understanding alienation in western canada

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Robert J. Lawson

Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d'études canadiennes, Volume39, Number 2, Spring 2005, pp. 127-155 (Article)

P bl h d b n v r t f T r nt PrDOI: 10.1353/jcs.2006.0018

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Understanding Alienation in Western Canada:Is “Western Alienation” the Problem?

Is Senate Reform the Cure?

Robert J. Lawson

This essay investigates the conceptual foundations of “western alienation” and evaluates

whether Senate reform is the appropriate cure for alienation in western Canada. It dis-

putes the thesis, put forward most persuasively by political scientist Roger Gibbins which

argues “western alienation” is both an exceptional type of regional alienation and is more

salient for many western Canadians than other types of alienation. Two main problems

with this conceptualization of western alienation and, by extension, its claim about how

we ought to understand alienation in western Canada are identified and explained: a

failure to acknowledge the wide variation and complexity of regional alienation within

the West; and the marginalization of political alienation. The essay argues that the prob-

lem of political alienation is central to understanding the alienation of many citizens in

western Canada. Because “political alienation” is rooted in discontent with political rep-

resentatives, institutions, and procedures for decision-making associated with represen-

tative government in Canada, the essay concludes that the curative benefits attributed to

regionally biased institutional reform of the federal government (e.g., Senate reform) by

proponents of the western alienation thesis are more limited than otherwise suggested.

Cet article examine les fondements conceptuels de l’« aliénation occidentale » et se demande

si la réforme du Sénat est le remède approprié pour éliminer l’aliénation dans l’Ouest du

Canada. Il conteste la thèse présentée de manière très convaincante par le politicologue

Roger Gibbins qui affirme que l’« aliénation occidentale » est un type exceptionnel d’aliénation

régionale et est plus saillant pour plusieurs Canadiens de l’Ouest que d’autres types d’aliéna-

tion. Deux problèmes importants visant cette conceptualisation de l’aliénation occidentale et

la façon dont nous devrions interpréter l’aliénation dans l’Ouest du Canada sont identifiés

et expliqués : un défaut de reconnaître l’importante variation et complexité de l’aliénation

régionale dans l’Ouest et la marginalisation de l’aliénation politique. Le présent article

avance que le problème de l’aliénation politique est un point essentiel aidant à comprendre

l’aliénation de plusieurs citoyens dans l’Ouest du Canada. Puisque l’« aliénation politique »

est causée par la participation de représentants, établissements et procédures politiques non

populaires à la prise de décisions associées avec le gouvernement représentant le Canada,

l’article conclut que les avantages curatifs attribués à la réforme institutionnelle avec un biais

régional du gouvernement fédéral (réforme du Sénat) par les promoteurs de l’aliénation

occidentale sont plus limités qu’on ne le croyait.

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Journal of Canadian Studies • Revue d’études canadiennes

Volume 39 • No. 2 • (Printemps 2005 Spring)

Western alienation” features prominently in the Canadian political lex-icon. In the aftermath of the recent federal election, talk about it hasonly intensified (Gibbins 2004). The seminal work of Roger Gibbins

and the Canada West Foundation (CWF) attributes widespread alienation amongwestern Canadians to the regional experience of the West in Canada. Westernalienation is defined as a “political ideology of regional discontent” rooted in thedissatisfaction of western Canadians qua western Canadians with their relation-ship to and representation within the federal government (Gibbins and Berdahl2003, 26-56, 81-82; Gibbins 1980, 167-69). This conceptualization rests on twocentral claims: first, western alienation is an exceptional type of regional alien-ation (in Canada); second, western alienation is more salient for westernCanadians than other types of alienation, especially political alienation. Gibbins’sconclusion, which is shared by the CWF, is that more effective regional represen-tation for the West in the institutions of the federal government, e.g., the Senate,is the necessary antidote for the problem of alienation in western Canada.

This essay investigates the conceptual foundations of western alienationand evaluates whether Senate reform is the appropriate cure for the problem ofalienation in western Canada. I focus particular attention on Gibbins mainlybecause of his prominent role in conceptualizing western alienation and his rel-ative success in persuading academics, politicians, and media that westernalienation is a political problem par excellence in western Canada. I also exam-ine research conducted by the CWF, a prominent research institute concernedwith promoting the interests and concerns of the West, which has been influ-enced tremendously by Gibbins’s ideas about western alienation.1 My mainpurpose here is to question whether the concept of “western alienation”explains the problem of alienation in western Canada adequately. I do not dis-pute the assertion that western Canadians are alienated. I object mainly to theputative claim that alienation in western Canada is both an exceptionally west-ern Canadian phenomenon and primarily regional in nature, i.e., most appro-priately understood as “western alienation.” Instead, I consider whether politicalalienation, which Gibbins himself marginalizes as a plausible explanation, mightbetter explain the alienation that persists in western Canada.2 By “political alien-ation,” I mean the alienation of citizens in western Canada from political repre-sentatives, processes of political decision-making, and institutions of representativegovernment (Barber 1984, 245-51; Offe and Preuss 1991, 164-65; Taylor 1995,278-79; Warren 2002, 680-82).

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“

The essay is divided into three main sections. In the first section, I outlinethe foundations of arguments about the importance of western alienation andthe institutional reform of the federal government proposed to alleviate it.

In the second section, I subject Gibbins’s seminal conceptualization ofwestern alienation to critical reappraisal. My argument here develops along twolines. First, even if, for the sake of argument, we privilege a regional under-standing of alienation, the claim that western alienation is an exceptional typeof regional alienation in Canada is not sustainable under closer scrutiny. Asrecent contributions to the literature suggest, similar types of regional alien-ation exist in other regions of the country and, more importantly, within “theWest” itself (Henry 2002; Resnick 2000). Second, the claim that western alien-ation most appropriately explains the alienation that persists in westernCanada ought to be rejected. To that end, I challenge some of the dubiousassumptions associated with an explanation of alienation in western Canadaprimarily through the lens of “western alienation.” In particular, I draw bothon problems with the use and analysis of survey and opinion polling data byGibbins and the CWF and the exaggerated relationship between the traditionof populism in the West and western alienation. Ultimately, I argue that polit-ical alienation is more salient for many citizens in western Canada than pro-ponents of the western alienation thesis are prepared to acknowledge; it moreappropriately explains the alienation many western Canadians experience. Tobe sure, I accept that western alienation is an unmistakable reality in the West,at least insofar as it pertains to the experience of some political elites (e.g.,elected representatives and party activists) at both the federal and provinciallevel. I do maintain, however, that this kind of alienation does not account forthe disaffection and discontent of many citizens in the West adequately—i.e.,it is not clear alienation among many citizens indicates primarily an excep-tional type of regional discontent.3 Also, even when we consider the traditionof populism in western Canada, it actually seems to indicate political alienation,not western alienation.

In the third section, I offer some sceptical conclusions about the curativebenefits of Senate reform. I argue that it is unclear whether an institutionalreconfiguration of the federal government designed to better represent regions(e.g., Senate reform) can do much to cure alienation in western Canada. Oncewe establish that political alienation is central to understanding the problem ofalienation in western Canada, it is questionable whether regionally biased insti-tutional reform of the federal government is an appropriate curative measure.Undoubtedly, some western Canadian political elites and sections of the west-ern media might still welcome it, but many citizens dissatisfied with the terms

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of representative government might invariably find such remedies wanting.Because Senate reform is designed only as a cure for “western alienation” anddoes not address political alienation, the curative benefits attributed to it are, ifnothing else, much more limited than otherwise suggested.

