ukraine before vilnius: who blinks first?

8142019 Ukraine Before Vilnius Who Blinks First

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Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation

2

ruling Party o Region amnesty pardon de-criminalization

o the provision in the Penal Code under which ymosh-enko was sentenced or sending her or treatment outsidethe country (Germany to be precise) Tey believe PresidentViktor Yanukovich does not want to pay the political price

or the AADCF A agreement as ymoshenkorsquos releasewill change the balance o power to his detriment andwould make him a weak politician in the eyes o the voterso avoid this the Party o Region argues that the decision

should be consensual and the responsibility be shared by allparliamentary parties and not by the president alone Teyaccuse the opposition o blocking the decision in the Rada(parliament) Hence both the ruling party and the opposi-

tion denounce each otherrsquos hypocrisy about their desire tosign the agreement in Vilnius and pass the responsibility

or the current blockage back and orth between themselvesTe parties seem to be preparing to accuse each other ora possible ailure in Vilnius and have apparently engagedin a game o ldquowho blinks rstrdquo where electoral calculationscount more than the signing o the AADCF A agreement

In an effort to appeal to the electorate o the oppositionYanukovich has molded himsel into the main Europeanintegration orce in the country Local V news leaves thewatcher with the impression that the Vilnius summit isabout ull membership in the EU and not only about theAADCF A agreement Te populist messages promisinglower prices and higher pensions afer the signing o theAADCF A agreement raise dangerous alse expectationsin the citizens Tese actions ultimately discredit the idea oEuropean integration and given the un avorable dynamico the Ukrainian economy which barely affords payment osalaries and pensions at their current level will most likelyweaken the position o EU integration advocates in themonths to come Yanukovich is pursuing an ideal scenariothat would allow him to be the ront runner in the 2015presidential elections specically 1) Yulia ymoshenkoeither in jail or under treatment abroad yet in Europeanguaranteed silenzio stampa and conditioned to return to jail

upon completion o treatment 2) the AADCF A agree-

ment signed in Vilnius and 3) an agreement with the EUand the IMF to stabilize the economy signed soon aferIn order to achieve all these Yanukovich is avoiding anyconcrete solution on ymoshenko until the last minutewhile as usual looking to the East or a plan B should thesituation require one

Ukraine-Russia A Plan ldquoBrdquo on the HorizonIn an ideal world the one described by Russian leaders inthe oreign media Russia should not be concerned by theUkraine-EU association In 2010 President Vladimir Putinunder the ldquoGreater Europerdquo label resurrected the idea oa ree trade zone rom Lisbon to Vladivostok Looked at

rom this perspective the AADCF A agreement betweenUkraine and the EU constitutes only a step urther inthis direction as noticed by European Commissioner orEnlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy StephanFulle Russiarsquos opposition to the Ukraine-EU agreementshows not only the emptiness o the Russian discourse butalso the weakness and vulnerability on its part As Europeandiplomats have observed Russia does not want successstories in its vicinity because Russia itsel is not a success ustate Te Moscow version o a Greater Europe has Russia asthe gravitational center o this mega-structure in the post-Soviet space institutionalized through the Eurasian Union(EAU) According to this line o reasoning Ukraine has toadvance toward Europe not as an independent state but atthe same pace with Russia and under Russiarsquos purview Atthe beginning o 2000 Moscow promoted the slogan ldquoInEurope together with Russiardquo or precisely this purposeRussian Ambassador to the EU Vladimir Chyzhov openlyadmits that Moscow would pre er direct negotiationsbetween the EU and EAU and not between EU-Ukraine-EAU

Afer the 2010 Ukrainian presidential elections Russiademanded that Ukraine replace some o its ambassadors tokey capitals Ten-newly elected Yanukovich complied inorder to revamp relations between the two countries andhis with Putin Afer a brie recovery the personal relation-ship between the two presidents has grown more tense inparticular with Russiarsquos recent pressures on the Ukrainianeconomy meant to discourage its association with the EUYet Ukrainian officials never changed their tone in rhetoric

