undergraduate thesis in philosophy

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The Roleof emoTionsin moRal DelibeRaTion:

Why We oughT noT envy, anD emoTionsas moRal moTivaToRs

By:

Sharon Barbour

Advisor:

Dennis Des Chene

Washington University in St. Louis

Department of Philosophy

2010


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ABSTRACT

In this paper I endeavor to prove false the belief held by many that emotions are the

enemy of reason and should therefore play no role in moral deliberation. Emotions are

an inextricable part of our decisional capacity, and deserve a role in moral delibera-tion. I argue that rather than attempt to act solely from duty, we should take account of

our emotions in order to determine whether the emotion we feel is worthy to be acted

upon. For many emotions, the context in which they are felt determines whether it

ought be acted upon; there exist, however, morally decient emotions which are not

permissible in any context, and should never be acted upon. Envy, for example, should

never be serve as a moral motivator, not because it is an emotino, but because is mor-

ally decient. Other emotinos, however, may and should serve as moral motivators,

which may lead to moral behavior more reliably than acting from duty alone. Thus, by

acknowledging the role of emotions in moral deliberation, we are can more reliably

act in accordance with morality.


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Table of Contents


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In this thesis, I argue that emotion has a proper role in moral deliberation. In this intro-

duction, I hope to motivate the discussion by laying out some of the history of what people have

thought about emotion and its relationship to reason, and to illustrate the problems that arise when

ethical systems deny the role of emotions in moral deliberation. To reach the problem of denying

emotion its place in moral deliberation, it is necessary to examine why its role is denied in the rst

place.

When it comes to moral deliberation, reason is often favored over emotion to determine

what one ought to do, as though the two are mutually exclusive. David Hume observes, nothing is

more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and rea-

son, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform

themselves to its dictates, (Hume,A Treatise of Human Nature 2.3.3, p. 265). Indeed, throughout

history, emotion and reason have often been viewed as diametric opposites. They have been pitted

against each other as foes: emotion is nothing more than primal vestiges of our prehistoric past;

reason is the dening characteristic of civilized man, the loyal guardian of duty. At the root of this

contrast is a philosophical error: the belief that actions motivated by emotion will be capricious

unless stabilized by reason, and the emotions themselves, even if acknowledged and controlled by

reason, can be nothing other than an obstacle. The conception of emotion as an opponent of reason

thus arose. This conception has been propagated in various forms, perpetuating the philosophical

error, as I discuss below.

Emotions have been closely associated with weakness of mind and character. A penchant

for sentiment is often viewed as proper to the weaker sex. Arguments about womens predisposi-

inTRoDucTion: emoTionasTheopponenTof Reason

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tion to excessive emotion illustrate the belief that emotion, when present, is in the place of reason,

as though it is a zero-sum relationship. Emotion, considered irrational, womanish, and weak, came

to be viewed as a aw, contrasted with an ideal of pure reason. It is as though emotion, if it plays

any role at all in a persons mental life let alone in moral deliberation, serves only to obscure

reason 1.

This conception has become entrenched in Western society. The association of emotion

with weakness and femininity can be found in ancient Greece. Aristotle held that

woman is more compassionate than man, more easily moved to tears, at the

same time is more jealous, more querulous, more apt to scold and to strike. She

is, furthermore, more prone to despondency and less hopeful than the man, more

void of shame or self-respect, more false of speech, more deceptive, and of more

retentive memory. (Aristotle, The History of Animals, Book IX, Part 1).

Such ideas about a womans predisposition to be emotional are echoed in later philosophical trea-

tises2. These arguments have been used to justify the exclusion women from public life in 18th-

and 19th-century France and England3. Claims that emotion and reason are incompatible were

1 This tradition has been echoed over centuries through literature and art. It is expressed in the condemnation of

the vengeful Clytemnaestra in Aeschylus Oresteia, and in the exile of the pitiable Agave of EuripidesBacchae.

Representations of a dichotomy between reason and emotion have endured, and the characterization of emotions as

incompatible with reason and duty is a recurring motif. It appears in Corneilles Surna (1674), Goethes Sorrows

of Young Werther(1787), Jane Austens Sense and Sensibility (1811), Michael Curtiz lm Casablanca (1942), and

countless other tales that involve a protagonist torn between being faithful to the emotions and doing what reason

dictates. In each of these cases, emotion stands in binary opposition to reason; they cannot be employed simultane-

ously or harmoniously. While many examples of literature and lm offer different views of the relationship between

emotion and reason, the recurrence of this theme over generations indicates that it represents an idea that resonates

with many.

2 In Book V ofEmile, Rousseaus treatise on the education of women is founded on the principle than men and womenare balanced opposites, and where man is rational woman is emotional. He calls women capricious and changeable,

even when it comes to religious faith: women cannot conne [the rule of their faith] within the boundaries of evi -

dence and reason, but, allowing themselves to be carried away by a thousand extraneous impulses, they are always on

this side or that of hte truth... The source of the evil is ... in the tendency to extremes which characterizes their sex,

(p. 276).

3 In correspondence with French revolutionary politician le Comte de Mirabeau regarding the public education in

France, Charles Maurice Talleyrand asserts, Sans doute la femme doit rgner dans lintrierieur de sa maison; mais

elle ne doit rgner que l : partout ailleurs elle est comme dplace (translated: Undoubtedly, woman must rule in

the home; but she must not rule anywhere else : everywhere else she is out of place)

The Roleof emoTionsin moRal DelibeRaTion

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maintained even in the 20th century: in 1926, psychologist James Henry Leuba describes how the

supposed correlation between emotion and femininity is proof that the rational capacities of wom-

en are inferior to those of men because they are, unlike men, susceptible to emotion and therefore

resistant to reason. His argument4 reects the belief that emotion somehow replaces reason in ones

mental life. The appearance of Leubas argument in a popular, mainstream publication indicates

that people were still arguing on supposedly scientic and philosophical grounds that emotion

diminishes a persons capacity for reason and intellect.

