Krzysztof Strachota

30

Turkey and The kurdish problem

new approacheS in the face of the Middle eaSt criSeS

NUMBER 30WARSAWFEBRUARY 2013

Turkey and The kurdish problem NEW AppRoAchES iN thE FAcE oF thE MiddlE EASt cRiSES

Krzysztof Strachota

© copyright by ośrodek Studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / centre for Eastern Studies

content editorAdam Eberhardt

EditorAnna Łabuszewska

co-operationKatarzyna Kazimierska

translationMaciej Kędzierski

co-operationJim todd

Graphic design pARA-BUch

dtp: GroupMedia

MapWojciech Mańkowski

photograph on coverKrzysztof Strachota

pUBliShERośrodek studiów Wschodnich im. marka karpia centre for Eastern Studies

ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, polandphone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40osw.waw.pl

iSBN 978-83-62936-19-9

Contents

MAiN poiNtS /5

thE KURdiSh pRoBlEM. iNtRodUctioN /7

I. KURdS – toWARdS SElF-GoVERNANcE /11

II. thE MAiN ActoRS oN thE KURdiSh politicAl ScENE /14

III. thE KURdS – chAllENGES ANd thREAtS /19

IV. tURKEY’S AttEMptS to RESolVE thE KURdiSh pRoBlEM /21

V. thE cRiSiS oF tURKEY’S policY toWARdS thE KURdS – NEW chAllENGES /25

VI. thE KURdiSh iSSUE – thE oUtlooK FoR tURKEY /30

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Main points

• For almost ahundredyears (sinceWorldWar I and thedis-integrationoftheOttomanEmpire)stability–orrather, thepermanent threat tostability–hasbeenakeychallenge fortheMiddleEast.Oneofthecentralelementsofthisthreathasbeen the so-called Kurdish problem, that is, the issues thatcontinually arise between the states of the region and theKurdishminority living in the area, aswell as the tensionsamongtheindividualstatescausedbyarangeofissuesrelatedtolocalKurds.ThecountrymostaffectedbytheKurdishprob-lemisTurkey.

• The last decade has been a period of deep tensions and re--evaluations across theMiddle East, with both domestic aswellaswider,geopoliticalramifications.This,inturn,hasledtoarapiderosionoftheregionalorderthatuntilnowhaden-suredat least somedegreeof stability.TheArabSpringandthecivilwarinSyria(since2011)arethetwomoststrikingex-amplesofthechangingreality.ThereturnoftheoldpoliticalorderacrosstheMiddleEastappearsratherunlikely.

• In the context of the Arab Spring, little attention has beenpaid to thechangesundertakenbyboth theKurdsandTur-key.Inbothcasesthepastdecadehasusheredinsignificantinternal transformations, and in both cases these changeshavereflectedthebroaderprocessesoccurringintheregion.Whatismore,inbothcasesthesetransformationshavebeenanimportantfactordrivingfundamentalchangesacrosstheMiddleEast.

• Attheendof2012,theKurdishpeople(regardlessoftheirin-ternalheterogeneity)arethestrongesttheyhavebeenintheirrecent history: they havemanaged to take effective controlovertheareastheyinhabit inIraqandSyria,andtheyhaveobtained significant political andmilitary power in Turkey.

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Consequently,theKurdishpeoplearenolongerperceivedonlyasanobjectandatoolintheMiddleEasternpolitics,butareincreasinglybeing seenas an independent entity on the re-gion’spoliticalscene.

• The changeswitnessed in Turkey over the last decade havehadanevengreater impacton theregion:namely,Ankara’sevolutionarybutconsistentprocessofre-modellingthestateanditsforeignpolicy,includingTurkey’sgrowingengagementintheMiddleEast,withthehopeofsecuringthepositionoftheregion’s leader.Consequently,TurkeyhasadoptedanewapproachtotheKurdishissue:domestically,byliberalisingitspreviouslyuncompromisingpositionon theKurdishminor-ity,andinitsforeignpolicy,byidentifyingthe(Iraqi)KurdsasoneofAnkara’skeypartnersinregionalpolitics.

• TheprocessoftheempowermentoftheKurdishpeopleisnotcompleteyet,and itsoutcomecannotbeguaranteed.At thisstage, Turkey’s position on its ownKurdishminority leavesmuchtobedesired,whileAnkara’sachievementsinitsMiddleEastpolicyremaindebatable.Moreover,Turkey’sspectacularprogressinitsrelationswiththeIraqiKurdshasbeentintedbynewthreats,includingthosegeneratedbytheKurdsthem-selves.TheKurdishminorityandtheTurkishstatearebothsubjecttoandthemaincausesofregionaltensionswhicharedynamic,turbulentanddifficulttoresolve–astateofaffairswhichislikelytocontinuewellintothefuture.InviewofthescaleofthechallengesfacedbyTurkey,asolutiontotheKurd-ishproblemisnotonlyaconditionforrealisingAnkara’sre-gionalambitions,butalsoforensuringthecountry’sinternalstabilityand thenatureof the transformations.And for theKurds, good relationswithTurkeyarenecessary if theyaretomaintainandstrengthentheirexistingaccomplishments.Pastexperienceshows,however,thatalthoughthiswillnotbeaquickandeasyprocess,apositiveoutcomeisnotimpossible.

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the Kurdish probleM. introduction

TheKurdishproblem– i.e., the deep and on-going tensions be-tweenKurds and the countries inwhich the Kurdishminoritylives(Turkey,Iraq,Iran,Syria)–hasoverthelastcenturybecomepermanently inscribed in thepolitical specificity of theMiddleEast1.Toagreateror lesserdegree, theKurdsareactivelyseek-ingtoexpandtheirpoliticalpowers,includingcallsforindepend-ence. In order toprotect their territorial integrity and internalcohesion,thecountriesintheregionhavetreatedKurdishaspira-tionsasathreat,andhavethereforeactivelyopposedthem.

box 1. Kurdistan Ageo-culturalregioninhabited,noworinthepast,bytheKurdishpeople,whoconstitutetheregion’sdominantethnicgroup.ItincludestheeasternareasofTurkey,northernIraq,westernIranandnorthernpartsofSyria.Dependingonthemethodology,Kurdistan’sareahasbeenestimatedatbetween200,000km2and530,000km2.DespitetheKurds’richhis-toryandculturalidentity,‘Kurdistan’hasneverexistedasaseparatestate;untilthetwentiethcentury,onecouldspeakofsemi-autonomousKurdishprincipalitieslocatedwithintheOttomanandPersianempires,andlatertheKurdishautono-mieswithinIraq.ProvincesnamedKurdistancurrentlyexistinbothIraqandIran,althoughthesedonotcoverallthear-easinhabitedbytheKurds.InTurkey,meanwhile,theuseofthenameKurdistan,withreferencetothecountry’seasternandsouthernprovincesinhabitedbyKurds,hasbeencon-sistentlyopposedinordertomaintaintheunitarynatureoftheTurkishRepublic.Inthepresentarticle,thetermKurdis-tanisusedinitsbroadsense,anddoesnotimplytheregion’spoliticalautonomyorpowersofgovernance.

