1

Gareth Bland

“Working-class students and the research-intensive universities”

Introduction

This project focuses on the UK government’s Widening Participation (WP) agenda.

This is of interest and relevance since it is an agenda that seeks to pursue equity in

terms of higher education provision. It also includes, as a target group, the white

working classes who form the source of my research interests, in that I shall examine

the decision making processes of those students who enter the research intensive

institutions from that group. Therefore, since the working class form part of the target

demographic of the WP agenda, my research interests can be located within that field

of enquiry. This study will take the form of two separate chapters each examining

facets of the WP agenda. Chapter one examines the agenda in full political, economic

and social context, with an international comparison with the USA included where

appropriate. Chapter two opens with an examination of three separate WP initiatives

and is then followed by an examination of the empirical literature relevant to each of

the WP target groups.

The WP agenda will be examined in two separate, succeeding chapters: In the first, I

shall critique the UK government’s widening participation agenda in its full context

and ask; what is widening participation? The UK government’s WP agenda sees as its

aims the extension of higher education (HE) provision to all members of society

traditionally underrepresented: lower socio-economic groups, ethnic minorities,

women and mature students (DfES, 2002; 2004). This widening of provision follows

over forty years of expansion from a period in 1963 when one in ten school leavers

went to university through to the 1980s when 17% participation was achieved, to

today when one in three school leavers goes into HE (Elliott, 2003: 54). In that time,

therefore, Britain’s HE system has gone from an elite to a mass system of provision.

The abolition of the binary divide between university and other tertiary education

institutions and the near universal granting of university status since 1992 has led to

the awareness of institutional prestige: in short, the awareness of a divide not between

2

university and other tertiary education institutions, but between “established” and

“new” university after 1992 (Ball, 2003). The working classes are mainly

concentrated in the post-1992 or “new” universities whilst the middle classes are

twice as likely to attend a pre-1992 research intensive university (Reay, 2003).

Recent research has demonstrated an awareness of institutional prestige among some

working class groups, together with an acknowledgment of the hierarchy among

universities (Baker et al, 2005a; Leathwood, 2005.) In addition to the awareness of

institutional prestige, empirical research has revealed that certain groups of young

people and mature students simply do not feel that the university experience and its

practices are suited to them. Simply put, a perception of snobbery and alien practices

precludes them from either involvement at all or participating fully in the social side

of university life once there (Marks et al 2003; Tett, 2004.).

I shall also examine the genesis of the approach toward WP. Essentially, where does

the policy drive toward WP in our universities originate? What is this policy agenda

informed by? That the widening participation agenda is informed by national and

global economic imperatives will form a major part in the discussion in chapter one.

The issue of student finance will also be examined in reference to the 1998 student

finance reforms which introduced tuition fees and student loans and saw the abolition

of maintenance grants. An inherent contradiction of the government’s WP drive is

that the target groups find HE prohibitive due to the funding reforms which have

created both a perception of and actual debt (Callender, Little & Van Dyke, 2003). A

discussion of the government’s admissions target leads to an assessment of the desired

50% participation rate. The imbalance between academic and vocational modes of

study at tertiary level also leads to the examination of the skills gaps created in the

labour market and the under deployment of graduate skills in many areas of the

employment sector.

Also pertinent for discussion in chapter one is the modern workplace culture into

which graduates enter on leaving university. This is summed up by the recent Skills

White Paper as “Replacing the redundant notion of a “job for life” with our new

ambition of “employability for life” (DfES, 2005: 1). This can be interpreted as a

3

policy intention to equip graduates with core skills commensurate with a transient

employment market. The inculcation of core skills into university curricula has led to

the change in the relationship between university and the subsequent graduate

employer: as Brown and Hesketh have argued, this can be seen as the university’s

new function to prepare graduates who are “oven ready” for their employers and who

can hit the “ground running” (Brown & Hesketh, 2004). The related debate as to

what kinds of undergraduate qualification best serves this skills economy will dovetail

with this issue of “employability”. Though this chapter will involve some

commentary on international higher educational policy, namely USA, it is not strictly

a comparative paper. Such comparisons will only be made to demonstrate how the

USA has similar issues in the global economy with reference to student finance and

funding within the sector.

Chapter one will also take in an examination of the tension between the demands of

central government to increase participation of those underrepresented groups in

society, and modern university funding constraints. In line with the culture of global

competition and comparison, some commentators believe that the leading British

universities should be allowed freedom from central government budget making and,

as with the US Ivy League institutions, exist wholly in the private sector or at least be

free to seek greater private endowments with the ability to provide bursaries for the

least financially able parents and students (Astle, 2006; Wolf, 2004). This tension

also involves the policy drive toward WP involving a regulatory body to measure fair

access and the budgetary constraints placed on UK universities and the increase in HE

accountability and assessment in the past two decades. The abolition of the binary

divide in 1992 between university and polytechnic saw the creation of new

universities. Both “new” and “old” university now have to compete for funding from

one centralised body. The operation of each type of institution will be examined under

current funding constraints. Essentially then, the initial chapter examines the

dichotomy at the centre of the government’s WP agenda and HE policy: essentially,

how to widen participation to underrepresented groups of society, increase the

financial and intellectual well being of the universities and meet national economic

imperatives, set against the financial limitations of a low-taxation state where HE is

but one demand placed on public expenditure.

4

The second chapter involves an examination of how social class and those other

groups targeted to widen participation are being defined and then re-defined.

Essentially, what is the government looking for in its bid to widen participation in HE?

How is the government differentiating between its target groups? The Higher

Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) says that the working classes or

lower socio-economic groups are those in social classes: iiim, iv and v (HEFCE,

2002). These make up a specific target grouping in the widening participation agenda.

Other groups include: ethnic minorities, women and mature students previously

proportionately underrepresented (Leathwood, 2005: 9). Selected WP initiatives

operating on both national and local scales will be assessed as to their effectiveness.

Evident in the initiatives examined is an approach toward tackling the question of

equity within Britain’s universities based on information drives, raising awareness

and aspirations in order to prepare a pathway into HE. This is at the expense of

challenging existing cultures within HE institutions which are seen as alien to some of

the WP target groups (Ball, 2003; Tett, 2004; McGavock & Osborne, 2005).

I shall further examine the participation of each of the target groups in the WP agenda

with gender being discussed across class and ethnic lines. Are certain members of the

target participation groups under or over represented as a result of rigid definitional

approaches? Certainly, where ethnic minority groups are concerned there is

considerable variance between each grouping and their propensity to take part in HE

and at which type of institution (Modood, 1993; 2006; Shiner & Modood, 2002).

Demonstrable though, is the fact that ethnic minority applications outstrip those of

whites as a proportion of the population (Modood, 1993; Modood, 2006), sometimes

doubly so according to ethnic group. While there does exist a gap between

applications and admission in certain institutions, ethnic minority applicants do not

appear to be discouraged from applying in greater numbers than whites (Modood,

2006.). If the effectiveness of the WP agenda is to be measured in terms of its ability

to attract the groups that have been historically underrepresented, then WP cannot be

said to have been successful. Groups such as the white working class and Black

Caribbean males are still not attracted toward HE in the numbers hope for (Modood,

2006). Conversely, the increase in university places have mostly been taken up by the

groups traditionally predisposed to HE (Tett, 2004). Since white applications overall

are fewer than any other ethnic group relative to their proportion of the population,

5

this gives added pertinence and gravitas to my future research which will examine the

decision making processes of the white working classes who attend the research

intensive institutions. This group presents an anomaly worthy of investigation since

they represent, in comparative terms, the lowest number of applicants both ethnically

(being white) and socio-economically.

6

Chapter One

Thematically, the emphasis in this chapter will be on the contradictions inherent in

the WP agenda. These can be said to be the result of Britain’s recent history as a low-

taxation state where education, like other areas of social policy, is almost totally

reliant on public expenditure. Moreover, unlike some of its global competitors in the

HE market, Britain attracts relatively low levels of private investment to augment

public funds. This economic policy stance is set against the desire to widen

participation in order to achieve social equity and the edict that the universities

compete internationally in terms of research and development and produce the

graduates to suit the demands of national economic imperatives.

This dichotomy presents the following problems: the quest for Britain’s elite

universities to compete internationally without commensurate increases in public

funding or their ability to set tuition fees in line with market rates or seek greater

investment through the private sector. The lack of public expenditure has, in some

cases, left facilities lagging behind international competitors. Academic pay has also

suffered in comparison with other public sector professionals, though the demands on

academics are to produce world class research to enhance their universities research

profile and to secure public sector funding. Consequently, morale in the profession is

low and has been further affected by the demands of governmental audit and

accountability which impinge upon teaching time. The actual WP target itself is open

to scrutiny. The 50% target is questionable not only in that it produces many

graduates with academic qualifications who may be over qualified for the actual job

market but also in that it affects the labour market in terms of leaving a skills gap at a

lower vocational educational level. Furthermore, the move from an “elite” to a mass

system of provision has come largely without any of the stratification and

diversification of institution which are seen in the competitor nations such as the USA.

A key starting point, however, must be the influences behind the agenda and the

admission target for HE participation. This will examine the influences behind the

7

50% admission target for 2010 and the basis of the government’s thinking. This will

be followed by an examination of the debates surrounding the funding of widening

participation from a student/graduate perspective, leading to a further debate about the

actual WP target itself and its effect on the UK labour market and the perception of

skills gaps within that. This section will take in an examination of the relationship

between the universities and the Treasury. That is, the demand for graduates to work

in what is called the “skills economy” and debates about the best kind of qualification

to serve the economy and employment market. This not only presents arguments

about academic versus vocational qualification but also the preparations made at

undergraduate level in order that graduates have core skills which will enable them to

work in the new economy.

A discussion of the role of universities as suppliers of “oven ready” graduates and the

notion of “employability” (Brown & Hesketh, 2004) will also ensue. The final section

of the chapter studies the tension between the governmental policy drive toward WP

and the sector’s desire for greater funding. This is demonstrable not only in the

demands for institutional and departmental funding, but from the repeated demands

for increased academic pay. The discussion will then move on to the audit and

assessment culture prevalent in the modern British university sector and the

constraints which that places upon academic staff.

Influences behind expansion: economic & political

The notion of WP in a HE context involves the spreading of opportunities to

underrepresented groups. These groups include those from the lower socio-economic

groups (namely iiim, iv and v), women, mature students and those from ethnic

minorities (Leathwood, 2005: 9). The need to include these groups stems from the

government’s desire that HE and the subsequent graduate employment market should

be more equitable and that they should reflect the multi-racial society of modern

Britain. However, the other dimension of the expansion target has its origins in

economic thought and from the lobbying of powerful employment groups intent on

competing in a globalised technological era. Throughout the 1990s the Confederation

of British Industry (CBI) lobbied for an increase in participation. On the premise that

“Higher education is a prime source of highly skilled people, a key contributor to a

dynamic economy and central to the future competitiveness of the UK” (Wolf, 2002:

8

169) the CBI argued for a 40% participation rate by 2000 and for 50% by 2010. It

was felt that Britain lagged behind its international competitors and that the best way

of bridging the gap would be an increase in university participation. Today, the

support for expansion continues with employer groups such as the Council for

Industry and Higher Education (CIHE) who since 2003 have supported the 50%

participation target (Keep & Mayhew, 2004: 301).

However, expansion of HE in Britain did not begin with New Labour’s policies. With

the collapse of the Eastern bloc economies in the late 1980s and the subsequent

expansion of the European Union and the rise and increased reliance on global

telecommunications and computer technology, new markets and increased labour

flow resulted. In addition, the rise of the so called “tiger economies” of Southeast

Asia increased global competition still further (Wolf, 2002). This was recognised in

a policy statement as early as 1991 by the Conservative government in the 1991

White Paper educational policy reforms. What modern employers needed, it said,

were “young people going into work” with “skills and qualifications they need for

their future careers” with education needing to respond to the “rising demand form

employers for more and higher level skills to meet the growing challenge from

overseas competitors in world markets” (Wolf, 2002: 12-13).

Since this global competition was taking place in a post-industrial age, with

manufacturing increasingly marginalised and much of Britain’s traditional industries

such as mining and ship building in marked and in some cases irreparable decline, the

onus on the education sector was to provide workers who could operate in a new kind

of economy: that of ideas and utilisation of high-technology skills, what would

become known as the “skills economy”. Charles Leadbeater a policy advisor to Tony

Blair and one of the authors of the Department of Trade and Industry’s 1998 policy

document Building the Knowledge Economy argued (Wolf, 2002: xii):

The generation, application and exploitation of knowledge is (sic) driving modern economic growth.

Most of us make our money from thin air: we produce nothing that can be weighed, touched or easily

measured. Our output is not stockpiled at harbours, stored in warehouses or shipped in railway cars

9

The assumption that the British economy had become increasingly globalised, was

responsive to international labour market vagaries and was reliant on not physical but

mental agility and skills was reinforced by Education Secretary David Blunkett in a

2000 speech convened by the ESRC (Blunkett, 2000: 12-21):

The powerhouses of the new global economy are innovation and ideas, creativity, skills and knowledge.

These are now the tools for success and prosperity as much as natural resources and physical labour

power were in the past century.

