unclassified asia-pacific counter-ied fusion center · one of the main insurgent groups, the...

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Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center Monthly IED Activity Report

DOI: 28 February 2019

Contents

Monthly Activity Overview pg. 1 Executive Summary pg. 1-2 Annual Activity Overview pg. 3 February Activity Switch Types pg. 4 Group Affiliation pg. 4 Special Assessment pg. 5-6 Person of Interest pg. 7 VEO of Interest pg. 7 South Asia Significant Activity pg. 8 Bangladesh pg. 9 India pg. 10 Nepal pg. 11 Southeast Asia Significant Activity pg. 12-13 Philippines pg. 14 Thailand pg. 15 Burma pg. 16 Indonesia pg. 17 Northeast Asia Significant Activity pg. 18

Calendar pg. 19 Glossary pg. 20

About the APCFC The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fu-sion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The cen-ter develops and synchro-nizes C-IED and EOD pro-grams and regional engage-ments. The center re-sources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Al-lied, and Partner Nations survivability.

Click on an entry to advance to the associated page.

This document is intended for those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforce-ment, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

Month at a Glance — February The Indo-Pacific region experienced 71 IED events in February: 50 events in South Asia, 21 events in South East Asia, and zero events in Northeast Asia. These events consisted of 157 devices. There were 31 IED detonation events, 12 IED found and cleared events, four IED hoax events, and 24 IED cache events. There were 71 casu-alties in February: four civilians killed, 11 civilians wounded, 45 host nation forces killed, and 11 host nation forces wounded.

There were 71 IED events in the Indo-Pacific region in February 2019

LEGEND

Detonation

Found/Cleared

Hoax

Cache

Icons depict events for February 2019; heat map depicts event density from February 2018 - February 2019

February IED Casualties February IED events by Country

Detonation Hoax

Found/Cleared Cache

February IED events

CIV KIA HN KIA

CIV WIA HN WIA

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February Executive Summary SOUTH ASIA IED activity dropped slightly in February from the previous month (50 events versus 53 events). Events in India dropped by 16%, but IED events increased in both Bangladesh and Nepal. Despite this reduction, Indian casualties more than doubled in February (56 casualties versus 21 casualties) due to the attack on an Indian security forces convoy in Jammu and Kashmir. Elsewhere in South Asia, Nepal experienced two attacks on infrastructure in February, including a large, coordinated attack on a cellular phone office and several cell towers. The attack killed one civilian and wounded two others; IED violence has not killed anyone in Nepal in over a year. In the coming months, violence in South Asia will likely increase due to the General Elections in India.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

IED activity dropped in February from the previous month by approximately 32% (21 events versus 31 events). The reduction in events is due to a reduced number of events in Thailand and the Philippines. In Thailand, a change in the leadership of one of the main insurgent groups, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) could affect recent and upcoming violence; authorities suspect the new leader may start to ramp up IED and insurgent operations in the near-term. In the Philippines, previous months’ IED violence related to the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) plebiscite could continue as the fall-out from the decision of each locality on whether to adopt it could inspire militant groups or other insurgents. In Burma, violence could increase in the coming months as the Burmese Army fights ethnic separatists in Rakhine. Additionally, in Thailand and Indonesia, upcoming elections could increase IED violence over the next couple of months.

NORTHEAST ASIA

There were no IED events in Northeast Asia this month. In China, however, pressure on religious communities has expanded from persecution of both the Muslim Uyghurs and Hui, to a Buddhist place of worship, where a statue of a deity was demolished. Continued, overly strict measures to control religious communities as a means to stem extremism could backfire and build resentment, eventually leading to increased radicalization.

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered ap-proximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

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Detonation Found/Cleared Hoax Cache Total

Device Count Month 56 8 3 37 104 Year 781 598 30 2018 3427

Event Count Month 22 8 3 17 50 Year 407 166 20 269 862




South Asia IED Events February 2018-February 2019

Southeast Asia IED Events February 2018-February 2019

Northeast Asia IED Events February 2018-February 2019

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INDOPACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count

Past Year IED events

Icons depict events from February 2018 to February 2019; occasional overlap occurs

LEGEND

Detonation

Found/Cleared

Hoax

Cache

CIV KIA CIV WIA HN KIA HN WIA

Past Year Casualties by Country Past Year IED events by Country





NOTE: The APCFC Monthly IED report includes both event counts (detonation, found/cleared, hoax, and cache) and device counts. It is important to note that a singular IED event may include multiple devices. For instance, a single IED cache event may contain several devices.

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IED Activity - Past 12 Months

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approxima-tions. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Switch Type Group Affiliation


Incident Highlight: Suicide Vehicle-Borne IED in Kashmir, India On 14 FEB, Pakistan-based Violent Extremist Organization (VEO) Jaish-e-Mohamed (JeM) claimed responsibility for conducting a suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED) attack on a convoy of Indian security forces in Pulwama, Jammu and Kashmir, India. The SVBIED, the most lethal attack conducted by JeM in India, caused at least 40 fatalities and injured dozens of officers. The attack occurred as a convoy of Indian Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) troops were en route from Jammu to Srinagar for a routine troop transfer. The convoy of 78 buses was trans-porting over 2,500 personnel, and had been delayed a few days because of snowfall and treacherous driving conditions on the Srinagar-Jammu highway. Security forces conducted a sweep of the route for IEDs, as per normal protocol, but the highway remained open to private transportation, allowing the SVBIED driver to gain access to the area. The driver, a Kashmiri from a nearby village who had gone missing the year prior, drove his SUV onto the highway and rammed the fifth bus in the convoy. The resulting IED detonation destroyed that bus and damaged several adjacent buses. Site forensics conducted by the National Intelligence Agency and bomb experts found enough remnants of the car to determine the make, model, and vehicle identi-fication, allowing authorities to trace its purchase and owner (who was not the driver, but another member of JeM from the local area). Further forensics information in-cluded an estimate of the explosive main charge type (military-grade pure RDX with ammonium nitrate), although the estimated amount varied based on the blast radius