The Foundations of “Western Alienation” and the Curative Benefits of Senate Reform

Western alienation is purportedly exacerbated by the historical and contempo-rary relationship of mistreatment experienced by western Canada as a regionvis-à-vis the federal government, in particular, by the promotion of the regionalinterests of central Canada (i.e., the provinces of Ontario and Quebec) at theexpense of the West. Gibbins in particular goes to great lengths to emphasizethe symbolic effects on the collective consciousness of western Canadians oftheir aspirations being ignored and marginalized since Confederation (Gibbinsand Berdahl 2003, 27). The Riel rebellion of 1870 over control of naturalresources in Manitoba, the Progressives’ resistance to federal tariffs and freightrates in the 1920s, Social Credit’s opposition to a financial system imposed byeastern banks that crippled farmers during the depression, the enforcement ofofficial bilingualism and other parts of the Royal Commission on Bilingualismand Biculturalism in the 1960s, and the imposition of the National EnergyProgram (NEP) by Prime Minister Trudeau and the federal Liberal government inthe 1970s provide but a few of the allegedly potent symbols of the mistreatmentof the West as a region by the federal government and elites in “central Canada”(Manning 1992, 118-24). Taken together, the consequence of these symbols is thedevelopment of a distinct western Canadian political culture typified by anexceptional type of regional alienation, or so proponents of the western alien-ation thesis argue.

What causes such an exceptional type of regional alienation? As a region,western Canada is thought not to have its voice heard effectively or its inputconsidered in the federal government mainly because of the government’scomposition on the basis of representation by population. “Rep by pop” sys-tematically privileges the concerns and interests of voters in Ontario andQuebec because these voters effectively determine the election results and, inturn, the public agenda by sending over half of the MPs in the House ofCommons to Ottawa. As a government ultimately relies on the support of votersfrom one or both of these provinces for victory (not to mention re-election),others—namely western Canadians—can safely assume the interests and con-cerns of these central Canadian voters take precedence.

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Even where other bodies in the federal government such as the Cabinetand the Senate have the capacity to represent and advance regional concerns,results are deemed unsatisfactory (Gibbins and Berdahl 2003; Gibbins 1982;McCormick, Manning, and Gibson 1981, 23-34). For one thing, the prime min-ister, who can enforce party discipline, dispense patronage, and control impor-tant appointments, is directly responsible for appointing people to thesebodies. The perception, then, is that members of these bodies de facto owe theirallegiance primarily to the prime minister and not to the region they may beappointed to represent.4 Moreover, with the Senate lacking any independent ordemocratic legitimacy, neither chamber of parliament as it stands offers amechanism sufficient for addressing regional issues.5

Because the West lacks adequate representation in the federal governmentand influence in federal politics, the federal government is able to ignore ormarginalize Western interests and concerns. Thus, the arrangement is allegedlydefective. Neither Gibbins nor the CWF, however, considers it irreparably defec-tive. Gibbins’s conceptualization of western alienation anchors its experiencein inadequate opportunities for institutionalized representation of regionalconcerns in the federal government; if western Canadian regional interestswere represented equally and effectively in the federal government, then feel-ings of western alienation would subside (Gibbins and Berdahl 2003; Gibbins1982). For example, Gibbins’s influential comparative study of regionalism inCanada and the United States argues that the United States suffers significantlyless from the problem of regional alienation because the federal governmentrepresents states equally in the Senate (Gibbins 1982). Thus, the solution to theproblem of regional alienation requires a strategy of intrastate federalism. Thisfederal arrangement accommodates territorial representation of regions andregional units of government in the central government (Cairns 1979).

Gibbins and the CWF question the curative benefits of strategies that pro-mote more interstate federalism (Gibbins and Berdahl 2003, 123-25; Gibbins andRoach 2003, 6; Gibbins 1980, 213-14). This federal arrangement involves greaterdecentralization of powers to regional units and, therefore, more autonomy forprovincial governments (Cairns 1979). Proponents of the western alienation the-sis suggest that complaints in western Canada most often have to do with mat-ters falling within the constitutional purview of the federal government, such astrade policy, tariffs, equalization procedures, and various aspects of fiscal arrange-ments pertaining to federal social program investment and expenditure. TheWest simply wants a fair say in these matters of federal concern. Consequently,this desire should not be confused with a demand for more extensive provincialpowers or jurisdiction.

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The most popular measure to promote regional representation in the fed-eral government is Senate reform, although it is not the only measure pro-posed.6 I focus on it here because it is integral to the intrastate model offederalism and consistently given priority by Gibbins and the CWF, amongothers. Gibbins and Berdahl, for instance, take care to emphasize that Senatereform is a “staple” of western Canadian political discourse and a necessaryremedy for western alienation (Gibbins and Berdahl 2003).7 The CWF lists fivecentral features and benefits of Senate reform: (1) it reduces the patronage pow-ers of the prime minister; (2) it could be a catalyst for experimentation with anew electoral system; (3) it can mitigate against party discipline, especially ifsenators are not permitted to enter Cabinet and the Senate is not made a con-fidence chamber; (4) it makes regional concerns and interests and the equalrepresentation of both a central feature of the federal government; and (5) itcan legitimize Supreme Court appointments by making them contingent uponSenate, which would be de facto regional, approval (Canada West Foundation2000, 6-15). These benefits presuppose that the Senate will be a politically effec-tive body with legitimacy to represent regional concerns. In other words, itmust be elected.

The most preferred option is the Triple E model (Elton and McCormick 1990).It demands an equal number of senators representing each province or region, arequirement that senators be elected by the people in each province or region, andthe necessity for senators to be effective, with a role in policy-making and thecapacity to veto or at least impede decisions by the House of Commons per-ceived as contrary to regional interests and concerns. Under such an arrange-ment, senators elected from the West would be endowed with the necessarypowers and influence to advance regional issues and concerns; however,because implementation of a pure Triple E model would require a constitu-tional amendment, this option has lost some of its earlier appeal. More modestproposals have been made recently. Gibbins and the CWF now seem to preferthat the Senate composition be altered by having the prime minister appointsenators previously elected in the provinces or regions (Gibbins and Roach2003, 11). Either way, the main point is that a second legislative chamber withequal regional representation and some kind of democratic legitimacy wouldallow regional concerns and interests to influence decisions effectively in thefederal government.

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Rethinking the Conceptual Foundations of Western Alienation

Gibbins’s seminal conceptualization of western alienation involves two centralclaims, which direct us to its necessary remedies. First, western alienation is anexceptional type of regional alienation. Second, western alienation is actuallythe most salient and distressing type of alienation among western Canadians.8

Consequently, rectifying the problem of alienation in western Canada requiresregionally biased institutional reform of the federal government (e.g., Senatereform) to promote more influence for the West in the Canadian federation. Inthis section, I investigate and assess the two central claims separately.