1 FollowingtheOttomanEmpire’sdefeat inWorldWarI (1918), thedivisionof its land (including the allocation of areas to the Kurds) was sealedbythe1923TreatyofLausanne.

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Theso-calledKurdishproblemisparticularlyvisible inTurkey.ThisisduetothefactthatTurkeyishometoabouthalfoftheen-tireKurdishpopulation(betweenafifthandaquarterofallTurk-ishcitizensareofKurdishorigin2).ThetraditionallynationalisticandcentralisednatureoftheTurkishRepublicmakesthisconflictparticularlypronounced,andthepossibilityofapoliticalsolutionto theproblemremainssmall.Since 1984,nearly40,000peoplehavebeenkilledinthetensionsbetweentheTurkishstateandtheKurdishminority,whilethecostoftheunresthasbeenestimatedatnolessthan$300billion.

Untilrecently, theKurdishproblemhadbeenquitesuccessfullycontainedbyall countriesacross theregion (includingTurkey).Thiswaspossibleduetothecountries’powerandconsistencyintheirnationalpoliciestowardstheKurds,aswellasthankstoef-fectivecooperationbetweenvariousregionalactors in thefightagainstKurdishseparatism.Overthe lastdecade,however,andespeciallyintheaftermathoftheArabSpring(early2011),therehasbeenasignificantchangeintheapproachtotheKurdishprob-lemacrosstheMiddleEast.Thischangehasbeenfuelledprimar-ilybyaseriesofcrisesandre-evaluationsintherespectivecoun-triesoftheregion.Theseareasfollows:theoverthrowoftheIraqiregime following US military intervention, which sparked theturbulentdisintegrationofIraq(since2003);ancivilwarinSyr-ia,ongoingsince2011;amountingcrisisinIran(causedbyIran’snuclearprogrammeandTehran’sattemptstoprotectandextenditsinfluenceacrosstheMiddleEast);andfinally,adeepre-eval-uationofgoalsinTurkey’sdomesticandregionalpoliciesfollow-ingthetakeoverofpowerbytheJusticeandDevelopmentParty(AKP)in2002.Allthissignalsanongoingandlong-termshiftintheregionalorder,whichatthisstagemakestheKurdsnotonlythekeyobjectofthesechanges,butis increasinglyencouraging

2 Estimatesrangebetween 11and25millionKurds,witha totalpopulationof Turkey at nearly 75million;moderate estimates suggest 13-19million.Formore,seeBox2.

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themandtransformingthemintoapoliticalplayer,especiallyinIraq and Syria,whereKurds exercise real control over denselypopulatedareas.

Over thepastdecade, theKurdish issuehasalsobecomea cen-trepoint inTurkishpolitics.TheAKP’spolicy of reforming thecountry’s political system (including a shift from a nationalistideology centred on the army to an ideology developed aroundcitizenshipandculture,particularlyIslamicculture)andariseinindependentgovernanceintheMiddleEasthaseffectivelyturnedtheKurdishpeopleintoasignificantpoliticalpartnerforAnkara.Thecomplicationslinkedtotheimplementationofthispolicy(thelackofpolitical consistencywithinTurkeyandanescalationofthecrisisinSyria)haveledtoanunexpectedexacerbationoftheKurdish issue inTurkeyandmade itakeyprobleminAnkara’sMiddleEastpolicy.Currently,itappearsthatbothTurkey’sinter-nalstabilityandthedirectionofitsdomesticreforms,aswellasTurkey’sfuturepositionintheMiddleEast,willdependtoagreatextentonasolutiontotheKurdishproblem.

box 2. the Kurds

TheKurdsareanIranicpeople(unliketheTurksandArabs),thevastmajorityofwhomareSunniMuslim(whichdistin-guishesthemfromShiitePersiansandAzeris inIran).MostoftheKurdishSunnisinIraq,TurkeyandIranbelongtotheShafi’i school,whichdistinguishes them fromHanafiTurksandArabs,aswellasthenewultra-conservativemovementsinspiredbyWahhabismandSalafism.Others adhere to Im-mami and Alevi Shiism, and Yazidism. The population islinguistically diverse (with Kurmanji and Sorani being twomain dialects), and shows historical and cultural heteroge-neity(includingsuggestionsthatZazaKurdsandYazidisfalloutsidetheKurdishethnicgroup).Throughoutthetwentiethcentury (andespecially in the last fewdecades) theKurdishpeoplehave beenundergoing a process of identity building,

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shapedbydynamicmigration(i.e.internalmigrationtolargeurbancentres,especially inTurkey,andeconomicandrefu-gee migrations to theMiddle East and theWestern world).

There are no reliable data on the exact number of Kurds.EstimatesplacethesizeoftheKurdishpopulationat30-45mil-lion,ofwhich13-19millionliveinTurkey(18-25%ofTurkey’spopulation),6.5-8millioninIran(7-10%ofIran’spopulation),about 6.5 million in Iraq (15-23% of Iraq’s population), and1.7-2.2million inSyria (6-9%ofSyria’spopulation).TherestoftheKurds live inothercountriesacrosstheregionandinEurope(including800,000inGermany).

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i. Kurds – toWards selF-GoVernance

Attheendof2012,theKurdsfindthemselvesinthestrongestpo-sitiontheyhavebeeninforacentury,thatis,sincethecollapseoftheOttomanEmpireandtheemergenceoftheso-called‘Kurdishproblem’.Sofar,despitetheirdemographicpower,astrongsenseof distinctiveness and sustained resistance to the centralist ac-tionsofTurkey,Iraq,IranandSyria(usuallydrivenbynationalistsentiments),theKurdshaveremainedpoliticallyweak.Thiswascausedby,amongotherthings,disproportionatepowerrelationsbetweentheKurdsandthemodernstatesintheregion,aswellasregionalcooperationinthefightagainstKurdishseparatism(de-spiteoccasionalshort-termtensions),andnotleasttensionsandseriousconflictsamongtheKurdsthemselves.

Currently,theKurdshavetheirownstateinsideIraq(anautono-mousregionofKurdistan,whichremainsafederalentitywithinIraq–seebelow).Theyalsocontroltheareastheyinhabitinwar-tornSyria,andforthelastyearandahalftheyhavebeenengagedin armed struggle against Turkey, which occasionally allowedthemtotakefullcontroloftheirterritory(atthelocallevel).

TheriseintheKurds’politicalcapacityandaspirationshasbeeninfluencedbyaseriesofprocessestakingplacewithintheKurd-ishethnicgroup,namelytheirpositivedemographictrends(par-ticularly the ethnic proportions inTurkey,which are changinginKurds’favour),aswellascontinuedmodernisation(including,rising levelsofeducation), thegrowingaspirationsof theKurd-ishpeople,andthematurationandstrengtheningresolveoftheKurdish elites3. Although at times complicated, the democratic

3 The twomain centres ofKurdishpolitical activity are the elites runningIraqi Kurdistan (primarily associated with the Barzani family) and theKurdistanWorkers’Party(PKK)togetherwithitsassociatedorganisationsthroughoutKurdistan.The formerhasexperienceofovereightyyearsofstruggle,andthelatternearlyfortyyears.Bothhavebeenengagedinlarge-scalesocial,organisational,andpoliticalactivity(alsointernationally).

