trip report abstract december 1, 1999 official traveler: … · trip report abstract december 1,...

TRIP REPORT ABSTRACT

December 1, 1999

OFFICIAL TRAVELER: Thomas H. Essig, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Health Physics Section, IOLB

Division of Inspection Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

TRAVEL TO: Vienna, Austria

BEGINNING: November 13, 1999

UNTIL: November 20, 1999

MEETING TITLE AND/OR AFFILIATION:

Mr. Thomas H. Essig, Co-representative for U.S. Government, along with Ms. Marcia Carpentier of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Technical Committee Meeting to provide feedback on international guidance for emergency planning and response and Its Implementation

SUMMARY

The IAEA's ad hoc Technical Committee Meeting on emergency preparedness and response was

held'in Vienna, Austria from November 15 - 19,1999. Attendees of the meeting are listed in

Attachment 1. Attachment 2 provides the agenda for the meeting. Attachment 3 contains a report

of the Technical Committee Meeting, which constitutes a good overall summary of topics and reports

discussed, as well as recommendations for follow-up actions.

The meeting was convened at the request of the IAEA Secretariat to provide expert feedback on

international guidance for emergency planning and response and its implementation. Specifically,

the committee was to consider Important concepts and terminology related to these areas, as well

as the relevance, scope, usefulness, detailed content, and consistency of a number of existing IAEA

documents related to emergency preparedness and response.

As of November 22, 1999, Mr. Essig was appointed as Chief of the Uranium Recovery and Low-Level

Waste Branch, DWM / NMSS

As shown in Attachment 2, the meeting format included plenary and break-out sessions to facilitate

covering the large volume of material requested by the Secretariat. The two U.S. Co-representatives

split the responsibility for attending the break-out sessions, thereby assuring complete coverage of

all topics. Mr. Essig attended breakout sessions which focused on reviewing the following

documents: TECDOC-718, "A Model National Radiological Response Plan for Radiological

Accidents;" TECDOC-953, "Methods for the Development of Emergency Response Preparedness

for Nuclear or Radiological Accidents;" and TECDOC-955, "Generic Assessment Procedures for

Determining Protective Actions During a Reactor Accident."

Of the three documents, most of the time in the breakout sessions was spent reviewing and

commenting on TECDOC-953. This document is relevant to NRC interests in that it is the IAEA

equivalent of NUREG-O654IFEMA-REP-1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological

Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." As the U.S.

Co-representative, I was able to provide constructive comments at key points during the discussion

of TECDOC-953 to help ensure, where appropriate and to the extent practical, that no major

inconsistencies would exist between TECDOC-953 and NUREG-0654.

Mr. Essig was also assigned to a task group of four persons which had been given the additional

responsibility to compile terms (and when practical, their definitions) which were to be added to the

draft IAEA Safety Glossary. The Safety Glossary is an internal IAEA document to be used by

individuals engaged in the preparation of IAEA documents. The task group was asked to add terms

to the list provided at the beginning of the Technical Committee Meeting which were gleaned through

individual members attending the plenary and break-out sessions during the week. Because task

group members were asked attend all plenary and breakout sessions in order to capture new terms

needing definition, little time was available to provide the detailed definitions themselves. Nearly 70

terms were identified by the task group as candidates for addition to the Safety Glossary. Definitions

were provided for over 20 terms. When practical, Mr. Essig suggested U.S. definitions of terms to

be included in the glossary; this proved generally acceptable to other members of the task group.

At the conclusion of the Technical Committee Meeting, it was generally agreed that future meetings

should be held approximately every two years for the purpose of providing critical reviews of IAEA

documents (Conventions, standards, guidelines and reports) relevant to

emergency preparedness and response.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The documents reviewed by the Technical Committee have their counterparts in NRC-issued

documents and guidance. NRC emergency preparedness and response staffs (NRR and IRO

respectively) should continue involvement in IAEA activities of this type becausethey are excellent

opportunities to: (1) provide U.S. views regarding the conduct of emergency preparedness and

response activities, as well as the development and upgrading of associated plans and procedures;

and (2) exchange ideas with emergency preparedness and response colleagues from other nations,

thereby expanding the base of knowledge used by the NRC in its own activities in these areas.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Technical Committee Meeting

to provide feedback on international guidance for emergency

planning and response and its implementation

Dates of meeting:

Place of meeting:

Scientific Secretary:

Secretary:

15-19 November 1999

IAEA Headquarters Meeting Room C07-V, A22 10, C0743

M. Crick B073 1, x22729 E-mail: [email protected]

Ms. Agnes Pirkfellner B0725, x22028 E-mail: [email protected]

List of Participants

Australia

Mr. D. Woods Head, Radiation Protection Services Australian Nuclear Science & Technology Organisation (ANSTO) PMBI Menai 2234 NSW Menai Tel: +61 2 9717 3578 Fax: +61 2 9717 9266 Email: [email protected]

Austria

Mr. E. Henrich General Directorate VI, Dept. VIn (Radiation Protection) Federal Chancellery Radetzkystrasse 2 A-1031 Vienna Tel: +43 (1) 711-72-4453 Fax: +43 (1) 712-2331 Email: [email protected]

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Attachment 1

Last saved: 1999-I1 - I

Dr. K. Mueck

Mr. J. Zechner

Belgium

Mr. D. Degueldre

Mr. F. Hardeman

Oesterr.Forschungszentrum Scibersdorf GesmblH (Austrian Research Cent.) A-2444 Scibersdorf Tel: +43 (2254) 780 3201 Fax: +43 (2254) 780 3206 Email: [email protected]

General Directorate VI, Dept.VI/7 (Radiation Protection) Federal Chancellery Radetzkystrasse 2 1031 Vienna Tel: +43 171172 4134 Fax: +43 1 712 23 31 Email: [email protected]