Today, the belief that emotions indicate mental weakness and suppress the intellect is

considered by many to be archaic. Our understanding of neurology and psychology has deepened

and reects a greater understanding of the various functions of emotion in ones mental life (I dis-

cuss this in detail in section 1). Men are admitted to have feelings, and women are known to be

as equally intellectually capable as men5. There remains, however, a tendency to reject any role of

emotion in practical ethical decision-making in favor of pure, rational thought.

As recently as the days of Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayors Senate Committee

Hearing, a contentious issue was her ability to render decisions free from her personal feelings.

Having stated clearly that she does not believe a judge can be completely impartial 6, many took

4 The anterior pituitary is connected, not only with the male sex-functions, but also in an intimate way with the

higher nervous system. It is therefore one of the sources of the energy of the intellectual functions. And the posterior

pituitary regulates, not only the reproductive female organs, but also the maternal promptings and their emotionalcorrelates. A great deal of evidence, writes [psychologist Louis Berman in The Glands Regulating Personality],

with reference to the posterior pituitary, is in our possession concerning the disturbances of emotion accompanying

disturbances of this gland, and controllable by its control. It might be said to energize deeply the tender emotions, and

instead of saying soft-hearted we should say much-pituitarized. (Leuba, The Weaker Sex: A Scientic Ramble

in The Atlantic Monthly, 1926).

5 That is to say, the equal intellectual capabilities of men and women are widely known to be true I recognize that

these facts are not universally recognized.

6 In her speech, A Latina Judges Voice, Sotomayor said, The aspiration to impartiality is just that its an aspira-

tion because it denies the fact that we are by our experiences making different choices than others.

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this to mean that she would consult her feelings, rather than strict legal reason, to make judgments.

Senator Lindsey Graham asked pointedly if she felt kind of touchy-feely stuff had a role in

legal reasoning. Her acceptance of the role of emotions in her judgments was met with derision.

Though jurisprudence was the issue at hand, the line of questioning to which Justice Sotomayor

was subjected reveals entrenched notions that emotion replaces reason, and that emotion should

have no part in such decision-making. Justice Sotomayor astutely recognized that emotions, which

are a signicant part of our mental lives, cannot be completely removed from our decision-making

when it comes to moral issues.

Although we understand that emotion does not necessarily diminish a persons rational or

intellectual capacity, the role of emotions in moral deliberation continues to be met with skepti-

cism and mistrust. This is especially the case in ethical systems in which reason and morality are

aligned, particularly deontological ethics. It is argued that emotions are too inconstant and capri-

cious to be suitable moral motivators, so it is best to leave them out of the process altogether. It is

a mistake to believe that should this line of thought be debunked it would become permissible to

act upon any emotion at any time and justice and order will subsequently be dismantled. There is a

reasonable, and reachable, middle ground: it is that emotion and reason are not mutually exclusive.

In this thesis, I argue that emotions are inextricable from moral deliberation, and that at-

tempts to disentangle the two are futile. In arguing for a form of virtue ethics in which character

and proper handling of the emotions are closely related, I refute the Kantian argument that duty is

the only admissible moral motivator. It is impossible to exclude our emotions from our decision-

making process due to the fact that emotion is a necessary component of decisional capacity (sec-


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tion 1). For feeling agents like ourselves, emotion is central to our consciousness; on the most ba-

sic level, it aids us in fully appreciating our surroundings. Not only are we incapable of qualitative

reasoning apart from emotion, but we will make ethical decisions more reliably if we take account

of our emotions during moral deliberation. It is for this reason that we must take into consideration

our emotional responses so that we can control or allow for their inuence in moral deliberation.

I will establish that emotions themselves have moral worth, and are moral or immoral depending

on the context in which they are felt, while some emotions are never moral in any context (sec-

tion 2). These emotions are intrinsically morally decient. By considering our emotions, we can

identify whether they are appropriate in the given context, and whether they are worthy of serving

as moral motivators. To illustrate this, I examine envy, a morally decient emotion (section 3). I

make the case against inappropriate and morally decient emotions as acceptable moral motiva-

tors (section 4), and demonstrate that there are emotions that we should give weight to in moral

decisions, such as compassion, empathy, and righteous indignation; these emotions may improve

our moral reasoning over duty alone (section 5). I explore this idea by addressing the problem

posed by Kants claim that we have a duty never to tell lies, even for altruistic purposes. I seek to

establish that the emotions ought to have a positive role in our moral deliberation process, as they

can enhance moral reasoning.

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The Kantian position that emotions ought not inuence our moral deliberation implies

that we, as feeling agents, are capable of making moral decisions wholly independently of emo-

tion. The emotions, however, are a central part of our consciousness; a person is not deemed to

have a full mental life unless sentience is accompanied by emotional capacity. Indeed, many psy-

chologists believe that without emotions or affects to amplify physiological drives and infuse

cognitive processing with subjective meaning, human beings would not care enough to stay alive,

much less mate, nurture offspring, create kinship bonds, or pursue art, science, literature, or moral

philosophy (Callahan, p. 10). We consider those who are incapable of emotions such as empathy

to be defective human beings.

Nevertheless some philosophers have argued that ethical decisions should be made inde-

pendent of emotions. The argument goes something like this: to make a moral decision, a person

is required to have an understanding of the rules of morality, and, using powers of observation

which are supposed to be independent of the emotions, the person must assess the situation based

upon the relevant facts. The decision is then made by a procedure that will determine which action

will have results that conform most closely with the rules of morality. In this view, emotion is not

only not necessary to elicit a moral decision; if anything, it would serve to obscure the facts of the

situation and prevent an objective assessment. Two consequences of this view are that a person

with no emotional capacity would be able to perform moral deliberation entirely competently, and

that a person whose emotions are in conict with the demands of duty can perform his duty just as

competently, and have equal moral standing, as a person whose emotions are not in conict with

the demands of duty. I consider each of these consequences below.

secTion 1: The emoTionsaRe inexTRicablefRom

moRal DelibeRaTion

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1.1 The false iDealof mR. spock: negaTive aRgumenTsfoRThe Roleof emoTionsin

moRal DelibeRaTion

If emotion is not a criterion for making ethical decisions, it follows that a person who

cannot feel emotions is competent to make such decisions. However, we recognize that this is not

the case. We view the capacity for emotion as critical to our humanity; merely knowing the rules

of society is not sufcient to make moral judgments. As Sidney Callahan observes, Persons may

have a high IQ and be able to articulate verbally the cultures moral rules, but if they cannot feel

the emotional force of inner obligation, they can disregard all moral rules or arguments without a

qualm (Callahan, p. 10). It is necessary to have some internal drive that moves one to follow the

rules of morality. This is why we consider sociopaths, individuals without a conscience or the abil-

ity to empathize, to be defective.

