tropical storm irene after action report54.172.27.91/em/rpc_irenelocalroads_aar_20111111.pdf · the...

Quechee Covered Bridge, by Kevin Geiger, 9/3/11

TROPICAL STORM IRENE AFTER ACTION REPORT The Regional Planning Commission Local Roads Recovery Effort November 11, 2011

For: Vermont Association of Planning and Development Agencies

c/o Chittenden County Regional Planning Commission 110 West Canal Street, Suite 202 Winooski, VT 045404-2109

By: ARMADA, Ltd.

http://www.cnn.com/video/?/video/bestoftv/2011/08/29/exp.nr.vt.gov.flooding.cnn�

TROPICAL STORM IRENE AFTER ACTION REPORT

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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iii

TROPICAL STORM IRENE AFTER ACTION REPORT 1 Overview: Tropical Storm Irene Causes Damage in Vermont 1 VTrans Initial Tasks to Regional Planning Commissions 2 Accomplishments from September 6 - October 21, 2011 4

VTrans After Action Report Questions For RPC Response 6

Analysis of Capabilities 18 Overall Strengths 18 Best Practices 18 Improvements and Recommendations 20

Conclusions and Lessons Learned 28

Other Resources 29

Appendix A 30 Combined RPC Input for Strengths, Needed Improvements and Recommendations (Raw Data) 30

Appendix B 35 Incident Review Form 36

Appendix C 37 Organizational Chart


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Regional Planning Commission

Local Roads Recovery Effort November 11, 2011

The Regional Planning Commission Local Roads Recovery Effort was a mission that was created by the need to provide immediate assistance to Vermont’s municipalities following historic flooding from Tropical Storm Irene on August 27, 2011. There were no advance plans or procedures in place for this type of response and recovery effort by the eleven regional planning commissions (RPCs) as tasked by the Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans). As a result, a regional structure and procedures was developed quickly to take on the task of the local roads recovery effort for devastated communities throughout Vermont, in particular, in southern Vermont. The incident demonstrated the successful capabilities of the RPCs to take on emergency response and recovery responsibilities delegated by VTrans that were beyond the scope of their work, training and funding.

VTrans has a prescribed role as State Support Function 1 (SSF1) in the State’s Emergency Operation Center (SEOC) during times of disaster. Due to the extensive road and bridge damage which occurred as a result of Tropical Storm Irene VTrans requested assistance from the RPCs, to round out their situational awareness, assess critical needs and provide initial recovery efforts for local communities while VTrans focused on assessing and repairing the state highway infrastructure. In advance of Tropical Storm Irene, the RPCs contractual relationship with VTrans was limited to transportation planning functions.

This After Action Report (AAR) addresses the observations that were captured 2 months after the initial event related to the tasks assigned to the RPCs by VTrans and the effectiveness of the implementation of those tasks and associated relationships. Considering that it was a “no-notice” response and recovery effort, and that it occurred in a resource-constrained environment, it went very well. The strengths that resulted from this unprecedented and unplanned event brought forth examples of untapped expertise and experience that should be considered in future improvement plans. Evaluation: The purpose of this report is to summarize preliminary observations made by the RPCs relative to their response effort. It identifies strengths to be maintained and built upon as well as areas for further improvement. The contents of this report are based on initial RPC feedback, and it is intended primarily for the RPCs and VTrans to review and use for recommendations in the State of Vermont final After Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP) as prepared by Vermont Emergency Management (VEM).


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There are 3 major areas for improvement that are identified by the RPCs with recommendations for VTrans and VEM to consider in order to improve future emergency response and recovery efforts. Finally, recommendations for implementing the improvements are outlined as well. Strengths

1. Pre-established RPC relationships with municipalities in the areas of transportation and GIS mapping allowed for quick response and coordinated assistance.

2. Pre-established daily working relationships and partnerships within state agencies, municipalities, and volunteer teams were important to understanding the working relationships and capabilities of organizations and local officials. Involvement in a variety of state and federal programs complimented the framework of relationships.

3. Inter-RPC mutual aid assistance was critical for those less impacted RPCs to help other RPCs that were more impacted; this framework of mutual aid assistance extended to include support to the SEOC generally and for VTrans SSF1 response.

Areas for Improvement

1. There was no pre-defined state plan role for RPCs to assist VTrans in the manner requested. This led to developing new roles, partnerships, procedures, products, services and information exchange on the fly. Funding for RPC support was not pre-determined.

2. Not all RPC staff had adequate knowledge and/or training for response and recovery efforts for large-scale disasters.

3. Communications were challenging on a number of levels. Much of the information needed was not available in a concise and easy to interpret format. There was not a central location for municipalities to go to in order to access the information they required. At times there was too much information being transmitted to RPCs, and subsequently to local officials, from a variety of entities which sometimes resulted in redundant information dissemination, as well as a deluge of requests for information which were not always well coordinated.

Recommendations

1. Plan – Include the RPCs in the SEOP and applicable SEOP Annexes with clear roles and responsibilities defined including SEOC support, regional liaisons between the state, federal and local governments and regional resource coordination capabilities, including the addition of a RPC seat in the SEOC. Specify RPC role in SSF activities for not only SSF1, but potentially for other SSFs.


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2. Fund. The annual contractual/grant agreements between the various state agencies

and the RPCs should include a funding provision for approved emergency activations.

a. Legislative and/or action by the Administration may be needed to establish the funding source and guidance related to administration of disaster response activities for RPC staff.

b. The demonstrated strengths of the RPCs far surpass the existing relationships with state agencies and local municipalities. The statutory language that governs regional planning commissions within 24 V.S.A. Chapter 117 should be reviewed with respect to their emergency management capabilities under 20 V.S.A. Chapter 1.

3. Train and Exercise. RPCs staff should receive additional training in DisasterLan, FEMA Public Assistance (FEMA PA), FHWA Emergency Relief (FHWA ER), Incident Command System, and emergency management in general if they will be expected to provide a greater role in response and recovery during large disasters. The entire state should be working under ICS for command and control.

4. Communication/Information. To facilitate clear, concise and coordinated communications:

a. A list of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) related to all elements of emergency response and recovery should be developed in advance; the materials could then be tailored to meet the circumstances of each disaster.

b. A central website/clearinghouse should be developed and maintained that has important information in place in advance such as: procurement requirements, FEMA PA and IA basics, FHWA ER basics, mitigation options, documentation requirements, consulting/contracting services. All state agencies should provide links to the central website for questions, answers and contact resources.

c. Information needs to be distilled and prioritized daily in order not to overwhelm already overwhelmed local officials.

d. All requests for situational awareness and unmet needs should be coordinated and the process and timing clearly defined.


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The Regional Planning Commission Local Roads Recovery Effort

November 11, 2011

Overview: Tropical Storm Irene Causes Damage in Vermont

On August 27, 2011 Tropical Storm Irene entered New England and Vermont causing flood damage that had not been seen since Vermont’s historic 1927 flood. Numerous roads and bridges were destroyed along with the loss or severe damage of over 700 homes. Highway access was severed to many communities, historic properties were lost, downtowns were devastated, and businesses destroyed.

After several days of initial response by first responders, local officials, local road crews, VTrans, the National Guard, VEM and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), it became very clear that the flood damage as a result of heavy rains concentrated in some of the valley areas of the state rose to the levels of historic flooding records.

On September 4th, as the floodwaters began to recede the magnitude and extent of road damage began to be understood and VTrans requested immediate situational awareness support regarding the local road network from Vermont’s eleven RPCs. The RPCs are statutorily (24 V.S.A. Chapter 117) responsible to assist the municipalities within their regional boundaries in the areas of land use planning and ordinances, local transportation planning, GIS, community development planning, natural resource planning and emergency/all-hazards planning (including floodplain management), in addition to other areas of planning, education and program implementation assistance. The RPCs maintain ongoing working relationships with VTrans, the Agency of Commerce and Community Development (ACCD), VEM and the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) and are well poised to assist their respective municipalities to determine situational awareness and to support these agencies in recovery efforts.