and destructive force. Initial reports of 350kg were later pared down to 70-135kg of RDX, that was mixed with some ammoni-um nitrate as an oxidizer, enhanced with fragmentation, and loaded in the SUV in drums. Media outlets cited Indian intelli-gence sources stating that the SVBIED was not impact detonated, but detonated via a triggering mechanism; Indian officials have yet to confirm this in public reports. Although it may be months before all the details gleaned from forensics and arrests of JeM members is known, information on the sophisticated nature of the attack, the Kashmiri-based planning and construction of the SVBIED, and the JeM mem-bers involved is already being released to Indian press services (see VOI). This deadly SVBIED, the first such attack in Kash-mir since 2005, indicates a new level of sophistication and coordination beyond what JeM has exhibited in the past and has resulted in the Indian security forces changing their troop movement procedures in the region.

Sources: The Economic Times (2/20/19) Time (02/15/19) Kashmir Life (2/23/19) Times of India (2/14/19) The Week (2/23/19) Financial Express (2/21/19) Times of India (2/15/19)

Aftermath of SVBIED attack in Pulwama, Jammu and Kashmir

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Road to a VBIED: The Deteriorating Security in Jammu and Kashmir


On 14 FEB, Jammu and Kashmir, India experienced the worst terrorist attack in their history when JeM detonat-ed an SVBIED against a CRPF convoy, killing at least 40 officers (see Incident Highlight). This type of incident is rare—it is the first Jammu and Kashmir VBIED in almost 15 years—but not entirely unexpected, as a confluence of local and geopolitical factors have increased violence and set the stage for this type of escalation. It is likely this violence will continue, if not worsen, in the near future. The first and leading indicator of this most recent outbreak of violence in Jammu and Kashmir was the souring of Pakistan-India relations in 2015 and the ensuing jump in ceasefire violations and violent activity in the region (see August 2015 Monthly). The growing trend of ceasefire violations across the India-Pakistan border in 2015 was an indicator of the worsening political relationship and a leading indicator of the deteriorating regional security climate – a dangerous cycle that consistently leads to increased violence and insurgent activity. Since 2015, the rate of ceasefire violations has increased, accompanied by an increase in insurgent activity leading to a rise in IED and other terrorist attacks in the region. Pakistan is known to host or even help Kashmiri insurgent groups—most notably, the 2008 Mumbai attacker’s handler was a Pakistani intelligence agent—and insurgent groups are responsive to Pakistan’s geopolitical interests. As relations worsen, insurgents likely feel they have latitude to attack, even if they are not being directly encouraged by Pakistan to harass India. During this time, Indian Kashmiris were also experiencing a host of issues which led to resentment towards the Indian government. Youth unemployment in Jammu and Kashmir is severe, with the highest unemployment rate in India at twice that of the national average. Among Kashmiris, there is a perception that Article 370 of the con-stitution, which guarantees autonomy to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, is a barrier to development and inte-gration into India. Under Article 370, non-Kashmiris are prevented from owning property, potentially stifling exter-nal economic development as businesses are less likely to invest in the area. Article 370 also guarantees Kash-miris have special status as Indian-Kashmiri dual citizens, but are at risk of losing this status if they marry non-Kashmiris, heavily discouraging integration into India. Additionally, the combination of a fractious and unstable local government with a national government that is perceived to be pivoting towards Hindu nationalism has re-portedly left many Kashmiri youth with the feeling that India’s political system will not be able to offer a solution to their problems.

The event that sparked the increase in violence was the July 2016 killing of Burhan Wani, a popular Hizb-ul-Mujahideen commander, who was part of a new wave of insurgents that did not hide their identity, and achieved fame through social media. Even the most conservative estimates indicate over 15,000 people attended Wani’s funeral, though some outlets reported as many as 200,000 participants. In the short term, his death resulted in an immediate spike in violence, and droves of Kashmiris joined various insurgent groups. This reaction to Wani’s death led to an over-reaction from Indian security forces, who used pellet guns to disperse crowds, blinding hundreds of people and fueling local and international condemnation. Over the long term, experts have credited Wani’s death with changing the nature of conflict in the region. Effects have ranged from youths increasingly engaging in

stone throwing and interfering in operations, to the disappearance of the traditional lull in violence over the winter months, to the number of local militants killed exceeding the number of foreign militants killed for the first time since 2000. Though Wani’s death alone could not have caused all these effects, it clearly activated a latent, widespread anger and led to a reinvigorated and locally-driven insurgency. Over the past few years, the dynamics of militancy in Pakistan has been changing. As the conflict in Syria and Iraq winds down, and international engagement and attention in Afghanistan dwindles despite increasing vio-lence in the country, the use of suicide attacks is increasing in Pakistan. This increase has raised concerns that technical expertise is returning to the region, which India, in particular, fears will make its way to nearby Jammu and Kashmir. The risk of transference is two-fold in this case: Pakistani militants have relatively free access to this expertise within their borders and can execute their own attacks. Also, the new demand for insurgency with-in the local Kashmiri population may pull the expertise from Pakistani groups, turning it into a native capability of Indian Kashmir insurgents. In fact, though the IED maker and planner was Pakistani, the attacker from the 14 FEB event was born and raised in the very district where the attack happened. The proximity of this expertise

