3

TRUST BASED FLOODING ATTACK DETECTION AND

RESPONSE MECHANISMS FOR AD HOC ON-DEMAND

DISTANCE VECTOR ROUTING PROTOCOL

BAHRAM YAGHOUBZADEH ASHOURUAN

A project report submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the award of the degree of

Master of Computer Science (Information Security)

Faculty of Computer Science and Information Systems

Universiti Teknologi Malaysia

JANUARY 2013

brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk

provided by Universiti Teknologi Malaysia Institutional Repository

iii

This project report is dedicated to my beloved wife, father, mother and sister for their

endless support and encouragement.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and foremost, I would like to express heartfelt gratitude to my valued

supervisor DR. SHUKOR ABD RAZZAK for his constant support during my study

at UTM. He inspired me greatly to work in this project. His willingness to motivate

me contributed tremendously to our project. I have learned a lot from him and I am

fortunate to have him as my mentor and supervisor.

Besides, I would like to thank the authority of Universiti Teknologi Malaysia

(UTM) for providing me with a good environment and facilities to complete my

master program and this project.

v

ABSTRACT

Mobile Ad hoc Networks provide a structure-less environment, enabling

participants in the coverage mobile nodes to communicate each other without using

any centralized authentication agent. Thus, it is compromised in face to various sorts

of attacks. Unfortunately, none of the presented secured routing protocols can detect

internal Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by itself naturally. One of the most

important and effective internal misbehaviors which has dramatic side effects on the

network’s throughput is Flooding Attack. This project aims at proposing an

alternative solution to detect and respond Flooding Attack in MANET which is based

on cooperative trust evaluation mechanisms. Actually, this approach is matched to

basic principles of distributed networks in which the participating nodes are

responsible for any needed creation, operation and maintenance of the network.

Moreover, it seems useful for high mobility networks where the suspicious nodes

move around the area repeatedly. Consequently, the gained results of the project

prove that the proposed Trust-based Cooperation mechanisms decreases the side

effects of Flooding Attack on Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol.

vi

ABSTRAK

Rangkaian Segera Bergerak (Mobile Adhoc Network) menyediakan

persekitaran kurang berstruktur, membolehkan pengguna yang berada di dalam

kawasan liputan untuk berkomunikasi di antara satu sama lain tanpa menggunakan

sebarang agen pengesahan berpusat. Oleh itu, ia mampu berhadapan dengan pelbagai

jenis serangan. Malangnya, tiada satu pun protokol laluan keselamatan tersebut dapat

mengesan Denial of Service (DOS) dalaman yang diserang oleh diri sendiri secara

semulajadi. Di antara kepentingan dan keberkesanan tingkahlaku dalaman yang

memberi kesan sampingan kepada laluan rangkaian ialah Serangan Banjir ( Flooding

Attack). Projek ini bertujuan untuk mencari penyelesaian alternatif bagi mengesan

dan bertindakbalas dengan Serangan Banjir dalam MANET yang mana ia

berteraskan mekanisma penilaian kepercayaan kerjasama. Sebenarnya, pendekatan

ini berpadanan dengan asas prinsip kepada rangkaian yang beredar / bergerak di

mana node atau laluan yang turut serta adalah bertanggungjawab kepada sebarang

keperluan yang dicipta, pengoperasian dan penyelenggaraan kepada rangkaian.

Selain itu, ia sangat berguna untuk rangkaian bergerak yang tinggi di mana node

yang mencurigakan bergerak mengelilingi kawasan tersebut secara berulang-ulang.

Kesimpulannya, hasil keputusan yang diperolehi dari projek ini membuktikan

bahawa cadangan mekanisma Trust-based Cooperation dapat mengurangkan kesan

sampingan Serangan Banjir (Flooding Attack) kepada protokol laluan On-Demand

Distance Vector.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER TITLE PAGE