Engineer, Nuclear Inspection Support, Operational Projects & Inspection AVN (Association Vincotte Nuclear) Avenue du Roi, 157 B-1190 Brussels Tel: +32 (2) 536 8345 Fax: +32 (2) 536 8585 Email: [email protected]

Studiecentrum voor Kemenergie (SCK/CEN) Boeretang 200 B-2400 Mol Tel: +32 (14) 33-2851 Fax: +32 (14) 32 1056 Email: [email protected]

Brazil

Mr. R. dos Santos Head, Radiation Emergency Assistance Services, Institute for Radiation Protection and Dosimetry Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear do Brasil Av. Salvador Allende, s/n, via 9 Recreio dos Bandeirantes CEP 22780-160 Rio de Janeiro Tel: +55 (21) 442 2539 Fax: +55 (21) 442 2548 Email: [email protected]

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Bulgaria

Ms. M. Nizamska

Czech Republic

Mr. P. Kuca

Head, Emergency Planning and Response Division

Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes (CUAEPP) 69 Shipchenski Prokhod Boulevard BG-1574 Sofia Tel: +359 (2) 940 6880 Fax: +359 (2) 707 069, 940 6889 Email: [email protected]

National Radiation Protection Institute Srobfrova 48 CZ- 100 00 Prague 10 Tel: +420 2 6708 2649 Fax: +420 2 6731 1410 Email: [email protected]

Estonia

Mr. M. Iila

Ms. E. Tanner

Head, Civil Emergency Planning Department National Rescue Board Raua Str. 2 EE-10124 Tallinn Tel: +372 6 282 005 Fax: +372 6 282 099 Email: [email protected]

Head of Department, The Ministry of the Environment Estonian Radiation Protection Centre Kopli Street 76 10416 Tallinn Tel: +372 660-3336 Fax: +372 660-3352 Email: [email protected]

Finland

Ms. H. Aaltonen Head, Emergency Preparedness Radiation & Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) P.O. Box 14 FIN-00881 Helsinki Tel: +358 9 759 88212 Fax: +358 9 759 88214 Email: hannele.aaltonen@stuk. fi

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France

Mr. T. Bouffort

Germany

Dr. H. Kom

Mr. D. Schrammel

Hungary

Dr. I. Lux

Japan

Mr. M. Hirano

Colonel Sp. charge de Mission, Direction de la Defense et de la Securite Civiles, MARN Minist~re de I'Int~rieur Place Beauvau F-75800 Paris cedex 08 Tel: +33 1 5604 7537. Fax: +33 1 5604 7591 Email: [email protected]

Section Head, Bundesamt fir Strahlenschutz (BfS) K6penicker Allee 120-130 D-10318 Berlin Tel: +49 (30) 50 922 704 Fax: +49 (30) 50 922 200, (30) 50 922 712 Email: [email protected]

Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe - Technik und Umwelt Postfach 3640 D-76133 Karlsruhe Tel: +49 7247 82 3252 Fax: +49 7247 82 4857 Email: [email protected]

Department Head, Nuclear Safety Directorate, Technical Department Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority P.O. Box 676 Margit krt. 85 H-1539 Budapest 114 Tel: +36 (1) 356 2772, (1) 356 3691 Fax: +36 (1) 355 1591, (1) 356 3846 Email: [email protected]

Principal Engineer Deputy Manager, Planning and Analysis Division Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) Tokai-mura, Ibaraki-ken 319-1195 Japan .Tel: +81 29 282 5978 Fax: +81 29 282 5408 Email: [email protected]

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Norway

Mr. F. Ugletveit

Russian Federation

Mr. B. Petrov

Mr. N. Trofimov

Slovenia, Republic of

Dr. R. Martincic

Sweden Mr. C. Calmtorp

Adviser, Nuclear Safety Department Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority Grini Naeringspark 13 P.O. Box 55 N- 1332 0sterfis Tel: +47 67 162 574 Fax: +47 67 147-407 Email: [email protected]

Head, Information and Analytical Unit Emergency Response Centre of MINATOM 2-nd Murinsky Prospect, 28 194021 St. Petersburg Tel: +7 812 247 5753 Fax: +7 812 247 5798 Email: [email protected]

Head, Division of Civil Defence and Emergemcy Situatuions Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy 24/26 B. Ordynka Street 101 000 Moscow Tel: +7 095 239 2288 Fax: +7 095 953 5484 Email: [email protected]

Head, Department for Low and Medium Energy Physics Jozef Stefan Institute Jamova 39 P.O. Box 3000 SI- 1000 Ljubljana Tel: +386 (61) 1773 493 Fax: +386 (61) 1232 120 Email: [email protected]

PCI Information AB P.O.Box 146 S-61 124 Nykoping Tel: +46 155 21 3605 Fax: +46 155 21 8000 Email: [email protected]

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Mr. R. Oisson (ioordinator LEmcrgency Preparedness. D)cp. o) inspection Swedish Nuclear Power I nspectorate (SKI) Klarabergsviadukten 90 S-106 58 Stockholm Tel: +46 (8) 698 84 51 Fax: +46 (8) 661-9086 Email: [email protected]

Switzerland

Chef, Sekktion St6rfallauswirkungen und Notfallschutz Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (HSK) CH-5232 Villigen-HSK Tel: +41 56 310 3939 Fax: +41 56 310 4939 Email: [email protected]

Ukraine

Mr. A. Ananenko Head, Department of Information and Crisis Policy Ministry for Environmental Protection & Nuclear Safety of Ukraine Nuclear Regulatory Administration 5 Khreshchatyk str. SU-252601 Kiev I Tel: +380 (44) 462 0603 Fax: +380 (44) 228-5777 Email: [email protected]

