tribal militias- an effective tool to counter al-quaida and its affiliates

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TRIBAL MILITIAS:

AN EFFECTIVE TOOL TO COUNTER AL-QAIDA

AND ITS AFFILIATES?

Norman CigarU.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS


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Strategic Studies Instituteand

U.S. Army War College Press

TRIBAL MILITIAS:AN EFFECTIVE TOOL TO COUNTER AL-QAIDA

AND ITS AFFILIATES?

Norman Cigar

November 2014

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FOREWORD

Most of the local societies in which Al-Qaida andits afliates and offshoots operate in the Middle Eastand Africa have a predominantly tribal or at least havea strong tribal component (Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Syria,Somalia, Mali, and Sinai). Countering Al-Qaidas con-tinuing presence, therefore, requires addressing thetribal milieu and understanding Al-Qaidas criticalvulnerabilities when it operates in tribal societies. Inthis context, the capability that tribally-based militiasprovide may be one of the most effective tools againstAl-Qaida, and may offer a cost-effective mechanismserving as a force multiplier for U.S. forces. It couldreduce the need for U.S. force commitment on theground in environments that might offer unfavorableconditions for a U.S. Landpower footprint.

It is important to appreciate the vulnerabilities thatAl-Qaida faces in dealing with tribes inherent in thedilemma between implementing its ideological andpolitical program and the social realities that are likelyto generate conict, such as Islamic vs. tribal law, folkreligion, social and economic mores, and the presenceof outsiders, not including the challenge to traditionaltribal leaderships that Al-Qaidas inuence may en-tail. Given this environment, it is therefore not sur-prising that tribally-based militias can be organizedand function as an effective supportive counter in theeffort against Al-Qaida.

In this monograph, Dr. Norman Cigar identiestwo models for tribal militiaseither managed by lo-cal governments and supported by outside patrons or

managed directly by an outside agent. The resultingdynamic is most often a triangular one among Al-Qaida, the tribes, and the local government. It must


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be studied within that perspective, as Al-Qaida hasa vote in the ensuing struggle as it attempts to adapt.

Dr. Cigar focuses on the experience in Iraq and Ye-men, but some lessons learned may be applicable morebroadly. While the positive results may be signicant,as in the case of Iraq and Yemen, there are cautionaryguidelines to be drawn from past experience for thecreation and functioning of such tribal militias thatcould mark the difference between success or ultimatefailure, including balancing the local governmentsdilemma between encouraging an effective counter toAl-Qaida and managing the threat from such autono-mous forces in the long run.

This monograph notes a number of lessons learnedfor the United States while acting as the direct man-aging patron of these groups. Among them are thefollowing:

to understand the strengths and limitations oftribal militias and shape the latters roles andmissions accordingly;

to support a tribal militia adequately in mate-rial terms;

to provide effective protection for key tribal mi-litia leaders;

to ensure that the U.S. management and use oftribal militias do not undercut an existing oremerging governments legitimacy;

to craft a realistic and effective demobilizationplan; and to conduct an effective informationcampaign directed toward the parent tribes.

When the United States acts as a support agent for

tribal militias managed by a local government, thelessons learned include:

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providing funding, arms, selected operationalsupport, and intelligence;

advising the local government on how to bestdeal with the tribal militias; and,

advising and supporting other countries thatmight act in the future as potential patrons oftribal militias.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offerthis monograph as part of its continuing effort to in-form the debate on dealing with the continuing threatof Al-Qaida and related movements. This analysisshould be useful to help strategic leaders, planners,intelligence professionals, and commanders to bet-ter understand the challenges of the contemporarystrategic landscape in the Middle East and to crafteffective responses.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