DECLARATION ii

DEDICATION iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv

ABSTRACT v

ABSTRAK vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS vii

LIST OF TABLES xiii

LIST OF FIGURES xv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xvii

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview 1

1.2 Problem background 2

1.3 Problem statement 4

1.4 Aim of the project 5

1.5 Objectives of the project 5

1.6 Scope of the project 6

1.7 Significance of the study 6

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction 7

2.2 MANET and its routing attacks 8

2.2.1 Overview of Mobile Ad hoc Network 8

viii

2.2.2

Routing Attacks in MANET

9

2.3 Analysis of Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector

routing protocol (AODV)

10

2.3.1 The algorithm of AODV 11

2.3.2 AODV path discovery 11

2.3.3 AODV reverse path 13

2.4 Overview of categorized approaches to mitigate

Flooding attack

13

2.5 Related approaches to detect and mitigate Flooding

attack in MANET

15

2.5.1 First effort to prevent flooding attack in

MANET (FAP)

15

2.5.2 AMTT scheme, an effort to eliminate FAP

holes

17

2.5.3 Effective Filtering schemes against RREQ

Flooding Attack

19

2.5.4 Secure scheme against Data Flooding Attack 21

2.6 Trust based approaches related to detect Flooding

attack in MAENT

23

2.6.1 Direct trust estimation techniques 23

2.6.2 Cooperative trust based techniques 26

2.7 Discussion 28

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction 33

3.2 Research Procedure 34

3.2.1 Phase 1: Investigating and analyzing

MANET and Flooding Attack

36

3.2.2 Phase 2: Designing proposed trust-based

Flooding Attack detection and response

mechanisms on Ad hoc On-demand Distance

Vector routing protocol

37

3.2.3 Phase3: Evaluation and reporting of the

project

38

ix

3.3

Research Instruments Used

38

3.4 Data analysis 38

3.5 Evaluation 40

3.6 Summary 42

4 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

4.1 Introduction 43

4.2 AODV routing protocol implementation on Network

Simulator (NS2)

