UNICEF UNHCR WFP

Full Report

of the

Tripartite (UNICEF/UNHCR/WFP) Study of the Great Lakes Emergency

Operation

September 1996 - 1997

Rome, June 1998

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction 1

II. Findings and Recommendations 1-13

General 1-3

Logistics 3-5

Telecommunications 5-6

Planning/Programming/Monitoring 7-8

Organization and Staffing 8-10

Security 10-12

Information Management 12-13

III. Concluding Remarks 13

Annex I: Tripartite Study Mission Composition

Annex II: Key Documents for the Tripartite Great Lakes Mission

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Report of the Tripartite (UNICEF/UNHCR/WFP)Study of the Great Lakes Emergency Operation

September 1996 - September 1997

Introduction

1. The objective of the joint WFP/UNHCR/UNICEF mission was to examine operationalaspects of humanitarian assistance co-ordination in the Great Lakes region in order:

• to contribute to a shared regional inter-institutional process of self-evaluation whichwill prioritise and shape work to improve inter-agency co-ordination of humanitarianassistance appropriate to the changing context, and

• to document lessons for broader application to humanitarian assistance.

The focus of the study was in the main limited to the three primary United Nations operationalagencies: UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF.

2. Over a period of three weeks the Mission visited six countries of the Region (Kenya,Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and also heldconsultations at the headquarters of the three agencies in Rome, Geneva, and New York. In thefield the Mission met with the regional directors/managers and country representatives of the threeagencies and with those staff of the three agencies who, working at regional, country and field levelin areas such as communications, logistics, programming, security and information, were mostclosely concerned with the implementation of the various emergency programmes. Following thefield visit, the team prepared a draft report which was subsequently revised to take account ofcomments made by operations and evaluation managers in the headquarters of the three agencies.The mission composition and itinerary are attached as Annex I. Key documents considered by themission are listed in Annex II, and are available upon request to the evaluation sections of WFPRome, UNHCR Geneva and UNICEF New York.

3. The Mission also interviewed officials of other United Nations agencies, including UNDPResident Co-ordinators and United Nations Humanitarian Co-ordinators. It met with NGOs inRwanda, and with national government officials in Burundi. In Tanzania, the Mission met withmembers of the Joint Food Aid Assessment Mission of the Great Lakes Region (JFAM) andattended part of its debriefing. Although the Tripartite team was unable to meet in the field with theInter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group/Department of Humanitarian Affairs mission(IASC/DHA Mission), which was studying strategic humanitarian co-ordination in the Great LakesRegion, it did subsequently have the opportunity for an extensive exchange of views.

4. The report which follows comprises three sections: a) introduction; b) general findings andobservations on policy matters together with specific recommendations for action; c) concludingremarks. The sectors covered by the report are: general (matters cutting across sectoral lines);logistics; telecommunications/information technology; programming (including planning,implementation, and monitoring); organisation and staffing; security; and information management.

Findings and Recommendations - GENERAL

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5. The Mission found that the quantity and quality of the formal and informal co-operation inthe field of operations among UNICEF, WFP and UNHCR operational staff were greater thananticipated. Agreements in the form of operational plans, MOUs (Memorandum of Understanding)and Technical Agreements which covered specific sectors such as logistics and telecommunicationswere concluded as a result of regional, country-level, and local initiatives. Subsequently, a GlobalMOU was signed between the Headquarters of WFP and UNICEF together with a GlobalTechnical Agreement covering radio communications.

6. More significant, from the point of view of future co-ordinated activities, was the increasednumber of joint activities undertaken by the three agencies, in which, for a finite time and forspecific purposes, they merged their identities. Informal arrangements included: some regional andlocal logistics control centres employing shared resources; an agreement for sharedtelecommunications connectivity and frequencies; joint use of equipment and personnel; andundertakings for common warehouse, office and other facilities. Subsequently, as the level ofemergency activity in the region has decreased, there has been a concerted effort by the agencies tobuild upon experience and to develop agreed written procedures to guide the establishment of jointactivities in future emergency operations. 7. The tripartite exercise also represents an attempt to document these co-operative effortsmore systematically, to highlight the more promising initiatives and to suggest guidelines for follow-up action. Such action is essential, and it must be clearly stated at the outset that the resourcesrequired to implement the recommendations made will be considerable. 8. In this, as in previous emergency operations, divergences of views between UN agencyofficers sometimes impeded co-ordination. When such differences occurred, even signedagreements and MOUs could do little to overcome them and harmonise agency operations. Anotherrecurring difficulty was the competition among the individual United Nations agencies to promotetheir own identity for fund-raising purposes. That said, it is acknowledged that these problems aredue in part to human nature and the competition for funds in the current climate of diminishingresources for international emergency assistance operations. 9. It is precisely these “natural” characteristics of the international emergency assistancesystem, however, that serve to emphasise the importance of the achievements of the personnel ofthe three agencies in the Great Lakes emergency operation in developing the new formal andinformal modalities of operational co-ordination and joint action which are discussed in this report. 10. It was often difficult to ascertain, both within the individual agencies and within thesystem as a whole, where responsibility for concerted action lay and at what level and underwhose responsibility key strategic decisions (those, for instance, relating to the delivery ofsupplies or food to certain groups which might have political or security implications) weretaken in those countries. Where the post of Humanitarian Co-ordinator existed, it often seemedthat the lack of resources to support the office diminished its authority, and, although beingabove the action should ostensibly be an advantage, it was often, in fact, a handicap. At this, asat other levels, the effectiveness of the co-ordination depended very much on the flexibility andtask orientation of those concerned. Although the detailed examination of the question ofstrategic co-ordination was properly the task of the IASC/DHA mission, the Tripartite Missionpermitted itself to comment on such co-ordination when it clearly had a direct relation tooperational matters. 11. It was observed that in general, the closer one gets to the physical ‘action’ the clearer

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the responsibilities among the agencies appeared defined, and the more coherent and co-ordinated the decision-taking mechanism, and the more orderly the manner in which thedecisions were implemented. At this level, administrators were more often than not focused onthe task at hand. 12. Either because of their size or their suddenness, there are emergency situations where,in the very early stages, the demand by individual agencies for immediate large scale resourcesis bound to exceed their availability. At such times, the agencies have often relied on standbyarrangements with a selected number of governmental or non-governmental agencies (that is,the Norwegian Refugee Council, ODA, Swiss Disaster Relief, etc.), in order to providespecialised services - service ‘packages’- that complement the agencies’ efforts. In the GreatLakes operation however, when packages were donated to one agency alone, the single agency‘ownership’ sometimes tended to hinder the establishment of joint or co-ordinated operations.Such was the case in the early stages of the Goma and Kisangani logistics operations, forexample.

Recommendation: The headquarters logistics sections in UNHCR, UNICEF and WFPshould explore the modalities for establishing common stand-by arrangements withdonors. Service packages could thus be made available to all three agenciessimultaneously when joint operations arrangements are concluded, such as theestablishment of a joint aircell, common communications centre or warehouse facility.

13. In the nineties, in an era of fast-moving, dramatic conflict emergencies, the publicprofile of an emergency organisation assumed a new importance. If an organisation issuccessful in establishing an early, visible presence when the drama was at its height, then thematerial support that it received increased significantly. The need to be first or to be seen in thefront line, and the need for an agency’s assistance to have a short-term impact, have greatlyincreased. Co-operation, co-ordination and especially joint action, however, all involve sharingthe limelight, and although that may also mean delivering greater quantities of aid moreeffectively, as far as fund-raising potential is concerned it frequently blurs the image of anagency.

Recommendation: The Mission wishes to emphasise the need, in the three agencies, forclear signals from the top levels of management regarding the balance between image andaction, and the need for those signals to reach and to be clearly understood at the end of thechain of command.

14. It was noted that a common perception among emergency aid officials was thatUNICEF appeared to be a somewhat reluctant participant in emergency operations, and thatwhen it did participate, its responses tended to be considerably slower than those of otheragencies. What was sometimes true, as for example at Kisangani and Tingi Tingi, was thatUNICEF was the first present, but its relatively modest contribution at that stage was soonovershadowed and merged into a much larger scale operation, where refugee and feedingactivities necessarily dominated the programme.

