united states v. martinez, 1st cir. (2014)

7/26/2019 United States v. Martinez, 1st Cir. (2014)

1/26

United States Court of AppealsFor the First Circuit

No. 12- 2219

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

Appel l ee,

v.

RAYMOND MARTI NEZ,

Def endant , Appel l ant .

APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURTFOR THE DI STRI CT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[ Hon. Pat t i B. Sar i s, U. S. Di st r i ct J udge]

Bef or e

Howar d and Kayat t a, Ci r cui t J udges,and McCaf f ert y, * Di st r i ct J udge.

Wi l l i am W. Fi ck f or appel l ant .Mar k T. Qui nl i van, Assi st ant Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, wi t h whom

Car men M. Or t i z, Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, was on br i ef , f orappel l ee.

August 6, 2014

* Of t he Di st r i ct of New Hampshi r e, si t t i ng by desi gnat i on.


2/26

KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Af t er t he di st r i ct cour t deni ed

hi s mot i on t o suppr ess evi dence of a f i r ear m f ound on hi s per son,

appel l ant Raymond Mart i nez ent er ed a condi t i onal gui l t y pl ea on one

count of possessi ng a f i r ear m as a convi ct ed f el on, see 18 U. S. C.

922( g) ( 1) , r eser vi ng t he r i ght t o appeal t he suppr essi on r ul i ng.

See Fed. R. Cr i m. P. 11( a) ( 2) . He now appeal s t hat r ul i ng, as wel l

as t he di st r i ct cour t ' s appl i cat i on of a si x- l evel sent ence

enhancement based on a f i ndi ng t hat hi s pr i or Massachuset t s

convi ct i on f or assaul t and bat t er y const i t ut ed a "cr i me of

vi ol ence" under t he Sent enci ng Gui del i nes. Though we af f i r m t he

deni al of t he suppr essi on mot i on, we vacat e Mar t i nez' s sent ence and

r emand f or f ur t her pr oceedi ngs.

I. Background

Af t er hol di ng t wo evi dent i ar y hear i ngs on Mar t i nez' s

mot i on t o suppr ess, t he di st r i ct cour t i ssued t he f ol l owi ng

f i ndi ngs of f act , whi ch r emai n l ar gel y unchal l enged on appeal . On

Apr i l 10, 2011, t wo member s of t he "Lat i n Ki ngs" st r eet gang wer e

shot t o deat h as t hey sat i n a car i n Wor cest er , Massachuset t s. The

wake f or one of t he vi ct i ms was schedul ed t o t ake pl ace at a chur ch

i n Frami ngham, Massachuset t s, at 4: 00 PM on Apr i l 14, 2011.

Frami ngham pol i ce of f i cer Rober t Lewi s i nf or med ot her of f i cer s of

t he wake at r ol l cal l bef or e t hei r 4: 00 PM shi f t on Apr i l 14 and

advi sed t hemt hat t her e was a hei ght ened r i sk f or gang vi ol ence i n

t he area. The Fr ami nghamPol i ce Depart ment ass i gned Lewi s, al ong

-2-


3/26

wi t h Detect i ve Mat t hew Gutwi l l and other Fr ami nghaml aw enf orcement

of f i cers, t o moni t or t he ar ea around t he chur ch where the wake was

hel d.

Soon af t er t he wake concl uded, Gut wi l l dr ove by near by

Roosevel t Par k and obser ved a number of car s and peopl e gather i ng

t her e. The par k was l ocat ed cl ose t o an addr ess wher e pol i ce

bel i eved t hat peopl e who had at t ended t he wake woul d congr egate.

Gut wi l l di d not r ecogni ze as gang members any of t he peopl e he saw

t her e. He di d, however , r el ay hi s obser vat i on of t he gat her i ng t o

a di spat cher over t he pol i ce r adi o, expr essi ng concer n t hat

"somet hi ng wasn' t r i ght . "

Upon hear i ng of Gut wi l l ' s message t o t he di spat cher ,

Lewi s dr ove t o t he park. There, he saw t wo marked pol i ce cars

appr oach t he par k and a t hi r d, si l ver car l eave abr upt l y, wi t h i t s

t i r es scr eechi ng. Af t er t he car r an a r ed l i ght , 1 Lewi s pul l ed i t

over , not i f i ed di spat ch t hat he was conduct i ng a t r af f i c st op, and

r equest ed backup.

When he appr oached t he car , Lewi s obser ved f our peopl e

i nsi de. He r ecogni zed t he f r ont - seat passenger as Raymond

Mart i nez, t he appel l ant , whom he had met bef ore and knew t o be a

1 Ther e was conf l i ct i ng t est i mony i n t he di st r i ct cour tr egar di ng whet her t he l i ght was r ed, but t he di st r i ct cour tcr edi t ed t he test i mony suppor t i ng t he concl usi on t hat i t was.Nei t her par t y chal l enges that concl usi on on appeal . See gener al l yUni t ed St at es v. Ander son, 745 F. 3d 593, 598 ( 1st Ci r . 2014)( argument s not advanced on appeal are wai ved) .

-3-


4/26

member of t he "Bl oods" st r eet gang. Lewi s al so knew t hat Mart i nez

had pr evi ousl y been charged wi t h assaul t and bat t ery and dangerous

weapons of f enses. Consequent l y, t hr ough t he open, dr i ver ' s- si de

wi ndow, Lewi s i nst r uct ed t he car ' s occupant s t o keep t hei r hands

where he coul d see t hem. The backseat passengers put t hei r hands

on t he backs of t he headr est s of t he seat s i n f r ont of t hem, and

Mart i nez put hi s hands on t he dashboar d.

Lewi s asked t he dr i ver f or hi s l i cense and r egi st r at i on.

The dr i ver sai d he had nei t her , but i dent i f i ed hi msel f as Mi chael

Ti sme. Lewi s r ecogni zed t hat name as bel ongi ng t o a member of t he

"Bl oods" gang. Af t er bei ng t ol d Ti sme' s name, Lewi s t ol d Ti sme

t hat he smel l ed mar i j uana i n t he car . He t hen or der ed Ti sme t o

exi t t he vehi cl e to be pl aced under ar r est .

At t hat t i me, Lewi s saw Mar t i nez pul l hi s hands of f t he

dashboar d and r each t owar d hi s wai st . Lewi s yel l ed at Mar t i nez t o

put hi s hands back on t he dashboar d, whi ch he di d. Lewi s t hen

conduct ed a pat search of Ti sme and f ound a bag of mar i j uana i n hi s

pocket .

At t hi s poi nt , Gut wi l l ar r i ved on t he scene. Lewi s

warned Gut wi l l t hat Mar t i nez appear ed nervous and had been pul l i ng

hi s hands t owar d hi s wai st , and asked Gut wi l l t o wat ch Mar t i nez.