July 2016—Funeral Procession for Burhan Wani

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Road to a VBIED: The Deteriorating Security in Jammu and Kashmir


Sources: Stimson Center (8/11/15) (3/21/18) Hindustan Times (8/11/17) Greater Kashmir (1/22/17) The Wire (11/22/2018) The Guardian (3/3/19) (11/8/16) Rising Kashmir (11/8/2018) FirstPost (4/2/18) Indian Ex-press (2/6/18) (2/16/19) West Point CTC (1/09) NDTV (12/25/18)

increased the likelihood that insurgents would use sui-cide IEDs across the border from Pakistan at some point. Together, the complex interactions of the above local and geopolitical factors contributed to the detonation of the Pulwama SVBIED, which has once again brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war. In the short term, another SVBIED or similarly large-scale attack is possi-ble but unlikely. Due to Pakistan’s patronage, insurgent groups demonstrate restraint if attacks could harm Paki-stan’s geopolitical interests and war at this time does not appear to be advantageous for Pakistan. However, it is possible insurgents may try to exploit perceived local issues, such as Wani’s death, to increase their levels of violence. In the mid-to-long term, IED use in Jammu and

Kashmir will likely continue, and trends in their use will follow the conflict’s intensity. Should the intensity of con-flict in Jammu and Kashmir escalate to the point in which a large-scale attack could be considered common-place, suicide bombings may resume, as the risk of war between Pakistan and India would be lowered. None-theless, given the plentiful expertise in Pakistan, and the recent use of an SVBIED attack, the technique is likely to stay in the Kashmiri insurgency’s repertoire going forward.

Kashmiri youth pelting stones

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Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

VEO: Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)

Sources: BBC (2/15/19) Australian National Security (3/4/219) Euronews (2/24/19) GlobalSecurity (2/25/19) Al Jazeera (2/27/19)

POI: Hatib Hajan Sawadjaan ROLE: Sub-Commander of the ASG and Unofficial ISIS-P Emir AFFILIATION: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG); ISIS-Philippines (ISIS-P)

Sources: BernarNews (2/7/19) The Manila Times (3/02/19) GMA Online (2/7/19) Star Online (2/23/19) SunStar (2/22/19) The News Tribune (2/21/19) Washington Times (2/7/19)

Hatib Hajan Sawadjaan is the commander of the Jolo based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the unofficial emir of ISIS-P, both banned organizations in the Philippines. Sawadjaan first took up arms in the early 1990s with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), shortly before joining the ASG. Sawadjaan further engrossed himself within a sub-group of the ASG that encouraged the immersion of foreign fighters. Throughout his tenure, Sawadjaan has organized and participated in multiple kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) operations, fought in the Siege on Marawi City, and planned IED attacks. In August 2000, authorities identi-fied Sawadjaan as a participant in the KFR of a U.S. citizen, Jeffrey Schilling. In 2017, Sawadjaan gained battlefield experi-ence as an ISIS-P fighter during the siege of Marawi City. Catastrophic casualties suffered by the ASG and ISIS-P during the conflict presumably led to Sawadjaan’s promotion. Since assuming a leadership role, Sawadjaan reportedly was the master-mind behind two recent, high profile IED attacks: the 27 FEB bombing targeting the Our Lady of Mount Carmel Cathedral that killed 23 people, and the first recorded Philippine SVBIED that detonated in Basilan on 31 JUL 2018 that killed 11 vic-tims. Sawadjaan, now in his sixties, took control over the ASG and the unofficial leadership role of ISIS-P after Isnilon Hapilon’s death in 2017. He commands between 200 to 400 followers, 40 of which, authorities suspect, are from a combination of Pa-kistan, Yemen, Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia, and Singapore. Sawadjaan’s early acceptance of foreign fighters into the ASG may be an indication as to why both recent high prolife IED attacks involved one confirmed, and two suspected, foreign fight-ers. Although unofficially confirmed as the ISIS-P emir by ISIS-Core, recent attacks suggest that Sawadjaan may be trying to institutionalize the foreign fighter role in the execution of ISIS-style attacks within the Philippines. Sawadjaan has proven to be a battlefield commander capable of planning and executing high profile attacks, while continuing to establish pro-ISIS messaging targeted at both Filipinos and foreigners.

JeM, whose name means the “Army of Mohammed,” is a radical Sunni Islamic organization founded by Maulana Masood Azhar after his release from an Indian prison under a prisoner swap deal for airline hostages in 1999. Azhar established Pa-kistan-based JeM to focus on terror operations in Kashmir, purportedly with the support of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelli-gence (ISI) agency, although this relationship remains unacknowledged by ISI. JeM has some grassroots Kashmiri support. Separatist political parties like Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), a religious-based political organization operating in Jammu and Kash-mir, add complexity to the political tableau and cause security concerns for Indian authorities. Notably, after JeM’s February 2019 SVBIED attack (see Incident Highlight), India security forces detained several hundred JeI members and have banned the organization for five years in an attempt to curb extremist support in Kashmiri communities, where JeM gets its recruits. The U.S. State Department designated JeM as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2001. Indian Security forces view JeM as the most active VEO in Jammu and Kashmir. Its declared mission is to liberate Muslims first in Kashmir, then throughout India, from Hindu and non-Muslim governance. However, unlike other local Kashmiri separatist groups, JeM seeks to place Kashmir under Pakistani governance. Though Pakistan banned JeM officially, JeM has based its operations in Punjab and operates at least one madrassa near Balakot, Pakistan (site of the Indian Air Force bombing on 26 FEB). JeM has conducted a series of large-scale attacks in Kashmir since 2001: the 2001 Jammu and Kashmir legislative assem-bly attack, the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, 2016 attacks on Pathankot airbase and Uri Army base, and the February 2019 CRPF bus attack. JeM receives funding from both legitimate business endeavors and Islamic charitable foundations like the al-Rehmat Trust (principal source of income). JeM supports over 300 Islamic institutions in Pakistan and gathers donations. In the coming months, JeM will likely attempt to capitalize on the publicity of the 14 FEB SVBIED attack to recruit and possi-bly plan more attacks. They could also attempt to disrupt the stability efforts of the Indian security forces in Kashmir; crowds of Kashmiri protestors have already met several security forces’ cordon-and-search operations, with some of the protests turning violent with stone pelting and skirmishes.

