three criteria.”25

Moreso, Brian Barry observes that Rawls’ emphasis on the importance of

distinguishing the two stages in the argument for justice as fairness, he finds himself

caught up again in the same misunderstanding he denounces. In the first stage, Rawls

observes that justice as fairness “is worked out as a freestanding political (but of course

moral) conceptions for the basic structure of society.”26 The second stage has to do with

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the stability of the principles of justice arrived at in the first stage. To this end, Barry

observes that “Rawls failed to provide in the Political Liberalism a coherent and self-

contained statement of what he takes the case for justice as fairness as a freestanding

view to be.”27 This is why Barry further emphasizes that Rawls has been inconsistent in

his account. In his words:

In the domain of political and overlapping consensus, a quite comprehensive statement of the themes of Political Liberalism, Rawls did set out the two stages sequentially. It is rather sad to see how, in Political Liberalism, this article is dismembered, with paragraphs from the exposition of the first stage scattered around the book and almost invariably mixed up with material relevant to the second stage.28

Rawls uses different words to mean the same ideas. This is clear when Rawls

says: “justice as fairness is presented there (A theory of Justice) as a comprehensive

liberal doctrine, although, the term comprehensive doctrine is not used in the book.” 29

How then will it be clear to reconcile these linguistic inconsistencies?

3b Hart on Liberty based Critique

Hart criticizes Rawls’ A Theory of Justice on Rawls’ account of the relationship between

justice and liberty, and in particular his conception that justice requires that liberty may

only be limited for the sake of liberty and not for the sake of other social and economic

advantages. The idea of liberty is expressed in the two principles of justice chosen in the

original position. For Rawls these principles are:

First principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Second principle: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.30

Rawls goes ahead to establish a priority rule to these principles, of which the most

important is that liberty is given a priority over all other advantages, so that it may be

restricted or unequally distributed only for the sake of liberty and not for any other form

of social or economic advantage. In actual fact, this is the first principle of justice. Now

Hart criticizes Rawls that “in the general conception of justice there is no such priority

rule and no requirement that liberty must be as extensive as possible”.31 This general

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conception of justice reads: “All social values – liberty and opportunity, income and

wealth, and the bases of self – respect – are to be distributed equally unless an unequal

distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage”32. Obviously, Hart

observes that inequality in whatever form is not justifiable in both the special and general

conceptions of justice, except that in the latter no priority rule is attached. And this is

what punctures Rawls’ theory. Another error Hart observes in Rawls’ later formulation of

his general principle is that liberty is no longer considered in general terms, but it has

now become “basic or formulation liberties, which are understood to be legally

recognized and protected from interference.”33

This new formulation now is: “Each person is to have an equal right to the most

extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty

for all.” 34.In the enumeration of the basic liberties, Rawls warns that “these are what they

are only ‘roughly speaking.” 35 They comprise “political liberty, that is, the right to vote

and be eligible for public office; freedom of speech and of assembly; liberty of

conscience and freedom of thought, personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest

and seizure”36 Offhand, Hart points out clearly the limitation in this enumeration. In his

words: “It seems obvious that there are important forms of liberty – sexual freedom and

the liberty to use alcohol or drugs among them-which apparently do not fall within any of

the roughly described basic liberties.” 37

Hart feels that Rawls does not have to be silent on these issues as well. For it will

be “surprising if principles of justice were silent about their restriction.”38 He criticizes

Rawls for not enumerating and formulating a “secondary set of principles for non- basic

liberties”. 39 Hart disagrees with Rawls as well on the fact that since these principles are

chosen behind the veil of ignorance, they cannot be the best of choices for the parties.

Besides, these constraint the individual’s liberty. The claim that liberty can be restricted

only for the sake of liberty has also been rejected by Hart. For instance, laws restraining

libel or slander, or publications grossly infringing privacy, or restrictions on the use of

private property (e.g. automobiles) designed to protect the environment and general

social amenities, according to Hart’s criticism, especially, these restrictions on the basic

liberties of speech and private property are commonly accepted as trade-offs not of

66

liberty for liberty, but of liberty for protection from harm or loss of amenities or other

elements of real utility.”40

In the final analysis, the main criticism labeled against Rawls is that concerning

his priority of liberty prohibiting exchanges of liberty for economic or other social

advantages and his insistence that it must be included among the requirements of justice.

