turkey as a modern developmental state - tomas vaclavicek
TRANSCRIPT
1
TURKEY AS A MODERN
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE?
COMPARISON WITH JAPAN
INTRODUCTION
In the 2015 Brookings report about the fastest growing metropolitan
areas of the world, China and one other country accounted for 8 out of
10 of these areas. (Brookings institute, 2015) This second country was
Turkey, a nation of 75 million people at the border between Asia and
Europe.
The growth of these four cities – Izmir, Bursa, Istanbul and Ankara
symbolizes the developmental drive of this country. The economy was
growing 5.8% in the first 5 years since AKP took power. (Onis, 2010)
Economy is predicted to expand at rates between 3 and 4% in the next
years according to OECD (2015). Even though more moderate than in
the past, such growth rates are still compatible with Turkey catching up
to the poorer members of the EU, such as Romania or Croatia, which is
underway.
However, Goldman (2012) claims that the expansion of Turkish economy
was driven mainly by strong credit expansion with as much as 40%
annual increase in credit provided in 2011. Therefore, he suggests that
Turkish economic success is not going to be long-lasting.
Turkey is currently ranked 70th in the world in terms of economic
freedom, slightly above the world average, but far behind economically
free countries. (Heritage Foundation, 2015). Therefore, present-day
Turkey is hardly a good example of free-market liberalism, despite
liberalization attempts from 1980s on. But can it be considered a modern
developmental state or does it more closely resemble another model?
The key question of this essay is whether Turkey in the period of AKP
(Justice and Development party) rule is comparable to the
developmental state of 1950s and 1960s Japan and it focuses
exclusively of similarities with the features of developmental states.
The following sections of this essay will aim to answer this question by
briefly reviewing the political economy of Turkey, key features of
developmental states with the example of Japan as a role model and
further by evaluating present-day Turkey based on these features.
ANOTATION
This essay compares
the economic and
political development
or Turkey under the
AKP rule to the model
of developmental state
practiced by Japan in
order to industrialize
the country.
The findings suggest
that while there are
some similar features,
significant differences
such as a lack of
bureaucratic insulation
are present as well.
Thus the evidence is
mixed. Also, important
risks might endanger
Turkey’s economic
development and
cause AKP to lose
power.
2
1. TURKISH POLITICAL ECONOMY IN 20TH
CENTURY
Since the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, the new Turkish state has evolved through several
quite distinct phases of development. In the early years after World War I, president Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk and Turkish governments were mandated by the international community to keep the role of the
state in the economy limited, refrain from interventions in the interest rates and exchange rates and from
conducting industrial policy which could transform Turkey from an agrarian economy. (Goksel, 2015)
While Turkey has inherited a poor state of development from the Ottoman empire, an educated class of
intellectuals, bureaucrats and military officers was beneficial for its future modernization efforts. The ruling
Republican party (CHP) further secured its power by cooperating with land owners. (Goksel, 2015)
The free market period was followed by a statist era, covering two decades of 1930s and 1940s and
brought about by the economic chaos of the Great Depression. In this period, the state focused on soviet-
style planning and autarky. (Goksel, 2015) Nationalization, state-led industrilization and control over
foreign exchange was the sign of the times. Development was complicated by the onset of 2nd World
War and the period of 1940’s is now remembered as a „lost decade“ for Turkey.
The prevailing policy was briefly reversed in 1950’s, as the CHP’s obsession with long term development
led to dissatisfaction and electoral defeat. Landlords and capitalists also felt endangered and ceased to
support CHP. (Goksel, 2015) Agriculture was favoured by the newly ruling Democratic party (DP) as it
represented the majority of its electorate. While the beginning of the decade was very hopeful, a balace
of payment s crisis of 1958 meant a defeat for DP, both politically and economically.