FOUNDED: Early 2000 LEADER: Maulana Masood Azhar HEADQUARTERS: Bahawalpur, Pakistan STRENGTH: 300-400 active fighters; several thousand supporters AFFILIATION: Jamiat-e-Ulema-I-Islam Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F), Harkat-ul-Mujahidin, Lashkar-e-Tayibba, al-Qa’ida, Taliban

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Bangladesh

On 1 FEB, the Rapid Action Battalion announced they detained four suspected Ansar al-Islam (Ansarullah Bangla Team, ABT) members over plans to assassinate the editor of a national daily publication. The suspects claimed the editor published an article in July 2018 that disrespected Islam. The four stated they created a cell of 92 militants and had been fundraising to conduct operations. The suspects also told investigators they were using social media platforms to monitor secular activists and identify them as targets. In previous years, ABT militants released a hit list of secular activists and systematically began to kill them. Dhaka Tribune (2/1/19) Daily Star (2/2/19) On 12 FEB, hardline Sunni Islamists attacked Ahmadi Muslims in Ahmadnagar over plans to hold a convention. A group of 700-800 Islamists reportedly attacked the Ahmadis with sticks and batons, erupting into a violent brawl. Police responded to the violence by firing rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse the crowds. In response to the 12 FEB attack, Ahmadi leaders cancelled the convention over fears of retaliation by Islamists. Violence against the minority group’s 100,000 adherents in Bangladesh has increased over the last couple of decades, to include an IED attack on a mosque in 2015. Indian Express (2/13/19) BD News 24 (2/13/19) On 20 FEB, an unknown explosion in Chawkbazar, Dhaka led to the deaths of 69 civilians, many of whom were burned alive by explosive fireballs. Investigating authorities discovered that illegally stored chemicals in one of the surrounding buildings fed the fire that engulfed five city blocks. Despite the loss of life, authorities stated that the damage could have been much worse if hundreds of chemical drums illegally stored in the basement of one building had detonated. Previous fires, such as the 2010 fire that killed 123 civilians, prompted a 2015 survey into illegal chemical storage. The report uncovered that of the 1,300 buildings surveyed, locals used 70% as warehouses, with 80% of those warehouses used to store chemicals. Activists and relatives of the victims have renewed calls on the government to enforce laws against illegal chemical storage. NYT (2/21/19) Daily Mail (2/22/19) Daily Star (2/23/19) New Nation (2/24/19) Dhaka Tribune (2/24/19) Daily Star (2/26/19) India

On FEB 25, Maharashtra Transport Minister, Diwakar Raote, warned drivers and conductors of public and private transport busses, that transporting unauthorized parcels (contraband) will result in losing their licenses and the seizure of their buses. His comments came after a 20 FEB incident involving the recovery of a parcel containing explosives concealed by the driver’s seat aboard an Indian State Transport bus at Apta, Maharashtra state. Subsequent reporting indicates that police detained the bus driver and conductor for illegally transporting the explosives for money. The bus driver reportedly has a history of transporting contraband for payment, a practice that is becoming frequent enough to issue a public security emergency. Business Standard (2/25/29) NDTV (2/22/19) Following the 14 FEB Pulwama SVBIED attack in Jammu and Kashmir, authorities issued a detailed security advisory on possible JeM attacks targeting railway stations at six locations in Jammu and Kashmir, as well as other regions in India, to include Mumbai. The advisory stresses the necessity for heightened vigilance at rail stations and addressed concerns that JeM could target Indian railway infrastructure and densely populated public venues. The Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) issued a comparable alert to all airports and airlines operating in India. The BCAS recommended 20 specific security measures for the airline industry to enact until further advised. The enhanced security posture in India is likely to remain in effect for a protracted period of time, given the current level of tensions between India and Pakistan. Times of India (3/2/19) Indian Express (3/2/19) Sri Lanka

On 4 FEB, President Sirisina refused to allow the release of firebrand extremist monk Galagodaatte Gnanasara, who is currently serving jail time for disruptive behavior in court and intimidating a female litigant. The governing Buddhist body in Sri Lanka attempted to pressure the president into releasing Gnanasara as part of the Independence Day reprieve, despite protests from lawmakers regarding the rule of law. Authorities and activists previously accused Gnanasara of instigating hate crimes against minority Muslims, and he is closely associated with Wirathu, leader of the violent Buddhist-Nationalist movement in Sri Lanka. Daily Star (2/5/19) Maldives

On 6 FEB, Maldivian police charged the former Prime Minister, Abdulla Yameen of corruption, money laundering, giving false statements, and theft. Authorities accused Yameen of laundering 1 million USD transferred to his personal account by a company involved in the country’s largest corruption scandal. In response to the charges, police arrested Yameen, and the criminal court stated that he would remain in custody throughout the duration of his trial. Maldives Independent (2/18/19)