Despite New Labour’s 1997 election mantra of “education, education, education” the

issue of HE was tacitly put on hold by the competing parties during the campaign as

Ron Dearing was compiling his report – published in July 1997 as Higher Education

in the Learning Society - which principally dealt with issues related to “learning,

teaching and quality assurance” (Smithers,2001: 421). In the report Dearing identified

that tuition fees would partly remedy the funding crisis as since 1989 there had been a

25% per capita cut in student funding (ibid.). Though mooted and ultimately rejected

under the Conservative governments of the 1980s, tuition fees were now clearly on

the agenda from 1998 when the first term Labour government introduced student

finance reforms including up front tuition fees and loans, rather than grants, to cover

student living costs (Barr, 2004: 279).

Additionally, in response to the lobbying of employment groups mentioned above,

successive post-1997 Labour governments have contributed to the widening

participation debate by declaring their intention to achieve a 50% participation rate in

HE among 18-30 year olds by 2010 (DfES, 2004). The government’s widening

participation priorities as expressed in 2002 were (DfES, 2002):

(HE policy) aims to ensure that the country has higher education institutions that can compete with the

best in the world in teaching, research and technology transfer and that link closely with business to

generate wealth

The lobbying of business groups and perceived geo-economic realities can be seen to

have translated into New Labour education policy. The inculcation of “core” and

latterly, “key” skills into national curricula became prevalent in 1991 when the

10

conservative government announced its intention to make the education system more

vocationally relevant and tailored to the demands of industry (Wolf, 2004: 327).

Again, the CBI were highly influential and in 1997 New Labour continued the culture

of target driven policies to eradicate skills gaps at elementary and secondary levels

and also extended this drive to those adults not participating in learning or who were

deemed insufficient in basic skills or level 2 (GCSE standard) skills. Key skills tests,

essentially numerical and verbal reasoning allied to problem solving skills, were also

introduced to improve adult skills after British adults had performed poorly on an

international adult literacy survey (Wolf, 2002: 329). Again, economic imperatives

and the knowledge based economy found their way into the policy text as a pretext for

the tests: “employers…cannot compete in a…knowledge based economy without a

workforce able to add real value at every level” (DfES, 2002: 8). Therefore, it is

demonstrable that the culture of “skilling” is prevalent throughout the education

system and not simply at HE level.

With regard to equity the notion of improving the skills base of those without the

necessary core or “key” skills can be linked, policy wise, to the New Labour

determination to tackle social exclusion. Established in December 1997 to run from

the cabinet office and answerable to the Prime Minister, the Social Exclusion Unit’s

remit was to work across departmental boundaries on such issues as “homelessness,

truancy, teenage pregnancy and neighbourhood renewal”(Riddell,2001:22).

Ostensibly working on a series of “action zones” namely health, community and

education, the unit drew upon outside expertise as well as on task group membership

(Glennerster, 2001). Therefore, equitably, WP joins the Skills agenda and the Social

Exclusion Agenda in seeking to utilise the skills base of the UK population by

reaching out to those underrepresented and also seeking to extend their life chances.

The relevance of these two other agenda to WP can be seen in the 2004 education

White Paper.

The 2004 education White Paper expanded on the original definition of WP in that it

spoke of the need for a more equitable representation of society to be found within

British universities. The paper states that “the social class gap among those entering

11

university remains too wide” (DfES, 2004: p.8) and that “education must be a force

for opportunity and social justice, not for the entrenchment of privilege” (ibid; p.71).

However, in terms of the student financing of such expansion, the onus is placed on

the individual participant directly, “we are asking students to pay for the benefits they

get from higher education, to build sustainable funding freedoms for the future, we

believe that it is also right that those who have already benefited from higher

education should contribute” (DfES, 2004: p.80).

Student finance: tuition fees and loans

Having established a contemporary political context for the WP agenda a further,

fuller examination of the policies related to individual student funding should be made.

As mentioned, in 1998 the Labour government introduced tuition fees and student

loans which replaced grants as a means of student maintenance. This policy openly

recognised that HE had to compete with other social policy demands in a post-

Keynesian economic market place. No longer, in other words, would higher

education be propped up in the manner of the former nationalised industries through

increased public spending. Accordingly, no longer could the student be able to rely

on free tuition and maintenance grants. Though the new system was introduced in

1998, no significant increase in the participation of the lower socio-economic groups

took place. True, there was an increase of 8% from those from manual backgrounds

between 1991 and 2001, with 5% from “routine” background (Leathwood, 2005: 9).

However, the increase from non-manual backgrounds was significantly higher, at

15%. Also noteworthy is that the figure dates back to 1991 when student loans and

tuition fees had yet to be introduced. Indeed, the introduction of tuition fees and loans

was some seven years away at that point. Therefore, the effect that these combined

elements of policy had upon the aspirations of the working classes and lower socio-

economic groups is difficult to quantify. However, there is considerable qualitative

evidence to strengthen the argument that low participation rates of working class

groups is not as a result of “low aspirations” but of definite “debt aversion” ( Marks et

al 2003; Leathwood, 2005). The government has admitted that the fee regime

introduced in 1998 has not reduced the number of working class entrants; neither has

it increased them (Callender & Wilkinson, 2003).

12

The 2004 White Paper has sought to remedy some of the perceived deficiencies of the

1998 funding reforms with measures that will benefit the student, and not act as a

disincentive to those from less affluent or non-traditional groups, and second – an

issue to be examined separately – will give the institutions themselves greater

autonomy to set fees and to secure funding. Barr argues that the initial legislation in

1998 which introduced up-front tuition fees and student loans had “serious problems”

since (2004: 279):

Central planning continued (universities were not free to set their own, variable fees), fees were

introduced, set by central government and were the same for all subjects at all universities, and fees

were an upfront charge, since there was no loan to cover them. The loans were too small to cover

realistic living costs (let alone fees), and incorporated an interest subsidy; on the access front, the 1998

reforms abolished the previous system of grants which practically covered a student’s living costs

Introduced for academic year 2006/07, Barr identified improvements in the White

Paper reforms of 2004 and sees the ideal student finance package as being the

effectiveness of three distinct parts or “legs” (Barr, 2004: 279-80). Writing in 2004,

some two years before the introduction of the reforms, Barr systematically addressed

each leg. The first involved tuition fees. These must, he argued, be variable so that

universities be able to charge the perceived worth of the course to the student.

However, there must be a fees cap in place so that a ceiling cannot be overshot and

demand will not be affected. The UK government has thus introduced a fees cap of

£3,000 for the academic year of 2006-7. The cap must not be set too low so that all

universities charge the same fee, effectively “bringing in flat fees through the back

door” (ibid: 281). Here, “world class” institutions would benefit so that they could

charge fees commensurate with their status and other, perhaps more local institutions,

would be able to charge lower fees and still attract sufficient numbers to remain viable.

Barr’s second “leg” involved the proper use of loans. Though he applauded the

introduction of income-contingent loans from as early as 1998, he added that the loan

amounts were insufficient and should have covered tuition fees and realistic living

costs, with a raised repayment threshold (DfES, 2004; Barr, 2004). Barr feels that the

student and the institution would benefit here since (2004:280):

13

From the point of view of the student, the situation is little different from the days of “free” higher

education: their fees are paid on their behalf, and money is paid into their bank accounts to cover living

cost. From the point of view of the graduate, the arrangements are like a system financed out of

income tax, except that the repayments (a) are only made by people who have been to university and (b)

do not go on forever.

The third “leg” of the student finance package which Barr identifies includes a set of

measures to promote access. Though applauding the introduction of an Access

Regulator, which includes scholarships for poorer students, as a “quid pro quo” for

charging higher fees, Barr feels that still more could be done to promote access

opportunities. “Poverty of information”, he argues, is a real threat to addressing

inequality of access and must be dealt with to address student and parental worries.

The worries outlined, and issues to be addressed through greater availability of

information, include (Barr, 2004: 281):

The new system will leave students with large debts; higher participation will lower the return to

getting a degree; student debt will make it harder to get a mortgage; variable fees are inequitable;

variable fees will harm access; variable fees will create a two-tier system; it is morally wrong to charge

for higher education. This is the start of a slippery slope

In terms of the second ”leg”, the issue of loans, Barr feels that the current interest

subsidy is regressive and could be amended to take the place of a targeted subsidy to

those most in need and redirecting savings toward larger grants (ibid: 280-281). The

reduction of the interest subsidy and its replacement with a targeted subsidy would

also offer all students full loans and the added advantage of introducing grants to

those most in need. 2006-07 sees the first intake of students under the new fee regime

and their effect on the WP target groups will be monitored with interest. Though

dismissive of the notion of a graduate tax, (2004) left-of-centre opinion is in favour.

David Purdy, a social economist, advocates the introduction of a 1% increase in the

rate of tax paid by all graduates who exceed the basic rate, the amount to be then

redistributed toward HE (Lawson, 2006: 27). In 2002, just 15% of students entering

university came from manual backgrounds, compared with 81% from professional

backgrounds (Astle, 2006:3). As Carole Leathwood has pointed out, WP initiatives

have not significantly made advances in attracting the target groups (2005: 9). The

perception of debt is a significant factor among those not attending university and this

14

needs to be addressed. However, as identified elsewhere (Callender et al 2003; Marks

et al 2003) the problems may be just as much about an aversion to risk as it is about

low aspiration. Until then, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that aspirations of

the lower socio-economic groups have increased.

The “knowledge” economy: skills utilisation, skills gaps and national economic

imperatives

Earlier, I noted the influence of business lobbying groups on the government’s drive

to increase participation in the modern “skills economy”. This level of participation

was also influenced by global economic changes, freer movement of labour and

capital and rapid technological change. However, what of this target? Is it feasible?

Does it leave skills gaps in other areas by concentrating on academic educational

routes? Contemporary debates about the WP target rate and the subsequent effect on

the economy and labour market require consideration. Keep and Mayhew (2004)

argue that the figures used by the government to support 50% participation are

“incorrect” (ibid: 300). The figures, quoted in the 2004 White Paper (DfES: 16) argue

that:

Demand for graduates is very strong, and research shows that 80% of the 1.7 million new jobs which

are expected to be created by the end of the decade will be in occupations which normally recruit those

with higher education qualifications

In effect, the data reveals that four out of every five jobs being created is at level 3 or

its equivalent by 2010 (Keep & Mayhew, 2004:301). The new jobs, purportedly to be

filled by those with “higher education qualifications” suggest that, instead, a gap in

the labour market would be filled by expanding level 3 education and training rather

than an increase in degree entrants (ibid.). The increased number of graduates also

creates a problem in the utilisation of their skills. With reference to the skills

economy, there appears to be a gap between perception and reality. Those jobs

which actually require a degree level qualification to work within the “skills

economy” in such areas as computing, science and engineering only require a finite

supply of graduates.

15

Richard Sennett argues that the “skills economy” needs only a relatively small

number of the educated who possess talent. “In the cutting edge realms of finance,

technology, media, design and creative services, the economic machine can run

profitably and efficiently by drawing on an ever smaller elite” (Sennett, 2006: 1).

This raises the question of where those with graduate qualifications will find

employment. As Keep and Mayhew contend, the current output of HE graduates will

have to look beyond the knowledge intensive economy for employment, sectors “in

which, in 2000, graduates made up less than 15% of the workforce, but which

accounted for 49.5% of all private sector employment in Britain ( such as hotels,

restaurants, retailing)” (Keep & Mayhew, 2004: 299). Moreover, “It is open to

question how graduates will be able to add value in shop floor jobs in, for example

mass market retailing given the product-market strategies, job design and

management hierarchies that tend to pertain there” (ibid.)

There appears to be a form of consensus that a 50% participation rate means that

fewer graduates will be able to gain the kind of graduate level employment which

they originally went to university for. The sector for which the HE expansion was

originally meant to serve – the knowledge based skills economy– needs only a finite

human resource, therefore, those unable to find jobs in those areas or with degrees

which would not qualify them for such work will be forced into the less knowledge

intensive areas of the economy. Accordingly, the graduate has adapted to the

changing job market by utilising techniques seen as those of the “player” (Brown &

Hesketh, 2004). It is now seen that the job selection process begins at university with

the utilisation of the careers service, employment web sites and graduate careers

“events” and sees the graduate position themselves against competitors for the best

available job, utilising a variety of skills and accumulative life experiences (such as

the “gap year”) to set them against the competition (ibid.). This new graduate, the

research infers, is not necessarily after the “dream” job or career, but the “best” job

available. However, Keep & Mayhew present the hypothetical case of the Art history

graduate who, after graduation, finds employment as a retail store manager. Does the

graduate bring more skills to the job than the German counterpart, who has had a level

3 equivalent retail apprenticeship lasting two years and spent primarily on the shop

floor honing his/her skills?(Keep & Mayhew, 2004: 301). The skills gap or

16

perception of a skills gap will be examined presently. However, first the issue of

skills under-utilization should be examined.

In the areas outside of the knowledge based skills sector, there is evidence to suggest

that graduates in the labour market have found that their skills have not been put to

use in the workplace. The associate level professional occupations will make up an

estimated 14% of expected employment growth up to 2010 (Keep & Mayhew,

2004:302) and are the kinds of positions most likely to be taken up by graduates.