Is “Western Alienation” an Exceptional Type of Regional Alienation?Gibbins relies largely upon two types of evidence to make the case that theWest suffers from an exceptional type of regional alienation. On the one handare historical factors and experiences that differentiate it from other regions inCanada. For instance, the political economy of western Canada was and largelyremains based on natural resource extraction and agriculture. Western expan-sion after Confederation was motivated by the belief that the abundance of nat-ural resources and fertile land could be used to fuel the industrial developmentof central Canada. The fact that western provinces did not have control overtheir own resources or the direction of economic policy in the formative stagesof their development allegedly helped exacerbate the federal government’s ten-dency to impose its will upon the West (Gibbins and Berdahl 2003, 25-32).Also, representation in the federal government is dominated by Ontario andQuebec, which makes western Canadian influence marginal at best. This insti-tutionalized favouritism in the House of Commons towards vote-rich Ontarioand Quebec invariably affects the federal party system, which tends to privilegethe interests of economic and political elites in central Canada (Gibbins andBerdahl 2003, 43). As Gibbins would have it, these problems have fuelled pop-ulist protest movements in western Canada (Gibbins and Berdahl 2003, 48-50).Westerners reactively look to regional parties that emphasize the conflictbetween the interests of “the people” in western Canada and “elites” in centralCanada as a solution.9

More recently, Gibbins employs behavioural analysis, using polling andsurvey data to show that western Canadians self-identify as alienated qua west-ern Canadians. In a 2003 CWF survey, Gibbins and Roach find that approxi-mately 80% of respondents in each of the western provinces “somewhat agree”that the West is a distinct region (Gibbins and Roach 2003, 8). Broken downfurther, a majority of rural, small urban (population 10,000-99,999), and large

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urban (population 100,000+) respondents classify themselves as alienated, asdo respondents in all age category groups and across gender lines. In anotherrecent survey, Gibbins and Berdahl also find that supporters of all major federalparties that contest elections in the West identify themselves as alienated(Gibbins and Berdahl 2003, 78-80). More strikingly, perhaps, Gibbins andBerdahl highlight the fact that western Canadians consistently register theirfrustration and dissatisfaction with the relationship between the West and thefederal government, as well as the national community (Gibbins and Berdahl2003, 70-89; Berdahl 2003). A sample of statements affirmed by westernCanadian respondents includes the following: “The West usually gets ignored innational politics because the political parties depend upon Quebec and Ontariofor most of their votes”; “My province doesn’t get its fair share fromConfederation”; “My province gets less than its fair share of influence in nationaldecisions”; and “My province is not treated with the respect it deserves inCanada” (Berdahl 2003). These responses represent a consistency in survey datathat stretches back over the last 30 years, when polls and surveys began to bewidely used to make the case for western alienation. On this basis, proponents ofwestern alienation maintain that it is an exceptional type of regional alienation.

At first, the argument appears compelling. There seems no reason to deny thatthe history of the West is in fact and substance different from that of other regions.Undoubtedly, western Canadians do express high levels of discontent with federalpolitics. There are, however, a number of problems with the claim largely unac-counted for in the evidence. To begin with, there is little acknowledgement thatregional alienation is pervasive within western Canada. The same factors thatGibbins and the CWF often rely upon to measure peoples’ sense of regional alien-ation, particularly the level of influence a person thinks her region has in govern-ment, can potentially be applied within provinces as well. For example, if regionalrepresentation in government and influence over public policy concomitant withit really matters, then we might expect that regions within provinces could be sim-ilarly alienated from provincial governments.

A case in point is Philip Resnick’s study of regional discontent in BritishColumbia. He actually finds high levels of regional alienation within theprovince itself (Resnick 2000, 18-19). For instance, people in more remoteregions such as Peace River, the North Coast, and the East Kootenays often per-ceive themselves to be ignored by the provincial government in Victoria and bypolitical and economic elites in the Lower Mainland region located in andaround the city of Vancouver. Somewhat analogous to the situation of theWest vis-à-vis central Canada, the population of the province is concentratedin Victoria and the Lower Mainland, as are centres of economic and political

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activity. The provincial government (analogous here to the federal government)supposedly focusses its attention on the interests and concerns dominant there.There is good reason to assume that, on the basis of these findings, similar exam-ples of regional alienation within provinces may also exist elsewhere in the West.The concentration of voters in particular regions within BC is not an exceptionalphenomenon. Similar findings within Alberta (where population is concentratedin Calgary and Edmonton), Saskatchewan (where population is concentrated inRegina and Saskatoon), and Manitoba (where population is concentrated in andaround Winnipeg) may further demonstrate this problem.

Resnick also argues that BC might even be considered a “province-region”distinct from the rest of western Canada (Resnick 2000). It has had and con-tinues to have a different relationship with the federal government than thePrairie provinces. Its different colonial history, political economy, and claims tobe a separate “province-region” analogous to Ontario and Quebec further tes-tify to this. If nothing else, BC does seem to present at least one problematiccase for Gibbins’s argument. Because he relies on both historical experiencesand self-identification for making a case about western alienation, the fact thatBC’s historical experience in Confederation is different from the Prairies andthat people in BC often view the province as a distinct region makes it difficultto collapse all of the western provinces into a singular western Canadian regionwith any conceptual precision.10

In addition to variation within the West, it is not altogether clear that west-ern alienation is exceptionally different from regional alienation experiencedoutside western Canada. In his recent challenge to the empirical observationsof Gibbins and the CWF, Shawn Henry uses a comparative analysis of surveydata taken from the 1997 Canadian Election Study to determine whether west-ern alienation may actually be a subset of a more general form of alienationpresent in all peripheral regions of the country (Henry 2002). Henry combinesnine different questions posed to Canadians in the Campaign Period Survey,Post Election Survey, and Mail-back Survey to measure regional alienation.11 Hethen collapses all of the responses into a “Peripheral Regional Alienation (PRA)Index.” The most telling aspect of Henry’s analysis is that while the PRA indexis high in Alberta, BC, and Saskatchewan, it is also reaches comparably highlevels in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the NorthwestTerritories (Henry 2002, 85). Among other interesting findings is that Alberta’sPRA index is much higher than anywhere else in Canada and Manitoba’s PRAindex is much lower than all of the Atlantic Provinces (minus Prince EdwardIsland). This is especially noteworthy because proponents of western alienation(including Gibbins) on occasion attempt to generalize across the West on the

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basis of data and experiences taken largely from Alberta (Gibbins 1980, 171;Manning 1992, 122). Henry concludes that “being on the periphery of theCanadian political and economic stage has similar effects both in the West andthe East” (Henry 2002, 85). His challenge to western alienation is helpful for ourpurposes here insofar as it demonstrates that feelings of alienation exist stronglyin other peripheral regions of Canada.

Coupled with my earlier point about the possibility of variation in regionalalienation within the West itself, Henry’s findings demonstrate that westernalienation cannot be counted decisively as an exceptional type of regional dis-content in Canada. While historical experience in the West is of course differ-ent from that in other regions of the country, it does not produce an exceptionalvariant of regional alienation from federal government institutions and poli-cies; nor is the kind of regional alienation that exists within the West itself uni-form. The first claim about western alienation is not sustainable.

Is “Western Alienation” the Most Salient Type of Alienation in the West?To answer this question, we need to entertain the possibility of alternative under-standings of alienation in western Canada. Here, I consider the impact of politicalalienation in the West. If for no other reason, we ought to consider this alterna-tive because Gibbins explicitly rejects the possibility that political alienation canaccount for and explain the problem of alienation in western Canada adequately(Gibbins and Berdahl 2003, 81; Gibbins 1980, 168). I want to evaluate this claimbelow. First, however, let us explore the central features of political alienation.

I suggested earlier that in a liberal democracy such as Canada, politicalalienation refers to the alienation of citizens from political representatives,processes of political decision-making, and institutions of representative govern-ment. Claus Offe and Ulrich Preuss suggest that political alienation in liberal rep-resentative democracies has three essential components (1991, 164-65). First, atemporal component highlights the fact citizens have little opportunity forinput or much of a role in political decision-making processes after the initialprocess of electing representatives. Second, a social component is based on the sep-aration between the lives and activities of citizens on the one hand and politicianson the other hand due to the increasing operating distance of the latter from theformer. Third, a substantive component is based on the discrepancies between theknowledge, values, and expertise of citizens and political elites—in particularelected representatives. To the extent that citizens perceive themselves as unableto participate in or affect political decision-making processes and outcomes, asense of political alienation can develop.