This priority rule of Rawls is chosen in the original position behind the veil of ignorance

as part of the special conception of justice, but the rule is not to come into play until

certain economic and social advantages are met, in the society of which they will be

members. For Rawls, “these favorable conditions are identified as those which allow the

effective establishment and exercise of the basic liberties”41 and “when basic wants can

be fulfilled.”42 It is only at this point that the general conception of justice is to govern the

society, and men may give up liberties for social and economic gains if they wish. Hart

being aware of the insatiability of human wants and the desire to acquire more criticizes

Rawls thus:

At any rate, it is quite clear that when this stage is reached there may still be in any society people who want more material goods and would be willing to surrender some of their basic liberties to get them. If material prosperity at this stage were so great that there could then be no such people, the priority rule then brought into operation could not function as a prohibitory rule, for there would be nothing for it to rule out.43

It is true that there are moments in life that without priority rule, people can still reach

modest stage where the basic liberties can be effectively established and the basic wants

satisfied. Hart therefore gives two options in order to support his criticism as follows:

A. If there is no priority rule and political liberties have been surrendered in order to gain an increase in wealth, the worst position is that of a man anxious to exercise the lost liberties and who cares nothing for extra wealth brought him by surrender.

B. If there is a priority rule, the worst position will be that of a person living at the bottom economic level of society, just prosperous enough to bring the priority rule into operation, and who would gladly surrender the political liberties for a greater advance in material prosperity.44

67

Hart believes that only those who are to make a choice of these options behind the veil of

ignorance that would prefer either of the options, but once the veil of ignorance is

removed all would prefer option B since it is the best worst off. For Hart, Rawls’

argument rested on interest and not ideals and it is a failure in representing priority rule.

3c Nozick’s Critique

One recalls the two principles that Rawls believes govern a just society:

1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.45

For Rawls, the first principle – which is the ‘liberty principle’ – is said to take ‘lexical

priority’ over the second principle, meaning that it must be satisfied before we can even

look at the issue of economic justice. Principle 2a is known as the difference principle

and is the main concern of Nozick’s objection. This second principle, for Rawls, serves

as a distributive justice and fosters fair social cooperation to the extent that it permits

inequality only and only if it improves the condition of the worst off group as much as

possible.

Now Nozick’s basic objection is that whereas the libertarian theory

acknowledges, as he sees it, that things are already always owned, the Rawlsian theory

treats the goods whose distribution raises questions of justice as manna from heaven.

Nozick questions:

If things fall from heaven like manna, and no one had any special entitlement to any portion of it, and no manna would fall unless all agreed to a particular distribution, and somehow the quantity varied depending on the distribution, then it is plausible to claim that persons placed so that they couldn’t make threats or hold out for specially large shares, would agree to the difference principle rule of distribution. But is this the appropriate model for thinking about how the things people produce are to be distributed? Why think the same results should obtain for situations where there are differential entitlements as for situations where there are not?46

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Nozick criticizes Rawls’ difference principle and says it fails to represent the fair terms of

justice that he had set out to accomplish that it is biased and one – sided, favouring the

worst-off alone. Nozick writes:

Let us consider first the likely reactions of those members of the worst-off group in society. Apparently, these people have every reason to be delighted with the difference principle, for they are to be made as well off as they possibly could be. But consider the best off group. It is highly likely that these people would be much better off under say, the entitlement conception of justice, where they could accumulate without limit, rather than being constrained always to promote the interests of the worst-off.47

