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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jason Kokinda : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff

:

vs. : Case No.___ 15-01593___

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al. :

Defendant(s)

ORDER

AND NOW, this _____ day of _____________________, 2016, upon consideration of the

“Motion for Recusal,” it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED that the “Motion for Recusal”

is GRANTED. Out of haste, I made many mistakes in this case; the biggest one being my

refusal to see that Mr. Kokinda has to plead a Monell claim in order to sue Corizon Medical, Inc.

and its D.O.C. employees, and that I obstructed development of these claims (his strongest

theories) unfairly. There is no way around this fundamental error, and it has created the

“appearance of impropriety” in this case, that as a govt. official I am trying to tilt the scales of

justice in favor of other govt. officials. My refusal to admit the error, or to chalk it up as mistake

(from one being so erudite in civil rights Law) would only further the ‘appearance of

impropriety.’ Therefore, I have mandated my own recusal in this case; and hereby rescind all my

decrees seeing how they obstruct the development of the claims. Namely, the dismissal of claims

against defendants in their official capacities with prejudice, and the dismissal of claims that

‘while located outside of the Western District, are necessary to come to an ultimate conclusion

concerning ‘supervisor liability’ and ‘unconstitutional policy’ as the application of a singular

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custom, witnessed by plaintiff, Mr. Kokinda, statewide, in all Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections, prisons. I do not take my decision lightly in this matter, seeing that it is better for a

judge to normalize the process, and let isolated errors be worked on appeal. But, my errors in this

case are so egregious and pervasive, that leaving them for appeal is impossible, if preservation of

the plaintiff’s rights were in order. I recognize that Mr. Kokinda, as a pro se litigant, had no duty

to even specify these legal theories which are so well-known to the judiciary. But, he has brought

the issues up, and will bring them up in any further amendments, and I cannot plausibly obstruct

such a well-established legal claim through personal dicta or misinterpretation. I refused to

clarify issues and break them down in any on-point manner for Mr. Kokinda, leaving him

guessing as to what to do in this case. This is intolerable, in that I had tried to estop Mr. Kokinda

from lawsuit altogether, through negligence to consider the most basic legal theories that would

be applicable to all of his claims. I cannot find any case-law which would undermine the Monell

claims in this case, that would grant the defendants the sovereign immunity I granted; so I just

ignored Mr. Kokinda entirely, holding proceedings virtually ex parte.

BY THE COURT:

_________________________________

District Judge Mark R. Hornak

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jason Kokinda, : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

:

vs. : Case No.___15-01593___

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al. :

Defendant(s),

MOTION FOR RECUSAL

TO JUDGE MARK R. HORNAK OF THE SAID COURT:

Petitioner, Jason Kokinda, pro se, moves for recusal of Mark Hornak, and

represents:

SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Quoting from In Re: Kensington International Limited and Springfield Ass. LLC,

353 F.3d 211, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26554 (Dec. 18, 2003):

Whe e e a judge s i pa tiality might reasonably be questioned in a

judicial proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires that the judge disqualify

himself. The test for recusal under § 455(a) is whether a reasonable person,

with knowledge of all the fa ts, ould o lude that the judge s i pa tiality

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might reasonably be questioned Edelstain v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128 (3d Cir.

1987).

It is of no consequence that the judge is not actually biased because §

455(a) concerns not only fairness to individual litigants, but, equally

i po ta t, it o e s the pu li s o fide e i the judi ia y, hi h ay irreparably be harmed if a case is allowed to proceed before a judge who

appears tainted. Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc, 10 F.3d 155, 162 (3d

Cir. 1993) (quoting School Asbestos, 977 F.2d at 776).

Quoting Jackson Hewitt, Inc. v. National Tax Network, LCC, 2012 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 59162 (D.N.J., April 27, 2012) ( in the absence of extrajudicial bias, a

party seeking recusal must show that a judge has a deep-seated and

u e ui o al a tago is that ould e de fai judg e t i possi le to o tai recusal. Meza-Role, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69503, 2011 WL 2579884, at *2

(citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 127

L.Ed.2d 474 (1994)).

DISCUSSION

1. There is no point in litigating this case any further before this corrupt Judge,

Mark Hornak. He has lost all credibility, by his absurd dictations in this case

and others. His decisions are not even coherent.

2. The litmus test for corruption is simple in this case, to see whether he has

the deep-seated bias that requires recusal for intrajudicial misconducts; as

expounded in Liteky. (See Memorandum of Law In Support of Recusal).