In an effort to prove that emotional capacity is a criterion for decisional competence,

Louis Charland examines Mr. Spock, a ctionalized ideal of reasoning. His thought processes are

guided by logic alone, and almost completely free of the disruptive inuences of emotions (Char-

land p. 67). It would seem that he would be more competent in deciding than any feeling agent.

Unfortunately Mr. Spock, because he lacks the capacity for emotion, also lacks the ability to fully

comprehend his surroundings and the situations in which he may nd himself. This is because

emotions are essential to our understanding of the world; their representational capacity provides

an information processing system designed to keep us appraised of our own internal states and

conditions [and] about events and situations in the outside world (Charland p. 70). Without a

capacity for emotions, we could not fully grasp what might elicit an emotional response in others,


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nor could we easily or reliably recognize the actual emotional response. Charland illustrates this

point with the example of a man holding a glass above his head: if you did not represent the man

holding a glass over his head in front of you as angry, you would have no reason to suspect he

might throw it at you, and, therefore, no reason to duck or hide (Charland p. 71). Charland argues

that emotions are phenomena that cannot be fully understood or appreciated unless one has the

capacity to experience them.

It is true that a rational agent could learn to interpret various facial expressions or other

indicators of emotional states, but as feeling agents, we can better appreciate the signicance of

emotional responses in others because we appreciate their signicance in ourselves. In principle,

a rational agent could be a pure behaviorist and learn all of the physical responses that result from

emotions in a feeling agent, and could determine that a glass raised above the head combined with

a certain facial expression indicates that the glass is about to be thrown. Evaluating motivation

based exclusively on physical signals is, however, inefcient and quite likely to be unreliable.

Moreover, in humans, emotional responses are more expedient than rational assessments; if I see a

person raise his glass above his head and see a look on his face that I interpret as rage, I am more

likely to feel fear and duck, than if I see the same sequence of events but do not immediately inter-

pret or feel any emotion. Arguments that emotions are not necessary for moral deliberation fail to

take into account their crucial role in how we perceive and interact with the world.

Further, Charland points to Antonio Damasios work, which indicates that emotions are

necessary for practical reasoning. Damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the region of the

brain that regulates emotion, has been shown to diminish practical reasoning ability in everyday

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life: Outside of the hypothetical theoretical context of the clinical testing environment, Damasios

subjects turn out to be unable to plan effectively for the future, [] to behave in self-destructive

ways that violate their best interests, and to be unable to maintain healthy and steady social and

personal relationships (Charland, p. 73). As a matter of biology, it seems, the emotions are central

not only to how we perceive the world, but to our ability to function in society 1. Contrary to the

idea that emotion and reason are binary opposites, it appears that we cannot reason without emo-

tion.

Charland concludes: insofar as practical reasoning is concerned, Mr. Spock is not, and

indeed could not possibly be, mentally competent, because he lacks any capacity for emotion, and

therefore lacks the ability to fully perceive the world. Indeed, in this case he is a psychological

impossibility a ction of misguided and incorrect intuitions about mental competence and emo-

tion (Charland, p. 77). Clearly, the emotions are inextricable from decision-making capacity and

are fundamental to our mental lives. This indicates that a person must have a capacity for emotion

in order to make decisions and employ practical reasoning. Below, I argue further that the emo-

tions play a positive role in moral deliberation as indicators of our character, as well as their role

as motivators.

1.2 The case againsTThe moRal beneficenT misanThRope: posiTive aRgumenTsfoRThe

Roleof emoTionsin moRal DelibeRaTion

The capacity for emotion is necessary for moral deliberation, but it alone is not sufcient

to make correct moral decisions. It seems that a feeling agent must have emotions that are morally

1 See also: Antonio Damasio Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Avon

Books (1994).


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appropriate in order for the feeling agent to be considered right or moral. To illustrate this point,

consider a misanthrope who, out of duty, performs philanthropic acts.

If we take the Kantian position that virtue is determined solely by fulllment of duty, then

a feeling agent whose cognitive faculties are not diminished by an absence of emotional capacity

can be virtuous no matter which emotions he feels.The example of a benecent misanthrope indi -

cates a problem with this consequence of denying the positive role of emotions in moral delibera-

tion. Kant identies the duty of benecence as an obligation to promote according to ones means

the happiness of others in need, without hoping for something in return (Kant, Metaphysics of

Morals, 6:453:30). The duty of benecence thus extends even to a misanthrope, who feels intense

hatred for all humanwity and wishes all people ill. If the misanthrope fullls his duty and helps his

neighbors even though he hates all people, we are reluctant to say that he is acting morally. Indeed,

his hatred for his neighbors and the internal conict he would suffer from acting against his incli-

nation lead us to consider him immoral, and his benecent actions, in a certain respect, perverse.

The benecent misanthrope cannot be considered morally good. I reject the Kantian po-

sition, which holds that the misanthropes hatred of his neighbors is irrelevant to the question of

whether he is morally good because his good consists only in having a will governed by duty. This

view does not take into account that hatred of those who do not deserve ones hatred is intrinsically

bad (I discuss the moral worth of certain emotions in greater detail in section 2). Furthermore,

when the misanthrope helps those whom he hates, the act is not morally good because his actions

are in conict with his inclinations, which is psychologically awkward and morally perverse. By

this I mean, it is a perversion to hate all people, as the misanthrope does, and yet to perform bene-

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cent acts for no reason other than duty; such an event seems akin to psychological agellation. To

deny the importance of an agents mental states when considering his moral state, as strict deon-

tologists and strict consequentialists often do, is to ignore a substantial part of the life of the agent,

resulting in only a limited view of the whole picture.