44

4.2.1 Required AODV functions for implementing

the project

45

4.2.2 Format of AODV Trace File 48

4.3 Analysis of proposed Trust based mechanism relied

on AODV

49

4.3.1 Infrastructures of the proposed trust based

mechanism

50

4.3.1.1 Trust values normalization 50

4.3.1.2 Trust level and threshold definition 51

4.3.1.3 Array of trust table structure 51

4.3.1.4 Trust packet type and Trust header

definition

52

4.3.2 Real-time trust based attack detection and

response

53

4.3.2.1 Detecting repeated route request

packet

54

4.3.2.2 Trust level computation and

assigning corresponding threshold

56

4.3.2.3 Flooding attack detection and

response

57

4.3.2.4 Sending Trust Packet 60

4.3.3 Trust level increment for the legal source

nodes

61

4.3.3.1 Trust table update and print 61

x

4.3.3.2

Interval checking for periodic

reporting trust values

62

4.3.4 Collective trust based cooperation module 63

4.3.4.1 Virtual society creation by using

trust based cooperation module

65

4.4 Flooding attack 66

4.5 TCL implementation 67

4.5.1 Mobile nodes configuration of the simulation 68

4.5.2 Topography setting and mobile node creation 69

4.6 Summary 70

5 RESULTS AND DISCUSISONS

5.1 Introduction 71

5.2 Reasons of using proposed method 71

5.2.1 Comparison functionality of AODV before

and after occurring attack

72

5.3 Comparing default and modified AODV in different

scenarios

73

5.3.1 Comparison results of default and modified

AODV in Small Network

74

5.3.1.1 Averaged Dropped Packets of

Small Network comparison

74

5.3.1.2 Averaged Packet Delivery Ratio of

Small Network Scenario

comparison

75

5.3.1.3 Averaged Throughput of Small

Network Scenario comparison

76

5.3.1.4 Analysis of Small Network

Scenario results

77

5.3.2 Comparison Results of Default and Modified

AODV in Medium Network

78

5.3.2.1 Averaged Dropped Packets of

Medium Network comparison

79

xi

5.3.2.2

Averaged Packet Delivery Ratio of

Medium Network Scenario

comparison

80

5.3.2.3 Averaged Throughput of Medium

Network Scenario comparison

81

5.3.2.4 Analysis of Medium Network

Scenario results

82

5.3.3 Comparison results of Default and Modified

AODV in Wide Network

84

5.3.3.1 Averaged Dropped Packets of Wide

Network comparison

85

5.3.3.2 Averaged Packet Delivery Ratio of

Wide Network Scenario

comparison

86

5.3.3.3 Averaged Throughput of Wide

Network Scenario comparison

87

5.3.3.4 Analysis of Wide Network

Scenario results

88

5.4 Results Discussion 89

5.4.1 Packet Delivery Ratio Discussion 89

5.4.2 Dropped Packets Discussion 90

5.4.3 Averaged Throughput Discussion 91

5.4.4 Results Discussion Settlement 93

5.5 Summary 94

6 CONCLUSION

6.1 Project Achievements 96

6.1.1 Overview of the Study 96

6.1.2 Review of the Results 97

6.1.2.1 Implication of the Results 98

6.1.3 Limitation of the Study 98

6.2 Recommendations 99

6.2.1 Recommendation based on the results 99

xii

6.2.2 Recommendations for Future Research

Works

99

REFERENCES 101

xiii

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE NO. TITLE PAGE

2.1 Format of AMTT 18

2.2 Individual trust Metrics to collect overall trust

estimation

25

2.3 Assigned trust level to normalized trust estimated 26

2.4 Classification of current related approaches 29

2.5 Trust based approaches to resist Flooding Attack in

MANET

30

3.1 Simulation assumptions and settings table 41

3.2 Simulated scenarios definitions table 42

4.1 AODV Trace File Explanation Table 49

4.2 Trust level assigning table 51

5.1 Comparison table of default AODV functionality

before and after occurring Flooding Attack with

modified AODV by trust based mechanism

72

5.2 Small Network Scenario results comparison table 74

5.3 Node Density and Neighbor Count Calculation table for

Small Network Scenario

78

5.4 Medium Network Scenario results comparison table 79

5.5

Node Density and Neighbor Count Calculation table

83

xiv

for Medium Network Scenario

5.6 Wide Network Scenario results comparison table 84

5.7 Node Density and Neighbor Count Calculation table for

Wide Network Scenario

89

xv

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE NO. TITLE PAGE

2.1 RREQ packet fields 11

2.2 Forward and Reverse Path, respectively in AODV

diagram

12

2.3 Filtering scheme flowchart 21

2.4 Integration of SMRTI and Fellowship architectures 28

3.1 Schematic of the Research Framework 35

3.2 Security issues in MANET stack 36

3.3 Operational Framework for relations between main

modules

37

3.4 Simulator usage graph for MANET 39

4.1 Class inheritance of AODV in NS2 diagram 44

4.2 Files reference of AODV in NS2 diagram 45

4.3 Trace format of AODV 48

4.4 Trust Packet type and header definition 52

4.5 recvAODV() Function with AODV Trust Type source

code

53

4.6 RecvAODV () Function with AODV Trust Type

diagram

54

xvi

4.7 RREQ Recorder Row diagram 55

4.8 Counting Broadcasted RREQ packets by Real time

Trust based module pseudo code

55

4.9 Computing Trust-Level and assigning Threshold

pseudo code

57

4.10 Malicious node detection and resistance pseudo code 58

4.11 Giving another chance to the restricted sender pseudo

code

59

4.12 Real Time module of Trust based Flooding Attack

Detection and Resistance Flowchart

59

4.13 Broadcasting a Trust Packet to report occurred attack

pseudo code

60

4.14 Pseudo code of trustTableUpdate() procedure 62

4.15 Pseudo code of trustTablePrint() procedure 62

4.16 Pseudo code of recvTrust() void function 64

4.17 Nodes adjacence as a virtual society diagram 66

4.18 Flooding attack procedure implementation pseudo

code

67

4.19 Mobile nodes simulation configuration 69

4.20 Topography setting and node creation 70

xvii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMTT Avoiding Mistaken Transmission Table

