u-boat monthly report - jan 1943

8/8/2019 U-Boat Monthly Report - Jan 1943

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onthly summary No. 1. AAF Antisubmarineommand Jan 4

This DocumentIS A HOLDING OF THEARCHIVES SECTION

LIBRARY SERVICESFORT LEA NWORTH, KANSAS

DOCUMENT NO . B fi 454- COPY NO . - 1

- A .rmsC--P3-1966-20 Mar 53-5


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ANALYSIS OF SUBMARINE WARFARE

CHART I

A. ALLIED SHIPPING LOSSES:

Sinkings of Allied and neutral merchant vessels by enemy submarines have continuedto decline, and in January amounted to thirty-three ships, totaling only 200,669 tons..The January losses, reported thus far, were the lowest for any month in more than a yearand were well below the average monthly loss since the beginning of the war.

Chart I shows the record of monthly tonnage losses as a result of submarine actionsince September, 1939, as well as the tonnage loss of tankers and cargo-passenger vessels.The curves shown on the chart are based on British figures prior to September, 1942; andAmerican figures thereafter. The American figures include ships that may have been usedfor transporting troops, regardless of whether the ships were classified as commissionedauxiliaries.

The loss of ships from enemy action of all types, including mines, air and surface'craft, as well as submarines, is shown in the following table for the months of January,1943 and December, 1942. The December figures have been revised upwards from thetotals shown, in the summary last month as more complete records of sinkings duringthe month became available. Even, ith these ad s ments, however, the December losseswere not great.

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SUMMARY OF SINKINGSMercnant Vessels Sunk By Enemy Action

January, 1943 December, 1942Ships Tonnage Ships Tonnage

North Atlantic Convoy Area. ...... . 2 20,702 15 77,633Canadian Coastal Zone . . . . . . . . . - - 1 6,089Hid-Atlantic Area ..... ....... - - 3 31,246Caribbean Sea Frontier, Western ..... 5 30,542 5 24,181Caribbean Sea Frontier, Eastern ..... 1 8,093 4 19,888Brazilian Area. . ............ . 3 11,684 12 59,596Northeast Atlantic - Northern. . .... 5 24,306 18 70,385Northeast Atlantic - Southern. . .. . 14 92,934 4 15,266Mediterranean Sea . .... ... ..... 7 31,689 6 36,545Indian Ocean. ............ . - - 7 34,390Pacific Areas . .......... ... . 3 10,267 - -Unknown Areas . .......... ... . 2 12,747 - -

TOTAL 42 242,964 75 375,219

Tankers . ... , ............ 12 102,281 7 48,102Cargo and Passenger Vessels . ...... 27 139,370 62 324,407Small Vessels (50-1000 tons). ..... ... 2 197 6 2,710Commissioned Auxiliaries ........ . 1 1,116 - -

TOTAL 42 242,964 75 375,219

AREAS:- The loss of merchant vessels diminished in every area except the Northeast Atlan-tic (Southern portion) where the increase in sinkings was largely due to U-boat attacks ontwo convoys bound for the Mediterranean. Unlike some previous months, no heavy surpriseattacks were made in distant areas such as the Cape of Good Hope or Mozambique Channel,where traffic is relatively unprotected. It is significant, however, that recently asteadily increasing proportion of the sinkings have occurred in areas relatively near theU-boat bases, and in January, 670% f the sinkings due to enemy action occurred in theNorth Atlantic Convoy Area, the Northeastern Atlantic Area and the Mediterranean. Sink-ings by areas are shown in Chart II.

TYPE OF SHIPS SUNK:- As compared with other recent months, a larger proportion of theships lost in January consisted of strategically important tankers; they made up 29% ofthe ships lost and they accounted for 42% of the tonnage sunk.

LOSS OF CONVOYED SHIPS:- As the convoy system for t a~pedmore completely month by month, and as the U-boa heir attacksagainst the convoys, it is natural that the prop a sunk from convoy should


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increase. In January, 46% ofthe ships and 38% of the tonnagelost through enemy action werevessels in convoy, while 10% ofthe sinkings were ships strag- ,gling from convoys at the time N.ATLANTIC CONVOY AREA

OOthey were attacked.00000

TYPE OF ENEMY ACTION:- Of the o" N6T aships lost through enemy action ooo0during the month of January, " NE. TLANTIC REAsix ships of 26,619 gross ton- MID-ATLANTIC AREA 0000nage were sunk by aircraft, all oobut one of these sinkings oc- -a-

C.S.F. (WESTERN)curring in the Mediterranean. ^. o o\ C.S.F. (EASTERN)Three ships sank as th e resultof hitting enemy mines, while " othe remaining thirty-three B L1ANships lost were sunk by. ub- AREAmarines. o 2MARINE CASUALTIES:- Due in partto severe winter weather, mar-ine casualties due to ordinary ,, 8o 6o o'4 20o" operils of the sea continued totake a rising toll, and twenty- CHART 11three ships, totaling 96,243 Sinkings, January 1943tons, were lost.

DAMAGED BUT NOT SUNK:- Thirteen other vessels were damaged by aircraft attack in theMediterranean and on the route to Murmansk, and two by submarine attack, but were notsunk. It is known that four other ships also were attacked but the extent of damageis not known at the present time.

B. ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS BY AIRCRAFT

EASTERN SEA FRONTIER AND GULF SEA FRONTIER.Anti-submarine activities in these areas for the month of January were more produc-

tive, from the standpoint of sightings and attacks, than activities during December.Nine sightings were reported, two of which resulted in attacks by the sighting aircraft.Of the total sightings six were made by Army paroe?- nd three by Naval air patrols. Innone of the sightings or atta ,was thdrQ conclusive :evidence of the presenceof submarines. In fa c est t ave 1 bmariedensity f igure for th e

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month fell to 0.2, as compared with 0.7 in previous record low. An averagedaily density of 0.2 submarines in an area of over 1,0 000 square miles is, of course,negligible.

The weather was generally unfavorable for flying during the early and latter parts ofthe month. Numerous missions had to be cancelled, and there was a virtual cessation of allair activities in both Frontiers for one.three-day period. Mid-January, however, provideda period of good flying weather.

The number of hours flown by Army and Navy aircraft. is shown in the accompanyingtable. A detailed report of the operations of the 25th and 26th Wings of AAFAC is inclu-ded at the end of this Summary.

Recon Escort Special Training Total Hrs.Army Bomb. and Observ. 2368 772 475 2981 6596Army CAP, CP ..... 8930 2993 - - 11923

Total Army 11298 3765 475 2981 18519

Navy Planes. . .... 6336 4242 702 - 11280Blimps . ....... 1568 1261 161 - 2990

Total Navy 7904 5503 863 - 14270

TOTAL ARMY AND NAVY. . 19202 9268 1338 2981 32789

1ST ANTISUBMARINE SQUADRON.Advance elements of the 1st Antisubmarine Squadron's air echelon arrived-in England

in the early part of November, 1942. Additional personnel and equipment continued toarrive during the remainder of November and in December. At the close of the latter-month the Squadron consisted of 36 officers and 137 enlisted men, and six B-24D aircraft.

Prior to the commencement of operations, it was necessary to indoctrinate the crewswith British procedure and methods. Numerous problems always attendant upon operationsfrom a new and foreign base had to be solved. Operations were begun with three planes onNovember 16, 1942. By December 5 the number of planes had increased to six. The infor-mation at present available indicates that 32 operational missions, totaling 257:25 hours,and an additional 88 hours on training flights were flown during the period November 16to December 26.

In a letter dated January 2, 1943, the Commanding Officer states that between Decem-ber 1 and 31 six submarine sightings and four attacks on submarines were made by planesof the R.A.F. and the 1st Antisubmarine Squadron in the Bay of Biscay and the Atlanticbetween latitudes 3700N and 5200N. T f ,sightings and attacks in the Atlantic weremade by the 1st Antisubmarine Squadr mpoxae+y 610 miles and the other 720miles from the operating base. One o 'c i s ed> U-boat "Probably Sunk",4


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and is desbedF1Eind is described n Secti IVBf this Summary Assessment of the secondattack is not ye e "

Combat crews patrol e ions which normially require from 8 to 11hours. The day of patrol is followe y relaxation and recreation for the-crew,and this in turn by a day of training. Briefing and interrogation of the crews requiretwo hours each, and they are conducted by a joint British-American station control.

Weather conditions are reported as being none too favorable, requiring utmost skilland judgment on the part of the pilot, navigator, radar and radio operators.

9TH ANTISUBMARINE SQUADRON OPERATIONS.

A noteworthy page in the operational records of the Army Air Forces AntisubmarineCommand has been written by the 9th Antisubmarine Squadron, operating in the Trinidadarea of the Caribbean Sea Frontier.

The air echelon of the Squadron, 42 officers and 72 enlisted men, in 10 planes,B-18R type, arrived in Trinidad on December 2, 1942. Patrol missions were begun immedi-ately thereafter, and a program of orientation and training was instituted.

The area of operations of the Squadron had become increasingly critical for theUnited Nation's shipping. In November, for example, U-boats had taken a toll of thir-teen vessels sunk in the waters around Trinidad. In December the toll in this areadropped to five ships and none was reported in January. It is impossible to assay thepart played by any one unit that is cooperating with other well trained units, but it isclear that the 9th Antisubmarine Squadron contributed to this favorable record.