I n t he cour se of doi ng so, Gut wi l l observed Mar t i nez agai n movi ng

hi s hands of f t he dashboar d t owar d hi s wai st . Al l par t i es now

agr ee t hat Mart i nez was movi ng hi s hands t o hi s wai st t o r each a

-4-


5/26

phone, and that , at some poi nt dur i ng the st op, he managed t o pl ace

a t wel ve- second cal l whi l e i n t he car wi t h t he ot her t wo

passenger s. The evi dence i s conf l i ct i ng as to whet her any of f i cer

act ual l y saw t he phone. The di st r i ct cour t f ound t hat t hey di d

not .

Shor t l y t her eaf t er , a t hi r d l aw enf or cement of f i cer ,

Ser geant Kat hr yn Esposi t o, ar r i ved and hear d Gut wi l l r epeat edl y

or der i ng Mar t i nez t o keep hi s hands on t he dashboar d. Gut wi l l

i nst r uct ed Esposi t o to remove Mar t i nez f r om t he car because

Mar t i nez was r eachi ng f or hi s wai st band. Esposi t o r emoved Mar t i nez

f r om t he car , wal ked hi m t o Gut wi l l ' s near by vehi cl e, and or der ed

hi m t o pl ace hi s hands on t he vehi cl e and spr ead hi s f eet . She

t hen asked i f he had any weapons on hi m. When an answer was not

f or t hcomi ng, she conduct ed a pat - f r i sk of hi m. As she st ar t ed t o

sear ch hi s wai st band, Esposi t o not i ced a har d obj ect t hat f el t l i ke

t he but t of a gun. She asked Mar t i nez, "What ' s t hi s?, " and when he

agai n f ai l ed t o r espond, she tol d hi m not t o move and t hen pul l ed

t he obj ect - - a l oaded f i r ear m- - f r om hi s wai st band. The of f i cer s

t hen pl aced Ti sme and Mart i nez i n handcuf f s.

Mar t i nez was subsequent l y i ndi ct ed f or bei ng a f el on i n

possessi on of a f i r ear m t hat had t r avel ed i n i nt er st at e commer ce.

See 18 U. S. C. 922( g) ( 1) . He moved t o suppr ess t he f i r ear mon t he

gr ound t hat t he of f i cer s had no reasonabl e suspi ci on t hat he was

armed and dangerous when t hey f r i sked hi m. See Ter r y v. Ohi o, 392

-5-


6/26

U. S. 1 ( 1968) . When t he di st r i ct cour t deni ed t hat mot i on,

Mar t i nez ent er ed a gui l t y pl ea condi t i oned on t he r i ght t o appeal

t hat r ul i ng.

Af t er Mar t i nez' s gui l t y pl ea, t he Pr obat i on Of f i ce

pr epared a pr e- sent ence report ( "PSR" ) i n whi ch i t r ecommended a

base of f ense l evel of 20. The r ecommendat i on r est ed on t he

concl usi on t hat Mar t i nez' s 2010 Massachuset t s convi ct i on f or

assaul t and bat t er y, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 13A, qual i f i ed

as a "cr i me of vi ol ence" under t he Sent enci ng Gui del i nes, see

U. S. S. G. 2K2. 1( a) ( 4) , 4B1. 2( a) . Af t er Mar t i nez t i mel y obj ect ed

t o t hat concl usi on, t he di st r i ct cour t hel d a hear i ng at whi ch i t

f ound t hat , i n t he pr ocess of pl eadi ng gui l t y t o t he assaul t and

bat t er y char ge i n st at e cour t , Mar t i nez had admi t t ed f act s t hat

made cl ear t hat hi s convi ct i on was f or i nt ent i onal , har mf ul assaul t

and bat t er y. The di st r i ct cour t t her ef or e concl uded t hat t he

of f ense const i t ut ed a cr i me of vi ol ence, adopt ed t he PSR' s

suggest ed base of f ense l evel of 20, and f ound t hat Mar t i nez' s

Gui del i nes Sent enci ng Range was 70- 87 mont hs, r ather t han t he 37- 46

mont h range t hat woul d have governed had t he "cr i me of vi ol ence"

det er mi nat i on gone t he ot her way. The di st r i ct cour t t hen

sent enced Mart i nez t o 70 mont hs i n pr i son.

Mar t i nez appeal s bot h t he deni al of hi s suppr essi on

mot i on and hi s 70- mont h sent ence. We have j ur i sdi ct i on under 28

U. S. C. 1291.

-6-


7/26

II. Analysis

We addr ess t he suppr essi on mot i on f i r st . Fi ndi ng t hat i t was

pr oper l y deni ed, we t hen di scuss Mar t i nez' s sent ence.

A. The district court did not err in concluding that the search

of Martinez was supported by reasonable suspicion.

Mar t i nez at t acks t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deni al of hi s

mot i on t o suppr ess on bot h f act ual and l egal gr ounds. Fi r st , he

ar gues t hat t he di st r i ct cour t cl ear l y er r ed by cr edi t i ng t he

of f i cer s' t est i mony that t hey genui nel y bel i eved t hat Mar t i nez' s

hand movement s were f ur t i ve and suspi ci ous. Second, he cont endst hat even i f t he di st r i ct cour t di d not cl ear l y er r i n i t s f act

f i ndi ng, t he t ot al i t y of t he ci r cumst ances si mpl y di d not gi ve r i se

t o t he sor t of par t i cul ar i zed suspi ci on necessar y t o suppor t a pat -

f r i sk under Ter r y v. Ohi o, 392 U. S. 1 ( 1968) .

1. The district court's finding that the officers believed

that Martinez had reached for a gun was not clearly

erroneous.

We begi n wi t h Mar t i nez' s f act - based chal l enge. On r evi ew

of a mot i on t o suppr ess, we r evi ew t he di st r i ct cour t ' s f i ndi ngs of

f act and credi bi l i t y det er mi nat i ons onl y f or cl ear er r or . Uni t ed

St at es v. Br ake, 666 F. 3d 800, 804 ( 1st Ci r . 2011) . Thi s def er ence

"r ef l ect s our awar eness t hat t he t r i al j udge, who hear s t he

t est i mony, obser ves t he wi t nesses' demeanor [ , ] and eval uat es t he

f act s f i r st hand, si t s i n t he best posi t i on t o det er mi ne what

act ual l y happened. " Uni t ed St at es v. Young, 105 F. 3d 1, 5 ( 1st

-7-


8/26

Ci r . 1997) ; see al so Uni t ed St at es v. Zapat a, 18 F. 3d 971, 975 ( 1st

Ci r . 1994) . Rever sal i s appr opr i at e "onl y i f , af t er consi der i ng

al l t he evi dence, we ar e l ef t wi t h a def i ni t e and f i r m convi ct i on

t hat a mi st ake has been made. " Br ake, 666 F. 3d at 804 ( i nt ernal

quotat i on marks omi t t ed) .