15. This situation was typically true in the latter half of 1996 when, with thecommencement of the civil war in Eastern DRC, a new phase in the Great Lakes emergencyoperation began. The sudden movements of large numbers of refugees and IDPs (internallydisplaced persons) tended to bring UNHCR’s protection and relief activities, and WFP’slogistics and feeding operations into the forefront of the programme. As the WFP and HCRoperations escalated with their significantly superior resources, UNICEF’s efforts were merged

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into this larger operation. Food, shelter, protection and transport becoming the primaryoperational concerns and certainly attracting the bulk of donor funding. The result was thatUNICEF was not always included at that stage as a full partner in those cases where locallogistics control centres or programming arrangements (that is, MOVCONS (MovementControl Centres) or joint workplans) were established. Then, when the local situationnormalised and the refugees/IDPs returned or re-located, the focus of the local community andthe governmental authorities turned to reconstruction of infrastructure and the re-establishmentof schools and health and other social services. Emergency water supply then had to bedeveloped into community water supply, for example. Consequently, when emergencyoperations wound down and rehabilitation and reconstruction activities were commenced,UNICEF, on occasions with very little advance notice, and without necessarily having beeninvolved in the emergency planning (as occurred in Kivu Province DRC), was expected to takeover the operations.

Recommendation: In the interest of programme continuity and to hasten normalisationand the resumption of basic social services in conflict-affected areas, the Missionrecommends that all three agencies be actively involved in planning and co-ordinatingactivities from the outset of complex emergency operations (that is, not only in thedevelopment of the programme proper, but also the entry and exit strategies). In particular,because UNICEF usually has a key role during the transitional phase of re-establishing basicservices, it should be a partner in planning of humanitarian relief even in those situationswhere, and at stages when, it does not have a substantial role to play in those operations.This recommendation could well apply to all aspects (including the technical aspects) ofoperational planning associated with the Emergency.

Findings and Recommendations – LOGISTICS 16. After the outbreak of civil war in September/October 1996 the objectives of theemergency programme in eastern DRC changed considerably. Over a million (mostly)Rwandan refugees suddenly fled the fighting to return to their places of origin or to movedeeper into eastern DRC, necessitating the re-positioning of aid agencies and the re-routing ofassistance. In eastern DRC logistics and telecommunications became major problems sincelarge numbers of refugees and IDPs had to be assisted and protected, and then moved out ofharm’s way and/or returned to their place of origin, amidst the ongoing hostilities. 17. As significant numbers of people migrated or were driven to a particular location, thethree agencies (or in some instances, the ‘two’ agencies, UNHCR and WFP) were able toagree on an ad hoc assignment of roles which corresponded to the funding, personnel andequipment resources at hand, available to each party at that location. Whichever agency hadthe formal designation ‘lead agency’ did not matter, for significant parts of the operation werecarried out through local joint arrangements, utilising shared staff, equipment and funding. 18. At the regional level in Kampala in December1996, DHA, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFPestablished a United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC). Originally intended primarily as aliaison point for the United Nations multinational force (MNF) briefly deployed to the region, theUNJLC was used to process information on logistics operations of the three operational agencies,and more broadly for the common management of their logistics operations throughout the region.This unit held responsibility for the co-ordination of incoming freight and support/forwardingto the field locations. Procedures for the establishment of UNJLCs in future emergency operations

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were agreed in draft form by the logistics sections of the three agencies in February 1997. Theyhave not, however, been amended to incorporate the experience since that time. In particular, forexample, they do not at the present time address such issues as logistics contingency planning andthe maintenance of strategic stocks. 19. The individual field operations which WFP and UNHCR established for the first time inthe Great Lakes emergency in locations such as Kisangani, Goma, Entebbe, Mbandaka,Mwanza and Brazzaville were called MOVCONs (for Movement Control Centres). Each hadits own specific form and content, developed to address the particular logistics problemsencountered in area covered by that operation. The implications of the establishment ofMOVCONs merit further comment. It is often the inconsistency between local, country and/orregional lead agency designations, on the one hand, and the actual capabilities and resources ofthe agencies on the ground, on the other, that can cause disagreements among United Nationsoperational partners. Through UNJLC, MOVCONs, and similar arrangements, anycombination of agencies can temporarily pool personnel and equipment resources to managean aircell or barge or trucking operation in a manner that is not only efficient and economic,but is also not threatening to those agencies involved. Further, the mix of inputs or assignmentof responsibilities (the tasking of aircraft, the management of warehouses, etc.) does notprejudice the formulation of arrangements in the establishment of joint logistics operations inthe next operation in a new location, several weeks or months hence, since its parameters willalmost certainly be different. 20. Where the Humanitarian or Resident Co-ordinator system is the preferred means forco-ordination of a United Nations emergency programme, the assignment of operational rolesamong the agencies in the very early stages can sometimes be a sensitive and acrimoniousprocess, particularly when the media coverage is high and ‘visibility’ is important.Occasionally, because these roles assigned in the field did not correspond to ‘lead agency’designations or to global agency mandates, there were other inter-agency disagreements. Butthese were rare, and in the main, the Mission observed that joint activities of this kind moreoften than not facilitated the work of both the Humanitarian/Resident Co-ordinator and the‘lead agency’ concerned. UNJLC and MOVCONs, in particular, help to reduce the potentialfor disagreement by providing a framework for co-ordination which has a precedent. At thelocal levels – both country and sub-office – where joint logistics operations were notestablished, logistics staff of the three agencies often operated independently and withoutregular meetings and exchanges of information.

Recommendation: The Mission recommends the eventual incorporation of the UNJLCdocument into the global inter-agency MOUs between the three agencies.

Recommendation: The Mission recommends that the concepts and procedures underlyingUNJLC and MOVCON be incorporated into the internal logistics manuals of the threeagencies and future directives reflect a strong bias towards the establishment of commonlogistics services and premises generally, but particularly in countries where there arecomplex emergency operations.

Recommendation: The Mission recommends that each agency formally adopt theMOVCON procedures which are presently being developed by the respective logisticssections, and determine a method of funding, perhaps from standing arrangements withdonors or the use of agency emergency reserve funds, of the early common costs. Mediumand longer term common costs could be funded from inter-agency consolidated appeals.

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Recommendation: The practice of selecting one agency to assume a lead role in localoperations should be encouraged by the three agencies, along with the routine establishmentof informal arrangements for joint operations.

21. In spite of the successes of the joint logistics operations, there were certain instances in theGreat Lakes emergency programme where warehouses, repair facilities, offices and transportequipment and even forwarding agents were unnecessarily duplicated by the three agencies,resulting in wasted resources. This observation echoes the findings of the Joint Evaluation ofEmergency Assistance to Rwanda. The costs of transport services (trucking services and aircharter contract for both passenger and cargo aircraft) were unnecessarily inflated when agencies, inthe heat of the moment at the start of operations, bid against each other for the same equipmentand/or services. Complicating this problem is the fact that for air operations UNHCR usuallypurchases ‘package’ aircell services including tasking, loading, etc., whereas WFP usually bids onplanes and aircrews only. During the start-up of air operations in the Great Lakes emergency, theagencies also tended to negotiate independently with the relevant governmental authorities onairport taxes and landing fees, with the result that rates have varied considerably. In much of theGreat Lakes emergency operation, particular in the early stages, the management of United Nationspassenger aircraft in support of emergency operations often proved problematic. Procedures wereoften inefficient and costs were unacceptably high. Agencies often had duplicate capacity, so planesflew lightly loaded or even empty in a few instances. In Rwanda, however, such problems werelargely overcome by the establishment by the three agencies of an arrangement previously used inEthiopia: a common air service for the transport of staff. A similar arrangement was established forthe transport of United Nations staff between Nairobi, Kampala, Goma, Kigali and Bujumbura. Thislatter undertaking became known as UNCAS (United Nations Common Air Service).

Recommendation: The Mission recommends that procedures be agreed among the threeagencies for common tenders for transport contracts.