However, empirical analysis of employers and employees in these areas revealed that

(Keep & Mayhew, 2004: 302):

There was no significant evidence to suggest that employers now require new entrants into associate

professional positions to possess graduate type of level skills. There are incidences of under-utilization

of skills

Later analysis revealed that among a representative sample of the UK labour force

only 13.4% believed that they were using a degree level qualification in their current

employment (Felstead et al, 2002). Though these findings are by no means uniform,

they are highly representative. Research has shown some sections of the graduate

employment market find that their skills have found use in the workplace and express

a satisfaction that they are being if not fully utilized, then at least of considerable use

in the workplace (Elias & Purcell, 1999) and that over time they do feel that their

skills are being put to the use of the employer. However, these were largely to be

found in the employment sectors which would be categorised as being “knowledge

based” (ibid.)

The subject of skills utilisation leads quite logically to the description of what

constitutes a graduate job in this modern workplace. Essentially, if the graduates feel

that their skills are not being fully utilised, if at all, does this render their mode of

employment a non-graduate level job? One effect of the large participation rate is the

creation of a “warehouse model” of educational qualification stockpiling whereby the

labour market has a ready made resource, albeit one over subscribed with too many

graduates having the requisite qualifications (Keep & Mayhew, 2004: 302). With so

17

many graduates available each employer can screen the best candidates for that

position. If graduates are applying and succeeding in gaining entry to a certain

position, then this becomes, in effect, a graduate job regardless of whether they will

be utilising graduate level skills once in that position. Such positions include

graduates employed in: retailing, recruitment consultancies, sales and market research.

Wolf goes further, arguing that the modern graduate is entering the workplace at 22

with a degree to do, in some cases, a job that their predecessors could have done at 16

or 18 (Wolf, 2002). Therefore, the degree comes to represent a kind of uniform

currency in the employment market regardless of the skills that will be needed to

execute the job. This discussion leads onto the question of where, if at all, a skills gap

does lie.

Labour market researchers have identified a skills gap exists in the provision of level

3 standard qualifications (Keep & Mayhew, 2004; Gleeson & Keep, 2004.). They

argue that the apprenticeship scheme in the UK is not providing the economy with the

requisite number of technicians and craft apprentices in the same manner as European

competitors (Keep & Mayhew, 2004: 305). Keep & Mayhew (2004: 306) add:

The policy issue is whether vocational needs in the labour market are most effectively met at level 3 or

level 4 and by what form of provision. In this regard, it should be noted that many official, and

academic international comparisons have indicated that the UK’s chief skills gap vis-à-vis Europe rests

at level 3. It is worth posing a question of whether we are not in danger of meeting a level 3 skills gap

with level 4 provisions. This may be an expensive solution and one that is ultimately dysfunctional not

least because many of the skills needed in craft and intermediate occupations are best created within

the workplace contexts within which they will be used

It must be noted that the UK government’s response to the lack of intermediate

technical and vocational skills in the labour market came with the introduction of

employer-led Foundation degrees (FDs) in 2001-02 (DfES, 2004). The FDs are also

acknowledged as being prominent in terms of the WP agenda (ibid.). However, no

lengthy qualitative or quantitative examination of the effect of FDs on the UK labour

market, students themselves or the providers (the HE institutions) has thus far been

made (Keep & Mayhew, 2004). The stressing of parity of esteem for such

intermediate technical qualifications and the need from employer groups (Clarke,

18

2002) that they be introduced to meet a skills gap means that their effect and success

needs to be monitored. The effect of these initiatives on the sector and on WP, along

with the changes linked to tuition fees and the funding cap in the 2004 White Paper,

have yet to be measured.

In terms of the impact of HE expansion and WP on the UK economy overall and its

ability to compete in a global economic market place, commentators are sceptical.

Within the workplace it is felt that organisations “do not appear to be re-designing

product strategies and work organisation in ways that best capture the benefits of a

more highly qualified workforce” (Keep & Mayhew, 2004: 304). On a macro-level

the idea that there is a positive correlation between a particular cohort’s participation

in HE and national economic performance is viewed as “doubtful” (ibid: 299). Some

nations such as New Zealand and Egypt which have large participation rates are not

economically successful in terms of the OECD (Organisation for Economic

Cooperation and Development) league tables, while a nation such as Switzerland with

considerably lower HE participation rates than England is highly successful

economically (ibid.). The case of Switzerland presents a further anomaly. In

eschewing an expansion of HE on the scale of other OECD countries, Switzerland

nevertheless manages to be the wealthiest non-oil producing state but has a very high

standard of vocational education provision and post school apprenticeship schemes

(Wolf, 2004: 322). This appears to confirm the link identified by macroeconomists

that some levels of education and training can become synonymous with growth,

though not all. As Keep and Mayhew (2004: 299) argue: “applied macroeconomists

find a statistically significant relationship between growth and the level of education

and training provision but they experience more difficulty in finding such a

relationship between growth and changes in provision”. Therefore, the current UK

governmental edict of HE expansion to meet national economic imperatives appears

to be misguided in this case.

It would appear that expanding provision to meet existing, identifiable skills gaps

would be the best way of meeting national economic imperatives. What then, of the

effect on national economic growth and productivity as a result of the HE expansion

in Britain? Despite continued HE expansion since the 1960s, the economic growth

rate has remained around 2.5% for half a century, while the great increase in the

19

output of graduates since 1989 has “not been accompanied by any concomitant uplift

in productivity growth” (Keep & Mayhew, 2004: 299). Consequently, though recent

funding reforms may improve the financial sustainability of Britain’s universities,

thus fulfilling the “world class” aspirations of the government; there appears little

certainty that such reforms would make much impression on national economic

growth.

As an examination of the British data suggests, there is a danger in overstating the

needs of HE expansion. In terms of Britain’s international competitors, the US is the

most successful economy in the western world and also a model for Britain’s

“massified” HE system (Keep & Mayhew, 2004: 303). However, official US labour

market projections indicate that by 2010 little more than a fifth of jobs in the US will

require a first or higher degree (Keep & Mayhew, 2004.). This shows that there is “a

danger of over-estimating the need for degrees, even within successful, supposedly

knowledge intensive economies” (ibid: 303). Having analysed the problems

associated with student finance and the difficulties in both attracting and retaining the

target groups in WP, as well as examining the consequences of the target WP rate, it

is necessary to examine the demands of the providers of the WP expansion, the

universities themselves. It is first necessary to outline the model of Britain’s

university system with reference to some of its leading international competitors;

chiefly US. The HE system will be placed within the framework of the UK

government’s taxation and public spending model which will, again, be placed within

an international context.

The British “model” of HE: an international comparison

The “model” of Britain’s HE system can be said to have evolved from an “elite” to a

mass to a near universal system since the 1960s. Fifty years ago one in twenty young

people attended university, now the figure stands at almost one in two (Astle, 2006: 6).

Moreover, since the expansion under the Labour governments in the 1960s spending

per student has not kept up with inflation. Indeed, between 1976 and 1997 spending

per student halved (ibid.). This comes as a consequence of continued reliance by the

HE sector on state funding, where education has to compete with other calls on public

expenditure. As will be established, US institutions have more autonomy in which to

operate within the private sector and their endowments and funding per student,

20

certainly at the private, “elite” level, far outstrip those of their UK counterparts.

Though UK universities are allowed to attract private sector funding, they do so at a

level significantly below those countries that have similarly expanded their HE

provision. Indeed, Britain’s total private expenditure on HE amounts to 27%, with the

US attracting 54% of private funding and Australia 50% (Astle, 2006:20). Both

Britain and Australia can be described as being “low tax” in terms of revenue

collection and social policy expenditure with their aims being directed toward

“selective services”. The US on the other hand, can be described as being “low tax”

but with provision directed “universally” (Glennerster, 2001: 386). The outline of

these nations’ social policy taxation models serves as a comparison with the Swedish

model where government taxation and public expenditure is much higher making it a

“high tax” and “universal services” model (ibid.). In short, in contrast to the British,

US and Australian taxation models, Swedish revenue collection is “high” and is

“universally” distributed across social policy needs. How does this then translate to

state expenditure on education and to HE policy? Whereas the British educational

sector is similarly reliant on the state it does so at much reduced levels of expenditure.

Returning to HE funding, however, the conclusions to be drawn from these models of

social policy expenditure and from the comparative glut of private sector funding

which Britain’s HE competitors (US and Australia) enjoy, are that a low taxation state

must either: remain “low” but distribute selectively, i.e. increase spending on

education at the expense of other social policy needs; or, increase taxation to “high”

levels i.e. like Sweden, and distribute evenly across social policy requirements; or,

allow for more private investment given Britain’s comparative aversion to high

taxation (Glennerster, 2001). As Astle argues: “For countries that do not tax and

spend on anything like this (Swedish) scale, the lesson is clear: universities need to be

able to raise more money privately if they are to remain competitive in the medium

and long term” (Astle, 2006: 9). As established, it is proposed that recent student

finance reforms will help improve university funding and help offset a lack of recent

expenditure. However, with the first intake due in autumn 2006 a quantitative and

qualitative examination of the effects on the sector and on WP is yet to be made.

Britain has then, a “massified” system of HE provision. However, this system has not

seen widespread diversification among the institutions themselves. Though an

examination will be made of how both “new” and “old” universities operate within

21

Britain’s “massified” market orientated system, there has been mostly little

diversification, with the bulk operating on a traditional academic model of delivery.

Though Hobson is not quite correct in asserting that each British HE institution is now

an “Oxbridge look-a- like” (1999: 226) – the ancient universities’ collegiate system of

governance is unlike the vast majority of Britain’s other institutions - there are certain

academic similarities where provision does not differ from that template; namely, the

provision of undergraduate and postgraduate teaching provision and supervision in the

arts, sciences and humanities and the concentration on research (ibid.). However, the

granting of university status has not meant that the “new” institutions have been able

to compete with the “old” universities for the most able students. Applicants with

higher “A” level grades have still sought admittance to the old universities (Ball, 2003;

Reay; 2003).

The apparent contradiction between a “mass” system of provision and an “elite”

method of delivery was highlighted by then minister for HE Margaret Hodge in 2001

when she argued “We have to recognise that not every university is the same as

another. In the past it may have been a mistake to try and build a uniform higher

education sector. It just is not like that.” (Sampson, 2005: 206).

If, as Keep and Mayhew (2004) assert, Britain’s “massified” system of HE provision

is lifted largely from the US model, then what form does that model take? The

American HE model is outlined below as it has journeyed from elite to mass to near

universal provision where institutions have adopted different strategies in order to

compete. Astle (2006: 27):

In the United States the journey from an elite, to a mass, to a near universal system brought with it a

process of stratification. Nobody in the US today would pretend that all American universities are

equally good or equally deserving of the same funding. There are world class universities, which

attract the most able students, offer the most costly education, and award the most valuable degrees.

But there are many other universities which provide a less costly education, closer to home, over a

shorter time span, and at much reduced cost. This is not a bad thing. It is the natural consequence of

putting two thirds of all Americans through university. The alternative being, of course, that all those

academically less able students in less prestigious universities do not go to college at all. With

“massification” comes stratification. And with stratification, comes diversification, as different

22

universities develop different specialisms, pursue different missions and target different students with

different aptitudes and different ambitions.

Having established the US model an examination of the HE model Britain adopts in

comparison to its competitor states is required. Therefore, it is worthwhile to look at

the kind of system in which it operates vis-à-vis the western world. To take a broadly

definitional approach, Britain adopts a system which can be stylised as an “Anglo-

American” model; which can be contrasted with the “Scandinavian” model of HE

provision, as outlined by Barr (2004: 265):

In the “Anglo- American model”, policy sees higher education as heterogeneous, regards this as proper,

and encourages diversity, varied forms of provision, and quality comparisons between them.

In the “Scandinavian model”, policy is based on the assumption that institutions are homogenous, and

therefore treats them equally and regards all programmes as equal

As a broad definition this works well; however, the definition misses two crucial areas

in which the “Anglo” and the “American” differ. These are in the areas of variable

fees and in terms of institutional funding where the American “ivy league”

universities are allowed to exist largely outside state funding constraints and operate

as private institutions with large endowments from corporate America and from their

alumni. The American elite universities are allowed to operate with negligible state

capping of fees and are more able to retain their world class status through this by

attracting and retaining world class staff. Princeton University has endowments of $1

million per undergraduate with Harvard almost double that amount, with the ability to

set the maximum annual tuition fee at $33,000 (Crace, 2006: 11). A large public

university with an international reputation like Berkeley, California, charges $7,500

with the remainder made up of state money and from private donations (ibid.).