The r ecor d i s uncont est ed t hat , cont r ar y t o i nst r uct i ons

f r om t he of f i cer s, Mar t i nez r epeat edl y moved hi s hands t o hi s

wai st . I t i s al so cl ear t hat Mar t i nez managed t o pl ace a t wel ve-

second t el ephone cal l dur i ng t he ar r est . Beyond t hat , t he r ecor d

pr esent s a cl assi c swear i ng cont est : Mar t i nez and anot her

i ndi vi dual who was i n t he car , Tr i ni t y Font , swear t hat t he

of f i cer s not i ced t hat i t was a phone f or whi ch Mar t i nez was

r eachi ng; t he of f i cer s swear t hey di d not . Gi ven t he t ense

ci r cumst ance, whi ch we di scuss i n mor e det ai l bel ow, ei t her st or y

i s pl ausi bl e. And t hat i s cer t ai nl y enough t o accept t he di st r i ct

cour t ' s f i ndi ng under t he appl i cabl e st andar d of r evi ew. See,

e. g. , Zapat a, 18 F. 3d at 975. We t her ef or e pr oceed on t he basi s of

t he f act s as t he di st r i ct cour t f ound t hem.

2. The search of Martinez was supported by reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity.

Mar t i nez al so cont ends t hat , even t aki ng as gi ven t he

di st r i ct cour t ' s f actual f i ndi ngs, t he sear ch was unconst i t ut i onal .

I n so ar gui ng, Mar t i nez suggest s t hat Ser geant Esposi t o act ed on

t he basi s of "a mer e hunch, " r at her t han wi t h t he suppor t of

"art i cul abl e f act s" gi vi ng r i se t o a r easonabl e suspi ci on of

-8-


9/26

cr i mi nal act i vi t y. See, e. g. , Uni t ed St at es v. Romai n, 393 F. 3d

63, 71 ( 1st Ci r . 2004) . We r evi ew de novo t he di st r i ct cour t ' s

cont r ar y concl usi on. See Uni t ed St at es v. Zapat a, 18 F. 3d 971, 975

( 1st Ci r . 1994) .

I n Ter r y v. Ohi o, 392 U. S. 1, 27 ( 1968) , t he Supr eme

Cour t concl uded t hat , under t he Four t h Amendment t o t he Uni t ed

St at es Const i t ut i on, " t her e must be a nar r owl y dr awn aut hor i t y to

per mi t a r easonabl e sear ch f or weapons f or t he pr ot ect i on of t he

pol i ce of f i cer , wher e he has r eason t o bel i eve t hat he i s deal i ng

wi t h an armed and dangerous i ndi vi dual , r egardl ess of whether he

has pr obabl e cause t o ar r est t he i ndi vi dual f or a cr i me. " The

Cour t cont i nued, " [ t ] he of f i cer need not be absol ut el y cer t ai n t hat

t he i ndi vi dual i s ar med; t he i ssue i s whet her a reasonabl y pr udent

man i n t he ci r cumst ances woul d be war r ant ed i n t he bel i ef t hat hi s

saf et y or t hat of ot her s was i n danger . " I d.

I nt er pr et i ng Ter r y i n Uni t ed St at es v. McGr egor , 650 F. 3d

813, 821- 23 ( 1st Ci r . 2011) , we hel d t hat a pat - f r i sk f or weapons

was const i t ut i onal where of f i cers had obser ved two men, one a known

gang member wi t h a cr i mi nal r ecor d, dr i ve up t o a hospi t al t o whi ch

t wo ot her gang members who had been shot had been t aken, l eave at

a hi gh r at e of speed wi t h ot her s, and appear "suspi ci ousl y ner vous"

as of f i cer s appr oached t hem. On t he basi s of t hose f act s, we wer e

unwi l l i ng t o "f aul t t he [ di str i ct cour t ' s] f i ndi ng t hat t he pol i ce

act ual l y and r easonabl y suspect ed t hat t he [def endant ] mi ght be

-9-


10/26

ar med- - a suspi ci on r est i ng on r at i onal r easons, r at her t han pur e

gut f eel i ngs- - whi ch . . . j ust i f i ed a l i mi t ed weapons

sear ch . . . . " I d. at 821.

So i t i s her e, a f or t i or i . At t he t i me of Mar t i nez' s

detent i on, of f i cers knew t hat a wake f or a mur dered member of t he

"Lat i n Ki ngs" gang had t aken pl ace t hat eveni ng, and were thus on

pat r ol f or gang vi ol ence i n t hat ar ea. They had observed t he car

i n whi ch Mar t i nez was r i di ng l eave abr upt l y as soon as pol i ce

crui ser s ar r i ved, r unni ng a r ed l i ght i n t he pr ocess. Lewi s had

r ecogni zed Mar t i nez as a member of t he "Bl oods" gang and as an

i ndi vi dual who had pr evi ousl y been charged wi t h dangerous weapons

of f enses and wi t h assaul t and bat t er y. When Ti sme i dent i f i ed

hi msel f , Lewi s had f ur t her r ecogni zed hi s name as bel ongi ng t o a

member of t he "Bl oods" gang. And wi t h al l t hi s backgr ound i n mi nd,

of f i cer s wat ched Mar t i nez r epeat edl y f l out t hei r or der s t o keep hi s

hands on t he dashboar d, i nst ead r eachi ng t oward hi s wai st , as t hey

at t empt ed t o compl et e Ti sme' s ar r est . As i n McGr egor , pol i ce i n a

hi ghl y vol at i l e si t uat i on r el i ed not si mpl y on gut f eel i ngs, but on

obj ect i vel y r easonabl e j ust i f i cat i ons f or suspect i ng t hat an

i ndi vi dual act i ng suspi ci ousl y dur i ng a t r af f i c st op was ar med and

danger ous.

Mart i nez makes no at t empt t o di st i ngui sh McGr egor , but

i nst ead poi nt s us t o t wo ot her cases, Uni t ed St at es v. Mont ei r o,

447 F. 3d 39 ( 1st Ci r . 2006) , and Uni t ed St at es v. McKoy, 428 F. 3d

-10-


11/26

38 ( 1st Ci r . 2005) , whi ch he suggest s ought t o gover n our anal ysi s.

I n Mont ei r o, we hel d t hat a sei zur e of a known gang member was

i mpermi ss i bl e under Ter r y where i t was based onl y on a "mi ni mal l y

cor r obor ated" t i p t hat t he def endant had been i nvol ved i n a

shoot i ng si x days ear l i er . 447 F. 3d at 42- 44. And i n McKoy, we

r ever sed t he deni al of a suppr essi on mot i on, r est i ng on t he gr ound

t hat " [ i ] t i s si mpl y not r easonabl e t o i nf er t hat a dr i ver i s ar med

and dangerous because t he of f i cers bel i eve t hat he appear s ner vous

and reaches t owards t he car ' s consol e when appr oached by t he

pol i ce, even i n a hi gh- cr i me nei ghbor hood. " 428 F. 3d at 41.

We di st i ngui shed each of t hese cases i n McGr egor i t sel f ,

and the gr ounds on whi ch we di d so appl y wi t h the same f orce here.