United Kingdom

Mr. N. Board

Mr. R. Hadden

Head, Emergency Planning Services British Nuclear Fuels PIc 1312 Berkeley Centre Berkeley Glos, GLI3 9PB Tel: +44 145 3813 250 Fax: +44 145 3813 246 Email: [email protected]

Health and Safety Executive, HSE/NII, Room 220 Nuclear Installations Inspectorate St. Peter's House Balliol Road L20 3LZ Bootle, Liverpool Tel: +44 151 951 4118 Fax: +44 151 951 4163 Email: [email protected]

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Mr. M. Baggenstos

United States of America

Ms. M. Carpentier

Mr. T. Essig

Office of Radiation and Indoor Air Environmental Protection Agency 401 M. Street S.W. (6608J) 20460 Washington, D.C Tel: +1 (202) 564-9711 Fax: +1 (202) 565-2037 [email protected]

Section Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Health Physics U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-12-H2 Washington, DC 20555 Tel: +1 301 415 2910 Fax: +1 301 425 2968 Email: [email protected]

International Organisations:

Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)

Mr. C. Rigney Agriculture and Biotechnology Laboratory, FAO/IAEA-Seibersdorf International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramerstrasse 5 PO Box 100 A-1400 Vienna Tel: +43 (1) 2060 28267 Fax: +43 (1) 2060 28222 Email: [email protected]

World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)

Mr. M. Mlaki Chief, Data-processing System Division, World Weather Watch Department World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 7 bis, avenue de la Paix Case postale 2300 CH- 1211 Geneva 2 Tel: +41 (22) 730 8231 Fax: +41 (22) 730 8021 [email protected]

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AAL.\ �IdI1 .�iciIhLJcR �

Mr. C. Nogueira de Oliveira Mr. G. Winkler Mr. M. Hawkins Ms. E. Buglova Mr. J. Meehan Mr. N. Halde

Consultants to the TCM:

Mr. J. Lafortune Director, International Safety Research 457A Sussex Drive 2nd Floor KIN 6Z4 Ottawa, Ontario Canada Tel: +1 (613) 241-4884 Fax: +1 (613) 241-1250 Email: [email protected]

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Technical Committee Meeting to provide feedback on international guidance for

emergency planning and response and its implementation

15 - 19 November 1999

Provisional Agenda- - -- -- I -

MONDAY 15 Nov 99

TUESDAY 16 Nov 99

08:30 Welcome09:00 1. Overview of Documents and Purpose of Meeting 09:40 2. Discussion on Document Structures

10:30 3. Overview of concepts for emergency preparedness and response 11:30 4a. Terminology discussion

14:00 5. Objectives of emergency 6. Goals of emergency response, intervention levels, preparedness, Emergency

hazard assessment Planning Categories; planning levels and responsibilities

08:30 4b. Plenary: Issues from previous day and terminology revisited09:00 7. Emergency Planning 8. Process for preparedness

Areas/Zones, Protective Action development; critical tasks strategies and timing for

implementation

14:00 9. Criteria for Notification, Classification and Immediate Actions, Decision-making,

assessment tools, harmonization and information flow, Operational

Intervention Levels

lOa. Infrastructure and Functional elements

WEDNESDAY 08:30 4b. Plenary: Issues from previous day and terminology revisited 17 Nov 99 09:00 11. Early Notification Convention 10b. Infrastructure and

and Assistance in Obtaining Functional elements SInformation

14:00 12. Assistance Convention: 13. TECDOC-953/718 Response and Preparedness

THURSDAY 08:30 14a. Plenary: Issues from previous day and discussion on additional 18 Nov 99 advice needed

09:00 t15a. TECDOC-955 16a. TECDOC-RTM2

14:00 15b' TECDOC-955 16b. TECDOC-RTM2, 17:00 Report and glossary available for reading

FRIDAY 08:30 14b. Plenary: Issues from previous day and discussion on additional advice needed

09:00 17. Comments on the report 19 Nov 99 13:00 Close of meeting

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Attachment 2

I

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INTRODUCTION

DOCUMENT STRUCTURES

GOALS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND PREPAREDNESS

INTERVENTION LEVELS AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT

EMERGENCY PLANNING AREAS/ZONES, PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGIES AND TIMING FOR IMPLEMENTATION .......................................................... EMERGENCY PLANNING CATEGORIES, PLANNING LEVELS AND RESPONSIBILITIES .. PROCESS FOR PREPAREDNESS DEVELOPMENT; CRITICAL TASKS .................... INFRASTRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS .................................. TECDOC-953/718 ................ ........ ........................................... TECD OC-955 .................................................................... TECDOC-RTM2 ...................................................... EARLY NOTIFICATION CONVENTION AND ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING INFORMATION ASSISTANCE CONVENTION: RESPONSE AND PREPAREDNESS. ......................

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REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE MEETING TO PROVIDE FEEDBACK ON INTERNATIONAL

GUIDANCE FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING AND RESPONSE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION

15 - 19 NOVEMBER 1999

AT THE IAEA HEADQUARTERS IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA

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INTRODUCTION

A Technical Committee Meeting to "provide feedback on international guidance for emergency planning and response and its implementation" was convened from 15 - 19 November 1999 at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna. A list of participants is attached as Appendix 1.

The purpose of the meeting was to provide expert feedback to the Secretariat on international guidance

for emergency planning and response and its implementation. This was to include consideration of

important concepts and terminology as well as the relevance, scope, usefulness, detailed content and consistency of documents on emergency preparedness and response.

While the Conventions were not the subject of this Technical Committee Meeting, participants agreed there are major issues that should be addressed by the IAEA.

Through a series of discussions and work sessions, the Committee formulated the following comments

and recommendations.