The parties seem to be preparing

to accuse each other for a

possible failure in Vilnius






4

afer their official visit conrms Europersquos exasperation with

Ukrainersquos intransigence o add to this it is possible thatthe meeting in Sochi between Yanukovich and Putin andthe consequent one in Moscow were partially meant to putpressure on the EU and cause jealousy It seems that Kyivperceives the condition o ymoshenkorsquos release as nothingmore than a bluff a position that can eventually be reversedo this end Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski has

asked the Ukrainians to stop bluffing and act according tothe conditions demanded by the EU

Te parties are lost in the translation o their own inten-tions Te Ukrainian side states that the EU is very inter-

ested in signing the AADCF A agreement which willgive it ree access to the Ukrainian market Proo thereois the postponement o the decision on signing the agree-ment until November 18 when the next Foreign AffairsCouncil will reconvene and the extension o the Cox-Kwasniewski mission in Ukraine both perceived in Ukraineas urther signs o EUrsquos desire to ultimately sign the agree-ment Frequent visits to and meetings with Kyiv officialsstrengthen their belie that Ukraine is very important tothe EU It is true that a lack o consensus with Ukraine inVilnius will be a ailure o the EU Neighbourhood Policybut it would have more devastating consequences or

Ukraine both economically and socially Te EuropeanUnion will survive without Ukraine but will Ukrainesurvive the rough year that lies ahead nancially withoutthe support o the EU

Currently the parties are in gridlock Te Cox-Kwasniewskimission has lef Kyiv afer two rounds o talks and willnow present its report to the European Parliament onNovember 14 Apparently the discussions ocused on theprocedural steps or ymoshenkorsquos treatment abroad and

her return upon completion o treatment EU representa-

tives announced that the Ukrainian draf law on medicaltreatment abroad or convicts could serve as a basis to reachconsensus in the ymoshenko case Te Party o Regionstill wants to amend the project to ensure her return tothe country afer treatment in order to serve out her entiresentence Should the law pass the government will have togo through all procedures or ymoshenkorsquos release at thespeed o light in order to meet the November 18 deadlineTis is not impossible though in a country that operates onorders rom the president

Te possibility o Yanukovich agreeing to submit the law or

parliamentary approval without actually releasing ymosh-enko is under consideration by Europeans On November18 he could present the law as a signicant progress in thematter and promise ymoshenkorsquos release on the eve othe Vilnius Summit or immediately afer Europeans arepreparing or this scenario as Yanukovich is known or not

ullling promises and playing tricks ldquoMs Merkel hasnrsquotmet with President Yanukovich in quite some time becausehe has made promises that he hasnrsquot keptrdquo explains a Euro-pean official Should this scenario come through a provi-sional signature o the AA with ull activation only uponimplementation o the law and ymoshenkorsquos departure or

treatment is under considerationTe nancial aspects o the country are also tightly linkedto the ymoshenko case Ukraine hopes that the signingo the AA agreement will guarantee a nancial interven-tion by the EU similar to the one in Greece Parallel to theCox-Kwasniewski mission the EU is holding talks with theIMF regarding a loan or Ukraine in 2014 which wouldbring macro-economic stability and minimize the impact opossible sanctions imposed by Russia afer signing the AADCF A agreement Te negotiated amount is between $10to 15 billion Te IMF has just closed a consultation session

with Kyiv authorities on resuming nancing Yanukovichrsquosdilemma is that current conditions imposed by the IMF aresimilar to those rom the previous agreement which wassuspended because the government ailed to ulll them Inorder to obtain loans rom the IMF and the EU Yanukovichwill have to take unpopular measures he has obstinatelyavoided so ar such as cutting gas subsidies or house-hold consumers and instituting better tax collection SinceUkrainian small and medium enterprises already carry aheavy scal burden the president will have to ocus on the

