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UNDERSTANDING INDIVIDUAL COMPASSIONIN ORGANIZATIONS: THE ROLE OF

APPRAISALS ANDPSYCHOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY

PAUL W. B. ATKINSAustralian National University

SHARON K. PARKERThe University of Western Australia

To enhance compassion in organizations, the processes by which compassion can beenhanced in individuals must be understood. We develop an expanded model of thecomponents of compassionate responding that includes noticing, appraising, feeling,and acting. Using this model, we propose that psychological flexibility (mindfulnesscombined with values-directed action) contributes to enhancing the perceptual, cog-nitive, affective, and behavioral aspects of compassion. Specifically, mindfulnessprocesses support the capacity to be compassionate while values processes motivateeffort to engage in compassionate action. Training in psychological flexibility shouldbe considered as one element of programs designed to increase organizationalcompassion.

I saw that my colleague was upset but I justmoved away. . . . I knew that he had been maderedundant and I thought he might blame mesomehow and that he might get really upset. I’mjust no good at handling it when people get reallyupset. I try and avoid it at all costs (manager’sexplanation for not helping a colleague).

Individuals are not always able to respondcompassionately. The manager quoted above isunable to demonstrate compassion to a workcolleague and avoids strong emotions “at allcosts.” He appears overwhelmed and is unableto let go of his self-focus in order to focus on hiscolleague. Sadly, such instances of a lack ofcompassion can be common in organizations.For example, Frost (2003) cataloged multiple“toxins” that create pain and suffering in theworkplace.

Yet compassion in organizations is recognizedas vital. Dutton, Lilius, and Kanov observed that“as human institutions, organizations are sitesthat inevitably harbor the emotional pain andsuffering of their individual members” (2007:110). These scholars argued that compassion istransformative within organizations: it not onlypromotes healing but builds the quality of rela-tionships among organizational members, cre-ating relational resources such as trust andstrengthening shared values of interconnected-ness. Lilius et al. (2008) described how receiving

compassionate support during critical incidentsnot only increased commitment but was inter-preted as indicating organizational support andthus led to further positive organizational out-comes. Caring social networks have also beenassociated with improved immunity, lowerblood pressure, lower mortality (Boyatzis, Smith,& Blaize, 2006), and greater creativity (Zabelina& Robinson, 2010).

One approach to studying compassion in or-ganizations is to focus on how organizationalculture and practices build compassion (e.g.,Kanov et al., 2004). This approach is criticallyimportant. But it is also vital to understand theprocesses of compassion within individuals.Otherwise, organizations might waste resourcesputting in place practices when individual staffmight be unable, or unready, to experience com-passion. Further, evidence on compassion fa-tigue in the helping professions suggests thatencouraging people to become more compas-sionate, without considering the associated self-regulatory demands, can lead to staff burnout orturnover (Boyatzis et al., 2006; Goetz, Keltner, &Simon-Thomas, 2010; Miller, 2007). Understand-ing the psychology of individual compassion—our core focus here—is critical for developingeffective approaches to enhancing compassionin organizations.

� Academy of Management Review2012, Vol. 37, No. 4, 524–546.http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2010.0490

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We have two specific aims. First, we extendprevious process models of individual compas-sion in organizations by examining the apprais-als associated with compassion. Appraisalshave been neglected in prior models of compas-sion in the workplace. We argue that appraisalsthat the sufferer deserves help and is relevant tothe self will influence whether or not a personfeels compassion. Furthermore, a self-efficacyappraisal that the person has the resources tocope influences whether that person experi-ences empathic concern and acts to alleviatethe other’s suffering or, instead, experiencespersonal distress and behaves defensively inthe presence of suffering. We show how includ-ing appraisals as an element of compassion en-ables a deeper understanding of potential bar-riers to compassion in the workplace.

Second, having developed a more comprehen-sive model of individual compassion, we turn tounderstanding the psychological determinantsof compassion so as to inform how it might beenhanced. We make a case for the importance ofpsychological flexibility—a way of being thatincludes both mindfulness and values-directedaction (Bond, Hayes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2006). Wepropose pathways whereby enhanced mindful-ness is likely to promote more compassionatenoticing, appraising, and feeling and wherebyenhanced values-directed action is likely to pro-mote more compassionate action. We also re-view evidence showing that psychological flex-ibility can be developed, thereby providing aleverage point for enhancing compassion thathas thus far not been considered. We begin bydefining what we mean by individualcompassion.

DEFINING INDIVIDUAL COMPASSION

Scholars generally agree that compassion in-volves both feelings and a response, althoughdifferent researchers have emphasized eitherthe feeling aspect (Davis, 1983; Goetz et al., 2010)or the response aspect (Kanov et al., 2004). Asexpressed by Lazarus, “The core relationaltheme for compassion . . . is being moved by an-other’s suffering and wanting to help” (1991: 289).The inclusion of responding, or actually helpingthe other, as a key element of compassion dif-ferentiates it from related concepts like empathyand aligns with contemporary functional viewsof emotion: “Emotions not only make us feel

something, they make us feel like doing some-thing” (Gross & Thompson, 2007: 5). From thisperspective, compassion is not a single state,action, or feeling. Rather, it is a process involv-ing both feeling and action.

It is also useful to distinguish between want-ing to help in order to alleviate the suffering ofanother and wanting to help in order to alleviateone’s own suffering in the presence of the other’ssuffering. We use the term empathic concern torefer to the “other-oriented emotional responseelicited by and congruent with the perceivedwelfare of a person in need” (Batson & Ahmad,2009: 6). By “other-oriented” emotional re-sponses, we mean feelings of empathy, sympa-thy, and tenderness that prompt action to helpanother. In contrast, personal distress is a “self-focused, aversive reaction to the vicarious expe-rience of another’s emotion (e.g. as discomfort oranxiety)” (Eisenberg, 2010: 130). A person maynotice another’s suffering, but if this activatespersonal distress rather than empathic concern,the individual’s attention and responding willbe diverted to minimizing his or her own dis-tress rather than compassionately responding tothe other.

Kanov et al. (2004) identified three subpro-cesses that collectively define compassion: no-ticing, feeling, and responding. Noticing anotherperson’s suffering is a critical first step, involv-ing becoming aware of the suffering of the other.Feeling involves “suffering with” the other per-son or empathizing with his or her hurt, anguish,or worry. Responding compassionately involvestaking actions to ease or eliminate the otherperson’s suffering (Frost, Dutton, Worline, & Wil-son, 2000). Feeling compassionate does not inev-itably lead to compassionate responding be-cause circumstances might sometimes preventaction. It is also possible that individuals willengage in acts that appear compassionate (e.g.,helping) but arise from motives other than em-pathic concern. Importantly, noticing, feeling,and responding are all necessary for an act tobe considered compassionate (Kanov etal., 2004).

Next we argue that compassion also includesa characteristic set of appraisals, in addition tothe three aspects of compassion identified byKanov et al. (2004). Additionally, we relabel com-passionate responding as compassionate actingbecause noticing, appraising, and feeling canalso be considered compassionate responses.

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IMPORTANCE OF APPRAISAL FORINDIVIDUAL COMPASSION

We concur that noticing, feeling, and actingare all aspects of compassionate responding.However, we propose that a more completemodel of compassion should also include anaspect not mentioned by Kanov et al. (2004)—namely, the person’s appraisals of the situation.After noticing that another is suffering, a personmight feel empathic concern (necessary for com-passion), but he or she might equally feel anger,distress, sadness, coldness, or other emotionsthat do not lead to compassion. The specificemotions that are evoked by noticing sufferingwill depend on the appraisals made. To elabo-rate our arguments, we use the term observer torefer to the person potentially extending com-passion and the term sufferer to refer to thetarget of that compassion.

The specific qualities of an emotion are deter-mined by the appraisals an individual appliesto events, particularly with regard to their impli-cations for the self (Gross & Thompson, 2007;Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). In otherwords, it is not an event per se (noticing anoth-er’s suffering) that gives rise to emotions buthow events are interpreted by the observer (ap-praisals about the sufferer). More specifically,cognitive appraisal theory (Folkman, Lazarus,Dunkelschetter, Delongis, & Gruen, 1986;Lazarus, 1991) identifies appraisals of both thesituation (primary appraisals) and one’s own re-sources for dealing with the situation (second-ary appraisals) as a critical influence on emo-tional responses. Primary and secondaryappraisals combine to affect whether an ob-server regards the person-environment transac-tion as threatening or benign, which, in turn,influences the observer’s emotions. In a similarvein, affective events theory (Weiss & Cropan-

zano, 1996) describes how an individual’s affectin any particular moment depends on apprais-als of transient events in that work environmentand how different emotions arise from differentappraisals.