The Squadron has been entirely dependent upon the ingenuity and skill of its Com-manding Officer and personnel during the course of its operations. Most maintenancework has been done by the air echelon and this in a latitude where climatic conditionsare particularly severe on virtually all types of equipment due to corrosion resultingfrom salt and humidity. The measure of the Squadron's self-contained efficiency andmorale is best revealed by the fact that during the month of January 1134 hours wereflown, a higher total than that of any other squadron in the Command.

The break-down f the flying hours for January is as follows:

Reco Escort Special Training Total

653: :25 26:00 130:25 1134:30

This record of one month's op e aQn t s especially significant because none ofthe original equipment of the squa replaced.


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C. ATTACKS ON ENEMY S

In the U.S. Strate attacksduring January, as com-pared with thirty-one i on w ic h the evidence obtained to date indicates thata U-boat was present. Of these twenty-five attacks, fourteen were made by aircraft andeleven by surface craft.

One of the aircraft attacks off the Coast of Brazil is believed to have resulted ina kill since several mangled bodies as well as three live men were seen in the water afterthe explosions. This attack is described in detail in Section IV-D of this Summary.

Five other aircraft attacks probably resulted in serious damage to the submarines.One of these took place south of Iceland, the others off Trinidad and the Brazilian Coast.One surface craft attack, near Newfoundland, is believed to have damaged a submarineslightly.

Full reports of attacks on enemy submarines are always slow in arriving. Hence, itis probable that this total of twenty-five attacks for the month of January will be in-creased by later reports. It is almost certain that, in the final analysis, the numberof January attacks will exceed the number in December. If so, January will be the firstmonth since August in which the attacks in the U.S. Strategic,Area have not declined.

D. GERMAN STRATEGY AND DISPOSITION OF SUBMARINES

The best intelligence available, based on sinkings, attacks, contacts and other in-formation, indicated a continued strategy on the part of the Germans during January ofmaintaining defensive screens in an attempt to intercept nor th Atlant ic and African con-voys. -During the early part of the month submarines were widely scattered, and a largenumber of them returned to their bases for repairs and supplies; but during the latterpart of the month the number of U-boats at sea increased steadily and tended to formthree rather definite screens. One of these was off the coast of Africa, in the vicinityof the Azores; a second was south of Greenland; and the third was in the northeasternAtlantic, almost directly west of the British Isles. At times, the latter two screenstended to merge into one extending in a northwesterly direction, but the objective clearlywas to form two areas of possible attack on trans-Atlantic convoys. There is also evi-dence that the U-boat packs which attacked convoys contained more U-boats than formerly -a development that is perhaps significant of a change in tactics. Chart III shows atypical distribution of U-boats during the latter part of January.

The outstanding strategical development of recent months, however, is the almostsensational drop in attacks on merchant vessels. Sinkings began to decline shortly afterthe landing of Allied forces in Africa and this trend has continued for a period ofthree months. Bad weather, unwise disposition of U-boats to intercept convoys, and bet-ter protection of convoys are all p o s that have been advanced to ex-plain this notable lack of U-boat t srs, nor any combinationof them, appear to be an adequate aatio kings from nearly 140


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ships in Novem d -.uary - a decliNo-completelyplanation is avai lable at thistime, but it appears that * *"either th e large number of U- 1 * * *boats estimated to be at sea r,have been restricted in their * *operations by some factor un- ' * *;.known at present, or that an *p.abnormal number of U-boats "are in port and the numberestimated to be at sea is a _ * * *gross exaggeration.

Adherents of th e theorythat there are many U-boats at * -'osea which have a greatly re-duced efficiency offer variousexplanations fo r this develop-ment; a shortage of oil whichis restricting th e radius ofU-boats and forcing them tooperate in areas that are 2o 0ob 20heavily defended; a shortageof torpedoes as a result of CHART IIIbombing of German industrial Typical U-Boat Distribution in Januaryplants; the continued bombingof U-boat bases forcing U-boats to stay at sea unduly long periods for their own protec-tion, but with inadequate supplies and'tired crews of low morale. Such explanations,however, are not quite consistent with the building up of a U-boat concentration south ofGreenland, and it would seem more logical under such conditions for the enemy to withdrawU-boats to relatively safe areas in the Baltic in order to rest tired crews and conservesupplies in anticipation of the necessity of blocking traffic later in the year when thepromised "Second Front" offensives become actualities. Continued operation of U-boats inthe cold north Atlantic with tired crews and low supplies mean not only inefficient oper-ation but a further break-down of morale.

Adherents of the theory that large numbers of U-boats are not, in fact, at sea basetheir argument on the fact that not only have sinkings declined sharply, but so also haveattacks by U-boats and even si ) They argue with logic that if a large number ofU-boats were at sea, they woul 1ttfo tack te t sghtings would be at leastnormal. It is known, however, 8 eflate df t a bro U-boats at sea in the pasthave been very accurate, an d current estimates .r hae qubstantial evidence. Onehesitates to discard these estimates without daefihite proof that they have become inac-curate.


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UNCLASSIFIEDIt was announced with considerable fanfare during January that Admiral Doenitz had

been promoted to be supreme Commander of th e German Naval Forces from his former positionof U-boat Commander-in-Chief. Such promotion would hardly seem logical in the face ofthree months of outstanding U-boat failure unless the decline in sinkings resulted from aplanned policy. Doenitz, furthermore, is known to be an advocate of aggressive use ofU-boats, as typified by his often expressed policy of "Kill! Kill! Kill!". This promotionand the. logic of the entire war situation indicates the necessity of a supreme Nazi effortto cut Allied supply lines this year, - even if the U-boats must be regarded as "expend-able." A major effort of this kind requires time for preparation, training and the accum-ulation of supplies.

During three periods in the past - March, April and May, 1940; from November, 1940 toJanuary, 1941; and again during th e months of October to December, 1941 - the activity ofU-boats, as indicated.by sinkings, was low, but a period of high activity and heavy sink-ings extending from five to nine months followed each one of these lulls. Now again, wehave had nearly three months of reduced activity. Resting of crews, refitting and repairof U-boats, accumulation of supplies, and possibly the fitting of U-boats with new equip-ment such as radar or some entirely new weapon - all take time and cause reduced activity.The Germans are estimated to have 425 U-boats, about 100 of which have been on shake-downtrials in the Baltic. It ay be that some of these are now in the Atlantic and that theapparently large number of relatively inactive U-boats at sea represent submarines onpractice cruises under combat conditions but operating under instructions not to acceptundue risks. Such a theory is he only one that squares with all the known facts.

Enemy capabilities include strong mid-ocean screens and other screens to form cor-dons around Europe and off th e American coast. Doubtless, he will exercise all of thesecapabilities in part, but it is lear that his greatest efficiency would be near thecoastal areas in hich it is easier to locate convoys than in the wide expanses of mid-ocean. To the extent that these areas can be made so dangerous to U-boats as to forcethem to remain 600 miles or more at sea, U-boat efficiency will be correspondingly re-duced.

Much of this analysis is ecessarily based on logical conjecture, but it does appearthat the enemy is capable of a major destructive campaign in the very near future, againstwhich immediate preparations are an urgent necessity. The acquisition of a greatly in-creased number of surface craft within a few months is hardly possible. Other sectionsof this summary are devoted to a discussion of the effectiveness of long range aircraftin anti-submarine work, both as a destructive weapon and as a means of developing arelatively safe zone for ships extending 300 to 600 miles at sea. It is feasible todetail a large number of long range aircraft to this work with little delay ana such astep appears essential in eeting the immediate threat of increased U-boat attack.

R


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AIRCRAFT PROTECTION OF CONVOYS

The November and December issues of this Summary contained charts which demonstratedth e effectiveness of the aircraft in driving U-boats away from coastal areas on bothsides of the Atlantic Ocean. Attention was not directed, however, towards the role ofaircraft in protecting convoys or the ways and means of extending the use of aircraft toincrease the safety.of trans-Atlantic convoys. Since the convoy system of protectingships undoubtedly will be continued, the battle in he future will be primarily one be-tween convoys and submarine packs. It is of value, therefore, to analyze enemy strategyin onnection with attacks on convoys in order to clarify the particular function ofaircraft in onvoy protection.

There has been discussion from time to time on the relative effectiveness of air-craft and surface craft in defending convoys, but controversy is unnecessary and is basedprimarily on a misunderstanding of the facts or a lack of knowledge of the proper coor-dination of aircraft and surface craft in such work.

U-boats ar e assigned by the German High Command to patrol specific areas of theocean. As soon as a U-boat sights a convoy, it makes a first sighting report, called anE bar report, which gets it s name from the distinguishing letter "Accentuated E" whichprefaces the signal. The U-Boat High Command Headquarters then broadcasts the sightingto all U-boats situated in he vicinity, ordering them to concentrate in he convoy area.When these U-boats in turn sight the convoy, they also make E bars, with the result thatth e U-Boat High Command knows accurately the position, course and speed of the convoy.U-boat packs are known to have shadowed convoys for several days before attacking, par' icu-larly if the first contact was made within the range of land-based aircraft. Shadowing isusually done from the rear and well out on the flanks at the extreme range of surfacevisibility during the day and from close range during darkness. The attack itself usuallytakes place at night with the U-boats closing in t high speed while running on the sur-face. They rely on the confusion following th e mass torpedo attacks to draw clear of theconvoy, to reorganize and to reload torpedo tubes.