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anddecentralisingprocesseswitnessedinthecountriesexercis-ingsovereigntyoverKurdistanhaveplayedanimportantroleinencouragingtheKurdishpeople.InthecaseofIraq,theUSmili-tary interventions in 1991 and 2003 imposed federalisation anddemocratisationon thecountry; inTurkey, thedemocratisationofthenationwasintensifiedundertheAKP;whileinSyria,thechangeshavebeenbroughtaboutbyacivilwarlaunchedonthebackoftheso-calledArabSpring4andfoughtundervaguedemo-craticsloganssince2011.

Kurdistan has also benefited from recent geo-political develop-ments in the region: a substantially weakened position of IraqandSyria,problemsinIran,anddifficultiesinpan-regionalcoop-erationagainstKurdishaspirations.TheKurdsmightalsobenefitfromthegradualcollapseoftheexistingregionalorder,especial-lyintheareaofnationalsecurity.AfterplayinganinstrumentalroleincreatingandsolidifyingtheKurdishAutonomousRegioninIraq,TheUnitedStatesispullingoutofitsroleastheregion’spoliceman,and thealliancebetweenTurkeyand Israel, seenasapillarofUSpolicyandakeyelementstabilisingtheregion,hascollapsed5.Dynamicchangesaretakingplaceintherelationsbe-tweenthecountriesoftheregion6,whilecrisesintheindividualstates are allowing radical Islamic movements and ethnic mi-noritiestoenterthepoliticalarenaasimportantplayers.Inviewofthegrowingchaosandcrisisofconfidence,theKurdsarein-creasinglybeingtreatedasavaluabletoolinthepoliticalgamesplayedbySyria,IranandTurkey,amongothers.Forexample,the

4 The mass-scale and turbulent political and social protests that sweptthroughalltheArabstatesin2010-2011,initiatingtheon-goingprocessofredefiningdeepideological,geopoliticalandpoliticaldevelopmentsintheArabworld(lastingachievementsincludetheoverthrowoftherulingre-gimesinTunisia,EgyptandLibya).

5 Fighting forastrongerposition in theArabworld, theAKPturnedTurkeyintoachampionofthePalestiniancauseandasharpcriticofIsrael’spolicies.

6 Examplesincludetheso-calledSunni-Shiiteconflict,i.e.,betweentheGulfStatesandtheirallies,andIran,SyriaandIraq;andSyriaandTurkey’stran-sitionfromcloseco-operationtobitterconflict.

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chaoticstateofaffairspresentinIraqsince2003hascontributedto the dynamic development of relations between Ankara andErbil (theadministrativecapitolof Iraq’sKurdishregion)at theexpense of previously good relations with Baghdad. FollowingtheoutbreakofacivilwarinSyriain2011,TurkeybecameavocalopponentoftheregimeinDamascus,whichendedthecountries’cooperationintheirfightagainsttheKurds(theso-calledAdanaagreementof1998),anddroveawedgebetweenTurkeyandIran,whichhasactivelysupportedDamascus.ThishasalsoincreasedtheattractivenessoftheKurds(especiallyinthecaseoftheIraqiKurds) to other countries interested in influencing geopoliticaldevelopmentsintheregion(includingtheUS,Israel,Russia,EUmemberstates,andPersianGulfstates).Theincreasedinterestinestablishingdialogueand cooperationwith theKurdshasbeenexemplifiedbyaseriesofstatevisits,includingofficialvisitsbythe head of Iraqi Kurdistan,Massoud Barzani, toWashington,Moscow,DohaandseveralEuropeancapitals,aswellasthemush-roomingofforeignconsulatesinErbil7.

7 Thewider context for today’s contacts had been created through severaldecadesofrepeatedinvolvementbyRussia(orrathertheformerSovietUn-ion), Israel and theUS, leading to speculationabout arms supplies to theKurds,especiallybyIsrael.

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ii. the Main actors on the Kurdish political scene

Currently,theKurdshavetwomainpoliticalcentres:theIraqire-gionofKurdistanandtheKurdistanWorkers’Party(PKK).

The former is a real Kurdish autonomous region within Iraq,whichwascreatedafterthefirstGulfWar(1991),bolsteredbythe2003AmericanmilitaryinterventioninIraq,andenshrinedintheIraqiconstitutionof2005(KurdistanisdejureapartoftheIraqifederation;however, it isde factoavirtually independentstate).Theareawasseparatedpolitically fromIraq,and incontrast toIraq proper, the situation in Kurdistan remains stable. The re-gionboastsawell-developedandfunctioningadministration,itsownarmedforces(atleast100,000troops,defactoindependentfromBaghdad);italsopursuesanindependentforeignpolicyandeconomicpolicy8,whichisperceivedasresponsibleandcrediblebyotherstates(includingTurkey)andbyenergycompanies.De-spiteobjectionsfromBaghdad,KurdistanhaswelcomedforeigninvestorssuchasChevron,Total,ExxonMobil,andGazpromNeft’,whichconfirmsErbil’scredibilityandcanalsobeseenasanex-pressionofsupportforKurdistanfromcountriessuchastheUSInaddition,foreigninvestmentprovideslong-termprospectsforthedevelopmentof an IraqiKurdistan independent fromBagh-dad.ThedominantpositioninIraqiKurdistanhasbeentradition-allyheldbytheBarzanifamily9;thepresidentoftheautonomousregion,MasoudBarzani,hopestopositionhimselfastheleaderoftheKurdishcauseoutsideIraq10andinthewiderworld.

8 Oneparticularmanifestationofthiswasthedevelopmentoftheenergysector.9 Since the beginning of the twentieth century, they have led rebellions

againsttheOttomans,theBritish,andIraq.TheBarzanifighterswerethearmyofanephemeralandpro-SovietKurdishRepublicofMahabadbasedinIran(1945-1946);afterthefalloftheRepublic,Barzaniwasofferedasy-lumintheSovietUnion.AfterreturningtoIraqin1958,BarzanionceagainheadedthepoliticalandarmedstrugglefortheindependenceofKurdistan.

10 In2011-2012BarzaniledtotheunificationofmostKurdishpartiesinSyria(resulting, in 2011, in the establishment of the KurdishNational Council

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box 3. (autonomous) region of (iraqi) Kurdistan – Kurdish regional Government

area: 40 643 km2 [the Kurdish autonomous region andBaghdad have so far failed to reach agreement on the sta-tus of Kirkuk province and parts of Nineveh and Diyaladistricts, all of which remain under Baghdad’s control].

population: 5.2million[lackofdataontheethnicmake-upoftheregion;alongsidethestronglydominantKurds,Kurd-istan is inhabited by Arabs, Turkmen, Assyrians, Yazidisandothers]11.

capital: Erbil(Kurdish:Hevler).armed Forces: officially 100,000 Peshmerga troops (formerguerrillafighters,nowcharacterisedasatypeofnationalde-fenceforceorinteriortroops;reducedfrom300-400,000around2005);thefiguredoesnotincludetheZerevani(themilitarisedtroopscontrolledbyKurdistan’smainpoliticalparties),northeAsayesh(theparty-controlledintelligenceagency).