AODV Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector

ARAN Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks

DOS Denial of Service

DSDV Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector Routing

DSR Dynamic Source Routing

FAP Flooding Attack Prevention

FIFO First in First Out

MANET Mobile Ad hoc Network

MS Microsoft

NS2 Network Simulation ver.2

PRP Proactive Routing Protocols

RAD Random Assessment Delay

RREP Route Reply

RREQ Route Request

RRER Route Error

RRP Reactive Routing Protocols

SAODV Secure Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector

SEAD Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance Vector Routing

Protocol

SMRTI MANET Routing with Trust Intrigue

WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy

WSN Wireless Sensor Network

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

Today, Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET) have been popular because of its

exclusive characteristics which have allowed wireless devices to connect each other

easily when fall in the radio coverage of each other [1]. Also, each node performs

the roles of an end-system and works also as a router to forward packet through the

network; therefore, mobile ad hoc network uses the concept of multi hop

communication. In addition, every node can move in the network freely. This

mobility is as a result of dynamic topology in MANET without any infrastructure

requirements such as centralized access point or centralized administration. As a

result, each node is in charge of its security threats [2]. Actually, the lack of

infrastructure in MANET nominates this kind of networks for using wherever the

implementation of network infrastructure is impossible or too expensive such as

military usages, emergency applications, PDA networking, and usual applications

such as wireless meeting or classroom.

MANET uses routing protocols to route packets to destination like the

conventional wired networks which are divided into PRP (Proactive Routing

Protocol) and RRP (Reactive Routing Protocol) [3, 4]. Proactive Routing Protocols

is called Table Driven Routing Protocol too. In PRP the routing information of all

nodes are stored by the others, and routing updates are propagated whenever the

topology of the network changes [5]. Another side, in the case of RRP, route

2

between the nodes is searched only whenever a source node wants to communicate

with the others; they use Flooding method to discover the route by sending route

request message which will be replied by the purposed destination. But the method

of on-demand routing to facilitate route discovery may be used by the Intruders or

the malicious node to consume the network resources, leading to Flooding attack [6,

7].

The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows; the second section will

be discussed problem background, subsequently, problem statement will be

described; the rest of the chapter is allocated for the objectivity of the project and its

scope; finally, significant of the project and references are cited.

1.2 Problem background

According to properties of MANET, especially the lack of network

infrastructure such as centralized administration, every node consists of many sorts

of attacks; mostly, denial of service attacks. Although, using RRPs (On demand

Routing Protocols) have irrefutable benefits for mobile ad hoc network, however,

they increases the risk of DoS attacks.

Actually, like conventional wired networks, MANET uses routing protocols

to forward packets to the destination; Proactive routing protocols also, known as

table-driven protocols is based on routing table between nodes. However, the main

advantage of Proactive routing protocols can be declared as predictability of the

control over head on these protocols; since it has a fixed upper bound which enables

it to be independent to the traffic profiles [22]. In contrary, as disadvantages, we can

state that they are not scalable perfectly and maintenance of routing table requires

substantial network resources [20]. On the other hand, Reactive routing protocols or

on-demand routing protocols are developed for MANET to direct packets to the

destination. In fact they indicate the real basis of MANET which provides more

3

dynamic networks in comparison with structured ones. In the on demand routing

protocols, nodes search for a route when they want to communicate with each other.

To discover the routes they use route discovery procedure which in turns uses the

Flooding method. Therefore, updating of the routing information is presented

whenever a node requires a route instead of periodically updating the route

information. Consequently, the control overhead will be reduced, especially in high

mobility networks where the periodical update causes significant waste overhead

[22]. However, on demand, routing protocols are categorized into secured on

demand routing protocols such as SAODV [29], SEAD [32], SRP [21], ARAN [2],

and Adriane [30]. And non-secure on demand routing protocols such as AODV [11]

and DSR [23]. According to the studies, AODV is one of the most popular routing

protocols for implementing additional DoS Attack detection modules because of its

dynamic structure and perfect performance [12, 13].

In fact, MANET Flooding Attack is known as a harmful DoS attack which

affects on functionality of almost all RRPs sharply. Mobile Ad hoc Flooding attack

makes it possible for an adversary to carry out DoS by saturating the support with a

quantity of broadcasting messages, by reducing the output of nodes, and in the worst

case, to prevent them from communicating. In fact, there is similar attack in

conventional wired networks which is popularly called SYN Flooding attack. In this

attack, the attacker sends many TCP connection requests with spoofed source

addresses to a victim. As a result, the resources of the victim host will be exhausted;

subsequently, no more incoming TCP connection can be established by this machine

[8].