Drawing on ideas from evolutionary psychol-ogy, Goetz et al. (2010) argued that compassion-ate responding involves making a kind of cost-benefit calculation in which people evaluatewhether the benefits of being compassionateoutweigh the potential costs. In terms of bene-fits, individuals make primary appraisals re-garding whether the sufferer is self-relevantand deserving, and in terms of costs, individualsmake a secondary appraisal regarding theirlevel of resources for responding in a compas-sionate way. This cost-benefit calculationmay not be conscious and does not imply thatcompassion is merely self-interest but, rather,that any adaptive organism naturally considersits own welfare along with the welfare of theother in the process of responding (Lazarus,1991). Next we elaborate how and why theseparticular primary and secondary appraisalsare part of an overall compassionate response(see Figure 1). Our intention with Figure 1 is todepict the unfolding of the constituent elementsof compassion. Later we propose psychologicalprocesses that can enhance these elements ofcompassion.

Noticing another’s suffering leads to feelingsof empathic concern when the observer ap-praises the sufferer as relevant to his or her selfand goals. Appraisal theorists recognize thatgoal relevance determines emotion intensity,with more intense emotions being felt for partic-ularly self-relevant or important events (Scherer,2001). Thus, the more the other’s suffering is in-congruent with the observer’s broader goals andvalues, and the more closely the other relates to

FIGURE 1The Elements of Compassionate Responding

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the observer’s sense of self, the greater the in-tensity of compassionate feelings experiencedby the observer. For example, people are morelikely to extend compassion toward, and hencebe willing to help, those to whom they feel moreclosely related (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, &Neuberg, 1997) or to whom they have similarvalues, preferences, characteristics, or beliefs(Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). However, if the ob-server makes an appraisal that the suffereris not self-relevant, then he or she is unlikely tobe moved by the suffering of another andthereby will not experience empathic concern(Batson, Eklund, Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007).

A further primary appraisal is whether thesufferer is deemed to be deserving of help. Al-truistic behaviors such as compassionate re-sponding produce evolutionary advantages ifthey are directed toward others who are per-ceived to be more altruistic, trustworthy, andcooperative. Otherwise, there is the risk of beingexploited by those perceived to be competitors(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). For example, peoplewho are deemed to be responsible for their ownsuffering are more likely to elicit anger in anobserver than compassionate feelings (Rudolph,Roesch, Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004), as arethose who are deemed to be cold, uncooperative,or nasty (Batson et al., 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick,& Xu, 2002). Furthermore, in a study of confeder-ates playing an economic game and then receiv-ing pain, the neural responses associated withempathy for the sufferer were modulated (inmen at least) by the degree to which the suffererwas appraised as being fair in the game (Singeret al., 2006).

A final critical appraisal is the observer’s be-liefs that he or she can cope with the situation tobring about desired future outcomes or preventundesired outcomes (Roseman & Smith, 2001).We refer to this appraisal as coping self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is an important aspect ofself-regulation “that influences individualchoices, goals, emotional reactions, effort, cop-ing and persistence” (Gist & Mitchell, 1992: 186).Bandura (1988) argued that if individuals lackself-efficacy to deal with disturbing thoughtsand feelings, they will experience high levels ofanxiety and engage in avoidant behavior. Thus,if the observer makes an appraisal that the suf-ferer is self-relevant and deserving, but the ob-server lacks the resources or capabilities tomanage his or her own emotions in the face of

the other’s suffering, the observer is likely toexperience the other’s suffering as aversive andanxiety provoking (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).Faced with such personal distress, the observeris more likely to act defensively rather thancompassionately.

Consistent with this idea, children and adultswho report being more able to regulate theiremotions are more likely to report feeling com-passion rather than distress in the presence ofanother’s suffering (Eisenberg et al., 1994). Fur-ther, a sense of secure attachment, which is re-liably associated with coping self-efficacy (Mi-kulincer & Shaver, 2003), has been positivelyrelated to the extent to which compassion canbe induced experimentally (Mikulincer, Shaver,Gillath, & Nitzberg, 2005). Thus, a person whobelieves he or she has the necessary skills andresources to regulate his or her own emotions ina given context (coping self-efficacy) will bemore likely to feel empathy and seek to assistothers.

We suggest that each of these three apprais-als is required to at least some degree for notic-ing suffering to lead to empathic feelings. Con-sider, for example, a manager who finds herselfin the situation of having to balance her caringfor individual subordinates with the needs of anorganization facing significant staff cuts. If shebelieves that alleviating the suffering of thestaff being downsized is not what her role isabout (an appraisal of non-self-relevance) orthat those to be laid off brought this decisionupon themselves through poor performance (anappraisal of nondeservingness), she is unlikelyto be moved by her staff’s suffering. If the man-ager does feel her staff’s pain but believes she isunable to cope with the situation, the resultinganxiety and personal distress she feels mightprompt defensive reactions that make her feelbetter yet don’t help her staff, such as avoidingsubordinates by being busy or trying to mini-mize the seriousness of the situation throughinappropriate and inauthentic reassurance.

There are also likely to be individual differ-ences in the dominance of these appraisals. Forexample, a person may choose to work in ahomeless shelter because he or she values ex-tending compassion to all people, irrespective ofdeservingness. Such a decision would involveall of the aforementioned appraisals, but thethreshold for appraisals of deservingness wouldbe lower as a result of the self-goal of uncondi-


tional compassion. In this sense the appraisalsmay vary in salience for a given individual, butall are needed to at least some degree for acompassionate response. It is also important torecognize that appraisals of self-relevanceare not the same as selfish appraisals. An indi-vidual with strong prosocial values, for exam-ple, might consider all instances of suffering asrelevant to him or her, given his or her commit-ment to others’ welfare. Prosocial values aredefined as values directed toward preservingand enhancing the welfare of others rather thanbenefiting the self.

It is useful to consider the ordering of theelements of compassion in Figure 1. We baseour argument that appraisals primarily arisebetween noticing and feeling on evidence andtheory regarding self-regulatory capability. Log-ically, individuals must first notice that anotheris suffering. Once they notice this, there may berapid and automatic bodily sensations, but ap-praisals appear to precede, or at least coevolvewith, elaborated emotions, such as empathicconcern (Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). Accord-ing to Gross and Thompson, “There is broadagreement that it is . . . appraisals that give riseto emotional responses” (2007: 5). We thereforeidentify appraisals as intervening between no-ticing and empathic feeling in an overall com-passionate response. Nevertheless, as depictedby the recursive arrows in Figure 1, we recog-nize that noticing, appraising, feeling, and act-ing coevolve and interact dynamically such thateach unfolds to some extent alongside the otheraspects of compassion. For example, while act-ing compassionately, people continue to noticethe other’s reactions and dynamically updatetheir appraisals. Likewise, evidence from stud-ies of self-perception (e.g., Bem, 1967) suggestthat when a person notices he or she is actingcompassionately, this is likely to influence theperson’s appraisals and emotions towardthe other.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY

Having articulated the four elements of com-passionate responding, we now explore howthese aspects of compassion might be enhancedvia psychological flexibility. Our approach topsychological flexibility is based on a functional-contextual (Gifford & Hayes, 1999) account ofhuman language and cognition known as rela-

tional frame theory (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, &Roche, 2001). This approach has, in turn, led to awell-validated, evidence-based approach to im-proving human functioning known as accep-tance and commitment therapy (Hayes, Strosahl,& Wilson, 1999). We commence with a brief over-view of relational frame theory (for a compre-hensive introduction see Torneke, 2010) beforedefining psychological flexibility in terms of aset of psychological subprocesses. We then sys-tematically examine how each of these poten-tially malleable subprocesses of psychologicalflexibility contributes to enhancing compassion-ate responding.

Proponents of relational frame theory view allhuman cognition as the act of relating events orexperiences (Hayes et al., 2001). Language arisesthrough learning and deriving relations be-tween words and events, where events are anyexperience of the world or of the self. The infi-nite generativity of human language arises fromour capacity to infer relations between any-thing, even arbitrary symbols, and to make useof many different types of relations, such asevaluative (better/worse), hierarchical (part of/includes), conditional (causal/if . . . then), andtemporal (before/after) relations. This uniquehuman ability to relate arbitrary cues allows usto step outside the realm of direct sensory expe-rience, formulate a past and a future, and usethose formulations to create meaning and solveproblems. However, this ability also creates hu-man suffering because, for example, people re-member unpleasant experiences, compare theirsituations to those who are better off, and fear-fully anticipate possible futures.