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Charles Taylor suggests citizens become alienated from the political processwhen power is exercised at a distance from their available avenues for input, isunresponsive to their own interests and concerns, and is inhospitable to theirinput and participation (beyond simply legitimizing representatives) in the polit-ical sphere (1995, 278-79). The problem is exacerbated in liberal democraciesbecause they generally function according to the idea that the political sphereought to be an isolated domain for the exercise of power and its translation intolegislative decisions. In particular, it ought to be restricted to the deliberations ofelected representatives, bureaucrats, and judicial authorities among others. Thissphere can be contrasted with what Taylor calls an “extrapolitical public sphere,”where citizens gather together outside formal political processes (that is to say,processes of legislative decision-making) to exchange ideas about the fair and legit-imate terms of their common political community and reasons for those ideas inorder to reach a common mind with others (1995, 259-71). The effect of this divi-sion of spheres in liberal democratic societies is to sever institutionally citizens’deliberations and decisions about the terms of political community from the leg-islative authority and opportunity to implement them (aside from the infrequentopportunities to elect representatives). This puts a distance between citizens’ desirefor self-government and the institutional mechanisms—e.g., legislative powersand decisions about their implementation—that make it actually possible. Theresult is invariably a sense of alienation among citizens based on the perceptionthat their concerns and interests have little or no effect or influence in thepolitical sphere. As Norberto Bobbio puts it, citizens are dissatisfied because the“promise of democracy” remains unfulfilled (1987).

We might say, then, that citizens suffer from political alienation insofar asthey perceive elected representatives, political institutions, and government ingeneral to operate at a distance from their own lives, and in a way that neithertakes into account their views, concerns, and interests nor is responsive to theirinput. In other words, they suffer mainly from a lack of political efficacy and alack of political trust. In the case of the former, citizens do not feel that theyhave opportunities or the capacity to affect political decision-making processesand institutions. They do not think elected representatives keep their promisesor represent the interests and concerns of constituents adequately. The resultsof this type of alienation can vary. Citizens may remain active in availableavenues of formal political participation (e.g., vote in elections or join politicalparties) and simply be content to express dissatisfaction with available avenuesfor involvement in political life. They may disengage from the formal politicalprocess altogether (e.g., not vote in elections or join political parties). They mayconcentrate their efforts on associational life in “civil society” and other forms of

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political activism outside the formal political sphere (e.g., join interest groups,social movements, or community-based associations). Or they may retreat entirelyto their own private lives and give up altogether on politics. It goes without sayingthat the last scenario is an especially alarming prospect in a democratic society.

Gibbins’s conceptualization of western alienation includes a forceful assertionthat it can and must be disassociated from political alienation, which, he argues,does not help us to understand alienation in the West. He suggests that politicalalienation applies only to “the most marginalized from the societal mainstream—the poor, ethnic and racial minorities, and those lacking in education and socialskills” (Gibbins and Berdahl 2003, 81; Gibbins 1980, 168). His narrow conceptionof who suffers from political alienation can be contrasted with his alternativeaccount of western alienation. Many western Canadians—i.e., those not “margin-alized from the societal mainstream”—suffer from an exceptional type of regionalalienation. Gibbins argues that those who suffer from this western alienation areactive participants in the political process who are simply frustrated by the denialof opportunities to achieve their aspirations in federal politics. As such, their con-cern is insufficient regional representation in the federal government. These peo-ple are alienated from the federal government in a way that they would not be, forexample, from a provincial government (Gibbins and Berdahl 2003, 81; Gibbinsand Roach 2003, 4; Gibbins 1980, 167).

Gibbins insists that withdrawal from the political process or dissatisfactionwith it at all levels of government neither characterizes alienation in westernCanada accurately nor explains it adequately, at least not for many westernCanadians. As recent trends in participation in electoral politics at both the fed-eral and provincial level indicate, however, increasing withdrawal from thepolitical process is an unmistakable reality across western Canada. To help elu-cidate this point, we can compare voter turnout in both provincial and federalelections in the western Canadian provinces. As table 1 (turnout for provincialelections) and table 2 (turnout for federal elections) both indicate, voterturnout has declined precipitously over the last 20 years in western Canada.Most arresting is the case of Alberta. Despite the frequent use of Alberta byGibbins and the CWF as the prototypical case for western alienation and dis-content towards the federal government, many Albertans are not even turningup to vote in provincial elections either. Voter turnout has even slipped from66% in the provincial election of 1982 to an abysmal 53% in 2001 and was aslow as 47% in 1986; and these percentages capture the decline in turnout onlyamong registered voters and not eligible voters—i.e., citizens over the age of 18.

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Table 1: Voter Turnout in Western Canada for Provincial Elections (By Province)

Percentage of registered voters who voted in provincial elections 1980 to present

Province Voter Turnout 1980 - Present

Alberta 2001 1997 1993 1989 1986 1982

53% 54% 60% 54% 47% 66%

British Columbia 2001 1996 1991 1986 1983

71% 71% 75 % 77% 78%

Manitoba 2003 1999 1995 1990 1988 1986 1981

54% 68% 69% 69% 74% 68% 72%

Saskatchewan 2003 1999 1995 1991 1986 1982

70% 66% 65% 83% 82% 66%

Sources: Elections Manitoba; Elections Saskatchewan; Centre for Research and

Information on Canada 2001, 42.

Table 2: Voter Turnout in Western Canada for Federal Elections (By Province)

Percentage of registered voters who voted in federal elections 1988 to present

Province Voter Turnout 1984 - Present

Alberta 2004 2000 1997 1993 1988 1984

59% 60% 59% 65% 75% 69%

British Columbia 2004 2000 1997 1993 1988 1984

64% 63% 67% 68% 79% 78%

Manitoba 2004 2000 1997 1993 1988 1984

57% 62% 64% 69% 75% 73%

Saskatchewan 2004 2000 1997 1993 1988 1984

59% 62% 66% 69% 79% 78%

Source: Elections Canada.

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Although Gibbins does not explicitly address these trends in his ownresearch, he does seem to try to modify his account of who suffers from west-ern alienation. In his most recent work, he argues, “Political elites in the West,frustrated in their national aspirations have consistently channelled that frus-tration into constructive efforts to reform the political system” (Gibbins andBerdahl 2003, 82). His own emphasis aside, the interesting point here seems tobe his own restriction of scope to the regionally based concerns and “nationalaspirations” of political elites. He speaks in particular about provincial govern-ment leaders and party activists, federal party activists, and other actorsengaged directly in the political process, people who are concerned with theirrelationship to the federal government. Consider this shift in emphasis in thelight of Gibbins’s argument that populist sentiment is a result of western alien-ation. This claim now seems even more problematic insofar as he wants to saythat political elites in the West suffer most from western alienation. If westernalienation were as pervasive as he argues and as closely tied to populism, thenone might expect that citizens in general would be plagued by it and notmainly political elites or those that express high levels of political efficacy. Ishall return to this problematic appropriation of populism by proponents ofthe western alienation thesis below.