Before describing Flooding Attack in MANET, it seems necessary to describe

more about on-demand protocols especially AODV [11] which this project is relied

on. AODV is one of the on-demand routing protocols, designed for MANET to

manage unicast, multicast, and broadcast announcement. Actually, AODV is

developed by using some principles of DSR [23] and DSDV [24] which are route

discovery and route preservation from DSR and hop by hop steering sequence

number and sporadic beacons from DSDV, respectively.

4

Actually, Flooding attack in MANET is categorized to two types which are

Route Request (RREQ) Flooding attack and Data Flooding attack [8]. In RREQ

Flooding attack the attacker broadcasts many route requests without consider to

Rate-Limit, roundtrip-time, and Back-off-time. On the other hand, Data Flooding

Attack occurs when an attacker creates a communication path with a victim node;

and in the next step sends a huge amount of useless data packets to it to exhaust

recourses of all intermediate nodes and waste bandwidth of the network. Because of

the authentication methods implemented in on-demand protocols, the intermediate

nodes cannot understand the contents of the packets, but they can just forward them

to the destination; therefore, no one can detect data Flooding attack except the

application layer of destination node [8].

Many valued efforts for sure have been tried to mitigate Flooding attack in

MANET by using vary approaches such as FAP [8], AMTT [14], Filtering scheme

[9, 10], and Trust scheme; but consequently, it seems that none of the mentioned

mechanisms could solve Flooding attack in MANET totally. In fact, each of them

has its specific limitations to solve both types Flooding Attack which will be

described comprehensively in the rest of this article. However, this project proposes

an alternative trust based scheme which is combination of related solution’s strength

and it is relied on cooperation between friend nodes. The main idea of this approach

is coming from a friendship based framework [44, 45]; in the proposed scheme, we

try to collect trust values from two ways as direct trust estimation and indirect trust

value (Recommended trust) which are coming from friend neighboring nodes with a

coefficient value that indicates their efficiency level in the decisions.

1.3 Problem statement

Although, Flooding Attack does not use any complex process to flood

network, but the secured routing protocols cannot detect this attack naturally. This

research tries to use a trust based mechanism to response route request Flooding

Attack in MANET according to neighbor suppression approach. Moreover,

5

cooperative mechanism to collect information about suspicious nodes can restrict

them for long term in the virtual societies greatly; then the problem of stranger nodes

in high mobility situations can be solved too. Furthermore, this cooperation is based

on both direct and indirect trust evaluation approach which is introduced as a suitable

approach for distributed networks such as MANET or WSN [38]. This research will

tries to show that cooperation of friend nodes can develop a trusted set of nodes

which can help to each other to make the best decision about a suspicious node and

limiting its capabilities to Flooding area by using both direct trust calculating and

recommended (indirect) trust computing simultaneously.

1.4 Aim of the project

This project tries to detect MANET Flooding attack by proposing a trust

based mechanism as an alternative solution and also response side effects of this

internal misbehavior.

1.5 Objectives of the project

In order to mentioned aims of the project, the objectives of the project related

to flooding problem in MANET are stated as below:

To analyze existing problems and solutions in MANET, related to

Flooding attacks.

To design alternative solution for MANET Flooding attack problem by

using trust based mechanisms.

To evaluate trust based Flooding Attack detection and response

mechanisms for Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol.

6

1.6 Scope of project

The scope of this project is defined as following:

Evaluations will be conducted only in simulation.

Trust based Flooding Attack detection and response mechanisms will be

compared with the original AODV routing protocol.

1.7 Significance of the study

The outcome of the project is to detect route request Flooding attack by using

an enterprise trust based mechanism which controls active nodes of MANET to

detect and response Flooding Attack. Actually, this method works as a friendship

system to identify suspicious senders for long term and decrease the side effects of

their attacks by monitoring their propagation. This project aims at introducing an

alternative trust based mechanism to record background activities of vicious nodes

and setup a plural opinion system for recognizing strangers in high mobility

situation.

101

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