The primary function of aircraft in the defense of convoys is the prevention of thegathering of U-boat packs capable of making destructive attacks. It accomplishes thisfunction in two ways: first, as a pack is gathering on a trailed and reported convoy,protective sweeps far ahead and to th e flanks of th e convoy enable aircraft to make kill-ing and damaging attacks or at least to force U-boats to remain submerged at slow speedssufficiently long to delay the formation of an effective pack. Second, through keepingth e trailing U-boats, on which the others are homing, submerged, aircraft can break theenemy's contact enabling the convoy to escape through change of course. In both of theseactivities aircraft are highly efficient, not only through actual kills but through thefrequent damaging attacks which, even if not lethal, are destructive of U-boat crewmorale. This function of impeding the gathering of packs is best accomplished by theairplane due to its ability to search wide areas in a manner not possible for even thefastest surface craft. The function of surface craft, on the other hand, is close-in


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CHART IV

Heaviest Attacks on Convoys - July-Decemnber 1942

protection of the convoy, particularly at night or in bad weather, after the pack hassucceeded in closing in. The two functions are in no sense competitive and, if sufficientlong range aircraft are made available, it should be possible to develop a high degree ofcoordination that will give maximum protection.

Chart IV shows attacks on vessels in the nine most heavily attacked trans-Atlanticconvoys during the final six months of 1942. The arrows show the general course of indi-vidual convoys, while the dots indicate approximate locations of individual attacks onships. The solid arc lines are drawn roughly three hundred miles from established orpossible air bases, while the dotted arc lines indicate a range of six hundred miles,within which adequate air coverage was, or could have been, provided. Actually the aircoverage between three hundred and six hundred mile limits on the west side of the Atlan-tic was inadequate during this period, while lack of equipment provided less than desir-able coverage in this range from either England or Iceland. Air coverage from Greenlandwas negligible. It is obvious from the chart that attacks on convoys began or broke offwhen convoys were at least three hundred miles from land. Outbound convoys apparentlywere trailed out of the air-coverage danger zone before the pack gathered and attacked,and similarly, attacks on inbound convoys were given up as soon as the enemy reached thearea of effective air coverage.

Sporadic sinkings of one or two ships in the chart oc-curred during this period within the three. once in the

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final six rted mass attack within the three hundred mileareas. Ob angs did occur within the six hundred mile circles, but in theseareas lack of equipment prevented satisfactory air coverage. It is significant that thethree hundred to six hundred mile areas off Iceland and the British Isles, which werecovered more completely by the R.A.F. Coastal Command, showed a much greater freedom fromsinkings than the similar areas off Newfoundland and Greenland which had little air cover-age. Even patrolling by the Coastal Command from three hundred to six hundred miles outon the usual convoy routes has not been heavy and averaged only about 800 hours per monthbetween September and November, 1942.

In addition to the evidence presented by this chart, the great power of aircraft inprotecting convoys is to be found in the detailed histories of two convoys, SC 104 andSC 107, which were presented in the November, 1942, issue of the Coastal Command Review,and from which Charts V and VI have been drawn. SC 104 was given close air escort byintermittent sorties, which are shown by cross hatched areas on the chart, from October6th to the 13th, as it proceeded up the American Coast past Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.The convoy probably was first sighted by U-boats on October 11th within three hundredmiles of Newfoundland and aircraft coverage ceased at 1938 on October 12th. Due to badweather no aircraft could be used thereafter until the morning of October 15th. Almostimmediately after aircraft coverage ceased, attacks were made, with the result thatthree ships were lost during the night of the 12th-13th, and five more during the nightof 13th-14th. Further attacks on the 14th-15th were beaten off by surface craft. Whenthe convoy was six hundred miles from Iceland, on the 15th, a Liberator from the 120thSquadron swept the area and made two sightings and attacks. On the 16th, a Liberatorfrom the same Squadron carried out close escort from 0900 to 1355 and put down one U-boat,while a second Liberator failed to meet the convoy but sighted and attacked a U-boatnorth of the convoy. Eight Catalinas and Liberators carried out offensive sweeps northof the convoy on the 16th and 17th, making three sightings and two attacks. The convoyarrived on the 21st with no additional sinkings after air protection was supplied on the15th of the month. This convoy is a clear case of good coordination of air and surfacecraft during which aircraft broke up and hampered the contact already established on the15th, while protective sweeps prevented another pack from converging again on the 16thand 17th. Surface craft provided efficient close-in escort, which resulted in sinkingsof three U-boats, - two of them by ramming.

SC 107 proceeded up the.American and Canadian Coast in poor weather with aircraftcoverage only on October 28th, and it is probable that it was sighted by a U-loat nearthe coast of Newfoundland on the 29th. Aircraft coverage was light and insufficient onthe following days, but -- although details are not available -- it appears that two airattacks were made by planes acting as close escort, while a single protective sweep pro-duced one sighting and attack, and a fortuitous sighting and attack by a returning air-craft was made considerably ahead of the convoy. These close-in air escorts, however,were insufficient to break the contact, and when the convoy reached a point four hundredmiles off the Gtahdian Coast, sinkings began with fifteen ships lost between November 2ndan d 5th t e of whih were far from land and during a period in which no aircoverage w we herf On November 5th, with the convoy seven hundred

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DAILY SLIMMARJE5OC 7 PATROLS5ANJCELLED-EATHER.8-ESCO~R 1239-2244.&5-i U/ 8 SIGHTED.30-1 U/B ATTACKED.

3- if , ESCORT 1325-1850.INL.'L- 1 U/B ATTACKED.2-1I MV SJNJK , ESCORT 1655-1735.3-1 MV SUNK, 6MVs SUNK

-ON 2.Nb ORZ3Ro.4- NO COVER PFROA ICELAND-DUE TO WEATHER5- ESCORT 1108-1958 2 U/Bs- ATTACKED, 1U/8 ss&FTED.6 -ESCORT 1350-1530, 1645- 1815-A/S SWEEP 10'f7-18I1I7AC7- ESCOR.T 14-44-1~800

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miles from Iceland, two Liberators provided close-in escort from 1108 to 1958, makingthree sightings and two attacks, both of which were good and one of which is believed tohave been fatal to the submarine. On the same day, two Catalinas swept th e area north ofthe convoy and on th e 6th two Catalinas provided escort and seven Hudsons carried outoffensive sweeps. On the 7th, one Catalina provided escort while four Hudsons and threeFortresses carried out sweeps, and further protection was given on the 8th. Not a singleship was sunk between th e time aircraft coverage was provided on the 5th and th e arrivalof the convoy in port on the 10th.

The above accounts of two convoys confirm the opinion of the Anti-Submarine WarfareDivision of the British Naval.Staff, which, in ts October 1942 Anti-Submarine report,states, "Experience is repeatedly affirming that a convoy, not protected by aircraft, maybe so disorganized by a concentrated attack and the resultant breaks in formation forrescue work and other adjustment that the escorts may become comparatively ineffectivefor either protection or offense, whereas the presence, even for a few hours, of on e ortwo aircraft has again and again prevented a concentrated attack from developing."

The accounts also are convincing arguments in favor of sufficient long-range land-based aircraft to provide adequate air coverage six hundred miles from the American coast,Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland and the British Isles. With these bases and equipmentavailable, convoys on th e northern lanes could be then routed completely within therange of air patrol and afforded substantial protection during good weather.As of a recent date, surface craft used in anti-submarine warfare amounted to 46fleet destroyers and 356 escort vessels, which include old destroyers, corvettes, PG's

and PY's. Naval authorities feel this force of more than four hundred surface craft, in-volving a huge investment and personnel, is inadequate and without doubt additional craftcould be used to advantage. The current destroyer--escort building program calling for300 vessels for delivery during 1943, and many more in 1944 should provide all the sur-face craft necessary. In comparison there were on the same date 702 medium range air-planes with an effective operating radius of 300 to 450 miles but only 95 aircraft withthe range necessary to cover the critical 300 to 600 mile danger area. The medium rangeaircraft have been successful in protecting the near shore convoys, but roughly ten timesth e present number of long range aircraft are necessary to give far off-shore convoysadequate protection. Probably the total investment in all types of aircraft is hardly aquarter of that in surface craft. Furthermore, if sufficient long range aircraft wereavailable, th e existing 700 medium range aircraft in use in anti-submarine warfare couldbe released for other service.

The need for an adequate number of long range aircraft is urgent and immediate inview of the enemy's capability of inaugurating more violent U-boat warfare in the nearfuture. With adequate air coverage extending 600 miles from available air bases, sink-ings can be held to a reasonable number or even reduced, and the cost would.soon berepaid in savings of steel, essential war cargoes and lives.