Between 1960 and 1980, new developmental efforts were focused on the Import substitution
industrialization (ISI) and a new engine of growth. The objective was creation of large state owned
enterprises mainly in the field of manufacturing which was entrusted to specialized institutions such as
the State Planning organization (DPT) rather than to politicians. (Onis, 2010) The end of this period was
once again marked by a crisis. In 1980, a military coup turned Turkey’s political system over and brought an economic liberalization as
well as a greater orientation on export. State-owned enterprises were privatized or pushed to become
more efficient, austerity policies were implemented and a new middle class began to emerge. Many of
the privatization attempts, however, were stopped by the deeply entrenched statist bureaucruts and thus
only 8.3% of SOEs were privatized between 1985 and 1998. (Goksel, 2015) Liberalization attempts also
cannot be considered conventional, as the political and economic influence of the state increased rather
then declined. (Goksel, 2015) In 1990’s, however, Turkey’s strong economic growth came to an end and
instability erupted. The ensuing severe economic crisis of 2001 staged a perfect moment for Erdogan’s
AKP (Justice and Development party) to take power. (Onis, 2010)
Throughout the 20th century, statism has played a central role in the Turkish economy. Despite partial
liberalization after the post 1980s period, this statist legacy remained an important heritage even in the
AKP era (Goksel, 2015) Another important fact to note is that unlike most countries in the region, Turkey
did not have a colonial experience and Turkey’s NATO membership since 1952 has provided a generally
safe environment for development that its neighbors can only dream of.
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2. KEY FEATURES OF THE JAPANESE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
The next part of this essay tries to capture the essence of developmental states on the example of after
war Japan. To break down the developmental state model into distinct features and list provide examples
from Japan, the list of developmental state features mentioned by Leftwich (1995, p. 405) is adopted.
a determined developmental elite;
relative autonomy;
a powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy
(henceforth analyzed as pilot agencies)
the effective management of non-state economic interests
a weak and subordinated civil society;
repression, legitimacy and performance.
A brief description of each feature follows, drawing from Leftwich and other authors in the field.
2.1. Developmental elite led by strong national leader
Developmental states of the past were led by strong elites which were committed to leading their country
through a period of rapid industrialization and who often were willing to sacrifice the short-term welfare
of the people in order to build a modern economy. In some developmental states, the elites are recruited
largely from the military, as previous business class was often lacking.
Leftwich mentions that elites from the public and private sector are typically linked to a large degree and
that they often shift between civil service and positions in business or military. In Japan, the tendency of
high government officials, such as the vice-presidents of MITI, to retire from civil service early and move
to positions of top business executives, is well-reported. (Johnson, 1982)
Leftwich (1995) further mentions that we don’t necessarily find developmental elites as monolithical
structures, but rather as what he calls “shifting coalitions of diverse interests” (Leftwich, 1995, p. 406).
Therefore, identifying the developmental elite may be a difficult task.
Further, at the top of the hierarchy in the developmental states stands a strong national leader. In Japan,
we talk of leaders such as Shigeru Yoshida or Hayato Ikeda, both of whom launched bold economic
programs and who managed to retain legitimacy despite short periods of losing power and experiencing
political setbacks. (Johnson, 1982)
2.2. Relative autonomy
Relative autonomy, sometimes labeled as bureaucratic insulation, can be best understood as a certain
level of protection or independence in decision making of the bureaucratic elite from special interest
groups (Leftwich) If properly established, relative autonomy should prevent wide-spread corruption and
rent-seeking, as those seeking to use public resources for their own benefit should find no way of
changing policy choices. Throughout the first decades, Japanese bureaucracy was remarkably protected
from outside interests. Even though a certain degree of corruption was present, the distinguishing feature
is that it did not influence decisions about industrial policy (Stiglitz and Yusuf, 2001)
4
2.3. Economic bureaucracy and pilot agency
Developmental states had established agencies or state organizations which were responsible for
conducting industrial policy, economic planning and economic co-ordination beyond the scope of a typical
finance or economic ministry. (Leftwich, 1995)
The chief example of a pilot agency and first of its kind was the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), established in 1949 and operating till today in a slightly different form under the name METI.
Examples from other countries include the EPB in Korea or Council for Economic Planning and
Development in Taiwan. Often, these technocratic organizations could act on their own, without oversight
from the elected parliament, enabling them to be very powerful in formulating structural policies.