South Asia: February Significant Activity


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Bangladesh: February IED Events There were five IED detonation events, one IED found and cleared event, two IED hoax events, and two IED cache events. On 14 FEB, suspects threw an IED at a government official at a tea stall in Bhoroshapur, Rampal, Bagerhat, Khulna resulting in one person killed. The deceased was a member of the Bangladesh National Party. Witnesses to the event claim the IED was a crude bomb. Daily Star (2/15/19) Dhaka Tribune (2/15/19) On 22 FEB, drug dealers threw IEDs at local police detonated during a raid on a suspected drug gang hideout in Par Gandaria, Keraniganj, Dhaka. Suspected drug dealers also fired small arms at police in an attempt to flee the area; police fired back, killing one known criminal. Following the raid, police recovered an IED cache containing one IED, one machete, and 1100 yaba tablets. BD News 24 (2/22/19) On 24 FEB, security forces cleared a hoax IED following the end of an attempted plane hijacking at Shah Amanat International Airport, Chattogram. The suspect reportedly brandished a fake gun and a hoax IED, attempting to gain access to the cockpit and threatening the plane’s crew and passengers. The device reportedly resembled pipe bombs. The pilots landed the aircraft in Chattogram, and authorities launched a coordinated security response. Security forces shot and killed the suspect after a tense standoff. Daily Star (2/25/19) Dhaka Tribune (2/27/19) Daily Star (2/27/19) Daily Star (2/28/19)

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

IED activity remained consistently low in February, with the majority of activity being criminal in nature. Two of February’s events were assassinations, one of which targeted a government official. Both of the attacks occurred in Khulna division and targeted individuals while they were at tea stalls. While authorities may never know the motivation for the 24 FEB attempted hijacking, the event raised concerns over airport security procedures and passenger screening. Despite this, improvements to security forces’ procedures and protocols in responding to violent attacks, in addition to the professionalism of the plane crew, prevented any loss of civilian life on the Biman Bangladesh flight. In the coming month, it is likely that criminal activity will remain the primary driver for IED events, though it is always possible that political or militant violence could also increase.

Past Year IED Event Casualty Count Past Year IED Events by Type Past Year Devices





Dhaka

LEGEND Detonation

Found/Cleared

Hoax

Cache

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India: February IED Events There were 14 IED detonation events, six IED found and cleared events, one hoax event, and 15 IED cache events. On 4 FEB, police recovered two IED caches at a platform and on a train at the Guwahati Railway station, Assam. One of the caches, found on the platform where the Awadh/Assam Express train was waiting, contained 440 gelatin sticks inside 22 packets, 700 detonators inside seven packets, and three fuse wire bundles. The other cache, found after a train had travelled 60km to Jagiroad, contained 160 gelatin sticks in eight packets and 500 detonators in five packets. Authorities suspect the cache was destined for use in the illegal mining or blast fishing industries, though it could also have been used by insurgent groups in Assam. The Hindu (02/4/19) On 14 FEB, EOD forces cleared an IED in front of the gate of a Catholic school in Canchipur, Imphal, Manipur. The IED, contained in a stainless steel tiffin, was concealed in a cardboard box. The Kangleipak Communist Party-People’s War Group claimed responsibility for the IED. The Shillong Times (2/14/19) The New Indian Express (2/14/19) On 27 FEB, Indian security forces recovered an IED cache in Joda Aam, Dumka, Jharkhand. Security forces suspect the cache belonged to Maoist insurgents who operate in the area, and specifically target security forces with IEDs. The cache contained 100kg of pentaerythritol tetra nitrate (PETN) explosives, four SLR magazines, five INSAS rifle magazines, and 77 live cartridges. Business Standard (2/27/19)


February IED activity was slightly lower than the previous month, but remained elevated. Media attention remained focused on the Pulwama attack in which a JeM SVBIED targeted Indian CPRF troops in a convoy. The unprecedented attack could significantly fuel the insurgency against Indian control of the region and negatively affect the fragile stability between Pakistan and India in the long-term (see Incident Highlight). Also concerning in February was an increase in IED activity along transportation infrastructure, including a passenger train explosion in Uttar Pradesh, an IED detonation on train tracks that derailed 15 cars in Jharkhand, the 4 FEB IED caches, and an IED found on a public bus in Maharashtra. These events raise concerns over security vulnerabilities in the Indian transportation sector, to include the willingness of operators to conduct smuggling or other illicit activity using their vehicles. Conversely, Indian security forces continued to aggressively target Maoist/Naxalite insurgents, leading to the recovery of several caches that could prevent attacks in the near-term. In the coming month, the run-up to the General Elections in April and May could lead to an overall increase in IED events and other violence






New Delhi

LEGEND Detonation

Found/Cleared

Hoax

Cache

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IED activity increased in February to include multiple attacks on infrastructure and foreign investments. The 7 FEB Arun III attack was the fifth attack on this site in the last year. Though no group claimed responsibility for this most recent attack, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) conducted previous attacks. The Arun III site is an example of foreign investment in Nepal, as it is an India-funded project. The 22 FEB coordinated attack was another example of threats to foreign investment, as a Malaysian telecommunication corporation owns Ncell. While attacking infrastructure has previously occurred in Nepal, it is concerning that two large-scale attacks occurred in one month after a months-long lull in activity. In the coming month, it is possible that the CPN-M will continue to attack foreign investments or infrastructure projects.