From the perspective of relational frame the-ory, an individual’s relating can be more or lessflexible. Flexibility here refers to the repertoireof different options for response in a given situ-ation. If a particular situation automaticallyevokes only one response, this would be an ex-ample of reduced flexibility of relating. To theextent that a person is able to step back from hisor her automatic response and see it in thebroader context of his or her aims and values,the individual has more options for action and,thus, more flexibility.

The term psychological flexibility refers to be-ing open and curious regarding the present mo-ment and, depending on what the situation af-fords, acting in accordance with one’s chosenvalues (Bond, Flaxman, & Bunce, 2008; Bond et


al., 2006). Instead of trying to control inner expe-rience, people who are more psychologicallyflexible are better able to observe their internalexperiences as they arise in an open, nonelabo-rative, noncontrolling, and nonjudgmental man-ner (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006).Bond et al. provided evidence that “people withhigher levels of psychological flexibility have agreater capacity to notice and respond more ef-fectively to goal-related opportunities at work”(2008: 652). They suggested that this occurred inpart because fewer attentional resources wereexpended in trying to control experience, andbecause being less emotionally disturbed byevents allowed people to more effectively noticethe situation and respond accordingly. In otherwords, individuals who are psychologicallyflexible are more sensitive to context, which al-lows for the more effective pursuit of goals (Bondet al., 2008).

Psychological flexibility can be disaggre-gated into a hierarchy of subprocesses (Figure 2,left-hand side). At a mid level the construct con-sists of mindfulness and values-directed action.As defined within acceptance and commitment

therapy, mindfulness consists of four interre-lated self-regulatory processes (Hayes & Plumb,2007): (1) attending to present moment experi-ence (herein referred to as “present moment con-tact”), (2) recognizing thoughts and feelings aspassing mental events (“defusion from thoughtsand feelings”), (3) acting from a sense of self asa perspective from which experience is ob-served rather than a particular set of identitylabels (“observing approach to self”), and (4) be-ing willing to experience any psychological con-tent, even negative aversive content (“accep-tance of unpleasant thoughts and feelings”).These four processes work interactively to un-dermine the dominance of verbal relating,thereby supporting behavior that is more sensi-tive and responsive to the environment and al-lowing a larger set of contingencies to be no-ticed and a broader behavioral repertoire to beavailable (Vilardaga, 2009). Changing the wayindividuals relate to their own verbal relatingprovides them with the capability to respondmore adaptively in a wider range of contexts.

The second midlevel element of psychologicalflexibility is values-directed action. Values-

FIGURE 2How the Subprocesses of Psychological Flexibility Contribute to Enhancing

the Elements of Compassion


directed action involves two subprocesses: (1)values affirmation, where one’s important val-ues are made cognitively accessible (Stapel &van der Linde, 2011), such as through a processof articulating one’s important life goals, and (2)commitment to values-consistent action, or thedetermination to act in line with one’s importantlife goals. We have argued that compassion ismore than just a feeling; it is a response thatinvolves action. Psychological flexibility is notonly about one’s relationship to inner experi-ences but involves purposeful action motivatedby values and goals. In this sense we see mind-fulness as primarily about the capability to becompassionate, whereas values-directed actionis primarily about the motivation to becompassionate.

Consistent with the above theorizing, studiesshow that psychological flexibility enables indi-viduals to pursue their valued goals in waysthat are constructive and healthy. There is con-siderable evidence for the positive impacts ofpsychological flexibility on work-related depen-dent variables, such as mental health (Flaxman& Bond, 2010a,b; Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010),performance (Bond & Bunce, 2003), physicalwell-being (Donaldson-Feilder & Bond, 2004), apropensity to innovate (Bond & Bunce, 2000), so-cial and emotional functioning (McCracken &Yang, 2008), and a capacity to thrive under con-ditions of greater autonomy (Bond et al., 2008).There is also strong evidence that mindfulnessinterventions can have positive consequencesfor individuals, including increased empathy(Block-Lerner, Adair, Plumb, Rhatigan, & Orsillo,2007; Shapiro, Schwartz, & Bonner, 1998), reducedburnout and increased life satisfaction (Macken-zie, Poulin, & Seidman-Carlson, 2006), improvedmental health (Williams, 2006), greater atten-tional performance and cognitive flexibility(Moore & Malinowski, 2009), improved perfor-mance (Shao & Skarlicki, 2009), and higher au-tonomous motivation and vitality (Brown &Ryan, 2003). To date, however, scholars have notconsidered how psychological flexibility mightenhance compassion.

INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICALFLEXIBILITY ON COMPASSION

Our primary claim in this section is that psy-chological flexibility will lead to enhanced indi-vidual compassion in organizations. To support

this claim we present evidence organized interms of the six subprocesses of psychologicalflexibility. Figure 2 summarizes the relation-ships between psychological flexibility andcompassion for which we believe there is mostevidence. On the left are the “input” processesassociated with psychological flexibility, and onthe right are the “outcome” processes of com-passionate responding. The arrows and inter-vening labels depict possible mediating pro-cesses that explain why psychologicalflexibility increases the likelihood of compas-sionate responding. We now elaborate the ef-fects of each subprocess of psychological flexi-bility on each element of compassionateresponding. It is important to note that, as weelaborate further in the discussion section, ouridentification of pathways is necessarily some-what simplified. In other words, we recognizethat the six subprocesses of psychological flex-ibility interact to reinforce each other in muchmore dynamic and integrative ways than wehave scope to articulate here.

Capability for Compassion: Mindfulness

Mindfulness can be defined in terms of fourelements: (1) present moment contact, (2) defu-sion from thoughts and feelings, (3) observingapproach to self, and (4) acceptance of unpleas-ant thoughts and feelings (Hayes & Plumb, 2007).In this section we explore how each of theseaspects of mindfulness contributes to enhancingindividual compassion.

Present moment contact. Why might a personfail to notice another’s suffering? Consider, forexample, a manager who is too preoccupiedwith an overdue task to notice that an employeeis in distress. In this situation the manager failsto notice cues available in the social environ-ment. If the manager is later asked why hefailed to notice, he might respond that his atten-tion had been directed toward his own thoughtsand goals. We propose that present momentcontact, which refers to deliberately attending tothe present moment, is important because it en-hances the noticing of another’s suffering bydirecting attention to what is actually happen-ing in the situation, rather than attending onlyto one’s own plans, memories, and judgments.

A key element of effective compassion is no-ticing one’s own and others’ emotional cuesavailable in the present moment. Recall our ear-


lier example of a manager who has to lay off astaff member to reduce costs. To respond com-passionately in a lay-off interview with a staffmember, the manager needs to notice not onlywhat the staff member is saying but also howthe person is saying it, including emotional toneand bodily gestures that might indicate suffer-ing. She also needs to correctly interpret staffmember behaviors, such as withdrawal or ag-gression. Such noticing requires a deliberate al-location of attentional resources to what is ac-tually happening in the present situation—directing attention to immediate cues, ratherthan being lost in one’s judgments and verbalconstructions of the past or future. Active listen-ing, if done well (Jentz, 2007), is an example ofdeliberately attending to the present moment asthe listener strives to pay close attention to whatis actually said, and the way in which it is said,to accurately understand the meaning and in-tent of the utterance. It is impossible to take theperspective of another when preoccupied withverbal representations of the past or future, suchas task goals or preexisting beliefs about theperson, rather than attending to the actuality ofwhat is said or done.

There is a growing body of evidence to indi-cate that mindfulness training enhances the ca-pacity to attend to cues available in the presentmoment. For example, McHugh, Simpson, andReed (2010) showed that a brief mindfulness in-tervention reduced stimulus overselectivity inelderly adults. Participants in the mindfulnesscondition were less likely to selectively excludepertinent information. Moore and Malinowski(2009) showed that mindfulness predicted perfor-mance on a concentration and attentional en-durance test, which measured the capacity todirect and sustain attention to the details ofexperience, as well as the Stroop task, whichmeasured the capacity to suppress automati-cally interfering information. Those who weremore mindful were better able to direct theirattention and less likely to react automaticallyto linguistic stimuli. Similarly, Jha, Krompinger,and Baime (2007) showed that meditators wereless susceptible to distraction than nonmedita-tors. Almost all approaches to mindfulnesstraining emphasize attending to stimuli occur-ring in the present moment (e.g., bodily sensa-tions, sounds, etc.) and noticing what is actuallyhappening, as opposed to getting lost inthoughts or feelings in response to what is hap-

pening. The evidence suggests that deliberatelydirecting attention in this way is likely to in-crease the degree to which the observer noticesemotional, physical, and verbal cues regardingthe other’s suffering and also the observer’s ownemotional reactions.