ThemainpoliticalforcesintheKRGaretheKurdistanDem-ocraticParty(KDP),headedbyMasoudBarzani(alsothere-gion’spresident)andthePatrioticUnionofKurdistan(PUK)led by Jalal Talabani (the president of Iraq). The PUK wasformedfollowingasplitwithinKDP;formanyyearsthetwopartieswerepoliticalrivals,butnowtheyformthepillarsofthe rulingKurdistanList coalition).Kurdish Islamic groupsareseenaspotentialrivalsto/bythecurrentpoliticalestab-lishment.

madeupof15parties)andinIran(the2012allianceoftheKurdishDemo-craticPartyofIranandKomala).ErbilhasbeentrainingandarminggroupsofSyrianKurdslinkedtoKurdishNationalCouncil.

11 Source:KurdistanRegionalGovernmentwebsitehttp://www.krg.org/?l=12

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Selected consular offices and chambers of commerce are lo-catedinErbil:Egypt,theUnitedKingdom,France,Germany,Iran,Jordan,Palestine,Russia,Turkey,theUSA,Italy,Korea,Romania,Sweden,Greece,andtheUAE.

The second political centre is the Kurdistan Workers’ Party(PKK),aradicalnationalistpartyespousingMarxistideology.Formorethan30yearsthePKKhasbeenengagedinterrorist/guer-rillawarfarethroughouttheregionnowknownasKurdistan.ItsstrengthliesinthelevelofsupporttheyreceivefromtheKurd-ish people and in its organisational skills, as evidenced by, forexample, anetworkof localpartyoffices indifferent countries,andanetworkoforganisationsthroughouttheKurdishdiaspora,especiallyintheEU.ThePKKalsohasaveryefficientarmysta-tioned in Iraq’s QandilMountains (moderate estimates suggest3000-10,000militantsand40,000familymembersandlogisticssupport),whichisreadyforactioninTurkey,SyriaandIran.Al-thoughthePKKisregardedasaterroristorganisation(forexam-plebyTurkey,theEUandtheUSA),inrealityithasbeenviewedasapartnerinpoliticalnegotiations(includingtheTurkey-PKKnegotiationsheldinOslobetween2005and2011).Atthemoment,thePKKiscarryingoutalarge-scaleguerrillawarinTurkey,andhas seized political control over Syrian Kurdistan through theDemocraticUnionParty (PYD).This reaffirms thepowerof thePKK,aswellasitsattractivenessasapotentialallyorpoliticaltoolforSyriaandIran.

box 4. pKK – Kurdistan Workers’ party Strictlyspeaking,thePKKwasanillegalKurdishnationalistandMarxistpartyfoundedin1978byAbdullahÖcalan(akaApo), which was engaged in terrorism and guerrilla war-fare,predominantlyagainstTurkey(significantlyincreasingthescaleofitsactivityafter1984),butwhichalsooperatedinotherareasofKurdistan.In2002,thepartybecametheCon-gress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan (KADEK).

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Inabroadersense–asusedinthepresentarticle–theKurd-istanWorkers’Partyisacomplexanddynamicnetworkofor-ganisationsoperatingasemanationsofthePKK,evolvedtore-flectthechangingcontext.FormalauthorityoverthenetworkliesinthehandsoftheKurdistanCommunitiesUnion(KCK;foundedaround2005),whichwasconceivedasaplatformforcivilandurbanactivityandanumbrellaorganisationforthelegislature (Kongra Gel), the People’s Defence Forces (HPG),and the judiciary. The PKK has been dominated by TurkishKurds,withtheFreeLifePartyofKurdistan(PJAK)andtheDemocraticUnionPartyofSyria(PYD)asitslocalbranches.Kurdishemigrantorganisations–especiallyintheEU(e.g.theKurdishNationalCongress[KNK]),aswellasactivistsofthelegalPeaceandDemocracyParty(BDP),operatinginTurkey–havebeensuspectedofcloselinkswiththePKK.

Despite its complicated structure, the substantial autonomyofthe individual organisations and occasional tensions and con-flicts, the PKK remains a coherent and effective force, capa-ble of organising and coordinating activities in various areas.ThePKKiscurrentlyheadedbyMuratKarayilan;Öcalan’sau-thority,however,isstillvisibledespitethefactthattheformerleaderisbeingheldinaTurkishprisonandhiscontactwiththeoutsideworld is limited tomessages sent throughhis lawyers,familymembersandvisitors.

ThePKK’s strongposition inKurdistanresults from theparty’ssizeable, professional, highly ideological andmotivatedmilitia,recentlyestimatedatanythingbetween3000and10,000fighters.ThetroopsarebasedintheQandilMountains,northernIraq,attheintersectionofthenationalbordersofIraq,IranandTurkey.NumerousattemptsatdestroyingtheirQandilstronghold(espe-cially by Turkish forces) have proved ineffective. PKKmilitarypersonnel are seen as the core of both themilitary operationscarriedoutbythePKKagainstTurkey,aswellasthebaseofthearmedforcesofSyria’sPYD.

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ThePKKhasbeendesignatedaterroristorganisationbyanum-berofgovernments, includingtheEUandtheUS(however, thePKKwasremovedfromAustralia’slistofterroristorganisationsin2012–amoveseenasareactionbothtoeffortstoimprovetheimageofthePKK,aswellasarecognitionofthePKK’simportanceintheregion).

Both political centres are competing for influence, butwithoutoverlooking the pragmatic importance of resolving the currenttensions,andbothhopetodevelopwaysofworkingtogether,es-peciallyinSyria12.Itmustbenoted,however,thatneithertheau-tonomousKurdishgovernmentinIraqnorthePKKhavedecidedtokeepupthenowcontroversialcallsforKurdistan’sindepend-ence: In Iraq, the political struggle between Erbil and BaghdadcentresaroundtheissueofrespectfortheconstitutionalrightsoftheKurdishminority,whileinTurkeyandSyriathePKKhasbeenofficiallydemandingextensiveautonomy.Nonetheless,thePKK’slong-termgoal(oftenomittedfortacticalreasons)stillseemstobeanindependentKurdishstate.

12 InErbil,on11July2012,BarzanioversawtheformalmergeroftheKurdishNationalCouncilandtheDemocraticUnionParty(PYD),theSyrianbranchofthePKK,intotheKurdishSupremeCouncil.Althoughthenewbodyhasnotbeenparticularlyeffective, themergerof thepartiessignificantlyre-ducedtensionsamongSyrianKurds.

