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The Limits to the CJEU's Interpretation of Locus Standi, a Theoretical Frameworkvan Wolferen, Matthijs

Published in:Journal of Contemporary European Research

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Citation for published version (APA):van Wolferen, M. (2016). The Limits to the CJEU's Interpretation of Locus Standi, a Theoretical Framework.Journal of Contemporary European Research, 12(4), 915-930.

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CitationvanWolferen,M.(2016).TheLimitstotheCJEU'sInterpretationofLocusStandi,aTheoreticalFramework’,JournalofContemporaryEuropeanResearch.12(4),914-930.Firstpublishedat:www.jcer.net

JournalofContemporaryEuropeanResearchVolume12,Issue4(2016)

ResearchArticle

The Limits to the CJEU's Interpretation of Locus Standi, a Theoretical Framework

MatthijsvanWolferen,UniversityofGroningen

Volume12,Issue4(2016)MatthijsvanWolferen

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AbstractTheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion(CJEU)hasrefusedtoallowdirectactionsasapossiblesolution for theprotectionof rights thatarenot individualisable throughpublic interest litigation.For53years ithasheldon to its interpretationof the standingcriteria in (now)Article263TFEU,severely limiting access to justice for all but the most specific of cases. The criticism of thisinterpretationhasbeencopiousandstrong,newlyinvigoratedinrecentyearsbyargumentsontheruleoflaw.Thisarticleaimsnottoaddtothecriticismbuttoofferacompellingexplanationofthe'why'behindtheCourt'sreasoning.Bymakinguseofaframeworkthataddressesasupremecourt'sinterpretativelimitsregardinglocusstandi,thisarticlewillnotonlyshedlightonthepastbutequallyexplain why the Court has chosen to reject public interest litigation, in a manner that mightotherwiseseemcounter-intuitive.

KeywordsCJEU;PublicInterestLitigation;JudicialRelations;Standing;AccesstoJustice

Inrecentyears,therehasbeenachangeoffocusincriticismoftheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion regarding its standing criteria.Where thePlaumann criteria have always been criticised bybothacademicsandAdvocatesGeneral, thiscriticismfocusedontheeffectof thedoctrineontheindividual.1 The new line of criticism focuses on the fact that the Court's interpretation of'individually concerned' has an evenmore adverse effect on thepublic interest, bymakingpublicinterestlitigation(PIL)bywayofdirectactionsanimpossibility.

This article aims to offer a theory on the reason behind the Court's severely restrictiveinterpretation. Although it has been contested for 53 years,2 the focus has largely been on theeffectsofthisinterpretationandwhy,sometimeshow,itshouldbechanged.3ThemainpremiseoftheseargumentshasalwaysbeenthattheCourtisabletodoso,ifitwouldjustsetitsmindtoit.4IntheircritiqueoftheCourt,mostauthorsunderestimatethenatureofstandingrequirements.These

1Togiveafulloverviewoftheacademicanalysiswouldseverelyimpactboththereadabilityandthestylerequirementsfor this contribution, a good timeline can be found along these lines: Gerhard Bebr, Judicial Control of the EuropeanCommunities (Stevens 1962); Ami Barav, ‘Direct and Individual Concern: An Almost Insurmountable Barrier to theAdmissibilityofIndividualAppealtotheEECCourt’(1974)11CMLRev191;HRasmussen,‘WhyIsArticle173InterpretedagainstPrivatePlaintiffs?’ (1980)5ELRev112;AnthonyArnull, ‘PrivateApplicantsandTheActionForAnnulmentUnderArticle173OfTheECTreaty’(1995)32CMLRev7;AlbertinaAlbors-Llorens,‘TheStandingofPrivatePartiestoChallengeCommunity Measures: Has the European Court Missed the Boat?’ (2003) 62 Cambridge Law Journal 77; Laurence WGormley, ‘Judicial Review – a New Dawn after Lisbon?’, Europe. The New Legal Realism: Essays in Honour of HjalteRasmussen(2010);Foranextensiveoverviewofthediscussion,pleaseseethehighlyrecommended:RolandSchwensfeier,‘Individual’sAccesstoJusticeunderCommunityLaw’(Diss,UniversityofGroningen2009).2Note1aimstogiveadecadebydecadeimpression.3Exemplaryofthisdiscussion isthebackandforthbetweenSteinandVinnigandHjalteRasmussen in:EricSteinandGJosephVining,‘CitizenAccesstoJudicialReviewofAdministrativeActioninaTransnationalandFederalContext’(1976)70Am.J.Int’lL.219;Rasmussen(n1).4And,asarguedbyRasmussen(n1),thatnotdoingsoisaresultofitsowninternaldesiretohaveeverythingremainasitis.


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rulesand traditionsare the focalpointof the cultureand traditionsofevery legalorder.As such,everyapexconstitutionalcourtisnotonlylimitedbytheliteralrequirementssetoutbythelaw,butsees its interpretative space as limited by a number of elements. This article aims to explain theCJEU's long-standing refusal regarding locus standi for the individual through the application of atheoretical framework that describes these limiting elements. The frameworkwill equallymake itclearwhythecurrentcall foraccess forpublic interestcaseswillbeevenmoredifficult toanswerthanaccessfortheindividual.5

To that end, this article is structured in the following manner. Given the nature of the problemregardingpublicinterestlitigation,thefirststepwillbetodefinewhatfallsunderthisheading.Itwillbeshownthatpartoftheproblemondebatingthis issueistheconfusionoftonguesontheterm.Secondly,theoriginsoftheCJEU'sPlaumanndoctrinewillbediscussed,asitistherootcausefortheproblems surrounding public interest litigation. It is then possible to describe the theoreticalframeworkthatcangiveanexplanationfortheCourt'srestrictiveinterpretationandapplyittothefactualsituationatthetimeofthePlaumannjudgment.ThesubsequentsectionwillexplainhowthespecificcharacteristicsofthepublicinterestinaEuropeancontextexacerbatestheproblem,makingpublic interest litigation impossible.Thiswillbe followedbyadiscussionofhowthe realisationofthisproblemhasledtoaqualitativechangeinthecriticismoftheCourt'scaselaw.Finally,thelastsegmentwillbedevotedtothemomentinwhichasignificantchangehasoccurredinallfouroftheelements restricting the Court's interpretational possibilities and the reasons behind the limitedjudicialresponse.TheconclusionwillofferacompellingargumentfortheCourt’scurrentlineofcaselaw, which might seem counterproductive to the creation of a European approach to solveunindividualisableproblemssuchasenvironmentalissues.

PUBLICINTERESTINEUROPEANCONTEXT

Foratermthatisusedsofrequently,inbotheverydayandacademicusage,theconceptsof'publicinterest' and 'public interest litigation' are ill-defined. Not unlike Justice Potter Stewart in hisattempttodistinguishfreespeechfromsmut,weknowitwhenweseeit.6Thishasledtoaplethoraofpossibilitiesforwhatcanbegroupedundertheheading.Theresultsofaseminalconferenceonthetopicareaprimeexample.7Althoughtheresultantbookoffersdiversestudyintothenatureof‘publicinterest’,itequallyshowshoweachscholarperceivessomethingofpublicinterestwithinhisorherownfield.Asoneoftheeditorsnotes,thedefinitionisdraftedsoastoencompass‘[...]diffuseinterests of a largenumberof people, such as in environmental protection, consumerprotection,safetyatworkandanti-discriminationpolicies’.8

TheideaisthatbyassertingthepossibilityofapublicinterestinallareasofEuropeanlaw,theCourtcanmoreeasily grant standingbymakinguseof thedoctrines ithasdeveloped foreachof thesespecific areas. As such, Arnull regarded the Court's approach in Codorníu as an opportunity.9 InCodorníutheCourtofJusticeandtheAdvocateGeneralappliedthestandingcriteriaunderwhatwas

5Forthepurposesofclarity,thisarticlewilloftenfocusontheareaofenvironmentalprotection,asitisarguablytheareainwhich the formation of a pan-European polity has gone the furthest, leading to the creation of a number of highlyorganisedNGOsthatinteractwiththeUnion'sinstitutions.6NicoJacobellisv.Ohio378U.S.184(1964).7Hans-WMicklitzandNorbertReich(eds),PublicInterestLitigationbeforeEuropeanCourts(Nomos1996).8 Norbert Reich, ‘Public Interest Litigation Before European Jurisdictions’ in Hans-WMicklitz and Norbert Reich (eds),PublicInterestLitigationbeforeEuropeanCourts,vol2(Nomos1996)6.9CaseC-309/89CodorníuvCouncil[1994]ECRI-1853.