With the remit of British universities to compete in terms of research and

development at an international level, the problem is highlighted still further when the

size of Harvard’s endowment is realised: “Harvard’s total endowment in 2001 was

$18.3 billion (£13 million) more than double the amount of all British universities”

(Sampson, 2005: 209). The ability to provide teaching and research facilities, attract

23

and retain the best staff and even grant bursaries and financial aid puts the US “ivy

league” institutions in an advantageous position in the international HE market. In

Western Europe, traditionally an area where HE is funded largely through public

expenditure, the leading industrial nations such as Germany, France and Spain have

seen the status of their universities diminish in the face of international competition

from the US, Australia and even China (Astle, 2006: 10). Even so, though the US

universities appear to dominate in terms of endowments and international prestige,

there is still no quantitative link between their financial success and national

economic growth (Keep & Mayhew, 2004; Wolf, 2002; 2004.). Much has been

written about the UK’s competitor states who favour greater private investment in the

international HE market. What then, of their record in terms of WP? Taking into

consideration the records of US, Australia and Britain in attracting students from the

lower income quartile, the participation rates are; 50% for US, 30% for Australia and

just 17% for Britain (Astle, 2004: 22). However, in the case of the US, it is worth

observing that student debt is disproportionately high, with a high cap on fees and

student loans which are not income contingent. Moreover, college costs have risen by

50% since 1990 while public funds in the form of grants have not kept pace

(Carnevale & Rose, 2003; Bowen et al, 2006). However, two thirds of graduates

complete their studies with manageable debt levels (Carnevale & Rose, 2003) and the

potential costs do not appear to act as a deterrent to those from the less affluent groups.

However, the combination of loans which carry a market rate of interest with the extra

pressure of non-income contingent repayments means that some three quarters of US

graduates rate their chances of full debt repayment as between very and somewhat

difficult (ibid.). These figures appear to chime with Barr’s criticism of the US student

loan system in that the lack of income contingent loan repayment schemes can act as

an impediment to debt repayment (Barr, 2004).

Astle misses a significant point when eulogising the high US participation rate among

the lower income quartile. For all the stratification and diversification of the

institutions that account for the high take up from the poorer groups, the numbers

attending private or “ivy league” and the leading publicly funded institutions is low.

In 2003 students from the poorest quarter of the population made up just 3% of the

student body at the nation’s leading 146 HE institutions (Carnevale & Rose, 2003: 6).

Moreover, 74% of those from the richest quarter inhabit the same institutions (ibid.).

24

A significant indicator of the poorest students in any institutions is to assess the

number of Pell Grant recipients. This is the federal grant given to those students from

the lowest income families, with family income below $35,000 (College Board, 2004).

The maximum grant is $4,050 and increasingly, recipients of the grant are found in

two year community colleges and other institutions outside of the nation’s leading

private and public institutions. Therefore, the diversification and stratification

advocated by proponents of the US “massified” system does not appear to create an

equitable representation of US society, certainly not at the “elite” level where students

from a wealthy background in the upper income quartile are 25 times as likely to

attend one of the leading 146 institutions than a student from the bottom quartile

(Carnevale & Rose, 2003:6). Moreover, analysis of the leading 20 US universities

reveals that only two institutions had more than 15% of their student body in receipt

of Pell Grants (College Board, 2004). With Britain’s first cohort under the new fee

regime about to begin an academic term, it has been warned that the introduction of

variable fees will “reassert elitism in higher education. Privileged students who

populate top universities will pay high fees, but get highly valued degrees. Low

income and access students who populate universities at the bottom of the hierarchy

will pay less and get less, but will still end up with large debts” (Callender &

Wilkinson, 2003:1). Though Barr has warned of the necessity of a fees cap to prevent

US levels of student debt, the introduction of variable fees does threaten to introduce

greater “stratification” to Britain’s HE sector. Similarly, though fees are not up-front

and are repaid on an income contingent basis, the perception of debt is still rife: 47%

of 6th

from pupils questioned in a recent survey admitted to fees as being the leading

impediment to attending university (Lawson, 2006:27.). When middle class students

are currently twice as likely to attend a pre-1992 university as a working class student,

will the introduction of variable fees lead to further stratification as in the US?

A post-1992, “New” university: market forces, heterogeneity and diversification

Moving on from variable fees to examine the workings of a “new” university under

current funding policies, it is noteworthy that since the 1970s HE expansion in the UK

has seen funding per student almost halved while student admissions have doubled

(Astle, 2006: 3). The increase in tuition fees to £3,000 beginning in academic year

2006/07 has been welcomed by Barr (2004) and Wolf (2004), although it is also felt

25

that the amount is still too low. Astle (2006) argues that the fees cap ought to have

been raised to a figure of £5,000, allowing the “world class” research intensive

universities to flourish, attract the best staff and students and still offer access to the

less well off through better bursary and grant schemes. However, greater fee

variability does bring the dangers of greater stratification and the possibility of

lessening social equity. Not all British universities are research intensive however,

and, therefore, a practical look at the workings of a post 1992 “New” university under

such funding constraints would be pertinent here.

What would a market-driven post-1992 HE institution resemble? UK universities

receive additional public funding, outside of their teaching budget, based on their

performance in the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). Since the best performing

universities in the RAE will normally be the research intensive institutions, with the

most “research active” academic staff, the remaining universities will be reliant on a

teaching budget allied to any private sector funding that they have managed to secure.

A low RAE and teaching assessment score can lead to a quantitative effect on student

applications and consequently on the department’s long-term future. Therefore, the

functioning of post 1992 universities is pertinent since they are most susceptible to the

ill effects of market forces and less likely to attain the same level of funding as the

research intensive and other “old” universities.

Luton University is a “New” post-1992 university and its response to such a scenario

was to shut down their history department and concentrate on “useful, practical

subjects” (Vasagar & Smithers, 2006: 2). Luton is presented in a Guardian article as

a successful, operational “new” institution which has surmounted financial difficulties

and funding constraints to achieve a budget surplus; hence its inclusion here (ibid.).

Luton’s history department had not met with large numbers of applicants and the

option, faced with competition from more prestigious universities and those with

higher RAE scores, was to shut down and, in the then education secretary Charles

Clarke’s words, “diversify” (DfES,2004). However, this was met with enthusiasm by

Luton’s Pro-Vice Chancellor who argued that the then 40% participation rate in HE

amongst school-leavers meant that a “broader range” of options must be available to

them (Vasagar & Smithers, 2006:2). Clearly, in a market orientated system Luton

26

was effectively playing to its strengths and having achieved a budget surplus – “over

50 universities came in with a deficit” -concentrated on areas such as design, media,

business and health and actively summed up their current position in the language of

the market as “we now have a much better match between supply and demand for our

courses and it has paid off” (ibid.). These are definite indications of the kind of

“heterogeneity” (Barr, 2004) and “diversification” (Astle, 2006.) which are

synonymous with the American HE sector.

Academic pay & assessment and accountability

The issue of institutional funding is compounded by low academic pay. Between 1982

and 2001 earnings of academic staff increased by 7%, allowing for inflation,

compared to the average earnings of all full-time employees which went up by 44%

(Sampson, 2005: 207). Accordingly, some of Britain’s leading and most sought after

academics have left to take up academic posts overseas, some in the US “ivy league”

institutions. Strike action in 2006 over the pay issue highlighted the disparities

between pay for academic staff and that of comparable public sector professionals:

While a university professor’s salary began at £44, 818, a Police Chief Superintendent

could expect between £65,244 and £68,961; a Head teacher in a large secondary

school could expect £67,827 and a hospital consultant between £69,298 and £93,768

(Stothart, 2006b:6-7). The subsequent pay offer did not totally assuage UK

academics’ fears that their sector was chronically under funded and that their pay in

no way reflected parity of esteem with comparable public sector professionals

Finally, the current HE sector exists within a public sector culture of assessment and

accountability quite at odds with the experience of its predecessors. What Onora

O’Neill calls the “audit explosion” did not begin with the election of a Labour

government in 1997 (Sampson, 2005: p.209). Rather, it is the result of the gradual

encroachment of government management systems on HE beginning with the

Conservative governments of the 1980s and their drive for accountability within the

public sector.

The framework of admissions targets and student and institutional funding reforms in

the Higher Education (HE) sector, the drive toward permanent assessment in the case

27

of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) in HE and OfSTED inspections in

schools mean that accountability and assessment are now part of the culture of

“schooling-as-performance” (Fielding 2001, p.697). Therefore, just as schools require

their OfSTED inspections; universities require their “research active” academics to

publish the requisite number of publications between assessments to satisfy the

criteria of the RAE. Additionally, all universities have to prove that their teaching

competence satisfies assessment criteria. Departments and institutions then function

as a result of funding commensurate with their RAE performance, with increasing

incentives to seek additional funding though private sector partnerships. This drive

towards accountability and the need to conform to inspection criteria and performance

fulfilment is best articulated by Fred Inglis in his elucidation of the “principle of

bureaucratic rationality” (Inglis, 2000: p.422):

Duties are subordinate to rights, and the determination of rights-fulfilment is only secured by

tabulation. A right is satisfied when evidence is produced not such that duty has been done, but that the

documentation on hand codifies its doing

Onora O’Neill (Sampson, 2005: 209) argued that the pressure to publish and thus, to

fulfil the RAE criteria was such that “In the end the new culture of accountability

provides incentives for arbitrary and unprofessional choices. Lecturers may publish

prematurely because their department’s research rating and its funding requires it”

Conclusions

To conclude, it can be asserted that the WP project of the New Labour government

exists within a framework which is often contradictory. It is demonstrable that the

widening participation agenda has taken place within a culture of global economic

challenge and change with the edict for universities to widen entrance to

underrepresented groups and operate within a market orientated system. This is

harnessed to the demands for a fuller, more equitable participation among the UK

citizenry giving greater and more realistic representation of a culturally mixed society,

beneficial to the citizenry and also meeting the economic imperatives of the UK

economy. Though an uptake in places has come from the WP target groups, the

largest increase since the introduction of a mass system in 1992 has been largely from

28

the professional classes. The WP agenda sees as an objective parity of esteem

between academic and vocational subject choices with an emphasis on the technical

and the vocational to meet the demands of the skills economy. Though the vocational

and the technical demands are met largely through the introduction of Foundation

Degrees in 2001/02, no qualitative or quantitative research has yet established their

effectiveness in terms of WP or their effect on the UK labour market. This and the

student funding reforms introduced in academic year 2006/07, with variable tuition

fees and increased loan provision and bursary/grant availability, will need to be

subject to scrutiny in order to assess whether WP is working.

With the possibility of additional funding through increased taxation effectively

ruled out since the de facto post-Keynesian settlement, universities have had to seek

additional funds through private sector funding; often in the endowment of chaired

professorships or whole new departments. Centralised control of tuition fees, set at

comparatively low rates have not enabled the “world class” institutions to attract

funding in the way of the US private institutions. Additionally, those “New”

universities or those not belonging to an “elite” research grouping have had to

compete in the same market, charging the same fees. Losing out to the research

intensive and older universities for higher achieving students, these universities have

responded to market forces by trimming staff and occasionally, closing whole

departments; essentially, playing to their strengths and opting for market efficiency.

With the introduction of variable fees each institution may opt to serve its target

groups of students and operate within a system more closely aligned to an American

model. The HE sector has also attempted to deliver WP and expansion during a

period when academic pay has fallen markedly below that of comparable public

sector professionals and at time when audit and accountability has impinged on

teaching and research time. The responsibility placed on academics by the RAE has

also meant that, in the research intensive universities a least, student/staff time has

been greatly affected; in some instances, undergraduates having little no time with

their nominal lecturers due to research commitments.

29

Chapter Two

Having examined the issue of student finance as a disincentive in chapter one, the

scope broadens to reveal other concerns of the WP target groups; here, the

conclusions of pertinent empirical research will help to establish the reasons why HE

has not opened up university entrance to the WP target groups in quite the way hoped.

This will demonstrate that the reasons are not purely economic but are also socio-

cultural. Economic factors and debt aversion have been discussed, but there is a

perception that university practices and cultures are best suited to those traditionally

predisposed to university entry and perception of “snobbery” and “alienation” act as a

deterrent to those from the lower socio-economic groups (Marks et al, 2003; Tett,

2004).

30

With this in mind, it is perhaps pertinent to examine other factors which may have

contributed to the relatively low participation rate among the target groups. Before

examining these other factors which may have militated against their participation in

HE, I shall examine some of the initiatives used to attract these groups.

Widening Participation: an assessment of selected schemes

A brief examination of the kinds of initiatives undertaken to attract some of the target

groups in the WP agenda highlights, in part, the benefits of early planning and the

need to address Barr’s “poverty of information” issue (2004: 279). The issue of

information poverty is not an exclusive factor in working class aversion to HE. The

socio-cultural factors, along with debt aversion which militate against greater working

class participation need to be examined in full context in this chapter. It is not

possible within the scope of this study to examine all WP projects in detail. Therefore,

three specific projects will be assessed. The first is the National Academy for Gifted

and Talented Youth (NAGTY) which aims to attract the most academically and

athletically able youth regardless of socio-economic and ethnic background. Though

not solely concerned with attracting the WP target groups, they do gain representation

as a directive of the academy is that it should be “equitable” (Eyre, 2006). Therefore,

NAGTY is assessed here since the WP groups are not specifically targeted but gain

representation as part of a wider directive; that of seeking the most able students

regardless of ethnic or socio-economic status. AimHigher is chosen since it is the one

nationally delivered programme synonymous with WP and whose directives are to

raise the aspirations of the target groups in order that they apply to HE. The third

programme to be assessed in terms of WP is the Sheffield University access to

medicine scheme.

31

This is a scheme which has been delivered locally rather than nationally and on a

smaller scale. This is of particular interest since it concerns access to a discipline

which has elitist connotations and whose aim is the creation of a more equitable

societal representation in a research intensive university’s medical school.