DOCUMENT STRUCTURES

The Technical Committee Meeting recommends that:

1. Safety Series No. 109 remain at the Safety Guide level because international consensus on this subject was needed

2. the Secretariat take steps to upgrade TECDOC-953 to Safety Reports to give them more authority, provided they can be made freely and widely available.

3. the Secretariat develop a practical stand alone document for assessment of accidents at research reactors and fuel cycle facilities and reactor types other than those included in TECDOC-955

4. the revision of the technical documents needs to address planning and response for agricultural countermeasures (Cross Reference with the FAO Guide)

GOALS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND PREPAREDNESS.

The Technical Committee Meeting recommended that a consistent set of goals and objectives for emergency planning and response be clarified taking into account the following reflections:

5. the overall goal of emergency response be defined as to protect human health, the environment

and to maintain the quality of life; that the principles for achieving this are by preventing deterministic health effects (providing first aid and treating injuries), reducing stochastic effects, reducing psycho-social effects, protecting the environment and reducing the economic consequences.

6. the goal of emergency preparedness be defined as to ensure that trained personnel can come together rapidly in well equipped facilities working with well understood procedures to fulfill the emergency response goals.

7. that the concepts and objectives should include the principle of "cost-effectiveness."

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8. these goals should then substitute for the general objectives of emergency planning as stated in TECDOC-953 (Section 2.1.1)

INTERVENTION LEVELS AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT

The Technical Committee Meeting agreed that:

9. changing OILs without reference to the GIL may introduce confusion and may even decrease the credibility, therefore "the GIL is this, and based on the information that we have, the OIL should be that"

10. the use of OILs is acceptable for decision-making and that the use of default OILs early in an emergency is acceptable provided that a) the OILs are clearly used in combination with the Generic Intervention Levels (GILs) b) all assumptions used in the derivation of OILS are clearly stated and well understood by

the people using them, and c) they are adjusted appropriately whenever new information affecting any of the

assumptions (not just isotopic composition but also for example exposure duration) become available

11. the default values of the operational intervention level should be optimised in the planning stage 12. in a Safety Guide the Agency should give guidance on how to develop technical planning basis 13. Emergency Planning should be based on the analysis of a wide spectrum of accident scenarios

including severe accidents. The Agency should address this issue for developing the technical planning basis - possibly in the framework of a TECDOC. The use of PSA for doing this was discussed, but no agreement was reached.'

EMERGENCY PLANNING AREAS/ZONES, PROTECTIVE ACTION STRATEGIES AND TIMING FOR IMPLEMENTATION

The Technical Committee aeed:

14. that the Precautionary Action Zone is a planning zone but is also a response zone 15. that actions within the PAZ need to be pre-established. Under exceptional circumstances there

might be a need to adjust these actions (e.g., extreme weather conditions) 16. that the timing of protective actions should be planned on the basis of an analysis of a wide

spectrum of scenarios, including severe accident 17. that the guidance on timing requirements for the implementation of protective actions provided in

the TECDOC is acceptable, but needs to be adapted based on facility type. 18. that at some sites pathways other than airborne contamination (e.g., water contamination through

liquid releases) may present a significant risk to people and the environment/ecosystem and should be taken into account in the planning process

'Notes by Dr. Mueck, for consideration on work on the technical planning basis, are provided as annex I

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19. that the approach for the development of a technical basis that applies to Category I also applies

to all other categories, except that, in the case of Category IV and also for nuclear power vessels

in transit, it may need to be adapted to take into account the fact that the sources may be mobile.

20. that a footnote be added to Table A2.1 (appendix 2 of TECDOC-953) that these distances are

indicative of the results that would be obtained from a technical basis that takes into account

severe accidents 21. on default values contained in TECDOC-953

EMERGENCY PLANNING CATEGORIES, PLANNING LEVELS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The Technical Committee agreed:

22. that enrichment plants do not meet the criteria for Category I (See Pg. 10, 18 and 102 of TECDOC-953). Criteria should be consistent to define which plants should be in what Category.

23. that the 5 Categories listed are appropriate. 24. that all Countries should have, as a minimum, Category IV. 25. with the categorisation used in the TECDOC and its use in higher level documents.

26. with the strategic concept for response for each category 27. that the categories cover all facilities and practices.

The Technical Committee recognized:

28. that emergency planning categories are a generic optimized planning approach that simplifies detailed optimisation of emergency planning.

PROCESS FOR PREPAREDNESS DEVELOPMENT; CRITICAL TASKS

The Technical Committee agred:

29. that the role of the National Co-ordinator is necessary. It was felt that more emphasis in Section

2.2.3 should be placed on early involvement in the writing process of all parties who have an

interest in the development and implementation of the Emergency Plan(s). Co-ordination "after

the fact" may actually be counterproductive by creating hostility or opposition to requirements

being imposed on those who had no part in assigning those obligations.

30. that no additional steps could be identified; however, it recommended modifications to several

existing tasks, especially Task 10, as contained in the marked up Master Copy of TECDOC-953.

31. that the document is basically valuable for its intended purpose.

32. that emergency plans give overview as part of planning process to achieve preparedness while

response procedures give detailed actions to be carried out during response.

33. that procedures should be simple and functional to use in an emergency.

34. that procedures need to be part of a Q.A. programme. 35. that an exercise or real event is valuable in validating procedures

36. that training programmes should be based on the procedures

The Technical Committee recommended:

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37. that Figure 4 should be re-drawn so that it does not look like a Flow Chart. Presently it creates the impression that each task must be completed before the next one can begin. It was agreed that many of the tasks can be started in parallel.