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iii. the Kurds – challenGes and threats

DespitetheimpressivepoliticalachievementsoftheKurdishpeo-ple,andfavourableprospectsforgainingfurtherpowers,itisun-likelythatthecurrentstateofaffairswillremainunalteredforlong. Kurdistan’s problems are linked to the dynamics and thescaleoftheeventstakingplaceintheregion.InIraq,thebrew-ing conflict between the political leaders in Erbil and the cen-tralgovernment inBaghdadhasbecomemorepronounced; thisisheightening theprospectof amilitary confrontation13,whichcouldpotentially ruin thecurrentachievementsof theKurdishleaders.InSyria,avictoryfortheopposition(madeupofradicalMuslimsandArabs)woulddoubtless startafight for theresto-rationoffullcontrolovertheareascurrentlyinKurdishhands;meanwhile,avictoryforthecurrentregimewouldincreaseten-sionswithTurkey,deprivingtheKurdsofroomforpoliticalma-noeuvre. InTurkey, thespectaculardemonstrationof thePKK’sstrengthanddetermination isunlikely to translate into lastingpoliticalgainsinthenearfuture.Despitesignificantprogressto-wardstheconsolidationoftheKurdishpeople,divisionsandten-sionsbetweenthevariousKurdishethnicgroups–whichothercountriesoftheregionhavetraditionallycapitalisedon–remainamajorproblem14.Althoughnoneofthescenariosdescribedear-lierofferssecuritytotheKurdishminority,itshouldbestressed

13 2012sawanumberofseriousdisputesbetweenErbilandBaghdadovertheextentoftheirautonomy(regardingpoliticalandenergyissues)andoverdisputedareasaroundKirkuk.StatementsbyPresidentBarzanisuggestedsecession.TherewerealsoseveralseriousincidentsbetweenKurdishforcesandtheIraqiarmyattheregion’sborders.

14 IncludingtensionsinIraqiKurdistanbetweenBarzani’sKurdistanDemo-craticPartyandthePatrioticUnionofKurdistancoalitionledbyIraq’scur-rentpresident,JalalTalabani.ThelatterisintentonpreservingIraq’sinteg-rityandisastaunchallyofIran,whichcontinuestosupportIraq’sShiiterulers;radicalMuslimpartiesandpoliticalsocietieshavebeenoperatingonthefringesofthecountry’spoliticalscene.Inrecentmonths,SyriahasseenanumberofviolentoutbreaksbetweenthePYDandtheKNC.TensionsandconflictsarealsovisibleintheTurkishandIranianPKK(theTurkishPKKisbelievedtobebenefitingfromIran’ssupport,butitslocaloffshoot,PJAK,hasbeenstronglyopposedbytheIranians).

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thatpotentialattemptstobreakupanyoftheKurdish‘bastions’(i.e. their autonomous regionwithin Iraq, thePKKbases in theQandilMountains,or thePYD-controlledareas inSyria)wouldcertainly prove very challenging for any of the regional states,andwouldsignificantlycontributetoafurther,radicaldestabili-sationacrosstheentireregion.

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iV. turKeY’s atteMpts to resolVe the Kurdish probleM

When theAKP formed a government in 200215, Turkey entereda period of evolutionary but radical restructuring of the stateandarevisionof itsforeignpolicy.Consequently,theKurdsliv-ingbothinTurkeyandtheneighbouringcountrieshavebecameimportantplayersinthisprocess.

TheAKPstartedbyeffectivelydismantlingthebasisoftheKemal-istrepublic,andhasfocusedparticularlyonthepoliticalstandingofthearmedforces–seenasapillaroftherepublic,aguardianofthecountry’ssecularandnationalistcharacter–whichuntilthenhadremainedexemptfromthedemocraticprinciplesoftheTurk-ishpoliticalscene16.TheAKPalsosubstantiallydepartedfromtheideologyofanationalistrepublic,infavourofIslamandthecon-ceptof fundamentaldemocraticvaluesand the liberalisationoftheeconomy.TheshiftinTurkey’sdomesticpolicydirectlyben-efitedtheKurdishminority,amongothers.

Democraticchangesinthecountryputanendtothedomesticpol-icieswhichhadignoredtheexistenceoftheKurdishminority,ledtoagradualremovalofanti-Kurdishlaws,andsawunprecedentedmovestocondemnAnkara’spolicytowardstheKurdsinpreviousdecades.The liberalisationofpolicies alsopermittedpublicuseoftheKurdishlanguage,thelaunchofKurdish-languagemedia,privateorelectiveKurdishlanguageclasses,theuseofKurdishinprisons,andevenplanstopermittheuseoftheKurdishlanguage

15 Insubsequentelectionsin2007and2011,theAKPsuccessfullyexpandeditselectorate,furtherstrengtheningitspositionasTurkey’spoliticalhegemon.

16 Overa10-yearperiod,theAKPmanagedtoneutraliseinstitutionalinfluenceonpolicy-making(withthehelpoftheSecurityCouncil);italsoeliminateditsmainpolitical opponents, andgained influenceovermilitaryappoint-ments.Finally, it succeeded indiscrediting thearmy’spoliticalambitionsbyrevealingflagrantabusesofpower,includingprovokedandstagedactsofterrorism(theErgenekontrial),andattemptstoescalatetensionswithGreeceinordertocarryouta coup d’etat(theBalyoztrial).

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by local government officials in provinces inhabited by Kurds.The new policy towards the Kurdishminority reached its pin-naclewiththeannouncementoftheso-calledDemocraticOpen-ing(2009),andearlier(2005)bylaunchinginformalnegotiationswiththePKK17onapossibleamnestyforthemilitants,amongoth-erquestions.OneoftheconsequencesofthisnewapproachwasahighlevelofsupportfortheAKPamongKurdishvoters.

AlongsidethechangestoTurkey’sdomesticpolicies,theAKPgov-ernment also significantly revised the country’s foreign policy,especiallywithregardtoitsrelationswiththeMiddleEast–are-gionwhichtheTurkishRepublichadtendednot toengagewithtooclosely.UndertheAKP,Turkeyoptedforapolicywhichwouldlead to amore active and independent role in the region,withclear ambitions tobecomeapolitical leader in theMiddleEast,andinthelongerterm,toraiseitsstatusinrelationswiththeUS,NATO and the EU18. The new approachwas to be implementedthroughgreateropennesstopoliticalandeconomictieswiththecountriesandpeoplesof theregion.Domestically, theAKPhar-nessed discourses of civilisational ties (with the Islamicworld)andhistoricallinks(datingbacktotheOttomanEmpire),whichhas ledpoliticalanalysts torefer toAKP’spoliciesas ‘neo-Otto-man’.Onaregionalscale(bothfornationalgovernmentsandtheArabpublic),Turkeyhasaspiredtobecomearolemodelformod-ernisationanddomestictransformation,aswellasamediatorinrelationswiththeWest(especiallywithregardtotensionswithIran) and an arbitrator in regional disputes (especially, in thePalestinian-Israeliconflict).

17 Theexpressions‘PKK’and‘KCK’areusedinterchangeablybyboththeTurk-ishmediaandinKurdish-publishedmaterials.

18 ThisincludeseffortstotakeoverasarepresentativeofWesternpoliticalin-terestsintheregion,andtherathersuccessfulattemptstobeseenasastra-tegicpartner,ratherthanapassiveactor,intheEU’sSouthernGasCorridorfromtheCaspianSeaandtheMiddleEasttoEurope.