Recommendation: The Mission recommends the adoption by the three agencies of acommon air charter agreement, similar to that already adopted by the Field Administrationand Logistics Division of DPKO. This agreement should include a common inter-agencyposition on United Nations privileges and immunities as they apply to airport taxes and fees.When possible one United Nations-wide agreement should be jointly negotiated.

Recommendation: The Mission recommends that the logistics sections of the threeagencies develop agreed procedures for the establishment of United Nations commonpassenger services in future emergency operations.

Recommendation: The Mission recommends that regular inter-agency logistics staffmeetings be held at the country and sub-office level, and that provision for such meetings beincluded in relevant local and country-level MOUs and in joint workplans.

22. Throughout calendar 1997 each of the three agencies has been independently developingnew and/or refining existing computerised commodity tracking systems (CTS) tailored to itsparticular requirements. To some extent, these independent development tracks reflect the differingrequirements of the three organisations. UNICEF handles over 2,000 items, a large number, but byno means all, directly through its Copenhagen warehouse, others purchased and shipped locally.WFP has far fewer types of commodities or ‘items’, but purchases and/or ships from many differentpoints, and, of course, in far greater bulk. Nevertheless, in spite of these differences - and this

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was particularly true in the large and complex Great Lakes operation - each of the threeagencies has an interest in tracking commodities in the other agencies’ supply chains.Moreover, as the United Nations moves toward a system of common services and premises inthe field, the three agencies’ interests in having access to information in each other’s CTSsystems will grow. Where each of the agencies are already involved in the development of jointand individual systems for logistics support to the field it is necessary to establish regularcontact among the three teams for the development of a clear understanding of commoditytracking, financial and programme management systems thus ensuring compatibility. Thiswork should eventually develop a close working relationships between the three agencies andtheir respective NGO implementing partners, to ensure consolidated reporting capacities. Caremust be taken to obtain an overview of each agency’s own particular logistics chain and mix ofsupplies. WFP for example has for some years been endeavouring to standardise terminology,allocation codes, etc., into a unified ‘system’ for tracking food items from the sourcing to theend distribution points. UNICEF is in the stages of developing its own program managersystem (ProMS) and implementing as its financial and logistics control package (SAP) withinits Supply Division. The complexity of the Great Lakes emergency operation has generated thefirst sustained effort among the three agencies to exchange information on their respectiverequirements, including a logistics CTS (commodity tracking systems) workshop in Kampala inMay 1997.

Recommendation: The Mission recommends that the CTS design teams of the threeagencies work closely together in the coming months to ensure transparency andmutual accessibility in their respective systems. In particular, the Mission recommendsthe formation of a tripartite CTS working group to ensure constant exchanges ofinformation and maximum systems compatibility.

Findings and Recommendations -TELECOMMUNICATIONS 23. Instant voice communications are critical to the conduct of humanitarian assistanceoperations in the high-risk security environments of conflict emergencies. The outbreak of civilwar in Eastern DRC in October-November 1996 posed severe challenges to the three agencies’voice and data communications systems. In particular, security concerns for staff in remotelocations (discussed later in the section on security), several large-scale evacuations and theco-ordination of complex inter-agency air, road, rail and water logistics exercises placedenormous demands on these systems. All three agencies actively participate in the UnitedNation’s Inter-Agency Telecommunications Advisory Committee (ITAC), a group consistingof 22 UN agencies and programmes whose focus is to promote United Nations co-ordinationin telecommunications. For the past several years UNHCR, with large numbers of staff in highrisk situations, has led the three agencies in acquiring and developing radio voicecommunications capability, particularly in the field of VHF systems. In order to supportlogistics operations and to track shipments of relief goods in remote locations, however, thetimely, dependable communication of text and data (tables, spreadsheets, etc.) is essential.WFP in the Great Lakes operation over the past 2-3 years, has developed a means toaccomplish this efficiently and cheaply using computers linked by HF radio to the Internet. This‘Deep Field Mailing System’ (DFMS) is also now being used in remote locations by UNICEF,and has attracted wide attention in the international emergency assistance community. 24. Building upon the experience in the Great Lakes over the past year, all three agencieshave begun to use the regional UN logistics and telecommunications meetings together with

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the Inter-agency Telecommunications Advisory Council (ITAC) to standardise theircommunications systems in both voice and data areas and to make them compatible. Thepossibility now exists (and in certain major international emergency assistance operations hasto some extent already been exploited) whereby satellite earth stations can quickly link anypart of the globe with all of the United Nations operational agencies. Emergency staff with alaptop will be able to connect to local servers to send voice, text, data and pictures via theinternet HF or VHF radio, satellite or telephone to locations globally. The rate at which changeis occurring in the United Nations system and globally in the field of telecommunications isastounding. This implies a need for constant review in order to ensure that the mostappropriate and cost-effective solutions are retained. 25. Upon its return from the field visit the Mission, in November and early December 1997,discussed and drafted a recommendation proposing that the three agencies agree to connecttheir long distance telecommunications systems to the existing Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO) satellite network in Brindisi, Italy. In an agreement reached under theaegis of ITAC, this additional capacity was made available in mid-December, although to dateit has not been utilised to any great extent. 26. On the basis of their co-operation in the field of telecommunications in the Great Lakesoperation, UNICEF and WFP recently concluded a technical agreement on fieldtelecommunications and support. The agreement provides for sharing connectivity resources,technical support, administration, for standardising on equipment specifications and strategictelecommunications stocks, and for joint TC/IT training. The Mission concludes thatsignificant benefits have accrued to the two agencies as a result of this agreement. It was alsorecommended that WFP and UNICEF senior management approve and sign a comprehensivebilateral technical agreement on field telecommunications, global co-ordination and mutualassistance (in field of telecommunications), which was being drafted in Kampala by staff ofWFP Kampala and UNICEF NYHQ at the time of the Mission. The agreement wassubsequently completed and signed by UNICEF and WFP in March 1998 as a technicalagreement in support of the Global MOU.

Recommendation: In the interest of establishing a global, inter-operabletelecommunications system for the international emergency assistance community theMission recommends that the senior management of all three agencies support theexpansion of their existing bilateral global MOUs, to include telecommunicationstechnical agreements developed among these three and other agencies, and includingthe agencies’ major implementing partners.

22. On a less positive note, the Mission observed that even as the three agencies are findingways to co-operate in the creation of inter-operable TC/IT systems, steps are being taken tocut back the field technical staff necessary to support these systems. It is ironic that theobjective of this action is to reduce direct support costs, since these reductions will result insubstantially higher voice and data communication charges – much greater than the intendedpersonnel cost savings. For example, if WFP had used INMARSAT mini-phones to handle itsvolume electronic mail in the Great Lakes region last year, instead of using its DFMS network,the Programme would have spent an additional 500,000 USD, a sum far larger than theproposed personnel cost savings for the coming year. UNICEF, as part of the new technicalco-operation between the agencies, has provided two technicians (under an agreement with the

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Norwegian Refugee Council) to ensure continued technical support. However, UNICEF’sprovision of support staff for DFMS is only a temporary measure and a partial solution.