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thenArticle173EECinrelationtodumpingcasesandappliedittoacaseconcerningatrademark.10Gormley opined on the importance of theAITEC case11 for the possibility for associations to beawardedstanding,inthiscaseinthefieldofstateaid.12Theseareonlytwoexamplesfromabodyofwork that comprises discussions of almost every field of European law imaginable. This lack of acleardefinition interfereswithacoherentanalysisof theactualproblem. It is thereforenecessarybriefly to define PIL in a European context to understand how the nature of this concept causesdifficultiesinthejudicialsystemoftheEU.

The above mentioned authors make use of an interpretation of ‘the public interest’ that isfunctionally equivalent to ‘the common good’.13 Under that interpretation, all areas of law canbenefit from PIL, where it can be a remedy for malfeasance regardless of the complainant. It isequallyinlinewiththeAmericanoriginsoftheterm.Theterm‘publicinterestlitigation’wascoinedbyJusticeLouisBrandeis,andreferredtothenatureofthelawyerwhowouldadvocateacausenotrelatedtothecorporate,lucrativeinterest.14Withinhismeaning,thiscouldbeanyareaofthelaw,from anti-trust to taxation - all could benefit from lawyers pursuing the common good. It wasthrough the rise of the civil rightsmovement that public interest lawyers and that cause becamesynonymous.Yet,evenwhenthesuccessesofPILarefamousandnumerous,standingintheUnitedStatesstillrequiresapersonalscope.Litigationoftenstartswithanengineeredtrigger,15beitRosaParksrefusingtogiveupherseatonabus,16theownersofpropertynearnationalparksthatareindangerofurbandevelopment17orthesearchforasame-sexcouplewithtaxissues.18

PublicinterestlitigationasassociatedwithitsAmericanoriginisthereforebetterexemplifiedbytheDefrennecasethanbytheabovementionedexamples;19acasewherealawyersacrificedtimeandknowledgeforthepublicgood,combinedwithacaseofrights infringementthatcanbelimitedtothescaleoftheindividual.20IntheUScontext,thepublicinterestis,ineffect,stillthedefenceofapersonalrightorinjury,theresultofwhichmayhaveaneffectonthegreatergood.Inprinciple,thestandingrequirementsoftheUniondonotdifferinthisregard.TheprobleminEuropeanlawisthatofthetruepublicinterest,aninterestthatcannotbedistilledtoasinglepointofconflictintheformofanapplicant.Therefore, it isproposedthat for thecurrentdiscussion,public interest shouldbedefined as those rights that are not individualisable. Rights that are individualisable can whenbundled be seen as a collective interest, which merits other considerations.21 The effect of this10 Anthony Arnull, ‘Challenging Community Acts - An Introduction’ in Hans-WMicklitz and Norbert Reich (eds),PublicInterestLitigationBeforeEuropeanCourts(Nomos1996)46.Itmustbenotedthat,atleasthere,ArnulldrawsconclusionsbasedonthephrasingoftheA-GandCourtofcertaintermsthatcouldequally,orperhapsevenmoreso,beinterpretedasstatingthatthiscasedealtwithaspecificsetofcircumstances.11CasesT-447-449/03AITECetal.v.Commission[1995]ECRII-1971.12LaurenceWGormley,‘PublicInterestLitigationandStateSubsidies’inHans-WMicklitzandNorbertReich(eds),PublicInterestLitigationBeforeEuropeanCourts,vol2(Nomos1996).13RvInlandRevenueCommissioners,expNationalFederationofSelfEmployedandSmallBusinessesLtd[1981]UKHL2(UKHL(1981)).14LouisDBrandeis,‘OpportunityintheLaw,The’(1905)3Commw.L.Rev.22,28.15AlecStoneSweetandThomasLBrunell,‘ConstructingaSupranationalConstitution:DisputeResolutionandGovernanceintheEuropeanCommunity’(1998)92AmPolSciRev63.16Browderv.Gayle,142F.Supp.707(1956).17SierraClubv.Morton405U.S.727(1972).18UnitedStatesv.Windsor133S.Ct.2675(2013).19Case43/75DefrennevSabena[1976]ECR455.20InthecaseofDefrenne,ElianeVogelPolskyactivelysoughtouta‘victim’ofgenderdiscriminationbecauseshebelieveditwouldbepossible to relyonEuropean Lawdirectlybefore theBelgianTribunal deTravaux andConseil d’Etat. It is aprimeexampleof strategic litigationwhere the federal lawofhigherorder isuseddirectly tocircumventordismiss thelowerlawsofthefederation’smembers.Forafullaccount,see:CatherineHoskyns,IntegratingGender:Women,LawandPoliticsintheEuropeanUnion(Verso1996).21MarkDawsonandEliseMuir,‘OneforAllandAllforOne?TheCollectiveEnforcementofEULaw’(2014)41LIEI215.


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definition isthatthetraditionallypurelyeconomic interests inthecasesmentionedbyMicklitzfalloutsidethescopeofthistreatise.Thereasonthattheycannotbeindividualisedliesinthenatureofthe act and poses a question not unknown in other legal orders. Consider the plight ofunindividualisablerights,suchascertainenvironmentalrights,forwhich,bythenatureoftheright,neithertheapplicantnorthecontestedact,willeverbegrantedstanding.

INDIVIDUALISATIONASAPILLAROFSTANDING

The problem in European law lies with the interpretation of Article 263 TFEU and its earlierincarnations, inwhich individualisation takesprideofplace.22Although thepowerof theCourt toreviewactsissweepinginscope,thepreciseextentofthispowerdependsontheclassofapplicants.It is clear from the wording of the Article that there are three categories of applicants:23 theprivileged intheformofCouncil,Commission,ParliamentandMemberStatesthatcanaskforthereviewofeverymeasure,nomatterwhetheritaffectsthemornot;24semi-privilegedapplicantsaretheEuropeanCentralBankCommitteeoftheRegionsandCourtofAuditors,theseareonlyenabledto request the review of acts that affect their prerogatives; finally, natural and legal persons asaddresseesofanactorwhendirectlyandindividuallyconcernedbysaidact.25

The focus of criticism of the Court for its interpretation of the standing criteria relates almostexclusivelytothislastcategoryofapplicants.Itisthiscategoryofapplicants,encompassingcitizens,companiesandNGOs,thathasthemost limitedcapabilitiesbothregardingtheactstheycanhavereviewedandthehurdlestheyneedtocrossactuallytobegrantedstandingbeforetheCourt.BothAdvocates General26 and legal scholars agree that the problem originates with the Court'sinterpretationoftheterm'individualconcern'thatstemsfromthenowinfamousPlaumannruling,datingfrom1963.27

Inthatcase,aclementine importerfromGermanyrequestedthereviewofaCommissiondecisionthatdeniedtheGermanstatethepossibilityofapplyingamoreadvantageoustariffforcitrusfruit.TheCourtruledthatPlaumann&Cowasnotindividuallyconcernedbythedecisionaddressedtothe

22Article173EECandArticle230EC.23Fourifoneweretomakeadivideinthecategorybasedonwhetherdealingwitharegulatoryactornot.24Thisincludeslegislativeacts.25Itgoesbeyondthescopeofthisarticletogointothenatureoftheactsthatcanberequestedtobereviewedbynaturalandlegalpersons,althoughtheArticlespecificallymentions‘[...]anactaddressedtothatpersonorwhichisofdirectandindividualconcerntothem’,therebynolongermakinguseoftheearlierspecificationsofdecisionsordecisionsintheformof a regulation. Technically, thismeans that all acts, including legislative acts, canbedemanded tobe reviewedby theCourt by natural or legal persons, however, clearly, this would be difficult to reconcile with the direct and individualconcernrequirements.TheArticleinitscurrentincarnationisinlinewiththecaselaw,whichclearlydidnotputtoomuchstakeonthenatureofanactoncetheaforementionedrequirementsweremet.26Forinstance,theOpinionofA-GLagrangeinoneofthefirstcases:JoinedCases16and17/62ProducteursdeFruitsvCouncil [1962]ECR471: ‘Such isthesystemthatthe jurist, forhispart,mightfindunsatisfactory,butwhichtheCourt isbound toapply. This is not theplace to justify the system.Onemightobserveonly that it is coherent and that seriousargumentscanbeputforwardtojustifyit’.27Seeforamorehistoricaloverview:MariolinaEliantonioandNellyStratieva, ‘FromPlaumann, throughUPAandJégo-Quéré,totheLisbonTreaty:TheLocusStandiofPrivateApplicantsunderArticle230(4)ECthroughaPoliticalLens’[2009]MaastrichtFacultyofLawWorkingPaper1.