2.4. Effective management of non-state economic interests
This feature of developmental state is mostly focused on large economic power of the state and the
pursuit of policies which are sometimes called “economic nationalism”. Developmental states typically
actively influence their trade balance, with measures including even a ban on imports of certain goods or
foreign travel. Further, they control foreign investment, at least in their first years. Private economic
interests are subordinated to the developmental strategy (Leftwich, 1995) Japan saw a large number of
these policies and was also notable for a special company structure, Kereitsu.
2.5. Weak and subordinated civil society
Developmental states typically leave little space for activities of organizations like labor unions,
independent media, non-profit organizations and other civil society features. Concerning labor protection,
they might force workers into a state-controlled labor union as in Singapore or suppress the activity or
such organizations. In the case of Japan, this feature might be less obvious. Some authors actually argue
that civil society in Japan was active and became an important part of Japanese economic miracle,
contributing to the creation of social capital and more beneficial processes. (Jones, 2001)
2.6. Repression, legitimacy and performance
Developmental states tend to suppress civil liberties and protect their own political power. In non-
democratic countries, this might be done through outright repression. In formally democratic countries, it
takes a more subtle approach. Still, as Leftwich (1995) argues, they usually retain their legitimacy or even
popularity through their economic success and impact on many members of the society. They either
make the impression or take a genuine effort to “invest into human capital” in various forms – supporting
public investment in healthcare, education and in some cases housing.
In Japan, a representative of formally democratic country in the first after-war decades, the ruling Liberal
Democratic party managed to retain a remarkable level of legitimacy by relying on its economic success
as well as on an entrenched partnership between the party, bureaucracy and corporations, known as
Iron Triangle.
5
3. TURKEY VS. DEVELOPMENTAL STATE MODEL
In this chapter, present-day Turkey is analyzed using the framework of the Japanese developmental
state in order to bring insights about the key similarities and differences compared to this model.
3.1. Strong national leader
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current president of Turkey, has been a dominant figure of the Turkish politics
since the 2002 elections. He has held the office of prime minister between March 2003 and August 2014.
He left the seat only to become president of Turkey following a victory in Turkey’s first direct presidential
elections and securing the presidency for 5 more years under the latest amendment of Turkey’s
constitution. (NSP, 2014) The length of term was reduced from 7 years, but greater powers were vested
in the presidency at the same time.
Erdogan promotes a strong long-term vision of Turkey, such as an ambitions 2011 election promise to
join the ranks of 10 largest economies by 2023. (Faidi, 2013) This vision is supported by an alliance of
bureaucrats, representatives of Islamic civil society and Islamic interests and close ties with select
business associations such as MÜSİAD, which represents primarily Anatolia-based SMEs. (Goksel,
2015)
3.2. Developmental elites
Turkey has distinct business elites which are nowhere to be seen in the western world. They combine
socially conservative attitudes, Muslim piety and entrepreneurial spirit. (Faidi, 2013) With these
characteristics, they might remind us of the “protestant work ethics” embraced by 19th century sociologist
Max Weber. Indeed, the Anatolian Tigers, as they are frequently called, attract interest of researchers for
this unique combination of attitudes.
The business structure evolving under AKP rule is quite different from that which we could find in after
war Japan or Korea. Instead of large corporations and conglomerates, the Anatolian Tigers are typically
operating export-oriented, family-owned SMEs. Some companies, such as Boydak Holding, however
evolved to a complex structure including a bank, reminiscent of Japanese kereitsu. (Faidi, 2013, p. 3)
Unlike Japan, where the elites mostly built ties in top-notch universities (Johnson, 1982), the Anatolian
Tigers began networking in mosques and Islamic social networks (Faidi, 2013) Apart from this new class
of entrepreneurs, state-owned enterprises (SOE) are still important in Turkey.