Acting in accordance with morality but contrary to our emotions seems to preclude being

considered moral. Acting in accordance with morality in concert with our emotional dispositions

seems more moral because it is better to wish to do good than to not wish to do good, but to do it

anyway out of duty. We presume that a person is better morally if their motives to act are in concert

rather than being at odds with one another. Justin Oakley offers an explanation for why it is better,

when we act morally, that this should be in harmony with our emotions:

First, in many cases we may be more reliable in successfully carrying out what

we value if we care about it. Second, and perhaps more importantly here, to

have our values and our emotions in harmony is to have a certain moral integrity

or wholeness, which is itself a morally good trait. [Third], a person who values

the right things and is emotionally moved to act on them seems morally betterthan someone who has and acts on these values in the face of conicting inclina-

tions, because the former persons emotions are an indication that these values

are really his (Oakley, p. 54).

The rst claim is supported by the intuition that we are more apt to complete a task to the best of

our ability if it is something in which we feel emotionally invested. A possible objection is that

a misanthrope could have the duty to help others to the best of his ability, making the utilitarian

value of his efforts the same as that of someone whose empathy and compassion move him to help

others. Oakleys second claim makes the point that the misanthrope would still be decient in

this case because of his conicting desires; he echoes Aristotles claim that it is inherently better

to perform a good action because to act under compulsion and against ones will is painful, but


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to act for a pleasurable or admirable object is pleasant (AristotleNicomachean Ethics 1110b12-

13). Even though the misanthrope is performing a good act by helping others, it brings him pain

because he hates those he helps. It is certainly worse for him to suffer internal conict than not; in

addition, that he should be pained merely by helping those in need indicates a aw in his character.

This is keeping with Oakleys third claim, which indicates that we consider a person who must be

obligated by duty to act in a morally good way to be decient in comparison to a person who can

act morally good because his emotions incline him to do so. It seems better to sincerely want to

help a person than to help a person merely because you have an obligation to do so. A child who

shares his toys because he wants his friends to be able to experience the same fun that he feels

seems to have done something better than a child who shares his toys out of a duty of benecence.

Indeed, the fact of being obliged to perform an action you dont want to seems to diminish the

moral worth of the action.

From a Kantian perspective, action in accordance with duty has greater moral worth if it

goes against the emotions. Of a philanthropic man who turns misanthropic, but fullls his duty

of benecence nonetheless, Kant says: He tears himself out of this deadly insensibility and does

the action without any inclination, solely from duty; only then does it for the rst time have its au-

thentic moral worth (Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:398). We can imagine

cases in which this is true, or at least not as one-sided as the example of children sharing toys. A

soldier who doesnt want to go to battle, not out of cowardice, but out of concern for his family,

is considered nobler if he goes to battle anyway than a soldier who has nothing to lose. Likewise,

an attorney who spends her spare time working for Legal Aid, rather than at home with her friends

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and family is considered more morally admirable because of the personal sacrice she makes. In

cases such as this, it is fortitude of character that is admired more than the action. Kant seems to

conate strength of character with morality in such a way that ignores the moral worth of emotions

themselves. Consider again the soldier: his friend who is also in the military doesnt want to go to

battle because he hates his country and is loath to defend it, but he goes anyway because it is his

duty. Both fulll their duty to their country, and both act against their emotional inclinations, but

the moral worth of their acts does not appear to be equivalent.

This is because, in addition to the epistemic value of emotions, the emotions themselves

have moral worth depending upon context. Love and concern for your family have moral worth.

Hating ones country is, in general, morally decient.While it is better not to act in accordance with

morally decient emotions, it is still of lower moral value than acting in harmony with morally

worthy emotions.

Further, we can imagine a third soldier who fullls his duty in accordance with his emo-

tions: he is happy to go to war because he loves to kill people. Even though this soldier is fullling

his duty by acting from his emotions, it is immoral to love to kill people. His emotions are immor-

al, and so diminish the moral worth of his actions. It is morally better to will that one should go to

war because of love of country than merely out of an obligation to do so, and morally better to will

that one should go to war merely out of an obligation to do so, than to will it for a love of killing. I

revisit the moral worth of emotions in section 2. For the moment, it seems clear that emotions are

necessary to make moral decisions, and that they can contribute to the moral worth of our actions.


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1.3 acknoWleDgingThe emoTionsTo ensuRe moRal behavioR

Because the emotions are essential to moral deliberation, it is imprudent to attempt to ig-

nore them altogether to perform ones duty. Emotions serve as powerful motivators, and have the

capacity to inuence our actions more extensively than we may be aware if we overlook them. It

appears that the moral worth of an action that is morally good by virtue of being benecial to an

individual or to society can be diminished by the concurrent presence of inappropriate emotions. It

is therefore important to account for our emotions so that we have a greater understanding of our

moral state when carrying out an action. To do so, we must consider whether the emotions we feel

are appropriate, and if they are found to be inappropriate, they must be dispensed with (this point

is discussed in section 2). If the emotions are found to be appropriate, they ought to be acted upon,

as actions motivated by appropriate emotion may enhance the effectiveness of the action we take,

a point I revisit in section 5.

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Emotions can serve as moral motivators, and so should be considered relative to their ca-

pacity to move us to act, but they also have moral value of their own; for many emotions, that value

is determined by their appropriateness in a given context. Emotions that are not appropriate should

not motivate the feeling agent: they will lead to immoral behavior; moreover, it is morally bad for

a person to feel or at least to maintain inappropriate emotions. This is because inappropriate emo-

tions generally stem from defects, either of character or of perception, that are aggravated by the

continued presence of the emotion. If I witness a person fall and I delight in her pain, my emotional

response is indicative of a defect of character: a person should not be happy on perceiving the pain

of a fellow person. This is not, or not wholly, a matter of how ones feeling inclines one to act; my

delight in my friends misfortune might move me to laugh and thereby to add embarrassment to

her troubles; but whether I act on my feeling or not, the feeling itself is morally wrong. It is mor-

ally wrong in this context because it expresses a defect of character. It reects a sort of emotional

languor, because it is easier for me and more pleasant than imagining myself to be the person in

pain, and, through empathy, recognizing that her situation is painful rather than pleasant.