NORMAN CIGAR is a Research Fellow at the MarineCorps University, Quantico, VA, from which he retiredrecently as Director of Regional Studies and the Mi-nerva Research Chair. Previously, he had also taughtat the Marine Corps Command and Staff College andat the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warghting.In an earlier assignment, he spent 7 years as a seniorpolitical-military analyst in the Pentagon, Washing-ton, DC, where he was responsible for the Middle Eastin the Ofce of the Armys Deputy Chief of Staff forIntelligence, and supported the Secretary of the Army,the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Congress with in-telligence. He also represented the Army on national-level intelligence issues in the interagency intelligencecommunity. During the Gulf War, he was the Armys

senior political-military intelligence staff ofcer on theDesert Shield/Desert Storm Task Force. He has alsotaught at the National Intelligence University and wasa Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Conict Analy-sis & Resolution, George Mason University. He hasstudied and traveled widely in the Middle East. Dr.Cigar is the author of numerous works on politics andsecurity issues dealing with the Middle East and theBalkans, and has been a consultant at the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at theHague. Among his writings are Al-Qaidas Doctrinefor Insurgency;Al-Qaida, the Tribes, and the Government;Lessons and Prospects for Iraqs Unstable Triangle; andthe forthcoming Al-Qaida and the Arab Spring: React-ing to Surprise and Adapting to Change. Dr. Cigar holds

a DPhil from Oxford (St Antonys College) in MiddleEast history and Arabic; an M.I.A. from the School ofInternational and Public Affairs and a Certicate from


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the Middle East Institute, Columbia University; andan M.S.S.I. from the National Intelligence University.


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SUMMARY

Despite over a decade of open war, dealing withAl-Qaida and its afliates in the Middle East is likelyto remain a concern for the foreseeable future and willpose a challenge requiring the use of any tool that islikely to be effective in meeting the threat. Most ofthe local societies in which Al-Qaida has operated inthe Middle East and Africa after September 11, 2001,have a predominantly tribal character or at least havea strong tribal component (Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Syria,Somalia, Mali, and Sinai). Developing effective tools tocounter Al-Qaidas continuing presence in that socialenvironment, therefore, is a priority and requires un-derstanding Al-Qaidas critical vulnerabilities when itoperates in those societies and developing the meansto counter Al-Qaidas efforts.

This monograph addresses the role of tribal mili-tias in the context of the ght against Al-Qaida. Theintent is to enrich policy analysis and clarify optionsfor future operations by focusing on past experiencein order to identify the positive and negative aspectsrelated to the use of such militias. The focus in thismonograph is on Iraq and Yemen. However, manyof the lessons learned may be applied more broadly.The thesis is that the capabilities which tribally-basedmilitias provide may be one of the most efcient, cost-effective tools against Al-Qaida. In some cases, suchmilitias can act as a force multiplier for U.S. Landpow-er forces, whether deployed on the ground in signi-cant numbers, or, in other cases, if such militias canreduce the need for a U.S. commitment on the ground

in environments that might present unfavorable con-ditions for a signicant U.S. Landpower footprint.At the same time, given the complexity of the local


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political environment, tribal militias are no panacea,but can be a two-edged sword. Like any weapon, the

use of tribal militias has to be understood and wieldedwith caution and skill in order to avoid unintendedconsequences.

This discussion includes two models for the tribalmilitias based on the nature of their patron. In Model1, the patron of a militia is an outside entity; in Model2, the national government is the patron (although anoutside entity may provide ancillary support). Therst case study deals with a Model 1 situation, wherea foreign patronthe United Statesacted in that rolein Iraq beginning in late-2006 and lasting through thehand-over to Iraqi authorities during the period fromDecember 2008 to April 2009. The second case studydeals with two ongoing Model 2 situations, again withIraq, but taking place after the national governments

assumption of responsibility for the tribal militia in2009. This case study is especially useful for compara-tive purposes with the rst case study. The third casestudy deals with Yemen, where the local governmenthas acted as the militia patron since 2012.