CRITERIA FOR NOTIFICATION, CLASSIFICATION AND IMMEDIATE ACTIONS, DECISION MAKING, ASSESSMENT TOOLS, HARMONIZATION AND

INFORMATION FLOW, OPERATIONAL INTERVENTION LEVELS

The Technical Committee ageed:

38. other classification systems may be needed 39. the current classification scheme applies to other types of practices within Cat. I, H and III (no

General Emergency in Cat. III) 40. that no general classification system is needed for Cat. IV practices 41. however, a simple classification system for satellite re-entries, e.g, satellite threat, satellite crash

should be considered 42. that the INES scale should not be used as a classification system because it is backward looking

whereas the classification system is forward looking


43. consideration be given to addressing the need of sheltering of livestock 44. to verify that activation of the monitoring system (especially far away from the plant) is

adequately covered in the documents 45. consideration of combining OILs for plume and ground contamination, and have one OIL for

evacuation and one for sheltering 46. addressing the usefulness of models in the deployment of survey and sampling resources and in

areas that are not easily accessible in decision making 47. that the value of 1 microSv/hour for OIL5 be used as a guide to indicate that sampling should be

prioritized in areas with readings above background 48. consideration of other OILs2: consider the use of time integrated air concentrations, air

concentrations, surface contamination (e.g., of vehicles), contamination of foodstuff for animals, and measured release concentrations and consider mentioning that other OILs can be developed by individual countries if they find that they are useful for them

INFRASTRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS

The Technical Committee Meeting recommended:

49. Paragraph 2.1.6. be rearranged and to change title for 2.1.6.: "Infrastructure and Functional elements" instead of "Integrated planning concepts".

50. that a new paragraph be added: 2.1.7. with the title "Integrated planning concepts" which consists of two last paragraphs of old 2.1.6.

2Note that some of these OILs have already been developed in the draft RTM2

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51. that "Infrastructure elements" be replaced by "Planning elements" and that "Functional elements" by "Response elements" throughout the Document

52. changes to items in Category I, recorded in a Marked-up copy of TECDOC-953. 53. that, for the B10 item (Psychological Impact Mitigation), the IAEA engage experts who should

review the lessons learned on mitigation of psychological impact during nuclear and radiological accidents, and write practical guidance to be included in the TECDOC-953.

54. that all the changes proposed for Category I should be reflected in the corresponding item in

other Categories. All the changes are fixed in the Mark-up copy of the TECDOC-953. 55. to make consistent the definition of Category III on page 60 (potential of unshielded dose rates of

more than 100 mGy/h at I m) and on page 18 Table II (potential of unshielded dose rates more than 10 Sv/h at 30 cm).

56. to make the changes in elements of Categories IV and V so that they are consistent with the changes proposed in Categories I - III.

57. to edit TECDOC -953 taking into account the proposals made and publish it in the form of Safety Report.

TECDOC-953/718 3


58. that there is a need for the contents of both Documents to be consistent. 59. that a consolidation of material on the details of the Emergency Plan contained in TECDOC-718

could be combined in the revision of TECDOC 953. 60. that the Appendices for TECDOC-953 were important to the document, and the content was

helpful to meet its purpose. Some modifications in detail were recommended. 61. detailed proposals for modifications and improvements, which are included in the mark-up copy

of TECDOC-953.

The Technical Committee accepted:

62. the structure, content, style and format of the document, with some minor modifications that are recorded in the Marked-up document

63. that TECDOC-718 has not been recently revised to reflect changes and improvements made in newer documents. j

TECDOC-955

The Technical Committee areed:

64. that there needs to be some guidance on the integration of the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) and the emergency classification scheme and that the emergency classification must not interfere with the safe operation of the plant

65. that in the update of TECDOC-955 the need to frequently review safety parameters and the emergency classes must be emphasised.

' Specific comments from Dr. Lux (Hungary) are attached as Annex II for consideration by the Secretariat

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66. that certain events that could occur in a nuclear power station, but are not covered in TECDOC955 need to be addressed

67. that the document should be kept as a TECDOC and not elevated to Safety Report, because this would require a major rewrite to ensure completeness (reactor type, accidents, etc...)

TECDOC-RTM2


68. that the document was useful and strikes a correct balance with the details in the document and the end user.

69. that changes proposed in the different Documents should be reviewed for consistency. 70. that throughout the document the term "non-reactor" should be deleted from the expression "non

reactor radiological emergency". Simultaneously a clear definition for a radiological emergency should be generated.

71. that the format of the Procedures is useful and fits the practical purposes. 72. various editorial proposals for change, which are included in the marked-up Master Copy of the

Document.


73. publishing the Document in the form of a TECDOC 74. that the Worksheets be exercised during table-top exercises to test their usefulness and clarity,

and identify needs for any changes. The Worksheets should be consistent with the Worksheets of the other documents which were considered. The tabulated data in RTM2 should be checked and referenced thoroughly prior to publication.

75. presenting the Procedures for the fire brigades and medical response teams along with the Appendix for medical response to the regular fire brigade and medical teams to see how it works.

GLOSSARY

The Technical Committee recommended that:

76. the Secretariat consider the material attached as Annex III to the report in developing a consolidated glossary of terms. Terms that require formal definition include:

nuclear accident, radiological emergency, release, unusual event in the definition of emergency classes, protective action, worst accident, most severe accidents,

77. Preventive actions are often seen as actions before an accident - probably precautionary is the better word for actions. Precautionary actions are actions taken as precaution, i.e., when protective actions may not be required at the time based on exposure, but may be required in the future or may not be required at all, consistent with the emergency response goal previously defined.

EARLY NOTIFICATION CONVENTION AND ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING INFORMATION

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The Technical Committee recommended that:

78. the application of the Convention be interpreted in the context of the goals of emergency

response, instead of being limited to "radiologically significant" events.