Under normal circumstance the best off will resent the difference principle as

being unfair to them. Furthermore, Nozick rejects Rawls’ interventionist approach in

erecting justice in societies. Strengthening Nozick’s objection, Njoku outlines in his

book, Studies In Jurisprudence, that Nozick’s “night watchman state” exists only in so

far as it protects people against force, fraud, and theft, and enforces contracts; it exists

to safeguard rights and this is its sole justification.48 For him, people are entitled to just

holdings and they can choose to redistribute at will. Certainly, Rawls would not concur to

this. For Rawls, properties are not to be distributed at will but according to the principles

chosen in the original position and it has to be in favour of the worst off. In contrast

therefore, Nozick believes that “holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by

the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer or by the principle of rectification of

injustice”49

Njoku is of the opinion that there should be a moral way of acquisition. By that he

means that people should not acquire so as to leave others impoverished and both the

state and individuals should have claims upon resources in the community. In the final

analysis, Nozick punctures Rawls’ theory again by arguing that some people work hard to

develop their natural talents and assets, while others let their abilities go to waste. So,

those people who put in the effort to cultivate their abilities don’t they deserve at least

some return on that effort? Rawls on the contrary, believes that whatever one has is an

undeserved natural or social assets that should be distributable. But Nozick believes that

69

this line of argument can succeed in blocking the introduction of a person’s autonomous

choices and actions only by attributing everything noteworthy about the person to certain

sorts of ‘external’ factors. For him, this reduces or denigrates a person’s autonomy and

prime responsibility for his actions. It is a risky line to take for a theory that otherwise

wishes to buttress the dignity and self-respect of autonomous being. Therefore, people are

entitled to their natural assets and it is not morally arbitrary. In essence, Nozick concludes

that, Rawls’ difference principle violates the separateness of persons that he sets out to

counter in utilitarianism; therefore, “Rawls fails by his own standards,”50 Nozick claims.

3d Political Liberalism as Utopic

This is another theory of Rawls that has also come under serious attack. Rawls

holds that it is political liberalism which can meet the challenge of providing for the

legitimation of political institutions which define the requirements of political

cooperation among reasonable people who have not chosen to live together. It applies the

principle of toleration, thus opening the way for adherents of a variety of world views to

participate in an overlapping consensus supporting justice as fairness. In contrast, this

theory has been dismissed on the grounds that the specifications of his ideas in the

political liberalism are unrealizable, and therefore utopic. For instance, James Bohman

argues that there are deep conflicts concerning epistemology and ethics between different

religious communities which precludes the possibility of one common public reason.

Using the followers of Christian science, he gives an example of them as people “who

refuse treatment owing to a different perception of medicine and cure; illustrating vast

disagreements concerning tolerance and legal matters, and the discussion about the legal

status of Native Americans in Canada and US, to demonstrate these deep conflicts”.51

Looking for an alternative solution, therefore, Bohman proposes dialogue and public

compromise between different public reasons as an alternative to Rawls’ ideas of one

common public reason.

Another point of attack is the claim that Rawls’ political stability does not require

its citizens to perceive the political conception of justice as being true, but to view the

political conception as only being reasonable. As a matter of fact, for Rawls, if political

conception were to be viewed as being true, it would be very impossible to realize an

overlapping consensus. Roberto disagrees with Rawls on this view. He sees an impending

70

danger when the citizens are to view only the political conception of justice as

reasonable. Roberto is prompted to this kind of thought because he feels “a prerequisite

for political stability is that the strength of affirmation regarding the political conception

of justice as being reasonable is greater than the strength of affirmation towards one’s

own fundamental values, or comprehensive doctrines as the case may be.”52 Roberto

feels so because he expects that a time would come when a small percentage in a society

would not accept the political conception, but would only take their own fundamental

values as the more reasonable doctrine. This is actually what baffles him and he

questions:

What reason do we have to expect that citizens will not abandon the overlapping consensus should they regard their own fundamental values as being more reasonable and true than the political conception of justice, or instead follow a more self interested route should a political shift in power occur?53

It is clear a few members may abandon the consensus and as such destabilize the

stability that political liberalism sets out to establish, therefore, rendering it utopic.

Roberto is also not comfortable the way with which Rawls uses the words ‘being

reasonable’. Is there a possible consensus on what reasonableness consists in? Because

for him, there are always divergent views on what being reasonable implies. What is

reasonable to one person may be considered unreasonable in some quartres, and vice

versa. For instance, Roberto raises an issue of Abortion which has created a lot of debate

– those who are pro-lifers may think their view is reasonable while at the same time those

who are not may think their view is also reasonable. He, therefore, goes ahead to explain

that it seems implausible that an overlapping consensus can successfully emerge if a

given interpretation of Rawls’ reasonableness in his political liberalism precludes one

view over the other. For Rawls Reasonableness concerns the concept of the right,

particularly the ideas of fairness and willingness to moderate one’s demands out of

respect for others and their legitimate claims.