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VTrans had set up two Transportation Incident Command Centers; one in Dummerston, VT and the other in Rutland, VT to coordinate the recovery of the state highways and bridges in the areas that were most impacted. State highway access was cut off from the east side of the state to the west side of the state. The RPCs set up a Regional Coordination Center (RPC RCC) to assist with the coordination of the recovery of the local roads under the direction of VTrans. This RPC RCC was located at the Chittenden County Regional Planning Commission in Winooski, VT. The CCRPC was selected because they housed the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) – a federally designated transportation planning program serving the Burlington Urbanized Area housing a staff of transportation planning expertise and technical resources. Additionally, the municipalities of the CCRPC were not heavily impacted as a result of Tropical Storm Irene and could offer organized and coordinated logistical support. CCRPC retained the consulting services of former VEM Director Barbara Farr through ARMADA, Ltd for short-term recovery assistance.

VTrans Initial Tasks to Regional Planning Commissions

A. Determine immediate local transportation needs: 1. RPCs to set up a command structure that parallels VTrans Incident Command

Centers. 2. RPCs to coordinate local road situational assessment, communications and recovery

repairs. 3. VTrans Planning Director to serve as the main point of contact for RPC RCC. 4. VTrans to transition assessment activities, including mapping of road, bridge and

culvert damage to RPCs for the development of local road situational awareness. 5. VTrans expects RPCs to assist their municipalities to find suitable surveyors,

engineers and inspectors for their road/bridge projects but not sewer, water, schools and other public properties which were routed to the SEOC.

6. RPCs to set up a local roads recovery resource network similar to the VTrans “virtual store” of construction vendors, inspectors, engineers, etc. for the state highway recovery. Vtrans will share surplus resources with RPCs for use by municipalities only if there are extra resources available. Other potential local highway recovery resources may include National Guard or other state resources through Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) with requests made through VEM/SEOC for extraordinary situations.

7. RPCs to assist VTrans with FEMA the rollout of the FEMA PA program including the coordination of the Applicant’s Briefing, the FEMA Kick-Off Meetings, and the development of project worksheets (PWs) for local highway recovery.

8. VTrans Incident Command Centers (ICCs) to coordinate the local Federal Aid Highway recovery documentation under the FHWA ER program.


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B. Possible other entities to coordinate with on local road issues: 1. VT Local Roads Program for communications, technical assistance, and education. 2. VLCT for communications to municipal officials, legal, and technical assistance. 3. Associated General Contractors of VT for securing engineering firms, inspectors,

project managers, materials resources and construction contractors.

C. Gaps: 1. Who will provide comprehensive coordination with municipalities on other public

assistance needs related to community development, emergency response and recovery, natural resources, municipal financing? Municipalities and state agencies may need some help to get through the response and recovery process.

2. Who at the regional level will coordinate and manage bigger, longer term projects such as home buyouts, regional mitigation strategies, affordable housing relocations, land use issues in flood areas? Municipalities and state agencies may need some help to get through the mitigation and recovery process.

D. Issues:

1. Where is the funding coming from to support RPC recovery coordination effort? State contract, FEMA, HMGP, VEM, ACCD, CDBG?

2. At least some RPCs may need extra staff or contract help for complex recovery efforts. Can resources be deployed between RPCs or additional resources secured?

Roxbury’s Bull Run Road taken by Daniel Currier


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Accomplishments from September 6 - October 21, 2011

RPC RCC Actions

• The RPC RCC was created at the Chittenden County Regional Planning Commission under the Metropolitan Planning Organization.

• An ICS structure was set up through the RPC RCC for the RPCs to report to VTrans with status updates to the State Emergency Operations Center. Michele Boomhower acted as the Incident Director with Charles Baker as the Alternate ID. The RPC RCC was staffed by CCRPC staff, along with staff from other northern RPCs which were less impacted by Tropical Storm Irene.

• The CCRPC hired Barbara Farr of Armada LTd. to provide on-going technical support to the RPC RCC.

• The RPC RCC received guidance from VTrans on situational awareness related to the local highway system from the RPCs through the RPC RCC.

• The RPC RCC collected detailed geographic and situational data with regards to damaged and/or closed road segments, bridges and culverts from each of the RPCs to provide detailed maps and status lists of local road, bridge and culvert damage throughout the state.

• The RPC RCC coordinated with VTrans and the RPCs to set up Applicant’s Briefings for the FEMA Public Assistance meetings.

• The RPC RCC coordinated the collection of municipal unmet needs through the RPC network.

• The RPC RCC coordinated RPC support to the SEOC daily – staffing multiple positions for SSF1 and the Planning Section.

• In coordination with VLCT the RPC RCC prepared materials and distributed guidance for damage reporting, procurement procedures, FEMA eligibility, FHWA process, ANR, VTrans, and contractor information to RPCs to distribute to local officials.

• The RPC RCC coordinated with VLCT for posting critical information on their website, and provided updates to the Vermont Local Roads Program.

• The RPC RCC coordinated directly with the Associated General Contractors of VT for municipal recovery resource provisions.

• The RPC RCC acted as the State of Vermont Irene Recovery Call Center for a period of approximately two weeks prior to state resources being assembled for Call Center processing.

• The RPC RCC developed and deployed a web based Google Maps local road recovery situational awareness map in coordination with VTrans and Google technical staff.

• The RPC RCC participated in regular state level situational awareness briefings.


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Field RPC Actions

• Field RPCs initiated regular contact with respective towns for updates on progress and unmet needs.

• Field RPCs collected detailed highway network damage reports and provided to the RPC RCC for mapping and data processing.

• Field RPCs distilled and distributed important information to local officials related to the recovery process.

• Field RPCs responded to questions on FEMA PA process, eligibility, scheduling FEMA appointments, contractor options and documentation requirements.

• Field RPCs conducted regular conference calls with the RPC RCC and VTrans. • Field RPCs acted as liaisons with local and state officials.


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VTrans Follow-Up Questions For RPCs In preparation for the development of the VTrans After Action Report the RPCs were provided a general list of questions to respond to with regards to the local roads recovery effort which spanned nearly two months. The initial primary task that the RPCs responded to under VTrans was the collection and documentation of the extent of local road damages including the development of detailed assessment maps which were coordinated through the RPC RCC along with a comprehensive database of closed road, bridge and culvert segments. Over the course of the recovery effort, the coordination and collection of information by the RPCs expanded to include not only the ongoing road network assessment updates, but also other unmet needs, river and debris assessments related to potential highway network risk factors, community development considerations, other municipal infrastructure damage and historical and cultural resource damage. The collective responses to those questions as provided to the RPCs on October 26, 2011 are listed below.

Moretown Bridge St. Truss Bridge, by Steve Gladczuk

1. Provide your assessment of the RPC/MPO relationship with Irene partnering organizations and state agencies e.g. VLCT, VT Local Roads, AGCVT, etc.

• Generally a productive relationship. • Staff felt overwhelmed by volume of email/correspondence. • There appeared to be too much of a “one size fits all” approach to collecting and


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reporting information. For ex: community needs in Windham County were far different than Franklin County.

• Need for simplified forms to convey information on programs such as eligible PA costs, Federal Aid highway repairs, and FEMA procurement.

• VLCT did an outstanding job of summarizing and distributing information for municipal use. I don’t know if we had much interaction with VT Local Roads during Irene response. AGCVT provided good information on resources that we passed along to towns. Support provided by other RPCs, especially map production and summary of local road, bridge, and culvert damage data was excellent. We worked very effectively with the FEMA PA teams, although the original consultants assigned to them did not appear to add much to the effort and in some cases caused some unnecessary stress with local officials. We had two good initial meetings with FHWA ER staff – who then disappeared never to be heard from again. Why is it that so much emphasis was placed on coordinating with FEMA and so little with FHWA (given that probably 25% of the local infrastructure damage was under FHWA jurisdiction)? Witt Associates appeared on the scene late and as a bit of surprise to everyone here, but provided good information and value for towns. VTrans was consistently helpful, especially coordinating some of the hyrdro studies and bridge inspections for towns. VT ANR was on the scene quickly and provided good direction for towns, although a change in engineers responsible for towns in our region resulted in mixed signals and some angst on the part of one or two towns.