There were three IED detonation events and one IED found and cleared event. On 7 FEB, three IEDs detonated at the powerhouse of the Arun III hydroelectric plant building site in Chichila-3, Sankhuwasabha, Koshi. Kathmandu Post (2/9/19) On 22 FEB, a large coordinated attack, claimed by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (led by Netra Bikram Chand, alias Biplov), occurred across Nepal. One VOIED detonated outside the Ncell office in Nakkhu, Patan, Kathmandu, Bagmati resulting in one civilian killed and two wounded. At the same time, Nepal Army EOD found and cleared a pressure cooker RCIED outside a restaurant in Kamalpokhari, Kathmandu, Bagmati; the device incorporated Neogel 90. Concurrently, militants detonated explosives at 20 Ncell cellular towers around the country leading to fires that damaged the towers and associated equipment. Authorities detained a total of 20 suspects related to these attacks. Nepal Monitor (2/22/19) Ratopati (2/22/19) Himalayan Times (2/23/19) Himalayan Times (2/23/19) Kathmandu Post (2/24/19) Setopati (2/24/19) Himalayan Times (2/25/19) Setopati (2/26/19) Nepali Times (2/27/19)




Nepal: February IED Events





Kathmandu LEGEND

Detonation

Found/Cleared

Hoax

Cache

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Philippines

On 6 FEB, the final plebiscite to include or exclude remaining areas into the new Bangsamoro region took place, officially ushering in the Bangsamoro Transition period that will take place from 2019 to 2022. The majority of Lanao del Norte province voted against inclusion in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). Lanao del Norte’s rejection was unsurprising, as they had similarly rejected inclusion in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 2001. Conversely, Cotobato City voted yes to the ARMM in 2001, but voted against inclusion in the BARMM. Despite this, 61 barangays in North Cotobato voted for the BARMM. President Duterte is still in the process of appointing the remaining 80 members to the Bangsamoro Transition Authority, and officials are already scheduling meetings to prepare for the BARMM’s first governance tasks. Rappler (2/6/19) Phil Star (2/8/19) Rappler (2/7/19) On 22 FEB, the former Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim announced the official end to the 40-year strife between the government and MILF during his swearing-in as the Chief Minister of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority in the new BARMM. The MILF had previously used violence to demand self-governance for the Moro people, but through decades of peace negotiations reached a series of compromises to govern autonomously the Bangsamoro Region. Since the establishment of peace, the Duterte government has called upon MILF members to have a role in maintaining security in the region. For example, following the 27 JAN Jolo Church bombing, President Duterte requested former MILF members aid the military to fight ISIS-linked militants, and to protect the 6 FEB BOL plebiscite polling places. These moves seem to indicate a spirit of inclusiveness and an increase in government trust in former MILF members. Politiko 2/23/19 Bernar News 2/22/19 Bernar News 2/12/19 Thailand

On 4 FEB, press reported the Royal Thai Army and US Army were starting a one-week jungle-based counter-IED training event called “Hanuman Guardian.” The training included identifying, assessing, and marking IEDs in a jungle environment, and culminated in a combined US-Thai dismounted lane that required reacting to an IED event. Urdu Point (2/4/19) On 17 FEB, a Royal Thai Army ranger based in Yala was shot and killed at his home in Muang, Songkhla, while he was on leave. Police claim the attacker inserted a gun barrel through the front door and opened fire on the soldier, hitting him once in the chest. Thaiger (2/18/19) In early February, MARA Patani (the southern Thai insurgency’s umbrella group) and Thai negotiators attempted to meet. However, MARA Pattani suspended the negotiations after the Thai chief negotiator was only willing to see the MARA Patani leader in person. The insurgency in southern Thailand is one of the longest-running in the Indo-Pacific region, and has claimed thousands of lives. The Nation (2/6/19) Burma

On 7 FEB, Burmese security forces arrested a French national for flying a drone above the Burma Parliament building. This violated the country’s import laws and laws against drone use in certain areas of Burma, such as the parliament complex. On 27 FEB, the court sentenced the suspect to one month in prison for the violations. Reuters (2/27/19) On 18 FEB, Burmese press reported that India deployed at least two infantry companies along the Burma-India border in Mizoram state, as fighting between the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw) and the Arakan Army (AA) has intensified over the last few months. According to Indian press, the troops were stationed in the area to prevent AA fighters from entering Indian territory and to assist displaced villagers. Irrawaddy (2/18/19) On 22 FEB, the AA abducted the village administrator and the head of police in Than Taung, Paletwa, Chin. At approximately 0300 local time, AA personnel brought the village administrator in front of the police station, and demanded that the Head of Police turn himself in and relinquish weapons. No shots were fired during the abduction, though there were some small arms encounters later in the day. Officials did not have additional information, but acknowledged abductions are common for those perceived to be getting in the way of AA. Irrawaddy (2/22/19)

Southeast Asia: February Significant Activity


UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 13

Indonesia

On 14 FEB, police arrested Triyono Wagimin Atmo (aliases Andalus and Abu Hilwa), a high profile Jamaah Anshrut Daulah (JAD) operative, during a regular traffic inspection in Temanggung, Central Java. The 32-year-old native of Karanganyar, Central Java confessed that he had been planning an attack on police stations in Yogyakarta, Java with three co-conspirators whom police have yet to apprehend. Triyono previously travelled to the southern Philippine province of Basilan in June 2016 to participate in paramilitary training with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Jakarta Globe (2/23/19) Malaysia

In mid-FEB, Malaysian police announced that they arrested two Malaysians and four foreigners during a series of counterterrorism raids that took place from mid-December through the end of January. These arrests included Mohamed Kazali bin Salleh, a 48-year-old Singaporean businessman in Johor Baru. Kazali who is believed to be a close associate of the most senior Malaysian ISIS fighter in Syria, a Malaysian named Wan Mohd Aquil bin Wan Zainal Abidin (alias Akel Zainal). Authorities also arrested a 21-year-old Filipino construction worker and suspected ASG member in Kota Kinabalu. The man reportedly had direct ties to ASG sub-commander Furuji Indama. Lastly, police arrested a 31-year-old Bangladeshi cleaner in Selangor. The Bangladeshi was reportedly an avid supporter of the Islamic State and was involved in recruiting local militants for them. Business Insider (2/15/19) Manila Times (2/16/19)