Proposition 1: Present moment contactenhances compassionate noticing bydirecting attention to immediate so-cial and emotional cues regarding an-other’s suffering and one’s ownreactions.

Defusion from thoughts and feelings. Earlierwe argued that primary appraisals of self-relevance and deservingness influence the de-gree to which an observer experiences compas-sion. Additionally, we suggested that theobserver must also believe he or she has theresources to manage his or her emotions in theface of the other’s suffering; otherwise, the ob-server is likely to experience personal distressand engage in defensive behaviors. The waypeople make sense of their experience and oftheir selves is, in our view, a critically importantbut somewhat neglected aspect of compassion.From the perspective of relational frame theory,appraising can be understood as the act ofevaluatively relating one event to another. Ap-praisals of deservingness or coping self-effi-cacy, for example, involve comparisons betweenperceived events and ideal standards. Here wepropose that, to the extent that people are ableto “step back from” their thoughts and feelingsregarding self and others and see thosethoughts and feelings in context (defusion), theywill be less automatically reactive to negativeevaluative judgments of self and others andtherefore will be more likely to respond compas-sionately. We elaborate this process next.

A key aspect of psychological flexibility isdefusion from thoughts and feelings, or the ca-pability to step back from one’s own thoughtsand feelings and see them in context. Defusionis “the recognition of thoughts, feelings andbodily sensations as passing events withoutbuying into the literal content of the temporaland evaluative language that accompaniesthese experiences” (Fletcher, Schoendorff, &Hayes, 2010: 43). Subjectively, the experience ofdefusion feels like “having” thoughts and feel-ings rather than “being” them. Metaphorically, agap is created between the thinker and the con-


tents of thinking, and in this gap there is thepossibility of more effective noticing and moredeliberate choice of response. The opposite ofdefusion is fusion. “Fusion is the processwhereby certain verbal functions of events exertstrong stimulus control over responding to theexclusion of other directly and indirectly avail-able psychological functions” (Wilson & Du-frene, 2008: 55). So, for example, recall the situ-ation of a manager who has to lay somebody off.If she is fused with thoughts, evaluations, andfeelings regarding herself, the other, and/or thesituation, she will struggle to see those thoughtsand feelings as just one possible response to thesituation and, thus, will be more likely to reactautomatically to negative evaluations.

To elaborate this process further, in the pres-ence of others, people continually make rapidand automatic evaluations, and these can inter-fere with noticing and interpreting availablecues regarding self and others. However,thoughts are abstractions of reality, not the re-ality itself. When thoughts, such as appraisalsof self and others, control responding, the capac-ity to question the veracity and usefulness ofthose thoughts is lost. In contrast, when a personis not identified with his or her thoughts andfeelings, that person is less likely to react auto-matically to them. For example, if managers areable to notice themselves judging another asundeserving of compassion, they may choosenot to react immediately to that thought but mayinstead seek additional information to decidewhether the thought is justified. Alternatively, insituations where there is a conflict between anegative appraisal of the other and an intrinsicdesire to help, defusion from the negative ap-praisal will lessen its impact on behavior, in-creasing the likelihood of responding in linewith the intrinsic desire to help.

Consistent with our arguments above, there isevidence to suggest that promoting defusionfrom thoughts and feelings reduces reactivity toautomatic evaluations regarding ourselves andothers. Hayes, Bissett, Roget, et al. (2004) showedthat, relative to a control group that receivedmulticultural training, a psychological flexibil-ity intervention for a group of alcohol and drugcounselors reduced stigmatizing attitudes to-ward clients and burnout at three-month follow-up. Thus, the intervention appeared to work toassist in both self-care and also caring for oth-ers. Masuda et al. (2007) reported similar results

but also showed that the psychological flexibil-ity intervention was most effective in reducingstigmatization for those participants who wereexperientially avoidant or fused with their judg-mental thoughts. Such a process appears to beimplicated in the lack of compassion arisingfrom stereotyping. Masuda et al. (2007) sug-gested that, to the extent that a person is fusedwith his or her categorizations and evaluationsof other human beings, he or she loses contactwith the individual, unique, and dynamic qual-ities of those others available in the presentmoment and sees them instead in terms of gen-eralizations (Hayes, Niccolls, Masuda, & Rye,2002: 298). This process appears to be similar tothe depersonalization of others described byself-categorization theory (Hogg, 2001).

Proposition 2: Defusion from thoughtsand feelings enhances compassionateappraisals by lessening automatic re-activity to negative evaluative judg-ments regarding self and others.

Observing approach to self. People can alsobe more or less fused with their thoughts con-cerning their identity. People often see them-selves in terms of relatively rigid roles and cat-egories, some of which will determine whetheror not they are likely to extend compassion toanother. For example, a person may believe, “Iam not the sort of person who is good at han-dling other people’s pain,” or “I am an engineer,not a therapist.” While such conceptualizationsof self provide a stable sense of identity, theirrigidity can interfere with flexibly responding tothe situation.

An alternative way of relating to self involvesseeing oneself as an observer of experience.Whereas defusion involves noticing one’s ongo-ing flow of emotions, thoughts, and sensations(e.g., “I am having the thought that this is goingto be hard to listen to”), one might also self-reflexively notice the perspective from whichthat awareness arises (e.g., “I notice there is aperspective from which I experience allthoughts and feelings”). From the perspective ofrelational frame theory, this can be understoodas constructing a sense of self as an observer,with thinking being just another aspect of theflow of experience. This subprocess of psycho-logical flexibility is what we call, in Figure 2, an“observing approach to self.”


We propose that an observing approach toself is likely to enhance compassion by reducingthreats to self in the presence of another’s suf-fering. To the extent that a manager identifieswith a particular self-categorization, or withachieving a particular goal, any threat to thatcategorization or goal will be experienced as athreat to self (Petriglieri, 2011). Being in the pres-ence of someone suffering can easily threatenidentity. Consider, for example, a manager whostrongly identifies with always being a “suc-cessful” manager—always able to provide solu-tions to problems. Faced with another’s suffer-ing that he cannot easily alleviate, the manageris brought into contact with his own inability tofix the problem, potentially threatening his con-ceptualized sense of self as successful. Alterna-tively, a manager may identify herself and well-being with always being in control of heremotions. Such a manager may find that beingin the presence of suffering threatens this senseof being in control and, thus, threatens the co-herence of her picture of herself.

Identifying oneself with being an observer ofexperience rather than the contents of experi-ence reduces perceptions of threat. This phe-nomenon is widely utilized in therapy to helpclients relate more effectively to difficult psy-chological content, such as memories, images,self-talk, or feelings (Hayes et al., 1999). Whereasit is easy to evaluate the content of experienceas good or bad, the self as an observer is beyondsuch evaluations. It is simply the awareness ofexperience and, as such, provides a stablesense of self irrespective of the content of expe-rience. Seeing one’s experience in context in thisway provides individuals with a sense of iden-tity (“I am an observer of my experience”) whileallowing them to relate to the contents of theirexperience more flexibly (Torneke, 2010).

Why should contacting a stable sense of selfbeyond threat enhance compassion? Earlier weargued that a coping self-efficacy appraisal canbe seen as a balance of the emotional demandsof the situation against the skills and resourcesthe person believes he or she has to manage thesituation. An observing approach to self ap-pears to reduce the perceived demands of thesituation, thereby enhancing coping self-effi-cacy. To the extent that a person identifies witha stable sense of self beyond threat, that personis less likely to experience another’s sufferingas demanding in the sense that it is aversive

and anxiety provoking (Lazarus & Folkman,1984). Further, if the person has less need todefend a particular self-conceptualization, he orshe has more resources available for managingthe situation. So, for example, a manager who isable to notice his or her feelings of discomfort inthe presence of someone crying, but can simplynotice those feelings of discomfort from the per-spective of an observing approach to self, islikely to experience the situation as less de-manding or threatening than a manager whofeels he or she has to resolve or avoid the prob-lem. Thus, an observing approach to self canenhance coping self-efficacy through reducingthe demands of the situation and freeing re-sources from continual efforts to protect identity(Bond et al., 2008).