• Good • ACRPC staff feels that the partnership in some cases worked well and in others was

clearly inappropriate. • All RPCs worked well together and were willing to engage in cooperative efforts for

the good of the state. • VLCT seemed to be operating largely on their own and helped contribute to mixed

messages being received by local government. • VT Local Roads had a small if any role in our RPC area. • AGCVT should have not been involved in this process. As a lobbying organization it

is dangerous for us, as representatives of our communities, or as representatives of the State to be perceived as advocating for any special interest member-group.

• Work with VTrans has gone smooth and their actual knowledge of construction has been of great benefit during FEMA PA scoping visits

• RPCs needed to have a strong partnership role with DEC River Management. • AGCVT focus seemed to be primarily on BIG ($) projects. • Information overload – multiple sources sending the same information caused some

local officials to tune out. • Organizational issues/relationships seemed to be worked out quickly once

recognized/addressed. • Tension at SEOC with so many FEMA people at the center. • The relationship between agencies and organizations was built as the recovery


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unfolded more than simply extended existing relationships. It was unclear if there was a separation of duties, and if all organizations were part of the incident response structure or adjunct to it.

• Given the contractual relationship (pre event and post event) between the RPCs/MPO and VTrans, this relationship was more structured than others it appeared. Since each of these organizations has its own mission and can act independently, creating the potential for duplication or cross messages, it should be more clear in the future if organizations are bring brought into a unified state response and what is expected of them. It may also help to assign organizations along ICS lines, for examples RPCs to Planning, VLCT to Logistics and AGCVT to Operations.

• Generally the RRPC relationship with partnering organizations was very good, particularly with VTrans. We lacked a preview of the information going out to towns from VLCT so at times there was a duplication of efforts. ANR came in late so we will lose money at data collection that could have done once for roads and streams. The short deadlines were an issue for us at times.

• RPCs were proactive with the Irene recovery efforts. The collaboration with state agencies was transparent and very professional. It would be helpful if, in the future, state agencies recognize that we are peers. For instance, when the ICC opened in Dummerston, we were told to contact our towns to identify all road closures, isolated communities, etc. We had been doing this since the first day after Irene, and had already posted an interactive map of this information on our website. Initially there seemed to be little interest in what we had already done and were doing. The nature of this relationship changed in a positive manner over time, presumably because they saw what we were producing and were capable of producing.

• The SWCRPC has an excellent working relationship with most of its partners. It would be helpful in the future to have a training to make clear the various roles and responsibilities of the partners. There also needs to be a clarification of the role of RPCs in disaster declarations, is the role of an RPC strictly for planning purpose, should the RPC have a more operational role? Since this was not clearly defined some individuals were resistance to working with the RPCs. Finally, we need to clearly define the role of RPC with FEMA.

• AGCVT – new relationship that worked very well. • VT Local Roads – there was no interaction. • Other agencies – built on previous, strong, relationships.

2. What value did the partnering organizations bring to the process? What

roles worked & did not?

• There was a greater need for a role/involvement from the Agency of Human Services.

• After the EOC was moved to Burlington, VEM and VTrans worked around-the-


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clock to mobilize resources and disseminate information. • RPC mapping support was invaluable – quick production of maps allowed us to

efficiently process damage reports and provide clear guidance and direction for FEMA and FHWA. As noted above, the first consultants partnered with FEMA did not appear to add much value and FEMA PA officers and town officials preferred to use BCRC staff for many of the meetings. Everything else was fine.

• Too many agencies/organizations sending stuff out. ACRPC Staff feels that, in spite of the comments above, all interaction with these partnering organizations was positive and helpful.

• It was good to know that members of AGCVT have all been vetted and tested for quality of workmanship in advance and had been also pre-qualified by VTrans. It was reassuring to know that merely paying membership dues does not add a new company to the list.

• VLCT has great knowledge and connection with its member communities. News releases were often duplicated and inconsistent due to the differing point of view between State agencies and a lobbying organization.

• To have VTrans as the lead and granting agency was somewhat difficult given the RPC role as created by and working for our member communities. The relationship worked well for us only because we kept our obligation to our towns as our primary mission

• RPC’s added the most value when we worked in our normal roles – transportation planning, GIS, and regional emergency management coordinators.

• Each organization brought value. VLCT has an excellent connection to selectboards, legal staff, a newsletter, and the ability to present a unified body for towns. It has not worked much to provide bulk-purchasing aggregation and this would have been useful. AGCVT obviously can connect with the private sector contractors well. RPCs have the best ability to field individual calls from towns, provide on the ground staff, and also have a wealth of transportation and GIS expertise.

• It was great that the MPO helped with mapping and saved us a lot of work. VTrans was very helpful answering our questions and having one go-to person for FEMA and FHWA questions was extremely helpful. The consulting engineers that they hired to work with FEMA were also good.

• The partnering organizations brought their own expertise. AGCVT was able to expedite the quote and bid process within the bounds of FEMA requirements. VLCT was able to assist towns with questions about finance and insurance. The biggest issue arose around the deployment of consultants to assist the towns. While certainly well-intended, the roll-out of these resources should have been more fully explained to the RPCs so we could fully explain to the towns what aspect of the recovery process these assets were to assist with, what specific tasks these assets were to perform, how these assets were to interact and work with other assets, and who was incurring the obligation for the costs of these assets.


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• Each organization brings with them their own level of expertise. Some organizations there was excellent communications (VTRANS, VLCT, AGVT, ACCD) while others there was no or very limited communication Dept. of Health, ANR, AHS, but given the extent of the incident, communication was pretty good.

• What didn’t work: Communication with VEM with lacking, there was very little communication between National Guard and the town, which was frustrating to local managers and officials. DLAN did not work. There was not feedback loop for towns when they placed orders for materials. Towns need to be better informed/trained on emergency and response phase to an incident. Trainings for EMD need to include town selectboards or town managers, we had a number of EMDs quit during the early phases. There was little communication with organizations that were assisting vulnerable populations.

• VLCT – was great at distributing bulk communications. • VT Local Roads – what did they do? There appeared to be a lack of understanding

from VT Local Roads of the emergency management structure. • AGCVT – thought they worked very well in the role they played. Provided timely

requested information – nothing more, nothing less. • Roles worked best when organizations stayed within the bounds of their expertise

and not beyond it. AGCVT is a great example of this working well.

3. Should these and other partnering organizations participate in future disaster events and should the procedure be formalized in state plans?

• Because the EOC was flooded, it did not appear that the State was actually able to implement its plan.

• There was no pre-existing plan for RPC involvement and, in some respects, we were not fully recognized within the state chain-of-command hierarchy.

• RPCs and partner organizations do have a role supporting VEM and VTrans, but it needs to be more clearly defined.

• The process was thrown together very quickly and I was amazed at how effectively it worked. The only down side was the inevitable flurry of emails and phone calls as things were getting organized. If the procedure is formalized in the future, much of the organizing and coordinating work can be avoided and we can spend more time on direct assistance.

• Yes • ACRPC staff agrees that RPCs and their roles should be formalized into State

emergency operations plans. We jointly feel the approach that came about as a result of Irene was crafted out of a broken system and worked admirably in spite of it. We also feel this system, as patched by the RPC/MPO/VTrans relationship, should not continue in its current form.

• The ideal formal RPC role would be to engage all RPCs in the activity of being remote status recorders working for the SEOC Planning Section. The RPCs have


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developed networks of CERT volunteers and trained municipal emergency mangers who are qualified to report local issues to the RPCs. The RPCs can in turn filter and validate reports for the SEOC.