Based on the experience from Iraq and Yemen, thismonograph concludes that the positive results of us-ing tribal militias in the ght against Al-Qaida andits offshoots may be signicant. Within the contextof ghting against Al-Qaida, encouraging and sup-porting any armed local constituencysuch as Iraqstribesmay be a reasonable or even an unavoidableoption at a particular juncture in time for an outsidepower or for a local patron in dealing with that insur-gency. Nevertheless, as is often true in the real world,

this is not a panacea and, based on past experience,there are cautionary guidelines to be remembered forthe creation and functioning of such tribal militias that


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could make the difference between success or ultimatefailure. Each of the two models studied has political

and military advantages and disadvantages, but onemay not have the luxury of which option to select in aspecic situation.

Among the recommendations for policy in thosesituations where the United States is a tribal militiasdirect patron are to:

understand the strengths and limitations oftribal militias and shape the latters roles andmissions accordingly;

support a tribal militia adequately in materialterms;

provide effective protection for key tribal mili-tia leaders from inevitable Al-Qaida efforts toeliminate them;

ensure that the U.S. management and use of

tribal militias do not undercut an existing oremerging governments legitimacy;

craft a realistic and effective demobilizationplan; and,

conduct an effective information campaigndirected toward the tribes.

When the United States is in a supporting role tothe local government, among the recommendationsare to:

provide funding, arms, selected operationalsupport, and intelligence channeled throughthe patron local government;

advise the local government as to the best wayto deal with the tribal militias; and,

advise and support other countries thatmight act in the future as potential patrons oftribal militias.


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TRIBAL MILITIAS:AN EFFECTIVE TOOL TO COUNTER AL-QAIDA

AND ITS AFFILIATES?

INTRODUCTION

Despite over a decade of open war, dealing withAl-Qaida in the Middle East is likely to remain a con-cern for the foreseeable future and will pose a chal-lenge requiring the use of any tool that is likely to beeffective in meeting the threat. Most of the local societ-ies in which Al-Qaida and its afliates have operatedin the Middle East and Africa after September 11, 2001,have a predominantly tribal character or at least havea strong tribal component (Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Syria,Somalia, Mali, and Sinai). Developing effective tools tocounter Al-Qaidas continuing presence in that social

environment, therefore, is a priority and requires un-derstanding Al-Qaidas critical vulnerabilities when itoperates in those societies and developing the meansto counter Al-Qaidas efforts.

In particular, this monograph addresses the role oftribal militias in the context of the ght against Al-Qa-ida. The intent is to enrich policy analysis and clarifyoptions for future operations by focusing on past ex-perience in order to identify the positive and negativeaspects related to the use of such militias.

The thesis is that the capabilities which tribally-based militias provide may be one of the most efcientand cost-effective tools against Al-Qaida. In some cas-es, such militias can act as a force multiplier for U.S.Landpower forces, whether deployed on the ground

in signicant numbers, or, in other cases, if such mi-litias can reduce the size or preclude the need for aU.S. commitment on the ground in environments that


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might present unfavorable conditions for a signicantU.S. Landpower footprint. At the same time, given the

complexity of the local political environment, tribalmilitias are no panacea, but can be a two-edged swordand, like any weapon, this weapon has to be under-stood and wielded with caution and skill in order toavoid unintended consequences.

Terms of Reference and Methodology.

This monograph examines two models for tribalmilitias, categorized on the basis of the nature of theirpatron, since this is a key factor insofar as affectinga patrons interests, the patron-tribe relationship, Al-Qaidas strategy, and the short- and long-term struc-ture and the political and military functioning of tribalmilitias. In Model 1, the patron of a militia is an out-

side entity; in Model 2, the national government is thepatron (although an outside patron may provide an-cillary support). The intent of the analysis is to extractlessons learned from which to craft recommendationsfor the future that can facilitate the development ofeffective policies and techniques by U.S. policymakersfor optimal use of assets in dealing with Al-Qaida. Ofcourse, every country in the Middle East has a uniquehistory and society, with a specic tribal social struc-ture and role in the national political system, as wellas being subject to differences in the local geostrategicenvironment. The focus here is on Iraq and Yemen.However, many of the lessons learned may be appli-cable more broadly. Likewise, although the analysisrelies on data up to mid-2014 and future develop-

ments cannot be foreseen in detail, nevertheless thesegeneral lessons learned should remain valid.