Mont ei r o st r essed " t hat t he pol i ce had no r eason t o bel i eve t hat

ei t her t he dr i ver or t he passengers had been or were about t o be

cr i mi nal l y act i ve when t he st op occur r ed. " See McGr egor , 650 F. 3d

at 823 ( ci t i ng Mont ei r o, 447 F. 3d at 42- 43) . I n McGr egor , by

cont r ast , t he of f i cer s had "sensi bl y suspect ed t hat t he [ def endant ]

mi ght be ar med and bent on r et al i at i ng f or t he shoot i ng, " and "had

r easonabl y gr ounded t hei r suspi ci on [ i ] n a host of f act s beyond t he

men' s obvi ous ner vousness. " 650 F. 3d at 823. A si mi l ar cont r ast

bet ween t he r easonl ess suspi ci on i n Mont ei r o and t he of f i cer s'

r el i ance on f act s appl i es her e: Whi l e t he of f i cer s' r easonabl e

suspi ci on of Mar t i nez r est ed, per mi ssi bl y, i n par t on hi s

i nvol vement i n past cr i mes, addi t i onal , obj ect i ve f act or s such as

-11-


12/26

t he nat ur e of t he occasi on, t he r eact i on of a car f ul l of gang

member s when a pol i ce car approached, and the r ef usal t o keep hands

vi si bl e al l poi nt ed t owar d a r easonabl e l i kel i hood t hat Mar t i nez

was ar med and potent i al l y dangerous.

Nor does McKoy cast doubt on our concl usi on. As we sai d

i n McGr egor , McKoy "r equi r ed suppr ess i on of evi dence sei zed dur i ng

a war r ant l ess car sear ch, hol di ng t hat t he pol i ce i nf r i nged t he

def endant ' s const i t ut i onal r i ght s by bot t omi ng t hei r suspi ci on

sol el y on hi s appar ent ner vousness and t he ar ea' s danger ousness. "

See McGr egor , 650 F. 3d at 823 ( ci t i ng McKoy, 428 F. 3d at 40- 41) .

Here, as we have expl ai ned, t her e was more. 2

For t he above r easons, we af f i r m t he di st r i ct cour t ' s

deni al of Mar t i nez' s mot i on t o suppr ess.

2 Mar t i nez cr ypt i cal l y cont ends that once Ti sme was ar r est ed," t he pol i ce had no r easonabl e suspi ci on of cr i mi nal act i vi t y t hatwoul d j ust i f y f ur t her i nvest i gat i ve det ent i on or Ter r y st op of t hepassenger s. " See Appel l ant ' s Br . , at 14 & n. 3. Thi s ar gument i snever devel oped at al l i n hi s br i ef , pr esumabl y because i t woul d besuch a st r et ch t o say t hat a gang member who r epeat edl y r eaches f orhi s wai st i n cont r avent i on of di r ect or der s f r om l aw enf or cementdur i ng a const i t ut i onal l y- per mi ssi bl e st op cannot be sear ched f orweapons. See gener al l y Ter r y, 392 U. S. at 10 ( observi ng t hat " t he

pol i ce ar e i n need of an escal at i ng set of f l exi bl e r esponses,gr aduat ed i n r el at i on t o t he amount of i nf or mat i on t hey possess" ) .I n any event , because t he ar gument i s so i ncompl ete t hat we ar eunabl e t o make out i t s cont our s, we decl i ne t o addr ess i t . See,e. g. , Uni t ed St at es v. Zanni no, 895 F. 2d 1, 17 ( 1st Ci r . 1990)( " [ I ] ssues adver t ed to i n a per f unct or y manner , unaccompani ed bysome ef f or t at devel oped argument at i on, are deemed wai ved. " ) .

-12-


13/26

B. The district court erred in concluding that Martinez's base

offense level was 20.

We t ur n now t o Mar t i nez' s chal l enge t o hi s sent ence.

Mart i nez argued unsuccessf ul l y bel ow, and now cl ai ms on appeal ,

t hat hi s base of f ense l evel shoul d have been 14, r at her t han 20,

because hi s 2010 convi ct i on under t he Massachuset t s Assaul t and

Bat t er y st at ut e di d not const i t ut e a "cr i me of vi ol ence" under t he

Sent enci ng Gui del i nes. See U. S. S. G. 2K2. 1( a) ( 4) , 4B1. 2( a) . The

gover nment def ends t he di st r i ct cour t ' s cont r ar y concl usi on and

f ur t her ar gues t hat an addi t i onal convi ct i on of Mar t i nez' s, under

t he Massachuset t s st at ut e cr i mi nal i zi ng si mpl e assaul t , al so

qual i f i es as a cr i me of vi ol ence, and t hus pr ovi des an al t er nat i ve

avenue by whi ch we may af f i r m t he sent ence. Fi ndi ng t hat nei t her

of f ense so qual i f i es, we vacat e Mar t i nez' s sent ence and r emand f or

f ur t her proceedi ngs.

1. Martinez's Massachusetts assault and battery conviction

The quest i on of whet her an of f ense qual i f i es as a cr i me

of vi ol ence i s a qui nt essent i al l y l egal one, and our r evi ew i s de

novo. See Uni t ed St at es v. J onas, 689 F. 3d 83, 86 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) .

Under t he Gui del i nes, an of f ense qual i f i es i f i t i s puni shabl e by

more t han one year of i mpr i sonment and ei t her " ( 1) has as an

el ement t he use, at t empt ed use, or t hr eat ened use of physi cal f or ce

agai nst t he per son of anot her , " or " ( 2) i s bur gl ar y of a dwel l i ng,

ar son, or ext or t i on, i nvol ves use of expl osi ves, or ot her wi se

i nvol ves conduct t hat pr esent s a ser i ous pot ent i al r i sk of physi cal

-13-


14/26

i nj ur y t o anot her . " U. S. S. G. 4B1. 2( a) . 3 As we have expl ai ned i n

det ai l el sewher e, we appl y t hi s st andar d empl oyi ng a "cat egor i cal "

appr oach: A st at e of f ense qual i f i es as a cr i me of vi ol ence onl y i f

i t s el ement s ar e such that we can concl ude t hat a per son convi ct ed

of t he of f ense has "necessar i l y" been f ound gui l t y of conduct t hat

meet s t he above def i ni t i on. Descamps v. Uni t ed St at es, 133 S. Ct .

2276, 2283 ( 2013) ( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) ; see al so

Uni t ed St ates v. Fi sh, No. 12- 1791, 2014 WL 715785, at *2- 12 ( 1st

Ci r . Feb. 26, 2014) . And not wi t hst andi ng t he absence of Si xth

Amendment const r ai nt s i n t he cont ext of Gui del i nes cal cul at i ons, we

have pr evi ousl y det er mi ned t hat t he cat egor i cal appr oach, f or al l

i t s "anomal ous" r esul t s, appl i es f ul l y t o t he det er mi nat i on of

whet her a pr i or of f ense const i t ut es a cr i me of vi ol ence under t he

Gui del i nes. See Uni t ed St at es v. Gi ggey, 551 F. 3d 27, 38- 41 ( 1st

Ci r . 2008) ( en banc) .