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State.28 Foranapplicant tobe individually concerned, so theCourt concluded,apartymust showthatheorshewasaffected:

[…] by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason ofcircumstancesinwhichtheyaredifferentiatedfromallotherpersonsandbyvirtueof these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the personaddressed.29

TheCourthasseenfittoelaborateonwhatcoulddifferentiateanapplicanttosuchanextentthatheorshecouldbefoundtobeindividuallyconcerned.Mostoftheseclarificationshavefocusedonthe rightsof specificeconomicactorswhoareaffectedby thoseareasofEuropean law thathavehad thegreatest impact.Problematic situations regardingdumping,30 state-aid,31 andcompetitioncases32 have been resolved by individualising the applicants in a number of ways. It has beenthroughthesecasesthattheCJEUinjectedbasictenetsofgoodgovernanceandtheruleof lawintheEuropeanlegalorder.Thecreationoftheconceptof‘generalprinciples’;33theuseofproceduralrightsandsafeguards;34theinsertionofbasicrightsprotection;35alltheseconceptsarenoweitherseenasalogicalpartoftheacquisorhavebeenconstitutionalisedintheTreatyproper.36Yettheseinnovationsalsodemonstratedthecruxof thematter inrelationtotruepublic interestcases.TheCourtcanonlyusethesetoestablishthenatureofanapplicantasapproachingthatofanaddresseeofameasure,throughdistinguishinghimorherfromanyotherapplicant.37Applicantswhodefendtheinterestsofusallcanneverstandout.TheconceptoflocusstandiinEuropeanlawisbasedonremedying the most personal of connections between Union and the individual. Where thatconnectionisdeemedtobeevenslightlymorenebulous,theactinquestionisineffectdeemedtobeofsuchanaturethatitisincontestable.38

THECONCEPTOFINTERPRETATIVESPACE

Theconceptof‘individualconcern’,asinterpretedbytheCourt,hasgivenrisetocriticisminbroadlyfour categories. Two of these are formal in nature: (1) the fact that (then) Article 173 EEC was

28 Itdidnot go into thequestionof the importerbeingdirectly concerned because, the Court reasoned, if the applicant was not individually concerned a further investigation would not be necessary as the demands of direct and individual concern are cumulative. 29Case25/62PlaumannetalvCommission[1963]ECR95.30CaseC-358/89ExtrametIndustriesSAvCouncil[1991]ECRI-2501.31Case169/84COFAZvCommission[1986]ECR391.32CaseC-198/91WilliamCookplcvCommission[1993]ECRI-2487.33JoinedCases7/56and3/57to7/57DinekeAlgeravCommonAssemblyoftheECSC[1961]ECR53.34Famously inExtramet(n30)butseethesimilarreasoninginCase264/82TimexCorporationvCouncil&Commission[1985]ECR849(paras.14-15).35Developedfromthegeneralprinciples(seen33atp.55)inCase29/69ErichStaudervStadtUlm[1969]ECR419,oftencitedinonebreathwithCase4/73J.Nold,Kohlen-undBaustoffgroßhandlungvCommission[1974]ECR491.36Art.6para3TEU‘Fundamentalrights,asguaranteedbytheEuropeanConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsand Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to theMember States, shallconstitutegeneralprinciplesoftheUnion'slaw.’37NotablyCodorníu(n9)demonstratesthecomingtogetherofindividualisationandcreativereasoningthroughmostofthemeansmentionedabove.38Thisisinpartduetothefactthattheclause‘directandindividualconcern’isnotonlyusedtodefinethepositionoftheapplicantbutalsothenatureofthecontestedact.Schwensfeier(n1)47;apartfromthispoint,itisclearthatthestandingcriteriaarenotexotic, as canbe seen from thecomprehensive study:MariolinaEliantonioandothers, ‘Standingup forYourRight(s)inEurope’(DirectorateGeneralforInternalPolicies-PolicyDepartmentC:Citizens’RightsandConstitutionalAffairs2012)StudyPE462.478.


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interpretedsodifferentlyfromitsECSCpredecessor,Article33;(2)theassumptionthattheCourtismerelyexercisingdocketcontrol.Theothertwoareofamoresubstantivenature:(3)theargumentthattheapproachto‘individual’isillogical;39(4)thelackofadherencetofundamentalhumanrightsinthecurrentinterpretation.Inallofthesecategories,thepremiseisthatthedefectisduetotheCourt’s case law rather than the actual wording of (now) Article 263 TFEU. Do these criticismssucceedinelucidatingandthusremedyingtheroleoftheCourtinthisproblem?

Thestatementthatanycourt isapplyingdocketcontrol is in itselfnotremarkable.Almostall legalordersmakeuseofaformofdocketcontrolasameansof judicialmanagement.Whenappliedtothe European situation, the complaint is meant to illustrate a seemingly random or even biasedelement that is introduced.40 This observation clashes with the fact that the Court has, over theyears, taken a progressive approach to the aforementioned rights and principles in the Europeanlegalorder41andusedthemwhenpossibletoindividualiseparties.Similarly,argumentstotheeffectthat theCourtdoesnot takesufficientaccountofcertainhumanrightsseemto forget that itwasthatsameCourtthatintroducedthemintoaneconomicallyfocusedTreatysystem.The‘lackoflogic’argumentequallylacksconvincingweight.Whenlookingattheexamplesoftheearlysugarcases,42itmayseematfirstglancetobeindeedremarkablethatoneproducerwillbedeemedtohavemetthestandingrequirements,whereaproducerinasimilarsituationhasnot.Yetthisiseasycriticismtomakefromthenationalperspective,whereactsarecategorisedandadministrativelawasafieldhastakenflight.Thisargumentneglectsthefactthatinthese‘illogical’situations,theCourtistryingto remainwithin theboundariesnotunlike those in, for instance, France,where thepossibilityofreviewofanactdrapedindemocracyisseverelylimited.43TheCourt,however,hastodosowithoutthebenefitofcarefullycategorisedandqualifiedacts.Theimpetusforthiscontributionisthereforethe fact that the scholarship on access to justice and the CJEU’s approach to standing does notengagewiththeplacethatstandingrequirementshaveinaconstitutionalorder.OnecanconcludethatthecriticismhasthereforenotbeenparticularlyhelpfulindefiningifandhowtheCourtcouldremedy the issueof standing.This contribution thereforeaims tooffera theoreticalunderpinningthatoffersamoreconstructivemannerinwhichtocritiquetheproblemof,forinstance,thepublicinterestinEUlaw.

TheonusiseverplacedontheCourt,whichindeedisrarelywillingtoengagewiththesecriticisms,44evenwhenlevelledbyitsownAdvocateGeneral.45Yetitshouldberemarkedthatinafewinstancesithasdonesowiththenotablecaveatthat:

While it is, admittedly, possible to envisage a system of judicial review of the legality ofCommunitymeasuresofgeneralapplicationdifferentfromthatestablishedbythefounding

39PaulCraigandGráinnedeBúrca,EULaw:Text,CasesandMaterials(4thedition,OUPOxford2007)512.40Arnull (n10)51;Seealso:LaurenceWGormley, ‘JudicialReviewinECandEULaw—SomeArchitecturalMalfunctionsandDesignImprovements?’(2001)4Camb.YBELS167inwhichtheauthorinfersamanagerialapproach.41SeetheremarkablereasoninginChernobylthatlaidthegroundworkforLesVerts,Case70/88EuropeanParliamentv.Council[1990]ECRI–2041.42Cases10&18/68Società‘Eridania’ZuccherificiNazionaliandothersvCommission[1969]ECR459.43LNevilleBrownandJohnSBell,FrenchAdministrativeLaw(5thedition,OxfordUniversityPress1998)157;CatherineElliott,CatherineVernonandEricJeanpierre,FrenchLegalSystem(PearsonEducation2006)226.44LudwigKrämer,‘EnvironmentalJusticeintheEuropeanCourtofJustice’,EnvironmentalLawandJusticeinContext(1stedn,CambridgeUniversityPress2009)209.45Ad.n25CaseC-50/00PUPA[2002]ECRI-06677.


