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    Turkish Secularism: Will it survive?

    In Turkey, secularism is often portrayed as a matter of national security. Historical relationship between

    secularism and security.

    Adullah Gl.

    At the heart of Turkish debate lies a struggle between secularism and Islam. On September 2, 2004, for

    example, Erdoan proposed making adultery a crime. When the European Union criticized this move,

    Erdoan told them "to mind their own business.

    On November 15, 2005, after the European Court of Human Rights decided against permitting head

    scarves in Turkish universities, he declared that "only ulama [Islamic religious scholars] could"

    Turkish commentators and editorialists discussed whether the prime minister's statements suggested

    that religious law guided Erdogan as much if not more than secular law.

    he Turkish armed forces have been concerned about the recent situation [and are] an absolute

    defender of secularism [and] maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming

    from laws to protect the inalterable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey."

    But Gl's nomination was unlike any previous presidential choice: By tradition, the parliament selects for

    the presidency a consensus figure approved by all major political party leaders. The president, in other

    words, is supposed to be above party politics. But rather than seek such a consensus figure, Erdoan

    used his party's majority to impose a candidate, declaring Gl his party's choice a day before the

    deadline, effectively eliminating discussion. Following the July 22 general elections which ensured an

    AKP majority in parliament, he again imposed the same appointee despite promises to seek a consensus

    figure.

    Unease with Erdoan's actions led many parliamentarians to deny Erdoan and Gl a quorum, an action

    deemed legal by the Constitutional Court.

    For example, according to Article 104 of the Turkish Constitution of 1982, the president returns laws to

    the Turkish Grand National Assembly for reconsideration should he believe them unconstitutional;

    submits to referendum, if he deems it necessary, legislation regarding amendment of the constitution;

    appeals to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of either part or the entirety of certain provisions

    of laws, decrees, and Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the grounds that

    they are unconstitutional; calls new elections for the Turkish Grand National Assembly; represents the

    Supreme Military Command of the Turkish Armed Forces on behalf of the Turkish Grand National

    Assembly; decides on the mobilization of the Turkish armed forces; appoints the chief of the General

    Staff; calls meetings of the National Security Council; proclaims martial law or states of emergency;

    appoints the members and the chairman of the state Supervisory Council; appoints the members of the

    Higher Education Council; appoints rectors of universities; appoints the members of the Constitutional

    Court, the chief public prosecutor and the deputy chief public prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals,

    the members of the Military High Court of Appeals, the members of the Supreme Military

    Administrative Court, and the members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors. The

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    presidency is one of the most essential pillars of the political balance of power formulated in the Turkish

    constitution.

    And while it is true that the prospect of a veiled first lady was a source of controversy before the

    election, the debate over Gl's wife, Hayrunnisa, went deeper. In 2002, she sued Turkey beforethe European Court of Human Rights over the head scarf, but based on an unfavorable decision

    upholding the ban and establishing a clear precedent, she had to withdraw her complaint in 2004

    What the Kemalists have done and, perhaps, what Tapinar dislikes is forbid the use of religion

    for political ends. That Turkey's constitution relegates the practice of religion to the privatesphere is no more radical than the U.S. Constitution's separation of church and state.

    Erdoan has presided over a remarkable transformation of Turkish society. Fifty-one percent ofTurkish Muslims surveyed in 2006 think of themselves as Muslim first and Turkish second. A

    year earlier, only 43 percent thought of themselves as Muslim before Turkish.

    On March 14, 2003, Recep Tayyip Erdoan, leader of the Justice and Development Party (Adaletve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP), became Turkey's prime minister.(n1) While the AKP makes no

    secret of its Islamic roots, it describes itself as a conservative party that fully accepts Turkey'ssecular system of government.(n2) "A political party cannot have a religion, only individuals

    can," Erdoan explained.