What is most remarkable is that this change in his appraisal of who suffersfrom western alienation, perhaps unwittingly, excludes many citizens whom healso does not count as belonging to “marginalized” segments of society—citi-zens he counts on to disassociate western alienation from political alienation.As declining voter turnout rates suggest, it appears to be these citizens—i.e.,those Gibbins does not want to count as susceptible to political alienation—that increasingly no longer participate in the electoral process, even at theprovincial level. This seems to leave a large number of citizens who are not mar-ginalized in the sense of the term employed by Gibbins but who also do not fitadequately into the category of political elites whose primary concerns reflectwestern alienation. Even more problematic is that Gibbins’s own use of surveyand polling data relies heavily upon citizens who seem to fall into this cate-gorical vacuum.

Let us examine some of these problems with Gibbins’s use of polling andsurvey data. To make his case, he relies upon surveys that for the most partrequire respondents to answer a question soliciting responses from an imposedregional perspective. Questions that ask respondents whether the West is a dis-tinct region, whether the West is treated unfairly or ignored, or whether theirprovince has a fair share of influence in national decision-making all testify toregionally biased considerations. Although it is undoubtedly true that people in

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the West are discontented, there is no broader consideration given to questionsthat might try to ascertain it differently. Instead, it is simply assumed thatregional alienation, and, in particular, western alienation best explains it. Onewonders, however, whether political alienation cannot be captured to someextent even in the language of regionally biased questions imposed upon therespondent. A respondent might indeed believe the West to be a distinct region(although this belief does not prove that alienation is primarily regional innature) and at the same time be dissatisfied with how he (as an individual cit-izen) is able to affect political decision-making at all levels of government. Inthis case, the dissatisfaction does not actually reflect a regional type of alien-ation. None the less, a question can elicit a regionally biased answer if that isthe context the respondent is provided with to register his discontent. It shouldcome as no surprise that some responses to these surveys could appear to indi-cate regional discontent. Still, even cursory reflection on this point is enoughto consider that respondents might still want to express dissatisfaction with thepolitical system in general if only offered the opportunity to do so.

Consider, for example, Harold Clarke, Jon Pammett, and MarianneStewart’s findings from the 1997 Canadian Election Study. Their analysisexplores feelings of political efficacy and trust in Canada (Clarke, Pammett, andStewart 2002, 67). Drawing data specifically from western Canadian respondents,they find that in the Prairies, 71% of respondents agree with the statement“People like me have no say,” 70% agree that “Government does not care,” and83% agree that “MPs lose touch.” Similarly, in BC, 69% agree that “People like mehave no say,” 66% agree that “Government does not care,” and 85% agree that“MPs lose touch.” Quite clearly, it is not only marginalized citizens in westernCanada that express high levels of dissatisfaction with their ability to affect thepolitical process and political decision-making or with the performance of electedrepresentatives. Voters and non-voters alike register these types of concerns.Coupled with the decreasing levels of voter turnout in western Canada in bothprovincial and federal elections, these significantly low levels of political efficacyand political trust suggest that many citizens in western Canada are increasinglyalienated from the political process and, more generally, from institutions andprocedures of representative government in Canada.

Incidentally, Clarke, Pammett, and Stewart’s findings from the West closelyresemble their findings from other regions of Canada, including AtlanticCanada and even Ontario, which is often perceived to benefit most from thepresent institutional framework. Thus, they conclude, “the traditional emphasison regional variations in Canadian political culture is overstated, and perpetuat-ing the search for regional distinctiveness risks missing the forest for the trees”

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(Clarke, Pammett, and Stewart 2002, 69). Citizens are indeed quite likely to reg-ister low feelings of political efficacy and political trust in other regions of thecountry as well as western Canada. These findings also seem to confirm some ofthe characteristics of political alienation Offe and Preuss emphasize. Canadians,including many western Canadians, are alienated from political decision-makingprocesses after and in between elections (the temporal component), and fromboth their elected representatives and political decision-making processes (thesocial component). When we consider feelings of alienation among politicalelites on the one hand and citizens on the other hand in the West, it also seemsplausible that there is a disconnect (although the data presented here, unfortu-nately, does not address this) between the concerns and values of elected repre-sentatives and those they represent (the substantive component).

Criticism of Gibbins’s behavioural analysis aside, we might also considerthe historical relevance of political alienation in the historical context of west-ern Canada. One of the most pervasive examples of discontent in westernCanada (and one of the most frequently cited) is the tradition of populism andthe formation of populist protest parties in the West. Again, Gibbins accountsfor the history of populism in western Canada by suggesting that it is largely areactive response to the inadequacy of regional representation in the federalgovernment. One of the central problems with this sort of explanation is thatit tends to elide the important connection between the antagonism in populistthinking between “elites” and “the people” and the central commitmentamong the latter to the reconfiguration of democratic institutions and prac-tices—to promote more direct involvement for ordinary citizens. This commit-ment stems from a feeling among citizens that they are disconnected from orlack appropriate influence in these institutions and practices, which is per-ceived as contrary to democracy. Indeed, it is this integral part of populistthinking that perhaps made populist protest movements such an attractivevehicle for political organization in the West to begin with (Laycock 1990).

This problematic appropriation of the populist tradition is also apparent inBarry Cooper’s sympathetic treatment of western alienation (2002). Althoughhe does acknowledge the centrality of democratic norms such as “popular sov-ereignty” in western populist movements and even emphasizes the importanceof demands to reform democratic institutions and practices in westernCanadian political culture, he argues that these movements and demands arerooted in an exceptional type of regional alienation in the West—i.e., westernalienation. There seems to be an element of question-begging here: accordingto Cooper, if citizens in western Canada are alienated from political institutionsand democratic politics more generally, then the source of this alienation must

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be regional in nature—i.e., because they are western Canadian. While one cancertainly acknowledge a difference in historical experiences between the Westand other parts of the country, it is not clear why this should be taken to meanthat actual demands in western Canada for more direct forms of democracyand opportunities for richer forms of self-government are themselves rooted inan exceptional type of regional alienation expressed uniformly across westernCanada. Populism, as Cooper indeed seems prepared to admit in his definitionof it (2002, 106), is not defined by or rooted in a particular region, although itcan conceivably be articulated through the lens of a region or territory.

Let me elaborate further about why I dispute this understanding of the rela-tionship between populism and alienation in western Canada. As David Laycocknotes in his theoretical analysis of populism and its impact in the CanadianPrairies in the first half of the twentieth century, “Populist contributions to thePrairie political competition were characterized by attempts to redefine and recon-stitute the process of democracy” (1990, 19). According to Laycock, despite all ofthe ideological varieties of populism that existed in the Prairies, six dimensions12

found in each of the major populist movements demonstrate this shared ideolog-ical tendency towards the reformation of democracy and representative govern-ment at both the federal and provincial level: (1) a conception of “the people” that emphasizes antagonism and conflict

with elites who exercise power in spheres outside of and unresponsiveto their influence;

(2) a favourable disposition towards “participatory democracy,” especiallythe reconfiguration of political and economic representation to allow“the people” greater access to and influence in processes of collectivedecision-making dominated by elites;

(3) co-operation in economic life to mitigate exploitation by economicelites (particularly banks and private firms) and better pursue strategiesof self-rule;

(4) a vision of the state both hostile to its promotion of power relationsthat serve to dominate the people and approving of its potential use asan instrument to eliminate that domination through more effectivepopular control;

(5) a conception of the “good society” based on the elimination of domi-nant power relationships embodied in the people/elite dynamic andthe reversal of a distribution of political and economic powers andbenefits that privilege the latter;