16


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- - CU-BOATASUALTIES

LEVEl Y 4BOAT C4ASUAZTIE.... S 'ubmarnrines nown sunk - --

"'nmmfefai^ probobn/y sun---- ----- probca/y damaged -

_ - C --.-- ___ I I I I

S DETC. AN. M. APR. JUNI JULY DEPTOC_ DC JXAEEC MA. APR. A JUNE/ ULY J CT._? DEfCAN. MR. N.P JUNE JULY CPT?\ CT DfC./939 / 940 / 94/ / 9 4 2

CHART VII

Five hundred and sixty-six German and Italian submarines have been sunk or damagedas the direct result of Allied action since the beginning of the war. This number willbe further increased as additional reports are received on attacks made during the lastfew months. The quarterly totals of submarines officially assessed as "Known Sunk","Probably Sunk" and "Probably Damaged" are indicated in Chart VII. It is clear thatthere has been a generally steady upward trend in U-boat casualties, from an average often per month in 1940 to over twenty-five per month in the first nine months of 1942.

In spite of this encouraging record, however, the German submarine fleet has grownfrom about seventy-five in December, 1939 to more than four hundred in December, 1942.This growth is probably continuing as it is believed that Germany is producing twentyor twenty-five submarines per month, while an average of about ten per month are esti-mated to h vbee 'de troyed in-l942- It is likely that most of the U-boats assessedas "Probaby 6aged" succeed in eaching their bases and are only temporarily inacti-vated for repairs.


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A further analysis of these statistics throws some light on th e relative effective-ness of aircraft and surface vessels as anti-submarine weapons. The assessed results ofattacks by aircraft and by all other agencies such as surface craft and mines whichcaused damage during th e first eleven months of 1942 are shown in the following table:

Known Probably ProbablySunk Sunk Damaged TotalBy Aircraft . ... . . . 18 17j* 118 * 154By Other. . . . . .... 36 18-* 432* 98

Total 54 36 162 252*Fractions indicate that both air and surface craft participated in attack.

The table indicates that over sixty per cent of the damaging or lethal attacks werecarried out by aircraft. Aircraft ability to cover wide areas and carry ou t attacks witha minimum of warning is learly shown, particularly in he "Probably Damaged" classifica-tion. Only in the "Known Sunk" group, do the figures suggest a clear superiority ofsurface craft, but it is almost certain that aircraft are in act more lethal than indi-cated by the statistics. Positive evidence is equired before a submarine is evaluatedas "Sunk" or "Probably Sunk" and it is frequently impossible for aircraft to obtain suchevidence, whereas surface craft on the scene can remain to obtain evidence through re-trieving wreckage, securing samples of oil and taking photographs. Detailed analysis ofattacks in the U.S. Strategic Area bear out this reasoning.

As pointed out in Section II, the role of aircraft in convoy protection is primarilyone of preventing U-boats from gathering around convoys in a position to deliver deadlymass attacks. It s role is o kill, to harry, to damage, to force submergence, so fre-quently that contact with the convoy will be lost and the gathering of a powerful strik-ing force prevented. The statistics which show that seventy-three per cent of theattacks assessed as "Probably Damaged" were made by aircraft, indicate that they arecapable of carrying out their mission.

The lethal quality of aircraft in anti-submarine warfare is eing increased rapidlythrough new technical developments. Longer range planes capable of carrying heavier bombloads, the development of the more accurate flat nosed depth bomb, the contact mousetrapbomb, and the radio sonic buoy which will allow underwater listening from aircraft, areall of primary importance and are expected to make aircraft even a more deadly anti-submarine weapon.

Aircraft and surface craft, properly coordinated, are natural partners in convoyprotection and all of the evidence bears out the recent statement by Prime MinisterChurchill that "nothing is ore clearly proved than that well-escorted convoys, especial-ly when protected by long distance aircraft, beat the U-boat".

MI


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#s .IgG AIRCRAFT ATTACKS

( 4

>~~~~~~~~~~------------------------- ; 1-t --- ,,--;,.6 7

CHART VIA. FIRST ENGAGEMENT WITH AN ENEMY AIRCRAFT

The first action between an airplane of the Antisubmarine Command and one of theenemy occurred on December 4, 1942, at 51-15 N 10-00 W. A B-24 of the 1st AntisubmarineSquadron, piloted by Capt. Lueke, on A/S patrol, encountered a plane identified as aJU-88. The. action as shown on Chart VIII progressed as follows:

1. B-24 on course 2540T - 1500' altitude - sighted a JU-88 at 1 mile, 300 to star-board.

2. JU-88 approached and passed B-24 500 yds. to starboard, and 1000 ft. above.At 500 yds. to rear on the starboard JU-88 banded away into 3600 turn.

3. JU-88 pulled up into a parallel course 600 yards to rear and 500 ft. above -still to starboard.

4. B-24 took evasive action, making a series of 900 turns to port and starboardand 1000 ft. climbs and dives in and out of clouds.During this phase, of 20 minutes, JU-88 maintained same relative position asin #3.

5. JU-88 pulled up even with the B-24 and 1000 ft. above.6. JU-88 immediately turned into the B-24 at a dive, crossing over about 800 ft.

above. The B-24 turned into a 450 starboard climb as the enemy approached. Thewaist gunner fired two bursts at 600 yds., the top gunner one burst at approxi-mately the same range. After the cross-over to port the top gunner fired threemore bursts at 1000 yds., as the JU-88 pulled into a moderate climb.

7. B-2 cd 0,6 o turn to left and resumed normal course at 1500 ft. JU-88, afterdi p rng, re urned ho }ds and followed B-24 1000 ft. above - 1 mileto g prtieE~ A s rt ;t later it headed westerly with no further action.


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B. FIRST BLOOD.

Details of a 1st Antisubmarine Squadron attack on an enemy submarine in the Bay ofBiscay, briefly outlined ;n the December Summary, have since reached these Headquartersand indicate that it was an excellently executed attack.

The attack was carried out by a B-24D, piloted by Captain Thorne, while on A/Spatrol at 1349 (GOT) on December 31, 1942 in 5120N 2058W. An A.S.V. contact was firstmade while the airplane was eight miles distant at an altitude of 1000'. The pilothomed on the signal, on acourse of 3000, gradually reducing altitude, and sighted thesubmarine about 47 miles away traveling on the surface at a speed of approximately 8knots, course 3300T. No wake was visible because of the heavy rough seas. The submar-ine began its crash dive as Pilot Thorne started his run. Attacking from 4 points abaftthe starboard beam of the submarine, at a speed of 200 mph from 175' altitude, 9 TorpexMK XI depth bombs, were dropped with a fuse setting of 25 feet and at a spacing of six-teen feet. The stick straddled the hull just behind the conning tower. Three depthbombs fell to starboard, two over the hull, and the remainder to the port side. Approx-imately 85 .50 calibre rounds were fired at the disappearing hull and conning tower bythe port ventral and tail gunners. The three depth bombs that fell to the starboardshould have moved in and exploded directly under the stern of the U-Boat, and the plumeof the depth bombs contained a black streak believed to have been oil. As the point ofattack was circled, an oil patch estimated to be 200 feet in diameter was observed; inthe center of which numerous small bubbles were noticeable. A flame float was dropped,and the plane left the area on baiting procedure, returning 50 minutes later withoutseeing any further evidence of damage.

This attack, which is considered to have been well planned and executed, receiveda damage assessment of B (probably sunk). Detection of this target by Radar beyondvisual range under adverse sea conditions illustrates the value of efficient personneland effective equipment.

C. U-BOAT FIRES ON AIRPLANE.Anti-aircraft fire from an enimy submarine directed against a Navy plane was the

experience of a PBY, 53-P-1, flying during the morning of January 5th off the coast ofTrinidad, British West Indies. Ensign J.E. Dryden, pilot, sighted a suspicious object15 miles distant and turned at 4500' to an intersecting course of 1900. At 5 to 6 miles,the sighting was definitely established as a gray U-boat with a black conning tower.

While the plane was still 2 to 3 miles distant, at 500 feet, and coming in for at-tack, the submarine saw the PBY and immediately opened fire with her 3-inch bow gunmounted forward of the conning tower. The U-boat fired 12 to 15 rounds of explosiveammunition, the closest exploding 150 to 200 yards short and to the right of the plane.Fire, which ceased when the plane was a half to a quarter of a mile away, was in rapidbursts with sounds obf the explosion heard by the crew above the roar of the plane'smotors. There was no anti-aircraft basket on the conning tower, but there was a small20


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A_> I{I Is 1gun mounted on the after part of the tower. This latter gun was not manned'when theplane passed over the submarine. No tracer bullets were seen coming from it and it isnot known if it was fired.

One man, dressed in a brown jacket or sweater and brown trousers, was firing the3-inch gun, remaining there while the plane passed over the U-boat. No one was observedpassing ammunition to this gun. Another man dressed in dark clothes, possibly dungarees,was seen forward of this gun and two men were observed on the conning tower during theapproach of the PBY, but apparently they had gone below by the time the plane passed overthe submarine. There were no uniforms being worn and no officers were identified. Be-cause the aircraft was under fire, the observations of the crew were not as accurate asnormally could be expected in an approach of this type.

The submarine was about 200 feet long with the conning tower painted black or verydark gray. No insignia were visible. The hull-was a dark gray with paint in good condi-tion and black below the water line. There was a net cutter on the bow but no jump wire,radio masts or life lines. No blister tanks were seen on th e hull, as th e boat was defi-nitely of very sleek, trim lines. No water came over the bow or splashed on the plankeddeck, although the U-boat was making 12 knots in a choppy sea. From the general descrip-tion, it is believed to be an Italian craft of either the Gemma or Sirena class.