• Annually, VEM should offer each RPC a training and response contract separate from EMPG that would require a basic competency in disaster response and recovery at least 3 deep at each RPC. Funds should be attached to this contract which would cover the costs of training for the staff. No other funds would be associated with the contract unless a need was identified by the RPC or by VEM which would then result in an open ended activation with funding. Any activation could be cancelled by VEM. Relying on an established support network would provide needed resources to the SEOC and alleviate some of the concerns that have been identified.

• VTrans, as head of the group responsible for PA statewide, needed to recognize earlier that it could not handle its responsibilities during a large disaster. VEM, as coordinator for VTrans and all other disaster- related activities needed to recognize that it was underwater for the majority of the response similar to VTrans.

• State government needs to understand that the needs of its citizens comes first, even if the State needs to borrow money to hire experts unavailable inside the State. Plenty of people were available and were better suited than the RPC staff to assist VTrans and VEM in the recovery process.

• Probably, but the scale and scope of RPC participation should be dependent on the event.

• Whatever organizations are brought into disaster response, it should be anticipated in plans and they should be pre-contracted each year. They should also participate in exercises and on smaller events. Each of these organizations, as well as others, bringing strengths that are useful, and would be even more so if formally structured with clear tasks and lines of command within and ICS structure.

• Yes, we should partner. Formalized procedures would give all clear roles and save some duplication. It also depends on the scale of the event.

• Yes. We’re well on our way towards establishing a system that works for Vermont. The RPC role as regional coordinator of state and federal assistance to the towns, and as the communicator of situational awareness for the region as a whole, should be formalized. Knowing that the RPCs will be collecting information needed by state and federal agencies, and that we will serve as the primary point of contact for concerns about the implementation of state and/or federal assistance, will expedite the process for everyone involved, and will allow us to establish communications processes and channels.

• Yes. There needs to be a role for regional organization to assist towns. • VT Local Roads should not have a role in future disaster events. They are education

and workshop based. • VLCT – should play a communication role only if it is well defined and only done

when asked.


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• Roles should certainly be formalized in state plans.

4. Does the day-to-day RPC TPI work facilitate & improve emergency preparedness for towns?

• Yes, to the extent that RPCs have a pool of technical assistance funds that can be used at the region’s discretion (outside the TPI workplan requirements).

• From a broader perspective, our transportation planning should work to address systems issue. For example, there is only one way in and one way out of several communities, which are often left isolated by floods.

• Local road and culvert inventory maps were extremely helpful as they provided a basis for all of the damage reporting and the resulting maps were a great tool for everyone involved. Maps were provided to all impacted towns within two days of the flood, enabling road foremen to identify the exact location, number, and physical attributes of damaged facilities. This information also was useful for doing remote hydro studies and will continue to be valuable in mitigation planning. In addition, knowledge of local roads and contacts with local officials developed over the years by BCRC greatly simplified and expedited response.

• Yes – for example the culvert inventory work we do help towns mitigate future problems.

• Yes. Day-to-day work under TPI allows for increased relationship building among RPC staff and our communities. This relationship building allows for a more trusting and rapid response during disaster by RPC staff. Additional benefits include:

o Ongoing assistance in EMPG highway-related grants o Increased understanding of mitigation practices o Assisting in regional road foreman meetings which foster mutual aid

cooperation in disaster • It can. There is a need to better integrate emergency planning, transportation, and

hazard mitigation efforts. Perhaps there could be a shift in the focus of the TPI program.

• Previous TPI work greatly enhanced emergency preparedness, response and recovery in four areas – awareness, skills, relationships and information.

• Awareness of issues, such as stormwater permitting, stream dynamics, hydraulic analysis or flood-resistant drainage made local response vastly more effective than it otherwise might have been. Awareness is much more general than a skill, but it creates an openness to and comfort in working together.

• Skills built at the local level through TPI workshops on HMGP grants, disaster documentation, road maintenance, procurement and other areas increased the speed and effectiveness of local response. As an example, many towns now carry cameras in town trucks as a matter of course to record damage.

• The relationships built between RPC staff and local road foremen/commissioners, as well as the increased connection between town crews that is a result of our monthly


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TPI meetings was critical in RPC staff having local trust, knowing who to contact and how, and in facilitating intertown cooperation. This trust increased town attention to warnings we were sending prior to the event, as well as to our advice following the event.

• Information, from pre-made maps to culvert inventories, was invaluable to have on the fly. Creating this information during the event was not possible given resources and staffing.

• TPI work helped by having the contacts in towns and the mapping. • It does to a certain degree. There are parts of the Work Program that contribute to

emergency preparedness (e.g. culvert inventory and bridge prioritization). There are opportunities for vertical and horizontal integration of programs implemented by the RPCs, the AOT District Offices, and multiple agencies. For instance, there’s a logical linkage between the ERAF program and all-hazard mitigation plans. There may also be a logical linkage between the annual verification of compliance with road codes and standards, and BEOPs. RPCs could assist with this.

• Absolutely. We need to strengthen emergency preparedness by using some of our existing programs to make critical connections between land use, housing, transportation and infrastructure.

• Our TPI work already covers this and is not done in isolation; rather it is done in conjunction with local planning and zoning efforts, etc.

5. Was the identification and mapping of damaged road segments helpful to you, your towns, and ultimately the FEMA/FWHA documentation effort?

• In some communities, it was helpful to have mapped road segments to lead FEMA on damage assessments.

• The effort wasn’t worthwhile in some of our lesser-impacted towns. • FEMA and FHWA found the maps and data sheets invaluable and often

commented on them; they were helpful in locating sites and in tracking costs and materials for each site. Town road foremen, select board members, and town managers also all commented on the value of the maps.

• Yes • Unfortunately, not to the level at which it was requested. This effort was fraught

with redundancy and development of information far in excess of what was needed. The greatest benefit coming from the information collected ended up being the map/visual representation of closed roads at the local level. When this information was shared on Google, the public finally had a way to plan their travel so as to be least disruptive to local response efforts. Unfortunately, shortly after this effort was available online, it was removed from public access rendering it worthless except to VTrans. This was a disservice to the traveling public and a hindrance to local efforts. Collecting point information with limited attributes that could quickly be updated, verified and widely distributed would be ideal. The simple shaded town maps


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showing incident summaries was helpful for situation awareness. We could have provided a quick hand drawn map to FEMA PA personnel which would have been nearly as effective. The PA visits are the only ones that matter in the PA project development process and any cost estimates collected during the RPC efforts only took road crews away from their response duties.

• Yes. This effort played to the RPCs existing skillsets. The information was valued by the FEMA people working in our region.

• This information needs to be better defined in terms of use. If the goal is to identify the original disaster impacts in order to transmit the scope of damage to VTrans and FEMA to fully anticipate Project Worksheets, then what was done should prove very helpful. However, this is a snapshot. If ongoing situational awareness is desired, then this task should be under the Planning section and will involve vastly greater resources the next time as it becomes stale daily. Better metadata also needs to be established in advance so that roads can be properly coded, and can also show where mitigation efforts would be beneficial. Since the information did not readily flow back to towns, its usefulness at the town level was marginal, though this could be fixed and its utility greatly improved.

• This provided a starting point for FEMA but the RPC collected too much information too often.

• Absolutely! We began our road closure mapping effort on August 30th and went live soon thereafter. We created this map at the request of our towns as they were looking for routes to get emergency equipment and supplies in and out through the roads of adjoining towns. Residents of the region also relied upon this map, which had more than 16,000 visits. This will serve as a template for future emergencies. The damage inventory which followed was also useful. We need to document what information was actually used versus what was gathered to mollify the sense of crisis beyond the impacted areas. This information will help us streamline future efforts.

• Yes, but we need to standardize our mapping effort, it was an iterative process and at times very frustrating to our GIS planners. We also need to develop an approach where we are not contacting the towns so frequently, we became an irritant after awhile, and they stopped communicating. We also need to create maps for the public showing alternative routes, many individual were displeased when the statewide map was taken down.