"Massachuset t s' s si mpl e assaul t and bat t er y st at ut e[ ]

cover s . . . t hr ee t ypes of bat t er y: ( 1) har mf ul bat t er y; ( 2)

of f ensi ve bat t er y; and ( 3) r eckl ess bat t er y. " See Uni t ed St at es v.

3 We have el sewher e observed t hat t hi s def i ni t i on i s "near l yi dent i cal i n meani ng" t o t hat of t he t er m "vi ol ent f el ony" i n t heAr med Car eer Cr i mi nal Act , 18 U. S. C. 924( e) ( i i ) ( B) . See, e. g. ,Uni t ed St at es v. Hol l oway, 630 F. 3d 252, 254 n. 1, 262 ( 1st Ci r .

2011) ; see al so Uni t ed St at es v. Wi l l i ngs, 588 F. 3d 56, 58 n. 2 ( 1stCi r . 2009) . Though t he meani ngs of t he t wo t er ms ar e "not qui t e[ ]t he same, " see Uni t ed St ates v. Fi sh, No. 12- 1791, 2014 WL 715785,at *2- 12 ( 1st Ci r . Feb. 26, 2014) , bot h par t i es seemt o assume t hatcases i nt er pr et i ng one ar e, i n t he cont ext of t hi s case, equal l yappl i cabl e t o t he ot her . Hear i ng no pr ot est , we " r ef er t o bot hbodi es of j ur i spr udence seaml essl y. " J onas, 689 F. 3d at 86.

-14-


15/26

Hol l oway, 630 F. 3d 252, 256 ( 1st Ci r . 2011) . Mar t i nez ar gues on

appeal t hat , f or t wo separ at e r easons, si mpl e assaul t and bat t er y

under Massachuset t s l aw i s not necessar i l y a cr i me of vi ol ence:

Fi r st , of f ensi ve bat t er y does not necessar i l y i nvol ve vi ol ent

physi cal f or ce, see i d. at 261; J ohnson v. Uni t ed St at es, 559 U. S.

133, 140 ( 2010) ( " . . . t he phr ase ' physi cal f or ce' means vi ol ent

f or ce- - t hat i s, f or ce capabl e of causi ng physi cal pai n or i nj ur y t o

anot her per son. " ) ; and second, r eckl ess bat t er y does not

necessar i l y i nvol ve the degr ee of i nt ent r equi r ed under t he

gui del i nes. 4 Apparent l y concedi ng t hese poi nt s, t he government

ar gues onl y that Mar t i nez pl eaded gui l t y speci f i cal l y to har mf ul

bat t er y. That f or m of t he of f ense r equi r es bot h an i nt ent i onal

t ouchi ng and vi ol ent f orce, see Commonweal t h v. Por r o, 458 Mass.

526, 529- 30 ( 2010) , and al l agr ee t hat i t qual i f i es as a cr i me of

vi ol ence under t he Gui del i nes, see Hol l oway, 630 F. 3d at 257, 262

( 2009) ; see gener al l y U. S. S. G. 4B1. 2( a) ( 1) .

To suppor t i t s cont ent i on t hat t he 2010 convi ct i on was

f or har mf ul bat t er y, t he gover nment r el i es sol el y on t he t r anscr i pt

of Mar t i nez' s 2010 al l ocut i on. See gener al l y Shepar d v. Uni t ed

St at es, 544 U. S. 13, 16 ( 2005) ( hol di ng t hat a sent enci ng cour t

at t empt i ng t o i dent i f y a cr i me of convi ct i on i s "gener al l y l i mi t ed

4 Mar t i nez makes no argument t hat t he Massachuset t s assaul tand bat t er y of f ense, whi ch f al l s under a si ngl e st at ut e t hat doesnot l i st al t er nat i ve el ement s, i s i n f act not di vi si bl e i nt o t hr eesepar at e of f enses. See Uni t ed St ates v. Ander son, 745 F. 3d 593,598 ( 1st Ci r . 2014) . We expr ess no opi ni on on t he mat t er .

-15-


16/26

t o exami ni ng t he stat ut or y def i ni t i on, char gi ng document , wr i t t en

pl ea agr eement , t r anscr i pt of pl ea col l oquy, and any expl i ci t

f act ual f i ndi ng by the t r i al j udge t o whi ch t he def endant

assent ed") . Speci f i cal l y, i t ar gues t hat t he t r anscri pt shows t hat

i n t he cour se of pl eadi ng gui l t y, Mar t i nez admi t t ed t o f act s t hat

made cl ear t hat har mf ul bat t er y was i n f act t he of f ense of

convi ct i on. The por t i on on whi ch t he gover nment r el i es r eads as

f ol l ows:

THE COURT: And t he f act s of t he case?

ASSI STANT DI STRI CT ATTORNEY: Your Honor , on Februar y 12,2009[ , ] of f i cer s of t he Hudson pol i ce depar t ment wer edi spat ched t o 86 Apsl ey St r eet , Apar t ment 4 f or r epor t ofassaul t and bat t er y. Upon ar r i val t hey di d speak wi t h an[ i ndi vi dual ] . She st at ed t hat she had got t en i nt o anargument wi t h her boyf r i end Raymond Mar t i nez and t hat hehad st r uck her dur i ng t he cour se of t hat ar gument . Thosear e the f act s of t he case, Your Honor .

. . .

THE COURT: You admi t t hat you commi t t ed t he of f ense j ustdescr i bed by t he DA?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, si r .

The gover nment makes no ar gument t hat t he act ual of f ense

char ged i ncl uded i nt ent ( or even vi ol ent f or ce) as a necessary

el ement . Nor di d Mar t i nez admi t i n so many words that he

i nt ent i onal l y st r uck hi s gi r l f r i end. The gover nment , t hough,

ar gues t hat when he admi t t ed t hat he "st r uck" hi s gi r l f r i end,

Mar t i nez necessar i l y admi t t ed t hat he i nt ent i onal l y st r uck her .

-16-


17/26

Cert ai nl y t he word st r uck can be used i n a manner t hat

connot at es i nt ent i onal conduct . One of t he def i ni t i ons of "t o

str i ke" i s " t o del i ver or ai m a str oke, bl ow, or t hrust . "

Webst er ' s Thi r d New I nt er nat i onal Di ct i onar y of t he Engl i sh

Language 2262 ( 2002) . And we do not doubt t hat , wi t hout anal ysi s,

one mi ght pr esume that an admi ss i on t hat one "s t r uck" another wi t h

enough f orce t o cause i nj ur y woul d be an admi ss i on t o harmf ul

bat t er y. I ndeed, i n an ear l i er case, we observed t hat a PSR

st at i ng t hat a def endant had "st r uck" an i ndi vi dual "above the l ef t

eye, t ear i ng t he ski n and causi ng i t t o bl eed heavi l y, " woul d, i f

t he PSR coul d be r el i ed upon, "al most cer t ai nl y be suf f i ci ent t o

show" har mf ul bat t er y. See Uni t ed St at es v. Davi s, 676 F. 3d 3, 9

& n. 5 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) .