The attack was made at 1156Q, position 10-45N, 54-55W, on January 5, 1942. As theplane made the attack approach at 160 knots, 75' altitude, the fully surfaced U-boataltered its course from 250 to 220 degrees just before D/C's were released. The planedropped four Mark 29 D/C's in salvo, all exploding about 40 to 50' short on the starboardside and about 15' forward of the conning tower.

The U-boat was so rocked by the explosion that the black paint was visible on thehull below the water line. It is believed that the three men were still on deck at thistime. The U-boat continued to alter her course to about 190 degrees and crash dived,submerging from 40 to 50 seconds after explosion of the D/C's. A small oil slick wasobserved about 50 to 100' away from the cordite slick, but no oil or air bubbles ordebris were observed. The plane stayed in the area about an hour after the attack, butno further action was observed.

Because of an unsuccessful attempt to take pictures, the 30 caliber bow gun was notbrought to bear until the run ended and the plane circled the U-boat. Ten rounds werefired when the gun jammed. The .50 caliber guns at the port and starboard waists fireda total of 18 rounds with hits on the deck forward of the conning tower. Hits were alsomade by 10 to 15 rounds fired by the tunnel gun as the plane was directly overhead.

D. SUBMARINE DESTROYED BY PBY.

A Navy PBY-5A, from Squadron 83-P-2, based at Natal, Brazil, attacked and destroyeda submarine on January 7, 1943, at 1153, in 0158S 3923W.

The PBY was flying a course of 015 0 T when th e pilot sighted th e submarine. Appar-ently th e was at a relatively high altitude, for th e pilot states that when heet the~~la _1 el i __: c ~L .--


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turned 900 to port to intercept the submarine, he pulled props and throttles nearly allthe way back and began to lose altitude at the rate of 2000 feet per minute with an indi-cated air speed of 184 knots. The submarine proceeding at an estimated 15-20 knots wasfully surfaced on a course of 1250T. Several men were lying on th e deck apparently sun-bathing.

The pilot, after turning to make the interception, endeavored to keep a small cloudbetween the submarine and plane. When about 3 to 4 miles from the target, he increasedpower to 2500 RPM and 45 inches. The submarine apparently failed to sight the plane fora considerable time as no effort was made to submerge and the men lying on deck jumped upand ran toward the conning tower only about the time the D.C.'s were released.

The plane approached th e target at a 60 to 80 degree angle, and four Mark 17 D.C.'s,25 foot setting, were released manually by the second pilot. Three dropped simultaneouslyand the fourth a split second later. At the moment of release, the plane was at an alti-tude of 35 feet and flying an indicated 225 knots. After passing over the submarine, thepilot turned steeply left to observe th e results.

One very large explosion, believed to be caused by the simultaneous detonation of3 D.C.'s, occurred within five feet of th e submarine, to port abeam the conning tower.One small explosion was observed about 60 feet to starboard slightly abaft the conningtower.

The submarine appeared to rise out of the water and break partially into two pieces.Three large tanks emerged from th e broken area as the bow settled. The stern rose almostvertically until 8 to 10 feet were visible above the water. It remained in this positionbetween 25 seconds and three minutes, then sank straight down. Miscellaneous debris andseveral mangled bodies were observed momentarily and three men were noted swimming andtrying to wave to the plane.

V.NEW TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. THE EXPENDABLE RADIO SONO-BUOY.

An underwater ear would be valuable in any ways to an airborne anti-submarine oper-ator. It is on e of the major handicaps of aircraft on anti-submarine missions to bealmost wholly insulated from their quarry by a few feet of water. Direct listening tounderwater noises is impossible, and devices dangled from an airplane into the water areimpractical. A third obvious method is to use a radio transmitting set to broadcast tothe aircraft from an underwater microphone. Such a device has been developed to thepoint of extensive service testing.

A glance at the tactical uses and limiting conditions will show the obstacles thathave to be overcome. First, the overside gear must be small, easily stowed, quicklylaunched, and light in weight. Secondly, it ust be rugged, able to stand the shock of22


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impact with the sea, and waterproof. Third, it must be acoustically sensitive and musttransmit accurately over a wide frequency range to allow various underwater noises to beheard and identified. Finally, it must be expendable.

The solution to these problems is the expendable radio sono-buoy; a frequency-modulated transmitter, battery powered, with a service life of four hours. Its overalllength is some forty-six inches, including attached parachute, and its diameter is fourand one half inches. It is provided with a collapsible antenna and an underwater hydro-phone with twenty feet of supporting cable. The total weight -- buoy, parachute, trans-mitter, hydrophone, batteries, etc., -- is fifteen pounds. Broadcast signals are re-ceived in the plane through a special FM receiver, provided with six frequency channels.

Tactically,. th e buoy is used either as a stethoscope or as a pointer . As a stetho-cope, it can be used to decide whether an MAD contact is a wreck or a submarine, whethera bombed submarine is running away or standing by, and, finally, it can be used at th escene of a disappearing ASV contact to determine the nature of the target. As a pointer,it is used to narrow the search area for a lost MIAD contact, or what amounts to the same

23K Ii

to i i;


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thing, to convert a disappearing ASV contact into a live MAD contact. Several buoys aredropped and search carried out in the vicinity of the buoy registering the most pro-nounced U-boat noise.

A fair amount of training is required to create a skilled operator. Underwaternoises are complex and confusing, but to a trained listener yield a good deal of informa-tion. With increasing information on sounds made by enemy submarines, operators shouldbe able to determine the approximate distance of the U-boat from the buoy and get a goodidea of the speed it is making.

B. MARK 20 "MOUSETRAP" BOMBS FOR AIRCRAFT

The Mark 20 "Mousetrap" bomb was originally developed as a rocket propelled contactweapon for use by surface craft against U-boats. The bomb has an overall weight of about60 pounds and carries 30 pounds of TNT. The charge is set off by contact with any hardobject after arming has occurred. Its light weight and excellent ballistic characteris-tics suggest using it as an airborne contact bomb launched by normal release. When usedin this way, the rocket motor with which the bomb is fitted is useless but not harmful.

Full scale model tests have been made both in this country and in England, whichindicate a high probability of doing lethal damage if the bomb explodes on contact witha U-boat. Experiments have shown no ricochets up to speeds of 250 miles per hour fromaltitudes as low as 75 feet. Underwater trajectory tests indicate approximately 35 feetforward travel and very little side travel.

The bombs will form a closed stick fo r a 500 to n U-boat with a fifteen foot spacingon a direct beam attack. A stick of twelve has, therefore, a length of 180 feet andweighs only 720 pounds. This contrasts with a stick of four Mark 17 depth charges havingan effective length.of 160 feet and weighing about 1300 pounds. However, since the"Mousetrap" is unarmed until it reaches a depth of about six feet, it is not suitablefor attack on a surfaced U-boat, and depth charges are recommended for this purpose.Moreover, the width of the contact bomb stick is, of course, only 15 feet, so that ifline errors must be seriously considered, the increased length of stick is offset bynarrowness as compared with a stick of depth charges.

"Mousetrap" bombs have been dropped on a U-boat by aircraft on two occasions. Inthe first case, on December 24, a PBY carrying two Mark 17, two Mark 29 and twelve Mark20 bombs, operating in the Trinidad area, dropped a pattern of twelve Mark 20 bombs ona fully surfaced U-boat . This drop was in error, since the intent was to drop th e depthcharges. As was to be expected. although two hits were made,-arming had niot taken place,and no explosions occurred. In the second case, correct tactics were used. On December29, a PBY attacked a fully surfaced U-boat with depth charges, after which th e planemade a sharp turn and came over the U-boat again while the conning tower was just sub-merging. .Mark 20 bombs were dropped on this run over th e U-boat an d one, or possiblytwo, contact bombs exploded. No positive evidence of a kill was obtained, though alarge oil slick was found on the ai r t een the same spot .24 4it


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C. ADMIRALTY NET DEFENS

This defense consists of a large net made of heavy wire with a mesh of five feethorizontal and two and one half feet vertical dimensions. It is carried on large boomsseventy to seventy-five feet long projecting fifty feet out from the ship's side. Thedefense extends between the two masts on a freighter, giving protection to number two tonumber f ive holds, inclusive.

When the net is streamed and in position, one of four things will happen if it isstruck by a torpedo:

(1) If a tropedo pistol hits the mesh wire or grip joining the mesh, the torpedowill probably detonate, and, as this will occur some fifty feet away from the ship's side,there will be only minor damage to the ship. This will happen to some forty per cent ofall torpedoes fired at the defense, no matter what speed they are running. This estimateis based on the size of the mesh and the diameter of the modern German torpedo pistolwhiskers.

(2) The torpedo may pass through the net until such time as its propellers getfouled by the mesh wires, in which case the torpedo may be caught and held fast by thenet.

(3) The torpedo may pass through the net and in doing so, have its tail deflectedup and forward so that it may be deflected under and aft of the vessel's hull.

(4) If the torpedo is running at a speed in excess of thirty-five knots, it maypass straight through the defense and hit the ship.

Extensive tests against German, British and U.S. torpedoes have shown that the netsstop or divert about eighty per cent of the thirty-five knot, twenty-one inch torpedoesand about fifty per cent of the forty knot, twenty-one inch torpedoes, that hit the net.The speed lost by a freighter when towing a net on both sides of the vessel is about oneand a half knots, and by a tanker about two knots.