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Turkey’snewpolicytowardstheregionacceleratedthedisman-tling of the current system,whichhad guaranteed the region’sprecarious stability. By doing so, Ankara distanced itself fromthe US and effectively ended its alliancewith Israel (followingaseriouscrisisofconfidencebetweenthepartiesandpersistentpolitical tensions in bilateral relations, leading to a breakdowninmilitarycooperation).Ontheotherhand,Turkeyestablishedcloser tieswithSyriaand Iran, andbegan toworkcloselywithnon-stateactors, suchas theKurds,Hamas,and lateralsowithSyria’sarmedoppositionforces19.TheArabSpring,andespeciallytheoutbreakofcivilwarinSyria(2011),ledtoafurtherdestabi-lisationof the regionandalteredAnkara’s relationswith statesacross theMiddleEast (forexample,openhostility towards theauthoritiesinDamascus,anddeepcrisisinrelationswithTehranandBaghdad).

TheradicalnatureofthechangesandthestrengthofTurkey’sin-fluenceintheMiddleEastcanbeseenmostclearlyinAnkara’sre-lationswithIraqiKurdistan.Afterdecadesofconsistentopposi-tiontoeventheslightestsignsofseparatistambitionsamongtheKurds,in2007–thatis,afterofficiallyfreezingallrelationsbe-tweenErbilandthePKKforcesbasedintheQandilMountains20–TurkeyestablishedclosepoliticalandeconomiccooperationwithIraqiKurdistan.Kurdistan(subsumedunderIraqintradestatis-tics)hasbecome the leadingmarket forTurkishgoods (a sharprisefrom$2.8billionin2007to$8.2billionin2011madeIraqthesecond biggest importer of Turkish goods, after Germany). Thesamewas true for services and investment, especially in infra-structureprojectsandtheoilandgassector.Energycooperation

19 After unsuccessful attempts to mediate between the government in Da-mascusand theopposition in thefirstmonthsofprotests in2011.TurkeyofferedrefugeandsupporttothepoliticalandarmedSyrianopposition,andremaineditsmainbenefactoratleastuntilthesummerof2012.

20 Until2006,TurkeyhadnopoliticalrelationswiththeKurdishautonomousregion.ThedynamiccooperationbetweenKurdistanandTurkeycoincidedwiththe2007appointmentofAhmetDavutoğluasForeignAffairsMinister(thearchitectoftheneo-Ottomanpolitics).

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withKurdistanwill,inprincipleatleast,allowAnkaratodiver-sify itsoil imports (and in future, also itsnaturalgas imports).ItalsobolstersTurkey’sambitionstobecomeastrategicinterme-diaryforenergyimportstotheEU.Atthesametime,Kurdistan’scooperationwithTurkeysignificantlystrengthensitspositioninthebrewing conflictbetweenErbil andBaghdad.This isdue totwo factors: first, the region’s growing economic independenceand thepossibilityof economicdevelopmentwithoutBaghdad’shelp,andsecond,thepossibilitythatAnkaramightbecomeErbil’spoliticalprotector(anunprecedenteddevelopment).ThebenefitsofestablishingclosetieswithKurdistanhavecostTurkeyitspre-viouslygoodrelationswithBaghdad,andwiththegrowingthreatofanarmedconflictbetween IraqiKurdistanand Iraq’scentralgovernment,AnkarahasimpliedthatitmayhavenochoicebuttosidewithKurdistanintheeventofhostilities.ItthereforefollowsthatIraqiKurdistanhasbecomethemostspectacularandtangi-ble embodiment of Turkey’s new domestic and foreign policies:thatis,aclearbreakwithitspreviouspolicyparadigmtowardstheKurdsandtheneighbouringstates;theprojectionofeconomicinterests, resulting in a significant expansion of political influ-ence;andatangibleattempttorevisetheexistingregionalorderwithaviewtoincreasingTurkey’sinfluence.

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V. the crisis oF turKeY’s policY toWards the Kurds – neW challenGes

Problems with the implementation of Ankara’s new policy to-wards theKurdsbegan toappearasearlyas2009, andbecamefully visible in 2011 and 2012. The liberalisation policy towardstheKurds,andespeciallythelaunchoftheDemocraticOpeningprogrammein2009,encouragedfurtherdemandsbytheKurdsandledtoarathertriumphalistmood21,whichprecipitatedare-turntoacarrot-and-stickpolicybyAnkara.ThissparkedawaveofarrestsofKurdishactivistssuspectedofhavingtiestothePKK/KCK;around8,000peoplewerearrested.(Atthesametime,how-ever, thegovernmentcontinued itsefforts to increase thepres-enceoftheKurdishlanguageinthepublicsphere,includingthemediaandtheeducationsector).ThetensionswereexacerbatedbyparliamentaryelectionsinJune2011,seenbybothsidesasatestof their real intentions. Therewas clear frustration among theKurdswhenthemainKurdishpartyandtheAKP’smainpoliticalrivalinsouth-eastTurkey–thePeaceandDemocracyParty(BDP)–wasforcedtorunintheelectionsafterhavingbeensignificantlyweakenedbyearlierarrests.SomeBDPMPswhowontheirballotswereunabletoclaimtheirseatsandweresubsequentlyarrested.AllthishastranslatedintogrowingsupportforPKK’sarmedac-tivity(whichhadbeenincreasingsincethespringof2011).

Contrary toAnkara’shopes for a completedisintegrationof thePKK–signsofwhichhadbeennoticedinthepreviousdecade22–theorganisationhasonceagainshownthatitcontinuestowieldseriousmilitarypower(includingincreasinglymodernweapons,

21 Exemplifiedbylarge-scalecelebrationsheldon24October2009inhonourofPKKmilitantsreturningtoTurkey,whichcausedextremeirritationinAnkara.

22 ExemplifiedbythearrestofPKKleader,AbdullahÖcalan,hissubsequentcommitmenttoapoliticalsolutiontotheKurdishproblem,andthestrongsupportoftheKurdishpeoplefortheAKP(backin2011,uptohalftheKurd-ishelectoratehadvotedfortherulingparty).

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trainingmethodsandcombattactics)coupledwithbroadpublicsupport.Foroverayear,thePKKhasnotonlysurvivedrepeatedattacksbyTurkishforces,buthaseffectivelymountedoffensivesagainst government troops, periodically taking control of areasandroadsinsouth-eastTurkey.IthasalsocarriedoutbombingsoutsidetheareastraditionallyinhabitedbyKurds.Sincethesum-merof2011,nearlyathousandpeople(soldiers,civiliansandPKKfighters)havebeenkilledinthehostilities.