As Japanese entrepreneurs were copying some inventions made in the USA and Koreans were learning
from Japanese business practice, Turkish entrepreneurs are reported to replicate German business ideas
(Faidi, 2013)
3.3. Relative autonomy
This feature represents probably the biggest departure of Turkey from the Developmental state model,
as the ruling party of Turkey is often accused of building ties with ideologically close businesses and
being an active player in clientelism. (Goksel, 2015) As Heritage Foundation (2015) puts it, “Corruption,
cronyism, and nepotism persist in government and daily life.”
According to Leftwich (1995, p. 410), formally democratic developmental states maintained bureaucratic
insulation partly by one-party dominance. The dominance of AKP in Turkish politics since 2001 thus
prepared good ground for achieving relative autonomy, but the chance remained largely unused.
6
However, other developmental states were also not corruption-free and as Leftwich mentions, in some
developmental states we can observe a mixture of partimonialist tendencies, corruption and autocratic
government alongside the rational, technocratic economic policies typically associated with
developmental states (Leftwich, 1995).
3.4. Pilot agency
While AKP rose to power promoting what some would call “Neoliberal” agenda combined with socially
conservative values of Islam, the actual policy conducted by the AKP government can be considered a
distinctly Turkish “third way” between statism and market economy. It is clearly influenced by past
development of Turkey and much more statist in comparison to Western political economy (Goksel, 2015)
Apart from the Ministry of Economy, Turkey also has a specialized Ministry of Development, which was
established in 2011 as a successor to the State Planning Organization, which has been around for a
large part of modern Turkish history – since the 1960 military coup. Ministry of development creates four
year development plan. Currently, Turkey is about halfway through its Tenth development plan focused
on years 2014 – 2018. The plan includes various components, ranging from economic issues to regional
cooperation and even human rights and issues of social protection. A report from Faidi mentions a great
expansion of investment in manufacturing (from around 25% of all investments in 2000 to 50% in 2008),
leading to a large shift of labor towards modernized sectors with higher productivity (Faidi, 2013).
However, R&D is significantly underfinanced compared to emerging economies and the EU (0.86% of
GDP in 2012 compared to 1.8% and 1.9%, respectively). (TEPAV, 2013) But overall, it is hard to find
such a powerful and independent institituon such as Japan’s MITI.
3.5. Effective management of non-state economic interests
Chalmers Johnson said: “Collaboration between the state and big business has long been acknowledged
as the defining characteristic of the Japanese economic system.” (Johnson, 1992, p.1) Let’s now take a
look whether we can find such a strategic ruling alliance in today’s Turkey.
Besides the growth of the SMEs described above, large Turkish companies became Europe-wide market
leaders in consumer durables. As an example, Goksel (2015) mentions that Beko became the top
company in the UK market and Vestel established itself as the 2nd largest TV producer in the continent,
just after Samsung. (Goksel, 2015) Large industrial conglomerates such as Koc or Sabanci therefore
play an important role in the Turkish economy. As Onis (2010) notes, many of the export companies have
been supported through protectionist measures, even during the “neo-liberal” period of Turkish
development. Select national champions, such as Turkish Airlines with 49% state ownership, also play
an important role both domestically and internationally, hand-in-hand with the foreign policy of the Turkish
government. (Intellinews, 2015) Many companies are also tied to the government through like-minded
business associations which AKP is nurturing, suggesting that Chalmers’s point is fulfilled in Turkey.
Goksel (2015) also mentions that unlike previous export-oriented industrialization (EOI) attempts 1980s,
new policies implemented in the AKP era paid more attention to the role of institutions and led to
enhanced growth based on Japanese and Korean example.
The role of foreign investments is different from the government-controlled model of after war Japan or
Korea. Due to lack of domestic savings, Turkey focuses on attracting foreign investment. A side effect of
this effort is the rise of ”hot money”, which exposes Turkey to the risk of sudden stops when hot money
retreats in pursuit of more promising returns. (Faidi, 2013, p. 7)
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3.6. Political authoritarianism and weak civil society
Formally, Turkey is still a multi-party democracy with the rule vested in the hands of elected parliament.