Throughout this section, I refer to emotions as appropriate and inappropriate. The

terms have the following signicance: appropriate will denote permissible emotional responses,

those that one ought to feel in a given situation, and inappropriate will denote those emotions

that are impermissible in a given situation.

2.1 appRopRiaTenessis DeTeRmineDby conTexT

Most emotions are intrinsically neither morally good nor bad. To say that pleasant emo-

secTion 2: The moRaliTyof

emoTions

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tions, those that are associated with pleasure and happiness, are good, and negative emotions, those

that are associated with pain and sadness, are bad, is a vast oversimplication. There are cases in

which negative emotions like anger would be moral, such as righteous indignation, and cases in

which positive emotions like joy are immoral, such as Schadenfreude. Aristotle argues that it is

difcult to be virtuous, as it requires one to feel or act towards the right person to the right extent

at the right time for the right reason in the right way. (Aristotle NicomacheanEthics, 1109a27).

He requires in other works that emotions be appropriate to the context in which they arise. It may

well be the case that requiring feeling agents to have appropriate emotions makes virtue more dif-

cult to attain. However, this form of virtue ethics presents a fuller picture of a persons moral life

than those which fail to consider whether an emotion is misplaced or aberrant in a certain situation.

Consider the following example:

Two people, Nero and Agrippina, are unacquainted but standing near each other. Sud-

denly, Nero collapses, and starts writhing in pain, clutching his chest. If Agrippina felt happy in

response to Neros apparent suffering, Agrippinas emotional response would be inappropriate. It

is wrong to take pleasure in another persons suffering; we should take an interest in furthering

the success of our fellow humans, and should be troubled by their pain. As people, we ought to

embrace a feeling of community and emotional connection with others. It is a defect of character

to derive pleasure from another persons suffering. If Agrippina became angry with Nero because

of his apparent suffering, that would be similarly inappropriate; it seems aberrant that a strangers

suffering would cause Agrippina to respond with anger. The appropriate response to the sudden

suffering of a stranger is concern, which reects an interest in the well-being of another, and would

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likely result in an attempt to ameliorate the situation. This concern for the well-being of a stranger

might motivate Agrippina to call an ambulance and wait until it arrives to ensure that Nero receives

medical attention.

Aristotle mentions that it is not enough to feel the right emotion at the right time; it must

be felt to the right degree, as well. Suppose that Nero and Agrippina are not strangers, but Agrip-

pina is Neros mother. Given the relationship of Nero and Agrippina, it would be inappropriate for

Agrippina to have equal concern for Nero, the stranger, and Nero, her child, because of the strong

emotional bond that is presumed to exist between parents and their children, but is not present

between strangers. In the rst scenario, it would be acceptable for Agrippina to move on with her

day after being sure that Nero receives proper medical attention; it might even seem excessive for

Agrippina to continue to be concerned for Nero after he receives medical attention. In the second

scenario, Agrippina would be callous if she did not have greater concern for her child, and accom-

pany him to the hospital and continue to worry.

Aristotles Principle of the Mean expresses his understanding that there is a spectrum of

emotional responses in a given context, and that within the spectrum there are appropriate and

inappropriate responses. It is inappropriate for Agrippina to feel happy at Neros suffering; we

should want success, rather than suffering, for all people because it will augment the status of

humanity. Happiness at an innocent persons suffering is thus an unworthy emotional response.

Callousness, or general apathy to the suffering of innocent people, is likewise inappropriate. It

is not the case that sympathy is good, antipathy bad, and apathy neutral; sympathy is good, and

antipathy and apathy are both bad, but antipathy is worse because it leads to more suffering and


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indicates internal defects within the feeling agent. We ought to take an interest in the success of

fellow people. From this, we can derive a method of evaluating the appropriateness of emotions.

It seems that the emotions that, if acted upon, are most likely to improve the situation or benet

society, and reect a reasonable degree of interest in others, can be considered appropriate. The

emotions that, if acted upon, would worsen the situation or harm society, as well as emotions that

indicate and foster defects of character or perception, can be considered inappropriate.

2.2 inTRinsically moRally DeficienT emoTions

Having established that emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate in a given context,

not merely instrumentally, but because of what they reveal about a feeling agents inner state, I

turn now to emotions that are never appropriate; these are intrinsically morally decient emotions.

Morally decient emotions are distinct from inappropriate emotions because their moral decien-

cy is intrinsic and independent of context. Among these are envy, malice, spite, and other emotions

that are necessarily invidious and never productive. These emotions indicate defects in the feeling

agent, such as the desire that harm befall an innocent person. Such emotions ought to be eschewed

by feeling agents, not only because, if acted upon, they will always result in immoral behavior, but

also because their presence in the feeling agents consciousness signies defectiveness of the feel-

ing agent. Harboring such emotions is sufcient to be considered immoral. I illustrate this point

more fully with the case of envy in section 3.

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20

Envy is an emotion that is morally decient. It is always inappropriate, and should never

enter into moral deliberation. In this discussion, envy will refer broadly to a painful feeling that

accompanies the desire of the feeling agent that another person unfairly lose possession an object,

tangible or intangible, that he or she has fairly come to possess. With this denition, envy is neces-

sarily invidious; envy is different from emotions that move the feeling agent to strive or emulate

the person that is envied.

It is necessary here to clarify the difference between envy and emulation, a distinction

drawn by Aristotle and currently upheld by many philosophers. Aristotle notes in Book II of the

Rhetoric: Emulation makes us take steps to secure the good things in question, envy makes us

take steps to stop our neighbour having them (1388a34-36), distinguishing emulation from envy.