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Treatyandneveramendedastoitsprinciples,itisfortheMemberStates[...]toreformthesystemcurrentlyinforce.46

Furthermore, theCourt keeps reiterating its opinion that there exists a ‘complete systemof legalremedies’.47ApparentlytheCourtitself isawareofthecritique, isclearlynotafraidtobringaboutchange,andyet itdoesnotmove.Rather thangivingreasons focusingonwhat theCourt isdoingwrong, researchshould focuson the ‘why?’behind this immovableobject, thereby facilitating theimaginingofapossiblefulcrumandlever.

FourElementsthatShapetheInterpretativeSpace

ItissubmittedthatinfacttheCourtdoesnotseetheinterpretativefreedomtowidenthescopeofitsstandingcriteria.Inalllegalorders,themostimportantelementthatdefinesthestandingcriteriaisinessencetherelationshipsthatexistbetweentheformativeinstitutionsandthestate.Thisiswhytheroleofstandinginjudicialreviewisofsuchinterest.Morethananyothersinglepointoflaw,itcan tell the storyof a state'sDNA. See, for example, the longhistoryof the French limitations tojudicial reviewoutof fearof the returnof judge-made law,a trauma fromthedaysof theancienregime.48OrtheGermansystemofadministrativelaw,basedontheprotectionoftherightsoftheindividual,areactiontothedarkdaysinthemiddleofthetwentiethcentury.49Eachsystemoutlinestherelationshipbetweenthe legislature, theexecutiveandthecitizen. Ineachsystem,theroleofthejudiciarydescribestherelativeweightofeachoftheseactorsinrelationtoeachother.

These relations are governed by more than merely the written law. They evolve over time andindeedinFrance,50Germany51andEngland,52thestandingregimehaschangedsignificantlywiththepassing of years. This has often happenedwithout any formal changes to codified principles, butrather through thecase lawof thecourts themselves.Yetwhatcompels thesecourts tochangearuleofsuchafundamentalnature?Whatmakesthemdecidethattheyhavetheauthoritytodosoatthatpointofchange?Lastly,whatrestrainsthatauthority?

It is proposed thatwe can describe the relationship that governs a (supreme) court's freedomofinterpretationoftherulesofstandingonthebasisoffourelements.53Thesefourelementsdescribethefieldoftensionthatisacourt'sinterpretativespace.Theseelementsequallyindicatetherelativeweightoftheactorswithintherespublica.Theseelementscanbesummarisedas:

− The constitutional relationship; the constitutional possibilities for legal challenges in aformalsense

− Federalism; theexistenceandextentofafederalsystemwithinthestate

46CaseC-50/00PUnióndePequeñosAgricultoresvCounciloftheEuropeanUnion[2002]ECRI-6677para45.47Case294/83Partiécologiste'LesVerts'vEuropeanParliament[1986]ECR1139.48EdwinBorchard,‘FrenchAdministrativeLaw’133,135;CSumnerLobingier,‘AdministrativeLawandDroitAdministratif:A Comparative Study with an Instructive Model’ (1942) 91 University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American LawRegister36,39.49PeterBucher,DerVerfassungskonventaufHerrenchiemsee,vol2(HaraldBoldtVerlag1981).50 PhilippeManin, ‘The Nicolo Case of the Conseil D’Etat: French Constitutional Law and the Supreme AdministrativeCourt’sAcceptanceofthePrimacyofCommunityLawOver,SubsequentNationalStatuteLaw’(1991)28CMLRev499.51BMuller,‘AccesstotheCourtsoftheMemberStatesforNGOsinEnvironmentalMattersunderEuropeanUnionLaw:Judgment of the Court of 12 May 2011 -- Case C-115/09 Trianel and Judgment of 8 March 2011 -- Case C-240/09LesoochranarskeZoskupenie’(2011)23JEL505.52RichardAEdwards,‘JudicialDeferenceundertheHumanRightsAct’(2002)65MLR859.53DavidFeldman,‘PublicInterestLitigationandConstitutionalTheoryinComparativePerspective’(1992)55MLR44.


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− Guidingprinciples; idealssetoutinconstitutionorotherdocumentsofequalstatus − FundamentalRights;theexistenceoffundamentalrightsintheconstitutionalorder,possibly

throughtreatiesorotherinternationalobligations.

These elements were first found in David Feldman’s work on the comparison of divergingdevelopments in the judiciaries of the Commonwealth countries. Yet they can be put to an evenmoreillustrativeuse.Bydevelopingthesefourelementsandusingthemasatheoreticalframeworkontheinterpretativespacefor(supreme)courts,itispossibletogiveshapetothatspace.

Theconstitutionalrelationshipislargelyfoundinthewrittenrequirementsforapplicantslaiddownin the law and the meaning assigned to them by the legislator.54 The constitutional relationshipdefinesthebasicconditionsthatanapplicantwillneedtofulfilinorderbeeligibletohaveherorhiscomplaintheard. Ingeneral, thereare threeapproaches to these requirements:an interestbasedapproach, a personal rights approach and the actio popularis. In general, the interest basedapproach,whereonlyaninterestintheactunderreviewneedstobedemonstratedisseenasmorepermissive than the personal rights approach, where the infringement of a right needs to bedemonstrated.Theactiopopularis,whereanypartycanaskforthereviewofanact,isveryrare.Thefederalistorcentralist tendenciesofastatedefinethebalancebetweencentralanddecentralisedgovernmentandtherelationshipthatthese institutionshavetotheapplicant. Ina federalsystem,anapplicantcanaskfortheprotectionofhisorherfederalrights,whereasacentraliststatewillnothave this added layer of protection. The guiding principles of a state can often be found in thepreambleorformativearticlesofaconstitutionandsetouttheaspirationsofthestate.Theyaimtodefine the state’s nature. In this sense, Germany aims to foster friendly relations with itsneighbours55 and Canada adheres to the concept of ‘Peace, Order andGoodGovernance’.56 Thiscannotonlyhelpasanimportantteleologicaltool,but insomecasesacourtwillbeabletoawardstandingon thebasisofagovernmentactingagainst its constitutionalnatureand limits.57 Finally,fundamentalrightsnotonlylogicallyshapetheinterpretativespacebecausetheycreaterightsandobligations but they are of interest as they can enter into the constitutional order throughinternationaltreaties,creatingradicalshifts.

Through the application of this framework, the following section will paint the picture of theinterpretativespaceasitexistedfortheCJEUattheinceptionoftheEECandhowithasdeveloped.Forthepurposesofthiscontribution,thefourelementsthatshapetheinterpretativespacewillbebrieflydescribedfortheperiodduringthePlaumanncase,toshedlightonthereasoningbehindthisseminalcase.ThesectionfollowingthisexplanationwillexplainhowtheinterpretativespacelimitsPIL. The last perioddescribedwill dealwith theperiod after 2009, inwhich all of theseelementshaveundergonechange.

54Or,ofcourse,theconstitutivebody,whichneednotbeaformallegislator.SeetheUSConstitutionof1787,theFrenchConstitutionof1791,orthePaulskircheConstitutionof1849,noneofwhichweredraftedbytheformallegislativebodyatthetime.55‘[…]vondemWillenbeseelt,alsgleichberechtigtesGliedineinemvereintenEuropademFriedenderWeltzudienen.’-preambleGrundgesetzfürdieBundesrepublikDeutschland(1949).56Aspersection91oftheConstitutionAct,1867.57Famously inGermanytheBVfGhadtoruleonpeacekeepingoperations,see:MarkusZockler, ‘Germany inCollectiveSecuritySystems-AnythingGoes?’(1995)6EJIL.274.