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(6) a relationship between a commitment to the democratic transforma-tion of society and government and the appeal of technocratic modesof social engineering and production. As Laycock’s account indicates, populist protest and sentiment in the West

are much more than a reactive response to a regionally unrepresentative federalgovernment; populism is not itself a regional phenomenon. Indeed, it is perhapsmore appropriately recognized as a social and political ideology normativelycommitted to a reconfiguration of both the system of representative govern-ment and a distribution of social power favouring any political and economicelites at the expense of the people. Of course, we can isolate prairie populismto the extent that it existed in the context of particular experiences in thePrairies; however, allegiances to populist ideas can plausibly apply to almostany community or regional community making similar appeals to or about thepeople, democracy, the state, and the “good society.” This is because populismexpresses the alienation of citizens (not regions) in a given political communityfrom political representatives and institutions, and procedures of representativegovernment. It involves a much deeper concern about the very ideals of democ-racy. To borrow briefly from Taylor’s language, it encapsulates citizens’ desirefor more effective democratic participation in the political sphere. Understoodin this manner, the alienation expressed in prairie populism applies not only tothe federal government but also to all types of representative government(including provincial governments). This is an indication of political alienation.

To sketch the relationship between populism and political alienation fur-ther, consider the somewhat paradoxical appeal of the Reform Party in westernCanada, at least in its early incarnation. Two central features of the party’s plat-form in its first 10 years of existence were (1) advocacy of direct democracy,specifically plebiscitarian measures such as the referendum, recall, and the ini-tiative; and (2) Senate reform in favour of the Triple E model (Reform Party1991). One, direct democracy, addresses political alienation and the other,Senate reform, presumably addresses regional alienation. Much of the party’searly rhetoric, however, prioritized the appeal of direct democracy and chal-lenged many aspects of representative government. This populist appeal wasarguably the anchor of the party’s initial support base in the West.13 Althoughthe Reform Party overwhelmingly employed the concept of western alienationand frequently espoused overtly regional rhetoric (pitting the West against theEast, or, more specifically, Quebec and Ontario) in party leaflets and electoralcampaigns, it also relied a great deal upon appeals to populist traditions andconservative ideology that have a great deal of traction in many parts of theWest. Laycock notes in his sceptical assessment of Reform as a Western party

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that the party is better understood to have been wedded to a “new right populistideology,” which sought to utilize carefully selected measures of direct democracyto reduce the distorting influence of organized special interests, the harmfulinterventions of an activist welfare state on individuals’ economic freedom, andto allow the “common sense of the common people” to prevail (Laycock 2002,94-113, 152-72). Similarly, Trevor Harrison, Bill Johnston, and Harvey Krahn con-clude that the rise of Reform and its electoral success in Alberta is most accuratelyattributed to its espousal of right-wing populism, which drew heavily from highlevels of political alienation among supporters in Alberta (Harrison, Johnston,and Krahn 1996). All of this suggests that a significant element of Reform’s suc-cess in the West was its ability to tap into the kind of political alienation thatoften provides the main impetus for populism and its appeal to many citizensin western Canada.

The historical and contemporary populist tradition in the West, then,appears to support the proposition that many citizens in western Canada maybe more alienated from politicians and from the processes and institutions ofrepresentative government per se than Gibbins either admits or is prepared toallow for in his conceptualization of western alienation. Most importantly, thisalienation seems to apply not only to marginalized peoples, as Gibbins definesthem, but also to many citizens who feel that their ability to participate effec-tively in politics is reduced by unresponsive representatives and representativeinstitutions, a lack of opportunities to participate in and affect political deci-sion-making (outside of elections), and the distance between themselves andthe exercise of power by elected representatives. As I have indicated here, notonly does western alienation lack conceptual precision, but it also fails toaccount for the salience and persistence of political alienation among many cit-izens in western Canada. To understand the problem of alienation in westernCanada, we must acknowledge the central importance of political alienation.

At this point, it is worth remarking that political alienation in westernCanada to some extent resembles experiences in other parts of the country aswell. Indeed, we can connect the idea of political alienation to a point brieflymade earlier about regional exceptionalism. Political alienation is neitherexclusive to nor identified by any particular regional context. While it may beexpressed in reference to a particular regional situation, context, or history (forexample in western Canada) the features of political alienation are perhapsmore ubiquitous. On this point, it is interesting to note the malaise that applieswith respect to the functioning of representative government throughoutCanada (and in many other liberal democracies). A case in point is found in arecent survey commissioned by the Centre for Research and Information on

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Canada, in which 72% of Canadians agreed that “governments do not care verymuch what people like me think” (Centre for Research and Information onCanada 2001, 15). Similar findings abound in more comprehensive analyses ofCanadians’ political attitudes by Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc, and Pammett, as wellas Blais and Gidengil (Clarke et al., 1996; Blais and Gidengil 1991). MostCanadians, including many western Canadians, express dissatisfaction withmuch more than regional representation in the federal government. The senseof alienation is a reaction to the very nature of the institutions and the func-tioning of representative government in Canada.

Rethinking Senate Reform as the Cure for Alienation in Western Canada

Given the salience of political alienation among many citizens in western Canada,where does this leave us with regard to Gibbins’s proposed cure for the problem ofwestern alienation? More specifically, can Senate reform appreciably alleviatealienation in western Canada? To clarify what I mean, let us consider: if “westernalienation” does not explain and help us understand the problem of alienation inwestern Canada adequately, are the curative benefits attributed to Senate reformperhaps more limited than its proponents suggest?

Even if the federal government were reformed along the lines suggested byGibbins and the CWF, it is unclear whether Senate reform can address politicalalienation in the West. As I indicate above, political alienation is central to theproblem of alienation in western Canada. Even if each of the provinces in west-ern Canada were to have equal representation with Ontario and Quebec in areconstituted Senate chamber, it is not clear how this would resolve either theproblem of distance between citizens and their elected representatives or thelack of opportunities for citizens to affect processes and institutions of politicaldecision-making, at least outside of infrequent elections. For instance, with areconfigured Senate there would be another layer of government where repre-sentatives, in some cases, might be responsible for representing more citizensthan MPs in the House of Commons already are.14 As the Senate would likelybe much smaller than the House of Commons, it would be a body comprisedof representatives responsible for such a large constituency that the input of cit-izens (as individuals) would perhaps have even less direct influence on its politi-cians, political institutions, and decision-making processes. This is an especiallylikely scenario in BC and Alberta, where senators would surely be outnumberedby MPs. Located in Ottawa, it would be another institution geographically distantfrom many citizens and largely incapable of being responsive to citizens’demands for more direct involvement in political decision-making. Finally, much

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like the House of Commons or even provincial legislatures, it would presumablybe a body relying almost entirely on infrequent elections to accommodate cit-izens’ desire to have a say in how they are governed. In short, we will havesomething resembling the House of Commons, duplicating all of these sameproblems. The only major difference in terms of its relationship to citizens is thatit would be elected on a more equal regional basis, rather than on the basis of rep-resentation by population. The curative benefits of Senate reform, when it isimbued with all of the problems that make institutions of representative govern-ment a catalyst for political alienation in the first place, seem quite limited interms of addressing alienation in western Canada.