• We believe the mapping efforts were beneficial overall for situational awareness. Some fields requested may not have been needed and could use refinement, but overall positive. Staff at the SEOC heard first hand from FEMA that documentation was helpful.

6. Can the RPCs increase their own staff training so they can become trainers for towns?

• Increase DisasterLan training, so that localized events can be routed to the


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appropriate state agency. • Building relationships and points of contacts with all of our communities, so that

they are aware of how RPCs can help. • Establishing procedures for who, what, and how RPCs can react after a major event. • There was a feeling that RPC staff could help towns with PA/ER documentation

and paperwork if provided with some additional training. • Not sure • Yes, in order to best benefit our communities, RPC staff should be trained to

understand the intricacies of the PA process including 406 mitigation, alternate projects and improved projects. That training will allow them to be more effective advocates for towns.

• FEMA and the State of VT are both “nice guys” but ultimately, whether a town receives all that they are entitled to is largely dependent on the towns understanding of the regulations.

• Our RPC will likely pursue Disaster LAN training, and more staff will become familiar with the BEOP and AHMP documents and processes.

• VLCT and the LEPCs would be good training resources for the towns. • Yes. Are existing (pre-Irene) programs sufficiently loose to provide funding to

support this? Unknown. Existing emergency programs can provide some support. Training to RPCs could include actually taking the FEMA PA training, improving the ability to procure and manage contracts, greater training in HSEEP in order to create exercises, etc. Even with improved training to RPCs though, this would not translate into actually training towns unless there were resources to support that as well. RPCs also need additional incident command training.

• Given funding, yes, we can become trainers but we do not understand what this training would be. We could help with admin and permitting questions, etc.

• Absolutely! We’ve begun to identify our own training gaps so we can provide better technical assistance to our towns, including building their own capacities.

• Yes, and would be happy to do so. • RPCS should increase their own staff training on FEMA paperwork and

administration, but not for the goal of being trainers to the towns. There is limited possibility that the RPCs will gain the extent of knowledge required to provide this service. The experts should continue to be the trainers and RPCs can continue to assist towns. RPCs need to stay within their role and not step on the toes of agencies that provide these skilled trainings to the towns.

7. Was the local roads recovery effort an appropriate task for the RPCs?

• Yes. However, we need to have a plan in place for the next disaster, so that we can mobilize faster.

• Absolutely. The local knowledge and relationships with local officials that exists at RPCs is uniquely valuable. We were able to provide information, set up meetings,


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and coordinate with towns immediately. • Yes, with substantial changes in the future;

o RPCs could have provided a valuable reporting and vetting role to the SEOC in relation to local roads but its unclear whether the SEOC had access to the information collected.

o Focusing on local issues and roads when VTrans focused on State highways did fill a needed gap.

o RPCs could have been far more effective with prior PA recovery training. o RPCs should have not been involved in getting or recommending contractors. o Cost and damage estimating was not an appropriate task for RPC staff.

• Yes. • Yes. Simply put, if RPCs had not been involved the state would have paid much

more for outside contractors to provide the same service or the service would simply not have been provided, leading to much less situational awareness, poorer town documentation, worse procurement, greater ineligible costs, less mitigation and high(er) levels of frustration. RPCs provide sustained technical assistance with a very short ramp-up time. Nobody else can.

• The local roads recovery was appropriate but the scope extended beyond what we do with towns.

• It was a very logical fit. Our relationship with our town officials is very well-established. There’s a level of trust and collaboration that no other entity has. I don’t think any other entity could do what needed to be done.

• Yes, the RPCs have an ongoing working relationship with its towns, understand many of the town dynamics, have extensive inventories of roads, bridges, sewer and water, mobile home parks, etc.

• In an emergency situation such as Tropical Storm Irene the effort was appropriate. The RPCs were the best choice available to accomplish this task.

8. Did the RPCs have the appropriate resources to respond to the Irene local roads recovery effort?

• Seemingly, RPCs had enough staff resources to contribute to the local roads recovery effort. However, the question of how recovery work would be funded loomed at the beginning of the process and may have delayed the collective RPC response.

• Yes, acknowledging, however, that we had to divert staff from virtually all other work for several weeks.

• Yes, but had to drop all the other work. • Yes, in large part they do. • RPCs have the understanding of local politics needed. RPCs have advanced

mapping capabilities RPCs have highly trained staff in a wide variety of disciplines • No, in some cases more is needed. • Previously identified training in disaster information collection, ICS training -


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specifically in Logistics, Planning and Finance and training in PA disaster recovery roles and nuances.

• Yes, for the level of damage that we had within our region. With the largest regional service area in VT (55 towns, 30 which applied for FEMA PA), we saw the value of our focus on the basics over recent years – ensuring that all towns BEOPs were current; bridge and culvert inventories up to date; and strong relationships and regular communications with our local communities.

• No. However, such a response effort was not tasked to RPCs in advance. If RPCs are to fulfill this needed role, then they should be pre-contracted to do this annually, since a disaster can strike at any time. They should also play this role as much as possible during routine operations, as this increases the effective of response. They will also require some training, a few basic supplies, and the ability to add temporary staff quickly. The state planning function under Irene response and recovery was woefully understaffed if the goal is to actually have awareness to the local level.

• We had the personnel and technical expertise however the cost of staff time far exceeded our reimbursement.

• Yes, though having technical transportation staff (PE) would have augmented our existing skill set. A minor issue was the availability of proper vehicles to access towns to assess damage. FEMA personnel arrived in rental cars that were inappropriate to reach towns. WRC staff took FEMA personnel out in their own personal high-clearance four-wheel drives. While there were no complaints, there are potential liability concerns.

• Yes, but in the future it would be very helpful if there was a clear channel for RPCs to receive financial resources to assist in the disaster. I would like to thank VTrans for providing funding to the RPCs in a timely manner. It was greatly appreciated.

• Luckily there was flexibility with TPI funds. • State agencies helped by putting projects on hold or shifting important deadlines.

Otherwise RPCs would have not been able to meet their obligations while also assisting with response and recovery.

• RPCs need to have a specific and clear role in the state plans. If activated by the state then expenses would be clearer and be a big help.

• Not enough trained staff to be in the SEOC and certainly not enough participation in staffing the SEOC. Staff from all RPCs should be available.

• Additional staff training on DLan is needed. • Standard resource with applicable information should be available.


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Analysis of Capabilities Each RPC was provided an Incident Review Form on October 26th with instructions to meet with their respective staff to conduct their internal After Action Report. They were to highlight three strengths from the Irene Local Roads Recovery Effort, three areas where improvements could be made, and then list recommendations for those improvements. The forms were returned and discussion took place on November 3, 2011 at a monthly Vermont Association of Planning and Development Agencies (VAPDA) meeting.

There were common threads running through the comments from the 11 RPCs, even though each RPC had somewhat different responsibilities and roles in the response and recovery effort. Those main issues are identified below. A complete list of responses are listed in Appendix A.

Overall Strengths

1. Pre-established RPC relationships with towns in the areas of transportation and GIS mapping allowed for quick response and assistance.

2. Pre-established daily working relationships and partnerships with state agencies, a variety of state and federal programs, municipalities, and volunteer teams were important.

3. RPC mutual aid assistance was critical for those less impacted to help others that were more impacted, including support to the SEOC.

Best Practices

Using the Incident Command System (ICS) to set up the RPC Resource Coordination Center (RPC RCC)

The creation and implementation of the RPC RCC was critical in providing a structure to assist VTrans in the response and recovery effort due to the excessive damage to Vermont’s local roads. Early in the initial response phase VTrans realized that it needed help with the local roads recovery process including situational awareness, data and mapping of damaged highway network investments, support for local officials, identification of unmet needs, contractor/resource support for municipalities, and general resource and communications support, etc. The Chittenden County Regional Planning Commission that houses the Metropolitan Planning Organization was unanimously selected to provide organizational


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support to the remaining regional planning commissions in the impacted areas because of their expert transportation resource knowledge and the lesser amount of local road damage sustained in Chittenden County from TS Irene.