Proposition 3: An observing approachto self enhances compassionate ap-praising by reducing the demands ofthe situation (in the form of threats toidentity), thereby enhancing apprais-als of coping self-efficacy.

Acceptance of unpleasant thoughts and feel-ings. Acceptance of unpleasant thoughts andfeelings refers to allowing “thoughts and feel-ings to be as they are without trying to changetheir content, form or frequency” (Fletcher et al.,2010: 43). Acceptance is at the core of modernbehavioral and cognitive therapies, where theemphasis is on helping people change their re-lationship to their experience rather than thecontent, form, or frequency of particularthoughts or feelings (Hayes, Villatte, Levin, &Hildebrandt, 2011). It is now increasingly recog-nized that aversive or unpleasant content is aninevitable aspect of experience, and it is whatpeople do in response to their experience (i.e.,the function of psychological events) rather thanthe content of particular psychological experi-ences that determines long-term well-being andeffectiveness (Hayes et al., 2011). From a rela-tional frame theory perspective, this change inemphasis from changing the content of experi-ence to changing the function of experiencemakes good sense. In brief, proponents of rela-tional frame theory argue that changes to verbalnetworks occur by the addition of new relationsto the relational network, not through subtrac-tion. Therefore, attempts to control experienceby further thinking (e.g., by rumination) simplylead to expanded relational networks that be-


come increasingly difficult to control or avoidand, consequently, to a reduced behavioral rep-ertoire. In contrast, dropping efforts to changethe content, form, or frequency of internal expe-rience (acceptance) enables the flexible choiceof responses that are more effective in the longrun. Importantly, from the perspective of effec-tive action, acceptance of unpleasant thoughtsand feelings does not mean resignation. An in-dividual may accept that something is happen-ing in this moment while simultaneously seek-ing to initiate change so that similarexperiences do not occur in the future.

Acceptance is essentially the opposite of ex-periential avoidance (Fletcher et al., 2010),which is defined as “deliberate efforts to avoidand/or escape from private events such as af-fects, thoughts, memories and bodily sensationswhich are experienced as aversive” (Ruiz, 2010:127). Experiential avoidance is a learned re-sponse that has been negatively reinforced byrepeated experience of short-term diminishmentof discomfort. But, in the long term, there is nowa great deal of evidence to suggest that efforts tocontrol, suppress, and avoid unpleasantthoughts and feelings do not work and can evenaccentuate long-term suffering (for a review seeWegner, 2009).

There is emerging evidence to suggest that, tothe extent that a manager is able to accept his orher unpleasant thoughts and feelings, he or sheis more able to extend compassion to another.For example, McCracken and Yang (2008), in astudy of rehabilitation workers, found that ac-ceptance of unpleasant thoughts and feelingswas negatively associated with stress and pos-itively associated with vitality and social andemotional functioning. Additionally, rehabilita-tion workers with higher levels of acceptancewere less likely to avoid situations in whichthey might encounter the suffering of their cli-ents. Viladarga et al. (in press) similarly foundthat mindfulness predicted levels of burnout(Maslach, Jackson, & Leiter, 1996) among addic-tion counselors. When fused with negative ap-praisals concerning their clients (previous sec-tion), and when unable to accept difficultthoughts and feelings (this section), counselorsbelieved they were less able to cope, less sen-sitive toward their clients, and less able to ef-fectively help their clients (Vilardaga et al.,in press).

We propose two pathways by which accep-tance of unpleasant thoughts and feelings influ-ences compassion. The first operates viachanged appraisals of coping self-efficacy(Proposition 4), whereas the second involveschanges in empathic concern (Proposition 5).However, before describing these two pathwaysin detail, we must first establish why being inthe presence of someone who is suffering can bedemanding, uncomfortable, and aversive.

Imagine what might happen in a meeting be-tween a manager and a subordinate who isabout to be laid off. The subordinate’s distresscan cause the manager to automatically mirrorthat distress (Iacoboni, 2009) and, if not inhib-ited, can create distress-associated autonomicand somatic responses (Preston & de Waal,2002). The manager might remember similartimes when she has been rejected, generatingfeelings of sadness. The manager might be un-sure what to do, generating uncertainty, and shemight be fearful of an aggressive reaction by thesubordinate. In the absence of a belief that shecan cope with all these unpleasant thoughtsand feelings, she is less likely to take the sub-ordinate’s perspective, feel empathy, or engagein prosocial behavior such as caring and help-ing (Alessandri, Caprara, Eisenberg, & Steca,2009; Eisenberg et al., 1994; Eisenberg & Okun,1996; Okun, Shepard, & Eisenberg, 2000).

We propose that repeated experience of ac-ceptance rather than experiential avoidance inthe context of unpleasant thoughts and feelingsleads to enhanced coping self-efficacy beliefs.The most potent source of self-efficacy informa-tion is enactive self-mastery, which occurs whena person repeatedly experiences success in agiven context (Bandura, 1997). Acceptance of un-pleasant thoughts and feelings is a demonstra-bly effective self-regulatory strategy (Hayes,Follette, & Linehan, 2004; Hayes et al., 2006; Ruiz,2010). Through accepting negative thoughts andfeelings and not avoiding the situation or theresponses evoked, the individual will accumu-late positive experiences of being able to effec-tively manage his or her own unpleasantthoughts and feelings while not avoiding theother’s distress, thereby increasing the individ-ual’s longer-term coping self-efficacy. As dis-cussed earlier, coping self-efficacy is a criticalappraisal in the process of compassionateresponding.


Proposition 4: Accepting unpleasantthoughts and feelings enhances ap-praisals of coping self-efficacy by en-abling the observer to repeatedly self-regulate effectively in the presence ofanother’s distress.

Acceptance of unpleasant thoughts and feel-ings also appears to be associated with en-hanced empathic concern and reduced personaldistress. As mentioned earlier, personal distressis a “self-focused, aversive reaction to the vicar-ious experience of another’s emotion (e.g. as dis-comfort or anxiety)” (Eisenberg, 2010: 130). A per-son may notice another’s suffering, but if thisactivates personal distress, the person’s atten-tion and concern will be diverted toward him/herself rather than the other, and the person willbe more focused on minimizing his or her per-sonal distress rather than responding compas-sionately (Eisenberg, 2010). In contrast, allowingthoughts and feelings to be as they are, withouttrying to change their content, form, or fre-quency, is reliably associated with reduced per-severative efforts to regulate negative emotionand control personal distress.

Over many studies, Eisenberg and her col-leagues generally found that enhanced self-regulatory capability is associated with en-hanced empathic concern for the other andlower levels of personal distress in the presenceof another’s suffering (Eisenberg, 2010). For ex-ample, children and adults who believe they arebetter able to regulate their emotions are morelikely to report feeling other-oriented concernrather than personal distress in the presence ofanother’s suffering (Eisenberg et al., 1994). Whenindividuals accept negative thoughts and feel-ings, they do not direct energy toward efforts tocontrol or avoid the primary experience of dis-tress, and this then provides more resources andenergy to focus on the other and the other’ssuffering. Returning to a manager who has tolay off employees, acceptance will not diminishthe objective difficulty of the situation—whichwill remain unpleasant—but is likely to reducethe manager’s personal distress, enabling agreater willingness to engage with the othersand providing more emotional resources for ex-tending empathic concern.

Proposition 5: Accepting unpleasantthoughts and feelings reduces thelikelihood of personal distress, thereby

providing resources for compassionatefeelings (empathic concern) for another.

Motivation for Compassion:Values-Directed Action

Thus far we have argued that the subpro-cesses of mindfulness contribute to more com-passionate noticing, appraising, and feeling inresponse to another’s suffering (Figure 2). How-ever, compassion also includes acting to ame-liorate the suffering of the other (Lazarus, 1991).Thus, while psychological flexibility expandsindividual capability to notice suffering, makemore compassionate appraisals, and feel em-pathic concern, we have not yet addressed whatmotivates an individual to actually engage incompassionate action. Here we argue that theelements of mindfulness help one act in linewith one’s values. That is, “acceptance, defu-sion, being present, and so on are not ends inthemselves; rather they clear the path for a morevital, values consistent life” (Hayes et al., 2006:9). For example, above we argued that cultivat-ing defusion from thoughts and feelings ap-pears to lessen automatic reactivity to negativeevaluations. Here we argue that defusion and itsassociated consequences (as well as the otherelements of mindfulness and their associatedconsequences) pave the way for deliberate re-sponding in line with one’s values. We definevalues as “verbally constructed, globally-desired life directions” (Wilson, Hayes, Gregg, &Zettle, 2001: 235).