In 2002 the UK government set up its National Academy for Gifted and Talented

Youth based at Warwick University and which now works with more than fifty

universities and colleges consisting of 85,000 members in the 11-19 age groups

(Sanders, 2006a: 8). There are currently 393 young people in the first sizeable cohort

to reach university age. The director of the National Academy has been given a remit

to compile a register of the top 5% of the most able children in England, with the aim

being to track what is hoped is the most able 20,000 secondary school pupils through

school and into university ( Sanders, 2006b: 21). This initiative is not without

precedent in recent education policy history. Indeed, it can be seen as a successor of

the National Association for Able Children in Education which itself expanded on the

work of the Gifted Child Project; the former seen as a means of helping teachers

identify and nurture the most able students and the latter initiated as a response to the

frustrations of parents of gifted children (Sanders, 2006b: 21). The director, Deborah

Eyre argues that the academy must be “equitable” and that “Children from all socio-

economic groups must benefit from the academy” (Eyre, 2006.).

Although schools have been encouraged to identify their top 10% in terms of talent,

the academy has been met with ambivalence from many schools that seem unwilling

to register their most able pupils. The academy has also received charges of elitism in

that it is seen as stigmatising pupils at an early age. (Sanders, 2006b: 21). However,

Eyre contends that egalitarian principles are at its heart as the state school system has

neglected the most able children since the 1970s (Eyre, 2006). In terms of its

definitions of “gifted” and “talented” the project implies the unsuitability of

32

vocational and craft subjects. The emphasis is on the academic and on the sports and

arts (Sanders, 2006b: 21):

The government has adopted simple definitions of “gifted” and “talented”. Gifted describes those

pupils who show the most promise and ability in academic subjects and talented are those who

demonstrate the greatest potential in the arts.

Initial data for the first academic cohort to attend university in autumn 2006 show that

61% of the cohort are set to attend the Russell Group universities (Sanders, 2006a: 8)

with “Academy students from the UK’s most deprived areas (who) are just as likely to

go to Russell Group universities as their more affluent peers” (ibid). For this cohort

there appeared to be a correlation between universities that had worked with the

academy through the Higher Education Gateway and student applications; appearing

to partly prove correct Barr’s assertion that information is key in addressing access

inequities (Sanders, 2006a: 8; Barr, 2004: 278-281). The Higher Education Gateway

programme “offers advice and learning opportunities to pupils with little experience

of higher education” (Sanders, 2006a: 8). Though the scheme has its critics, notably

Alan Smithers who called the NAGTY method of pupil selection “deeply flawed”

(Sanders, 2006a: 8) in a newspaper column, it does recognise the need to address HE

progression at an early stage of the secondary system.

Another initiative introduced to widen access and increase HE aspirations is the Aim

Higher initiative. Though not concerned with identifying a finite number of talented

individuals in any given area, it seeks to widen opportunity to those who traditionally

would not have the aspiration to attend university but also to “simplify and encourage

progression” to universities from local partner colleges of FE and secondary schools

in neighbouring areas (AimHigher, 2005:2). AimHigher is a scheme in national

operation with specific objectives (Pennell, Hind & West, 2006: 3):

To develop partnerships between schools, colleges and higher education institutions in order to raise

aspirations and attainment and so encourage greater progression to higher education (Strand 1)

To increase funding to higher education institutions to reach out to more young people (Strand 2)

33

To provide clearer information and better marketing of the route to higher education for young people

(Strand 3); and

To pilot new forms of extra financial help through 26,000 opportunity bursaries to young people worth

£2,000 per full-time student over three years (Strand 4)

The initiatives involve both post-1992 universities and the Russell Group research

intensive institutions. Additionally, and through partnerships with Connexions, the

careers advisory service, and the Open University, there is also a remit to “target adult

learners up to the age of 30 who come from backgrounds where an experience of HE

has been traditionally lacking” (AimHigher, 2005:2). However, despite these

initiatives there still appears to be reluctance to take up HE places from members of

the target groups. There is still widespread “concern about incurring debt” and

despite the information drives “policy related awareness-raising and aspiration-raising

awareness activities were insufficient to overcome barriers to aspiring to a university

education” (Morris & Rutt, 2005: i)

An example of a specialist scheme to widen access to underrepresented groups exists

at the University of Sheffield where the medical school has introduced its own access

scheme. The “outreach and access to medicine scheme” cohort have been chosen and

will be guided through secondary school with the intention of entering university to

study medicine (Lyall, 2006: 3). They will be invited to spend time with medical

students during term time, take part in summer residential schools, visit hospital

departments and become used to university medical school applications procedures.

Ultimately, the pupils are guaranteed interview for one of 20 “ring fenced” places at

Sheffield’s own medical school (Lyall, 2006:3). The scheme comes as a response to

analysis of medical school intakes during the periods 1996-2000 which revealed that

pupils from social class i (professional) were 34 times more likely to attend medical

school than those in social class v; and that no black people from social class v were

admitted to any of Britain’s medical schools in the same period (Lyall, 2006: 3). The

scheme seeks to address participation inequities not only in socio-economic make up

but also in terms of ethnic representation. It is also seen as response to the societal

make up of Sheffield and Britain’s inner cities.

34

Though the Sheffield medicine scheme has had some success in raising awareness and

aspirations among underrepresented groups, the emphasis appears to be on improving

the route of progression to HE rather than focusing on the specific institutional

cultures which may alienate students from the target groups. This is by no means

peculiar to the Sheffield medicine scheme and is a common feature of all schemes

which have been discussed.

Each attempts to answer the problem of equity by addressing the issue of poverty of

information. Therefore, the emphasis is placed upon promoting greater awareness of

HE opportunities and providing a more negotiable pathway to an academic institution

whose practices remain fundamentally unchanged. As McGavock & Osborne (2005:

17) argued when discussing medical access schemes specifically, “it is likely to be

important that additional resources and pastoral support mechanisms are available to

“non-traditional” medical undergraduates. Non-traditional students may experience

feelings of isolation, culture shock, prejudice and alienation from their own

communities”. Such feelings are common to undergraduates from the WP target

groups in many disciplinary contexts not simply medicine. The act of raising

aspirations and ensuring progression to university does not deal with the perception of

exclusivity of HE practices and the external environment of the student which may

have “impeded their entry to university” (ibid.). Access schemes based solely on

providing pathways for the underrepresented will not alleviate the feelings of social

alienation once in HE nor will they deal with the problem of continually poor school

examination performance so prevalent among some of the target groups, particularly

Black Caribbean males and white working class students (Astle, 2006). An overview

of the British education system suggests that the problem of achieving equity within

the universities; essentially at the apex of the sector, demands societal intervention

and a systematic focus at the pre-entry levels to alleviate the problems of the WP

target groups. As Bowen et al contend when addressing the issue of equity within the

US sector (Bowen et al, 2005: 243):

Preserving the status quo (within universities) without tackling the accumulated disadvantages that

children carry with them throughout their lives would ultimately erode a half century of progress in

enhancing the capacity of our colleges and universities to serve the country’s core values

35

In the previous chapter, both Barr (2004) and Astle (2006) ignored the perception of

elitist HE institutional cultures as a disincentive to non-traditional groups. Both

concentrated on the argument of increasing awareness and university led access

schemes as a means of delivering WP. Conversely, Tett (2004) focuses on the

perception of institutional cultures as elitist and favourable to traditional, campus

based students. However, another American perspective on the British HE system

delivered a verdict which seemed to be damning not of the HE sector, but of the pre-

university system which delivers it its students. The inference being that the under

performance of non-traditional students and their reluctance to apply to HE cannot be

blamed solely on the universities, but on the education system and the British class

system more widely. UK universities, it is argued, cannot and should not be seen as

societal and educational “finishing schools”. Seen in this context, it must be

questioned whether WP initiatives need to begin much earlier than the secondary level

or, given the perception of an entrenched class system and economic inequality,

whether they can actually work at all (Bowen et al 2005: 223):

UK universities cannot be regarded as primarily responsible for the class divide that permeates British

society, or for the pre-collegiate underperformance that contributes to the under representation of

students from lower socioeconomic groups. Universities have a role to play in addressing these issues,

but the class divide in education, and in society at large, will narrow only when families, communities,

schools, and government use their social and financial capital to nurture, inspire and prepare young

people to compete equitably in the marketplace

Further, recent work on the make up of British medical schools highlighted anomalies

in ethnic minority participation. Using a standardised admission ratio to chart class

and ethnic minority participation, researchers discovered that Asian students from

social class i were between six and ten times more likely to attend medical school

than those Asians from social classes iv and v (Seyan, Greenhalgh & Dorling, 2004:

1545). Demonstrable here is the redundancy of rigid definitional approaches which

differentiate students between class, gender, age and ethnic background since any one

student may belong to more than one grouping. However, the conclusion of the

research showed that “ethnic minorities and women are no longer under-represented

in medical schools but lower socio-economic groups are” (ibid.). The authors’

standardised admission ratio is explained as:

36

Statistics on entry profile of UK medical schools are usually expressed as the selection ratio (the

proportion of admissions to applications). We propose that the standardised admission ratio which

expresses the number of pupils admitted to medical school as a proportion of the number who would do

so if places were allocated equitably across all socio-economic and ethnic groups and equally by sex,

should become the standard measure of widening participation. It would not, of course, be an index of

discrimination at selection stage.

The standardised admission ratio revealed “massive inequalities in medical school

admission by social class” (Seyan at al, 2004). However, it is plain that Asian pupils

were more likely to compensate for the low socio-economic background than whites

(ibid.). If ethnicity and social class are combined then it is clear that the most over-

represented groups are Asians from social class i and the least represented group are

Black people from social class iv, there being no black students from social class v

admitted to medical school in the UK during the period1996-2000 (ibid.). Again,

combining ethnicity and class, white and black students were one hundred times more

likely to gain a place in medical school if they were from social class i (ibid.).

Overall, white students were underrepresented using the standardised admission ratio.

A more thorough examination of ethnicity would have been preferable since the

authors’ rely on the blanket term “Asian” and “black”. Since it has been shown, and

will be demonstrated later in this chapter, that there are many differently performing

groups within each ethnic bracket, a more detailed examination would have been

welcome. However, the standardised admission ratio could conceivably gain usage

across all subject areas and across all ethnic and socio-economic groupings, which

would be helpful in gauging the efficiency of WP programmes.

Empirical analyses: the WP target groups and their attitudes toward HE

Having examined selected WP initiatives, it is necessary to examine some of the

empirical literature concerning the access to HE and subsequent experiences of the

target groups. It would be incorrect to state that the sole factor in the non-

participation of the WP target groups in British HE is solely one of economics. As

has been demonstrated earlier, there is certainly a case to be made for debt aversion

among those from the lower socio-economic groups which may certainly have

contributed to the lower than expected increase in their participation. Barr’s critique

of the student finance package introduced in 1998 highlighted flaws which led to

37

continued debt aversion: upfront tuition fees, insufficient loans and a relative “poverty

of information” (Barr, 2004). With the 2004 reforms to be introduced in 2006/07, it is

too early to speculate on the kind of success such changes may bring to access and to

WP. However, partly through increased tuition fees (around one third) an extra £300

million will increase university funds to be redistributed in the forms of loans and

grant subsidies targeted at poorer students (Astle, 2006: 3).

Until then, there is insufficient evidence to suggest aspirations of the lower socio-

economic groups have increased. Economic factors and debt aversion have been

discussed, but there is a perception that universities, with “exclusive practices and

cultures, which many working class people find snobbish and alien” are simply not

the preserve of the working classes and other target groups (Leathwood, 2005:9).

Certainly, addressing the issue of “poverty of information” may indeed make students

in the WP target groups better informed, but it does not necessarily follow that they

will be any way more inclined to attend university or better suited to its practices and

cultures once there. Closer scrutiny of the empirical literature reveals an aversion -

most prominently among the white working classes - to university based on cultural

and social factors.

Lyn Tett’s study of a group of mature, working class students in a Scottish “elite”

university highlighted this perception of an alien culture. The group confessed to

feelings of isolation and inadequacy due to their regional accents, their age (being

mature), economic disparities and the feeling that the university’s practices were best

suited to more traditional, campus based students. Access to libraries, timetabling and

usual university services were apparently based around the assumption that the

student would be one of traditional entrant age and campus based or close to

university (Tett, 2004: 257-259). Additionally, structuring the demands of family life

around a rigid academic timetable was a strain on Tetts’ cohort (ibid.).

Due to their responsibilities in the family milieu and the existence outside of the

traditional campus arena, Tett’s cohort did not build up relationships with the

traditional students across what “seemed like a big cultural divide” (ibid: 259). Marks

et al (2003) adopted a different approach by monitoring a cohort who did not intend

to go or indeed had not gone to university. Oddly, their perceptions of university life

were similar to the views of students who had attended, were of working class origins

38

and had failed to enjoy or gain any positive feelings from the experience. Crucially,

though economics played a part in their decisions and the perception of debt was a

real concern, the perception of cultural and social alienation played a significant part

in their decision not to attend (ibid.). As Stephen Ball et al have argued the working

classes position themselves “outside” of HE, therefore constructing it as an “alien”

place (Ball et al in Tett, 2004: 256). These feelings of cultural “otherness” allied to

the risk of debt and uncertainty in the subsequent graduate job market may explain

more fully the reluctance of working class groups to attend university in increased

numbers. As Ball et al argue “(when entering HE) the risks and reflexivity of the

middle classes are about staying as they are and who they are. Those of the working

classes are about being different people in different places, about who they might be

and what they must give up” (Ball, 2003:23). These experiences are not uniform,

however. Studies of rural Welsh, working class communities with groups who have a

record of HE attendance and some at an “elite” level reveal an ease with the cultural

transition, indeed some scarcely noticing the change (Baker et al 2005a; 2005b).