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THEINTERPRETATIVESPACESINCEPLAUMANN

Althoughauthorshavehailedthesuccessof theconstitutionaldevelopmentof theEuropean legalorder,58theearliestdaysoftheprojectwerefraughtwithideologicaldifficulties.Atthetimeofthedraftingof theTreatyofRome, theoriginal idealofa federalEuropewas increasinglybecomingalostdreamratherthanavisionforthefuture.Theresultwasabare-bonesframeworkthatwasofadecidedlyeconomicnature.EventhoughtheGermandelegationpresentatthenegotiationspushedforamorefederalapproach,includingastrongfederalcourt,theinstitutionalarrangementsendedmostly in a system after the French systemof administrative law,with onlyminor concessions.59Whereinafederalcontextasupremecourthasfarreachingpowerstopreservetheboundariesandrights laid down by the agreements in the constitution, the system of the Treaty of Rome wasdistinctly silent.60 Indeed, it was the Court itself thatwould cut through this Gordian knot in thefamousVanGendenLoosandCostavENELcases.61

Given thenatureof the fledglingEEC, it isnot surprising thatnomentionwasmadeofanygrandoverarching ideal in relation tohumanrightsor the furtheranceofpeace in theworld.Where theGerman preamble to its Constitution speaks of Germany's obligation tomaintain friendship withother people and secure the peace,62 the preamble to the Treaty of Rome only hopes that thesharing of resources will lead to peace. Human rights were deemed to be covered by the newlycreatedEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsandweredeliberatelyleftoutoftheTreatytext.Theonlyrightsthatdidfindtheirplaceweresuchrightsastherighttoequalpay.63 Itshouldbenotedthat these rights were mostly constructed to prevent any unfair competition between MemberStates,suchastheuseofwomenaslowcostlabour.

In this context, the role of the Court was extensively discussed. France, which had opposed thecreationofacourtsincethedaysoftheECSCtreaty,didnotagreewiththeliberalinterpretationtheCourthadgiventostandingunderArticle33ECSC.64Thefactthatindustryhadsuchrelativelyeasyaccess totheCourthadnever fittedwellwiththeFrenchconceptof theEuropeanproject.Article173EECwasexplicitlygivenalimitedmeaningasopposedtoitsECSCcounterpart.65Thenegotiatingdelegations were of the opinion that the opening of the standing requirements by the Court ofJusticehadgonetoofar.66AmorelimitedapproachwasexplicitlyandcarefullydraftedtodisallowoverlywideaccesstotheCourtofJustice.ThisisperhapsbestreflectedintheSpaakReport,whichfollowed theMessinaConferenceas a further concretisationof theplans towards theEEC. In the

58ProbablymostfamouslyWeiler:‘TransformationofEurope,The’(1990)100YaleL.J.2403.59DokumenteZumEuropäischenRecht-Band2:Justiz(Bis1957).Availableonline:http://www.springer.com/law/international/book/978-3-540-63498-0[accessed8October2014].60Foranoverviewof the strugglesofearlyAmericancomparative scholars indefininga federal jurisdiction, see:PeterHay, ‘FederalJurisdictionoftheCommonMarketCourt’ (1963)12AmJCompL21;JerryLMashaw,‘Federal Issues inandabouttheJurisdictionoftheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanCommunities’(1965)40TulLRev.21.61Morten Rasmussen, ‘Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law: TheHistory of the Legal Service of theEuropeanExecutive,1952–65’(2012)21ContemporaryEuropeanHistory375.62‘Bythewilltofulfilltoguaranteethelibertyandtherightsofhumans,toarrangethecommunityandeconomiclifeinsocial justice and to serve social progress, to promote the friendship with other people and to secure the peace, theGermanpeoplegavethemselvesthiscondition.’-PreambleGermanBasicLaw194963 Article 119 EEC: ‘Each Member State shall in the course of the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain theapplicationoftheprincipleofequalremunerationforequalworkasbetweenmenandwomenworkers’.64GerhardBebr,Ruleof LawWithin theEuropeanCommunities (Institutd'EtudesEuropéennesde l'Université LibredeBruxelles,1965).65Barav(n1)191.66AnneBoerger-DeSmedt,‘NegotiatingtheFoundationsofEuropeanLaw,1950–57:TheLegalHistoryoftheTreatiesofParisandRome’(2012)21ContemporaryEuropeanHistory339,246.


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report,whosefocuswasonthewaysinwhichmarketintegrationcouldtakeplace,theparagraphontheCourtread:

LaCour,quiseracelledelaC.E.C.A.,serachargéedestatuersurlesplaintesconcernantdesviolationsdutraitéparlesEtatsoulesentreprisesetsurlesrecoursenannulationcontrelesdécisionsde laCommissioneuropéenne, sansavoir lepouvoird'y substituerunedécisionnouvelle.67

There is explicitly nomentionof judicial recourse for individuals and thepowersof theCourt arefurtherlimitedbythefactthat itcannotsubstituteadecisionbytheCommissionthrougharuling.The Court of Justicewas, for all intents and purposes, increasingly an administrative court in theFrench tradition,withan instructionnot to travel the road ithadgonedownbefore.As such, theconstitutionalrelationshipbetweentheCourt,theinstitutionsandthecitizenswasexplicitlylimited.

WhenPlaumanncamebefore theCourt, it found its interpretativespaceseverely limited. It couldnot interpret federal safeguards to suchanextent that the clementine importer couldbegrantedstanding,norcoulditinvokeoverarchingpolicyprinciplesorhumanrightsthatcouldbeusedtogivea more encompassing reading of the text. Perhaps most importantly, the Court knew that thedraftershadgivenaveryspecificmeaningtothetextofArticle173EEC,allthekeypeopleworkinginthesphereoftheCourt,bethatonthebenchorbehindthescenes,hadplayedanactivepartinthe drafting of the Treaty and the creation of the institutions. The individual supplicantwill onlymakeittothetopoftheKirchbergwhenthecaseaffectshimorherinthemostdirectofmanners.

THEIMPOSSIBILITYOFPUBLICINTEREST

Therealfactthatthedogmaof‘individualconcern’posesdifficultiesforthoseintereststhatfacetheimpossibility of individualisation became clear from a series of cases beginning with the famousGreenpeacecase. InthisfirstcaseinwhichanEnvironmentalNGO(ENGO)contestedanactoftheCommission, two things became clear. For one, the Community had matured to the point thatmeasuresweretakenoutsideofthefieldofmarketregulationthatwereclearlyofanadministrativelawnature.Second,thesemeasureswerenoteasilyqualifiablethroughthetraditionalapproachoftheCourtastheydidnotproduceaneffectthatcouldbebroughtdowntoasingleapplicant.Inthiscase,whichdealtwithfundingfortheconstructionofacoal-firedpowerplant,theCourtreliedonearlier case law: associations will be granted standing if their procedural interests have beenaffectedorwhentheirmembersareeachindividuallyconcerned.

Greenpeace illustrates how EU standing requirements are ill-suited for the pursuance of publicinterestlitigation.68Althoughthefactsofthecaseareproblematic,itisclearthattheCommission’sactundertheEuropeanStructuralFundhasnopersonalscopeinrelationtospecificinhabitantsoreconomic operators, it is equally clear that the nature of the act is notwithin the domain of thelegislativemeasurestraditionallycordonedofffromjudicialinterference.TheGreenpeacecasewasa

67 ‘TheCourt,whichwillbe thatof theECSC,willbe responsible for rulingoncomplaintsof violationsof the treatybystatesorbusinessesandonappealsagainstdecisionsoftheEuropeanCommission,withoutthepowertosubstituteanewdecision’,therebyfollowingtheFrenchnotionofanadministrativecourtwithlimitedjudicialdiscretion.RapportdesChefsdeDelegationauxMinistresdesAffairesEtrangeres,2Bp.25(SpaakReport).68Seeforfurthercases:T-117/94AssociazioneAgricoltoridellaProvinciadieRovigoa.o.vCommission[1995]ECRII-455,onappealC-142/95PAssociazioneAgricoltoridellaProvinciadieRovigoa.o.vCommission[1996]ECRI-6669;T-219/95RDanielssonetal.vCommission[1995]ECRII-3051.


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clarioncallthatawakenedthedifferentactorstothefactthattheEuropeanprojecthadevolvedtosuchanextentthatpublicinterestlitigationhadapossibleplaceinit.