The coordination between VTrans, the RPC RCC and the RPCs included:

• Providing support from those RPCs that did not have severely damaged roads to the SEOC as well as to those RPCs that needed assistance;

• Coordinating a statewide mapping process for damaged roads, bridges and culverts according to a standardized format. Data was supplied by the RPC RCC to VTrans and the SEOC at scheduled times to feed into other mapping programs and the Joint Situational Report;

• Providing situational awareness and status updates on public infrastructure damages and general municipal government needs to VTrans and the SEOC based on data collected from towns by their respective RPCs;

• Disseminating critical material via email to RPCs for distribution to local officials on procurement procedures, FEMA PA Applicant’s Briefing schedule, PA and ER eligibility requirements, documentation requirements, available contractor resources, FEMA PA contacts and general needs assessment information;

• Coordinating a schedule of RPC staff liaisons for SEOC and SSF1 support.

Distilling and packaging important information to local officials

The RPC RCC sent out important information via email to the RPCs for distribution to local officials. In some cases the distribution of information ended up causing communications overload for the local officials who were additionally receiving materials from a variety of other sources.

One of the shining examples of a best practice was the Windham Regional Commission which took each day’s multiple email communications and distilled them into one consolidated email message which was sent to local officials at the end of each day. The emails highlighted and prioritized actions and information that was pertinent to the current stage of the recovery process. The towns in the region came to quickly understand that this was their reliable source of information. Local officials could depend on quality information and get direct answers if they had questions.

The consolidated daily emails were shared among the RPCs so they could also tailor them for their local officials as appropriate. Although this was most likely an extra burden on the WRC to distill and package the daily information, it was recognized by all RPCs as an excellent example of how to disseminate the information in the most useful manner to local officials when so much redundant information was being funneled to them daily.


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Improvements and Recommendations

Observation 1 • There was no pre-defined state plan or role for RPCs. This led to developing new roles, procedures and information exchange on the fly.

• Funding for RPC support was not pre-determined.

□ Noted Strength Area for Improvement

Capability Element

□ Equipment □ Organization □ Personnel

Planning □ Process □ Training

References (Standards, Policies, or Plans)

1. State Emergency Operations Plan

2. SSF 1 Annex

3. Other Annexes as appropriate

Analysis Because there was no pre-defined state plan or role for RPCs, there were no procedures in place for immediate response and recovery actions following this disaster by the RPCs. This led to developing new roles, procedures and information exchange on the fly.

The RPCs have traditional planning responsibilities that are well-defined through statutory language and implemented through state agencies to support their local municipalities. These responsibilities include land use planning, natural resource planning, hazard mitigation planning, community development and flood zoning to name a few.

The RPCs are well-suited to expand their roles from planning and preparedness to emergency coordination and recovery aspects when needed in all emergency situations. The concept of setting up the RPC Resource Coordination Center was born out of the scale and scope of the damage received by TS Irene. The concept and operational component of the RPC RCC was


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necessary to set up under ICS so there is a clear line of command and control. Because there were no pre-defined procedures or adequate training, the RPCs experienced unclear direction, organization and communication with other emergency groups in the beginning of the incident. This was rectified by placing additional RPC staff support in the SEOC Planning Section and with SSF1 and establishing a proper flow of information under ICS.

Once the RPCs were contacted to assist VTrans, the question of a sustained funding source to provide services requested was questioned since none had been pre-identified. In addition, while the RPCs were initially requested to provide information on local road damages, their role grew quickly to provide assistance on FEMA eligibility, FHWA eligibility, other public damage (not road related) and federal procurement requirements. If RPCs are to fulfill this needed role in the future, there should be emergency management provisions pre-identified in their respective contracts with state entities such as Vermont Emergency Management, VTrans, the Agency of Transportation, and the Agency of Commerce and Community Affairs. Sub-grants should provide for this annually, since a disaster can strike at any time. The RPCs should also participate in this role (to be defined in plans) as much as possible during routine operations, as this increases the effective of response.

Recommendations 1. Plan – Include the RPCs in the SEOP and applicable

SEOP Annexes with clear roles and responsibilities defined including: SEOC support, regional liaisons between the state, federal and local governments and regional resource coordination capabilities, including the addition of a RPC seat in the SEOC.

2. Fund - The annual subgrants between appropriate state agencies and the RPCs should include a funding provision for approved emergency activations.

a. Legislative and/or Administration (?) action is needed to establish the funding source and guidance related to administration of disaster


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response activities for RPC staff. b. The demonstrated strengths of the RPCs far

surpass the existing relationships with state agencies and local communities. The statutory language that governs regional planning commissions (VSA T. 24, Chapter 117) should be reviewed with respect to their emergency management capabilities under VSA, T. 20, Chapter 1.


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Observation 2 • Not all RPC staff have enough knowledge or training for response and recovery efforts for large-scale disasters.


Capability Element


□ Planning □ Process Training


1. Vermont Emergency Management a. FEMA Individual Assistance b. Incident Command System c. DisasterLan

2. Vermont Agency of Transportation a. FEMA Public Assistance and 406 Hazard

Mitigation b. FHWA Emergency Relief

Analysis Each RPC has a staff member dedicated to an emergency preparedness program for their respective communities. Duties typically involve regular contact with the appointed local emergency management directors (LEMDs), helping develop basic emergency operations plans and all-hazard mitigation plans, supporting Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs), participating in state and local exercises and assisting with HMGP applications where needed.

In addition, each RPC has an executive director, a dedicated transportation planner, a GIS planner, and a land use planner and other necessary administrative staff. None of these positions identified have ever been called upon to actively participate in an actual response and recovery capacity – until TS Irene.

There was general consensus that the RPCs were the logical and appropriate entities to interact directly with their communities on the issue of collecting local damage


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assessments, mapping of damaged areas, resource identification, administrative support, coordinating with state and federal officials, and disseminating critical information for the recovery process.

At least one person in each RPC had been trained on DisasterLan, the state’s disaster management software, but most had not every actively used the software in emergency activations. When the SEOC relocated due to flooding, the DisasterLan system was temporarily out of service and not usable by the State Support Functions. For situational awareness, SSF1 (transportation) adopted their own system of managing the state and local damages in order to not lose valuable time immediately following the flood impacts. When the RPCs were tasked by VTrans to manage information on the local road damages, they developed their own system for tracking and assessing damages. After a week or so of damage collection, this data (maps and lists) was then fed back to VTrans and the SEOC to become part of the big picture for statewide reporting.

The RPCs identified that it would be helpful for more of their staff to have regular training and practical use (exercises or real events) in all aspects of emergency response and recovery. They feel well versed in preparedness and mitigation. With more training they will be more effective in any new defined roles.

Recommendations Train - RPCs need more staff training in DisasterLan, FEMA PA, FHWA ER, ICS, and emergency management in general if they are expected to provide a greater role in large disasters. The entire state should be working under ICS for command and control.


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Observation 3 • Communication issues: There was too much information to RPCs and local officials from too many entities with redundant requests that were not well coordinated.


Capability Element


Planning □ Process □ Training


• State Emergency Operations Plan, Annexes and Procedures

• Local Emergency Operations Plans • SSF websites • Governor’s website • VLCT website

Analysis The RPCs were tasked by VTrans to collect damage assessment from local officials on their local roads. It became apparent early on that there was a lot of information that needed to be collected and in turn disseminated. Other groups, state agencies and organizations were also reaching out to local officials for information. It became painfully evident that there was information overload to those who were in the communities assessing the damage and recovering from the damage. Local officials became frustrated and confused by the redundant information, sometimes conflicting, and repeated requests for information.