Having established the attitudes toward HE of mature and working class students, it is

necessary to examine the attitudes and approaches toward the sector of the other

target groups. An assessment of the other ethnic minority target groups and their

propensity toward HE serves two purposes: first, it enables an examination of their

attitudes toward application – and institutional attitudes toward them - to different

types of HE institution (research intensive, red brick and “new”) and enables us to

examine further inter-ethnic variances within the ethnic minority population of the

UK and, second, it leads to a comparison between these groups and the white working

classes.

Inter-ethnic variances in HE participation: attitudinal and institutional

A series of studies from 1993 (Modood) through 1998 (Modood) to 2002 (Shiner &

Modood), utilised the full range of available UCAS (and in the case of the 1993 study

PCAS and UCCA) data for university entrance to all HE courses in the UK. Each

data set contained both applications and admissions data which revealed disparities

between the two. In 1990, both UCCA and PCAS (who would subsequently become

one admissions body, UCAS, after the abolition of the binary divide in 1992), the then

polytechnic admission system, asked applicants to specify their ethnicity (Modood,

39

1993.) This data could clearly augment the existing data which specified each

applicant’s socio-economic background. The research published in 1993 showed

disparities in ethnic representation whose patterns are followed thirteen years later; as

Modood observed, “Taking ethnic minorities as a whole, far from being an under-

representation, they enjoy a representation at twice their population size in applicants

and somewhat better in admissions” (1993: 169).

However, the diversity among the ethnic groups showed that Africans had a

representation at three times their size of the population, Indians and “other Asians”

had a representation of two and a half times their size, Chinese at double their size,

Pakistanis at less than double, and Black Caribbean were 50% over represented

(Modood, 1993). However, the Black Caribbean intake was swelled by women, with

Black Caribbean men under-represented.

This 1993 study is also based on admissions data prior to the abolition of the binary

divide. Therefore, we see ethnic minority applicants on the whole taking up places in

polytechnics and institutes of HE, institutions which would go on to attain university

status after 1992. Whereas Black Caribbean men were under represented, then so too

were Bangladeshi and to a lesser extent, Pakistani women (Modood, 1993: 170).

Moreover, whites were over-represented in the university sector – those institutions

that would be classified as “old” or “traditional” institutions after 1992 (ibid.). The

under-representation of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women and Black Caribbean men

notwithstanding, ethnic minority applicants clearly outstripped those of whites.

However, comparing admissions to applications reveals a greater acceptance rate for

whites, particularly in the “old” university sector (Modood,1993: 170-171). Similarly,

though admissions favoured whites, applications to high status and high paying

vocational degrees such as medicine and law saw greater applications from Asians

overall and from Blacks. Indeed, as a whole, ethnic minority students were seen to

choose courses which would lead to more lucrative careers than whites: Business

administration degrees for Asians and engineering and technology for Chinese and

Black applicants (Modood, 1993: 175). Noteworthy are their comparative lack of

applications for less lucrative careers with degree courses in the arts and humanities

and social sciences and in teacher training. In terms of “A” level performance,

40

Chinese and white applicants performed the best and were both most likely to find

acceptance in the “old” university sector (ibid: 177).

Modood concluded that the low acceptance rate in old universities outside of

medicine, law and the business and engineering courses was as a result of those ethnic

groups restricting themselves to a very few institutions with applications to the most

seemingly “professional” and financially lucrative courses (Modood, 1993: 178). This

targeting of high status positions can be interpreted as a cultural predilection for

advancement, both economically and socially. However, overall, though ethnic

minority groups were found to be less likely to gain acceptance than whites in the old

university sector, they showed the propensity to apply in far greater numbers than

their white counterparts.

Overall, the pattern of the 1993 study showed that the polytechnic/”new” university

sector found disproportionate representation from ethnic minority students, that

whites were disproportionately in the “old” university sector, although in terms of

some prestigious degree courses such as business, engineering, law and medicine

(Modood, 1993:180) ethnic minority students, namely Chinese and Indian, were over-

represented. Moreover, the 1993 study reveals that the white working class had the

lowest number of applications per group and were being outperformed in school

examinations by their ethnic minority counterparts, a trend which is still prevalent

today (ibid.). Astle has noted that one of the chief reasons behind working class

failure to attend university is their continued poor performance at GCSE level, where

the failure of 70% of the lowest socio-economic group to attain 5 GCSE grade A to C

passes is a serious impediment to their educational and later life chances (Astle, 2006:

24). Concluding his study and speaking vis-à-vis widening participation, Modood

argued “it would be foolish to ignore class based problems of access and to ignore the

under-representation of the less motivated, which means primarily the white working

class” (Modood, 1993: 180). As Modood’s 1993 study utilised the first available data

from the admissions services regarding ethnicity of applicants, it is essential to

examine further, more contemporary studies to establish patterns in ethnic

applications and admissions and their position vis-à-vis the white working class.

41

Further studies from Modood (1998), Leslie et al (2002) and Shiner and Modood

(2002) built on the existing data to examine ethnic minority participation in Britain’s

universities. One reason why many ethnic minority groups outstrip white students in

terms of applications is probably due to their being or having being descended from

economic migrants. Therefore, the desire to better themselves and “consciously use

higher education to alter their own class composition” (Shiner & Modood, 2002: 210)

is to a certain extent ingrained. This is such that though ethnic minorities make up 8%

of 18-24 year olds in the UK, they make up almost twice that number of university

entrants (ibid.). This is also achieved from low social class positions which only

serve to highlight the relative paucity of white working class applications. While two

thirds of white applicants are from non-manual backgrounds, only one third of

Bangladeshi and Pakistani applicants come from the same backgrounds (ibid.). This

reflects a better performance in school examination marks for those in the ethnic

minority groups and a culture of advancement and aspiration toward HE which

appears to be lacking in the white working class.

As with Modood’s 1993 study, the later data used in 2002 (Shiner & Modood) reveals

a similar pattern when the issue of institutional make up is examined. In the earlier

paper, research showed that ethnic minority groups were largely concentrated in the

polytechnic and HE college sector (Modood, 1993). Later research revealed that,

despite the abolition of the binary divide between university and other HE institutions,

ethnic minority groups were still heavily concentrated in what were formerly

polytechnics and other HE institutions (Shiner & Modood, 2002: 211). Indeed,

groups such as the Black Caribbean, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were more likely

than whites to have been accepted into a “new” university (ibid.). Again, figures

showed that application to medical schools and to study law were high among

Chinese and Indian groups, with Chinese applicants overall being more successful

throughout the application procedure than even white applicants (ibid: 214). However,

Black Africans and Pakistanis had noticeably poor success rates overall in terms of

applications to admissions. Further anomalies involve the use of the clearing system

to secure a HE place. While 12% of whites gained a place through this route, ethnic

minority groups were between 1.5 and 2.5 times more likely to do so (Shiner &

42

Modood, 2002: 215). Again, this can partly be attributed to a desire to gain a HE

place to secure a more prosperous future, whatever the route.

Of all ethnic minorities, Chinese applicants were the only to gain a higher percentage

of admissions per population group than whites. These students were also the only

ethnic minority group who were “underrepresented” in the “new” institutions (ibid:

215). Not only did Chinese applicants have the lowest rate of admission to the new

universities but they were also the lowest in terms of applications. This also reflects

their superior “A” level performance, being the only ethnic minority group

performance which compared favourably (being equal) with whites (Shiner &

Modood, 2002: 215.). The data also reveal that, as a group, whites gained 67% of

confirmed offers from “old” universities with only the Chinese, again, at 62% of their

population group being of an ethnic minority who attained over 50% of confirmed

offers (ibid.).

In terms of the most academically competitive courses there was evidence that the

Chinese applicants “systemically” applied to these (ibid.) Chinese students were

particularly attracted to courses such as Mathematical sciences and business

management, reinforcing the view of a “cultural predisposition to education as a

means of securing a prosperous future” (Leslie et al 2002:81). Medicine and dentistry

were particularly popular among Black African and Indian candidates, reflecting a

traditional familial disposition toward such vocations (Shiner & Modood, 202: 218).

Some explanation for the exceptional performance of the Chinese groups in attaining

high “A” level scores and gaining acceptance into the “old” university sector can

possibly be accounted for by their attitude toward private schooling, where in fact,

they were more likely to have attended such a school than whites (ibid.).

Demonstrable here is the success rate among Chinese applicants and the relative

success of groups such as Indians and Black Africans. However, other groups such as

Pakistani and Bangladeshi minorities who are concentrated in the “new” university

sector should be assessed as to why they did not compete with such success at the

“old” universities or as to why there is such a gender imbalance in these groups. One

explanation, offered by Modood (1993) is that the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups,

being mainly Islamic, are more likely to be family centred and remain close to or in

43

the local community. This tends to mean applications to local FE colleges to gain the

requisite entry qualifications to enter HE. This predisposition to college rather than

6th

form study is a popular route for Pakistani and Bangladeshi applicants; almost half

of whom do not have “A” level qualifications but, instead, their equivalent (Modood,

1993: 178). This can also be interpreted as a potential bias at the application stages

against the lack of the “gold standard” “A” level entry requirement (Modood, 1993;

Leslie et al, 2002). The greater likelihood of being accepted at the “new” universities

without A level qualifications, but with their equivalent, probably accounts for their

overrepresentation at such institutions. Using a multivariate analysis, both

Bangladeshi and Pakistani applicants were more likely than whites to gain an initial

offer at the “new” universities though less likely than whites and any other ethnic

groups to gain an offer from an “old” university (Shiner & Modood, 2002: 226).

The notion of bias against those without the “gold standard” “A” level qualifications

highlights several points concerning diversity and institutional diversification. As

recognised, there are the greater numbers of ethnic minority students without “A”

levels but, instead, who possess equivalent qualifications such as GNVQs (mainly

Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Black Caribbean). These students are handicapped by the

lack of institutions willing to accept them on to a degree course, certainly in the “old”

university sector. However, the favouritism toward those with “A” level

qualifications also hinders the progress on to degree courses of mature, older students,

who often do not have the requisite “A” level qualifications. Using the full range of

available UCAS data, Leslie et al concluded that irrespective of ethnicity, class or

gender, age militated against acceptance on a university degree course; more

markedly so in the “old” university sector (Leslie et al, 2002: 74; 89). Therefore, it

would appear that the “diversification” of the American model has yet to be adopted

in the UK, certainly in significant numbers, in the “old” universities and in terms of

the standard of entry qualification. The universities appear to favour the traditional

qualification route taken by 18 year olds, though around 36,000 mature students with

the Access/Foundation qualification are accepted into HE each year (ibid:74).

However, they concluded that the level of qualifications attained, and subsequent

grades, trumped all other factors (Leslie et al, 2002:86):

44

The overall conclusion of this analysis is that acceptance into HE is a qualification standard driven

system. Qualifications, not ethnic or social background, are what really matter. Social class,

educational institution and ethnicity might have a major impact on qualifications rather than being a

major additional determinant of being accepted into the HE sector

In respect of gender, all ethnic groups, including whites, demonstrated a gender

imbalance in applications in favour of women bar the Pakistani and Bangladeshi

groups. This imbalance between male and female initial participation rates: in the

case of Bangladeshi and Pakistani groups; 54% of Pakistani men, 44% women; 43%

Bangladeshi men, 33% women, can probably, again, be ascribed to Islamic norms

regarding gender (Modood, 2006: 249). There exists the perception that Islamic

women, particularly the young, have difficulty in breaking out of the conservative

ways of their parents and that Islam itself is seen as a way of breaking away from the

conservatism of their lifestyle “it is particularly used by girls to justify and negotiate

educational and career opportunities with conservative parents, often of rural

backgrounds with little knowledge of the scriptures” (Modood, 2006: 250). However,

overall, Leslie et al concluded that the effect of ethnicity was greater than gender in

attaining a HE place and that their multivariate analysis of the entire UCAS data

revealed no grounds for gender discrimination (Leslie et al, 2002: 69). The case of

Pakistani and Bangladeshi women can be seen as cultural anomalies. Notable areas of

gender imbalance in favour of females are in the cases of Black Caribbeans where

almost 50% more females took up places than males and in the “other” Asian

grouping (Leslie et al, 2002:69.). The Black Caribbean male population reveal an

aversion to HE participation quite at odds with Black Africans. Possible explanations

for this anomaly include the greater instances of lone parent families among their

group and their comparatively advanced age of application (25) combined with a

greater propensity toward GNVQ standard qualification and not the “gold standard”

“A” level qualification (Leslie et al, 2002: 74-78). The twin factors of entry

qualification and mature age militating against their HE acceptance on to a degree

course.