Southeast Asia: February Significant Activity


UNCLASSIFIED


Philippines: February IED Events There were four IED detonation events, three IED found and cleared events, and seven IED cache events. On 5 FEB, one IED detonated near a gas station along a national highway in Barangay Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Northern Mindanao, Mindanao. An unidentified individual riding on a “kumong-kumong” (large truck to carry people) threw the device. Although the motive is still unknown, the event could potentially be linked to two other explosions that occurred on 5 FEB - 60km away in Kauswagan and 20km away in Sultan Naga Dimaporo. Barangay Maranding was not included in the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) plebiscite that occurred on 6 FEB; however, it is potentially related because the majority of Lanao del Norte was included in the plebiscite. Lanao del Norte Governor Imedla Dimaporo believes that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is responsible for the detonations, but these speculations have not been validated. PNA (2/6/19) On 7 FEB, an IED turn-in was conducted by two New People’s Army (NPA) rebels in Nueva Visayas, Mawab, Compostela Valley, Davao, Mindanao. The pair surrendered to the authorities, and turned in three IEDs that weighed 15kg each. MB (2/8/19) On 14 FEB, security forces recovered an IED cache from an NPA encampment in San Buenaventura, Luisiana, Laguna, CALABARZON, Luzon. Prior to the cache find, a brief firefight erupted, resulting in one NPA casualty. The cache contained two IEDs, detonators with wires, two M16 magazines, 10 fixed tents, one tablet, eight cellular phones (two of them smartphones), a Baofeng radio, an NPA flag, one pack of medicine, three bags and other training materials. MB (2/14/19)


IED activity in February was slightly lower than January, with the majority of events being caches perpetrated by the NPA. There were three IED detonations in Lanao del Norte that occurred the day prior to the BOL plebiscite referendum on 6 FEB but the events have not been directly linked to election violence. Heightened violence and IED activity is likely next month as the NPA celebrates its 50th anniversary on 29 MAR.






Manila

LEGEND Detonation

Found/Cleared

Hoax

Cache

UNCLASSIFIED


Thailand: February IED Events There were three IED detonation events and one IED found and cleared event. On 14 FEB, an IED detonated in Ban Pa Phai, Rangae, Narathiwat, targeting Thai Army Rangers. The Rangers were conducting a teacher escort duty near a makeshift shelter for rubber vendors when the detonation occurred. The Nation (2/14/19) On 20 FEB, an IED detonated in Sueng, Khulung, Chanthaburi, during a criminal attempt to breach an ATM machine’s cash box. The detonation destroyed the ATM, but the cash box remained intact. Media described the device as a pipe bomb. Bangkok Post (2/20/19) On 26 FEB, a roadside RCIED detonated in Ban Ubae, Banang Sata, Yala, targeting a group of Thai Army Rangers returning from teacher escort duty. The incident killed one ranger, and wounded one ranger and one civilian. The detonated device weighed approximately 10kg. During checks following the detonation, security forces found and cleared a second unspecified device. Bangkok Post (2/26/19)


February IED activity remained low, decreasing from previous months, as Thai government negotiations continued with the various southern insurgent groups. Despite consistently low IED activity over the last several months, indicators suggest that IED activity will likely increase in the coming months. For example, in late 2018, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) appointed Sama-ae Kho Zari as its new leader, in what was viewed as an anti-peace move. Thailand’s Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) attributed the recent spikes in overall violence to Zari making a show of force to establish himself and gain trust from BRN members. Likewise, political turmoil following the Thai Raksa Chart Party’s dissolution could lead to violence, as other Thaksin-aligned parties (such as the Red Shirts) have been responsible for IED violence during protests in previous elections.






Bangkok

LEGEND Detonation

Found/Cleared

Hoax

Cache

UNCLASSIFIED


Burma: February IED Events There were two IED detonation events. On 26 FEB, an IED detonated in Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Rakhine resulting in one civilian killed. The device incorporated steel ball bearings in a pipe bomb. Authorities suspect the perpetrators placed the device in a Tatmadaw (Burmese Army) officer’s household goods while in transport. When the officer’s wife unpacked their belongings, the device detonated resulting in her death. The Army suspects the Arakan Army (AA) is responsible for the attack, though the insurgent group denied any involvement. Radio Free Asia (2/26/19) Jakarta Post (3/1/19)


IED activity in Burma remained low in February, with only one event identified as an improvised device. However, unrest in Rakhine continued to increase as the AA engaged in hostilities with the Burmese government. This included two events described as landmines; however, both had the hallmarks of IED events. The government instructed the Tatmadaw to neutralize the AA, following attacks on four police outposts in January. Increasing violence in Rakhine will likely hold steady or increase in the coming months as the Burmese government seeks to neutralize the threat. The presence of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in the region could also contribute to the volatility of the situation and unclear attribution of attacks for which groups may not want to claim credit, as was the case in the 26 FEB event.