Many different agencies and organizations had important information on their websites but it was not always coordinated, complete, or updated. Example include: FEMA, VEM, VLCT, Vermont.Gov, Red Cross, United Ways, Congressional websites, 511, 211, WCAX, WVPR, etc.

When the RPCs contacted their respective towns for damage assessments and unmet needs, many local officials expressed frustration because they were asked for the same information


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from FEMA representatives that no one was aware of in the towns, Red Cross volunteers, transportation officials, church groups, historic and cultural groups, other state agencies. Many local emergency planning directors reportedly resigned their positions and/or were fired. Details are not known in all cases.

Points of contacts (POC) in each community vary so it was discovered that one email address and phone number was not necessarily the best way to convey important information. Sending emails with timely attachments to one identified POC did not always reach the proper entity. For example: documentation and reimbursement requirements for expenses might go to the LEMD but not get to the road foreman who is repairing the roads and ordering fill and bridges. The Selectboard Chair might get information that is pertinent to the town treasurer and the road foreman but due to the volumes of information received, cannot distribute in a timely manner to the appropriate persons.

Materials and documents were developed on the fly in many cases to address federal procurement requirements, examples of bid documents, available resources, debris management, mutual aid templates, etc.

There was no evident central point for reference material that was prepared in advance for emergency recovery efforts.

Recommendations Communication/Information - a. A list of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

should be developed in advance and tailored to meet the circumstances for each disaster.

b. A central website/clearinghouse should be developed and maintained that has important information already developed such as: procurement requirements, FEMA PA and IA basics, FHWA ER basics, mitigation options, documentation requirements, consulting/contracting services. All state agencies should provide links to the central website for questions, answers and contact resources.

c. Information needs to be distilled and prioritized


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daily in order not to overwhelm already overwhelmed local officials.

d. All requests for situational awareness and unmet needs should be coordinated and the process clearly defined.

Pittsfield, off RT100, photo by Kevin Geiger, 9/10/11


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Conclusions and Lessons Learned Overall, utilizing the strengths and capabilities of the existing structures of the 11 RPCs to assist in situational awareness, road damage mapping, assess other damages and to document unmet needs following a disaster should be considered a success. The lessons learned after the fact include:

• RPCs are a valuable and overlooked resource when it comes to response and recovery.

• They already have a solid background in emergency planning and mitigation, transportation planning, GIS mapping, land use and natural resource planning, National Flood Insurance Program knowledge, zoning, affordable housing, economic development and local infrastructure.

• They have institutional knowledge of their communities within their regions and are on a first name basis with many of the local officials within their jurisdictions.

• They are a structured, trusted and stable source of reliable information to their communities and to multiple state and federal agencies.

The RPCs have demonstrated that they are more than capable and flexible to rise to the challenge to undertake new tasks under stressful and unplanned incidents. The RPCs were part of the solution to enhance situational awareness and provided valuable assistance in a timely and knowledgeable manner to their towns and to the state.

While this After Action Report is focused on the VTrans tasks as assigned, the expertise of the RPCs can be utilized for other public property damage, natural resource impacts, housing impacts and economic development impacts in their regions.

The demonstrated strengths of the RPCs during the initial response and recovery stage of TS Irene far surpass their existing responsibilities with state agencies and local communities. The statutory language that governs regional planning commissions (VSA T. 24, Chapter 117) should be reviewed with respect to their emergency management capabilities under VSA, T. 20, Chapter 1.


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Other Resources Associated General Contractors of Vermont

Vermont Local Roads Program

Vermont League of Cities and Towns (VLCT)

Addison County Regional Planning Commission

Bennington County Regional Commission

Central Vermont Regional Planning Commission

Chittenden County Regional Planning Commission

Lamoille County Planning Commission

Northeastern Vermont Development Association

Northwest Regional Planning Commission

Rutland Regional Planning Commission

Southern Windsor County Regional Planning Commission

Two Rivers-Ottauquechee Regional Commission

Windham Regional Commission

Vermont Agency of Transportation

Vermont Division of Emergency Management


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Appendix A Combined RPC Input for Strengths, Needed Improvements and

Recommendations (Raw Data)

Strengths

1. Town management of the incident. 2. Collaboration of partner organizations. 3. RPC communication system. 4. RPC GIS personnel performed well as mapping resources. 5. RPC staff advocating 406 mitigation, codes and standards, etc. as part of FEMA PA

visits. 6. Pre-established inter-RPC working relationships. 7. Ability to create a new system in a very short period of time that worked effectively

and provided needed information and services. 8. Ability to help the other RPC’s that needed it. 9. Ability to devote resources instantly. 10. We already had good contacts with the towns but now that has improved. 11. Long-established relationships with towns and state agencies. 12. Responsibility for implementation of multiple relevant programs (emergency

planning, transportation, natural resources, community development) established us as a primary point of contact between the towns and state and federal agencies ahead of the event.

13. Because we were not directly impacted, we were able to serve as a primary point of contact between towns and the SEOC immediately in the wake of the storm.

14. Staff and their established relationships with towns . 15. Communication gathering and distribution 16. Technology (GIS, etc.). 17. VEM did a good job of publicizing how big this storm could be. 18. VEM reached out to area LEPC’s and RPC’s by doing the conference call on

Thursday, 8/25 to discuss CPOD’s and staffing for the SEOC. 19. The Regional Planning Commissions showed how valuable they are by providing

staff to assist not only at the SEOC but in the hardest hit areas of the state. 20. Staff has established relationships and ability to coordinate/communicate with

municipal officials in an expedited manner. 21. Staff knowledge of municipal road and bridge network. 22. Staff has skill set and technology in-house to collect and disseminate mapping and

other technical information related to disaster response in electronic and hard-copy. 23. RPCs have detailed local knowledge about people and the area, including GIS maps.


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24. RPCs have a wealth of experience in procurement and federal project management. 25. RPCs are willing and able to learn tasks fast and undertake them professionally. 26. Ability to create a new system in a very short period of time that worked effectively

and provided needed information and services. 27. Mapping and data collection/distribution. 28. Involvement of ANR staff to provide guidance to towns in physical aspects of

restoration work. 29. RPC/VTrans relationship within the SEOC. 30. Having 1 RPC serve as the lead for data collection. 31. GIS mapping and analysis.

Needs Improvement

1. DisasterLan 2. Communication at the SEOC with federal, state, regional and local partners. 3. Communication with organizations dealing with vulnerable populations. 4. Initial organization to hopefully avoid excess emails which, literally, consumed at

least six hours per day just to read, sort, process, prioritize, and respond. Need focus and prioritization at the front end.

5. The structure that was created as a reaction to internal systems failure at State of VT. 6. Excess information was collected creating waste of staff time (damage assessments,

road segments vs points, etc). 7. RPC staff not qualified for the majority of tasks requested. 8. Better communication and understanding of the role(s) of consultants. 9. Better communication between involved agencies (FEMA, FHWA, NRCS). 10. The information we were asked to gather kept changing. 11. Too much information was sent out by different sources, it wasn’t organized or

prioritized too many emails. 12. There was no single source for list of meetings/deadlines were confusing 13. Lack of a defined formal role of the RPC in the response to large-scale, multi-town

disasters. 14. Assistance/provision of resources to towns was sometimes awkward due to the

manner in which it was rolled out (not enough context, explanation of purpose or tasks to be performed, or financial responsibility/obligation incurred). This delayed or otherwise compromised the use and usefulness of these resources.

15. In hindsight, much of the river and stream behavior was predictable. 16. ANR should have been involved sooner, with clear direction, policy and permit

requirements. 17. We needed a clearer understanding of the role and expectations of the RPC from

VEM. 18. Too much uncoordinated information went out from too many organizations.


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19. The applicant briefing for Rutland was set up less than 36 hours notice and in Manchester.

20. Communication is always an issue. On the day of the storm I thought communication went as well as could be expected with all that was going on but over the next few days I saw some breakdown in communication, which resulted in some issues not being addressed and in other cases some things were being duplicated.