Findings and Recommendations - PLANNING/PROGRAMMING/MONITORING 28. An MOU, LOU (Letter of Understanding), joint workplan or operations plan expressesan intent: it does not necessarily ensure co-ordination. It presupposes that the structures of theagency emergency programmes involved are sufficiently compatible to permit a minimum levelof co-ordination. An MOU can take no account of human nature, and the phrase that theMission heard repeated most often (in relation to almost all of the aspects of operational co-ordination that were studied) was ‘it depends on personalities’. ‘It’ in this case represents thesuccess or failure of a particular undertaking. Nevertheless, in its discussions with agencyprogramming officers, the Mission found that these different written agreements were usuallytaken very seriously. Generally, those with whom the Mission talked thought that working atthe outset of planning/programming within the framework of a written agreement (MOU,LOU, etc.) had been useful. The Mission was told that even draft MOUs sometimes signalledto staff in the field that they would begin to find efficiencies in combining resources andeliminating redundant capacities. 29. More often than not, particularly at the local level, these agreements had provided aframework for co-operation for the duration of subsequent operations. In the case of theGoma Joint Workplan involving WFP and UNHCR, the document was scrupulously updatedon two subsequent occasions. The second extension was still in force when the war in DRCbroke out and the target population fled. The Joint Operations Plan for HumanitarianAssistance in Burundi, brokered by the United Nations Humanitarian Co-ordinator andinvolving all three agencies, assigned lead roles to each of the agencies in critical operationalareas. In other situations the Mission noted the effectiveness of the practice of the UnitedNations co-ordinator’s designation of one agency to take the lead role in local operations,particularly when this designation is accompanied by the establishment of mechanisms for jointoperations, such as MOVCONs. As one Resident Co-ordinator said: the question of whichindividual or organisation is responsible for the co-ordination is subordinate to the need forappropriate and effective co-ordination of the task in hand. 30. In spite of the numerous innovative forms of joint action in the Great Lakes operation,and the pace of political/military developments during the review period, there was asignificant lack of joint contingency programme planning among the three agencies. TheMission believes that advance joint situational assessment and consideration of agency assetsand possible roles, can at very least advance, even if it does not ensure, smooth programmeco-ordination when the crisis occurs. An early consonance of views on these matters, in turn,can be beneficial for later co-ordination in the areas of security, logistics, commonservices/facilities, public information and even resourcing. Monitoring missions serve severalpurposes, of course, ensuring that basic needs are covered and that resources are usedoptimally in a changing environment. They are also an important tool to ensure that lessons arelearnt and mistakes not repeated. They are also part of the institutional memory of theagencies. Whereas joint assessments of needs were routinely undertaken in the Great Lakesregional emergency operation, joint monitoring missions were not.

Recommendation: In emergency-prone areas, the Mission urges the three agencies toroutinely undertake joint contingency planning. With a revised regional office structures

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such planning might best be undertaken at that level, and should involve logistics,communications, information, security and programme staff.

Recommendation: In order to avoid or at least alleviate the impact of loomingemergencies, or new phases of existing ones, the three agencies should also study andagree upon preparedness preventive measures, such as the pre-positioning of reliefassistance, mass information campaigns (see below), or the facilitation of posting ofhuman rights monitors.

Recommendation: At the onset of an emergency and at agreed intervals duringimplementation of major complex emergency programmes, the three agencies should asa matter of course field joint assessment/monitoring missions. Evaluations of complexemergency operations should also routinely be conducted jointly.

31. Several of the countrywide (Burundi, Rwanda) and some of the major local (Bukavu,Goma, Kigoma, Ngara) emergency operations in the Great Lakes, were covered at the outsetby joint workplans or operations plans. Not all of these included all three major United Nationsoperational agencies, however, and these documents varied considerably in regard to the areasof responsibility and their degree of specificity. Where UNHCR and WFP were involved, theglobal MOU between the two agencies was often consciously used as a model. The Missionobserved that quite often these local agreements did provide guidance for working relationsfor the duration of the operation in question, but even when they did not, the staff involvedconsidered the exercise to have been useful in establishing agreed roles and responsibilities atthe outset of an operation.

Recommendation: The Mission urges the development of joint operations/workplansas routine at the outset of emergency operations, at both the local and country levels.These exercises should involve all three agencies and, in addition to a clear delineationof the respective areas of responsibility, should, where possible, include agreement onthe (initial) caseloads, the location of EDPs (extended delivery points) and an ‘exitstrategy’ for the operation, including the elements of staff, communications, logisticsand security.

32. As an extension to this it was noted that in the Great Lakes emergency operation,individual agencies have in certain local areas (and regionally in eastern Democratic Republicof the Congo) taken unilateral decisions on the termination of operations and the withdrawal ofstaff, without due consideration for the effects of the withdrawal on the operations of otheragencies. In these instances, advance warning might have provided the remaining agencies tobetter prepare for expanded roles and operations.

Recommendation: The Mission urges the three agencies to agree that decisions toterminate operations be taken in consultation with other effected agencies (andimplementing partners) and that this policy be routinely incorporated into local andcountry-level MOUs and workplans.

33. The Mission noted a near universal perception in the Great Lakes Region that refugeesreceived a far greater proportion of relief assistance than did internally displaced persons(IDPs) or civilian victims of conflict. Inevitably, this disproportionality was viewed, rightly orwrongly, by the new governing authorities in the region as a political position taken by the aidinstitutions and their donors. Disparities in the provision of relief to different caseloads cangive rise to serious problems, affecting not only the well being of the beneficiaries, but also the

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prospects for a long term solution and in some cases even the security of the emergencyassistance staff involved.

Recommendation: To the extent possible, the levels and types of assistance to be providedto different categories of beneficiaries should be agreed mutually among the threeagencies, at the outset of the operation or a new phase of the operation.

Findings and Recommendations - ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING 22. Within the three agencies, the management structure differs considerably from oneagency to another, as for example in the roles and authority of Regional Offices. Moreover, theagencies are constantly rethinking and changing their lines of authority. The rationalisation orsimplification of existing lines of authority within and across agencies may be difficult, but atleast it should be possible to clarify and understand better those that do exist. Understandingand accepting these different roles and adapting to them are the keys to better exploitation ofthe existing agency strengths, and to the efficient use of the strengths of each across agencylines.

23. In effect, the regional offices were at the heart of the confusion concerning lines ofcommand generally and the levels at which strategic decisions were made. First, the regionaloffice for each agency covered a different geographic area. Thus, although the three agencyregional offices with the largest coverage of the Great Lakes region were the most concerned,offices outside those regions were also interlocutors and colleagues. For example, WFP’sKenya Country Office, while not in the Great Lakes region, was involved in decisionsregarding food brought in through the ‘northern corridor’, that is, through Mombasa. Thediffering responsibilities were also reflected in the different geographical locations of theagency regional offices (two in Nairobi and one in Kampala).

24. The most significant difference between the Regional Offices, however, is in the rolesand responsibilities that each agency assigns to its regional office. While these roles arechanging and evolving, the differences are at present very striking. At one end of the spectrumwas the strong advisory role of the UNICEF Regional Office and at the other the stronglymanagement-oriented Regional Office of WFP. The implications of this structure are that forpractical purposes discussions on co-ordination, between, say WFP and UNICEF, would mosteffectively take place between the WFP Regional Director and the relevant UNICEF CountryRepresentatives, which is not at first sight an obvious or natural line of communication. In spiteof these apparent drawbacks, however, the regional approach should eventually permit moreflexible use of staff and resources.

25. By contrast, the managers of agency technical matters in the Great Lakes operationappear to have been far more effective in getting around their ‘lines of authority’ problems, andin finding ways to foster co-ordination at the local, country and regional level. For example, asindicated above, the Mission was particularly impressed with the effectiveness of theMOVCON and UNJLC arrangements, and with the manner in which regional technicalmeetings (such as the UNHCR and WFP-sponsored Great Lakes regional logistics meetings)and global technical working groups (such as ITAC) have been used to encourage inter-agencyfostering transparency, access, standardisation and co-ordination. However the actual controlpoint for various technical activities and sub-activities, such as supply, logistics, commoditytracking, communications, etc. was sometimes located at different levels in differentorganisations.

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Recommendation: The bilateral global MOUs which have been negotiated among thethree agencies in the last few years have generally served to clarify respective roles.However they have not, so far, been able to address the ‘differing lines of authority’issue. The Mission recommends that consideration be given by senior management ofthe three agencies to a process of reconciliation of the bilateral documents,incorporation of the various technical agreements into these documents, and theireventual consolidation into one tripartite MOU covering the working relationships ofall three agencies. Technical agreements, such as that between WFP and UNICEF,should be incorporated into, or referenced in the bilateral global MOUs, and ultimatelyinto the tripartite MOU.

26. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that considerable savings would be made, notonly in emergency situations, but at country and possibly even regional level as well, ifcommon basic services and common premises were routinely established. Security of premises,too, could be made more reliable, although others might argue that the concentration of assetsin one place might be a risk. Significantly, in those instances where agencies were sited in thesame building, inter-agency communication and understanding) improved. 27. It is appreciated that the provision of a common service implies a notional loss ofautonomy of action and a real reduction of flexibility, but much routine transportation andcommunication, for example, could be undertaken by a common system without affectingthe specialised role which is entrusted to each agency. Common standing arrangements forservice packages could be especially useful to accelerate in an orderly manner theestablishment of joint activities at the outset of operations. 28. Numerous examples of sharing of facilities and services were encountered at fieldlevel (sub-country level). Such initiatives were universally welcomed and executed in aspirit of generosity and co-operation, but an organised system of sharing premises andservices would be much more beneficial than an ad hoc one. 29. The discussion on establishment of United Nations common services and commonpremises in respect of development activities in the field is already well advanced in the GeneralAssembly and the Joint Consultative Group on Policies (JCGP). UNDP has played a key role inthese discussions, due in part to the functioning of the UNDP Resident Co-ordinator as thesenior United Nations representative in most countries. However, in the Great Lakes emergencyoperation the three agencies have achieved economies by employing the concept of commonservices/facilities in respect of, inter alia, charter of passenger and cargo aircraft, trucking leases,warehouses, offices and communications facilities. It is important that the priorities of the threemajor operational agencies are accorded the highest importance, particularly in regard to plansfor emergency-prone countries.

Recommendation: UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP should, through the aegis of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) develop a common position on procedures for theestablishment of common services/facilities in emergency-prone countries. TheMOVCON model developed in the Great Lakes operation might even be adapted toserve other areas than logistics, such as security and communications.

30. More serious impediments to the general process of co-operation and collaborationare the glaring disparities in incentives accorded to the staff of the various agencies (in thiscase the reference is to all the agencies and is not restricted to HCR, UNICEF and WFP).These disparities relate to the nature of the contracts awarded for similar jobs (SSA vFTTS); the interpretation of financial rules (advances, etc.); mission status (the staff of

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interpretation of financial rules (advances, etc.); mission status (the staff of some agenciesare granted mission status in emergency stations, others not); Rest and Recuperation (R&Ror Procurement Missions) – some grant R&R to staff, some do not; and hazard pay(personnel of some agencies receive hazard pay when out of station, on leave, or on R&R).Apart from the blatant injustice of treating United Nations staff unequally when they areworking together under extremely difficult conditions, such difficulties impede co-ordination. It is possible to explain why such discrepancies arise, but not why they arepermitted to continue to exist. This point was made particularly strongly in Burundi, butwas noted throughout the region.

Recommendation: The senior management of the three agencies should consider thestandardisation of incentives and conditions of service, as well as forms and (to theextent possible) content of contracts for staff serving in emergency stations, and forcontracts with NGO implementing partners.

31. A significant number of those whom the Mission met thought that inter-agencyoperational co-ordination had been easier at those project sites where UNHCR and WFP, atleast, had utilised the same (usually NGO) implementing partners. All were agreed thatgreater uniformity in the terms of contractual agreements with the same implementingpartner (or with different partners at the same location) was desirable.

Recommendation: The three agencies should where possible utilise the sameimplementing partners and a higher degree of uniformity in contractual agreementsissued by the agencies to implementing partners should be sought.

Findings and Recommendations - SECURITY 44. The relief assistance environment in the region for the last four years has beencharacterised by more or less continuous armed conflict. At the time of the Mission’s fieldvisit, large-scale fighting had resumed in western Rwanda, and random conflict wasoccurring in eastern DRC and in Burundi. Even where it did not presently exist, keyinformants agreed that there was a potential for a resumption of ethnic conflict over muchof the region. In such a situation the security of personnel is obviously a critical factor inthe delivery of emergency aid in the region, and this in itself tends to ensure a high level ofco-operation among the agencies in security matters. It was observed that in the countriesof the Great Lakes Region communication facilities were often shared and security servicesextended wherever possible to provide as wide a coverage of aid personnel as resourceswould allow. However, this spirit of co-operation should not be confused with effectivecountry-wide co-ordination of security (of personnel, of property and of premises). 45. While country security or crisis management teams functioned, because of theintensity of the work load and paucity of resources, they tended to be re-active rather thanpro-active in their approach to security. There was a general concern for the security ofstaff and equipment (less so for premises), but this did not necessarily translate intoaccountability for security beyond those immediately concerned. And accountability forsecurity could not and did not translate into material support for security. Significantly, theFlash Appeal for Congo Brazzaville contained no reference to security requirements,beyond a communication system for WFP. It seems to the Mission likely that the donorsresponding to such an appeal would have been prepared to give a high priority to thesecurity of the agency staff delivering aid generated by that appeal, had they been asked.

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46. Agency staff, both local and international, usually had hand sets, although not in allcountries. They could call into a Field Security Officer (not necessarily from their ownagency) or to a central control, although the volume of traffic on the net was frequentlyparalyzingly high and it was not always possible to switch frequencies or channels to calldirectly. Thus, the system probably would work much of the time, but there was little or noroom for failure. Resources, paradoxically, were sometimes found to be almost prodigal,but not especially well co-ordinated. More often, they were frugal and well co-ordinated.There did not appear to any uniformity in security coverage in the various countries, exceptin one negative sense: no country in the region appeared to provide security training foragency and NGO staff. 47. One country, it was reported, had no fewer than 5 FSOs and 6 independentcommunications networks: another country had two efficient networks with one agencymaintaining a 24-hour watch. A third country had two FSOs (from two different agencies)who covered all agencies and, apparently, the neighbouring country as well. Securityinformation was routinely exchanged between agencies at regular intervals. Agenciestended to report serious security incidents immediately to headquarters level, where theexchange of information between the agencies is exceptionally reliable. 48. The progress of missions into insecure areas was carefully monitored at central levelin-country, but once again this, with rare exceptions, tended to be an agency-based ratherthan a co-ordinated undertaking. In some cases individual drivers did not have radiocommunication equipment and convoy discipline was not always standardised. Evacuationplans varied in their plausibility (particularly those at country level) - the mostdisconcerting situation being that of Kinshasa, where it was agreed that evacuation wassimply not possible. Who is accountable for the security of personnel in that case? 49. As with so many other aspects of operational co-ordination, security seemed towork best in the field at the sub-national level, where the concept of lead agency usuallymeant that that agency charged with security had the resources and the authority to carryout the task. This highlights the dilemma that confronts the three agencies in manycountries. The United Nations Humanitarian or Resident Co-ordinator often does not havethe resources to support a comprehensive security system. The will to participate in jointfunding is too weak, and sometimes the resources too meagre to permit effectiveparticipation. The Designated Security Official finds him or herself bearing enormousresponsibilities with scant resources (and, by implication, diminished authority) to carry outa crucial task. In these circumstances agencies have tended to establish parallel if notindependent security systems. Sometimes these systems are considerably moresophisticated and effective than the central UN system. When these resources are sharedlaterally with other agencies, as they almost always are, the possibility for overall co-ordination is diminished and the development of contingency plans made more difficult.Where some degree of security protection is possible, agency accountability takesprecedence over collective accountability: where that protection is not possible, as in thecase of the evacuation plan cited above, collective accountability is then invoked. It appearsto be a ‘no win’ situation for the common system. 50. The role of the individual Regional Offices in security matters reflects their role inother fields. Thus, at one end of the spectrum the UNICEF regional Office maintains anadvisory role and at the other WFP is more directly concerned with country level security.

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Generally, though, the collation of security information is carried out most effectively atheadquarters level. This will probably remain the case until there is some coherence in theroles, location and geographic spread of the three agency ‘Great Lakes’ regional offices. 51. The Mission noted a considerable amount of ad hoc inter-agency co-operation onsecurity arrangements, which took different forms in different countries, depending uponwhich agencies had Field Security Officers (FSOs) posted in-country and how pro-activewas the United Nations Designated Security Official (DSO). There were disturbingconstants, however: there were no FSOs for certain of the agencies in certain of thecountries and/or critical field stations; little if any security training for agency staff had beenundertaken; and most of the existing security contingency or evacuation plans were notupdated. Rarely, in the countries visited, did the DSO know the location of all UnitedNations and NGO implementing partner emergency assistance staff. In the areas whereperiodic security meetings did take place, they frequently did not include NGOimplementing partners. Those with responsibility in country for security are severelyoverworked and well aware of the shortcomings of the present system.