Yangon

LEGEND Detonation

Found/Cleared

Hoax

Cache

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 17

IED violence remained low in February. Although details surrounding the 19 FEB event remain sparse, it does not appear to be VEO-related. General elections will be held in Indonesia on 17 April 2019. For the first time in Indonesian history, the President, the Vice President, and members of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), will be elected on the same day by over 190 million eligible voters. Electoral violence is typically muted in Indonesia, and when it transpires, it is concentrated in remote areas with restive histories such as Aceh or Papua. It also does not typically manifest as IED violence. However, given the unprecedented nature of these elections, an uptick an IED violence cannot be ruled out. The forthcoming election-related events (i.e., debates, campaign rallies, and polls) offer VEOs, such as JAD, multiple opportunities to raise their profile on the world stage with an IED attack. Indeed, these concerns were shared by many on 17 FEB, the night of the first Presidential debate, when a loud explosion was heard outside of the debate venue as the debate was unfolding. Although police downplayed the event as a “prank” caused by a firecracker, others claimed that the CCTV footage and physical evidence revealed something more powerful. While it is difficult to state categorically what transpired outside the debate venue that night, the incident underscores the potential threat VEOs like JAD could pose as the election season develops.

There was one IED hoax event. On 19 FEB, police cleared a hoax IED at the Sampang Market, Cilacap, Central Java. Police responded to a report of a suspicious package and discovered the hoax device, which was composed of a pipe container. Tempo (2/19/19)




Indonesia: February IED Events





Jakarta

LEGEND Detonation

Found/Cleared

Hoax

Cache

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 18

China

On 2 FEB, Chinese authorities demolished a 57.9 meter tall statue of Guanyin, the Buddhist goddess of compassion and mercy, in Hebei Province. The statue, the largest such representation of Guanyin carved on a cliff face, was completely destroyed by explosive blasts. It had been part of a protected site, situated near the Huang’an Temple in the Wuwushui Ecological Scenic Area, but was destroyed as part of a crackdown on Buddhism. The Chinese Central Party launched a campaign to secularize religious practice in China, which resulted in destruction or shuttering of a number of religious sites and worship locations. Local villagers attested that the site drew an average of 10,000 visitors a day and had only been carved and open for public visits two years ago. Taiwan News (2/2/19) Bitter Winter (3/4/19) Japan

On 28 FEB, the Tokyo High Court allowed an extension of the state surveillance period on a group of people linked to the doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo. The court ruling overturned a lower court decision and allowed another three years of monitoring of members of Hikari no Wa, a splinter group of the Aleph cult. Aleph is the current name of Aum Shinrikyo, which rebranded itself after the group went underground following the 1995 Sarin gas attacks on a Tokyo subway. The government argued successfully in court that current Aleph members (and the splinter Hikari no Wa group, formed in 2007) were Aum Shinrikyo followers at the time of the gas attacks and that there is no fundamental change between Aum Shinrikyo and Aleph. Under Japanese law, the state may surveil groups that have committed mass murder for three years, with extensions upon approval. The courts have granted five extensions to surveil Aleph since 2000. Nippon (2/28/19) Religion News (1/24/12)

Northeast Asia: February Significant Activity


UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 19

Late January to early February (WW): Attacks have coincided with the anniversary of worldwide protests to Danish Cartoons in 2006

28 FEB (THA): First peace agree-ment signed between Thai Govern-ment and southern insurgents

12 MAR (IND): Anniversary of 1993 Mumbai attack

13 MAR (THA): Anniversary of the founding of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional

15-16 MAR (IND): United Libera-tion Front of Assam Army Raising Day

24 MAR (THA): Thai General Elec-tion

29 MAR (PHL): Anniversary of the founding of the New People’s Army

7 APR (IND): ULFA Raising Day

13-15 APR (THA): Thai New Year (Songkran)

28 APR (THA): Anniversary of 2004 Krue Se Mosque Incident

IED Calendar S M T W T F S

27 WW

28 WW

29 WW

30 WW

31 WW

1 WW

2 WW

3 WW

4 WW

5 WW

6 WW

7 WW

8 WW

9 WW

10 11 12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28 THA

1 2

3

4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 IND

13 THA

14 15 IND

16 IND

17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 THA

25 26 27 28 29 PHL

30

31 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 IND

8 9 10 11 12 13 THA

14 THA

15 THA

16 17 18 19 20

21

22 23

24 25 26 27

28 THA

29 30 1 2 3 4

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.


IND – India PHL – Philippines THA – Thailand WW – Worldwide

Feb

ruary 2

019 M

arch 2019

Ap

ril 2019

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 20

PN – Partner Nation PPIED – Pressure Plate IED QRF – Quick Response Force RCIED – Radio Controlled IED RCP – Route Clearance Patrols RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade SA – South Asia SAF – Small Arms Fire SEA – Southeast Asia SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C7H5N3O6) TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures UXO – Unexploded Ordnance VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED VEO – Violent Extremist Organization VOIED – Victim Operated IED WIA – Wounded in Action

Common Terms and Acronyms AN – Ammonium Nitrate ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao CIV – Civilian CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear COIN – Counter-insurgency CWIED – Command Wire IED DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal F/C – Found & Cleared HME – Homemade Explosives HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government) IDF – Indirect Fire IDP – Internally Displaced Persons IED – Improvised Explosive Device KFR – Kidnap for Ransom KIA – Killed in Action LOC – Line of Communication LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas MSR – Main Supply Routes NFI – No Further Information NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report PBA – Post Blast Analysis PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED PCB – Printed Circuit Board

Governments, Groups and Organizations JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh KIA – Kachin Independence Army KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao KIO – Kachin Independence Organization LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front NPA – New People’s Army PNP – Philippine National Police POLRI – Indonesian National Police PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh) RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam UWSA – United Wa State Army YCL –Youth Communist League

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate BSF – Border Security Forces BNP – Bangladesh National Party BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces) CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist) CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India) GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen HNLC – Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (India) HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh IB – India’s Intelligence Bureau IM – Indian Mujahideen IrW – Irregular Warfare ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan) ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid JI – Jemaah Islamiya JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed


unclassified asia-pacific counter-ied fusion center · one of the main insurgent groups, the...

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