To be sure, this does not mean Senate reform has no potential benefits, atleast for some people in western Canada. Regionally biased institutionalreforms could perhaps be of major consequence for resolving some of the prob-lems that some political elites in the West are faced with, at least in terms oftheir own influence in the federal government. For political elites from theWest who often feel regional concerns are marginalized in federal institutionsand in processes of decision-making at the federal level, a reconfigured Senatemay well provide the opportunity for greater influence of these concerns inboth. Similarly, a reconfigured Senate may also provide an alternative venue forwestern political elites to advance provincial or regional concerns that cannotbe sufficiently dealt with by provincial governments or existing avenues forintergovernmental relations. To this extent, proponents of the western alien-ation thesis can plausibly argue that Senate reform might reduce western alien-ation, mainly among the limited group of people we identified in the previoussection (i.e., political elites) who suffer most intensely from it.

That said, part of what supposedly makes western alienation a compellingexplanation of alienation in western Canada—and so interesting in the firstplace—is that it is purported to account for and explain the historical and con-temporary problem of alienation in western Canada more generally. Once wedelimit the scope and application of western alienation, however, as propo-nents of the western alienation thesis including Gibbins seem increasinglymore inclined to, Senate reform’s relevance to the problem of alienation is lesspronounced. The curative benefits attributed to it (or any other regional recon-figuration of the federal government) appear much more limited than other-wise suggested. Once we acknowledge the salience of political alienation formany western Canadians and its central part in understanding alienation inwestern Canada, it is unclear why Senate reform, which is predicated entirelyon regionally biased institutional reform of the federal government, is the mostappropriate measure to alleviate alienation appreciably in western Canada.

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Further Considerations on Senate Reform and the Problem of Alienation in Western CanadaI now wish to consider a possible objection to my treatment of western alien-ation thus far. My argument might not appear to acknowledge that the rheto-ric of western alienation seems to be popular among many western Canadians.Many western Canadians perhaps feel like they have an affinity with westernalienation and willingly accept its expression through the lens of an excep-tional regional identity and set of concerns. Consequently, reforming institu-tions of the federal government to accommodate western concerns may indeedhelp cure this problem. In other words, if we effectively accommodate regionsin the institutions of the federal government, this might signal to westernCanadians that they or their elected representatives have a central and impor-tant role to play in federal politics.

To confront this objection, we might consider that the psychological baggageof western alienation perhaps has much to do with the fact that its proponentshave succeeded in recent years in framing the discourse about alienation in theWest as an exceptionally regional phenomenon. As I elucidated in the last sec-tion, misleading assumptions and dubious claims about western alienationabound. More disconcerting perhaps, they can colour the research and analysisemployed to draw conclusions about the problem of alienation in westernCanada. Among other things, this, in turn, helps to establish conclusions thatinstantiate a perception among many western Canadians that western alien-ation is indeed the problem. The option of an explanation such as politicalalienation is effectively marginalized and people are reminded frequently thatit is because they are western Canadians that they are alienated. As a result, thereis a tendency to try to explain feelings of alienation in regional terms. “Westernalienation” becomes the dominant discursive framework for the expression offeelings of alienation in western Canada. The only way to cure the problem isto make sure that the West is empowered in Ottawa. Thus, Senate reform maybe the necessary cure for this alienation.

As I have tried to demonstrate here, though, it is not clear that alienationamong western Canadians can or should be understood as primarily regional innature or rooted in an exceptional regional experience, notwithstanding somepeoples’ possible affinity with the rhetoric of western alienation. This is not to saythat a western Canadian history or experience does not exist, but only to makeclear that the problem of alienation in western Canada is not explained ade-quately as an exceptional type of regional alienation. Just because the discourseabout alienation in western Canada has been successfully captured and subse-quently framed by adherents to the western alienation thesis does not render it

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the most appropriate explanation of the problem of alienation in western Canada.It is unquestionable that political alienation is a major problem in western Canadaand an enduring feature of alienation in the West more generally. The fact that itssymptoms can be manipulated to indicate regional discontent and directedtowards regionally biased solutions does not mean the problem of alienation isprimarily a regional one, requiring solutions like Senate reform.

For the sake of argument, however, let us accept that many westernCanadians have an affinity with the rhetoric of western alienation and, corre-spondingly, make strong demands for Senate reform. Let us also reconsider thequestion posed earlier: if institutions of the federal government (e.g., theSenate) were reformed to promote more regional representation, would theproblem of alienation in western Canada be appreciably alleviated—even giventhe aforementioned affinity with western alienation? To answer this kind of ques-tion, we need to move beyond public opinion polling and surveys which are lim-ited in terms of what they tell us about how such a measure might actually work.Considering the discussion of the symptoms of political alienation in the pre-vious section, it is not clear how Senate reform could appreciably alleviate thealienation of many western Canadians. Recall findings from recent CanadianElection Studies indicating that western Canadians are among the most likelyto agree that “People like me have no say,” “Government does not care whatpeople like me think,” and “MPs lose touch (with their constituents).” Thesekinds of feelings and attitudes indicate low levels of political efficacy and polit-ical trust; it is difficult to imagine that senators and more generally a reconfig-ured Senate would be capable of reducing such political alienation. Again, theactivities of senators and decision-making processes in the Senate would stilltake place at a distance from citizens. Citizens would still also have relativelylittle personal input into the activities and decisions of elected representatives.Citizens would still have relatively few opportunities (as compared to theHouse of Commons) to participate themselves in processes of decision-makingbeyond periodic elections. Taken together, citizens would still score poorly inOffe and Preuss’s test of political alienation. As I have tried to stress here, theseare problems that are not primarily and certainly not exceptionally regional innature. Thus it is unclear what contribution Senate reform will make to the res-olution of this (political) alienation, which is a central part of the problem ofalienation in western Canada.

The argument I present here does not dispute that western Canadiansmight have some kind of affinity with the rhetoric of western alienation. Nordo I dispute that reforms of institutions such as the Senate may not indeedbenefit some western Canadians, namely western political elites. I also do not

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challenge the notion that western Canadians in general are perhaps morefavourable towards Senate reform than people elsewhere in Canada. Rather mypurpose here is only to suggest that, given the problems with the concept of west-ern alienation and its capacity to explain the problem of alienation in westernCanada adequately, institutional reform of the federal government may not beeffective in dealing with the problem of alienation in western Canada. This pointholds notwithstanding people’s possible affinity with western alienation and sup-port for Senate reform. Ultimately, the persistent emphasis on western alienationand Senate reform both misconstrues the problem of alienation in westernCanada and misconceives the kinds of remedies that are appropriate to alleviateit appreciably.

If deeply rooted political alienation, which is a central feature of alienationin western Canada, is to be addressed, then curative measures will need toemphasize the creation and development of more spaces and opportunities forcitizens in western Canada (and all over the country) to participate more effec-tively in processes of political decision-making and to have closer contact withand influence over representatives and political institutions. These strategiesmight entail a shift in attention to more localized venues of issue-focussed rep-resentation and more opportunities for more localized forms of government thatcan accommodate more direct citizen participation. This stands in revealing con-trast to the promotion of regionally focussed institutional reform at the federallevel, which would, in the case of western Canada, benefit existing regional elitesfar demonstrably more than many citizens who suffer from political alienation.Exploring these alternative citizen-focussed strategies should be the task of futureresearch on the problem of alienation in western Canada and elsewhere.

Conclusion

I began this essay by noting that western alienation, particularly as it is con-ceptualized by Gibbins, rests on the twofold presumption that the problem ofalienation in western Canada is mainly a regional one (as distinguished, forinstance, from political alienation) and, in that vein, an exceptional one.According to proponents of this thesis, once we establish this, the remedy bestsuited to alleviate the deleterious effects of alienation in western Canada isinstitutional reform of the federal government designed to promote more effec-tive regional representation—i.e., Senate reform.