That obser vat i on i n Davi s, present ed as an asi de i n a

f oot not e, was pl ai nl y di ct um. I n subst ance, i t was ent i r el y

unnecessary t o t he hol di ng, whi ch was t hat t he def endant had made

no showi ng of pr ej udi ce st emmi ng f r omr el i ance on t he PSR, because

he di d not ar gue, even on appeal , t hat hi s pr i or convi ct i on was not

f or t he har mf ul t ype of assaul t and bat t er y. I d. at 9- 10. As

di ct um, t he observat i on war r ant s our car ef ul consi der at i on, but

does not cont r ol t he r esul t s of t hat consi der at i on. See, e. g. ,

Di az- Rodr guez v. Pep Boys Cor p. , 410 F. 3d 56, 61 ( 1st Ci r . 2005) .

I ndeed, even wer e the quot ed observat i on i n Davi s not di ct um, i t

mi ght wel l not cont r ol our deci si on her e, because t he st andar d

-17-


18/26

r ef er r ed t o i n Davi s ( "al most cer t ai nl y") i s l i kel y no l onger t he

cor r ect st andard. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct . at 2283 ( maki ng cl ear

t hat t he quest i on i n cases such as t hi s one i s whet her an ear l i er

convi ct i on r eveal s t hat a def endant i s "necessar i l y . . . gui l t y"

of a cr i me meet i ng t he r eci di vi st st at ut e' s r equi r ement s ( i nt er nal

quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) ) . I n any event , whet her t he st andar d

appl i ed i n Davi s was corr ect or not , we ar e unabl e, wi t h t he

benef i t of f ul l br i ef i ng and an oppor t uni t y t o consi der t he

quest i on when i t s answer makes a di f f er ence, t o agr ee that t he ver b

"t o st r i ke" necessar i l y ( or even "al most cer t ai nl y") descr i bes t he

i nt ent i onal causi ng of cont act . As ear l y as 1894, t he r epor t er of

deci si ons at Massachuset t s' s Supr eme J udi ci al Cour t ( " t he SJ C")

descr i bed a case i n whi ch "detached cars were i n char ge of a

br akeman, who was on t he t op of t he car whi ch st r uck pl ai nt i f f ' s

i nt est at e, and t hi s br akeman cal l ed out t o t he pl ai nt i f f ' s

i nt est at e, t o ' l ook out , ' j ust bef or e he was st r uck, but not i n

t i me t o pr event t he acci dent . " Keene v. New Engl and Mut . Acc.

Ass' n, 161 Mass. 149, 149 ( 1894) . The usage of "st r uck" t o

descr i be acci dent al conduct has persi st ed: For exampl e, when we

r ead t hat a pedest r i an was st r uck i n a cr osswal k, we cer t ai nl y do

not pr esume t he st r i ki ng was i nt ended. E. g. , Kel l eher v. Amer i can

Mut . I ns. Co. of Bost on, 32 Mass. App. Ct . 501 ( 1992) . And i n

myr i ad other cont ext s, common usage makes abundant l y cl ear t hat t he

ver b "t o st r i ke" war r ant s a st at e- of - mi nd qual i f i er wi t hout

-18-


19/26

cr eat i ng r edundancy. See, e. g. , J ohnson v. Uni t ed St at es, 559 U. S.

133, 136- 37 ( 2010) ( speci f yi ng t hat t he Fl or i da assaul t and bat t er y

st at ut e per mi t s convi ct i on i f t he st at e pr oves t hat t he def endant

"' i nt ent i onal l y str uck' t he vi ct i m" ( i nt er nal ci t at i ons and

al t er at i ons omi t t ed) ) ; Roder i ck v. Br andy Hi l l Co. , 36 Mass. App.

Ct . 948, 949 ( 1994) ( descr i bi ng an assaul t i n whi ch t he of f ender

"had obt ai ned [ a] st i ck f r om t he wooded ar ea adj acent t o t he

pl aygr ound j ust bef or e he st r uck [ t he vi ct i m] acci dent al l y i n t he

eye wi t h i t " ) ; see al so Char l es Di ckens, The Ol d Cur i osi t y Shop 409

( Oxf or d Uni v. Press) ( 1987) ( "Ther e ar e chor ds i n t he human hear t - -

st r ange, var yi ng st r i ngs- - whi ch ar e onl y st r uck by acci dent ; whi ch

wi l l r emai n mut e and sensel ess t o appeal s t he most passi onate and

ear nest , and r espond at l ast t o t he sl i ght est casual t ouch. ") .

Even t he ver y di ct i onar y on whi ch t he gover nment r el i es provi des a

def i ni t i on of "t o st r i ke" t hat i ncl udes no i nt ent . See Webst er ' s

Thi r d New I nter nat i onal Di ct i onar y of t he Engl i sh Language 2262

( 2002) ( " . . . t o come i nt o cont act or col l i s i on . . . ") .

I t i s t her ef or e no sur pr i se t hat one of our si st er

ci r cui t s has, i n a cl osel y anal ogous case, f ound t hat t he admi ssi on

of "st r i ki ng" was not an admi ssi on of i nt ent i onal st r i ki ng f or

pur poses of t he Gui del i nes. See Uni t ed St at es v. McFal l s, 592 F. 3d

707, 717 ( 6t h Ci r . 2010) . Faced wi t h an ear l i er convi ct i on i n

whi ch t he i ndi ct ment had char ged t he def endant wi t h "st r i ki ng t he

vi ct i m about t he f ace wi t h an unknown obj ect , i n t hat t he vi ct i m

-19-


20/26

r equi r ed medi cal t r eat ment , " t he Si xth Ci r cui t hel d t hat t he

document di d "not cl ear l y answer t he quest i on of whet her " t he

def endant " act ed pur posef ul l y or knowi ngl y i n

causi ng . . . i nj ur y. " I d. Thi s was so even t hough t he i ndi ct ment

al l eged t hat t he assaul t and bat t er y had caused an "unl awf ul i nj ur y

t o t he per son of sai d vi ct i m, " and despi t e t he f ur t her al l egat i on

t hat t he "st r i k[ e] " was " accompani ed by ci r cumst ances of

aggr avat i on. " I d.