ThedebateinitiatedbyGreenpeacecametoaheadbythecircumstancesoftheUPAandJégo-Quérécases.69Inthesecases,issuesofproblemswithindividualisationandtheroleofrights,especiallytherighttoaneffectiveremedy,werelaidbarebytheopinionofAdvocateGeneralJacobs.70Triggeredbyhisextensiveanalysisoftheproblems,71theCourtofFirstInstanceproposedadifferentreadingoftheterm'individualconcern'thantraditionallyusedbytheECJ.72Althoughtheparticularsofthecases and the intra-institutional fight that ensued are not particularly relevant for the thesis putforwardinthiscontribution,theepisodedidcontributeavaluableelementtothediscussion.Jacobsopenedthe floor toawiderdiscussionon justiceandtheroleof the ruleof lawand fundamentalrights within the scope of European law as, in his opinion, the Court did not adhere to theseprinciples.73

TheOpinionwasremarkable,notleastduetotherolethattheCourthasplayedinthedevelopmentof rights and the rule of law. Even before therewas any discussion of Europe's accession to theECHR, itwastheCourtof Justicethat foundandenforcedhumanrightswithintheEuropean legalorderthroughtheconceptof'generalprinciples'.74TheCourtsubsequentlymadeuseoftheserightswhereitcouldtoindividualisecertainapplicantswhenpossible,withoutcrossingthelinetowardsarights-based standing criterion; an option that exists in, for instance, Germany andwas explicitlydismissedwhen theCourtwascreated. It shouldalsobekept inmind thatalthough theCJEUhasmadeuseof the case law from the Strasbourg court in its discovery and interpretationofhumanrights, the right to fair trial and an effective remedy as set out in the ECHR have always beeninterpretedinsuchawayastoallowawidediversityofstandingregimes.75

Similarly,theintroductionoftheconceptoftheRuleofLawcamethroughtheCourt'srulinginLesVerts. The Advocate General's opinion makes it clear that he considers this term to have a far-ranging effect, aswould be expected from a scholar in the Common Law tradition.However, thecontinent does not have such an extensive legal tradition in relation to theRule of Law,which isreflectedinthesubtledifferencesinthewordingofthedifferentlanguageversionsofthecase.Thedifferences in meaning between Rule of Law, rechtsgemeinschaft, communita di diritto andrechtsgemeenschap,combinedwiththeexplanationgivenbytheCourtleadstotheconclusionthatthe Court gives an expansive reading of the principle of legality, not intending to insert a newtheoreticalstandard.76Jacobs,however,wasoftheopinionthatthesystemdidnotensuretheright

69T-173/98UniondePequenosAgricultoresvCouncil [1999]ECR II-3357,C-50/00PUniondePequenosAgricultoresvCouncil[2002]ECRI-6677;T-177/01Jégo-QuéréetCieSAvCommission[2002]ECRII-2365,C263/02PCommissionvJégo-QuéréetCieSA[2004]ECRI-3425UPAdealtwiththeeffectsofaRegulationthataimedtoreorganisethemarketforoliveoilproducts.Jégo-QuérédealtwithaCommissionRegulationthatlaiddownthemeshsizesoffishnetting.70C-50/00PUniondePequenosAgricultoresvCouncil[2002]ECRI-6681.71AnopinionthatisstillwidelycitedandperhapsishismostfamouscontributiontoEUlaw,seeinhisFestschrift:TakisTridimas and Sara Poli, ‘Locus Standi of Individuals under Article 230(4): The Return of Euridice?’,Making EuropeanCommunity Law: The Legacy of AdvocateGeneral Jacobs at the European Court of Justice (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd2008).72Adn70.ToquoteJacobs:‘Inmyopinion,itshouldthereforebeacceptedthatapersonistoberegardedasindividuallyconcerned by a Communitymeasurewhere, by reason of his particular circumstances, themeasure has, or is liable tohave,asubstantialadverseeffectonhisinterests’.73Foraverythoroughoverviewoftheaffair,see:ChristopherBrownandJohnMorijn,‘CaseC-263/02CommissionJego-Quere&CieSA’(2004)41CMLRev1639.74Case4/73J.Nold,Kohlen-undBaustoffgroßhandlungvCommission(1974)ECR491para.13.75AswouldbecomeclearintheBosphorusruling.BosphorusHavaYollariTurizmvIreland(2006)42EHRR1.76 Laurent Pech, ‘“AUnion Founded on the Rule of Law”:Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law as a ConstitutionalPrincipleofEULaw’(2010)6EuConst359,365.


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to an effective remedy, nor did it ensure the existence of the Court’s oft asserted ‘[...] completesystemofremedies’.77

TheOpinionhasbeentherallyingcallforauthorsonpublicinterestlitigation,especiallyinthefieldofenvironmentallaw,whichhasundergonethegreatestdevelopmentswithintheEuropeanproject.Authorshave taken theargument toheartandpublishedextensively,pushing fora change in theCourt’s interpretation.78 However, these arguments come from the wish of the authors to bringabout the level of environmental protection that they feel is needed. The mere wish for widerinterpretationofstandingtoprotecttheenvironment79doesnottakeintoaccountthenatureoftheactsundertakenbytheEUandthelimitsthatnatureimposesontheCourt.Inmostcases,nofurtherreasoningisgivenexcepttheaforementionedgeneralprinciplesandrightsthatneedprotectionbythe Court. But as demonstrated earlier in relation to individual rights, the fact that certainconstitutionalelementsexistdoesnotautomaticallyensurearelationshipbetweenthoserightsandtheapplicantinamannerthatensureslocusstandi.Reductivereasoningliketheaforementionedis,asWaldronwarnsus,80‘outcome-relatedreasoning’andthevaluethereof,nomatterhownobletheaspiration,isnegligibleandnotconduciveforchange.

Inreality,therewereonlysmallshiftsintheEU'slegalorderthroughtheintroductionofthewishfora high level of environmental protection81 and the acceptance of the Court's case law on humanrightsbywayoftheCouncilConclusions.82ThesechangesarehardlyenoughtocauseasignificantshiftinthefourelementstoallowforaninterpretativeshiftbytheCourt.

2009,DIEVERWANDLUNG?

In2009, significant changes to the fourelements that create the interpretative spaceof theCJEUcameintoeffect.Firstandforemost,theentry intoforceoftheTreatyofLisbonbroughtthemostsignificant change to the wording of Article 263 TFEU to date. Second, the Aarhus ConventionformallyenteredintoforceintheEuropeanlegalorder.83Last,theCharterofFundamentalRights,incorporatingarighttoeffectivejudicialprotectionhasgainedthestatusofprimarylaw.84Althoughthese changes superficially seem to address the criticism of the interpretation of the Court, theextenttowhichtheyactuallyshapetheinterpretativespacewillbeoftheessence.

77AsfirstmentionedinLesVertspara23.78See,forinstance:NicolasdeSadeleer,GerhardRollerandMiriamDross,AccesstoJusticeinEnvironmentalMattersandthe Role of NGOs: Empirical Findings and Legal Appraisal (Europa Law Publishing 2005); Ludwig Krämer, ‘TheEnvironmentalComplaintinEULaw’(2009)6JournalforEuropeanEnvironmental&PlanningLaw13;CPoncelet,‘AccesstoJusticeinEnvironmentalMatters--DoestheEuropeanUnionComplywithItsObligations?’(2012)24JEL287.79Krämer(n43)209.80JeremyWaldron,‘TheCoreoftheCaseagainstJudicialReview’(2006)YaleL.J.1346.81AscanbeseenfromtheadditionsmadebytheTreatyofAmsterdamto(then)Article100(a)ensuringthatallmeasuresundertakenbytheCommissionwilltakeasabaseahighlevelofenvironmentalprotection.Anenactmentofthestatementunderthenewpreamble.82OJ1977C103/1CouncilDeclarationonDemocracy,ECBulletin31978p.5.83 Convention onAccess to Information, Public Participation inDecision-Making andAccess to Justice in EnvironmentalMatters38ILM517(1999),asapprovedbytheUnionbywayofDecision2005/370/EECOJL-12484Arguably,theLisbonTreatyhasequallycausedforachangeinthefederalnatureoftheUnionthrough,forinstance,thedefiningofexclusiveandsharedcompetences inrelationtosubsidiarity.Thoughof interest, thesechangeshavenotyetseenuseinthefieldofpublicinterestlitigation.Thiswillbediscussedintheauthor’sforthcomingdoctoralthesisonthissubject.Seeuntilthattime:RSchütze,‘SubsidiarityAfterLisbon:ReinforcingtheSafeguardsofFederalism?’(2009)68CLJ525.