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The focus is on dealing with insurgent groups in-spired by Al-Qaida, even if they are not always con-

trolled by the traditional Al-Qaida leadership. In thatcontext, a clarication may be in order for the termsidentifying these organizations as used here. In Iraq,the main jihadist organization has been through anumber of name changes since its appearance in thatcountry under the leadership of Abu Musab Al-Zarqa-wi in 2003 as the Monotheism and Jihad Group (JamaatAl-Tawhid wal-Jihad). The group was renamed Al-Qaida in Mesopotamia (Al-Qaida Bilad Al-Radayn)in 2004 when Al-Zarqawi adhered formally to UsamaBin Ladin as leader of Al-Qaida. In October 2006, theIslamic State of Iraq (Dawlat Al-Iraq Al-Islamiya, or ISI)was proclaimed, although still maintaining at leastnominal loyalty to Al-Qaidas central leadership.

In the wake of the Arab Spring, it was ISI that oper-

ated with delegated authority from Al-Qaida Central(by that time led by Ayman Al-Zawahiri), in Syria be-ginning in January 2012 through its creation, JabhatAl-Nusra. However, the announcement by Abu BakrAl-Husayni Al-Qurayshi Al-Baghdadi, head of ISI,on April 9, 2013, to the effect that he was establishinga joint Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya Al-Iraq wal-Shamor ISIS), revealed openlythe sharp differences over command relationships be-tween the two adjoining theaters and with Al-QaidaCentrals leadership.1Rejecting this initiative, Al-Za-wahiri disowned the ISIS. With the beginning of Ra-madan at the very end of June 2014, ISIS changed itsname once again when it proclaimed itself the IslamicState (Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya), calling itself the Rightly-

Guided Caliphate (Al-Khilafa Al-Rashida). Neverthe-less, despite Al-Zawahiris repudiation, Al-Baghdadihas continued to lay claim to Bin Ladins mantle of


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leadership, and it may be a moot point as to whichof the twoAl-Zawahiri or Al-Baghdadis organiza-

tionnow represents the Al-Qaida legacy.Clearly, thanks to its success on the ground, ISIS

has gained momentum and widespread recognitionwithin Al-Qaida jihadist circles, and many promi-nent Al-Qaida gures now support it over a moreisolated and contained Al-Zawahiri. Moreover, apartfrom Jabhat Al-Nusras own website, only one of thetraditional Al-Qaida websitesa key element in Al-Qaidas political outreach, legitimacy, and commandand control systemstill sides with Al-Zawahiri, asall the others by mid-2014 recognized and supportedISIS or, at best, remained silent on the split. In thatsense, ISIS is still Al-Qaida, whether Al-Zawahirirecognizes it as such or not. In this study, dependingon the time period in question, the terms Al-Qaida/ISI

are used when dealing with the earlier phase and ISISwhen dealing with the more recent phase, althoughfor practical purposes, the discussion is applicable tothe broader Al-Qaida phenomenon.

In Yemen, the organization Al-Qaida in the Arabi-an Peninsula (Al-Qaida Al-Jazira Al-Arabiya) had re-sulted from the 2009 merger of Al-Qaidas branches inSaudi Arabia and Yemen. Under that name, Al-Qaidahad already been battling against the Yemeni Armyfor several years by the time the Arab Spring brokeout in Sanaa in early-2011. As was the case elsewherein the Arab World, a new organizationthe Support-ers of the Law (Ansar Al-Sharia)also appeared inYemen although, even more clearly than elsewhere,there was in practice little substantive change, as the

Ansar Al-Sharia were essentially part of Al-Qaida us-ing a new name. In fact, very often it was impossibleeven for the Yemenis to differentiate between the two


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names. In this monograph, the generic name Al-Qaidawill be used for the organization in Yemen.