Psychological flexibility includes two impor-tant elements with respect to values-directedaction: (1) values affirmation and (2) commit-ment to values-directed action. In this sectionwe argue that values affirmation reduces defen-sive responses to situations involving sufferingand thereby increases the likelihood of compas-sionate action. We additionally suggest thatcommitment to values-directed action can resultin individuals’ effective self-regulation to act inaccordance with their values, thereby enhanc-ing their compassionate action. We propose thislatter pathway is moderated by an individual’sprosocial values (the stronger an individual’sprosocial values, the more that commitment tovalues-directed action will lead to compassion-ate action) and the work context (for individualswith prosocial values, the effect of goal regula-tion on compassionate action will be further


strengthened by a prosocial work climate). Weelaborate the thinking behind these proposi-tions next.

Values affirmation. Values affirmation (or“contact with values,” as it is referred to in thepsychological flexibility literature) occurs whenone’s personally important values are madecognitively accessible (Stapel & van der Linde,2011), such as through a process of identifyingwhen one feels most vital and alive. Values af-firmation is important because theory suggeststhat values will only influence behavior if theyare accessible in the moment of action. For ex-ample, Schwartz argued that “values affect be-havior only if they are activated and if, at somelevel of awareness, they are experienced as rel-evant in the context” (2010: 230). There are manyways in which values affirmation can bebrought about. For example, in social psycho-logical studies it is typically achieved by askingindividuals to rank values and then write aboutwhy their most important value is important.Likewise, psychological flexibility interventionssuch as acceptance and commitment therapyoften encourage individuals to identify andelaborate their core values, making them morereadily accessible as a guide to behavior in anygiven moment.

We propose that values affirmation contrib-utes to compassion because it reduces the ten-dency to behave defensively in emotionallydifficult situations (Crocker, Niiya, & Misch-kowski, 2008; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). We seedefensive behavior as the outward expressionof attempts to control and minimize aversiveprivate experience, defined earlier as experi-ential avoidance. When individuals behave de-fensively in the face of another’s suffering, theyavoid the other’s emotional experience and,thus, are unlikely to reach out to help the other.In contrast, when an individual is not feelingthreatened and overwhelmed by another’s suf-fering, the individual is less inclined to avoidthe situation by, for example, walking away,denying suffering is occurring, or derogating thesufferer and, instead, is more likely to help thesufferer.

There are two key theoretical ways in whichvalues affirmation reduces defensive behavior.One way is through self-affirmation. That is,affirming one’s important values enhancesone’s self-integrity and self-worth, which leadsto lower perceived threat and reduced defen-

siveness (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Values affir-mation enhances one’s clarity about one’s self(knowing who I am), and therefore one is moreresilient to information that might otherwisethreaten the self (Stapel & van der Linde, 2011).There are many studies that show how valuesaffirmation reduces defensiveness. For exam-ple, when heavy alcohol consumers write aboutimportant values, they are more receptive toself-threatening information linking alcohol useto negative health outcomes (Harris & Napper,2005). Likewise, values affirmation has beenlinked to reduced prejudice toward others (Fein& Spencer, 1997). Because people feel betterabout themselves as a result of values affirma-tion, they are less likely to try to boost theirself-worth by derogating outgroup members. Inthe context of compassion, values affirmationmeans that individuals will better know “whothey are” and have a stronger sense of self-worth; hence, they will be less threatened andoverwhelmed by another’s suffering andthereby less defensive and experientiallyavoidant.

A second way in which values affirmation re-duces defensive behavior is through a processof self-transcendence. Crocker et al. (2008) rea-soned that when individuals reflect on and writeabout important values, this reminds them ofwhat they care about beyond themselves,thereby inducing other-directed feelings and,hence, greater openness to potentially self-threatening information. In two studies Crockeret al. (2008) had participants write for ten min-utes about their most important value and whyit was important and meaningful for them. Theythen asked participants to rate their experienceof a range of positive or negative emotions. Par-ticipants who reflected on important valueswere far more likely to report positive, lovingfeelings than those in a control condition whoreflected on unimportant values, regardless ofthe content of the particular value that theychose. The relative enhancement of positivefeelings was larger for other-directed than forself-directed positive emotions, suggesting thatvalues affirmation specifically enhances proso-cial emotions. Further, the relationship betweenvalues affirmation and acceptance of a poten-tially threatening stimulus was mediated by theintensity of loving feeling, leading Crocker et al.to conclude that “values-affirmation manipula-tions remind participants of people or things


beyond themselves that they care about andthat are more important than temporary feelingsof self-threat” (2008: 746). From a compassionperspective, this suggests that values affirma-tion will remind individuals of aspects beyondthemselves and, through this self-transcen-dence, will reduce experiential avoidance andthereby increase the likelihood a person willengage compassionately with suffering.

Proposition 6: Values affirmation en-hances compassionate action throughself-affirmation and self-transcendentprocesses that reduce defensivenessin response to another’s suffering.

Commitment to values-directed action. Com-mitment to values-directed action refers to indi-viduals’ commitment to engage in “larger pat-terns of effective action linked to chosen values”(Hayes et al., 2006: 9). Whereas values affirma-tion involves knowing what one’s values areand having them consciously accessible, com-mitment to values-directed action involves astrong sense of determination to act in value-consistent ways. The construct has parallelswith that of goal commitment, defined as deter-mination to reach a goal (Locke, Latham, & Erez,1988), but whereas goal commitment refers to aspecific and focused goal, commitment to val-ues-directed action is about one’s determinationto act in ways congruent with broader life prin-ciples. In acceptance and commitment therapy arange of behavior change methods are used toenhance commitment to values-directed action,such as goal setting and anticipating strategiesto overcome potential barriers to action (Hayeset al., 1999). Drawing on self-regulation theory(Bandura, 1991), we expect that if individuals arecommitted to values-direction action, they willallocate more effort and will persist and engagein more strategies to enact their values throughtheir day-to-day actions. A great deal of evi-dence suggests that goal commitment predictssuperior performance on goals, especially ifthose goals are difficult (see, for example, Klein,Wesson, Hollenbeck, & Alge, 1999). In applyingthis prediction to compassion, however, oneneeds to also consider the content of an individ-ual’s values and the work context in which theindividual operates, issues to which wenow turn.

Moderating Role of Individual Prosocial Valuesand Prosocial Work Climate

We propose that the link between commit-ment to values-direction action and compas-sionate action is moderated by an individual’sstrength of prosocial values, which is, in turn,further moderated by aspects of the work cli-mate. Specifically, we suggest that to the extentan individual holds prosocial values, there willbe a positive effect of commitment to values-directed action on compassion. Likewise, we ar-gue that work contexts vary in the extent towhich they support prosocial behavior and thata prosocial work climate will, in turn, facilitatethe enactment of prosocial values, leading togreater compassion.

Prosocial values. Individuals vary in the rela-tive importance of different values. Schwartz(2010) identified ten universal values, applicableto all individuals, of which “universalism” and“benevolence” are two that are particularly di-rected toward preserving and enhancing thewelfare of others. Universalism values (such asunderstanding, appreciation, tolerance, andprotection) are directed toward all people andnature, whereas benevolence values (such asforgiveness) are directed toward benefiting oth-ers with whom one is in frequent contact. WhileSchwartz (2010) called these “self-transcendencevalues,” we have used the term prosocial valuesto emphasize their other-directed nature.

We propose that the link between commit-ment to values-directed action and compassion-ate action will be stronger for individuals whoidentify prosocial values as relatively more im-portant to them than self-enhancement values(Schwartz, 2010). When engaging in self-regula-tion processes to act in a values-consistent way(e.g., goal setting), individuals with more proso-cial values will be inclined to set, and strive toachieve, other-oriented goals. In essence, theywill be more motivated to respond in a caringway to another’s suffering than individuals whoalso are trying to act in values-directed waysbut whose values are more self-serving. Echoingour earlier discussion of the importance of cop-ing self-efficacy, Caprara and Steca argued that“both personal values and self-efficacy beliefs. . . are needed to enact actions that may carrysacrifices and loss. Assigning priority to others’welfare, as assessed by endorsement of self-transcendence values, set [sic] the goals to be


achieved” (2007: 234). Consistent with this, sev-eral studies suggest that individuals with moreprosocial values are motivated to pursue moreprosocial goals and, indeed, appear to experi-ence positive affect if they are able to fulfill theirprosocial values (Schwartz, 2010). Prosocial val-ues correlate positively with empathic concernand perspective taking (Silfver, Helkama, Lonn-qvist, & Verkasalo, 2008) and with prosocial re-sponding (Caprara & Steca, 2007).