79. a working agreement between State Parties and the Agency (IAEA) on the language to be used in

notification and additional information messages be made. (The legal basis of the conventions

does not address this.)

The TCM recommended guidelines to address the following Definitions and Issues:

80. "Radiological Safety Significance" is nowhere defined and is an issue of concern. A minor

incident may have a major psychological significance. Guidelines for the interpretation of this

phrase would be helpful. 81. "A Risk of a Transboundary Release" is a prerequisite for compulsory notification. In the

event of nationals being in a foreign State where an accident occurs, there is no requirement to

notify the nationals' State. If the foreign national is irradiated there is still no obligation to inform

the national's country. There is, however, an obligation to inform the country of foreign nationals

if many of them are involved. This, however, is as vague as the "Radiological Safety

Significance" issue, because the term "many" is also relative. 82. There is a need to examine how the Conventions can be applied to military facilities.

83. Guidance is needed on the application of the Conventions when a State Party is affected by an

accident of unknown origin. 84. In the proposed revision to ENATOM, it was suggested that monitoring data be included and

grouped under "KEY DATA" 85. It was felt that the IAEA should be pro-active in informing State Parties on situations that have

caused considerable media interest. State Parties should be encouraged to inform the IAEA of

these incidents, even though they are not obliged to report under the Conventions. The

participants agreed to bring this up in their countries. 86. The issue of Contact Points not responding to requests for information or to communication drills

should be brought up in the Board or the General Conference or both.

87. The criteria for notification to the Agency were discussed. This should be related to the

comments on basing the applications of the Conventions on the goals of emergency response.

Some form of harmonisation should be sought. 88. The fact that there are two different places for reporting an event (INES and ERU) is not clear to

some Member States. This should be re-emphasized by the IAEA.

89. The Convention does not address the issue of when the obligation to provide additional

information stops, and this should be clarified. Unless otherwise justified, there should be only

one Point of Contact per country. This is explicit in the Conventions, but is not always put into practice.

90. When possible, Notification Forms should be harmonised. This has been done now within the

context of the IAEA Convention, and between the IAEA fax form and that of the EC's reporting

form. The problem, however, could be complicated when bilateral and multilateral notification

agreements are made. The IAEA should foster this harmonisation of notification.

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91. The TCM supports the deeilopment of a Joint Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan of the International Organisations.

92. There was a consensus that it would be beneficial for a larger meeting involving all national Contact Points to the Early Notification Convention to be convened approximately every two year. The TCM recommends theIAEA should explore mechanisms for conducting such meetings. The IAEA should facilitate dialogue between Member States/States Parties on the interpretation and implementation of the Notification and Assistance Conventions to improve their effectiveness. (See No. 70, above.)

93. Recognising that ENATOM has no legal status, the Technical Committee strongly -recommends the IAEA pursue mechanisms to promote/encourage its adoption by State Parties. This includes, for example, regular meetings of all national contact points to discuss implementation issues related to the Conventions

ASSISTANCE CONVENtION: RESPONSE AND PREPAREDNESS


94. that there was no definition of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency in the Conventions, and in all other emergency preparedness documents.

95. that clarification was needed of how "lost sources" fits into the convention structure. 96. that there was a need for an interpretation/guidance document for the Assistance Convention,

which could be prepared for the General Conference's approval and be of similar status to the Requirements for Preparedness and Response to Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies.

97. that the Conventions themselves implied a very narrow concept of assistance, focusing only on equipment and human resources. It was suggested that this definition should be broadened to include "remote" assessment such as the provision of information in response to a request.

98. that the establishment of an Emergency Response Network was seen as a move in the right direction

99. that the IAEA should not automatically forward details of a request for assistance to other States because of the "confidentiality" clause in the convention. However, any such information, subject to the agreement of the requesting State, would be useful.

100. that the terminology used for all future documents should be consistent in order to minimise confusion.

101. that it would be useful if the States Parties to the Assistance Convention could meet once every two years to discuss its implementation4 .

The Technical Committee endorsed:

102. the concept of one contact point

" A discussion took place on the appropriateness of combining this with the similar one on Early Notification. The legal interpretation was that they are two completely different conventions. If they were held on the same week, however, they would have to be organised consecutively as distinct components of the meeting programme. It was noted that some contact points are contact points for both conventions and that some Member States have signed both Conventions and others only one. This is a matter of logistics which can be dealt with later.

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The Technical Committee discussed:

103. the difficulties of assembling the requested data specified in Section 7 of the ENATOM manual

was discussed. This will always be a problem if compiling such data was done only at the

request of the IAEA. Such data should be a normal part of the review process of national

emergency plans. If the collection of such data was routine, as laid out in a national plan, its

provision to the Agency would not be a problem.

The Technical Committee supports:

104. 105. 106.

the planned ENATOM user group meeting scheduled for 2001. the harmonisation of terminology, equipment and collection of monitoring data the momentum with which the production of documents presented to the meeting have been achieved and recommended that this momentum be maintained. The group endorsed the ideas

proposed and recognised the value of the work which went into them to date.

The Technical Committee considered:

107. the next steps needed after the meeting to help to implement some or all of the proposals. It was

suggested that they consult with their IAEA Board or general conference representative.

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ANNEX I

Scope For Planning For Emergency Planning Zones And Emergency Response

Supplied by Dr. Mueck, for consideration

To determine the scope of emergency planning, the size of emergency planning zones and the amount of emergency preparedness required, accident scenarios have to be considered with possible severe radioactive releases to the environment.

"* PSA is a useful tool to:

"* help identify accident sequences with severe consequences

"* identify the time periods available to the emergency staff to decide and implement precautionary and protective actions at various stages of the accident development

identify the source term feasible or to be expected for a given accident sequence

Apart from PSA an approach for identifying severe accident sequences by deterministic approaches is also feasible. In that case for emergency planning purposes usually it is assumed that only passive mitigating features are available, while non-passive systems are assumed to fail.