Three case studies will serve as the database andprovide the context needed to understand the role ofthe tribal militias and the other players. The rst casestudy deals with a Model 1 situation, where a foreignpatronthe United Statesacted in that role in Iraqfrom late-2006 through the December 2008-April 2009period when responsibility was handed over to theIraqi authorities. The second case study deals with atwo Model 2 situation, again with Iraq, but in a Phase II,after the national governments assumption of respon-sibility for the tribal militia in 2009. This case study isespecially useful for comparison with the earlier phase.The third case study deals with Yemen, where the localgovernment has acted as the militia patron since 2012.Of course, the Yemeni and the Iraqi situations are on-

going, with the potential for evolution, but the generallines of development as identied here should providesufcient information for an appreciation of the militiaexperience.2

Iraq and Yemen are both tribal societies, althoughin different ways. Since the retribalization of soci-ety for political reasons under Saddam Hussein in the1990s, tribes have become an increasingly signicantfactor in Iraqi society, and even 80 percent of the ur-ban population now is said to have a tribal allegiance.3In Yemen, tribes are perhaps the dominant politicalplayers in the country, and one can view even theYemeni government itself as tribally-based to a sig-nicant extent, relying on certain in-tribes, which isreected in the composition of the military, police, bu-

reaucracy, and funding for specic tribal regions. Iraqitribal society is further complicated by sectarian andethnic divisions between Sunni and Shia Arabs and


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Sunni and Shia Kurds. Yemeni tribes, too, are dividedbetween Sunni and various branches of the Shia.

Not surprisingly, the militias raised in both Iraqand Yemen to counter Al-Qaida have been essentiallytribally-based both in terms of organization and per-sonnel. To be sure, at times their name may not des-ignate them as being tribal, with the substitutionof a euphemism intended to suggest a more modernorganization rather than one based on a tribe, since atribal label may carry a stigma in international circlesor among local intellectuals. In Iraq, ofcially such mi-litias have been known as the Awakening (Sahwa, orthe plural Sahwat)as well as Sons of Iraq and othernames. However, the Iraqi media, in a nod to reality,at times also uses the term Tribal Sahwa (Al-SahwaAl-Ashairiya). In Yemen, the militias are most oftenknown as Popular Committees (Al-Lijan Al-Shabiya)

but here, again, the local media and participants arenot shy about using the term Tribal Committees(Al-Lijan Al-Qabaliya).

Tribal militias do not exist in a vacuum: a coun-trys tribal fabric, the character of a government, andAl-Qaidas overall relationship with the tribes providethe necessary background for understanding the trib-al militias functioning. In fact, the local government(or a foreign patron), the tribes, and Al-Qaida are allactive players with their own interests, objectives, andstrategies, and are forces that interact and seek to ma-nipulate the other actors, thus forming an unstable tri-angular relationship. In this respect, it is particularlyimportant to appreciate the vulnerabilities that Al-Qa-ida faces in dealing with tribes in general, vulnerabili-

ties that are an inherent dilemma for Al-Qaida, as thelatter is often caught between implementing its ideo-logical and political program and dealing with social


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realitiesand is a situation that is likely to generateconict, as will be seen in the succeeding case studies.

MODEL 1

The Iraqi ExperiencePhase I.

The tribal militias which emerged in Iraq in 2006illustrate the Model 1 version of tribal militias, with aforeign entity, the United States, as the patron.

Developing the Sahwa.

Overall, the establishment and development ofthe Sahwa tribal militias can be seen as the result ofa concurrence of interests in 2006 between a signi-cant number of Sunni tribes and a foreign patron, the

United States, which one could consider at the timethe effective governing authority in the eld in manyareas of Iraq. With an active insurgency putting Al-Qaida and a spectrum of other smaller groups againstthe U.S. presence, the security situationparticularlyin the countrys Sunni areashad reached a worri-some level that many found intractable. In order toengage in the jihad, Al-Qaida/ISI, of necessity, had tooperate in the Sunni tribal milieu, which offered themost likely potential foundation for its effort. At rst,Al-Qaida was able to make rapid inroads in the tribalcommunity in Iraq, feeding on resentment againstwhat was often viewed as an anti-Sunni and pro-ShiaU.S. occupation. It was not alone in that, as other anti-U.S. militant groups representing disfranchised tribal

elements, often linked to the proscribed Bath Partyor the dissolved Iraqi military, also contributed tothe insurgency.


