UCPB VS LUMBO

FACTS: The respondents borrowed the aggregate amount of P12,000,000.00 from UCPB. To secure the performance of their obligation, they constituted a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located in Boracay, Aklan and all the improvements thereon that they owned and operated as a beach resort known as Titay’s South Beach Resort. Upon their failure to settle the obligation, UCPB applied on November 11, 1998 for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, and emerged as the highest bidder at the ensuing foreclosure sale held on January 12, 1999. The certificate of sale was issued on the same day, and UCPB registered the sale in its name on February 18, 1999. The title over the mortgaged property was consolidated in the name of UCPB after the respondents failed to redeem the property within the redemption period.

On January 7, 2000, the respondents brought against UCPB in the RTC an action for the annulment of the foreclosure, legal accounting, injunction against the consolidation of title, and damages (Civil Case No. 5920).

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 5920, UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession to recover possession of the property (Special Proceedings No. 5884). On September 5, 2000, the RTC granted the ex parte petition of UCPB,4 and issued on December 4, 2001 the writ of possession directing the sheriff of the Province of Aklan to place UCPB in the actual possession of the property. The writ of possession was served on the respondents on January 23, 2002 with a demand for them to peacefully vacate on or before January 31, 2002. Although the possession of the property was turned over to UCPB on February 1, 2002, they were allowed to temporarily remain on the property for humanitarian reasons.5

On February 14, 2002, the respondents filed in the RTC handling Special Proceedings No. 5884 a petition to cancel the writ of possession and to set aside the foreclosure sale. They included an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession.

On March 19, 2002, the RTC denied the respondents’ application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Aggrieved by the denial, the respondents brought a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus in the CA.

ISSUE: WON THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED

HELD: Yes. Assuming, though not conceding, that the RTC did err in denying the respondents’ application for injunction to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession, its error related only to the correct application of the law and jurisprudence relevant to the application for injunction. As such, the error amounted only to one of judgment, not of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and such error is reviewable only through an appeal taken in due course. In contrast, an error of jurisdiction is committed where the act complained of was issued

by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, and such error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ ofcertiorari.25

Considering that there is no question that the RTC had jurisdiction over both Civil Case No. 5920 and Special Proceedings No. 5884, it should follow that its consideration and resolution of the respondents’ application for the injunctive writ filed in Special Proceedings No. 5884 were taken in the exercise of that jurisdiction. As earlier made plain, UCPB as the registered owner of the property was at that point unquestionably entitled to the full implementation of the writ of possession. In the absence of any clear and persuasive showing that it capriciously or whimsically denied the respondents’ application, its denial of the application did not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to either lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It was of no consequence at all that UCPB made its ex parte application for the writ of possession the action (Special Proceedings No. 5884) when Civil Case No. 5920 (in which the respondents were seeking the annulment of the foreclosure and the stoppage of the consolidation of title, among other reliefs sought) was already pending in the RTC, for the settled jurisprudence is to the effect that the pendency of an action for the annulment of the mortgage or of the foreclosure sale does not constitute a legal ground to prevent the implementation of a writ of possession.26

The second concerns the CA’s reversing and undoing the RTC’s denial of the respondents’ application for the injunctive writ, and enjoining the RTC from implementing the writ of possession against the respondents "pending the final disposition of the petition for its cancellation and the annulment of the foreclosure sale."27 The CA effectively thereby granted the respondents’ application for the injunctive writ. In so doing, however, the CA ignored the essential requirements for the grant of the injunctive writ, and disregarded the patent fact that the respondents held no right in esse that the injunctive writ they were seeking would protect. Thus, the CA committed another serious error.

LIGOT VS REPUBLIC

FACTS: Petitioner, Benjamin Ligot, served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.

On July 1, 1964, R.A. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government" took effect increasing the salary of the members of Congress from P7,200 to P32,000. The Act expressly provided that the increases "shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."

When Ligot was elected for his third four-year term, he was not entitled to the salary increase by virtue of the Court’s unanimous decision in Philconsa v. Mathay:

"that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935

Constitution..” Ligot lost in the 1969 elections and filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity.

On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum of P122,429.86 in Ligot's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress.

Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant due to a pending resolution by the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by former Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term as Congressman also expired on December 30, 1969.

On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the warrant and its supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim by virtue of the Auditor-General’s adverse decision to Singson’s claim On January 20, 1972, the Auditor General through Velasco denied Ligot’s request for reconsideration.

Ligot then filed a petition for review appealing the decision of the Auditor-General alleging that at the time of his retirement, the salary for members of Congess “as provided by law” was already P32,000 per annum, so, he should receive his retirement gratuity based on that salary increase.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to retirement benefits based on the salary increase of the member of Congress

HELD: The petition was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi:

There is no question that Ligot is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 as amended by RA4968. The issue is whether or not he can claim in based on the P32,000 per annum salary of the members of Congress. The Court decided that to grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them more than what is constitutionally allowed.

Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution provides that: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.”

SALIBI VS COMELEC

FACTS: a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, was filed in the SC, seeking to annul the Resolutions dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which denied due course to and canceled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (petitioner) for the position of Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections

- When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months

- It’s undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family

were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.

- Private respondent filed a “Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacyand to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification” against him before the COMELEC

- private respondent alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latter’s COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code

- both petitioner and respondent presented evidence as to prove their argument

- the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position

- the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. Although he was able to receive his copy of the Resolution, no prior notice setting the date of promulgation of the said Resolution was received by him

- petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case

- the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 2010 suspended Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 by ordering that “all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation” in view of “the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material time.”

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.