The European Union will survive

without Ukraine but will Ukraine

survive the rough year that lies

ahead nancially without the

support of the EU




5

oligarchs who pre er to trans er their income to offshore

accounts in order to avoid paying taxes A stricter scaland social policy might upset the oligarchs and nurture thediscontent o the lower classes an un avorable scenario ora 2015 reelection

ConclusionsSeen rom any angle the options ahead o Yanukovichpresent many risks or his political uture Te oppositionwhich received good results in the 2012 parliamentaryelections will try to use the ymoshenko case and possible

ailure at Vilnius to remove him rom power Similarlytaking unpopular economic measures would be a gif orthe opposition in the electoral campaign Russia will tryto tempt Yanukovich with Euro-Asian promises usingUkrainersquos nancial vulnerability and the presidentrsquos own

ears in order to deepen Ukrainersquos political and economicdependency on Russia I Yanukovich signs the AADCF Aagreement with the EU later this month the Kremlinwill take measures to augment Ukrainersquos decit by settingimport restrictions in place Under the same scenario theEU will gain more inuence over Ukraine I the agreementis not signed this month Ukraine will exit the Europeantrajectory until autumn 2014 (when similar agreementswith Georgia and Moldova are anticipated) or until 2015-16 and will be more susceptible to blackmail rom Moscow

By trying to balance between East and West and avoidingto address the ymoshenko case until the 12 th hour Yanu-kovich has pushed himsel in a corner acing only optionsthat are risky or his political career Whatever his choicehe will either give the opposition a strong advantage in theupcoming elections will have to run against a eared rivalwith a good chance o winning or will depend togetherwith his entire country on an unreliable partner Yanu-kovich should stop looking or an attractive solution thatwould be good or himsel and instead choose the onethat would be good or the country Despite the rustra-tion this process has generated European diplomats shouldcontinue to be patient and try to be at least as creative astheir Russian counterparts in giving him the space to dothis Tey should remind him o the incentives to arrive atthe right decision

About the AuthorStanislav Secrieru holds a PhD in political sciences and hasconducted research at the NA O De ense College (Rome) theInstitute or European Politics (Berlin) and the New Europe College(Bucharest) He has been involved in research projects at the EuropeanCouncil on Foreign Relations (London) DemosEuropa (Warsaw)the Europeum (Prague) the Heinrich Boumlll Foundation (Berlin) theOpen Society Foundation (Bucharest) and the Finnish Institute orInternational Affairs (Helsinki) He has eld research experience inpost-Soviet space (Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova Russiaand Ukraine) He recently co-authored South Caucasus 20 Years AferPolitical Regimes Security and Energy

About GMFTe German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) strengthenstransatlantic cooperation on regional national and global challengesand opportunities in the spirit o the Marshall Plan GMF does this bysupporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlanticsphere by convening leaders and members o the policy and businesscommunities by contributing research and analysis on transatlantictopics and by providing exchange opportunities to oster renewedcommitment to the transatlantic relationship In addition GMFsupports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies Foundedin 1972 as a non-partisan non-prot organization through a gif rom

Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance GMFmaintains a strong presence on both sides o the Atlantic In additionto its headquarters in Washington DC GMF has offices in BerlinParis Brussels Belgrade Ankara Bucharest Warsaw and unis GMFalso has smaller representations in Bratislava urin and Stockholm

About the On Wider Europe SeriesTis series is designed to ocus in on key intellectual and policydebates regarding Western policy toward Wider Europe that other-wise might receive insufficient attention Te views presented inthese papers are the personal views o the authors and not those othe institutions they represent or Te German Marshall Fund o the