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Arguably, at the same time, Al-Qaida created itsown unique critical vulnerabilities in Iraq by alienat-

ing the tribes and making them amenable to cooperat-ing with U.S. forces. While, to some extent, aspects ofAl-Qaidas policy were attributable to its ideologicalunderpinnings of the organization as a whole, a moreimportant factor was how the branch operating inIraq chose to implement such principles in a range ofpractical situations.

Under its then-leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, thelocal Al-Qaida clashed increasingly with tribal societyby seeking to impose a strict interpretation of Sharia,or religious law, bolstered by religious courts hand-ing down harsh sentences, in place of the traditional,more exible, tribal law. Among the consequencesof the enforcement of the Sharia were personal con-trols, such as banning music, shaving, and smoking,

and restricting the role of women in public, as wellas suppressing well-established elements of folk reli-gionsuch as invoking the intercession of saints orcelebrating Muhammads birthday (the mulid)andinterfering with marriage traditions. The high visibil-ity of foreigners among Al-Qaidas leadership in Iraq,and the shunting aside of local clerics, only served asan additional irritant among the tribesmen, who aretraditionally suspicious of outsiders. The violation ofsuch tribal cultural values was felt as an unpardon-able humiliation and, as one prominent shaykh, ortribal chief, put it, Al-Qaidas intent was to trample onthe tribes cherished values, that is to do away withsocial custom (urf ijtimai) . . . that was the real goal ofcutting off heads.4

Al-Qaida also insisted on a monopoly of controlin the insurgency, either edging out or attacking com-peting armed groups, as well as being in the habit of


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launching indiscriminate attacks that often resultedin numerous civilian casualties. And, Al-Qaida was

uncompromising: tribes had to choose sideseitherwith Al-Qaida or with the United States. Recalcitrantshaykhs were often assassinated.

However, it may have been, in particular, Al-Qai-das negative impact on the tribes economic interestswas decisive in estranging both the tribal leadershipand ordinary tribesmen. Al-Qaidas violence in Al-Anbar and its growing control over the local societycrippled the local economy and made U.S. projects un-likely given the lack of security, thereby undercuttingthe tribal shaykhs inuence as they could no longerbroker economic benets for their tribes. Al-Qaida alsocompeted at times for control over the lucrative traderoads, a traditional source of some tribes income. Inthe key case of Shaykh Abd Al-Sattar Abu Risha, who

eventually became the most prominent U.S. ally in Al-Anbar province, a struggle with Al-Qaida for controlof the main supply route from Amman to Baghdadpitted Al-Qaida against his tribe. Traditionally, AbuRisha's tribe had supplied most of regions truck driv-ers and may well have raided trafc and extortedtolls. During this struggle with Al-Qaida, prominentmembers of his family were killed.5 It was this turnof events that induced Abd Al-Sattar to return fromJordan in 2006 and to approach the United States tojoin the ght against Al-Qaida.

Nevertheless, alone, the tribesor the insurgentgroups that were often intertwined with the tribesrealistically had been no match for Al-Qaidas orga-nization, zeal, and ability to mass mobile forces from

multiple locations against isolated tribes. Many tribeswere reluctant to confront Al-Qaida, even as increas-ing numbers of their fellow-tribesmen joined the latter,


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because of its supposed dominance. Only graduallydid the escalating disenchantment among tribesmen,

accompanied by the increasing realization that co-operation might be possible with U.S. forces, changethe environment.