21. Although the people from FEMA were sent here at the request of our Governor, I thought the SEOC was overwhelmed for a few days with too many people. This could be considered a communication issue as I am aware of how the request was made and why so many FEMA people came. I know they all meant well and were here to help, but still felt that we possibly ended up with more than what was really needed.

22. Public Awareness/Education of what FEMA can and can’t do or will and won’t do. Many people think FEMA is going to fix all the problems and need to understand there is only so much money available.

23. RPC staff was required to learn PA and ER (as well as numerous others) programs on the fly as we are not normally involved in these programs.

24. Initially, communication with municipalities and others was seemingly muddled due to too many folks trying to “get the word out” and seeking info.

25. State should establish sources and guidelines of funding for the next event. 26. RPCs need more training in emergency management and to understand the state’s

emergency management structure and plans. 27. The state needs to fully use ICS as a state, and be clear about what the incident is,

who is in command, and what role the state is playing on each incident. 28. The state needs to better formulate FAQs in advance about contracting and

procurement under a federal disaster. 29. Initial organization to hopefully avoid excess emails which, literally, consumed at

least six hours per day just to read, sort, process, prioritize, and respond. Need focus and prioritization at the front end.

30. Staff trained in ICS, DisasterLan, EOC functions and staff availability. 31. Better electronic communications between the RPCs. 32. No clear defined role for RPCs in state structure.

Recommendations

1. Prepare a plan that establishes clear roles and responsibilities. 2. Careful pre-screening of consultants and better communication about their roles. 3. Getting FEMA, FHWA, NRCS, VTrans, etc. to discuss areas where information

was slow to be released, or where vague and confusing information was released, to be sure everyone is on the same page. Ensuring consistency between and among individual project review teams.

4. Some person or agency should have been organizing all the information and putting it out there (a website maybe) with levels of priority.


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5. Training should be offered on a regular basis. 6. More engagement between the state agencies and the RPCs in the development of

resources to be provided to the towns. This is not a matter of turf; it is about situational awareness in determining what resources are needed, and the roll out of those resources in a way that minimizes confusion and expedites their use.

7. Formally define role of RPC in response to large-scale, multiple town disasters. We plan to begin this process immediately through the LEPC.

8. Borrowing from the lessons learned from this disaster, roles and expectations for all players should be defined, and appropriate responses and processes developed.

9. We should compare the behavior of the streams and rivers in this incident to evidence we have of prior behavior, and incorporate this information into regional and local plans.

10. Better communication and coordination between all state agencies with a clear structural organization representing the consolidation of agencies would alleviate a lot of duplication, and confusion.

11. VEM should have worked with VTrans to provide the information that towns needed.

12. More emergency watershed protection $ is needed. 13. Consistency and uniformity across the state for information through DisasterLan or

other reporting forms would be beneficial and DisasterLan should be made accessible to RPC staff or another streamline method to get damage reports from towns

14. Better coordination among state/local agencies to address what roles different people have in these incidents. The ICS was in place and overall worked well but there were still some people involved in this incident who did not understand who to reach out to for certain staffing/resource issues or what their role might be if they were involved in possibly being a decision maker in this incident. I believe many agencies do a good job of training together to prepare for incidents like this, but other agencies need to be involved and of course more local government officials need to be involved in training.

15. I am not sure what action step could be taken for this one. Without trying to politicize this or be critical, it appears the Governor felt we needed more staff from FEMA than what was really needed. I would agree it is better to have more help than not enough, but with the space that was available at the SEOC in Burlington it seemed to be overcrowded and some people were sitting around waiting for something to do. I realize once some of these people got out to areas that needed assistance, they were utilized but there was still duplication efforts in the Northeast Kingdom area between state, local, and FEMA people.

16. Provide updated information on what help is available from FEMA by doing Public Service Announcements/Forums, or any other avenue that can be used to educate the public. I understand they only really pay attention after something happens, when they need the help.


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17. RPC staff should be provided training in the applicable programs. This should be tailored to the type of initial response actions seen in Irene as all RPC’s already have a designated Emergency Management Planner (EMP). Events of this scale require more staff to pulled in and they would not need to have all the attributes of the EMP but to be competent to assist in initial response efforts

18. Streamline communications as was seen after the first week or so with the RPC communication. Make it clear to all other organizations that under normal situations forward and cross post emails that they should desist forwarding emails. In this event municipal officials needed to get specific and timely info from those in the know. Red Cross posters were simply filling up officials email boxes and in some cases were disseminating old info that was not helpful as the needs and actions required were changing very quickly.

19. Legislative and/or Administration (?) action is needed to establish the funding source and guidance related to administration of disaster response activities for RPC staff.

20. As much of the disaster response framework as possible should be built into day-to-day operations. To this end the state should provide annual emergency funding for transportation and mitigation projects and make these aligned with federal disaster response requirements so that we “play” the same way on disasters or in day-to-day operations.

21. The state should review its emergency management structure across all agencies and bring it into compliance with ICS and the State EOP.

22. RPCs should receive training and real world practice on assignment in disasters so that they are qualified to fill roles in planning and logistics that they may be assigned.

23. Prepare a plan that establishes clear roles and responsibilities. 24. Careful pre-screening of consultants and better communication about their roles. 25. Getting FEMA, FHWA, NRCS, VTrans, etc. to discuss areas where information

was slow to be released, or where vague and confusing information was released, to be sure everyone is on the same page. Ensuring consistency between and among individual project review teams.

26. Train staff in pertinent areas and have planners available from all RPCs to staff the SEOC.

27. Compatible licensing and software. 28. Formalize RPC role in the EOC as well as in the regions themselves.


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Appendix B To: RPC Directors From: Michele Boomhower, Barb Farr Subject: Irene After Action Survey Date: October 26, 2011

In an effort to document the recent Irene local roads recovery effort, VTrans would like to capture the lessons learned in this historic event. The lessons learned from each RPC will be combined into a comprehensive After Action Report that will help guide plans, procedures, actions and partners for future events. Please take an hour or two to meet with your staff collectively to: A. Discuss each question below and provide a brief response to each one. B. Using the format on the attached Incident Review Form - Identify top 3 strengths; identify the top 3 areas that need improvement; and describe what action steps should be taken for issues needing improvement.

1. Provide your assessment of the RPC/MPO relationship with Irene partnering

organizations and state agencies e.g. VLCT, VT Local Roads, AGCVT, etc. 2. What value did the partnering organizations bring to the process? What roles

worked & did not? 3. Should these and other partnering organizations participate in future disaster

events and should the procedure be formalized in state plans? 4. Does the day-to-day RPC TPI work facilitate & improve emergency

preparedness for towns? 5. Was the identification and mapping of damaged road segments helpful to you,

your towns, and ultimately the FEMA/FWHA documentation effort? 6. Can the RPCs increase their own staff training so they can become trainers for

towns? 7. Was the local roads recovery effort an appropriate task for the RPCs? 8. Did the RPCs have the appropriate resources to respond to the Irene local roads

recovery effort? Return your response to the questions and one Incident Review Form per RPC to Barb Farr [email protected] no later than Wednesday, November 2, 2011 by 4pm. The results will be discussed collectively at the November 3, 2011 VAPDA meeting and will form the basis for the final After Action Report.

mailto:[email protected]�


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Incident Review Form

Event Name: Tropical Storm Irene Name (optional): ____________________________________________________ Agency (Optional): __________________________ Role: ____________________________

Recommendations and Action Steps

1. Based on your experience in the incident, list the top 3 areas of strength identified.

2. Based on your experience in the incident, list the top 3 areas the need improvement.

3. Identify the action steps that should be taken to address the issues

identified above.


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Appendix C Organizational Chart

Chart 1 – RPC Resource Coordination Center

Chart 2 – RPC (Field) Coordination Centers


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tropical storm irene after action report54.172.27.91/em/rpc_irenelocalroads_aar_20111111.pdf · the...

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