Only a few reports of actual operations of this defense have been received, but in-dicated results appear satisfactory. The British steamship Fort Fork was equipped witha torpedo net in San Francisco, and caught three torpedoes on a trip from San Franciscoto Trinidad. One exploded but caused no damage. During the African operation, twenty-seven British ships were fitted with the Admiralty Net Defense. Two of these vesselswere attacked. One torpedo exploded in the net of the Ocean Pilgrim with no damage tothe vessel. Torpedoes were caught in the nets on each side of the Hardingham. These didnot explode but later dropped out of the net with no damage to the ship. On the otherhand, in the case of the Empire Celt, a British tanker, the torpedo broke one strand ofthe net, penetrated, and the vessel subsequently sank.

D. CAMOUFLAGE; AIRCRAFT vs. SUBMARINE

A submarine in a crash dive moves forward ten to thirteen feet in one second; anairplane in an attack moves nearly three hundred feet in a second. One second may meanthe difference beteen life or death to a submarine, and between a miss or a kill for anairman. Camouflage o th airplanes an d suibarines, therefore, is of considerable importance.

} _ ,l 25~I /


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- - - --. The British have experi-mented at great length with white

/ camouflage for aircraft on anti-aI__ _submarine patrol. Most signifi-

4-, o cant, perhaps, are a recent ser-/I ies of tests to determine the

O / I chances of aircraft approachinga, Ia0.0 within any given distance of a-3 4submarine without being spotted

by the lookout, and the variationI in this chance when the aircraft

04 is given white camouflage. Whit-0 I ley type planes, flying at one

thousand feet and at a speed of4 )one hundred forty knots, were

O ,_ - used as test models. All vari-o ables such as atmospheric condi-

tions, lookouts and their equip--f -x- ment were carefully controlled so

6,000 1,000 4,000ooo 3,000o 000 1oo,000 /0,000 go000o that any change could be attri-Range in Yards buted directly to the camouflage.

CHART IX Some of th e results of the'seexperiments are indicated on the

accompanying graph. It will be noted, for instance, that at twelve thousand yards thechance of spotting an uncamouflaged Whitley is .87, whereas the chance of spotting awhite camouflaged Whitley is .42. At this distance, the latter plane is only half as aptto be spotted as the former because of its camouflage. The graph - it must be remembered- applies only to a Whitley flying at one thousand feet at one hundred forty knots, andthe effectiveness of this camouflage will vary as the type of plane, altitude, speed andatmospheric conditions vary.

No single method of camouflaging an airplane, however, is perfect or even efficientunder varying conditions. If the undersurface of the wings of an airplane could bepainted.white so as to reflect 100% of the light falling on them, they would still appeardark -since they could reflect only light from the-sea, which is approximately 5% of thelight from the sky. Experiments are now going forward on artificial lighting of planesin addition to using the light reflective power of paint.

Vertical surfaces also present a problem in variables, since they may be seen againsta dark cloud, a clear sky or a brilliantly lit thunderhead. Thus white vertical surfaceswould be nearly perfect in a misty overcast area but not suitable in a sun-lit, cloudlesssky such as the Mediterranean or where the airplane might be subject to enemy air attack.

Camouflage is of no value when a plane is approaching from.the direction of the sun,since the plane necessarily will appear dark unless it is directly in front of the sun sothat the watcher is dazzled. The idea directly out of the sun26


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Experimental "White" Camouflaged B-25appears to be at such an angle that the lower wing surfaces are not seen and th e color ofthe plane itself matches the sky background. The accompanying photograph shows an experi-mental camouflaged plane on which, however, the de-icers have not been painted white.Paints which can be used on rubber recently have been developed for this purpose. Themost effective variations of aircraft camouflage for different geographical areas and at-mospheric conditions have not yet been completely determined. It is xpected, however, thatall Antisubmarine Command aircraft will be suitably camouflaged in the near future.

The submarine is anxious also to gain every second before it is sighted and conse-quently has exploited the possibilities of camouflage. The most common color used in thepast by a majority of submarines has been dull black - chosen because it reflects lesslight than any other. Its use in he past, however, cannot be taken as an indication ofits predominance in the future. U-boats operating in he North Atlantic, for example,have sometimes been painted a combination of light green, pale brown and sea-green blue,a camouflage decidedly effective under conditions of low visibility and disturbed surfaceconditions. The crew of a plane operating out of Nova Scotia in September, 1942, sighteda fully surfaced U-boat which had a sea-green hull and a white conning tower. They statedit was a very effective form of camouflage, giving the U-boat the appearance of a sailboat even in the excellent weather conditions prevailing at the time. Likewise in Septem-ber, Pan American pilots reported U-boats in he vicinity of Ascension Island were paintedwhite, which constituted an almost perfect camouflage for that particular area. Reportsfrom th e Mediterranean show a German preference for dark neutral, and an Italian for darkgreen with brown spots.

The Many different combinations of colors employed in amouflaging their U-boatsare indicative of German interest and effort in this field. Review of sightings of Germanand Italian submarines by Allied Air and naval craft reveals that the following colorshave been used cmouflage their U-boats: gray; light blue with alternate green andsky blue stripe acd conning tower; sea green with white conning tower; dark neutral grayand green; dark ray; light gray green; green white and dark green with brown spots.


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VIATTACKS ON GERMAN U-BOAT BASES

Admiral Doenitz' U-boat installations in Europe felt the weight of the RAF and USAAFten times during the month of January. Lorient, St. Nazaire, Brest and other submarinebases were raided. Seven attacks were carried out by the RAF and three by the USAAF.Hamburg, largest submarine manufacturing center in Europe, suffered it s 94th raid, whileCherbourg's 77th raid was executed by RAF Bostons. RAF Mosquito bombers attacked theshipyards and U-boat engine plants at Copenhagen. The first American bombing raid onGermany proper was made by Fortresses and Liberators over Wilhelmshaven and Emden.Seventy-nine took part in the attack and nine of forty-five enemy interceptors wereshot down.

St. Nazaire was the objective of "the most successful raid to date" on January 3rd,when USAAF bombers scored several hits on sub pens and docks and demolished a torpedostorehouse. The most popular target, however, was Lorient which was blasted five times -one pair of raids on the 14th and 15th, another pair on the 23rd, and a single long raid,which included Bordeaux as well as Lorient, on the night of the 26th. The RAF stated"the biggest force of British bombers sent against Europe so far this year" was employedat Lorient on the 14th, and thirty-five aircraft bombed Lorient and Brest on the 23rd.

Announced losses in eight of the raids totalled twenty-eight aircraft, an average of3* per raid. The largest loss in one raid was seven in the attack on St. Nazaire. Enemylosses at St. Nazaire and Lorient were conservatively estimated at 23 destroyed, 25 prob-ably destroyed, and 6 damaged.

Two examples of new tactics were displayed, one of deception by USAAF bombers, theother by German fighters. The VIII Bomber CoL1mand in operations from England againstsubmarine pens along the west coast of France dispatched the main effort out to sea atan altitude below 500 feet, thus concealed from Radar detection, until it was 115 mileswest of the target. At. this point the main effort climbed to normal altitude and,simultaneously, fighter or other diversions were flown toward the French north coast.Both the main effort and feint appeared on the enemy radio detection screen at the sametime indicating approaches from widely separated directions. The low-altitude approachgave the enemy a minimum of warning and the enemy was compelled to split it's fighterforce in half.

Unable to make the long flights to Lorient and St. Nazaire, Allied escort fighterswent as far as Brittany with the bombers, then picked them up again on the return home.Taking advantage of this situation, Nazi fighters waited till the attackers were overthe target area, then swarmed in against our bombers, attacking head-on from below inpairs and turning away on their sides so that only their heavily armored bellies wereexposed to return fire. Despite heavy AA fire and frequent attempts at interception byfighters, the German defense was not generally effective.

There is little detailed evidence of the amount of damage inflicted, but the raidsappear to have been highly suc ess u ACr eaux fires were left burning

28


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on the docks. Hits were scored on the shipyards and U-boat engine plants at Copenhagenand Hamburg. The Wilhelmshaven and Emden raids also were rated successful. -Lorientsuffered numerous hits on the sub pens, docks and other installations, as well as severalfires and RAF reconnaissance has shown that at least 10 acres of the base and naval ar-senal at Lorient have been damaged by bombings.

German propaganda maintains that it is ridiculous to bomb the sub pens at Lorientwhose walls are 11 feet thick and roofs impregnable, but this contention is denied byaccounts from Berne, Switzerland, repor t ing th e evacuation from Lorient of all personswhose presence "is not necessary for the maintenance of the economic life." This reportpossibly emanates from French authority, but the inspiration is necessarily German, asLorient is in the Forbidden Zone. Whether or not U-boats themselves were hit, the magni-tude of the damage inflicted can be measured by the necessity of mass evacuation of thepeople and the devastation recorded by the RAF reconnaissance.

VII

SUMMARY OF JANUARY WEATHER

The average contact weather during operating hours for the 25th Wing in the EasternSea Frontier area was 7470, with the area north of Cape Hatteras averaging 78% contactweather and the area south of Cape Hatteras averaging 70%. The lowest average was 67%in the Charleston, S.C. to Langley Field, Va. area.