U.S. policy had also evolved. At rst, the UnitedStates was indifferent or hostile to the Sunni tribes.Because they were often tied to Saddams powerstructure and were seen as part of a negative past,American leaders were reluctant to take advantage ofa hospitable tribal terrain. Initially, as a former U.S.military intelligence ofcer noted to a reporter:

[W]e couldnt get the CPA [Coalition ProvisionalAuthority] to move . . . The standard answer we gotfrom [CPA Head L. Paul] Bremers people was thatthe tribes were a vestige of the past, that they have noplace in the new democratic Iraq.6

By late-2005, U.S. forces on the ground were be-coming more supportive of those tribes already inconict with Al-Qaida. At that time, elements of whatlater coalesced into a general U.S. policy had alreadyproved successful when they were attempted on a lo-calized scale. For example, in 2005, one Army ofcer

made an agreement with a local shaykh in return forconstruction projects and within a few weeks, Whathad once been the most dangerous area in my zonebecame one of the safest.7

However, a strategic policy change from the Amer-ican side emerged only in late-2006. At that time theunfavorable facts on the ground catalyzed a U.S. policyreview leading to a revision in the counterinsurgency

approach.8 The key element of this revised approachwas a greater willingness to partner with the Sunnitribes. These partnerships began initially in Al-Anbar


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and subsequently also in other Sunni areas, leading tothe formation of a formal alliance in September 2006

between U.S. forces and a newly-established tribalorganizationthe Sahwa.

The Patron-Client Relationship.

To make the Sahwa a reality, the United States pro-vided a range of tangible rewards that beneted boththe shaykhs and ordinary tribesmen. These rewardsincluded clothing, food, and public services. Whatwas perhaps key were contracts to build or refurbishmilitary facilities, pumping stations, roads, schools,clinics, and utility services, thanks to which, as oneshaykh noted, We were able to put our people towork.9 Salaries for tribesmen serving in the Sahwawere an especially important inducement. According

to one prominent shaykh, in just one section of Bagh-dad, the United States was supposedly paying $52million a month on salaries to the Sahwa.10 Equallyimportant was the generous U.S. military assistanceto the Sahwaas well as to the local policein theform of arms, ammunition, body armor, fuel, equip-ment, training, vehicles, and salaries for cooperatingshaykhs, allowing the latter to eld an organized,more or less full-time, military force under their con-trol.11The shaykhs could now claim credit for havinglifted the burden of Al-Qaidas oppressive presencefrom their fellow-tribesmen. At the same time, thanksto the relationship with the United States, shaykhscould strengthen their control over subordinates andclients in their tribes through the power of patronage

and prestige. In fact, the United States, as a matter ofpolicy, would seek to strengthen the power of coop-erative shaykhs by providing contracts to the latter or,as one senior U.S. military ofcer was to note:


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All of it [i.e., money] we funneled through the sheikhs.

. . . We empowered the sheikhs because there reallywasnt a government functioning. . . . And we did allwe could to empower the sheikhs.12

Especially crucial as an enabling factor was thepersonal security that U.S. forces now provided toimportant individual shaykhs, which addressed akey vulnerability that Al-Qaida had been able to tar-

get up to then. Earlier, by simply eliminating selectedshaykhs, Al-Qaida had been generally successful innipping tribal resistance movements in the bud. Now,on the contrary, U.S. forces, for example, even sat out-side the Abu Risha compound and residence for al-most a year.13While not fool-proof, the new personalsecurity regime afforded sufcient protection to con-vince shaykhs they could challenge Al-Qaida.

For the tribal shaykhs, the United States was theideal government, as it was a governing author-ity whose interest was primarily in security (and onecould argue that even the promotion of developmentand providing services were tied to that primal in-terest) and which had little interest in interfering intribal affairs or in asking too many questions about a

shaykhs economic dealings. There was limited over-sight into how the shaykhs spent the money whichowed from the United States. As a senior U.S. mili-tary ofcer operating in Al-Anbar noted:

[T]heres a risk, because youre going to give him[i.e., a shaykh] money, and youre not sure where themoneys going to go, because its difcult for you to

get into that area, because of security, to ensure theprojects are being taken care of.14


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Tribal forces joined the Sahwa in large numbers,and initiatives followed to replicate the Al-Anbar

experience elsewhere. In some provinces, the Sahwawas set up considerably later, as in the case of Diyala,where it took until October 2008 to do so formally.Nevertheless, already by March 2008, the Sahwa na-tionwide numbered 91,000 personnel.