Kant, too, draws a distinction between emulation and envy:

there awakens in us a discontent with our own condition, by comparing it with

others, and hence arises emulation or jealousy, because we have perceived aninequality with the others well being, or an equality with our own, which could

only have been prevented by ourselves. The result of it is an immediate endea-

vour to pull evel with, or get ahead of the other, accompanied, therefore, with

activity designed to enlarge or extend our natural endowments. But the effect is

totally different if it arouses envy in us. This consists in hatred of the other, sim-

ply because he is fortunate, or has advantages over us (On the Metaphysics of

Morals, 27:693).

Likewise, John Rawls states inA Theory of Justice that we may think of envy as the propensity to

view with hostility the greater good of others even though their being more fortunate than we does

not detract from our advantages, (Rawls, p. 466), and compares proper envy to cases of benign

envy, in which there is no ill will intended or expressed... By these conventional expressions

we are afrming the value of certain things that others have (Rawls, p. 467). In my discussion of

secTion 3: envy

a sTuDyofa moRally DeficienT emoTion


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envy, I follow this tradition of treating envy as a distinct emotion from emulation, or, as Rawls

calls it, benign envy. The emotion that I consider in this discussion is invidious envy.

Traditionally, envy has been eschewed and discouraged. It is forbidden by the tenth Com-

mandment in the Judeo-Christian Bible: You shall not covet your neighbors house. You shall not

covet your neighbors wife, or his manservant, or his maidservant, his ox or donkey, or anything

that belongs to your neighbor. (Exodus 20:2-17). The word covet here signies envying a per-

son his uniquely possessible object, and desiring to obtain that object at the expense of its current

possessor. In the Catholic tradition, envy is the second of the seven deadly sins. Dantes Divine

Comedy shows the envious languishing in Purgatory, punished by having their eyelids threaded

and sewn up / By an iron wire, so they may never again gaze enviously upon another object

(Dante,Purgatorio, Canto XIII, 73). Shakespeares Iago warns Othello, oh beware my lord, of

jealousy / it is the green-eyed monster, which doth mock / the meat it feeds on, (Othello Act 3,

Scene III, 193), and jealousy, a species of envy, is the ultimate cause of Othellos demise. The use

of monstrous imagery to depict envy predates Shakespeare; Ovid describes the goddess Envy as

gruesome: Pale, skinny, squint-eyed, mean, her teeth are red / with rust, her breast is green with

gall, her tongue / suffused with poison. (Ovid, Metamorphoses, 2:771-805). These and many

other examples make it clear that in Westerb culture envy has almost uniformly been regarded with

suspicion and disdain. It is regarded as resulting in harm for both the person who is envied and the

feeling agent.

Envy is identied as conducive to the indulgence of our most monstrous impulses, and

therefore as deleterious to society. Such views of envy are rooted in the belief that envy has nega-

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tive effects not only for the object of envy, but for the feeling agent as well. Descartes identi-

es physiological effects of envy such as leaden complexions (Descartes, Passions of the Soul,

Art.184), indicating the damage it can cause to a feeling agent. Nietzsche describes ressentiment,

a species of envy, as originating in groundless feelings of injustice in feeling agents, indicating

that it is a reection of the feeling agents defective internal state. The belief that envy is a morally

decient emotion can be attributed to what envy and its various species jealousy, resentment,

schadenfreude reveal about the feeling agent, and the effects they have on the feeling agent.

Envy is morally decient not merely because it is instrumentally bad and likely to lead to immoral

behavior; it is intrinsically morally decient. It is likely to distort reasoning, and is indicative of

character aws such as a false view of the self and a propensity to spitefulness. Envy, as it is mor-

ally decient and is never a permissible moral motivator, ought to be eschewed by feeling agents.

3.1 DefiniTionof envy

Envy arises when a feeling agent witnesses a person in possession of an object he or she

has fairly come to possess, and the feeling agent desires the person not to have the object. If the

person has not fairly come into possession of the object, then the feeling agents anger and pain at

the persons possessing the object can be a sort of indignation, which, unlike envy, is not neces-

sarily invidious. We will see that the qualication of fairly is required so as to distinguish envy

from righteous indignation (see example (3) below).

It is necessary to distinguish between two types of envy: possessive envy and destructive

envy. Possessive envy is what is most commonly denoted by the term: it is the feeling agents de-


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sire to possess the object that inspires envy. Destructive envy is the feeling agents desire that the

person who is envied should cease to possess the object. Both are rooted in a perceived disruption

of the balance of superiority between the feeling agent and the person in possession of the object.

It is not the object itself, but the perceived superiority conferred by the object, that inspires envy1.

The balance of power, or superiority, can be pictured as a staircase (See gure 1): two

people, Caesar and Brutus, initially stand on the fourth step. Caesar fairly comes into possession

of an object and climbs to the fth step. Brutus is left standing on the fourth step and does not

move lower on the staircase from his original position, but sees that he is lower on the staircase

relative to Caesar on the fth step. Rather than believing his position to be just as high as it ever

was, Brutus envies Caesar because he feels as though he has been lowered. Although his position

has not been diminished, Brutus views his relative position not as a staircase, but as a set of scales

(See gure 2). Like in a zero-sum game, if Caesars weight increases, Brutus necessarily weighs

less, and is inferior not only to Caesar, but to his original position. It is this perceived demotion that

yields envy. Envy, then, can be understood as a special kind of hate that arises when a person, by

virtue of possession of a trait or an object, causes the feeling agent to feel inferior, an unpleasant

feeling. To overcome this feeling of inferiority, the feeling agent desires that the person should lose

possession of the object. Rather than be inspired by emulation, admiration, or the desire to fairly

come to possess the object in order to move up the staircase, Brutus wishes that Caesar should

be pulled back down so they are again even, and the scales are no longer in Caesars favor. It is

1 I accept Adam Smiths view, in which he identies envy as that passion which views with malignant dis-

like the superiority of those who are really entitled to all the superiority they possess, (Adam Smith, The Theory of

Moral Sentiments, p. 244), except that I take superiority to include perceived or real superiority, by virtue of material

or intangible goods.

secTion 3

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necessarily destructive because the desire to restore the balance of superiority consists primarily in

wanting Caesar to lose possession of the object or trait.