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(a). The most egregious error (of his many pervasive errors) is: that he has

dismissed the § 1983, § 1985, § 1986, issues of the Complaint, against the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, and all defendants in their

official capacities with prejudice, u de his alleged Eleventh Amendment

sovereignty bar;

(1). Citing Will as the bedrock for this decision, and completely ignoring the

Monell claims, as (superfluously) expounded in the Motion for Clarification

of 3/2/2016 Order; Monell claims, where suit against the defendants in

their official capacities is required, as an exception to the Eleventh

Amendment sovereign immunity. (See Pg. 4 ¶(d). of ECF Doc. #16)

(i). Monell claims against the defendants intra-statewide in the aggregate, is

the most objective claim in this case, a dead lawsuit. One that proves a

policy of denying allergy-free diets to inmates; that makes all of the parties

liable in their official capacities, and perhaps in their individual capacities

for going above and beyond to carry out fraud and deception. ADA claims

are more subjective, and have less defined traction in this context; and are

too easily discredited. Therefore, the refusal to acknowledge Monell as an

exception to sovereign immunity by the judge, (and his refusal to allow for

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proof of supe iso lia ility a d u o stitutio al poli ies and customs by

examining customs of prisons in the aggregate, statewide,) is fatal to any

meaningful litigation in this undebatable civil rights violation.

(2). Also, that he does not even discuss what element is lacking (if any) of,

what is on its face made out to be an Eighth Amendment claim of

deli e ate i diffe e e to o goi g se ious i ju y f o efusal to p o ide

basic needs of allergy-free diet.

(3). He instead hides behind off-base boilerplate discussions, which show

an outrageous lack of comprehension for the questions presented by Mr.

Kokinda, (the plaintiff in the Complaint).

3. The only conclusion one can draw is, that Mr. Hornak is a corrupt puppet,

who is not fit to call himself a judge.

(i). When the issues before the court are all so black and white, and the

judge ignores the plaintiff, and simply dismisses all claims with prejudice,

solely upon a legal estoppel incontrovertibly proven inapplicable; it is

impossible to litigate the claims any further. The hole o ept of li e al

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amendment is undermined, by creation of a per se Eleventh Amendment

a solute i u ity a , as he claims (ridiculously) to exist in Will supra.

(ii). It is also plain to see that the Judges are making mere pretences of

add essi g M . Koki da s fili gs, and proceeding with the case, only within

the ost a o , su je ti e, a d t u ated s ope of e ie — a vacuum

that they have created from the initiation — to ultimately preclude any

relief whatsoever.

(iii). Hornak completely undermines the concept of a Motion for

Clarification, when he refuses to clarify at all. Refusing to even admit that

he has made litigation impossible by his dogmatic decrees. It can never be

said, that the current opinions/orders are sufficient in a Motion for

Clarification. There is no such thing on planet earth. Everything could

always be explained clearer and more directly to the litigant s questions, no

matter the content, especially a pro se litigant. Hornak simply o t a s e

the Motion for Clarification of 3/2/2016 Order (ECF Doc. #16)

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(iv). These acts are completely intolerable, and are part of the same type of ex

parte proceedings, under nonsense standards, that Mr. Kokinda has faced in every

court he makes entry before. See Forfeiture Appellant Brief filed in

COMMONWEALTH V. ONE(1) 1992 Volkswagen Passat GL,

VIN #WVWFB4310NE257007, 40 CD 2016; where it is objectively proven that the

fake corrupt puppet judge, Maria L. Dantos held proceedings in same manner. See

also Omnibus Motion filed in 13-CV-2202, Kokinda v. Gilmore, et al., U.S. Dist.

Ct. E.D. Penn.; where it is argued that the courts are not even considering the

plaintiff in proceedings.

(v). This is an indelible record, and one that proves insurmountable

damages, against the Commonwealth and its cohorts, for all of the well

documented evils they have done to Mr. Kokinda.

(vi). But, having an animalistic mentality, all the defendants can do is kick

the can down the road, in hopes of putting far off the day of evil; the

judgment that is ultimately coming against them, when Mr. Kokinda,

through his genius, quickly becomes rich again to lead a great reformation.

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THUS, for each of the foregoing reasons, the recusal of imposter judge

Mark R. Hornak is required immediately; with all of his decisions admittedly

null and void, regardless of whatever he says, because what he does, is the

operative evidence.

The envy of the world,

/s/

Jason Kokinda

420 13th

St.

Hammonton, NJ

08037 (609)-271-8867

SWORN CERTIFICATION

I, Jason Kokinda, certify under penalty of perjury that the facts set

forth in the foregoing documents are true and correct to the best of my

personal knowledge and belief.

Date: March 4th, 2016 /s/_________________________________

Pro Se Petitioner

PROOF OF SERVICE

Date: March 4th, 2016

I, Jason Kokinda, hereby certify under penalty of perjury that this

day I am serving the foregoing documents in the manner listed below,

which service satisfies the civil rules of procedure applicable to a civil

rights action under 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986.

Service by Online/ECF Mail to all of the following parties:

Pittsburgh’s Clerk Office700 Grant Street, Suite 3110

Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1957

Date: March 4th, 2016

/s/_________________________________

Jason Kokinda

420 13th St.

Hammonton, NJ 08037

(609)-271-8867

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jason Kokinda, : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

:

vs. : Case No.___15-01593___

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al. :

Defendant(s),

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECUSAL

I. ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS: And, although Hornak has not

uttered those magic words (recognized in Liteky) that he is fixing the

outcome of the case; he has incontrovertibly proven it by his actions!

A. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d

474 (1994). One Liteky example of deep-seated intrajudicial bias, which

requires recusal; is that of a judge saying, that he is going to ensure

reconviction. The actions of the judges in this case, are in the same vein;

proving with conclusive objectivity, that they are fixing the case for

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dismissal; completely refusing to even clarify their stated opinions in

relation to specific questions, due to the irreconcilable contradictions they

have deliberately created. See Motion for Clarification of 3/2/2016 Order

(ECF Doc. 16) and (ECF Doc. 18) 3/3/2016 Order denying it.

B. By wholly adopting the Magistrate s ‘&‘ ECF Do . #6, Pg.8 at n.2 , Hornak

relies solely upon her discussion of Will v. Michigan Department of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), as his authority to grant immunity to all

defendants in their official capacities — dismissing all §§ 1983, 1985, 1986

claims against them, with prejudice.

1. The Motion for Clarification of 3/2/2016 Order (ECF #16) absolutely

PROVES, that Hornak is not able to answer the specific questions, of how

such a doctrine can apply; especially in light of Monell, and the

unconstitutional policy and supervisor liability issues objectively pled at

¶46. through ¶51., of Complaint, especially.

(a). The errors could not be more egregious. That no matter how perfect a case is

pled, Mr. Kokinda does not have access to any lawful authority, with the sham-

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judges just making up a case for him within their vacuum; designating the case for

destruction before there is any opportunity to even serve parties.

(b). Furthermore, Hornak, points to case-law in his 2/22/2016 Memorandum, at

Pg. 3 (ECF Doc. #12); that he is dismissing claims from other prisons, — by simply

ignoring, that the abovementioned claims (of unconstitutional policies and

supervisor liability ) incontrovertibly hinge upon such unified factual

development — from multiple prisons. There was no distinction in the events at

each prison, to separate them into piecemeal litigation. A pattern is required to

show culpability, and existence of unconstitutional policies and supervisor

liability. Furthermore, the claims would be timebarred, if litigated piecemeal.

(See Ferencz v. Medlock, et al., Civil Action No. 11-1130 (May 15, 2015) R&R

Western Dist. U.S. Dist. Ct. Penn. Memorandum Opinion And Order of the Court,

at Pgs. 10-13 in particular, discussing supervisor liability for la k of poli y, and how deli erate indifferen e is esta lished y pattern of violations for claim.)

(1). Mr. Kokinda dedicated an entire section, V., of Complaint, for, expounding

singular legal and factual questions, that were based on the common conduct of

defendants at all of the prisons he was at. Yet, Hornak, through his ignorance,

concludes impossibly that there is no signal unified theory connecting them.

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(2). The Motion for Clarification of 3/2/2016 Order makes the errors appear

with the most objectivity, in that, Hornak is not able to even make sense of his

own orders — to clarify them.

(3). This is not a case where subjectivity exists; as if, Mr. Kokinda was merely

unhappy with the outcome of a permissible choice by the judge, a challenge to

his discretion. Nor are these the types of tiny errors of judgment that could be

effectively resolved on appeal. This is a wholesale denial of justice, that

fundamentally subverts the rights of the plaintiff at every level; through sheer

ignorance of law and fact; holding proceedings ex parte, as if Mr. Kokinda were

Dred Scott. No civilized society would tolerate this type of judicial foreclosure;

egregiously fixing the case from the door against plaintiff, with no effective

remedy. The Monell based claims against Corizon Medical, (as expounded in

Motion for Clarification of 3/2/2-16 Order ), are the most desirable claims to

litigate, and Hornak has diminished any chance of suit, by foreclosing them

unlawfully (as stated above).

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THEREFORE, for each of the foregoing reasons, if Judge Hornak does not want an

indelible record to forever haunt him, he should recuse himself forthwith to

maintain the appearance of propriety. Denying the recusal motion only proves

further impropriety and corrupt motives behind his misconducts; and objectively

proves that they were not mere errors of law or oversights.

The envy of the world,

/s/

Jason Kokinda

420 13th

St.

Hammonton, NJ

08037 (609)-271-8867

SWORN CERTIFICATION

I, Jason Kokinda, certify under penalty of perjury that the facts set

forth in the foregoing documents are true and correct to the best of my

personal knowledge and belief.

Date: March 4th, 2016 /s/_________________________________

Pro Se Petitioner

PROOF OF SERVICE

Date: March 4th, 2016

I, Jason Kokinda, hereby certify under penalty of perjury that this

day I am serving the foregoing documents in the manner listed below,

which service satisfies the civil rules of procedure applicable to a civil

rights action under 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986.

Service by Online/ECF Mail to all of the following parties:

Pittsburgh’s Clerk Office700 Grant Street, Suite 3110

Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1957

Date: March 4th, 2016

/s/_________________________________

Jason Kokinda

420 13th St.

Hammonton, NJ 08037

(609)-271-8867