Our argument is that when engaging in self-regulation processes to act in a values-consis-tent way (such as via goal setting), individualswith more prosocial values will be inclined toset and strive to achieve other-oriented goals,such as helping colleagues. Goals direct energyand attention, stimulate strategies for goal at-tainment, enhance self-regulation, and promotepersistence in the face of obstacles (Latham &Locke, 1991). For example, when an individual isaiming to achieve other-oriented goals, he orshe is more likely to seek out and attend toinformation in the environment that is relevantto others (Verplanken & Holland, 2002), such asby listening more attentively to the sufferer.

Proposition 7: For individuals withprosocial values, commitment to val-ues-consistent action will enhancecompassionate action by driving ef-fective self-regulatory action (e.g.,goal setting).

Prosocial work climate. Whether an individ-ual acts in accordance with his or her values isalso likely to be a function of the social environ-ment in which the individual operates. Peoplelearn to act in ways that are appropriate withintheir environment (Biglan, 2009; Rokeach, 1973),and work contexts vary in the degree to whichtheir practices and structures support and rein-force prosocial behaviors. Dutton et al. (2007)argued that through interpersonal acts of com-passion that generate relational resources,shared values and beliefs, and interpersonalskills, organizations can achieve a capacity forcooperation. For example, organizations de-velop shared other-focused values through in-formal acts, such as story telling about compas-sionate incidents (Dutton et al., 2007), or throughformal policies, such as the need for the CEO tobe informed immediately in the event of an em-ployee death or serious illness (Kanov et al.,2004). Likewise, Brickson argued that some orga-

nizational structures and practices reinforce “re-lational” identity orientations, in which “indi-viduals are primarily motivated to procurebenefit for the other” (2000: 85). Dense networksthat are integrated across levels and functions,dyadic task structures, and rewards for rela-tional work (e.g., work directed toward the wel-fare of others) are example practices that pro-mote a relational orientation. Work designs canalso cultivate prosocial motivation, such as jobdesigns with task significance and feedbackfrom beneficiaries (Grant, 2007). Thus, work con-texts vary in the extent to which they activelypromote, support, and reinforce other-orientedbehaviors between members. This is what werefer to as a prosocial work climate.

There is considerable evidence that individu-als in the workplace try to act in ways that arecongruent with wider organizational values(Meglino & Ravlin, 1998). We therefore expectthat individuals seeking to enact more prosocialvalues will do so more readily in a climate thatis conducive to such action. A prosocial workclimate likely will strengthen the link betweencommitment to values-directed action and goalregulation, as well as the link between effectivegoal regulation and compassionate action. Forexample, if a manager has committed to beingmore other oriented (commitment to values-directed action plus prosocial values), and thismanager is also operating in a context that en-courages and supports prosocial behaviors, heor she is likely to want to reach out and help anindividual who is suffering. If, however, an in-dividual who has committed to acting on proso-cial values finds him/herself in a highly compet-itive and unsupportive work context, he or she islikely to be more cautious about helping some-one who is suffering, fearing possible negativesanctions from peers or managers.

Proposition 8: For individuals withprosocial values, the effect of commit-ment to values-consistent action oncompassionate action in the work-place will be enhanced by a prosocialwork climate.

DISCUSSION AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS

Compassionate behavior in organizations isassociated with increased helping, trust, sup-port, and cooperation. But individuals can be too


preoccupied, or too emotionally unregulated, toeven notice the suffering of another, let alonerespond effectively to it. In this article we haveproposed an elaborated model of the elementsof individual compassion, and we have exploredhow compassion might be increased throughinterventions to enhance psychologicalflexibility.

Theoretical Contributions

The inclusion of appraisal as an element ofcompassion recognizes the importance of cogni-tion in compassion and clearly distinguishescompassion from the unregulated vicariousemotions of personal distress. Our model high-lights that compassion is a regulated responseinvolving cognition. Compassionate responsesdo not automatically follow from noticing anoth-er’s suffering. Rather, the observer must identifythe sufferer as in some way relevant and deserv-ing of help, and the observer must make a judg-ment that he or she is capable of coping. Theinclusion of appraisals in an individual modelof compassion builds on well-established theorylinking cognition to affect and highlights howindividual compassion should be thought of asa process that involves thinking as well as feel-ing. Furthermore, we have briefly discussedhow relational frame theory conceptualizes thethinking involved in appraising as verbalrelating.

Recognizing the role of these appraisals alsolinks studies of individual compassion at workto a richer empirical and theoretical base thanis currently the case. For example, recognizingthe role of appraisals of self-relevance in thecompassion process enables one to better un-derstand the effects of social identities (e.g., or-ganizational role, gender; Ashforth & Mael, 1989)on compassion. Also, reducing reactivity to ap-praisals of deservingness and increasing accep-tance may reduce attributional biases, such aswhen people make more benevolent attributionsto themselves than to others (Regan & Totten,1975). Including deservingness appraisals incompassionate responding highlights the im-portance of promoting perspective taking in or-ganizations, not only through training but alsothrough work redesign and associated practices(Parker, Atkins, & Axtell, 2008).

Beyond the consideration of appraisals, a sec-ond key contribution of our article is that we

have identified the importance of psychologicalflexibility—the combination of mindfulness andvalues-directed action—as a facilitator of com-passionate responses, with mindfulness servingas a key capability and values-directed actionserving to motivate action. We suggested thatpresent moment contact increases the likelihoodof noticing another’s suffering. Likewise, defu-sion from thoughts and feelings creates a gapbetween the experience and one’s thoughts andfeelings regarding the experience, thereby less-ening reactivity to automatic evaluations.Adopting an observing approach to self de-creases the likelihood of being lost in self-absorption and seeking to defend the self inways that may interfere with compassion. Ac-ceptance of unpleasant thoughts and feelingshelps to enhance coping self-efficacy appraisalsand also reduces personal distress, allowingmore empathic concern. In terms of motivationto be compassionate, values affirmation reducesdefensive behaviors aimed at avoiding suffer-ing, and commitment to values-directed actionenables individuals with prosocial values tostep out of immediate reactivity and pursuegoals in line with those values. As noted earlier,from the perspective adopted in this article,mindfulness is not an end in itself but, rather, a“a method of increasing values-based action”(Hayes et al., 2006: 8). Overall, psychologicalflexibility loosens the grip of verbal relatingprocesses that underpin experiential avoidanceassociated with noncompassionate defensivebehaviors, and it supports awareness, learning,and resilience to enable individuals to be morecompassionate, even in stressful environments.

In our view, psychological flexibility providesa way of bridging the apparent tension betweendistancing and connection—distancing so thatone does not become absorbed in another’s suf-fering and one can place it in context, and con-nection so that one cares. In relational frametheory terms, psychological flexibility can beunderstood as the development of increasinglysubtle and complex relations of distinction andsimilarity between aspects of self and emo-tional experience. “Detached concern” (Miller,2007) is not about a sense of self that is indepen-dent of others but a sense of self that is bothdifferentiated from and integrated with others(Kegan, 1994). Similarly, Labouvie-Vief de-scribed how


mature empathic responses are based on muchmore complex representations in which individ-uals are able to inhibit their own personal dis-tress response and instead experience an emo-tion of compassion that is targeted at thesituation and specific needs of the suffering per-son (2009: 4–5).

Emotional differentiation helps people becomeless overwhelmed by negative emotions (Leary,Tate, Adams, Batts Allen, & Hancock, 2007). Insum, developing psychological flexibility is away of achieving more complex differentiationand integration of the self and emotions, ulti-mately enabling a focus on others that at thesame time preserves a distinct sense of self.

Our exposition of psychological flexibility hasfocused on separate subprocesses because wewish to generate propositions for further re-search, as well as point to strategies for enhanc-ing individual compassion. But we recognizethat the subprocesses of psychological flexibil-ity are deeply interrelated. For example, it ishard to imagine how one can step back and takea perspective on thoughts without also accept-ing the presence of those thoughts in the sensethat one is willing to have them. Conversely,acceptance of a thought cannot occur withoutawareness that one is having the thought. Ulti-mately, we see both psychological flexibilityand compassion as functions of a whole organ-ism responding in context.