The white working class: low participation and class bound inhibitions

What the data also reveal according to gender applications is that white males have an

initial participation rate of 34% of their population group as opposed to 41% of

45

women. The overall rate for the white group is 38%, therefore lower overall than any

other ethnic group (Modood, 2006: 250). With the WP target of 50%, all ethnic

minority groups bar two – Bangladeshi and Black Caribbean – have very nearly

achieved this figure or even exceeded it in some cases. Whites then, are the lowest

performing group. Therefore, when two thirds of all white applications come from

the professional and non-manual classes, the applications coming from the white

working classes are almost negligible given their numerical strength among the UK

population. When a composite is taken of the bottom three social classes across all

ethnic groups, the white groups have the lowest number of applicants (Leslie et al

2002: 79). Even compared to groups who have comparatively low overall

participation rates such as the Bangladeshi and Pakistani groups, the white applicants

are outstripped by six and seven times as much in social class v (ibid.). Even the low

performing Black Caribbean group has a greater percentage of applicants from social

class v (ibid.). However, looking across the board at all ethnic groups, including

whites, it is easy to discern a pattern that shows that applications are coming

predominately from the professional and the intermediate classes (classes i and ii)

(ibid.). Where there was an “unknown social class” tag among the data, this was

disproportionately in favour of the ethnic minority groups who are possibly less class

conscious than whites. However, it should be noted that unemployment is greater

among ethnic minority groups, where the occupation is less likely to have been

recorded (Leslie et al, 2002: 74).

Analyses of empirical work elsewhere in the chapter alluded to the cultural aversion

toward HE among the white working class. This is significant because it helps

demonstrate how both white and ethnic minority groups view class. In the case of the

ethnic minority groups, they do not appear to be so rigidly defined by their class

identity and are able to surmount obstacles, seeing HE as a means to advancing

themselves both economically and socially; this, despite having higher levels of

unemployment and a lower admission to application ratio overall than whites in HE.

Maybe, as Modood (1993; 2006) infers, this may be attributable to their cultural

lineage as descendents of economic migrants, where education is a means of escaping

poverty and deprivation. Moreover, ethnic minority groups are perhaps not imbued

to the same extent as their white working class counterparts with the cultural

inheritance of “being” working class: a sense of place and order and a propensity

46

toward manual work and relatively conservative cultural predilections and career

paths (Charlesworth, 2000; Hoggart, 1956.).

Overall, ethnic minority applications to HE between 1996 and 2000 increased ten

times more than those by whites in the same period (Leslie et al: 78). However, the

litmus test of WP success would be in its ability to attract the non- traditional groups

in to HE. As Estelle Morris, then Secretary of State for Education remarked in 2001,

(in Leslie et al, 2002: 66): “part of meeting that challenge will be to reach those who

would not traditionally enter higher education”. The data show that for Pakistani and

Bangladeshi groups of either gender, Black Caribbean men and the white working

class little improvement has been made in terms of WP. Indeed, Modood’s 1993

study which used data from entry year 1990-1991 showed each of these groups to be

proportionately underrepresented (Modood, 1993.). The 2006 study using data from

entry year 2001-2002, showed that they were still the lowest participating groups in

HE (Modood, 2006). In these terms as expressed by the former Secretary of State, it

is difficult to see WP as a success. To expand on this point, it has to be questioned

whether WP initiatives can, in their current forms, tackle the problem of a more equal

societal representation in Britain’s universities. The recent data suggest that the

groups most averse to HE are those which have traditionally been less inclined to

participate. The notion of an entrenched class system, both culturally and

economically appears to explain the aversion among the white working class whilst

cultural and religious norms may hinder the progress of Islamic groups. Similarly,

comparatively poor examination performances for such groups at pre-entry level

cannot be a problem attributable to the HE sector. As American perspectives have

suggested, these are problems which need to be tackled at early pre-entry level and

through a wider societal context.

Conclusions

In conclusion, whether WP is to be qualified as a success depends on the target group.

However, overall, those in socio-economic groups i and ii irrespective of gender and

ethnicity are still more likely to attend university. It is the socio-economic groups

below the intermediate level of occupation; in groups iiin through to v that the battle

for WP is crucial. It is these groups who are traditionally less likely to attend

university and are less likely still to attend a research intensive or “elite” institution.

47

It is in these situations that ethnic differences become apparent and how much class

makes a difference upon their decision making. Those from the ethnic minority

groups; predominately Indian, Chinese, Pakistani and Bangladeshi show a greater

propensity to use HE to advance themselves economically and socially. Perhaps a

familial heritage as economic migrants makes them see educational opportunities as a

way of creating a more lucrative future. Other factors include the desire to advance

socially and through education pursue the kind of career that will disassociate and

remove them from the crime levels and gang culture associated with some members

of the white working classes; a HE course is one way of being removed from the

white working class urban culture (Modood, 2006; Charlesworth, 2000).

That some ethnic minority groups see huge disparities between applications and

admissions does not seem to deter them from applying still further. Some groups,

such as the Chinese perform equally as well as whites and see their chances of

attending a research intensive or “old” university as being just as high. This leaves the

white group. Though making up more than nine tenths of the population, whites have

the lowest percentage of any participating group in HE. This leaves them below the

government’s WP target objective of 50% and the actual figure includes two thirds of

those from the upper socio-economic groups. Therefore, in the case of the white

working classes - a target group - WP must be considered to have failed. In

comparison to those from the equivalent socio-economic groups among the ethnic

minorities, their participation rates are the lowest of all. Worse still, their applications

are low, something which cannot be said of their ethnic minority counterparts who are

not deterred from applying. Though concepts such as debt aversion and poverty of

information have been mentioned as reasons for their abstention, they are not strictly

the only causes. Other than fear of debt and a lack of knowledge of HE and its

practices there is genuine evidence to suggest that many of the white working classes

do not feel that HE is for them and that they view university as an alien place with an

alien culture where they feel viewed as “others”.

In terms of the WP initiatives assessed, it is demonstrable that each depends on

alleviating the problem of equity by focusing on awareness of HE and schemes which

ensure progression from either schools or partner institutions at the secondary or

further education (FE) level. Despite such efforts there still appears to be reluctance

48

to engage with HE among some members of the target groups. Widespread attempts

to assess change and adapt cultures within HE and schools so that target group

students are more suited to the culture and practices of HE institutions do not appear

to have been made.

Finally, when white working class students perform less well than their ethnic

minority counterparts in terms of applications and acceptance to Britain’s universities,

then an examination of the decision making processes of the same white student

groups who go on to attend the research intensive universities is necessary. To

reiterate: in terms of the white group overall, the initial participation rate in HE stands

at 38% which is lower than any other ethnic group (Modood, 2006: 250). When it is

considered that of that figure, the disproportionate number (two thirds) come from

social classes i and ii (professional) it is then clear that the white working class form a

comparatively negligible percentage of the student body in terms of their size of the

population. Even when social class and ethnicity data are combined, the white

working classes represent a lower figure than any other group; even the low

performing Black Caribbean male population. Additionally, the white working classes

are also out stripped by Bangladeshi and Pakistani groups in the lowest socio-

economic group (v) by six and seven times (Leslie et al, 2002: 79). Therefore, my

doctoral work will examine just what sets white working class students who attend the

research intensive universities apart from the majority of their fellow students in

reference to their HE choices. This lacuna in research is doubly pertinent since it

examines the choice making process of students who are among the lowest

participating groups in terms of their percentage of the population i.e. being white and

also, are also the among the lowest in terms of socio-economic categorisation.

Therefore, the white working classes who attend the research intensive universities

present an interesting anomaly.

As this paper has shown, access initiatives have not encouraged the kind of take up of

places among the target groups which was envisaged and have only really succeeded

in attracting the kinds of students who were previously well represented. Therefore,

the anomaly that is white working class representation in the research intensive

universities needs to be investigated in order that their differences are accounted for.

This examination needs to determine whether they were/are responsive to government

49

WP or access initiatives or whether other factors are at play such as a different

parental or peer group attitude or outlook. Are regional differences accountable? Is

there any difference between the urban and rural working classes?

Finally, do certain types of working class background inculcate a culture of

advancement through HE? Lockwood (1966) suggested that there existed two distinct

“types” of indigenous working class: one that was deferential and culturally

conservative, apt to follow the political example of their social “betters” and a second

type; one that was politicised and socially aware. The latter type, it can be inferred,

would be less averse to HE. This study was conducted some forty years ago prior to

the decline in British manufacturing and the concomitant decline in union

membership and identity. Therefore, whether the decline of a particularly politicised

element of the working class has resulted in a change in parental attitudes toward HE

and to social advancement remains a question that my research will attempt to

uncover. Alternatively, it may be the case that those families who would have

traditionally been members of a politicised and unionised culture are now located in

other employment areas such as the service sector and who continue to exercise life

style choices in the same way. It may, of course, be the case that other societal factors

are at play which influence the white working classes to attend the nation’s research

intensive universities. The explanation for the subversion of class norms among this

group may also be attributable to distinctly different cultural attitudes and tastes.

50

Conclusions

The Widening Participation agenda of the UK government can be said to be related to

the twin agendas of skills and of social inclusion in that they seek the pursuit of

greater equity and an expansion of life chances to the UK citizenry. There are other

factors which have influenced the introduction of the WP agenda. WP was heavily

influenced by business groups who continually lobbied British governments from the

late 1980s onwards. Beginning with the 1991 education White Paper, which also

introduced the notion of skills, the lobbying of British business groups successfully

influenced government thinking in that the future for the economy and for Britain’s

workforce lay in a “knowledge” economy. That is, one where the onus is no longer

on the employee’s physical labours as in days gone by, but one in which ideas, mental

skills and “knowledge” would dominate. This lobbying was wedded to the belief that

HE expansion could increase economic growth; a thesis which appears to be

erroneous since there exists no statistical evidence to support it. The idea of a

knowledge driven skills society then came to be inculcated in educational policy.

After 1997, under New Labour the need to “skill” the work force and the discourse

about adaptation to a post-industrial “skills” economy continued. That theme was

allied to a need for an equitable societal representation in Britain’s universities and

the further yardstick of an actual target for admissions; widening participation meant

that 50% of adults between 18-30 should be in HE by 2010.

The WP target figure which would hopefully produce the graduates to work in this

skills economy was augmented by the universities remit to produce world class

research so that they too could compete internationally. However, universities in the

UK were in a financial position resulting from two decades of public sector under

investment where they had had to compete with the other demands of social policy.

Similarly, HE had been subjected to the assessment and accountability measures

prevalent across the public sector which impinged upon teaching time. Therefore, the

WP agenda can safely be said to have begun amid a climate of contradictions: the

51

need to admit more students with worsening facilities in many cases, when funding

per student had declined over three decades since the 1970s; the need for academic

staff to deliver the graduates to the “skills” economy who had seen their pay decline

in comparison to other public sector professionals; the requirement that the leading

research intensive universities compete internationally for the best students and staff

and produce world class research was also hampered by funding mechanisms which

failed to allow the universities to charge the market rate for their tuition. This existed

in a quasi-market situation after 1998 when students were forced to pay upfront

tuition fees to the universities. However, these fees compounded the problem of

access and of failing to stimulate sufficient university funding since the upfront

charge was an impediment to the less wealthy students who were reliant on parental

contributions and were, in many cases, unable to go to university and second; the up

front fee was not sufficient to make a significant difference to the university funding

system. Therefore, neither access nor equity aims were sufficiently met nor was the

university funding problem resolved in any significant manner. These policy

contradictions existed within the framework of a low taxation state which is not

traditionally predisposed to allowing HE to augment public funds with private monies,

certainly not in amounts commensurate with its international competitors.

The abolition of the binary divide between university and polytechnics after 1992 did

not bring with it the kind of stratification and diversification that exists in the US

“massified” system. Instead, the former polytechnics and institutes of HE were

granted the university title and left to compete with older more established institutions.

The “new” universities continued the policy of asking for “A” level grades

commensurate with their former status and did not seriously compete with the older

institutions for the better qualified undergraduates. Moreover, the charging of upfront

tuition fees and an upsurge in university places due to expansion meant that students

were increasingly exercising choice when it came to institution. Accordingly, though

the binary divide had officially disappeared, a new divide replaced it; that between old

and new university. The pressure of competing with the old universities for the same

students meant that the new institutions either closed unpopular departments or

merged with other universities or colleges. Some, as the example of Luton university

in chapter one illustrates, did begin to diversify in the US manner; closing down

52

departments that proved unpopular and playing to their strengths with the expansion

of popular courses which saw them operate at a profit.

As the new university sector adjusted to the market situation, the old universities also

had difficulties. With the edict of sustainability in an international HE market, the old

institutions have also needed to operate in financially difficult circumstances. With

tuition fees of home students not really making serious impact on funding demands,

the old universities have admitted increasing amounts of international students whose

fees are sometimes eight times as much as home students. The universities have been

unable to charge fees in line with their international competitors such as US and

Australia who charge substantially more and who also are free to attract greater

private investment.

