UNCLASSIFIED

MINE WARFARE REQUIREMENTS BRIEF

TOMINWARA Spring Conference, May 11

MajGen T. C. “BT” Hanifen, USMCDirector, Expeditionary Warfare Division

UNCLASSIFIED

PROJECTENGAGE RESPOND

OPNAV N85

Director, Expeditionary Warfare (N85)

Naval Special Warfare Branch (N851)

Mine Warfare Branch (N852)

Amphibious Warfare Branch (N853)

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Branch

(N857)

• NSW Requirements• Information Warfare

• Airborne• Surface• RMS• ABS• Unmanned MCM

Vehicles• Mining

• In-service Amphibious Ships

• Future Amphibious Ships

• NBE• NSFS• MPF(F)• LCAC/SSC/LCU/JHSV

• NECC• NCF• MESF• EOD/JEOD• COMCAM• ECRC• ELSG• NEIC• JNLW• MCAST

• Resource Sponsor for all U.S. Naval Mine warfare• CNO’s Staff Subject Matter Expert on Mine Warfare• Expeditionary and Mine Warfare Advocate for the Fleet

Agenda

Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)--“American Style” -Stand Off -Blockades -UUVS/Submarines -Advanced Underwater Weapon Systems (AUWS)

MCM In Support Of Maritime Homeland Defense -LCS Transition -Importance of MCM for Homeland Defense -MCM for Homeland Defense Requirements -“Fly Away” Capability

Mine Counter Measures—Thinking outside the box -Additional Thoughts on MCM -Guinea Pig Ships -Budget

Opening Thought

“Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some

of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double

somersault, land in our rear, and on both of our flanks at the same time… Go back to your command, and try to

think what are we going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going

to do!” ---U. S. Grant

A2 / AD Minefields

A2/AD, “American Style”

“The Navy should develop … smart mobile mines capable of autonomous movement to

programmed locations over extended distances” --AirSea Battle Concept

“Deploying smart mobile mines might prove particularly effective in attriting submarines and/or blocking them from access to their

bases” --AirSea Battle Concept

Sub Base

Sub Base

A2/AD “American Style”

• In time of conflict the USN must own the maritime domain• The seas are ours; we must control our adversaries’ ability

to access that domain Exit and chokepoint control techniques

Submarines Airpower Mining

Boundaries and shielding techniques Mining

• Investment and current capability is not aligned with level of warfighting contribution of mining Current stockpile of mines only covers the shallow water No significant S&T investment in recent years USN proficiency in mining has declined

Give the A2/AD problem to our Potential Adversaries

Concepts for the Future

Encapsulated Weapons

Unmanned Vehicles

Long-range Weapons

Expendable Target Detection Devices

• Weapons

– Wide Area Coverage

– Stand Off Delivery

– High Volume Placement

• Sensors

– Target Detection

– Target Discrimination

• UUV

– Delivery / Re-position

• On Demand Command & Control

– RECO, Change Mission, IFF

– Dual Mode weapons

• Long Duration

– Rechargeable Power source

– In theatre rearming

Current

LD-UUV Weapons with Mobile Warheads

Legacy Weapons (QuickStrikes)

Reduces number of weapons---Increases utility

Autonomous Weapons w/ Mobile Warheads

Near-Term

Far-Term

From Current Mines to an Advanced Underwater Weapon System (AUWS)

Value of an AUWS

SHALLOW INTERMEDIATE DEEP SHALLOW INTERMEDIATE DEEP

Traditional Mining(strategic, autonomous)

Deliver Arm / EngageDecide

Days Days - Months

Sterilize/Destruct

Months

Clear

Transformational AUWS(tactical, controlled)

Deliver ArmDecide Engage

Days Minutes+

Destruct/DisArm

HoursHours

Extract

Minutes+

Quickstrike SLMM (through FY12)

400 Traditional Mines 1 Transformational Mine

Distributed Sensors

Minutes+

Eases Delivery & Clean-up; Provides Tactical Flexibility

LD-UUV w/ Mobile Mines or Torpedoes

UAV, USV, UUV, UGV

Adapt to new Goal

Risky Delivery & Extensive Clean-up

Transition from Mining to an AUWS

Quickstrike

UUV

USV

LCS

SSN/SSGN

Capability

Technology

NextUnmanned delivery,

Precision emplacement, Controlled engagement

NowManned delivery,

Estimated emplacement, Ambiguous engagement

FutureAutonomous delivery,

Precision positioning, Cooperative engagement

UAV

Sensors

Vehicles

Weapons

Distributed Sensors / TDDs

LWT

SDV LD-UUV

SLMM

Transition to Smart Mobile Mines and Unmanned Vehicles

AUWS

CDV

ImprovedStandoff / Precision AUWS

ImprovedStandoff / Precision

Next Gen Mine

MCM VISION:Field a Common Set of Unmanned,

Modular MCM Systems Employable from a Variety of Host Platforms or Shore Sites that can Quickly Counter the Spectrum of