It is sufficient to use only a few accident sequences, typically 2 - 3, for emergency planning purposes which will cover the range of accident consequences for which the planning should be performed. These may comprise accident sequences of low consequences with higher probabilities as well as sequences with high consequences but very low probabilities.

Taking into consideration that accidents may also occur that are not foreseen before the accident, often an approach is used by which without specific considerations of accident sequences and possible IEs, an accident with a release of a large fraction of the inventory is assumed for planning purposes.

The size of the planning and preparedness may be limited by applying probabilistic analysis and assuming a reasonable cut-off frequency comparable to planning for severe accidents in non-nuclear hazards. However, while a cut-off frequency may be acceptable for licensing purposes, for emergency planning purposes the cut-off frequency should be adopted at a lower level.

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ANNEX II COMMENTS AND PROPOSAL CONCERNING TECDOCs-953 AND 955

By Dr. Ivan Lux

TECDOC-953 Pg. 18, Table II, cf. Discussion in a separate memo Pg. 106, Appendix 6: It is suggested to complement the National Plan Outline with references to the

specific details/recommendations/suggestions in the main body of the TECDOC. This would highly.

facilitate the practical use of the document in an actual planning process. It is proposed to supplement Appendix 6 with suggested outlines of the various detailed plans that are to

be used at lower levels (e.g. by various leading organizations like ministries, and at local EP organizations) and are to be elaborated in Task 8.

TECDOC-955 Pg. 72, Table B 1, footnote (d): the unconditional evacuation in case of a release should be reconsidered

and perhaps smoothened by requesting only substantial sheltering when this involves less risk than the evacuation. Pg. 75, Table B4: it is proposed that OILI and OIL3 be substituted by a single limit valid for doses originating from either plume or deposition. (It may be difficult to distinguish between the sources in an actual measurement.) It is suggested to define OILs for sheltering and for evacuation separately as opposed to OILI and OIL3. The default value of OIL5 in Table B4 may only have informative value since the results of such a measurement shall strongly depend on the circumstances (nuclide composition, ratio of noble gases that

are present in the measurements but do not contaminate food, season of vegetation, etc.) This might somehow be reflected in the recommendations. Pgs. 107 - 110, Procedures E2 and E3: it is suggested to consider the implementation of the algorithms given in these Procedures into InterRAS. Pg. 181, InterRAS: Development of the Windows version of the program is highly recommended.

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Technical. Committee Meeting Guidance for Emergency Planning

ANNEX III Report of Working Group on IAEA Safety Glossary

Essig, Hardemann, Lux, Mueck

The following represent proposals to the Secretariat for consideration in the development of a consolidated glossary of terms for use in the development and revision of documents in the Emergency Preparedness and Response arena.

1. Improvements and changes required in definitions

accident definition needs improvement; refer to the difference between accident and incident; in most countries, incident is used for an event which leads to doses below limits. Accidents is used for events leading to doses above limits, see also INES

nuclear accident accident which is caused by a nuclear chain reaction in a reactor or critical assembly, or other facility where a nuclear chain reaction may occur

radiological accident accident which is caused by irradiation from or dispersion of a radioactive substance or an irradiation device other than by a nuclear chain reaction or reactor. (NOTE. The Advisory Group did define "Radiological Emergency, but would rather use this term - it can be adapted if need be.)

accident precursor bad definition; better: an event or sequence of events preceding an accident that would lead to the accident in case of malfunction of the accident preventing system

actuation actuation of a measure or a preventive action;

preferably use the term actuation instead of initiation of an action, do not use the term activation for this.

barrier the term barrier should be used in the documents basically for barriers to prevent the penetration of radionuclides into areas or zones where the radioactivity should not enter. It should not be used for barriers to prevent the "movement of people" or for "shielding against radiation". Inhibiting the movement of people by barriers is a psychologically very negative statement and should not

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be used at all. Rather phrases should used such as "access restriction" and "access control" throughout the

documents.

proposal for a definition: A physical or chemical obstruction to prevent the penetration or movement of radionuclides from an area

of high activity to areas or zones outside this area or to the environment. The term is used both in nuclear

facilities and repositories to describe active or passive (natural) features to inhibit or reduce the penetration

to areas outside the

multiple barriers: definition as in the glossary okay, retain

chemical barrier: delete this paragraph (see definition above)

competent authority broaden the definition to emergency authority, licensing authority.

confinement bad definition! confinement should be used only with installed safety features to mitigate releases of activity to the

environment. A pressure vessel although confining radioactivity for certain period of time, should not be

referred to as "confinement". The same applies for confinement in repositories.

> a very good definition for confinement is given in the glossaries on research reactor safety.

countermeasure present text is okay; but a remark on the difference between measure and countermeasure should be added.

A measure is an action taken in the facility to reduce the risk or mitigate the consequences of releases to the

environment, a countermeasure is an action taken outside the facility or the activity containing area to reduce

the exposure of the public or the personnel on-site. use protective action or remedial action where possible.

critical

only two items should be used with this term, i.e. no. 2 and no. 4 in the definitions.

The first paragraph should be transferred to the end, explaining what critical should not be used for.

delete: 3. having a reactivity of zero

criticality add a definition on prompt criticality.