Roberto also criticizes the view of toleration Rawls raises in his Political

Liberalism that it may not hold sway in societies as well as Rawls’ society. This is

because, for him, Rawls regards human nature too optimistically. For not the vast

majority if given absolute authority over the state or even are strong enough to suppress

71

all opposing forces, would still tolerate different views. To this end, he argues that even if

overlapping consensus can ever be achieved, it would last only for a short period of time.

In fact he concludes that it is unrealizable, it is a fictitious ideal world. Kymlicka accepts

this view. On his part, “Rawls’ liberal and communication arguments, though support a

principle of tolerance between groups, do not, as it were, support the same conclusion on

the issue of individual freedom of conscience, which is the freedom of individual

members within each group to question and reject their inherited beliefs”.54 This implies

that overlapping consensus in political liberalism can be difficult.

5.4 Implications of Rawls’ Political Morality for the Nigerian Society

As Nigeria struggles with her democracy, a democracy which has been a transition from

the brutality of the military regime, one wonders whether there has been a difference

between the two systems. However, this work does not set out to criticize, rather it aims

at reminding us of effective use of the principles of democracy in practice of problem -

solving in social institutions. The principles of democracy, one means here, refer to

procedural choice of a leader by the people through voting. To this end, Rawls’ political

morality can profer a lot of help in some areas that Nigeria is lagging behind both

politically and morally. Rawls belongs to a liberal democracy that is socially pragmatic.

In the practice of Nigeria’s democracy where the vote of the people sometimes do not

seem to count, and where god-fatherism seems to be influential, the interest of the general

good seems to be sacrificed on the altar of personal gains. This kind of situation disagrees

with Rawls difference principle. It rather leaves the worse-off worst and the better-off

best. Imploring Rawls principles of mutual disinterestedness subject to a veil of

ignorance may lead to what Hume calls an impartial spectator. Thus an impartial

spectator experiences a pleasure in contemplating the social system in proportion to the

net sum of pleasure felt by those affected by it. Bribery and corruption alongside with

gross disregard for constitution are the things that characterize our Nigerian democracy.

As such, if representatives are called to order either by law of civil disobedience (as

Rawls proposes, e.g. strikes) when they fail to comply with the agreed principles that

placed them at their positions, things will improve definitely. Representatives have to be

reminded that they are there as an impartial spectators. This is the function of an impartial

spectator, as Hume write:

72

His own interests do not thwart his natural sympathy for the aspirations of others and he has perfect knowledge of these endeavours and what they mean for those who have them. Responding to the interests of each person in the same way, an impartial spectator gives free reign to his capacity for sympathetic identification by viewing each person’s situation as it affects that person. Thus he imagines himself in the place of each person in turn, and when he has done this for everyone, the strength of his approval is determined by the balance of satisfactions to which he has sympathetically responded.55

Given the fact of the above quotation, one agrees with Kant’s view that people are to act

as if their actions will become a universal maxim. By implication, Rawls’ justice as

fairness is feasible. This is the theory that the Nigerian polity has to benefit from. The

strength of approval of a leader should not lie in the political power of coercion and

material power one has, but it should be in the mutual enhancement of each person’s

condition in social cooperation. Furthermore, a country like Nigeria where it is difficult

to respect peoples freedom, one wonders whether Rawls’ enumeration of basic liberties

can be feasible. Briefly, basic liberties for Rawls cannot be restricted for any economic

advantage except for liberty itself. And these basic liberties are: “political liberty, that is,

the right to vote and be eligible for public office; freedom of speech and of assembly;

liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person, along with the right

to hold personal property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure”.56 Our Nigerian

media houses have been monopolized by those in the corridor of power and it is only the

things they want to hear that are said there. Is this appreciating the freedom of speech?