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ThemostobviouselementtohavechangedisthemannerinwhichtheTreatyofLisbonhasaddedanew category of applicants. Although the article largely remains the same, the paragraph on thepossibilitiesfornaturalandlegalpersonsnowreads:

Any natural or legal personmay, under the conditions laid down in the first and secondparagraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is ofdirect and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of directconcerntothemanddoesnotentailimplementingmeasures.85

This innovationwas a result of the discussion circle at the Intergovernmental Conference for theConstitution for Europe. During the negotiations on a constitutional document for the EuropeanUnion,abroaddiscussiontookplaceonallelementsofEuropeanlaw.Withinthediscussioncircleonthe futureof theCourt, the issueof standingwasnaturallydiscussed,but the solutionsproffereddifferedwidely.86Themainproblemseemstohavebeenanagreementonwhattheactualproblemwas that needed tobe resolved.On theonehand, therewas a camp that, in the lineof Jacobs'scomments, wanted to see far-reaching change of the fundamental underpinnings of the Article,somesuggestingtheneedforarights-basedapproachtojudicialreview.87Ontheother,thenarrowviewoftheproblemdealtwiththesituation inJégo-Quéré,88 theonesituation inwhichthiscampwasoftheopinionthatanactualdenialofjusticemayhavetakenplace.Theresultwasthecreationof a clause that is difficult to see out of the context of the original idea behind the Constitution.UndertheConstitution,thenumberandnatureofEuropeanactswassupposedtobereducedandsimplified.89Theconceptofthe'regulatoryact'wouldhavecreatedacategorythatwasbroughttolightbyJégo-Quéré,anactbyanInstitutionthatcreatedanimmediaterealworldeffectwithouttheintercession of another body. Setting themesh size of netting, placing chemical agents on lists,thesearetypesofadministrativeacts thathaveadirect relationshipwiththoseaffectedbythem.Although this seems a clear concept, the clear categorisation of acts did not transfer from theConstitutionintotheTreatyofLisbon,90resultinginthenecessityofinterpretationbytheCourtonwhata'regulatoryact'comprisedpost-Lisbon.

LisbonalsochangedthestatusoftheCharterofFundamentalRightsoftheEU.Wherethestatusofthedocumenthadbeenvaguesinceitsinceptionin2000,theTreatyofLisbonelevatedtheCharterto the status of primary law, reaching equivalence in legal status to the Treaties themselves. TheCharterformallyimplementsanumberofhuman,socialandeconomicrightsintotheEUlegalorder,amongstwhichisArticle47guaranteeingtherighttoaneffectiveremedyandafairtrial.Article47aimstoconsolidateArticle6and13oftheConventionintoonearticleandassuch,theArticleneedstobe interpreted in linewith thecase lawby theStrasbourgCourton fair trial.91Oneof Jacobs'smainpoints in theUPAopinionwas the fact that even though theCharter did not have a formalstatus, the rights stated therein should at least be indicative of theUnion's intentions. The CourtansweredtheAdvocateGeneral'sargumentbyreferringtotheArticlesintheConventionandtoitscaselawwithregardtotheMemberStates,buttheeffectseemedlimittothesemereremarks.ThefactthattheCharternowhasthesamestatusastheTreatiesmakes itanenforceablerightratherthanaguidinglight.

85Article263(4)TFEU,emphasisadded.86SeethefinalreportfortheIntergovernmentalConferencebyCircleI:CONV636/03.87SeetheDraftArticlesforPartTwoontheCourtofJustice:CONV734/03p.2188Seesupran35.AgainsttheUPAformula,itisimpossibleforamemberstatetocreateanimplementingactinsituationswheretheCommissionprescribesacertain(technical)normorstandard.89ArticleI-33,TreatyEstablishingaConstitutionforEuropeOJC310,16.12.2004p.26.90Jean-ClaudePiris,TheLisbonTreaty:ALegalandPoliticalAnalysis(CambridgeUniversityPress2010).91See:Explanationonarticle52ExplanationsRelatingToTheCharterOfFundamentalRightsOJ2007C-303/02


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While Lisbonwas dawning on the horizon, theUnion had committed itself to the obligations laiddown by the Aarhus Convention, a ground-breaking international agreement that seeks to helpcitizensintheenforcementoftheirenvironmentalrights.Assuch,itisbuiltonthree'pillars'thataimto facilitate this, the rights of: access to information; access to decisionmaking procedures; andaccess to justice.Whilst the first twopillarshavebeen implementedwith,arguably, relativeease,thethirdpillarhascausedalotofproblemswithintheEuropeansystemofjudicialprotection.92ThepremiseoftherightsofaccesstojusticewithinthemeaningoftheConventionistheideathateveryperson should be able to have acts that affect his or her direct environment reviewed by anindependentbody.Notonlythat,buttheAarhusConventionexplicitlycreatesaroleforNGOsinthisprocess,obliging signatory states tomake itpossible for them tohaveaccess to justicewhen theprotectionoftheenvironmentistheirstatutorygoal.93

CHANGESINELEMENTS≠CHANGESININTERPRETATIVESPACE

Given the changes discussed above, one would be forgiven for assuming that the Court'sinterpretativespacehaschangedtosuchanextentastocreateapossibilityfortheCourttobemorelenient regarding PIL, at least when involving the environment. However, the opposite seems tohavehappened. Inrecentcase law,theCourthasheldonto itsclassical interpretation,gainsayingthe claims of environmental organisations to their rights.Where NGOs have tried to rely on theAarhusConventiondirectly, it has stated that it is not possible to do sodue to thenatureof theConventionasitisnotsufficientlycleartorelyon.94Ithasmadeuseoftheunclearsituationoftheterm‘regulatoryact’tolimititsinterpretationtothemostliteralmeaningpossible.95Eventheterm'directconcern',whichwasunderdevelopedbeforeLisbon,hasnowbeengivenanewleaseonlife.96Where inearlier cases theCourtwouldnotplace toogreatanemphasison the term,acceptingapartytobedirectlyconcernedwhenthememberstategivingactualeffecttothecontestedmeasuredidnothaveanydiscretion in itsapplication,noweven thecollectionof finesor tariffswillmeanthattheapplicantisnotdirectlyaffectedbytheunderlyingEUact.

Thismayseemremarkable,yetcloserinspectionthroughthelensofthetheoreticalmodelmayofferanexplanation.TheshiftintheelementsthatformtheCourt'sinterpretativespacemayhavebeenfarlessgreatthanassumedonfirstinspection.ThechangestothetextoftheTreatyhaveexplicitlyconsidered the problems faced by both the individual applicant and public interest litigants. Andwhile the regulatoryactwasdeemed tooffer solace for the individual, theplightof, for instance,NGOswasdeemedtofalloutsidethescopeoftheTreaty.97TheExplanationstotheChartermakeclearthatitisnottheintentofArticle47tochangethesystemofjudicialprotectionwithintheEU.98TheAarhusConventionstatesthatitallowsfortherightsitaimstogranttobeachievedwithinthelegal frameworkalready inplace in thesignatorystates. InproceedingsbroughtbyENGOsagainst92Regulation1367/2006/ECOJL-264.93Art.2paragraph5AarhusConvention.94CaseC-401/12PCouncilvVerenigingMilieudefensieandStichtingStopLuchtverontreinigingUtrechtandCase[2015]C-404/12PCouncilvStichtingNatuurenMilieuandPesticideActionNetworkEurope[2015].95CaseC-583/11PInuitTapiriitKanatamiandOthersvParliamentandCouncil[2013].96CaseT-312/14FedercoopescavCommissionthetermhashadsuchanegligiblerolethatitdidnotwarrantdiscussionintheprecedingsections.97FinalReportoftheDiscussionCircleontheCourtofJustice,CONV636/03(2003).However,itshouldbenotedthattheycanformpartoftheproceedingsbeforetheCJEUwhenpartoftheproceedingsinthepreliminaryreferenceproceedingsas a third party intervention. Cf. Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister forCommunications,MarineandNaturalResourcesetal.[2014]notyetreported.98Art.52para2CharterandthecorrespondingtextintheExplanations:‘[…]suchrightsremainsubjecttotheconditionsandlimitsapplicabletotheUnionlawonwhichtheyarebased,andforwhichprovisionismadeintheTreaties’.