HELD: As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.

2. As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty

3. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.

4. Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be finaland non-reviewable.

5. In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

6. In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.

AGG TRUCKING VS YUAN

FACTS:

Petitioner Alex Ang Gaeid had employed respondent Melanio Yuag as a driver since 28 February 2002.His clients were Busco Sugar Milling Co., Inc., operating in Quezon, Bukidnon; and Coca-cola Bottlers Company in Davao City and Cagayan de Oro City.

Petitioner noticed that respondent had started incurring substantial shortages. It was also reported that he had illegally sold bags of sugar along the way at a lower price, and that he was banned from entering the premises of the Busco Sugar Mill.Petitioner asked for an explanation from respondent who remained quiet.

Alarmed at the delivery shortages, petitioner took it upon himself to monitor all his drivers, including respondent, by instructing them to report to him their location from time to time through their mobile phones.He also required them to make their delivery trips in convoy, in order to avoid illegal sale of cargo along the way.

Respondent, along with 20 other drivers, was tasked to deliver bags of sugar from Cagayan de Oro City to Coca-Cola Bottlers Plant in Davao City on 4 December 2004.All drivers, with the exception of Yuag who could not be reached through his cellphone, reported their location as instructed.The Coca-Cola Plant in Davao later reported that the delivery had a suspiciously enormous shortage.

When confronted about the shortage and his failure to report his loacation, respondent did not respond to petitioner. Thereafter he was instructed to "just take a rest" which respondent construed as a constructive dismissal. After respondent demanded that his separation be made in writing, petitioner insisted that respondent return the next day and take a rest. Respondent however, went to file a complaint with the BLR for illegal dismissal and asked for his separation pay and 13th month pay; alleging that he was dismissed based on his non-returned call.

The Labor Arbiter however, sustained the dismissal for lack of substantial proof to sustain the allegation of illegal dismissal and that parties were under an employer-employee relationship. Upon appeal with the NLRC, the LA decision was reversed because respondent was deemed to be under preventive suspension without pay. A motion for reconsideration was made but was denied for being filed out of the reglamentary period.

On appeal through certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the court ruled on the existence of an employer-employee relationship and reversed the NLRC decision by reinstating the Labor Arbiters decision instead with modification to the award for damages.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR IN REVERSING THE NLRC DECISION.

HELD:

Petitioner is correct in its argument that there must first be a finding on whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and on what these acts were.In this case, the CA seemed to have forgotten that its function in resolving a petition for certiorari was to determine whether there was grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent NLRC.The CA proceeded to review the records and to rule on issues that were no longer disputed during the appeal to the NLRC, such as the existence of an employer-employee relationship.The pivotal issue before the NLRC was whether petitioners telling respondent to take a rest, or to have a break, was already a positive act of dismissing him.

Furthermore, the NLRC Resolution that reversed the LA Decision had nothing in it that was whimsical, unreasonable or patentlyviolative of the law.It was the CA which erred in finding faults that were inexistent in the NLRC Resolution.

In addition to this, the CA erroneously modified the NLRC decision when it can no longer be modified for being filed out of time. It is not a mere technicality that the CA may brush aside. The NLRC Resolution sought to be set aside had become final and executory 25 days before respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration.Thus, subsequent proceedings and modifications are not allowed and are deemed null and void.

PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: That on or about the 1st day of September, 1991, and for some time prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Sasmuan, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ABELARDO PANLAQUI being then the Municipal Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga, RENATO B. VELASCO and ANGELITO PELAYO, being then the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator and the Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of Sasmuan, Pampanga, VICTORINO MANINANG being then the Barangay Captain of Malusac, Sasmuan, Pampanga, and hence all public officers, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their position, committing the offense in relation to their office, and conspiring and confederating with one another and with WILFREDO CUNANAN, the representative of J.S. Lim Construction, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and with evident bad faith cause undue injury to the Government and grant unwarranted benefits to J.S. Lim Construction in the following manner: accused ABELARDO P. PANLAQUI, without being authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sasmuan, Pampanga, entered into a Contract of Lease of Equipment with J.S. Lim Construction, represented by accused WILFREDO CUNANAN, whereby the municipality leased seven (7) units of Crane on Barge with Clamshell and one (1) unit of Back Hoe on Barge for an unstipulated consideration for a period of thirty (30) days, which equipment items were to be purportedly used for the deepening and dredging of the Palto and Pakulayo Rivers in Sasmuan, Pampanga; thereafter accused caused it to appear that work on the said project had been accomplished and 100% completed per the approved Program of Work and Specifications and

turned over to Barangay Malusac; as a result of the issuance of the Accomplishment Report and Certificate of Project Completion and Turn-Over, payments of P511,612.20 and P616,314.60 were made to and received by accused WILFREDO CUNANAN notwithstanding the fact that no work had actually been done on the Palto and Pakulayo Rivers considering that J.S. Lim Construction had no barge or any kind of vessel registered with the First Coast Guard District and that no business license/permit had been granted to the said company by the Municipal Treasurer's Office of Guagua, Pampanga, which acts of the accused caused undue injury to the Government and granted unwarranted benefits to J.S. Lim Construction in the total amount of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY- SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX AND 80/100 PESOS (P1,127,926.80), Philippine Currency.

ISSUE: WON THE COURT A QUO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE MANDATORY PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE (PD) NO. 1594

HELD: No. It is fitting to reiterate the holding of the Court in People v. Tria-Tirona,[6] to wit:

x x x it is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.

x x x x

x x x Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.[7]

The Court further expounded in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,[8] thus:

It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo. (Emphasis supplied.)[9]