Per haps prepar ed f or our concl usi on t hat t he wor d

"st r uck" does not mean " i nt ent i onal l y st r uck, " t he gover nment

ar gues t hat even i f t he or di nar y meani ng of "st r uck" i mpl i es no

sci ent er , "t he di st r i ct cour t coul d r easonabl y concl ude" t hat , i n

t he cont ext of a domest i c di sput e, t he wor d necessar i l y r ef er r ed t o

a pur posef ul act on Mart i nez' s part . We do not see t hi s ar gument

as havi ng t he f or ce cl ai med by t he gover nment . As an i ni t i al

mat t er , t he gover nment ' s f ocus on what t he di st r i ct cour t "coul d

r easonabl y concl ude f r omt he gui l t y pl ea hear i ng" i s a red her r i ng:

as t he government concedes, see Government ' s Br . , at 26, our r evi ew

i s de novo. Moreover , we f i nd no suppor t i n l aw, l ogi c, or common

exper i ence f or t he not i on t hat al l or even most al l st r i ki ng i n a

domest i c di sput e i s i nt ent i onal . To t he cont r ar y, i t may wel l be

t hat heat ed ar gument i s conduci ve t o cl ose encount er s and reckl ess

gest i cul at i on i n a manner t hat ot her si t uat i ons gi vi ng r i se t o

cont act ar e not .

-20-


21/26

So, when Mar t i nez admi t t ed t hat he st r uck hi s gi r l f r i end

i n what t he gover nment descr i bes as a domest i c di sput e, was he

admi t t i ng t hat he i nt ent i onal l y st r uck her , or t hat he

acci dent al l y, negl i gent l y, or even r eckl essl y st r uck her ? No

Shepard document answers t hi s quest i on. Nor woul d i t make any

di f f erence i f we t hought t hat Mart i nez, a gang member who car r i ed

a gun and had obvi ous i ssues wi t h aut hor i t y, "most l i kel y"

commi t t ed i nt ent i onal bat t er y. Rat her , what i s i mpor t ant i s

whet her Mar t i nez' s assent t o t he use of t he wor d "st r uck"- - ei t her

al one or i n conj unct i on wi t h t he cont ext i n whi ch i t was used- -

act ual l y necessi t at es t he f i ndi ng t hat he admi t t ed t o conduct t hat

was bot h i nt ent i onal and physi cal l y vi ol ent . See Descamps, 133 S.

Ct . at 2284 ( " [ A] convi ct i on based on a gui l t y pl ea can

qual i f y . . . onl y i f t he def endant ' necessar i l y admi t t ed [ t he]

el ement s of t he [ qual i f yi ng] of f ense. ' " ( quot i ng Shepar d, 544 U. S.

at 26) ) . Cl ear l y i t does not .

To summar i ze: Mar t i nez admi t t ed t hat he "st r uck" a

per son. Such a st r i ki ng can occur wi t hout i nt ent , as when a dr unk

dr i ver st r i kes a pedest r i an, or a gest i cul at i ng ber at er swi ngs

r eckl essl y. The gover nment must t her ef or e ar gue t hat , based on t he

ci r cumst ances, t he st r i ki ng t o whi ch Mar t i nez admi t t ed was bot h

i nt ent i onal and f or cef ul . Yet no Shepar d document shows t hat

Mart i nez conf essed t o such an added gl oss. Nor does l ogi c or

exper i ence compel such a r eadi ng of hi s conf essi on. And no

-21-


22/26

pr ecedent aut hor i zes us t o di sr egar d r eal , non- hypot het i cal

uni nt ent i onal conduct t hat coul d ver y wel l have gi ven r i se t o a

convi ct i on or pl ea. Ther ef or e, we cannot say wi t h t he r equi r ed

cer t ai nt y t hat he has been convi ct ed of an of f ense t hat has t he

r equi r ed el ement of i nt ent t o qual i f y as a cr i me of vi ol ence. 5

2. Simple assault

The gover nment f ur t her ar gues t hat , notwi t hst andi ng our

concl usi on as t o Mar t i nez' s assaul t and bat t er y of f ense, we may

af f i r m on t he al t er nat i ve gr ound t hat a separ at e 2009 convi ct i on

f or si mpl e assaul t , see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 13A, qual i f i ed

as a cr i me of vi ol ence. I n par t i cul ar , t he gover nment cont ends

t hat t he cr i me of si mpl e assaul t i s def i ned i n Massachuset t s "as

ei t her an at t empt t o use physi cal f or ce on anot her , or as a t hr eat

of use of physi cal f orce. " See Commonweal t h v. Gorassi , 432 Mass.

244, 248 ( 2000) . The ar gument , i n shor t , i s t hat t he el ement s of

si mpl e assaul t , unl i ke t he el ement s of si mpl e assaul t and bat t er y,

5 Because we f i nd no adequate pr oof t hat Mart i nez admi t t ed t opur posef ul conduct , we have no need t o deci de whet her t he conductwas vi ol ent wi t hi n t he meani ng of t he Gui del i nes. Nor need wer each t he per haps mor e di f f i cul t quest i on of whet her , when t heel ement s of t wo or mor e of f enses ar e not t r ul y "al t er nat i ve, " e. g. ,

Descamps, 133 S. Ct . at 2283- 84, but i nst ead over l ap, a pl eacol l oquy i n whi ch a def endant admi t s t o f act s t hat mi ght have gi venr i se t o a convi ct i on under mor e t han one of t hem never t hel essper mi t s a sent enci ng cour t t o concl ude that t he admi ss i ons wer el egal l y necessary component s of a pl ea t o a more ser i ous char ge,r at her t han ext r aneous f act ual admi ssi ons of f er ed i n t he cour se ofa pl ea on an over l appi ng, per haps l esser char ge.

-22-


23/26

r equi r e t he t ype of i nt ent t hat i s necessar y to qual i f y an of f ense

as a cr i me of vi ol ence under sect i on 4B1. 2( a) ( 1) . 6

The probl em f or t he gover nment i s t hat t he Gui del i nes

al so requi r e "physi cal f or ce, " whi ch has been def i ned as " vi ol ent

f or ce, " see Uni t ed St at es v. J onas, 689 F. 3d 83, 86 ( 1st Ci r . 2012)

( emphasi s added) - - " t hat i s, f or ce capabl e of causi ng physi cal pai n

or i nj ur y t o anot her per son. " See Uni t ed St at es v. J ohnson, 559

U. S. 133, 140 (2010) ; Fi sh, 2014 WL 715785, at *6 ( hol di ng t hat

"si nce [ assaul t and bat t ery wi t h a dangerous weapon, under t he

Massachuset t s s t atut e, ] may be accompl i shed by a mere t ouchi ng,

however sl i ght , i t does not have as an el ement t he use of physi cal

f or ce" ( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) ) . By cont r ast , t he SJ C

hel d i n 1983 t hat t he "physi cal f or ce" t hat suf f i ces under t he

Massachuset t s assaul t st atut e may be a "mere t ouchi ng. " See

Commonweal t h v. Burke, 390 Mass. 480, 482- 83 ( 1983) .