ThegovernmentinAnkarahasalsobeensurprisedbyunexpect-edlyhighpublic support for thePKK,andby theparty’sabilitytocapitaliseonthisdevelopment.Theseanti-governmentsenti-mentshavebeenfuelledparticularlybythearrestsoflocalactiv-istswithtiestothePKK,andtheviolentconsequencesofalarge-scalemilitaryoperationagainstPKKinsurgents.ThisinturnhashelpedswelltheranksofthePKKfightersbasedinthemountains,andcementedsocialresentmentagainstthestateapparatus.Ontheotherhand,thescaleofthecrisissuggestspenetration,oratleastgreatmutualaffinity,betweenBDPandPKK/KCKactivists–itcanbesafelyassumedthatmuchofthechargesbroughtagainstBDPactivistshadbeenbasedonsolidevidence;afterall,BDPmem-bershadoftenpubliclyvoicedtheirsupportforthePKK/KCK.ThechancesthatthegovernmentwillseetheBDPasapotentialpoliti-calpartnerhavethereforefallensharply,whilethelikelihoodoftheBDPbeingusedbythePKKhavemarkedlyincreased.OneofthemostspectacularmanifestationsofthePKK’sabilitytomobi-lisetheKurdswasahungerstrikestagedinOctoberandNovem-ber 2012 by groups ofKurds held inTurkish prisons (involvingseveral hundred people altogether): the inmates demanded therighttospeakKurdishduringcourtproceedingsandcalledonthegovernment toallowÖcalanaccess tohis lawyers (hehadbeendeniedthisrightsince2011).TheincidentwaswidelypublicisedintheWesternmedia,whichledtoaninterventionbytheEuro-peanCommission,andconsequently toconcessionsby thestate(althoughthegovernmentannouncedbothchangesregardlessofthe strike, thefinaloutcomewas interpretedasa clearwin for

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theKurds).ThemilitaryandpoliticalpowerofthePKK,asdem-onstratedlastyear,hasseriouslycomplicatedtheimplementationofAnkara’sliberalisedapproachtowardstheKurds–itopensupthegovernmenttoallegationsthattheirpolicieshavebeeninef-fective,itstallsthem,andtakesawaythegovernment’sinitiativeinimplementingthem.

However,thecircumstancewhichposesthemostseriousthreatto Ankara’s new approach towards the Kurdish problem (andmorebroadly,toitsentireMiddleEastpolicy)istheongoingcivilwarinSyria,whichbeganinthespringof2011andappearsfarfromover.ThewarisparticularlysignificantforAnkarabecauseTurkeyhad(indirectly)sidedwiththeSyrianopposition23;thisre-sultedinapoliticalconflictbetweentheTurkishgovernmentandtheregimeinDamascus,andbyextensiontheregime’ssupport-ersinTehran.FromAnkara’sperspective,thenegativeinfluencetheSyrianconflicthashadontheTurkishKurdsisnotsomuchanintensificationofTurkey’spre-existinginternalproblemasitisthemaincauseoftheproblem,andthereforeastrategicchal-lengeforthegovernment.Turkeybelieves–notwithoutgoodrea-son–thattherenewedPKKactivityinTurkeyisdirectlylinkedtotheSyriancrisis.ItalsosuspectsthattheactionsbetweentheSyrianandTurkishPKKfightersarecoordinated,andtheescala-tionoftensionshasbeenfuelledbythesupportthePKKhasre-ceivedfromSyriaandIran.TheassumptionthattheactionsofthePKKandPYDarebeingcoordinatedissupportedbythefactthatbothorganisationsoperateunderadefactosinglegroupoflead-ers,aswellasthefactthatthesizeablearmedforcesoftheTurk-ishandSyrianKurdsarepartlymadeupofprofessional troopspermanentlylocatedinIraq’sQandilMountains(forexample,thebulkof thePYD forces ismadeupof a 2,000-strongcontingentsentfromtheQandilstoSyriainthespringof2012).Inaddition,

23 Inspring2011,TurkeyofferedrefugeandsupporttotheSyrianpoliticalop-position(apoliticalbaseforthefutureSyrianNationalCouncil);sincethesummerof2011Turkeyhasprotectedandsupportedgroupsof thearmedopposition(FreeSyrianArmy).

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Turkishanalyseshaveshownthatabout30%ofthePKKmilitantskilledinTurkeywereofSyrianorigin24.Thereisalsosomeevi-dence that the PKKhas been receiving support fromSyria andIran:forinstance,theobviousandacuteconflictofinterests25;anamnestyforPKKmilitantsgrantedbySyriaatthebeginningoftheconflict(forexample,PYDleaderSalihMuslimMuhammadhadalreadyreturnedtoSyriafromtheQandilsin2011);thewith-drawalofSyriantroopsfromtheareasinhabitedbytheKurds(byJuly2012);reportsaboutIran’sdecisiontomakeitsbasesontheIranian-TurkishborderavailabletothePKK26;andfinally,there-portsabout theexpansionand increasedactivityof the IranianspynetworkintheTurkishKurdistan(oneofthespyringswasuncovered in late August/early September 2012). Viewed fromthisperspective,theriseofPKKactivityinTurkeyin2011wouldbetraythePKK’srealintentionstowardstheallies,andtheeffec-tive ‘autonomy’ for theSyrianKurds,granted in thesummerof2012,couldbeseenasarewardfortheircooperation.

Withalltheambiguitiesassociatedwiththeanti-Turkishactivi-tiesofthePKK,thefactremainsthatthePKK/KCKholdssufficientpolitical,socialandmilitaryinfluenceinsideTurkeytoberecog-nisedasaserious,endemicpower.Atthesametime,thekeyfac-torswhichincreasethePKK’spoliticalandmilitarycapacityandprovidesitwithstrongsupportareitsbaseintheQandilMoun-tains,andespeciallythenewpoliticalachievementsinSyriaandtheallegedbackingfromSyriaandIran.TheSyrianKurds’infor-malautonomyhasbeengettingstronger,thePKK’sfreedomtoact

24 InpartthismaybeduetothefactthatalargegroupofSyrianKurdsismadeupofKurdish refugees and their children fromTurkey,who relocated toTurkeyinthe1980s.

25 Turkey’ssupportfortheSyrianoppositionhasinevitablyledtoaconflictofinterestsbetweenAnkara,DamascusandTehran.Evidenceforthisargu-mentcanbefoundinthequiteopenthreatsmadeagainstTurkeybyIran’schiefofstaff,referringtotheconsequencesofTurkey’ssupportfortheSyr-ianopposition.

26 In contrast to the bases in the QandilMountains, these bases cannot bebombedwithimpunitybytheTurkishairforce.

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continuesto increase,andtheeliminationofautonomyappearstobecurrentlyoutofreacheitherfortheSyrianoppositionorthegovernment inDamascus (nordoes it appear tobeamong theirimmediatepriorities).Nor is it likely thatTurkeywouldbeabletocontaintheSyrianKurdsbymilitarymeans.Dueto thecur-rentlystrainedrelationsbetweenTurkey&thePKK,andDamas-cus&Tehran,theonlyactorscapableofsomewhatlimitingPKKoperationsinSyriaareeithertheKurdishautonomousregioninIraq(specifically,theKurdishNationalCongressinSyriabackedbyBarzani,whichnonethelessremainsunabletooffsetthePYD’sinfluence)ortheSyrianopposition27.Currently,thePKK’sunmis-takable sense of power, Ankara’s rejection of this fact, and themutual distrust and the dynamics of the recent developmentsrender the chances for a resumption of a political dialogue be-tweenTurkeyandthePKKratherremote(inboththeTurkishandtheSyriancontexts).