Recommendation: The Mission believes that in all six countries of the region thereis an urgent requirement for the following actions:

• the posting by all three agencies of qualified security professionals at the countrylevel AND in field posts with high-risk security environments;

• country and situation-specific security training for all field staff, including NGOimplementing partners;

• the updating of security contingency and evacuation plans, including logisticsoptions, and the clarification of the status of various categories of staff, includingthat of implementing partners;

• the creation and maintenance of a central list of the names and locations of allinternational staff and others in the region who are eligible for evacuation;

• in a situation of extreme emergency the status of local agency staff and ofinternational staff of NGOs who are implementing partners remains confused,and needs to be clarified;

• the development of a mechanism at the regional level for co-ordination of thesecurity plans and activities of all three agencies.

Recommendation: the Mission team strongly believes that greater accountabilityshould exist at headquarters, regional and country levels for the security of staffworking in high-risk environments and that this accountability should be clearlystated.

Recommendation: The Mission strongly feels that the security costs (staff, equipment,training, etc.) for agency staff and their implementing partners who are posted inhigh security risk situations should routinely be included in both flash appeals andconsolidated inter-agency appeals as part of the ‘cost of doing business’ in suchoperations.

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Findings and Recommendations - INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

52. There are three basic classes of information that have to be managed within the typeof emergency operation that existed in the Great Lakes Region. All three classes are notonly critical to the success of the operation, but are also highly sensitive and, if wronglyhandled, can put it in jeopardy. The first class of information is public information; that is,informing the outside world about the situation and how it is being handled. The second,separate from the first, although clearly related to it, is statistical information required forplanning and monitoring. The third is the kind of information that has to be disseminated tothe target populations.

53. The disparity in the human resources invested by each agency in the publicinformation sector virtually assures an uneven and sometimes puzzling, if not altogethercontradictory, flow of information to media about the overall programme.

Recommendation: In a major emergency operation, all three agencies should appointand post PI Officers at the regional level, whose Terms of Reference would interalia include close co-ordination and regular sharing of information with each other.When critical programme statistics involve more than one country, the regionaloffices and information officers of the three agencies should consider the issuanceof regular information notes, as is proposed below, at the country level.

54. Because of the sheer size and scope and the highly political nature of the Greatlakes conflict emergency, there has tended to be considerable confusion and disagreementabout the statistics involved in the humanitarian assistance operation. Media interest hasbeen intense and unrelenting. The numbers, origins, and the age, gender and ethniccomposition of gatherings of refugees, returnees, internally displaced and other conflict-effected persons have been sources of controversy from the outset, as have figures onamounts of food and other relief provided, the numbers of wounded and missing, and soforth.

Recommendation: The Mission thinks that, in this and similar future complexemergency operations, it is important for the three agencies to co-ordinate theirpublic information at the headquarters, regional and country levels. Among theheadquarters and regional offices, this would probably have to be done primarily bytelephone, fax and email. However at the country level, the Mission recommendsthat the three agencies replicate an operation undertaken in Dar Es Salaam over thepast year where the entire United Nations community have issued, through the aegisof the Resident Co-ordinator’s office, weekly information notes containing timelyprogramme statistics developed on a consensus basis. Each agency in Dar EsSalaam, of course, continues to undertake its own public relations, but there is aconscious, concerted effort to anticipate and allay public differences on statistics.

55. One cannot have a co-ordinated or even a consistent public information policyamong the three agencies without basic agreement on essential statistics, includingcaseloads, population and population movements, assistance provided and assistancerequirements. In the Great Lakes operation, this was to a large extent provided by IRIN, theInter-Agency Regional Information Network of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs(DHA) office in Nairobi.

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Recommendation: The Mission thinks that IRIN should be a model for publicinformation activities in future United Nations humanitarian assistance operations inregional complex emergencies. The three agencies should routinely pool resourcesand share information at the regional level under the aegis of the United NationsHumanitarian Co-ordinator.

56. In recent complex situations, (Vietnamese boat people, Albania, formerYugoslavia), a new and important aspect of emergency operation information support hasemerged: mass information campaigns aimed at the beneficiaries of the relief efforts,whether refugees, internally displaced persons, or civilian populations of affected areas.The campaign may provide accurate information about real conditions in the place of originto refugees or IDPs who are making decisions about movement, or it may inform aboutmass vaccination programmes or provide information to allay the fears of local populationsaffected by the existence of large numbers of refugees or IDPs. A further objective can beto improve the monitoring of the human rights situation by expanding awareness andencouraging the report of abuses. The Mission thinks that the Great Lakes emergencyprogramme would have benefited from such a campaign, from the inception of operationsin 1994.

Recommendation: The Mission recommends routine use of mass informationcampaigns in future complex regional emergency operations. UNHCR should takethe lead in these undertakings, however all three agencies should participate. Careshould be taken that there is no inconsistency between the regional publicinformation effort (the IRIN model) directed at the international media, and themass information campaign directed at affected populations.

Concluding Remarks

57. The way in which the international emergency assistance programme in the GreatLakes region developed and mutated over the past four years was to a large extent random,accidental, ad hoc. Civilians had long been targets of the ethnic violence in the area, but thescale and organisation of the slaughter in Rwanda in 1994 surpassed anything seen on theContinent in generations. The aftermath of anger and bitterness have fuelled the fightingthat continues sporadically to this day. To some extent, it is this constant presence of low-medium level conflict across six countries, and the sudden population movements it causes,which have dictated the random patchwork of United Nations, bilateral and NGOorganisational staffing, responsibilities, activities, funding, etc. The situation is constantlychanging, and the system responds reflexively.

58. There have been other determinative factors, of course, including the politicalmotivations of donors, sharp fluctuations in media coverage and public interest/funding,and the very size and complexity of the international emergency assistance system itself.Many of these same factors have been present in other recent conflict emergencyoperations, and they will doubtless be there in the next big one as well.

59. That said, the Mission team believes that in the Great Lakes emergency operationthe disparate elements of the system, and in particular the three United Nations agencies atits core, began to relate to each other operationally in ways and to a degree not seen before.The ethos of competition was to some extent overcome by the ethos of co-operation. Thisreport provides ample evidence of this fact, just as it details those glaring failures to co-ordinate which remain. Certainly the system’s chaotic approach to personnel security in a

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high-risk environment throughout the operation, must temper any celebration of new formsof joint action and co-ordination

Annex I

TRIPARTITE STUDY MISSION COMPOSITION

1. UNHCR, Operations Department Officer

2. UNICEF Consultant (UNICEF retired staff member)

3. WFP Evaluation Officer

4. WFP Consultant

MISSION ITINERARY(13 October - 05 November 1997)

Rome 13-15 OctoberNairobi 16-17 OctoberKampala 18-19 OctoberKigali 20-22 OctoberBujumbura 23-24 OctoberKampala 25-28 OctoberDar Es Salaam 29-30 October

Mission splits

Nairobi 31 October Nairobi 31 OctoberKigali 31 October-02 November Kinshasa 01-02 November

Mission rejoins

Geneva 03-05 November

Annex II

KEY DOCUMENTS FOR THETRIPARTITE GREAT LAKES MISSION

1. Chronology of the Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency since April 1994 (WFP/OSA)

2. Interim Study on WFP’s New Capacities in Responding to the Great Lakes Crisis, August 1997

3. Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency, November 1996 - June 1997 (WFP/OSA)

4. The World Food Programme’s input to the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Great LakesRegion, January 1997

5. WFP/UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding, March 1997

6. WFP/UNHCR Goma Joint Workplan, 1995

7. WFP Commodity Tracking System Workshops, Kampala, 12-16 May 1997

8. Pipeline Outlook February/December 1997: Great Lakes Region,18 February 1997 (WFP/OSA)

9. Final Report: Activities of the Air Movement Cell within Movcon Kisangani (by Steve Smith), 18 July 1997

10. Great Lakes Cluster Regional Logistic Meeting, Bujumbura,14-17 July 1997: Recommendations and Conclusions

11. Mission Report - Repatriation of CDR Refugees from Tanzania (by J.P. Leroy), 14 August 1997

12. Inter-Agency Logistics Co-ordination Eastern Zaire, 1997 (by D. Katruud)

13. Operating Procedures for United Nations Joint Logistics Centres, 1997

14. David Schaad General Report on Movcon Kisangani, June 1997

15. Rail Assessment in Eastern Zaire, 1997 (by Pedro Figueiredo)

16. WFP Air Operations Entebbe in Support of the Great Lakes Region and Eastern Zaire Emergency,1997 (by N. Sanders and S. Larrson)