Authoritarian tendencies of the AKP, however, are not hard to find. In the period starting in 1980, the
country had faced two decades of increased political turbulence. In contrast, the political environment
was stabilized after the electoral victory of AKP in 2002. The party’s promise of liberalization was soon
forgotten. Instead, during his rule, Erdogan has been blamed of leading the country in a more
authoritarian way, creating what some perceive as “neo-ottomanism” – an attempt to amass the power
once held by the nation’s all-powerful sultans.
The government has demonstrated its power by implementing unpopular reductions to social security in
selected provinces in order to increase competitiveness. This and other steps of AKP might raise
inequality concerns. But, as observed in the data and contrary to most developmental states, Turkey has
retained a stable, albeit quite high, level of inequality during the AKP rule. (OECD Database, 2015)
However, at least one part of the civil society thrives. That is the part tied to Islamic values which are in
line with the official policy of AKP, such as Islamic charities. These charities, as described by Goksel
(2015), play an important role in Erdogan’s hybrid social policy.
3.7. Repression, legitimacy and performance
Through which mechanism does the leading party retain its legitimacy? Similarly to Japan, the ruling
party has not seized power by force, but rather gained it through elections. Fairness of the elections has,
however, been disputed and opposition is frequently labeled as “enemies of the nation”. (Kocamaner,
2015, p.5) Voting rules in Turkey also deserve attention, as they strongly favor the winning party. In 2002,
AKP managed to control 66% of seats in the parliament as a result of only 34.28% popular support. A
political party must achieve at least 10% of the vote to be awarded seats in the parliament. Therefore,
we can observe some growing degree of authoritarianism, which is appearing in the previously
democratic system.
AKP has also been able to secure legitimacy so far largely due to improved economic situation and
stability, through so-called performance legitimacy, which is at odds with the situation before AKP took
power, which became known as the “lost decades of Turkish development” (Goksel, 2015). For example,
poverty was greatly reduced since AKP took power, with the poverty headcount ratio decreasing from
30.3% of the total population in 2002 to only 2.3% in 2012. (Goksel, 2015) This happened despite a
reduction of relevant expenses in the government budget. The masses lifted from poverty by the
cooperation of AKP and its business allies then provide political support and legitimacy for the party.
A large percentage of Turkish population is reported as not covered by social security of healthcare.
(Goksel, 2015) This resembles the practice of developmental states, which were often accused of
exploiting workers and providing only minimal social protection necessary to make the workforce
productive. Evidence of investing into the worker’s productivity, which at the same time was typical for
developmental states, is however harder to find in case of Turkey.
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4. COMPARISON: TURKEY VS. JAPAN
Overall, there seems to be a number similarity between present-day Turkey and developmental state in
Japan. But some notable differences do not allow us to conclude that Turkey is a full blown developmental
state.
We can certainly find a strong national leader and close cooperation between the state bureaucracy,
ruling party and select business elites (such as the Anatolian tigers), similarly to Japan and other
developmental states. A unique mix of limited social protection and heightened state power in economic
activities (Goksel, 2015) also strongly resembles developmental states and leads to successful
achievement of at least some of Turkey’s developmental goals, namely poverty alleviation.
As developmental states were distinguished as “plan rational” rather than “plan ideological” political
environments (Leftwich, 1995, p. 403), it seems clear that both Japan after the 2nd World War and Turkey
under AKP are much closer to the “plan rational” model, even though Turkey seems to be focused more
on SMEs as part of its strategy. Ideologically speaking, the ruling elite in Turkey considers itself more
economically liberal and socially conservative, but with alleged cronyism and with a large number of
policies, the Turkish system seems rather pragmatic and rational.