27 Syrian opposition forces strongly oppose the Kurdish calls for autonomyor federalism; Turkey’s direct influence over the opposition has also di-minished (at ameeting inDoha inNovember, theTurkish-backedSyrianNationalCouncilwasreplacedbytheSyrianNationalCoalition,whoseori-ginandcompositionmorecloselyreflectsboththerealbalanceofforcesinSyriaandtheinterestsoftheGulfstates).

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Vi. the Kurdish issue – the outlooK For turKeY

Turkey’spolicytowardstheKurdishminorityhasreachedanim-passe.TheKurdsarebecominganevermorepowerfulandinde-pendentpoliticalplayeragainstthebackgroundofthedeepeningpoliticalcrisisintheMiddleEast(inSyria,Iraq,andpotentiallyinIran).Ifthedynamicsoftherecentdevelopmentsintheregioncontinue,theformationofaKurdishstateinthecomingyearsisno longer justapipedream,particularlyas thecapacity tostopthisprocessbyforceisdiminishing.

ForTurkey,thekeyobjectivesatthemomentarethepacificationofthePKKwithinitsborders,followedbyapoliticalsolutiontotheproblem. Considering the armed offensive launched by the PKKandAnkara’smilitaryresponse,thechancesforapoliticaldialoguehavegreatlydiminished–partlybecauseanyconcessionsmadebythegovernmentatthisstagewouldbeseenaslossofprestigeandapoliticaldefeat.Thechancesforacompromisearealsonothelpedbyregionaldynamics (especially inSyria).Thematter is furthercomplicatedbythepoliticalcalendarshapingAKP’spriorities:theAKPisseekingspeedychangestotheconstitution,andisgettingreadyforlocalgovernmentandpresidentialelectionsin2014.ThisisforcingtheAKPtoseekalliesontheTurkishpoliticalscene(al-thoughinpracticetheAKPisinterestedintheextremenational-istandanti-KurdishNationalistMovementParty[MHP]),aswellasthevotesoftheconservativepartsoftheelectorate–theKurds’mainpolitical forces, theBDP andPKK/KCK, are opposed to theAKP. In the currentpolitical context, a repeat of theDemocraticOpening to theKurds is ratherunlikely, although it is clear thatsuchapolicycoulddistract theKurdishminorityawayfromthePKK.Thisapproachcouldalsobereintroducedduringfutureworkon the constitution. It canbe assumed thatAnkara couldobtainmoreroomformanoeuvreontheKurdishissueifthepositionoftheAKPweretobestrengthenedfurtherfollowingfutureelectionsandchangestothecountry’sconstitution.

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Turkey’spolicyonIraqandthelocalKurdshasalsoreachedadif-ficultpoint.Ontheonehand,theKurdishautonomousregioninIraqhas comeunderTurkey’s political and economic influence,and elevatedAnkara to theposition of Erbil’s protector againstBaghdad.Ontheotherhand,TurkeyisbecominghostagetoErbil’spolicytowardsIraqanditspolicytowardstheSyrianKurdsandthePKK; in effect, the region currentlyoffers theonly solutiontocounterbalancePKK’sinfluenceandtheonlywaytoinfluencetheKurdishminorityfromwithin.InIraq,theconflictbetweentheKurdishautonomousregionandBaghdadhasbeenbecomingincreasinglyseriousforatleastayear,andcouldescalatetocivilwar.This,however,wouldmeanamoreorlessopenconfrontationbetweenTurkeyandIraq(andindirectlyalsowithIran)inthenottoodistantfuture.Consequently,thefateoftheKurdishautono-mousregionwillbeasignificantdeterminantofTurkey’sfuturepositionintheMiddleEastandinrelationtothelocalKurds.

Aseriousandlong-termthreattothestabilityoftheregionwillcontinuetocomefromSyriaandthelocalKurdishminority,whoarecurrentlyenjoyingrealpoliticalindependence.Thisfactcan-notbeignoredregardlessofwhichsidewinsthecurrentconflict.If,followingthecivilwar,Syriaremainsinthehandsoftheoldregime,andiftheregimeacceptsandformalisestheKurdishau-tonomousregion,thatregionwill likelyhaveanexplicitlyanti-Turkishcharacter.If,ontheotherhand,theconflictiswonbytheopposition, formalautonomyfortheSyrianKurdsseemsratherunlikely(withtheexceptionofperhapsatemporaryagreement).SuchascenariowouldleadtoamilitaryconfrontationinSyria,resultinginaseriousarmedconflictonTurkey’sborder,withalltheconsequencesofsuchadevelopment(atleastintheareaofsoftsecurity,suchasamassinfluxofrefugees);alternatively,itwouldleadto thestrengtheningof the independenceofPKK’spseudo-state.So far, the instrumentsAnkarahasused to influence thesituationinSyriahavefailedtoreflecttheseriousnessoftheriskstheconflictcouldposetoTurkey.Ankara’sinvolvementthrougheithertheSyrianoppositionortheIraqiKurdswouldhaveatmost

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an indirect effect on thewar, andwouldnothelp it resolve theconflictinawaythattheTurkishgovernmentwoulddesire.Inthelongrun,anIraq-stylesolutioninSyriawouldbemorefavourabletoTurkey:namely,theoverthrowoftheregimeandalong-term,butnotnecessarilyformal,divisionofthecountry.Asinthecaseof IraqiKurdistan, this outcomewould force theKurds to seekasolutionbyengagingwithTurkey,andgiveTurkeyfarmorebar-gainingpower.However,thisisjustoneofmanyequallyplausiblescenarios.

Takingtheaboveintoaccount,onecouldspeakofaseriouscrisisinAKP’s ‘neo-Ottoman’policiestowardstheKurds:theproblemhasbeenexacerbatedbybothdomesticandinternationaldevel-opments,andopenednewareasofpotential conflict forTurkey–contrarytoitsintentionsandcapabilities.

Ontheotherhand–unlikeinpastdecades–thesituationintheregionhasbeenverydynamic,andthepowerstrugglesandcrisesoccurringintherespectivecountrieshavebeenwidespreadandlong-lasting,affectingtheregion’sgeopoliticalorder.Itisunlikelythatthesituationwillstabiliseintheshortterm;itisalsoimpossi-bletoexpectareturntothestateofaffairsof2010,letalone2002.Comparedtotherestoftheregion,Turkeyisnotonlythestrong-estandmoststablestate,butisalsoanationthathasstarteditsowninternalreformsandinitiatedashiftintheregion’sgeopo-liticalorder.Thisgivesreasontobelievethatthecurrentcrisisislikelytoleaveitevenstronger.Withoutadoubt,theKurdishissueremainsafundamentalpillarofTurkey’sMiddleEastpolicy,andanimportantelementofitsdomesticpolicy;inthiscase,however,therearenofastoreasysolutions.

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