CB

C+

B

Figure 1

C BC+

B

Figure 2

3.2 an illusTRaTionof envy

In this section, I offer an illustration of envy and what it indicates about the feeling agent.

This is followed by characterFlawsinthe Feelingagent inDicateDby envy, in which I discuss

in greater detail the defects of character revealed by envy that are mentioned below.

To illustrate different instances in which envy may arise, consider the following scenarios

involving two colleages, Horace and Virgil, who are given the opportunity for a promotion, and are

told that the one who works harder and is more productive will receive the promotion. In each case,

Virgil is given the promotion, and Horace becomes envious of Virgil and, rather than work harder

and become more productive so that he might receive a promotion in the future, Horace becomes

determined to cause Virgil to get demoted or red, in hopes that he will be Virgils replacement.

(1) Virgil works harder than Horace and is more productive, and receives the promotion.

Horace knows that Virgil worked harder than he did, but still becomes envious, wish-

ing that he had received the raise instead of Virgil.

(2) Horace and Virgil work equally hard and are equally productive, and

their employer, Tacitus, unable to distinguish between the merits of the two employ-

ees, tells them that he will ip a coin to determines who will get the promotion. The

coin lands on the side Virgil guessed, and he is promoted.


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(3) Horace works harder than Virgil and is more productive, but Tacitus gives the promo-

tion to Virgil, even though he did not earn it.

Analysis of these scenarios shows how envy indicates distorted reasoning and defects of character

on the part of the feeling agent.

In cases (1) and (2), Horace is unhappy with a fair outcome: Virgil worked harder than he

did in case (1), and so Virgil deserved the promotion while Horace did not. In case (2), they worked

equally hard, but it was by chance that Virgil received the promotion, not by dishonesty. The

promotion was decided by a coin toss, so each candidate had an equal chance of being awarded

the promotion; Virgil fairly won. In (1) and (2), though an appropriate response might be disap-

pointment, Horace thinks he should have received the promotion rather than Virgil; he mistakenly

feels that he has suffered an injustice. He incorrectly reasons that because the outcome is not in his

favor, he has been wronged.

The outcome of case (3), however, is unjust; even though Horace earned the promotion,

Tacitus awards it to Virgil. In this case, Horace seems entitled to respond with negative feelings

because he has actually been wronged. However, he misplaces his negative feelings by directing

envy at Virgil. It is through no fault of Virgil that Horace suffered an injustice; it is more appropri-

ate for Horace to feel righteous indignation at Tacitus unfair actions. In this case, Horace could

rightly desire that Virgil be stripped of the promotion, so that Horace may be awarded what he, not

Virgil, has earned. This desire is rooted in the goal of rectifying an actual injustice, not in harming

another person. This is different from Horace desiring that Virgil should be stripped of the promo-

tion in cases (1) and (2) because of a mistaken belief that he has been wronged. Here, however,

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Horace actually has been wronged, but he mistakenly directs his negative feelings toward Virgil,

rather than Tacitus. In all three cases, Horace exhibits a misunderstanding of justice.

In each of these cases, Horace is revealed to have the character aw of nding value in

himself only in relation to others, rather than intrinsically. Although Virgil has done nothing to

harm him, Horace, like Brutus on the scales, feels as though he has been demoted because his

colleague has been promoted. A propensity to look outward to nd ones inner worth leads to in-

security and anxiety, and a false view of the self. Horace feels inferior even though, in reality, he

has not been harmed by injustice or suffered any material loss. Valuing himself relative to Virgil,

however, he feels inferior. Desiring to rid himself of such unpleasant feelings, Horace wants to

cause Virgil to be red or demoted so that the promotion can be transferred to him, and he will be

superior to Virgil.

These cases also provide an example of possessive envy that is rooted in destructive envy;

Horace may want the raise for the additional authority and increased pay that comes with a promo-

tion, but rather than endeavor to earn it fairly, he becomes determined to have Virgil demoted or

red. This indicates that he is more interested in pulling Virgil down than he is in advancing him-

self upward. This is because envy is the strong negative feeling in response to a perceived shift in

the balance of superiority. We can imagine that Horace will be satised to have Virgil red, even

if he does not receive the promotion as a result. Either way, Horace is no longer inferior to Virgil.

Horaces desire to restore the balance of perceived superiority by detracting from Virgil regardless

as to whether he then receives the promotion is spite, another character aw associated with envy.


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3.3 chaRacTeRflaWsinThe feeling agenT inDicaTeDby envy

A disposition to envy presupposes a disposition to estimate ones own worth based on

comparison with others, as opposed to looking for intrinsic value. While it is natural to do so, such

dispositions lead to insecurity and anxiety, because the feeling agent is usually in the midst of

others whose fortunes uctuate. Finding self-worth in relation to others results in an unstable and

sometimes false view of the self, and when the feeling agent perceives himself to be of low value

relative to others, many negative emotions arise. Among these are sadness, and a propensity to

direct negative emotions at others who have not actually harmed the feeling agent.

Nietzsche says that the feeling ofressentiment, a form of envy that is specically hatred

or ill will toward those with more power, arises from weakness and results in self-deception. It

arises, like all forms of envy, because of a perceived imbalance of power. Those who feel ressenti-

mentdo so because they feel weak in relation to those who are stronger. Nietzsche describes the

way in which ressentimentallows the weak to feel better about being in a lower position through

self-deception:

The well-born felt they were the happy; they did not need rst of all to con-

struct their happiness articially by looking at their enemies, or in some cases by

talking themselves into it, lying themselves into it (as all men ofressentimentare

wont to do) (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, rst essay, chapter

10).

The feeling agent, according to Nietzsche, observes the superiority of another, and the feeling of

ressentiment permits the feeling agent to construct happiness articially by determining that

the other person should not possess the object that makes him superior. Nietzsche identies this

as false happiness, a kind of self-deception, but it is also a defense against feelings of inferiority.

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Because ressentimentallows the weak to falsely believe themselves to be content with their status,

Nietzsche argues that those who feel ressentimentdo so to compensate for their own weakness.