Implications for Further Research

Further research investigating the relation-ships between each of the elements of psycho-logical flexibility and compassion is clearlywarranted. We recommend a triangulation ofmethodologies. Qualitative accounts of why in-dividuals choose to help someone (or not) couldbe used to explore the role of appraisals andpsychological flexibility in compassion, such asindicated by the quote that we referenced at thebeginning of the article. In addition, a surveymeasure of psychological flexibility exists (Bondet al., 2011; Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson, et al., 2004),an earlier version of which has been shown topredict mental health and behavioral outcomesin longitudinal studies (Bond & Bunce, 2003).More research is required using this and othermeasures to explore associations between psy-chological flexibility and compassionate re-sponding as perceived by individuals. However,

self-report summary measures are not ideal forinvestigating processes that are dynamic, rapid,and often unconscious. We therefore also recom-mend laboratory-based investigations in whichelements of the process are systematically ma-nipulated and experience-sampling approachesthat go beyond between-person average differ-ences to explore when and why a particularindividual responds with compassion.

While the evidence suggests that psychologi-cal flexibility is beneficial in many, perhapsmost, contexts, further research is obviously re-quired to delineate the elements of context (suchas individual histories and job roles) that maymoderate the impact of psychological flexibilityon compassionate responding. It is possible thatpsychological flexibility might not be helpful insome specific situations. For example, Mitmans-gruber, Beck, and Schussler (2008) found that,contrary to the usual finding, paramedics ap-peared to experience better well-being if theywere not accepting of their thoughts and feel-ings and instead made use of control-basedstrategies to minimize negative emotions. Para-medics operate in an extreme context, with 15 to22 percent experiencing posttraumatic stressdisorder (Lowery & Stokes, 2005). Further re-search is required to explore whether, undersuch extreme circumstances, psychological flex-ibility might interfere with compassionate re-sponding in limited circumstances in the sameway that it may interfere with well-being.

Although we have kept the capability and mo-tivational elements of our model discrete in theinterests of clarity, there are opportunities forresearch investigating reciprocal relationshipsbetween mindfulness and valuing processes. Aspeople notice their own and other’s experiencesmore deeply through mindfulness, they also no-tice more clearly what matters to them (valuesaffirmation). Conversely, Verplanken and Hol-land’s (2002) proposal that values affirmationhelps individual define and interpret situations,attend to value-relevant information, and differ-entially weight such information, together withthe claim by Crocker et al. that “values affirma-tion enables people to transcend the self” (2008:746), suggests that values work may enable peo-ple to be more mindful and take a more systemicand long-term perspective. This, in turn, maypotentially reduce the incidence of inappropri-ate actions to alleviate suffering—what Bud-dhists sometimes call “idiot compassion.” For


example, a manager might try to “sugar coat” asubordinate’s bad performance review or delaya redundancy that is inevitable, both of whichwill exacerbate problems in the long run. Again,this is likely to be a defensive reaction born outof an immediate need to avoid suffering, ratherthan choosing to respond in accordance withone’s longer term prosocial values. For example,sometimes acting compassionately may involvewithholding help and allowing the person totake responsibility for his or her own responses,or a compassionate response might involve em-pathic presence rather than jumping in to solvethe other’s problem. Contacting prosocial valuesmay also guide information processing to createmore effective compassionate action.

Finally, our analysis has implications forthinking and research regarding organization-al-level responses to enhance compassion.Kanov et al. (2004) highlighted the way in whichorganizations can be designed to enhance col-lective noticing, feeling, and responding. Orga-nizational compassion also clearly involves col-lective appraisal processes. For example, whatis supported as goal or identity relevant, who isseen as deserving, and what are the stories thatreflect and bolster coping self-efficacy? Weickand Roberts’ (1993) notion of “heedful interrelat-ing” bears interesting similarities and differ-ences to the construct of mindfulness as usedhere. This exploration would, in a sense, answerWeick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld’s (2005) call to fur-ther explore the relations between organiza-tional sensemaking and emotion.

Practical Contributions

Organizations can take various steps to en-hance compassion, such as those put forward byDutton et al. (2007). However, our analysis sug-gests these efforts might be wasted if onedoes not consider the capability and motivationof individuals to engage in compassion. For ex-ample, recognizing the role of self-relevance ap-praisals highlights the need to ensure that indi-viduals see caring and helping others as part oftheir role, which, in turn, might be affected bytheir work design (Parker, Wall, & Jackson, 1997).Likewise, increasing managers’ coping self-efficacy through structured mastery opportuni-ties (Bandura, 1997) will likely promote more reg-ulated feelings of empathic concern, rather thanunregulated personal distress in the face of suf-

fering, thereby leading to greater managerialcompassion.

In this vein, one of the key advantages of afocus on psychological flexibility over andabove other individual-level constructs that arepotentially also associated with individual com-passion (such as attachment security, self-esteem, or adult development) is that psycholog-ical flexibility is malleable and can bedeveloped. In the context of work and perfor-mance improvement, acceptance and commit-ment therapy-based training often begins withexercises to connect with one’s values and toidentify what matters most, and then movesthrough a variety of experiential exercises toenhance aspects of mindfulness. For example,to cultivate a capacity to observe thoughtsrather than be absorbed by them, people can betrained to regard their thoughts as if they wereleaves drifting by on a stream. As another ex-ample, the “passengers on the bus” metaphor(Hayes et al., 1999: 157–158) invites participantsto imagine they are driving a bus containingscary and undesirable passengers (representingaversive thoughts and feelings). The metaphoris used to illustrate the ways in which attempt-ing to control difficult thoughts can lead to aconstricted life, while at the same time illustrat-ing the power of acceptance to facilitate com-mitted action in the direction of values. Al-though it is beyond the scope of this article toelaborate the specific details of approaches toenhancing psychological flexibility, Flaxmanand Bond (2006) provide illustrative protocols fortypical group-based workshops in an organiza-tional setting (see also Gardner & Moore, 2007,and Harris, 2009).

Given that such intensive interventions arelikely to be costly, they might be targeted tosituations in which compassionate respondingis most important, such as for those in care-giving roles or for those managing processeslike downsizing or other changes likely to causeuncertainty and suffering among staff. Anothercontext where psychological flexibility trainingcould be particularly powerful is in organiza-tions or teams with diverse members where ap-praisals of self-relevance and deservingnessmay be less likely. In terms of roles, we haveimplied throughout this article that displayingcompassion is likely to be especially importantfor managers and leaders. This group is typi-cally responsible for performance management,


identifying and monitoring signs of staff stressand suffering, and modeling compassionthrough their own actions (Dutton et al., 2007). Atthe same time, leaders and managers oftenhave high workload pressures, making it chal-lenging for them to contact the present momentand “notice” suffering or to respond appropri-ately. Since these interventions can have otherpositive consequences, including promotingbetter well-being and innovation, their positiveimplications for managers and leaders willlikely transcend enhancing compassion.

CONCLUSION

We have argued that to develop individualcompassion, attention should be paid to the waypeople make sense of their social experiences.Once this is done, recent advances in the under-standing of cognition and emotions can bedrawn upon to help develop both the capabilityand the motivation to be compassionate. Thecapacity to be open and curious about experi-ence enhances the ability to notice what is ac-tually going on for others, as well as providesspace for more conscious and less reactivechoices regarding the ways sense is made ofexperience. The ability to willingly experiencenegative thoughts and feelings allows engage-ment with another’s suffering rather than actingdefensively to protect the self. But motivation isas important as capacity for compassion. Ifspace can be made for people to express andenact their values, one of the most powerfulcontexts in the modern world, our organizations,might become places for people to learn to bemore compassionate and, therefore, morefully human.

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Paul W. B. Atkins ([email protected]) is an associate professor in leadershipand organizational behavior at the Crawford School of Economics and Government,Australian National University, Canberra. He received his Ph.D. in psychology fromCambridge University. His research interests include perspective taking, empathy,defensiveness, identity, self-determination, and mindfulness effects on engagement,well-being, and performance.

Sharon K. Parker ([email protected]) is a Winthrop Professor in Organiza-tional Behavior at the Business School, The University of Western Australia, Perth, andan Australian Research Council Future Fellow. She received her Ph.D. from theUniversity of Sheffield. Her research interests include proactivity, work design, team-work, organizational change, self-efficacy, perspective taking, and well-being.


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