Overall, the biggest difference between Japanese developmental state and present-day Turkey is the
lack of bureaucratic insulation in Turkey which encourages corruption and nepotism. If Turkey is
interested in imitating the developmental state of after war Japan and Republic of Korea as it claims
(Goksel, 2015), it should focus on dealing with this issue. A related issue is greater discontent with the
AKP led government, which is appearing since 2013, when corruption scandals brought about protests
largely followed by the media from all over the world. As a result of these protests, selected social media
sites were temporarily blocked, which can be considered a clearly authoritarian way of protecting the
power of the ruling party. (Kocamaner, 2015)
In developmental states, we typically observe a rapid change of industrial structure in a short period of
time. In Turkey, we cannot observe such a rapid change today. The importance of industry rather declined
moderately between 2003 and 2013. However, this is not necessarily a contradiction of a modern
developmental state in Turkey, as industrial share of gross total value stood at 23.4% at the beginning of
the period, which is more than the EU average of 20.3% (Eurostat Database, 2015) Rather, we can
observe an expansion in a broad range of services sectors. Also, the context of today’s global economy
might not favor such a change as much as the period of industrialization after the Second World War
which was the stage of Japanese economic miracle. For more detailed analysis of this issue, one can
refer to the debate about the 21st century developmental state, which is beyond the scope of this essay.
Also, it has to be noted that this essay focused exclusively on the comparison of Turkey and
developmental state model represented by after-war Japan, not a full description of political economy of
Turkey per se. There are some indications that Turkey could be viewed through the lens of a
partimonialist state as well, such as the cronyism and corruption scandals appearing in recent years, but
this would require a more detailed analysis of ideologies prevailing between the ruling elite (or lack of)
and a large additional research which would also go beyond the question this essay was aiming to
respond. The conclusions of this essay, however, are in line with Onis (2010), who claims that Turkey
has both characteristics of an economic tiger and a “temporary star” whose growth is endangered by
instability and hard to sustain.
9
The election in June 2015 brought a large setback for the ruling Justice and Development Party, as it
gained 40.87% of the popular vote and 258 seats in the parliament of 550 and came short of the 276
seat majority. A period of political vacuum and uncertainty resulted amids slowing economic growth,
mounting private debt and corruption scandals. The following elections in November were won by AKP
on the promise of bringing stability. However, with new conflicts and tensions arising in the region, this
promise might prove impossible to attain. Some scholars say that developmental states typically only last
for approximately two decades. Only the next months will tell if the AKP rule will end in the years
immediately following 2015 or if it will retain power similarly to Japan’s LDP.
CONCLUSIONS: RISING TIGER OR “TEMPORARY STAR”?
In closing, it seems that Turkey is close to the developmental state which we could observe in Japan
during the 1950s and 1960s in a number of ways. Some features such as bureaucratic autonomy,
however, are much weaker or missing. For example, the link between the ruling party, AKP, and such a
political establishment is harder to find. AKP seems as a supporter of developmental state policies only
in the last years, when it is becoming increasingly authoritarian. At the beginning, it ran in the elections
with a neoliberal agenda and aim to dismantle the entrenched Kemalist bureaucracy of the past. (Goksel,
2015) The ties of the government with Islamic businessmen, however, seem to have fueled economic
growth and helped AKP to retain its power and legitimacy.
Faidi now predicts looming problems for the Turkish economy, stemming from low savings, not yet fully
developed sophistication of exports and other issues. (Faidi, 2013) 2015 marked a slowdown in the
economy, investment outflow and a resulting weakening of the Turkish currency. Another factor, which
is worrisome, is the rapid debt expansion in the Turkish economy. While government debt is not high,
keeping around 46% of GDP (OECD Database, 2015), there has been a credit boom in the private sector
and the net external debt reached 51%, an unusually high level among emerging economies (Faidi, 2013)
This further fuels concerns about the sustainability of the Turkish development model.
Meanwhile, the notable political stability of the 2000s deteriorates. Resembling the way how the fast
growth of metropolitan areas symbolizes Turkey’s success, another shock might mark its upcoming
decline. On 10th October 2015, bombs exploded in Ankara, the nation’s capital, killing 102 people. In late
November 2015, a foreign policy tensions with Russia greatly escalated, as Turkey shot down a Russian
plane which allegedly crossed its border. Turkey’s NATO colleagues such as the USA stand by their ally
despite Russian claims that Turkey has been trading with ISIS. (CNN, 2015) This also highlights that
NATO membership and the role of Turkey in the region could have created favorable conditions for the
existence of developmental state at the crossing of Europe and Asia in the past. But amidst the worsening
security environment, the future of Turkey remains wide open.
10
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