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dose rate bad definition; alter the definition

emergency plan (improvement on existing definition)

A document which defines the manner in which emergency planning requirements and guidelines will be implemented. Emergency plans are prepared at several different levels: national, local, and facility. Details regarding the accomplishment of specific tasks dutlined in emergency plans are contained in emergency procedures.

evacuation add precautionary evacuation and include a definition

level add generic intervention level (GIL) and generic action level (GAL)

longer term protective action or long-term protective action it seems that the term should be more appropriately defined as "long-term" rather than "longer term". The terms early-phase, intermediate phase and long-term phase are commonly used in IAEA documents to refer to the different phases after a severe release of radioactivity to the environment. Using the term "longer term" is confusing in that context and should be changed accordingly.

notification currently in the definitions:

1. A document submitted to the regulatory body .... This is a bad definition. The term notification should not be used in that context. Better to use the term "Application for a license" or "Submission of documents for license application". (NOTE- a hand written note in the margin here indicates "delete", but it is not clear what is to be deleted.)

However, notification in the context of a shipment of radioactive substances is a proper term. Therefore the following text under this term is proposed (including an amendment of NUE):

notification An information submitted to a national or international authority providing details of an event, which either occurred or is anticipated to occur. Notifications may be


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notification as required by the Convention of Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

notification of an unusual event (NUE) notification of unusual event

notification of a shipment notification of the appropriate authorities that a shipment will pass through or into their countries, as required under by IAEA Transport Regulations.

worker add a definition for emergency worker

zone for emergency planning 6 zones are defined; in the opinion of the WG this is too much, a smaller number of zones may be sufficient. Should be revised.

2. New definitions Include the following terms or definitions

authority a governmental body responsible for safety and health of the population under normal and abnormal circumstances

local authority regional authority national authority licensing authority

abnormal condition either add definition or refer to plant states

access control add definition; term should be used instead of barriers to control movement of people

accident class use emergency class

clearance

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add definition

convention add definition

core degradation use core damage

diversity missing as separate definition. It is included under redundancy, but usually redundancy and diversity are used as opposite terms, and diversity is not part of redundancy. Related term: redundancy

EMERCON add definition DO NOT USE THIS TERM IN PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

emergency add definition include phases of emergency in definition:

early phase intermediate phase long-term phase

emergency planning All activities associated with the development and maintenance of: (1) an emergency plan and procedures, and (2) facilities and equipment (e.g., emergency centers, telecommunications equipment, computers, etc.) needed to support emergency response functions.

emergency preparedness A state of readiness by an organization to respond to an accident or other situation which could result, or has resulted, in a significant release of radioactive or other hazardous material, either on-site or off-site, or to the environment (when no facility is involved). The state of readiness is based on conducting emergency planning activities, training, and exercises.

emergency response All actions associated with implementing an emergency preparedness program in response to an accident or other situation which could result, or has resulted, in a significant release of radioactive or other hazardous material, either on-site or off-site, or to the environment (when no facility is involved).

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environment Add definition

exercise An event that tests the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within

emergency plans and organizations. The exercise simulates an emergency that results in off-site radiological

releases which would require a response by off-site authorities.

drill "A supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing, and maintaining skills in a particular operation.

"A drill is often a component of an exercise. A drill is to be supervised and evaluated by a qualified drill

instructor. Drills are conducted at the facility and local levels and typically include the following areas:

communications, fire protection, medical emergency, and radiological monitoring.

generic action level see level

generic intervention level see level

hazard Add definition

leakage Add definition

hot spot Add definition

intervening organization Add definition

measures presently not included. Should be included, should refer only to measures within a facility to reduce risk or

mitigate consequences.

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possible definition: measures are actions taken in the facility to reduce risk of major failures of systems or to mitigate releases in the progress of a developing accident; use the term accident management wherever possible.

in contrast to protective action or countermeasure which should be used for measures or actions outside the plant to protect the public. add definition and contrast it to the related terms!

mitigation Add definition

monitoring Take definition from RTM2

near the border This term is used in TECDOC 953 and it was felt that it has to be defined. Proposal for definition: Refers to coordination of emergency preparedness activities with a neighboring country. Such coordination should be extended by the country operating a Category I or II facility to neighboring countries as follows: (a) for a Category I facility, all countries within 1000 km of the facility; (b) for a Category II facility, all countries within 50 km of the facility.

However, it is doubtful whether distances of up to 1000 km could be called "near a border"; probably a better definition or phrase should be established.

off-site officials needs a definition. However, maybe the term authority (local, regional, national) is preferable and should used instead.

personal protective equipment add definition

phases of an emergency see emergency

precautionary evacuation see evacuation


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preventive evacuation use instead precautionary evacuation

probabilistic risk assessment use probabilistic safety assessment

probabilistic safety assessment add definition

radiation survey Methods used to determine the presence of radioactive materials either as contamination or as contained

sources. Techniques can include calculation (e.g., mathematical models or simple algorithms), analysis (e.g.,

gamma spectroscopy), monitoring with a radiation detection instrument, or a combination of these.

radiological significance a term often used which is presently not clearly defined. It is believed that this term needs a profound discussion to obtain a good definition; possibly it requires a

separate technical meeting to derive an appropriate definition.

recovery add definition

release A term having two meanings in the context of emergency preparedness and response:

1. Actions taken (normally involving monitoring activities) to determine whether an object, material, or

person having external or internal contamination can be released in an unrestricted manner from facility

or other controls imposed for radiation protection purposes.

2. Radioactive material emitted in a controlled or uncontrolled manner to the atmosphere or body of water from a facility.

remedial action mentioned under countermeasure, but nowhere defined in the glossary.

response initiation see actuation.

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reprocessing of spent fuel add definition

worst accident use generally severe accidents or serious accident (INES)

unusual event An event which indicates a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occur.

OPEN OUESTIONS

issues brought up during the meeting, but definition seems okay

intervention

planning categories

qualified expert

thyroid blocking agent does it need definition

radiological emergency = radiological accident ?

user

waste

Glossary from TECDOC-955 was not included in the glossary list.

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