Religious crisis (e.g. Muslim versus Christians) is obvious and it restricts the individual’s

freedom of conscience and thought. One cannot doubt the fact of arbitrary arrest of some

innocent Nigerian citizens by policemen who are scattered all over our potholed roads

today. Kidnapping is on the increase. These and many more are indications that the

freedom of the majority is in jeopardy. If Nigeria imbibes the culture of self-respect,

which for Rawls is the highest primary good for the rational plan of life for an individual,

there will be a stable growth of fair terms of reciprocity. In order that Rawls’ principles

be relevant to the Nigerian democracy, Nigeria has to imbibe the culture of strict

73

adherence, to constitutional democracy over majoritarian democracy. For Rawls,

constitutional democracy has regard for the rule of law while majoritarian does not.

Nigeria has to shift away from mere majoritarian view and respect what the constitution

says.

We had considered Rawls’ public reason as incorporating divergent

comprehensive views in a constitutional democracy. We noticed that a modern

democratic regime is characterized by pluralism and only public reason can withstand

this heat. Public reason is the reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise

final political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in amending

their constitution in a democratic society. Historically, one of the main defects of

constitutional government has been the failure to insure the fair value of political liberty.

The necessary corrective steps have not been, indeed, they never seem to have been

seriously entertained. Nigeria can borrow a leaf from Rawls’ political morality in this

regard. If Nigeria, which is highly pluralistic, allow public debate to be engaged in by her

citizens and a fair-mindedness in hearing entertained, a lot of improvement will occur in

the public sector. This on its own will demand tolerance characterized in an overlapping

consensus. It allows various varying reasonable views to coexist. It also calls for

participatory democracy.

Conclusively, Rawls was writing about political experiences of liberal societies

like America and the like. He was concerned about just and rational persons who wanted

to advance their good. Nigeria which is not so liberal can still lean on Rawls’ idea of

justice as fairness. I, therefore, submit that the political morality of Rawls is vital for the

Nigerian situation in many ways.

74

5.5 An Evaluation of Rawlsalian Political Morality

I have been able to point out the strengths and weaknesses of Rawls’ political

morality using various philosophers’ views. Now, the problem I discovered from his

political morality has to do with the choice of the principles. In fact, one wishes to concur

with F.O.C Njoku that “passions play a lot of roles in social choices such that

disinterested grounds are difficult to come by.”57 If passions could be ruled out in Rawls’

parties in the original position, I think they will come out with something feasible.

However, of these two principles chosen which, for Rawls, form the core of his political

morality, one is not comfortable with the second principle. That reads: “social and

economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to

be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all” It is

clear from this principle that Rawls does not accept of inequality in whatever form. Now,

supposing that transplant technology reaches such a pitch of perfection that it becomes

possible to transplant eye balls with a hundred percent chance of success. Anyone’s eyes

may be transplanted into anyone else, without complications. In this regard, some people

are born with defective eyes, or with no eyes at all, should we redistribute eyes? That is,

should we take one eye from some people with two healthy eyes, and give eyes to the

blind? Of course, some may volunteer, but certainly not all would. In this case, should we

have a national lottery, and force the losers to donate an eye?

One observes also that Rawls speaks, for example, of the duty of mutual aid, the

duty of helping one another when one is in need or jeopardy, provided that one can do so

without excessive risk or loss to oneself. Now, looking at the second principle again, it

seems, according to T.M. Scanlon, likely that those to whom we are bound by these ties

of justice will fare better at our hands or at least have a stronger claim on us than those to

whom we owe only duties of mutual aid; for justice, which requires that our institutions

be arranged so as to maximize the expectations of the worst-off group in our society,

says nothing about others elsewhere with whom we stand in no institutional relation but

who may be worse off than anyone in our society. If this is so, then it may make a great

deal of difference on Rawls’ theory where the boundary of society is drawn. Are our

relations with the people outside this contractual principle, for example (or the people in

isolated rural areas of our own country), governed by considerations of justice or only by

75

the duties which hold between any one human being and another? I do not seek to

provide answers to these questions, rather, these serve as an eye opener to understanding

Rawls and a way of leaving room for contribution by researchers in this area since this

work is not exhaustive. By and large, the present writer appreciates Rawls as being one of

the greatest contributors to modern political theory.