    He has sought to reverse the ban on head scarves in state institutions, called for a "change of

    mindset" in the judiciary,(n5) embraced Hamas, and endorsed an Al-Qaeda financier.(n6) He

    has sought to equate religious school education with that of secular schools,(n7) and his political

    party has worked to enforce Islamic alcohol bans in some municipalities.(n8) On April 12, 2006,President Ahmed Necdet Sezer warned, "Religious fundamentalism has reached alarming

    proportions. Turkey's only guarantee against this threat is its secular order.

    . As he considers a presidential run, a juxtaposition of statements made early in his career with

    his actions as premier suggest that while his style may have changed, his agenda has not. Far

    from being just the Muslim equivalent of a Christian Democrat, Erdoan remains an unabashedIslamist,

    One ought not to stand [in respect, stiff] like a straw on Atatrk's commemoration events."--

    Hrriyet, May 12, 1994

    "I am against the [Western] New Year's celebrations."--Sabah, Dec. 19, 1994

    "Alcohol should be banned."--Hrriyet, May 1, 1996

    "Swimsuit commercials are lustful exploitations."--Hrriyet, Mar. 6, 1996

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    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan has been a sore in Turkish secularists side for

    over two decades. His bold tendency of mixing Islam with contemporary Turkish politics has setTurkey on a path of what many Kemalists would consider to be unconstitutional. Prime Minster

    Erdoan controversial policies have now spread across Turkeys borders. In the past seven

    years, during which Erdoan has been Prime Minister, Turkey has surprisingly and brazenly

    positioned itself as being far more connected to the Middle East. Some very recent events in thatregion are succinct examples of this new posturing.

    His fierce protests against the Israeli flotilla attacks and a controversial new nuclear agreement

    with Iran have cemented Prime Minister Erdoan as a major player in international politics. This

    new focus on Erdoan is vital because he is, indeed, one of the most important figures in all ofthe Middle East. Nevertheless, the most intriguing piece of Prime Minister Erdoans rsum is

    his precipitous rise through the dogmatically secular minefield of Turkish politics.

    Mr. Erdoan first became a significant figure in Turkish politics when he was surprisinglyelected as the mayor of the cosmopolitan city of Istanbul in 1994. He came into power as a

    member of the Welfare Party. During his term as mayor, he efficiently reformed many ofIstanbuls infrastructural issues, including fixing its water shortage problems. However, it soonbecame abundantly clear that the city was progressing toward a more conservative agenda. He

    openly claimed that he was the Iman of Istanbul and that he supported the proposal to

    inaugurate the parliament by reciting the Quran.

    In 1998, the Kemalist loyalist Supreme Court deemed Erdoans political party unconstitutional

    and sent him to jail for religious incitement of hatred. What was originally declared a victory

    for secularism turned out to only invigorate a very determined Erdoan . In 2003, Erdoanbecame the Prime Minister of Turkey after a changing of laws which effectively allowed

    someone who had served a prison sentence to become Prime Minister. He came into power under

    a new and initially more moderate political guise, the Justice and Development Party (AKP).

    His election as Prime Minister is one that should be accepted as an exceptionally democratic

    event. It is an event that the guardians ofAtatrks ideology, that is the military and SupremeCourt, are undoubtedly very bitter about. Hispartys recent reelection in 2007 garnered 46.7% of

    the vote and truly expressed the will of the people. This is a reminder to all spectators that

    Turkey is a country experiencing a democratic and profound transition. Prime Minister

    Erdoans policies reflect increasingly Islamic Turkish values. In a 2006 Turkish survey, Turkish

    Muslims were asked if they considered themselves to be primarily Turkish or Muslim. 51

    percent of respondents answered that they would describe themselves as being primarily Muslim.

    One year prior, the very same question was asked with only 43 percent of Turks claiming to beprimarily Muslim.

    Prime Minister Erdoans rise has shown that he is an extremely astute and effective politician.