I have provided a number of arguments that suggest that we cannot attributethe problem of alienation among many western Canadians to either an excep-tional or even specifically regional phenomenon. If the concept of western

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alienation is to be employed in future, it will have to be significantly delimitedand modified in terms of both scope and application. Once we do this, how-ever, we must also recognize that it does not help us to explain a central partof the alienation that persists among many western Canadians; or, for that mat-ter, indicate how we might sufficiently cure it. Indeed, when we turn our atten-tion to the problem of political alienation, we see that many citizens arealienated from political representatives, political institutions, and the func-tioning of representative government, even within and across regional bound-aries. Thus, we can see why institutional reforms of the federal governmentdesigned to promote more effective regional representation, such as Senatereform, will not appreciably alleviate alienation in western Canada. By misun-derstanding and marginalizing an important source of alienation for many cit-izens in western Canada, we only perpetuate the lack of constructive solutionsto it. Rethinking western alienation and the curative potential of its proposedremedies is a first and necessary step we must take to avoid this tendency, tounderstand the problem of alienation properly in western Canada, and to ascer-tain the most appropriate remedies.

Notes

The author wishes to acknowledge helpful comments and criticisms from David Laycock,

Janet Hiebert, George Wootten, and the anonymous reviewers from the Journal of

Canadian Studies on earlier versions of this essay. The author takes full responsibility for

any errors or problems that remain.

1. Incidentally, this influence was marked by the appointment of Gibbins as president

of the CWF in 1998.

2. Gibbins attributes political alienation only to “the most marginalized from the soci-

etal mainstream—the poor, ethnic and racial minorities, and those lacking in edu-

cation and social skills” (Gibbins and Berdahl 2003, 81; Gibbins 1980, 168). As I will

elucidate in this essay, this is a far too restrictive definition, especially when we con-

sider evidence of political alienation in western Canada.

3. An anonymous reviewer has suggested that an earlier version of this essay implies a

dichotomy between western alienation and political alienation in western Canada,

which appears to reject the possibility regional alienation has any salience among

citizens in western Canada. I am convinced my argument does not entail this kind

of claim, nor do I intend to make such a claim here. What I mean to argue is that to

a large extent—and, certainly, to a much larger extent than adherents of the “west-

ern alienation” thesis are willing to allow for—political alienation more appropriately

explains the kind of alienation that persists among many citizens across western

Canada than does western alienation. To wit, marginalizing political alienation and

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using western alienation to explain the problem of alienation in western Canada

risks obfuscating much of the problem; hence the limited prospects for remedies

such as Senate reform to cure alienation in the West as well. That said, this means

neither that certain kinds of people in western Canada may not suffer from “west-

ern alienation” (as I willingly acknowledge in this essay) nor that many citizens who

suffer largely from political alienation might not also experience some type of

regional alienation (although not necessarily an exceptionally “western” type).

Rather, it means that an explanation based on an exceptional variant of regional

alienation—i.e., “western alienation”—neither is as conceptually precise as sug-

gested nor helps us to understand the problem of alienation in western Canada ade-

quately. The essay urges a rethinking of the problem of alienation in western

Canada, which recognizes both the salience of political alienation for many western

Canadians and the need for measures that can appreciably alleviate this central part

of the problem; a part of the problem heretofore marginalized and neglected by pro-

ponents of the western alienation thesis.

4. For a contrasting view of this argument in the case of cabinets, see Herman Bakvis,

Regional Ministers: Power and Influence in the Canadian Cabinet (1991).

5. Recently, some Canadian scholars have proposed that the Senate actually has a valu-

able role to play in Canadian federalism in spite of its perceived undemocratic rep-

utation. See especially the collection of essays in Protecting Canadian Democracy: The

Senate You Never Knew, ed. Serge Joyal (2003).

6. Gibbins and Roach have recently compiled a “ten point action plan” for addressing

and alleviating western alienation. Aside from the usual demands for Senate reform

and more effective regional representation in the federal government, it demands

more effective intergovernmental relations through the adoption of and commit-

ment to the recently proposed “Council of the Federation” put forward by provin-

cial premiers, more regional balance in the composition of the public service, and

the loosening of party discipline. See for example, Gibbins and Roach, The West in

Canada: An Action Plan to Address Western Discontent (2003).

7. For further discussion of the central importance of Senate reform, see also David

Elton and Peter C. McCormick, A Blueprint for Senate Reform (1990); McCormick et

al., Regional Representation (1981); Canada West Foundation, Beyond Regionalism: The

Rest of the Senate Reform Story (2000); and Gibbins, Regionalism: Territorial Politics in

Canada and the United States (1982).

8. These premises are offered initially by Gibbins in Prairie Politics and Society as a basis for

using and applying the concept of western alienation to his study of politics and soci-

ety in the prairies. They are subsequently restated throughout his later research and

work on western alienation. See for example, Prairie Politics and Society (1980), ch. 5,

especially 167-69. Cf. Gibbins and Loleen Berdahl, Western Visions, Western Futures:

Perspectives on the West in Canada, 2nd ed. (2003), ch. 2, especially 26-56, 81-82.

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9. For a similar but more philosophical defence of this view, see Barry Cooper,

“Regionalism, Political Culture, and Canadian Political Myths” (2002). It is interest-

ing to note that this perspective ignores or at least marginalizes in both cases the

possibility of similar disconnectedness between the interests of citizens and elites

within the West. I shall take up this point later.

10. Resnick cites a number of examples and survey data that indicate the tendency of

British Columbians to identify BC as a region separate from the rest of western

Canada. Most recently, he notes the public outcry against legislation in 1995 that

recognized Quebec as a “distinct society” and granted vetoes to four regions

(Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, Ontario, and the West). After vehement demands by

the BC government, the regional veto was then extended to BC as well, separating

it from the veto given to the other western provinces. See The Politics of Resentment:

BC Regionalism and Canadian Unity (2000), 28.

11. Henry separates the questions into three categories that test respondents’ attitudes

towards the performance of representatives, the performance of the federal govern-

ment vis-à-vis their region, and their feelings towards the accommodation of

Quebec’s constitutional demands. His methodology and sample data can be found

in “Revisiting Western Alienation: Towards a Better Understanding of Political

Alienation and Political Behaviour in Western Canada” (2002), 81-82.

12. Laycock proposes four main varieties of populism in his book. These include Crypto-

Liberalism (personified by the Progressive Party), Radical Democratic Populism

(exemplified in the early platforms of the United Farmers movements and the writ-

ings of William Irvine), Social Democratic Populism (the variant espoused by the Co-

operative Commonwealth Federation), and Social Credit and Plebiscitarian

Populism. The six dimensions of prairie populist democratic thought are discussed

in detail in Populism and Democratic Thought on the Canadian Prairies, 1910-1945

(1990), 7-14.

13. For an excellent thematic overview of the Reform Party’s successful, albeit problem-

atic, appropriation of the language of direct democracy in establishing its early

appeal in western Canada, see Laycock, “Citizen Alienation, Right-Populism, and the

Redefinition of the Democratic Struggle” (2002).

14. I am assuming here of course that senators would be elected on a regional or

province-wide basis and would be responsible for representing some kind of regional

perspective. An analogous example would be the constituency responsibilities of

American or Australian senators, elected to represent the composite states of each

country. We can safely assume, based on most proposals for Senate reform in

Canada, that the Senate would be no more than half (likely even less than half) the

size of the House of Commons (which has 308 seats) and would likely remain

roughly similar in size to the present Senate (105 seats).

153


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