Setting the universities free from public spending constraints would leave them free

to charge the market rate for their “product” and result to specialisation across both

sections of the university sector. With a properly designed loan system set up for

student funding, with income contingent payments and a cap on fees at each

institution, then this may be the solution to the crisis in university funding and in

matters of access and equity. However, as the example of the US demonstrates, the

unfettered free market does little to solve problems of equity and access where there is

no cap on fees and loan repayments are not income-contingent. The case for less rigid

control of HE policy is made even more plausible when Britain’s recent history as a

low taxation nation is considered. Few electoral groups have shown tolerance for tax

increases or the suggestion of such in recent years. Indeed, the New Labour

government’s initial commitment in 1997 and beyond to Conservative spending plans

demonstrates a repudiation of age-old Keynesian deficit management. Consequently,

modern economic realities would seem to rule out a return to increased taxation and

further increases in spending on social policy concerns such as HE.

In terms of the WP target itself, leading labour market analysts point to the disparity

between Britain’s level 3 educated technical staff and its European competitors who

have suitably qualified technical and vocational staff receiving the apprenticeships to

meet those demands for skills. In Britain, the edict that 50% of 18-30 year olds

53

follow the academic route into university has left a skills gap in respect of trades and

craft personnel at vocational level. Subsequently, many graduates not suitably

qualified to work in the “skills” economy have been left to fill employment gaps

where their skills learned at graduate level are being put to questionable use. The

notion of a technology led, “skills” economy needs only a finite resource of the

suitably qualified to work in the technical areas of the labour market. Therefore, those

graduates outside of these parameters in terms of qualifications gained or skills

accrued will be left to fill in areas of the employment market which were hitherto not

areas for graduate employment at all.

In respect of the second chapter which evaluated selected WP initiatives and empirical

literature, and the assessment of WPs success in reaching its target groups, there is

considerable evidence to suggest that the lowest achieving target groups are the white

working class. Though commentators in the initial chapter were correct in asserting

that debt aversion is common among the white working class as a factor in non-

participation, this is not the only reason why they fail to participate in HE in the

expected numbers, and why WP initiatives have proved unsuccessful in attracting

them. There is the perception that HE is not their place; that they do not belong there

and that a university education is the preserve of people unlike them. This appears to

be true of the white working classes who have the lowest number of applications to

HE across ethnic groups sharing the same socio-economic background. Similarly,

WP initiatives attempt to attract the target groups by focusing on issues such as HE

awareness and information drives and ignore factors such as changing institutional

cultures. The perception of an entrenched class system may render the effectiveness

of WP redundant anyhow.

The ethnic minority working class, however, do not appear to view class in such an

inhibitive way and use HE as a means of removing themselves from it and into

lucrative careers. They do not seem to have been put off applying by the disparities in

application and admissions figures, which tends to militate against certain members of

the ethic minority groups such as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. As the descendents of

54

economic migrants, these ethnic minority groups appear to be using the same attitude

to attaining a better life position for themselves as their forebears. It could be the case

that the working class white population do not see academic HE this way; that this is

simply not in their culture and that a manual job, whether skilled or unskilled would

be preferable. This could be explained by the influences of peer groups or familial

traditions. Conversely, some ethnic minority groups see HE as an advancement and a

way out of working class white culture; imbued with notions of violence and

drunkenness.

This all begs the question of whether WP has had any effect on attracting “new”

students i.e. those students that would not have applied previously to HE. If certain

ethnic minority groups showed a historical and cultural tendency to participate in HE

and therefore, still attend in relatively large numbers, then has WP changed anything?

Conversely, if working class whites showed no historical or cultural tendency to

advance themselves in large numbers through HE, and they still quantifiably fail to

apply and participate in numbers commensurate with their size of the population, has

anything changed there either? Recent data has revealed that both working class

white males and females have the lowest percentage of applications of any groups to

HE. Their numbers were below the government’s WP target rate, with women among

that group fractionally higher than men. Therefore, if WP initiatives have really not

altered the class composition of Britain’s universities then the agenda would appear to

be a qualified failure.

Despite data which shows that access initiatives have only succeeded in attracting

more of the traditional university entrants, there remains the anomaly of the white

working class students who attend Britain’s research intensive universities. Though

relatively negligible in number, they represent a demographic that is traditionally the

most averse to HE in the country. An examination of their decision making processes

and the influences that helped shape them will hopefully reveal much about

indigenous working class attitudes toward HE and social and educational

advancement in the early twenty first century. It should also help identify what

“type” of working class such students belong to and whether any new societal patterns

can be discerned. In essence this is an attraction of opposites: students from the lower

socio-economic groups attending university at the “top end” or “elite” level where,

55

normally, they are situated in the post 1992 “new” institutions in disproportionate

numbers.

56

References

Astle, J. (2006) Open Universities: A funding strategy for higher education

CentreForum

Baker, S & Brown, B. J. (2005a) Images of excellence: Constructions of Institutional

Prestige and reflections in the University choice process Research Institute for

Enhancing Learning, School of Education, University of Wales, Bangor Unpublished

paper

Baker, S; Brown, B. J. & Fazey, J. (2005b) “Like a duck to water” Entering Higher

Education and the Aspirational Habitus Research Institute for Enhancing Learning,

School of Education, University of Wales, Bangor Unpublished Paper

Baker, S. (2005) “Mind over matter: why efforts to widen access are still relatively

unsuccessful” The Guardian Education, 7th

June 2005, p.19

Ball, S. J. (2003) Class Strategies and the education market: the middle classes and

social advantage London: RoutledgeFalmer

Barr, N. (2004) “Higher education funding” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 20 (2),

pp264-283

Beck, U (1992) The Risk Society London: Sage

Blunkett, D. (2000) “Influence or irrelevance: can social science improve

government?” (Speech made by David Blunkett, Secretary of State for Education and

Employment to a meeting convened by the ESRC on 2nd

February 2000) Research

Intelligence pp12-21

Bowen, W.; Kurzweil, M.; Tobin, E. (2005) Equity and excellence in American

higher education Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press

Brown, P., Hesketh, A. (2004) The social construction of graduate employability

ESRC final report

57

Building Pathways and Open University Guidance Support Network (2006) Pathways

to higher education: courses and careers in early years Sheffield, Aimhigher & OU

Callender, C.; Little, B.; Van Dyke, R. (2003) Attitudes to debt: school leavers and

further education students’ attitudes to debt and their impact on participation in

higher education

Available from:

http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/studentdebt/

Callender, C.; Wilkinson, D. (2003) 2002/03 student income and expenditure survey:

students’ income, expenditure and debt in 2002/03 and changes since 1998/99

Available from:

http://www.dfes.gov.uk/research/programmeofresearch/index.cfm?type=5&

Accessed 31st August,

Carnevale, A.P. & Rose, S.J (2003). Socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, and

selective college admissions

Available from:

http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=pb&pubid=428

Accessed 31st August, 2006

Charlesworth, S. (2000) A phenomenology of working class experience Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press

Clarke, A. (2002) “Rostrum” Guardian Education 22nd

January, p.43

Crace, J. (2006) “Living the Californian dream” Guardian Education July 11th

, p.11

DfES (2000) The Excellence Challenge: The Government’s Proposals for Widening

Participation of Young People in Higher Education London: Department of

Education & Skills

Department for Education and Skills (2003) The Future of Higher Education London:

DfES available from: http://www.dfes.gov.uk/hegateway/uploads/White%20Pape.pdf

Accessed 29th

March, 2006

Department for Education and Skills (2005) Skills: getting on in business, getting on

at work Available from: http://www.dfes.gov.uk/employers

Accessed 11th

September, 2006

Elias, P., Purcell, K. (1999) Moving on: graduate careers three years after

graduation Manchester, Careers service unit

Elliott, G. (2003) “From elitism to inclusion: why are we widening participation in

higher education?” Journal of Access Policy and Practice 1, (1) pp53-68

58

Eyre, D. (2006) Providing for gifted and talented youth

Available from:

http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/newsandevents/audio/?podcastitem=gifted.mp3

Accessed 30th

August, 2006

Felstead, A., Gallie, D.,Green, F. (2002) Work skills in Britain 1986-2001 Nottingham:

Department for education and skills

Fielding, M. (2001) “OFSTED, Inspection and the Betrayal of Democracy” Journal of

Philosophy of Education vol.35, no.4, 2001, pp695-709

Gleeson, D., Keep, E. (2004) “Voice without accountability: the changing relationship

between employers, the state and education in England” Oxford Review of Economic

Policy 30 (1), pp37-63

Glennerster, H., “Social Policy” in Seldon, A. (2001) (ed) The Blair effect: The Blair

government 1997-2001 London: Little & Brown, pp383-403

Hepworth, M., Spencer, G. (2002) A regional perspective on the knowledge economy

in Great Britain London, Department of Trade and Industry

Hobson, D. (1999) The National Wealth: Who gets what in Britain London:

HarperCollins

Hoggart, R. (1957) The uses of literacy Harmondsworth: Chatto and Windus

Inglis, F. (2000) “A Malediction upon Management” Journal of Education Policy

vol.15 no.4, pp417-429

Keep, E., Mayhew, K. (2004) “The economic and distributional implications of

current policies on higher education” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 20 (2),

pp298-314

Leathwood, C. (2005) “Participation” Guardian Education 19th

April, 2005 p.9

Leslie, D., Abbot, A., Blackaby, D. (2002) “Why are ethnic minority applicants less

likely to be accepted into higher education” Higher Education Quarterly, 56 (1) pp65-

91

Lockwood, D. (1966) “sources of variation in working class images of society”

Sociological Review vol.114, pp249-267

Lyall, J. (2006) “Success, with no strings attached” Guardian Society 11th

January,

p.3

Marks, A., Turner, E., Osborne, M. (2003) “Not for the likes of me”: the overlapping

effect of social class and gender factors in the decision made by adults not to

59

participate in higher education” Journal of Further and Higher Education 27 (4)

pp347-365

McGavock, K. & Osborne, M (2005) “Making a difference? A review of widening

access initiatives to medicine in the UK” Journal of access policy and practice vol.3,

no.1 pp1-18

Modood, T. (1993) “The number of ethnic minority students in British higher

education: some grounds for optimism” Oxford Review of Education 19 (2), pp167-

182

Modood, T. (2006) “Ethnicity, Muslims and higher education entry in Britain”

Teaching in Higher Education 11 (2), pp247-250

Morris, M. & Rutt, S. (2005) Evaluation of AimHigher: excellence challenges

aspirations to higher education, one year on

Available from:

http://www.dfes.gov.uk/research/programmeofresearch/index.cfm?

Accessed 31st August, 2006

Owen, G. “Industry” in Seldon, A. (2001) (ed) The Blair effect: The Blair government

1997-2001 London: Little & Brown, pp209-225

Pell Grant Status Report available from:

http://www.collegboard.com/prod_downloads/press/cost04/pell2004.pdf

Accessed 30th

August, 2006

Pennell, H.; Hind, A.; & West, A. (2006) Evaluation of AimHigher: excellence

challenge follow-up surveys of opportunity bursary applicants

Available from:

http://www.dfes.gov.uk/research/programmeofresearch/index.cfm?

Accessed 31st August, 2006

Reay, D. (2003) “Shifting class identities? Social class and transition to Higher

education” in Vincent, C (ed) Social justice, education and identity London:

RoutledgeFalmer

Riddell, P. “Blair as Prime Minister” in Seldon, A. (2001) (ed) The Blair effect: The

Blair Government 1997-2001 London: Little & Brown, pp21-43

Sampson, A. (2005) Who Runs this Place? The Anatomy of Britain in the 21st Century

London: John Murray

Sanders, C. (2006a) “Elitism charge is challenged” Times Higher Education

Supplement May 12th

, p.8

60

Sanders, C. (2006b) “Tracker of talent with 200,000 in her sights” Times Higher

Education Supplement May 12th

, p.21

Sennett, R. (2006) “Out with The Old” The Guardian Money, pp1-3, February 11th

available from: http://www.money.guardian.co.uk/print/o,,5396633-117763,00.html

Accessed 23rd

March 2006

Seyan, K., Greenhalgh, T., Dorling, D. (2004) “The standardised admission ratio for

measuring widening participation in medical schools: an analysis of UK medical

schools admissions by ethnicity, socio-economic status and sex” British Medical

Journal vol.328, pp1545-1546

Shiner, M., Modood, T. (2002) “Help or hindrance? Higher education and the route to

ethnic equality” British Journal of Sociology of Education 23 (2), pp209-232

Smithers, A. “Education policy” in Seldon, A. (2001) (ed) The Blair effect: The Blair

government 1997-2001 London: Little & Brown, pp405-426

Stothart, C. (2006) “Top cop gets £20k more than professor” Times Higher Education

Supplement May 12th

, pp6-7

Tett, L. (2004) “Mature working-class students in an “elite” university: discourses of

risk, choice and exclusion” Studies in the education of adults 36(2), pp252-264

Vasagor, J. & Smithers, R. (2003) “Will Charles Clarke have his place in history?”

The Guardian Education pp1-3, May 10th

available from:

http://www.education.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4665747110864,oo.html

Accessed 15th

March 2006

Wolf, A. (2002) Does education matter? Myths about education and economic

growth London: Penguin

Wolf, A. (2004) “Education and economic performance: simplistic theories and their

policy consequences” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 20 (2), pp315

61