CONCLUSION

What the researcher has been able to establish as political morality in Rawls is

gotten from the two principles of justice, chosen by parties in the original position behind

the veil of ignorance. Being aware that these principles chosen behind this veil cannot

handle the pluralism that is characteristic of a modern democratic regime, political

liberalism is implored to handle this overlapping consensus. To this later Rawls, public

reason is of great importance in allowing varying views to coexist. To this end, the

researcher concludes that our exercise of political power is proper only when we

sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions were we to state

them as government officials are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other

citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons as free and equal citizens.

Finally, as we clamour for power and wealth, human beings should not be used as

means to these ends; rather, they should be seen as ends in themselves. This is a fact that

we cannot but appreciate in Rawls’ political morality.

76

ENDNOTES

1 Francis O.C. Njoku, Philosophy In Politics, Law and Democracy (Owerri:

Claretian Institute of Philosophy, 2002), XIX.

2 Samuel Freeman, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2003), 63.

3 Freeman, 63.

4 Freeman, 63.

5 Freeman, 78.

6 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 136 –

137.

7 Basil Blackwell, Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.

Norman Daniels ed. (Oxford: Pitman Press, 1975), 170.

8 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 114.

9 Blackwell, Reading Rawls, 204 – 205.

10 Blackwell, XXVII.

11 Samuel E. Stumpf and Fieser J., Philosophy History and Problems Sixth Edition

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 486.

12 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 247.

13 Stumpf, Philosophy History and Problems, 489.

14 Stumpf, 489.

15 Stumpf, 490.

16 Rawls, , A Theory of Justice, 5.

17 Stumpf, Philosophy History and Problems ,490.

18 Kukathas Chandran and Philip P, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and Its Critics

(California: Stanford University Press 1990), 136.

19 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1993),

XVI.

20 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 447–448.

21 Brian Barry, John Rawls and the Search for Stability, www.jstor.org/cgi-bin/jstor/

(Assessed 10 October, 2010).

22 Barry, (Accessed 10 October, 2010)

77

23 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 35

24 Rawls, A Theory of Justice , 453 – 454

25 Barry, (Accessed 10 October, 2010)

26 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 140 – 144.

27 Barry, (Accessed 10 October, 2010)

28 Barry, (Accessed 10 October, 2010)

29 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 489

30 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 302.

31 H.L.A Hart, Essays In Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1983), 226

32 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 62.

33 Hart, Essays In Jurisprudence and Philosophy, 228.

34 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 302

35 Rawls, 61.

36 Hart, Essays In Jurisprudence and Philosophy, 229.

37 Hart, 231.

38 Hart, 231.

39 Hart, 231 – 232

40 Hart, 239.

41 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 152.

42 Rawls, 542 – 543.

43 Hart, , Essays In Jurisprudence and Philosophy, 244.

44 Hart, 246.

45 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 302.

46 Robert Nozick, Property, Justice and the Minimal State, in Rawls: A Theory of

Justice and Its Critics by Chandran Kukathas and Pettit Philip, 84.

47 Jonathan Wolff, Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State

(California: Stanford University Press, 1991), 120.

48 Francis O.C. Njoku, Studies In Jurisprudence: A Fundamental Approach to the

Philosophy of Law, Second Edition (Owerri: Claretian Institute of Philosophy,

2007), 358.

78

49 Njoku, 359.

50 Wolff, Robet Nozick, 122.

51 J. Bohman, In Possibilities of Religious Pluralism, Collste G. ed. (Linkoping:

Linkoping, 2005), 57.

52 D. Roberto, Rawls’ Political Liberalism – Achievable? Philosophy Times,

http://philosophytimes.blogspot.com (Accessed 05 Feb. 2005).

53 Roberto, (Accessed 05 Feb., 2005).

54 W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. (Oxford:

Oxford, 2002), 233.

55 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 186.

56 Hart, Essays In Jurisprudence and Philosoph, 229.

57 Njoku, Studies In Jurisprudence, 357.

79

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