The 26th Wing averaged 79%0 contact weather condition during operating hours in theGulf Sea Frontier area. Florida stations reported 84% contact weather and the remainderof the Gulf area 70%. The highest average of contact weather was found to be the south-ern part of Florida with 90%o. This is due mainly to the southward seasonal migration ofthe Doldrum Belt at this time of the year.

The lower average of contact weather in the Gulf and South Atlantic states was duemainly to the advection of the warm and moist tropical maritime air from the Gulf ofMexico and the tropical'Atlantic moving inland up the land slope to the condensationlevel to the vicinity of Cape Hatteras, and occasionally as far north as New England,producing low ceilings, poor visibility and widespread precipitation. Fog increasedover the Gulf.and South Atlantic states as is characteristic during the winter months.In addition, the fronts of cold dry air masses of high pressure areas moving southeast-ward from Canada had the tendency of stagnating in the vicinity of the Cape Hatterasarea.

The usual path of most cyclonic disturbances at this time of year through the NewEngland states resulted in a more or less regular succession of bi-weekly low pressurestorm area with accompanying fronts producing a considerable amount of snow or rain.An intervening ito 3 day period of good weather would be accompanied by cold northwestwinds. Patrol operations were considerably restricted in this area since about the timethe front &d oved far enough e stwrd over the Atlantic Ocean to permit extended


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UNCLASSIF EDpatrols, another front would be moving in upon the Atlantic Coast operating bases fromthe west or northwest. Ice on runways at bases north of Delaware restricted operationsfor several days or approximately 5% to 10% of the month.

The most active precipitation producing storms were those which formed from a waveformation on cold fronts that had previously moved off the coast and developed into adeep and intense low pressure area in the vicinity of Cape Hatteras, centered 100 to 300miles offshore near th e Gulf Stream, and moving generally northeast to the vicinity ofNew England coast where it is called the ,"Northeaster". The east wind that is producedon the Atlantic east coast causes the moist maritime air to flow inland aloft over thecolder air over the land surfaces to condensation levels. This type of storm continuesuntil a wedge of cold dry air from a high pressure area.from the northwest displaces themoist air and there follows the prevailing northwest winds accompanied by clearing skiesand the temperature often falling below zero degrees Fahrenheit even south of New YorkCity.

VIIINOTES ON BOMBING AND GUNNERY TRAINING

A short time ago questionnaires were sent to all units of this Command concerningthe availability of, bombing and gunnery ranges. A directive was issued to initiate theconstruction of more or less uniform range facilities at all airdromes occupied by ourunits. Reports now being received from Heavy Bombardment and our own anti-submarinesquadrons outside the United States indicate that bombing and gunnery training is notentirely satisfactory. It is our objective to provide all necessary training facilitiesat each of our stations for the present units and for newly activated squadrons. Thesenew squadrons in particular will need every facility for bombing and gunnery trainingthat can be made available.BOMBING: Submarine bombing peculiar to this type of attack requires specialized trainingbecause: (1) a submarine is a moving and elusive target; (2) ttack is largely a matterof opportunity and seldom can an ideal run be made; (3) resent bomb sights are unsatis-factory for submarine bombing. Results now depend upon the skill and proficiency of thebombardier which can only be developed and maintained by regular and planned practice.

In conjunction with this training, much needed study on the accuracy of present sub-marine bombing methods will be undertaken and data compiled. Such information is eces-sary, for example, to determine the ideal length of train. The length of train in urndetermines the spacing of bombs. Spacing, if too great, can result in a perfect straddlewithout a bomb within lethal distance of the pressure hull, and, consequently, the trainshould be as short as possible consistent with the expected accuracy.

AAFAC Circular 50-6 Antisubmarine Bombing practice, recently revised to authorizeadditional types of targets, is ased on the above considerations. Since it is a firstattempt, the methods advised cannot be considered final. As new training equipment,ammunition and bombing methods are obtained the cg g be revised. It is


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/tW 11So

necessary that all of this circular in submarine bombingpractice, in order that uniform results can be iled for study. Two civilian special-ists of the antisubmarine warfare unit of NDRC, stationed at Command Headquarters, willcompile the bombing accuracy data from practice records forwarded from lower units.Suggestions for revisions of this circular will be welcomed by the Command Headquarters.

The 26th Antisubmarine Wing initiated a comprehensive submarine bombing programprior to the receipt of AAFAC Circular 50-6, which calls for practice bombing of towedwater targets and actual practice bombing on submarines stationed at Key West. A similarprogram has been arranged and will be soon initiated by the 25th Wing.

The towed diving target has been tested by the first Sea-Search Attack Group andwill be procured and distributed to units of the Command. A study is being made to lo-cate suitable towing vessels. It is hoped that they will be made available to the Com-mand by the Navy.

AERIAL GUNNERY TRAINING:A circular will soon be issued concerning the training of aerial gunners. This

training has been seriously handicapped by a lack of facilities for ground training andof aircraft equipped for towing targets. To rectify this situation several E-5 trainersand turrets have been obtained and shipped to Headquarters Squadrons of the 25th and 26thWings and the 18th ARON. The use of this equipment will be coordinated by the A-3 of thetwo wings. Twelve B-34 airplanes will be equipped for tow reel installation and dis-tributed to the same units. A plan to request authorization of a tow target flightassigned to each Wing Headquarters Squadron is under consideration. The airplanes andpersonnel of the flights would be made available to the squadrons by the A-3 of each Wing..

Ground gunnery ranges should be selected close to the airdromes. The report of thecommittee of officers of the VIII Bomber Command, European Theater of Operations, stressesthe importance of ground ranges being easily accessible to the units concerned. Groundtraining is often a matter of opportunity. If time is lost through transportation, littletraining can be accomplished during the short periods between flights.

It is agreed in this Command that graduates from flexible gunnery courses are wellinstructed in the theory of aerial gunnery, but a great deal of practical training is re-quired on their return to the squadron and they should be given the maximum that thesituation will permit. The same committee of the VIII Bomber Command stresses the neces-sity for aerial gunners, armament and ordnance maintenance personnel to be thoroughlytrained in methods of handling ammunition and machine gun care and that the largest per-centage of turret failures can be traced directly to improper maintenance operation."GUNNERS SHOULD LIVE BY THEIR GUNS FOR BY CARELESSNESS THEY MIGHT DIE BY THEM."

Our training is conducted within th e United States and therefore there is a tendencyto slight training of aerial gunners. Each squadron commander must realize that nextmonth he an,-his unit may be in a theater of operations where losses may be expected fromenemy aer ac o. /It, behooves him to accomplish his aerial gunnery training now. Upuntil no ought has Pee v' to th e inclusion of offensive formation andevasive tactics e ingos,.ommand.. However, we do have a striking force


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Anow

mission and normal bombardment tactics must be practiced. For the time being, all train-ing of this phase of operation will be guided by WD Training Circular, Number 60 and WDTraining Circular Number 84.

TRAINING IN THE USE OF SMALL ARMS:This training must be accomplished so that each squadron will be prepared to take an

active part in airdrome defense. Recent reports reaffirm the value of the hand grenadein close-in fighting. For this reason it has been decided to . include such training fo rall our units. Parachute troops and airborne troops are most vulnerable and their disor-ganization is more easily accomplished during the first thirty minutes after landing. Iflanding of hostile troops takes place in dispersal areas a great deal of close-in fightingmay be expected to take place. These hostile troops will be carrying hand grenades andthe old solution of fighting fire with fire still holds.

IX

HISTORY OF THE ARMY AIR FORCESANTISUBMARINE COMMAND

On the morning of December 8, 1941, the Commanding General of the First Air Forceissued an order to the Commanding General of the I Bomber Command to institute imnmediateoverwater reconnaissance by all available aircraft to locate and attack any enemy surfaceforces which might be approaching our coast for raids or invasion. At 1005 that samemorning, Majors Lyon and Feagin of the I Bomber Command, together with a group of sevenenlisted men, arrived at Mitchel Field to begin operations. In the early afternoon,patrols by planes of the 20th, 43rd and 96th Bombardment Squadrons were flown along thecoastline. Thus, although there was no mention of providing air coverages for the pro-tection of merchant shipping or for the seeking out and destruction of enemy U-boats,these December 8th operations were the beginning of the Antisubmarine Command.

It can be considered a real stroke of good fortune that enemy U-boats did not put intheir appearance for the first few weeks of the war. The I Bomber Command, on December8, was part of the First Air Force, assigned to the northeastern section of the UnitedStates. The Command at that time was able to send out planes equipped with demolitionbombs, capable of conducting high-level bombing attacks against any enemy surface craftwhich might have presented themselves but the tactics and technique necessary for theconduct of anti-submarine warfare were non-existent. In addition, there were no facili-ties for joint Army-Navy operations, although the idea had at least been discussed onpaper. The original plan called for a joint operational headquarters for the First Armyand North Atlantic Naval Frontier. The Atlantic Naval Frontier, however, became theEastern Sea .Frontier, and the I Bomber Command operated with the ESF from the very firstday. Operations under a formal unity of command, however, did not begin until March26 1942.

After four days at M pFieldthte Headquarters moved to the 14thfloor of th e Federal Bull V l t 90 Q c ,k, and officially began opera-


35/38

tions from there at 1520, December 12th, with a message sent to all units notifying themof the new address.