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the Union before the body that was instituted by the Convention to ensure compliance of itssignatories, theACCC, the Institutionshave remained firm in their insistence that itmakescorrectuse of this clause.99 Furthermore, the Institutions have made their opinion clear that almost allenvironmental measures fall into the category of ‘legislative act’, a category exempt from the‘AccesstoJustice’provisionsinAarhus.Last,butcertainlynotleast,thedeclarationuponapprovingtheAarhusConventionby theEUexplicitly refers to the fact that itdoessoon theunderstandingthatthesystemofjudicialprotectionwillnotbeaffected.100Again,theCourtfindsitsinterpretativespaceseverelyrestricted.

It has, however, found a solution to its dilemma. Within the four elements of the theoreticalframework,theCourthashadthemostspaceregardingthefederalnatureoftheUnion.Althoughatitsinception,itwasexplicitlynotfederalinnature,certainelementshavegiventheUnionatleastafederal character. The preliminary reference procedure, and the manner in which the Court hasdevelopeditisoneofthoseelements.Inrecentyears,theCourthasproactivelyenforcedtheAarhusConvention when the possibility arose through the references of Member States’ courts. This isespecially astonishing as these rulings go against the grain of the principle of proceduralautonomy,101perhapsoneof the lastareas free fromEuropean interference.102 Somehavecalledthisjudicialsubsidiarity,103butitissubmittedthatinfacttheCourtismakinguseofitsfreedomintheinterpretationofthefederalnatureoftheUniontobringtofruitionfinallythecompletesystemofremediesithasalwaysenvisioned.Bysecuringtherightsofpublicinterestorganisationstobringacase before the national courts104 and by strengthening the obligations under the preliminaryreferenceprocedure,105theCJEUisabletocreateajudicialstructurethroughwhichitcaneffectuaterightsandenforceEUandmemberstateobligations,withoutsteppingovertheboundariesinplaceregardingdirectaction.

CONCLUSION

The use of the theoretical framework of four elements that shape the interpretative space toillustrate the Court of Justice’s limits when interpreting the standing requirements offers acompelling argument regarding the Court’s well documented reticence in relation to access forpublicinterestlitigants.IthasbeendemonstratedthattheCourt’spowerasthefinalarbiterofthe

99 ‘Submissions of the European Commission, on behalf of the European Community, to the Aarhus ConventionComplianceCommitteeconcerningcommunicationACCC/C/2008/32’p.10.100‘[…]theEuropeanCommunityalsodeclaresthatthelegalinstrumentsinforcedonotcoverfullytheimplementationoftheobligationsresultingfromArticle9 (3)oftheConvention’DeclarationuponapprovaloftheConvention.Availableonline:http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/details_notes.jsp?treaty_id=261[accessed14October2016]101JHJans,SPrechalandRJGMWiddershoven(eds),EuropeanisationofPublicLaw:SecondEdition(2ndedition,EuropaLawPublishing2015).102MichalBobek, ‘WhyThere IsNoPrincipleof“ProceduralAutonomy”of theMemberStates’,TheEuropeanCourtofJusticeandtheAutonomyofMemberStates(Intersentia2012).103 George A Bermann, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States’(1994)94ColumLRev331;SanjaBogojević,‘JudicialProtectionofIndividualApplicantsRevisited:AccesstoJusticethroughthePrismofJudicialSubsidiarity’(2015)34YEL5.104 As illustrated in, for instance, Case C-263/08 Djurgården-Lilla Värtans Miljöskyddsförening v Stockholmskommungenomdessmarknämnd [2009] ECR I-9967andCaseC-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenieVLK vMinisterstvoživotnéhoprostrediaSlovenskejrepubliky[2011]ECRI-1255inwhichtheCourtofJusticeorderedfarreachingchangestorespectivelySwedishandSlovakprocedurallawonstandingrequirementsinordertoconformwiththerelevantEuropeanregulationimplementingtheAarhusConvention.InbothcasestheCourtofJusticeinterpretstheRegulationinthelightofthepurposesoftheConvention,achievingamorejudicialresultthantheAarhusConventionComplianceCommitteewouldbeabletoachieve.105CaseC-160/14JoãoFilipeFerreiradaSilvaeBritoandOthersvEstadoPortuguês[2015](notyetreported)


930

Treatyhas,fromtheinceptionoftheEuropeanproject,beenlimitedwhenitcomestoallapplicants.TheframeworkrevealshowtheCourthasbeencreative infindingwaysto individualiseapplicantswhilst remainingwithin the limits these elements set. In doing so, it has proven to give a betterexplanation for the Court’s behaviour and a useful tool for analysis. The rise of public interestlitigationasaresponsetothegrowthoftheEuropeanUnionintoalegalorderthatgoesbeyonditsmerelyeconomicoriginshasofferedachallenge.Althoughchangeshavetakenplaceasaresponsetothisdevelopment, thesechangesaremostlysuperficial innatureandhave in factdonenothingfortheinterpretativespaceoftheCourt.TheCourt’sseeminglyunflinchingapproachto‘individualconcern’isthereforelogicalwhenseenthroughthelensoftheframework. ThelogicalextensionofthisconclusionisthattheCourtwillonlyseethepossibilityforchangewhentheTreatyisredraftedwiththeexplicitwillofthedrafterstoallowforunindividualisablerightstobedefended.ThisisinpartaparticularitythatexistswithintheEuropeanconstitutionalorder,inwhichprimary law cannot be directly changed through other legislation, be it international treaties orsecondary law.However, thisassumptionunderestimates the roleof theotherelements.The factthat the Court is now building on the role of the preliminary reference procedure is moreremarkablethatonemightassumeatfirstglance.Forthelongesttime,theCourthasstatedthattheprocedure as it exists inArticle 267 TFEUwas not a remedy.106 However, in the faceof changingcircumstances, theCourthasdevelopedtheoneelement inwhich ithashad the least limitations:thefederalnatureofthejudicialsystem.

The effects of this development are difficult to predict. On the one hand, the possibilities ofdefendingtheseinterestsbothregardingnationalrulesandUnionmeasureshaveincreasedduetotheCourt’scaselaw.ThiseffecthasbeenreachedwhilststillcomplyingwiththewishesofMemberStates and Institutions to keep the balance as it has always stood. On the other hand, themoreformalcriticismsalreadymentionedbyJacobsremainvalid.Thecost,bothmonetaryandintime,toanENGObeforeitcanactuallyhaveanactbytheUnionanditsInstitutionsreviewed,issubstantial.Theapplicationof theCourt’s intervention is also limited to the fieldofenvironmental law;whensocialrightsincreaseinimportancethisprocesswillhavetotakeplaceagain.Equally,thisapproachhinders the formation of a pan-European NGO movement. This not only hinders the pooling ofknowledgeandresourcesbuthasbeenarguedtobelessefficient.107Althoughthefinalconclusionof this contribution has to be that the Court is making the best use of its severely limitedinterpretativespace,thisconclusionalsohastocomewiththeobiterdictumthatthiswouldnotbenecessaryiftheconstitutivepartiesintheEuropeanlegalorderwouldrealisethatthenatureoftheUnionhaschanged,andPILhasaplaceinit.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincere thanks to theUACES student forum for offeringme the chance to present and for itsinput in developing the argument.Also toDr Lorenzo Squintani,DrDimitry Kochenov and JustineQuinnLL.M.fortheirhelpfulcontributions.

CORRESPONDENCEADDRESS

MatthijsvanWolferen,FacultyofLaw,UniversityofGroningen,P.O.Box72,9700ABGroningen,TheNetherlands[[email protected]].

106CaseC-283/81SrlCILFITandLanificiodiGavardoSpAvMinistryofHealth[1982]ECR3415para.9107CarolHarlow,‘PublicLawandPopularJustice’(2002)65MLR1.

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