    The dramatic shift in Turkish popular opinion is indisputable evidence of that. The military and

    Supreme Court would be wise to not intervene during his successful tenure. Such an action could

    potentially lead to mass rioting and grave conflict. It is by now clear that Turkey is graduallyexperiencing an unprecedented transition away from the West and towards the East. The Israelis

    committed a serious blunder by, essentially, murdering nine Turkish citizens who were on their

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    way to provide aid to Gaza. This event will only further infuriate Muslims in Turkey and incite

    more feelings of unity and compassion for the increasingly oppressed Palestinians. Prime

    Minister Erdoanhas and will continue to capitalize on Turkeys widespread disapproval ofIsraeli policies and actions. The recent nuclear deal with Iran, in which Brazil and Turkey agreed

    to enrich uranium for Irans energy use, certainly showed that Turkey is willingly to work with

    Israels enemies. Prime Minister Erdoan has masterfully effected change among the Turkishpopulace and has now shown that he is a major player on the world stage. The following months

    will certainly provide us with a clearer idea of just how far Erdoan is willing to go in his

    seminal transformation of Turkish policy.

    Haredi Jewish Uprising in Israel

    Most of us Americans are used to reading about the ongoing struggle between Palestinians and

    Israelis in Israel, but there also seems to be significant amounts of disagreement among different

    groups of Jews in Israel. Last week, ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazim Jews protested an anti-segregationist decision by the Israeli Supreme Court. The ruling mandates that an ultra-Orthodox

    community of Jews of European origins must share their school in the small village of Immanuel

    with Sephardic Jews of Middle Eastern and North African origins.

    The Euro-Israeli ultra-Orthodox Jews have accused the notably secular Supreme Court ofinterfering with their religious practices and defying their very conservative, or Haredi,

    interpretation of the Torah, the Jewish faiths holy book. To these very pious followers, theirholy book is the ultimate interpretation of how life should be experienced. Unfortunately for

    them, Israeli law does not seem to agree.

    Consequently, mass protests in Jerusalem, including over 100,000 angered ultra-Orthodox Jews,took place in the streets in a display of frustration against what they consider blasphemy. This

    event is especially significant because ultra-Orthodox are having far more children than the moremoderate progressive and conservative Jews. The ultra-Orthodox already make up for more than

    ten percent of the Israeli population. They also tend to be a burden on the Israeli economy since

    ultra-Orthodox men spend the majority of their lives studying the many complexities of theTorah (nytimes.com). The state has to find a new way to respond to this infuriated and important

    faction of its society. This is especially important because Israel must now define clear

    boundaries concerning how far extremely pious followers of the national faith can go in theirworshiping.

    The court has made this a landmark decision by saying that it will not tolerate racism by any

    means. Ultra-Orthodox Jews reacted by saying that their actions are by no means racist and thatthey are merely following the divine will of God. Separating a state-funded girls elementaryschool by a wall between light skinned Jews and darker skinned Jews would seem to contradict

    the communitys statements. Due to the court mandate, the Haredi-observing parents haverefused to send their girls to a school where they would have to interact with their Sephardic

    classmates.

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    Many ultra-Orthodox Jewish parents who ultimately did not comply with the court decision have

    been sentenced to serve two week long jail sentences for defying the Supreme Court s final andauthoritative word (nytimes). The fact that these parents are now being sent to prison has in

    many ways made these members seem like religious prisoners. One of the more active members

    of the community even stated that they are going to prison with pride (nytimes.com). What

    does this exactly mean for Israel? I would argue that it means continued and now morecomplicated conflict in a state already torn by deteriorating Arab and Jewish relations. This

    situation will further alienate certain members of society and create more fractures in the

    countrys social fabric.

    In the end, the most important implication of this whole conundrum is the effect that this willhave on the future of Israel. As mentioned before, the ultra-Orthodox community is now the

    home to the largest birth rates in all of Israel, averaging between six to eight children.

    (nytimes.com) Feelings of societal rejection, religious persecution and forced secularization of

    their communities could lead to widespread chaos and possibly violent clashes. Additionally, the

    Israeli economy will most likely suffer as modern market-friendly Jews are having less

    children and the traditional ultra-Orthodox are having far more. The Israeli government has tostrategize and play a balancing-act with the Supreme Courts secular tendencies with the ultra-

    Orthodoxs preference for following the Torahs law. If the government leaves things as they

    are, the implications for its nations future are dire.