The gover nment concedes t hat t he Gui del i nes st andar d

r equi r es vi ol ent f or ce. I t ar gues, however , t hat Massachuset t s has

mor e recent l y l i mi t ed t he scope of t he assaul t of f ense t o conduct

i nvol vi ng vi ol ent f or ce. Speci f i cal l y, i t poi nt s us t o

Commonweal t h v. Mar i nho, 464 Mass. 115, 131 n. 24 ( 2013) , i n whi ch

t he SJ C st at ed i n di ct umt hat "[ t ] he al t er nat i ve el ement s of si mpl e

assaul t i n Massachuset t s- - t he at t empt ed or t hr eat ened use of

6 Per haps wi sel y, see Uni t ed St ates v. Fi sh, 2014 WL 715785,at *6- 12 ( 1st Ci r . Feb. 26, 2014) , t he gover nment decl i nes t o ar guet hat t he of f ense qual i f i es under sect i on 4B1. 2( a) ( 2) .

-23-


24/26

physi cal f orce agai nst t he person of another , see Commonweal t h v.

Gor assi , 432 Mass. 244, 248 ( 2000) - - mi r r or t he def i ni t i on of

' cr i me[ s] of vi ol ence' under Feder al st at ut e. " 7 And i t f ur t her

r el i es on Gor assi i t sel f , t he case on whi ch t he Mar i nho cour t

r el i ed, i n whi ch, agai n i n di ct um, t he SJ C suggest ed t hat "[ i ] n t he

case of an at t empt ed bat t ery t ype of assaul t . . . t he Commonweal t h

must pr ove t hat t he def endant at t empt ed t o do bodi l y harm. " 432

Mass. at 248.

The gover nment ' s cl ai m t hat mer e of f ensi ve t ouchi ng no

l onger suf f i ces t o suppor t a convi ct i on f or si mpl e assaul t i n

Massachuset t s nevert hel ess appear s at best pr ematur e. For exampl e,

si de- by- si de wi t h t he quot at i on above, t he Gor assi cour t

appr ovi ngl y ci t ed i t s ear l i er deci si on i n Bur ke f or t he pr oposi t i on

t hat "cr i mi nal bat t er y i s a har mf ul or of f ensi ve t ouchi ng, " and

made cl ear t hat an assaul t i s ei t her an at t empt ed bat t er y or a

t hr eat ened one. See 432 Mass. at 347 ( ci t ed i n Gorassi , 432 Mass.

at 247) . Gor assi al so r el i ed on t he SJ C' s ear l i er opi ni on i n

Commonweal t h v. Del gado, 367 Mass. 432, 437 ( 1975) , i n whi ch the

SJ C expl i ci t l y endor sed t he def i ni t i on of assaul t f ound i n t he

Rest atement ( Second) of Tor t s: " [ w] ords do not make t he act or

l i abl e f or assaul t unl ess t oget her wi t h ot her act s or ci r cumst ances

7 Though we def er t o t he SJ C' s const r uct i on of st at eof f enses, see, e. g. , Fi sh, 2014 WL 715785, at *14, t he ul t i mat edet er mi nat i on of whet her an of f ense so const r ued qual i f i es as a"cr i me of vi ol ence" under t he Gui del i nes i s of cour se a mat t er off eder al l aw, see i d.

-24-


25/26

t hey put t he ot her i n reasonabl e appr ehensi on of an i mmi nent

har mf ul or of f ensi ve cont act wi t h hi s per son. " 367 Mass. at 437

n. 3 ( emphasi s added) . And even more r ecent l y, t he SJ C agai n

conf i r med t hat a t hr eat of sl i ght t ouchi ng, i f mer el y of f ensi ve, i s

suf f i ci ent t o est abl i sh a t hr eat ened bat t er y, and t hus an assaul t .

See Commonweal t h v. Por r o, 458 Mass. 526, 529- 31 ( 2010) . At t he

t i me when Mar t i nez was convi ct ed, onl y one Massachuset t s case,

Gor assi , r an agai nst t hi s t i de.

I n shor t , al t hough t he SJ C has occasi onal l y suggest ed i n

di ct um t hat t he of f ense of assaul t mi ght r equi r e a t hr eat or

at t empt t o cause physi cal har m, r at her t han mer e of f ensi ve

t ouchi ng, i t has never r epudi at ed ei t her t he pr i nci pl e that assaul t

i s at t empt ed or t hr eat ened bat t er y or t he pr i nci pl e t hat bat t er y

does not r equi r e vi ol ent f or ce. I n t he f ace of such ambi gui t y, we

ar e const r ai ned t o concl ude t hat t he Massachuset t s assaul t st at ut e

cri mi nal i zes al l t hat t he SJ C has sai d i t cri mi nal i zes, i ncl udi ng

mer e t ouchi ng i f of f ensi ve. We t her ef or e concl ude t hat t he

Massachuset t s assaul t st at ut e does not const i t ut e a cr i me of

vi ol ence under sect i on 4B1. 2 of t he Sent enci ng Gui del i nes, and

consequent l y, t hat t he di st r i ct cour t i mpr oper l y cal cul at ed

Mar t i nez' s base of f ense l evel .

* * *

I n r ul i ng t hat t he government has not shown t hat Mart i nez

was pr evi ousl y convi ct ed of a cr i me of vi ol ence as def i ned i n t he

-25-


26/26

Gui del i nes, we ar e awar e t hat a f ul l expl or at i on of t he f act s

under l yi ng Mar t i nez' s pr i or convi ct i ons mi ght wel l r eveal t hat hi s

conduct has t r ul y been vi ol ent by any measure. But as t o each

of f ense, t he gover nment asks us t o r esol ve ser i ous, l i nger i ng

doubt s i n i t s f avor and agai nst t he def endant , by r el yi ng on

hunches as t o what we t hi nk Mart i nez act ual l y di d. The Supr eme

Cour t , war y of such f or ays beyond t he nar r ow scope of def i ni ng t he

el ement s of an of f ense, has demanded subst ant i al l y mor e cer t ai nt y

i n t he appl i cat i on of t he cat egor i cal appr oach t han t he

gover nment ' s anal ysi s can af f or d. See, e. g. , Tayl or v. Uni t ed

St at es, 495 U. S. 575, 599- 600 ( 1990) . For t hat r eason, and f or

ot her s her e i dent i f i ed, we observe qui t e si mpl y t hat wher e st at e

l aw and t he Shepard document s l eave open a pl ausi bl e and r eal i st i c

possi bi l i t y t hat t he def endant ' s pr i or convi ct i on was f or an

of f ense whose el ement s do not meet t he appl i cabl e def i ni t i on of

r eci di vi st conduct , we cannot si mpl y pr esume t hat t he act ual

conduct qual i f i ed.

III. Conclusion

For t he f or egoi ng r easons, we af f i r m Mar t i nez' s

convi ct i on, vacat e t he di st r i ct cour t ' s or der sent enci ng hi m, and

r emand f or f ur t her proceedi ngs consi st ent wi t h t hi s opi ni on. So

ordered.

-26-

united states v. martinez, 1st cir. (2014)

Documents