He states that the success of the powerful is all very much the opposite of happiness at the level

of the powerless, the oppressed, and those rankled with poisonous and hostile feelings, for whom

it manifests itself as essentially a narcotic, an anaesthetic, rest, peace, sabbath, relaxation of the

mind and stretching of the limbs. (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, rst essay, chapter

10).Ressentiment, like all species of envy, is indicative of discontentment with ones position rela-

tive to another, but it is not productive; it fails to produce a desire to achieve, and is instead the

festering of negative emotions.

The feeling agents desire that the person he envies loses possession of the object for no

other reason than to diminish his perceived superiority is a spiteful desire. In some cases of envy,

the desire extends to the object coming into possession by the feeling agent. This is still an instance

of spite because the feeling agent does not want merely to possess the object he wants the other

person to lose possession the object.

Kant recognizes envy as a propensity to view the well-being of others with distress, even

though it does not detract from ones own [Envy] aims, at least in terms of ones wishes, at

destroying others good fortune. (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 6:459). Though the formula-

tions of the Categorical Imperative stipulate objective duties that do not allow for consideration of

emotion, Kant recognized the impact of emotions on the propensities of an individual to certain

actions. Though the Kantian position advocates disregarding the emotions when performing moral

duties, emotions are always a part of moral deliberation, so we will be more likely to act morally


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when we are aware of the role emotions play in decision-making and seek to control those that

are unworthy, as explained in section 1. Kant recognizes that spite is inherent in envy. The desire

to [destroy] others good fortune is spite, and it is unproductive for the feeling agent and detri-

mental to the person who is envied if it is acted upon. Envy does not result in improvement of the

feeling agent, rather, as Kant points out, envy is when we wish imperfection and ill-fortune to

others, not so that we might ourselves be perfect and fortunate in consequence, but so that in that

case we might alone be perfect and fortunate. (Kant,Lectures on Ethics, 27:438). These feelings

are not worthy in people because we should have an emotional investment in encouraging com-

munity and justice.

The feeling agent desires the destruction of another persons good fortune, as well as his

failure and unhappiness, though the person has not harmed the feeling agent, nor will his downfall

result in anything positive or productive for the feeling agent. These spiteful inclinations are often

satised by immoral acts, though it is immoral just to desire such things. As human beings, it is a

defect in our nature to wish harm upon an innocent human being.

The inappropriateness of envy is explored in Aristotles virtue ethics. Aristotle denes

envy as a turbulent pain arising from the prosperity [of another person] but is not a pain arising

from undeserved prosperity, but from the prosperity of one who is equal and similar to him who is

envious (Aristotle,Rhetoric 1387b21-25). With this denition, Aristotle identies envy as a kind

of pain resulting from an improper feeling. The pain associated with envy is distinct from a mor-

ally good pain, such as pain arising from a sense of injustice at seeing an innocent person being

beaten in the street. Anger and empathetic pain is morally appropriate, because the feeling agent

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is witnessing an injustice and has an interest in preventing such acts from occurring. Righteous

indignation is a mean in accordance with eudaimonia, happiness, between spite and envy. Aristotle

says, the man who feels righteous indignation is distressed at instances of undeserved good for-

tune, but the envious man goes further and is distressed at any good fortune, while the spiteful man

is so far from feeling distress that he actually rejoices (Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics, 1108b3).

It is clear from this that righteous indignation is distinct from envy, which for Aristotle has a more

insidious nature. Desiring that your fellow human should fail is inherently bad, and is an inap-

propriate pain. Aristotle states, some [feelings] have names that directly connote depravity, such

as malice, shamelessness, and envy All these, and more like them, are so called as being evil

in themselves. (Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics, 1107a9-14). Envy is identied with many vices,

rooted in unworthy feelings toward others, which are never morally appropriate or acceptable.

A truly virtuous person will not feel envy because this person will not have the defects of

character or misunderstanding of justice that are necessary for envy to arise. If Brutus, from the

example diagrammed above, had determined his self-worth based on intrinsic value, not his value

in relation to Caesar, he would not have had feelings of inferiority and therefore would not have

felt envy. Likewise, if, endowed with a proper understanding of justice, Horace had recognized the

fairness in Virgils promotion in cases (1) and (2), or correctly identied the source of injustice in

case (3), he would not have envied his colleague his promotion.

3.4 The negaTive impacTof envyonThe feeling agenT

It is obvious that envy can lead to harm for those who are envied; indeed envy necessar-


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ily involves desiring that harm be brought upon those who are envied. What is less clear is how

envy harms the feeling agent, as well. The monstrous imagery employed throughout the ages to

depict envy concerns itself mostly with the feeling agent and not with the objects of envy. Not

only can it move us to act immorally to bring harm to those we envy, merely feeling the emotion

can be harmful. Descartes identies damage done to the body by envy. InPassions of the Soul, he

describes envy as a danger to human happiness in article 184, titled Why the Envious are Apt to

have Leaden Complexions. He states, There is no vice so harmful to human felicity as that of

envy. For not only do those who are tainted by it afict themselves, they also do everything in their

power to disturb the pleasure of others. (Passions of the Soul, Article 184, 10-13). He adds, And

they usually have leaden complexions that is, pale, mingled with yellow and black, as though

bruised, (Ibid. 13-15) noting physical as well as psychological damage done to the person who

feels envy.

Although much of the physiological observations are incorrect, Descartes rightly identi-

ed that envy has a negative impact on the feeling agent. Envy is intertwined with feelings of in-

feriority and insecurity, which lead to anxiety. The physical damage that can be caused by anxiety

is well documented in the eld of psychiatry. Additionally, by its nature, envy is an unpleasant

sensation. Envy reminds the feeling agent of his feelings of inferiority and brings about feelings

of insecurity, and the hatred and negative emotions that accompany these feelings are disagreeable

to the feeling agent. Envy, then, not only indicates aws in the feeling agent, but causes negative

emotions to surface, making the feeling agent unhappy, and even resulting in physical harm.

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undergraduate thesis in philosophy

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