Mines to Enable Assured Access with Minimum Risk from Mines

• Slow• Heavy

• Large footprint• Stovepiped

• Primarily CONUS-based• Manpower Training

Intensive

• Fast and Agile• Precise• Lethal

• Modular• Organic

• Optimized Manpower Requirements

Mine Countermeasures Roadmap

• Distributed and Netted• Unmanned Operations• Cooperative Behavior• Computer Aided Detect/Classify• Common Operational Picture• Sea Warrior Transformation

Removing the Sailor from the MinefieldTo Increase Clearance Rates

MCM Force in Transition

MH-60SMH-60S

MH-60SMH-60SMH-60SMH-60S

LCS 1 (LM)LCS 1 (LM)

LCS 2 (GD)LCS 2 (GD)

AMNSAMNS

OASISOASISAQS-20AAQS-20A

RMMVRMMV

AQS-20AAQS-20A

MQ-8BFire Scout

VTUAV

MQ-8BFire Scout

VTUAV

MH-60SMH-60S

LCS 2 (GD)LCS 2 (GD)

LCS 1 (LM)LCS 1 (LM)

ALMDSALMDS

OASIS: Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep / AMNS: Airborne Mine Neutralization SystemRMMV: Remote Multi Mission Vehicle / UISS: Unmanned Influence Sweep System / ALMDS: Airborne Laser Mine Detection System

UISSUISS

Detect, Classify & IdentifyDetect, Classify & Identify Engage (Neutralize)Engage (Neutralize) Engage (Sweep)Engage (Sweep)

LCS Mine Countermeasures Concept

AMNS NEAR SURFACE UPGRADEAMNS NEAR SURFACE UPGRADE

MH-60SMH-60S

LCS Mine Countermeasures Concept

Buried Mine –Promising Potential

with Low Frequency Broad Band

Unmanned Surface Sweep System / Organic Airborne and Surface Influence

Sweep

Airborne Laser Mine Detection System

IOC: FY13/FOC: FY25

Laser (Hunt)

Buried Mine DetectionIOC: FY16/FOC: FY24

Propelled Expendable Neutralizer (Kill)

Airborne Mine Neutralization Near-

Surface UpgradeIOC: FY13/FOC: TBD

Minefield Detection and Neutralization

Assault Breaching System

IOC: FY13/FOC: FY22

Magnetic/Acoustic Influence Sweep

Sonar (Hunt)IOC: FY15/FOC:

Remote Minehunting System & MH-60S AN/AQS-20A

Organic/LCS-Based Mine Countermeasures (OMCM)Mission Package (MP) Systems

OASIS

IOC: FY14/ FOC: FY26

Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Underwater Vehicle and Low Frequency Broadband

UISS

IOC: FY16/FOC: TBD

AN/AQS-20A

IOC: FY12/ FOC: FY25

RMS

IOC: FY15/FOC: FY25

Airborne Mine Neutralization System

Propelled Expendable Neutralizer (Kill)

IOC: FY13/FOC: FY25

LCS Based MCM System Components

MCM for Maritime Homeland Defense: Why is this important?

• In 2008, U.S. ports imported and exported nearly 7.6 billion tons of cargo

• International trade via our ports accounts for more than 32 percent of the U.S. GDP

• There is $3.8B worth of goods moving in and out of U.S. seaports each day

• All U.S. ports are “minable”

MCM for Maritime Homeland Defense

• Responsibilities for defending our ports is prescribed in Presidentially directed and validated Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) USCG lead in port defense against terrorist attack

DOD support for MCM Navy is only DOD MCM capability

DOD lead in port defense against state actors Navy is only DOD MCM capability

• Response time, capacity and prioritization being defined by NORTHCOM

• N85 is studying and resourcing UMCM forces with rapid fly-away capabilities to counter this threat

Looking for additional ideas and cost-saving COTS solutions…

Fielded Capability

UMCM Capabilitiesfor Maritime Homeland Defense Mission

Delivered through the FYDP

Mid-Term UMCM Capabilities for Maritime Homeland Defense Mission

Other Thoughts on MCM

• In-Stride Neutralization

• Non-traditional methods

• Rapid clearance enablers/Assault Breaching Systems

• Real Time Communications to allow for real time MIW analysis

• UxV decoy systems

Mine Resistant Vessela.k.a. “Guinea Pig”

Ahead of the force, validates MCM clearance, reduces riskAhead of the force, validates MCM clearance, reduces risk

• We can do this with an out of service tanker?• Can we do it with a USV or autonomous vessel?

• COTS solution?• Command and

Control Solution?• Hardening of Existing

Vessels for Use

Navy Budget

• PB12 is currently on the “Hill”

• Navy TOA for PB12 is $161.4B, $.8B more than FY11

• N8 Warfare Sponsors control $54B; 33% of Navy TOA

• N85 PB12 TOA is $6.2B in 76 Programs of Record which is 4% of overall budget

• Mine Warfare budget is $930M across 14 programs, which is .6% of Navy TOA*

*LCS Ship SCN/MH-60S APN Costs excluded

• N852 allocated 33% of FY11 budget to legacy systems; this decreases to ~20% by FY17 as organic systems enter fleet

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Questions

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Backup

Small Diameter UUV Schedule - POM-12 Basis