The Command, by the middle of January, was able to set up a wire system of communica-tions to all bases, and had begun to establish a system through which intelligence couldbe communicated from Bomber Command Headquarters to squadron operations rooms, and fromairplane to Headquarters. Also, at this time, Colonel Bob Williams, who had been with theA-3 Section of the First Air Force, was assigned to the Command as Executive Officer andserved in this capacity until he was promoted to Brigadier General in October. On March1, Colonel Larson, Commanding Officer of the 13th Bombardment Group at Westover Field,was promoted to Brigadier General, and within a few days assumed command of the I BomberCommand, which now had a staff of sixteen officers, including Special Staff members. Unitswere located as follows: 92nd Reconnaissance Squadron, Dow Field, Me.; 45th BombardmentGroup, Grenier Field, Manchester, N.H.; 13th Bombardment Group, Westover Field, Mass.;20th Bombardment Squadron, Mitchel Field, N.Y.; and the 2nd Bombardment Group, LangleyField, Va. There was also a "striking force" of a few B-18's under the command of Col.Merrick, located at Charlestown, S.C.

The aircraft employed at that time were for the most part unsatisfactory for anti-submarine work. The only type of plane available in any number was the old B-18 which,at that time, was not equipped with Radar. There was one squadron of B-17's and a groupof DB-7's. At this time, all the observation aircraft were operating under the controlof the 1st Air Support Command.

It was soon realized that separate control rooms for the Army and Navy were unsatis-factory and steps were taken to set up a joint control room. With the aid of Wing Com-manders Canning and Gibbs of the Royal Air Force Coastal Command, and, under the directionof Commander Robert Payne of Eastern Sea Frontier a new joint Army-Navy control organi-zation was planned and construction begun.

Meantime the Army and Navy began joint operations in early April in what was thenthe Navy Control Room. Here the Army and the Navy Air Controllers and the Navy SurfaceController sat side by side for joint control. This system worked so well that asimilar control room was organized at Headquarters of the Gulf Sea Frontier at Miami.The Army unit sent by Command Headquarters became known as Gulf Sea Frontier. At thesame time work was begun on standardization of all station controls similar to the con-trol room at Headquarters.

Finally in October, the permanent Joint Control Room in the Federal Building wascompleted, and at 0800, October 9, operations were begun. The control room is located inthe center of the building while office space for Army and Navy personnel is on eitherside. Controllersiton a raised platform overlooking a situation map which covers theentire wall and includes all the coastal and water area from Halifax to th e Caribbean. 'In th e rear of the platform, Army and Navyj ntelligence Officers receive and evaluate

.~ -~~c ~ htlfrr to the Senior Controller for ac-incoming intelligence messages which ar thenreerred to th e Senior Control ler for ac-tion. Previously, the Intelligence Officers were located in separate rooms, but it wasfound that by working together, the evaluation of information was more accurately andquickly accomplished.

33


36/38

F .,CLRF DDue to the-geographical divisions of various commands, administrative difficulties

were encountered in the shifting of squadrons to new areas of submarine activity. Al-though a squadron could "pick up" and shift from Maine to Mexico in a day after receivingthe necessary orders, the processing of the move through the various channels of Army andNavy command would take a long time. To correct this situation, the Army Air Force unitsengaged in hunting submarines along the Atlantic Coast were organized as the Army AirForces Antisubmarine Command. This organization was created under the direction and ap-proval of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Thefield of operations of the Command was also greatly expanded. The directive stated ineffect that the Antisubmarine Command was to have no geographical limitations but wouldoperate against enemy submarines wherever they might be located.

In accordance with the directive,- the Antisubmarine Command was activated on October13, 1942, and was organized into two Wings. The 25th Wing took over the physical set-upof the I Bomber Command at 90 Church Street and the Gulf Task Force at Miami became the26th Wing. The Command itself also established its Headquarters in the Federal OfficeBuilding in New York. The Antisubmarine Command now consists of twenty permanently as-signed squadrons and three others that are attached. Three of the permanently assignedsquadrons are on.detached service outside the continental limits of the United States,while one is a training squadron directly under the Command. Eight are observationsquadrons which are currently making the transition to four-engine bombardment planes.

The equipment for the Antisubmarine Command has been standardized with the B-24 forheavy aircraft and the B-25 for medium aircraft. It is expected that the rate at whichthe Command will receive new aircraft will gradually increase as the overall productionof these plane types increases.

From a tiny nucleus of December 8, 1941, the I Bomber Command found itself withinninety days as the only tactical Army command in the United States actually engaging theenemy. The war in which it was engaged was with a singularly elusive and ruthless enemywho was destroying hundreds of ships and thousands of lives in our own home waters. Withvictory on the Atlantic Coast won, the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command now facesthe greatest expansion in its history and its greatest task,--seeking out and destroyingenemy submarines wherever they may be located. It is being called upon to do its part,in cooperation with the Air Forces and Navies of the Allied Nations, in destroying theenemy's one remaining hope of victory through cutting the supply lines to our armedforces.

xAMERICAN THEATER CAMPAIGN RIBBON

Many of the officers and men of this Command are now entitled to wear the AmericanTheater Campaign Ribbon. The Secretary of War has ruled that the duty performed by thecombat crew members of the Army Air Forces Ant rine Command while on anti-submarine'patrol at sea is considered as perice e e ntinental United States for thepurpose of authority Am 1 rbon.


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OPERATIONAL STATISTICS

Operations Table - January, 19435TH WINGBOMBARDMENT

3 ARON.4 ARON.5 ARON.6 ARON.

11 ARON.12 ARON.13 ARON.14 ARON.16 ARON.19 ARON.46 BS. .

TOTAL BOMBARDMENT

CIVIL AIR PATROL,COASTAL PATROL

# 1 ATLANTIC CITY, N.J .# 2 REHOBOTH, DELAWARE . .# 4 PARKSLEY, VIRGINIA# 6 ST. SIMON'S ISLE, GA .# 8 ST. JAMES ISLE, S.C. .#16 MANTEO, N.C. . . . . .#17 SUFFOLK, L.I . . . . .#18 FALMOUTH, MASS .#19 PORTLAND, MAINE. .#20 BAR HARBOR, MAINE. . .#21 BEAUFORT, N.C. . .

TOTAL CAP, CP.

TOTAL 25TH WING

18 ARON, AAFAC O.T.U...

RECON

175:20175:50226:1080:405:50

101:40

64:00120:35488:05

1438:10

RECON

240:55407:00174:30373:43259:37464:15518:55276:25362:20369:35408:17

3855:32

ESCORT

149:40202:3043:157:45

9:00

142:4044:35

599:25

ESCORT

949:15168:50175:20127:02198:3029:10

184:10255:05123:50113:10

2324:22

5293:42 .i ";%2923:47

245:35

SPECIAL

63:15113:0095:4549:300:45

4:4026:003:3597:4510:45

465:00

SPECIAL

465:00

TRAINING

162:1547:4094:4540:40104:55244:25134:20288:50161:4095:55

214:15

1589:40

TRAINING

1589:40

448:50

~ e~o

ro r

TOTAL

550:30539:00459:55178:35111:30346:05139:00.387:50165:15456:55757:40

4092:15

TOTAL

1190:10575:50349:50500:45458:07493:25518:55460:35617:25493:25521:27

6179:5.4

10,272:09

694:25

. . . . . . . .. .

~L


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COMb"' L". EAVENWORI I"I,,

3 169508513

26TH WING Operations Table - January, 1943

BOMBARDMENT

7 ARON . . . . . . . .8 ARON . . . . . . .10 ARON . . . . . . . .15 ARON . . .........17 ARON . . .........76 BS . . . . . . . . . ..

TOTAL BOMBARDMENT

OBSERVATION124 OBSN . . . . . . .128 OBSN . . . . . . . . .

TOTAL OBSERVATION

TOTAL BOMBARDMENTAND OBSERVATION

CIVIL AIR PATROL,COASTAL PATROL# 3 LANTANA, FLA . . . . .# 5 DAYTONA, FLA . . . . .# 7 MIAMI, FLA . . . . . .# 9 GRAND ISLE, LA . . . .#10 BEAUMONT, TEXAS . .#11 PASCAGOULA, MISS . . .#12 BROWNSVILLE, TEXAS . .#13 TAMPA, FLA . . . . ..#14 PANAMA CITY,. FLA . . .#15 CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS.

TOTAL CAP, CP.

TOTAL 26TH WING

RECON

17:55322:45128:45

27:20193:50

690:35

RECON

65:25174:05

239:30

930:05

RECON

552:25624:35546:05342:45461:30472:10477:,30580:35574:15443:00

5074:50

6004:55

ESCORT

29:35

9:40

106:00

145:15

ESCORT

27:10

27:10

172:25

ESCORT

224:50114:20117:15

6:1037:056:10

54:10

19:1090:30

669:40

842:05

SPECIAL

9:45

9:45

SPECIAL

9:45

SPECIAL

TRAINING

198:55400:15130:5516:2561:15

247:45

1055:30

TRAINING

104:15231:40

335:55

1391:25

TRAINING

9:45 1391:25

TOTAL

246:25732:45269:2016:2588:35

547:35

1901:05

TOTAL

169:40432:55

602:35

2503:40

TOTAL

777:15738:55663:20348:55498:35478:20531:40580:35593:25533:30

5744:30

8248:10

u-boat monthly report - jan 1943

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