17. Lessons Learned from the Movcon Operation, 1997 (by David Katruud)

18. Movcon-Airlift- Eastern Zaire Crisis TC/IT Lessons Learned (by P. Casier)

19. Mid-Year Report for the Regional Logistics Office, Kampala, 8 September 1997

20. Great Lakes Region (WFP/UNHCR Joint Food Aid Assessment Mission), October 1996

21. UNICEF Supply and Logistics Review - Great Lakes Region,30 September - 3 October, 1997

22. Assessment of Health Care Services, Health and Nutrition Status, Dr. Arthur, Marx, CDC,16 May 1997

23. Site Visit of Eastern Congo/Zaire: Analysis of Humanitarian and Political Issues, April - 10 May 1997

24. Mid-Term Review Meeting on the Great Lakes Region, 4 August 1997

25. Conference Calls, 2 October 1997

26. Sitreps, 5 September 1997 (UNICEF Brazaville)

27. Contribution to Interagency Meeting, 13 August 1997 (UNICEF Brazaville)

28. MOU: UNHCR and UNICEF, 14 March 1996

29. Burundi Weekly Update, 16-22 September 1997

30. Overview of Humanitarian Situation, 26 September 1997

31. DRC Sitrep, 16-22 September 1997

32. Burundi Operations Management and Process Review

33. GLR Daily Information Summary, 3 October 1997

34. DHA Report Projected Humanitarian Activities in Eastern DRC, June - Dec. 1997

35. Draft Joint USAID/EPI/UNICEF/WHO, Immunization Pre-Implementation Team (Report of a fieldvisit to DRC 6-22 August 1997)

36. Report of a field Mission on Gender Issues in Emergencies (UNICEF), Burundi,14-16 Aug 1997

37. Rapport de mission au Burundi, Joanne Csete, UNICEF Nutrition Section,16 September 1997

38. Burundi Humanitarian Situation Report, 25 June - 1 July 1997

39. United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Great Lakes EmergencyMid-Term Review, United Nations, July 1997

40. United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Great Lakes Emergency, January - December 1997, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, March 1997

41. Brazzaville Flash Appeal, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, October 1997

42. Revised Terms of Reference for Lessons Learned Study on Humanitarian Coordination in the GreatLakes Region, Dept. of Humanitarian Affairs, 11 September 1997

43. Minutes of the Regional Logistics Meeting (UNHCR), Nairobi, 26-27 February 1997

44. Letter of Understanding (UNHCR/UNICEF/WFP), UN Aircraft Operation in Rwanda, August 1997

45. WFP/UNHCR Joint Work Plan, Kigoma 1997

46. Humanitarian Interventions in Response to the Great Lakes Crisis, UNICEF Dar Es Salaam, October1996

47. Project agreement between the World Food Programme in Rwanda and the United Nations Children’sFund in Rwanda, Kigali, June 1997

48. Outline agreement between UNICEF and World Food Programme on Cooperation within the GreatLakes Region, October 1996

49. WFP/UNICEF Global Field Telecommunications MOU, 6 November 1997

50. Joint Operations Plan for Humanitarian Assistance in Burundi, Bujumbura, October 1996

Sept 1997

UNHCRIUNICEFIVIIFP tripartite lessons learned exerciseon operational coordination in the Great Lakes

(Sept 1996 to present) - TORs

1. Background:

Almost two years have passed since the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance toRwanda raised significant issues of concern over coordination of humanitarian response.This multi-donor evaluation (covering up to 1995) focused principally on broader strategiccoordination issues but also touched on operational coordination. With the turn of eventsin eastern Zaire, humanitarian assistance agencies have since operated in a worseningsecurity environment over an expanding area of the region. The Great Lakes experiencehas continued to present rapidly changing challenges for all facets of coordination. Withthe Rwanda study as an important reference, this context presents further opportunity tolearn how and why a culture of coordination as successfully evolved in some areas, andnot in others, as well as how it can be cultivated more broadly.

In response to a request by the IASC at their meeting 20 June 1997, DHA hascommissioned an independent study focusing on issues of strategic coordination and therelated role of the humanitarian coordinator. This will be aimed at broader policyrecommendations to the IASC on the function of the humanitarian coordinator.

At the same time there is need to draw lessons learned from and to strive to improveconcrete aspects of operational coordination in the Great Lakes. A number of structuresand mechanisms have been developed in' this area which merit careful assessment forfurther development or future replication. The three largest operational internationalagencies working in the Great Lakes - WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF - propose to carry out ajoint internal lessons learned exercise which will serve to document and consolidate theiroperational coordination efforts and mechanisms in the region.

The two exercises are to be linked as part of a coherent evaluative process throughinformation sharing between teams.

2. Objective:

The propose tripartite UNHCR/UNICEF/WFP lessons learned exercise will examineoperational aspects of humanitarian assistance coordination in the Great Lakes region inorder:- To contribute to a shared regional inter-institutional' process of self-evaluation which

will prioritize and shape work to improve inter-agency coordination of humanitarianassistance appropriate to the changing context, and

- To document lessons for broader application to humanitarian assistance.

3. Key issues to be examined:

For the purposes of this evaluation, operational coordination issues are understood toencompass those practical problems and solutions encountered in linking theimplementation of humanitarian assistance as carried out by various organizations. Themain areas of operational coordination to be studied are grouped as follows, with some

key examples of existing coordination structures and mechanisms provided. Others mayemerge in the course of the exercise. Evaluation questions listed further below wouldapply for each area.

• Coordination of programme implementation including targeting of vulnerablesub-groups, practical linkages in programme activities and maintaining humanitarianaccess. Structures and mechanisms existing include Memorandums ofUnderstanding (MOUs), joint work plans (between UNHC /WFP), standingagreements with NGOs, contingency planning, established emergency responsecapacity, and various coordination fora.

• Logistics operations, including regional level coordination (e.g. UN Joint LogisticsCentre in Kampala, cross-border operations such as Ngara-Kigoma involvingcustoms clearance procedures, links with Multi-national Forces military in Kampala),local coordination (e.g. MOVCONS), links with other logistic facilities (e.g. MCDUs),as well as specific issues such as shared air and road transportation (aircells).

• Communications systems and networks, e.g. Deep Field Mailing System as well asvoice communications.

• Supply management issues, including supply pipeline for food aid and non-food items- e.g. SIMS, use of the "Julia" WFP supply contingency planning module, readinessplans and stockpiles - as well as commodity tracking systems.

• Joint evaluative activities including both formal evaluations and on-going evaluationthrough various coordination fora.

• Security systems guiding programme operations and protections measures forpersonnel.

In addition, supporting all of the above areas of operational coordination are:

• Information management: This entails information collection and analysis to guideimplementation of activities, which includes security information and political analysisas well as data on affected populations and programme activities. Mechanismsinclude joint assessments (needs assessment at onset and re-assessment), on-goingmonitoring systems, informal information sharing networks and coordination fora.Information management also entails coordinating information for external relationswith local authorities, international media (e.g. experience with UN spokespersons)and donors, both for accountability and fund-raising/mobilization.

• Development and application of technical standards and operational procedures, e.g.development of joint procedure guidelines, joint training, joint quality control &supervision.

4. Key evaluation/assessment questions:

As mentioned above, the following questions should guide information gathering on eachof the operational coordination issues outlined:

• What were/are the priority problems in operational coordination?• What contextual and broader institutional factors shaped these problems?• How effective were inter-agency coordination processes or mechanisms in analysing

problems and developing solutions?• How effective were solutions proposed?• What opportunities for cost-sharing or cost reduction were or are there

(cost-effectiveness)?• How appropriate were/are solutions for the context (political, security, urgency of the

situation of the population), at the time of developing the solutions or response,currently and for other emergency contexts?