United States




2

ruling Party o Region amnesty pardon de-criminalization

o the provision in the Penal Code under which ymosh-enko was sentenced or sending her or treatment outsidethe country (Germany to be precise) Tey believe PresidentViktor Yanukovich does not want to pay the political price

or the AADCF A agreement as ymoshenkorsquos releasewill change the balance o power to his detriment andwould make him a weak politician in the eyes o the voterso avoid this the Party o Region argues that the decision

should be consensual and the responsibility be shared by allparliamentary parties and not by the president alone Teyaccuse the opposition o blocking the decision in the Rada(parliament) Hence both the ruling party and the opposi-

tion denounce each otherrsquos hypocrisy about their desire tosign the agreement in Vilnius and pass the responsibility

or the current blockage back and orth between themselvesTe parties seem to be preparing to accuse each other ora possible ailure in Vilnius and have apparently engagedin a game o ldquowho blinks rstrdquo where electoral calculationscount more than the signing o the AADCF A agreement

In an effort to appeal to the electorate o the oppositionYanukovich has molded himsel into the main Europeanintegration orce in the country Local V news leaves thewatcher with the impression that the Vilnius summit isabout ull membership in the EU and not only about theAADCF A agreement Te populist messages promisinglower prices and higher pensions afer the signing o theAADCF A agreement raise dangerous alse expectationsin the citizens Tese actions ultimately discredit the idea oEuropean integration and given the un avorable dynamico the Ukrainian economy which barely affords payment osalaries and pensions at their current level will most likelyweaken the position o EU integration advocates in themonths to come Yanukovich is pursuing an ideal scenariothat would allow him to be the ront runner in the 2015presidential elections specically 1) Yulia ymoshenkoeither in jail or under treatment abroad yet in Europeanguaranteed silenzio stampa and conditioned to return to jail

upon completion o treatment 2) the AADCF A agree-

ment signed in Vilnius and 3) an agreement with the EUand the IMF to stabilize the economy signed soon aferIn order to achieve all these Yanukovich is avoiding anyconcrete solution on ymoshenko until the last minutewhile as usual looking to the East or a plan B should thesituation require one

Ukraine-Russia A Plan ldquoBrdquo on the HorizonIn an ideal world the one described by Russian leaders inthe oreign media Russia should not be concerned by theUkraine-EU association In 2010 President Vladimir Putinunder the ldquoGreater Europerdquo label resurrected the idea oa ree trade zone rom Lisbon to Vladivostok Looked at

rom this perspective the AADCF A agreement betweenUkraine and the EU constitutes only a step urther inthis direction as noticed by European Commissioner orEnlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy StephanFulle Russiarsquos opposition to the Ukraine-EU agreementshows not only the emptiness o the Russian discourse butalso the weakness and vulnerability on its part As Europeandiplomats have observed Russia does not want successstories in its vicinity because Russia itsel is not a success ustate Te Moscow version o a Greater Europe has Russia asthe gravitational center o this mega-structure in the post-Soviet space institutionalized through the Eurasian Union(EAU) According to this line o reasoning Ukraine has toadvance toward Europe not as an independent state but atthe same pace with Russia and under Russiarsquos purview Atthe beginning o 2000 Moscow promoted the slogan ldquoInEurope together with Russiardquo or precisely this purposeRussian Ambassador to the EU Vladimir Chyzhov openlyadmits that Moscow would pre er direct negotiationsbetween the EU and EAU and not between EU-Ukraine-EAU

Afer the 2010 Ukrainian presidential elections Russiademanded that Ukraine replace some o its ambassadors tokey capitals Ten-newly elected Yanukovich complied inorder to revamp relations between the two countries andhis with Putin Afer a brie recovery the personal relation-ship between the two presidents has grown more tense inparticular with Russiarsquos recent pressures on the Ukrainianeconomy meant to discourage its association with the EUYet Ukrainian officials never changed their tone in rhetoric

The parties seem to be preparing

to accuse each other for a

possible failure in Vilnius






4



















support of the EU




5











United States






4



















support of the EU




5











United States




5











United States

ukraine before vilnius: who blinks first?

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