• What factors contributed to the success or failure of response to coordinationproblems?

• Where work is in progress or gaps remain currently, what are the priorities for action?• For these priorities, what solutions or processes to develop solutions are

recommended to improve coordination?

5. Scope:

• The focus on operational coordination will link to issues of strategic coordination aswell as the role of the humanitarian coordinator as mentioned below. (See below no. 6)

• While the focus will be on the three larger operational UN organizations - WFP,UNHCR and UNICEF - this exercise will necessarily examine coordination with theiroperational partners, including NGOs, UN agencies, interns Tonal organizations as wellas government. This will cut across coordination of implementation, informationmanagement, security, logistics and supply.

• The exercise will concern itself with country level as well as regional coordinationexperience and issues.

• Formal and informal coordination mechanisms will be examined.

6. Links to strategic coordination as proposed for separate study by DHA:

While the focus of this exercise is on operational coordination issues, the links to issuesof strategic coordination must also be considered. It is important to consider how strategiccoordination influenced operational coordination and vice versa. This includesconsideration of the role of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the humanitariancoordinators, where these have influenced the formulation of operational coordinationmechanisms and responses among the three agencies and their partners

The links between strategic and operational coordination are strongest around thefollowing issues:

• Programme planning is both a product of broad programme strategy and a tool forcoordinating implementation and programme operations – the Consolidated AppealProcess, while generally considered a strategic coordination tool, may have affectedoperational coordination problems and solutions;

• Information management guides implementation as mentioned but also feeds thedevelopment and adjustment of broad strategies.

• Targeting of vulnerable populations is guided by information from monitoring activitiesas well as by organizational mandate, and is articulated in programme plans.

• Humanitarian access, which is linked to security developments as well as the politicalpositioning in humanitarian coordination, also relates to operational coordinationefforts to ensure access on a basis of need.

• Security information and analysis, and coordination mechanisms are shaping bothoperational and strategic coordination options and solutions.

In the course of this exercise, information sharing with the team commissioned byDHA on behalf of the IASC will be most important on the above mentioned issues.

7. Methodology:

The following considerations guide choices on methodology:

• While the exercise will distill lessons learned considering their relevance to other andfuture humanitarian assistance contexts, priority will be give to added value to fieldoffices in the Great Lakes, in terms of on on-going improvements to operationalcoordination.

• Ownership of recommendations by management and staff of the three participatingorganizations is a priority.

• The exercise is undertaken with full recognition of the work in progress in the field toimprove operational coordination.

Based on the above, the evaluation will emphasize joint analysis by agencies, maximumparticipation of and dialogue among key field staff, and a facilitated process ofself-evaluation.

Objectivity in self-evaluation will be instilled by the evaluation team, the members ofwhich are all lightly removed from daily operations in the Great Lakes. Similarly theprocess of consultation with key informants from partner organizations will provide aneutral external perspective.

The following methodologies will be used:

• Documentary review.• Individual key informant interviews.• Facilitated consultations with key staff of partner organizations (NGO, national and

local, other UN agencies). Consultations will be designed to elicit participation of keypartners in analysis of key problems, response to problems and remaining gaps.

• Facilitated self-evaluation with selected management, operational, technical staff ofthe three agencies as appropriate for specific areas of operational coordination(functioning as working groups). The self-evaluation process draws information fromthe first four methodologies listed above and will involve identification/validation ofpriority problems, analysis of findings on response to problems and remaining gaps,formulation of lessons learned and development of recommendations. The processwill use meetings/workshops and facilitated e-mail/telephone discussion groups as isappropriate for the different steps of the analysis, i.e. from information gathering todevelopment of recommendations.

Field staff in involvement:

The objective of the study and the proposed self-evaluation approach necessarily implya heavy involvement of field staff (current and past) of the Great Lakes region. For anumber of reasons (logistics, cost, process) this involvement will be best achievedthrough the use of selected key informants in a series of working groups which cutacross agencies and field stations, bringing staff together around issues or areas oroperational coordination. A wider group of key informants, including staff previouslyworking in the region, will be used for individual interviews or soliciting comments onrecommendations.

Broader participation:

Participation f partners will be introduced in information gathering and analysisfacilitated by the evaluation team which will then be fed into the self-evaluation by thethree agencies. Transparency and promotion of dialogue will be the responsibility ofcountry offices through, for example, dissemination of recommends ions. Theevaluation team, however, will promote these through its guidance in formulation offollow-up structures and steps.

Beneficiaries consultation will not be included due to the particular focus of theevaluation - on internal coordination mechanism, problems and solutions - and thebreadth (geographically and in terms of technical issues) of the lessons learnedexercise. In the context of this exercise, beneficiary consultation is rather a criteria forevaluating the effectiveness and appropriateness of some coordination mechanisms,problems and solutions examined. This is primarily of concern in the area ofprogramme implementation, particularly in relation to management of information onaffected populations and programme activities.

8. Evaluation team:

The evaluation team will lead the lessons learned exercise. The team will comprise threemembers. A mix of staff persons and/or consultants will be selected with heavy emphasison using their combined knowledge of the three organizations to foster discussion,ownership and follow through on recommendations.

In order to successfully support a self-evaluation process, the final composition of theteam will include expertise related to humanitarian assistance operations in complexemergencies in the following areas: programme planning and coordination, logisticsoperations, supply pipeline management, communications systems and networks,security, information for programme management and external relations. All teammembers should be fluent in French and have knowledge of the Great Lakes region.

9. Products:

The product of the review will be a working document focusing on practicalrecommendations and proposing a work plan for implementation.

This will include:1. A synthesis and analysis of findings on positive experiences in operational

coordination.2. A distillation of clear recommendations on their potential replication in other contexts.

3. Identification of gaps or unsolved problems.4. Recommended priorities for action and processes for improving operational

coordination.5. Input to a work plan to be agreed upon by the three agencies with a defined

schedule for achieving results and clear assignment of responsibilities.

In addition, a summary of the exercise will be prepared by the evaluation team fordissemination to the three agencies Executive Boards, members of the IASC, donorsand NGOs.

10. Follow-up:

Follow-up will be ensured both through mechanisms in the Great Lakes region andthrough support from the headquarters of the respective agencies. Mechanisms in theregion will be proposed as appropriate during the lessons learned exercise. A focal pointfor execution of the lessons learned exercise and for coordination of follow-up will anamed by each agency.

An additional appendix on Information sources (key informants and documents) is beingprepared.

Appendix A: Work plan

The timing of he study focusing on operational aspects of coordination is based on theneed to capture structures and systems which were put in place at the height of the crisis,wit access to the greatest number of key informants on site to allow dialogue among themas well as with the study team.

Preparatory phase prior to full-time assignment of team (dates agreed WFP/UNHCR/UNICEF):18 Aug. Draft 1 of TORs.1 Sept. Draft 2 of TORs with input from field21 Sept. TORs finalized.10 Oct. Documentation prepared:

Documentary sources of information collected for review by teams.Initial draft of time line for analysis of Great Lakes Sept. 1996-present.Draft work plan elaborated.Timing and mechanisms for coordination with DHA team finalizedEvaluation team hired.

Preparatory phase by evaluation team:Week 1 (8-13 Oct.)- 2-3 day work at HQ of UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF complete (team splits)- Draft interview guide developed and shared with field offices- Revised work plan shared with field offices- Majority of documentary review completed- Initial consultation with DHA team

Field phase (rough outline)Week 2-3 (14 Oct - 7 Nov):- Key informant interviews conducted- ConsuItations with NGOs- Documentary review continues- Work groups for self-assessment complete phases of problem identification/validation

and analysis of findings, identification of remaining gaps (produced as workingdocument)

- Work groups for self-assessment complete identification of lessons learned andrecommendations

- Work plans and follow-up mechanisms developed and established in field- Working document compiled.

Week 6 (7-14 Nov):- Interviews of HQ personnel- Work plans and follow-up mechanisms established in HQ/Regional offices- Summary document produced.