The Renewed War against Al-Qaida.

The establishment of the Sahwaas the embodi-ment of the changed relationship with the tribeswasa key element in the turnaround of the situation withAl-Qaida, as it generated the large standing forces fa-miliar with the local situation that could challenge Al-Qaida, at least with U.S. combat support. Conversely,recruiting the Sahwa also removed a signicant por-

tion of the active or potential personnel pool involvedin the insurgency when they switched sides. In par-ticular, the switching of allegiance by a shaykh couldhave signicant inuence on the security of an area.As Army Colonel Sean MacFarland noted of the situa-tion in Al-Anbar, Once a tribal leader ips, attacks onAmerican forces in that area stop almost overnight.15

Of course, elded U.S. military forces were alsocrucial to operational success against Al-Qaida, pro-viding vital capabilities that the Sahwa could not. Asa necessary complementary effort, U.S. forces (andIraqi forces under U.S. guidance) could, and did, en-gage Al-Qaida in signicant conventional operations,while also providing air and ground-based res, forceprotection, intelligence, planning, logistics, and infor-

mation operations in support of the Sahwa effort.16Es-sentially, by providing combat support and personalsecurity, U.S. forces made the area safe, providing the


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shield which enabled the Sahwa to wield its swordagainst Al-Qaida at the level where it could make a

unique contribution.U.S. strategy took advantage of the Sahwas

strengths: their knowledge of the local physical andhuman terrain; their ability to identify and isolate sus-pected Al-Qaida members (whether outsiders or fel-low-tribesmen); the presence of ready-made tribally-based cohesion; collective responsibility (despite riftsin ideological loyalties even within families); and thepermanence which made possible continuous controlof an area, taking away Al-Qaidas mobility and ini-tiative, so that it became very difcult for the latter tooperate without at least a tribes indifference. Equallyimportant was the Sahwas ability to nd Al-Qaidaarms caches, the loss of which limited Al-Qaidas abil-ity to move at an operational level.

Sahwa operations against Al-Qaida often took theform of struggles within individual tribes, pitting proand anti-Al-Qaida tribesmen against each other, as Al-Qaida had also recruited from within the tribes. In fact,a local Sahwa commander noted that most of thosewe arrest or kill are from our own tribe.17Pitched bat-tles were rare, though there were some erce armedengagements between Sahwa forces, often supportedby U.S. combat forces, and Al-Qaida. More frequently,however, the dismantling of Al-Qaidas structure tookthe form of identifying and isolating operatives withina tribea task which only their tribe was capable ofdoingand informing the authorities, turning themover, or eliminating them directly. As part of theanti-Al-Qaida ght, according to one shaykh, he had

personally reported to the authorities 130 members ofAl-Qaida from within his tribe, including an Al-Qaidadeputy commander and a minister in Al-Qaidas ISI,


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in Iraq, producing a comprehensive policy review inlate-2009/early-2010.25 So impressed was Al-Qaida

with the Sahwa that the document proposed to itsafliate in Iraq a counter-Sahwa, however unrealisti-cally, urging: We call on the Islamic State of Iraq to estab-lish jihadi Sahwa Councils.26(emphasis in the original).Rather than railing against tribal loyalties as had ear-lier been the case, Al-Qaida now saw local tribal forceswho were protecting their homes and their folkbutnot necessarily commited to Al-Qaidas beliefsastheir best hope for control of an area. They saw thatthese tribal units draw their power from their localenvironment, since they represent everyone in the areawhich they are defending and protecting.27Althoughmodeled on the Sahwa, in Al-Qaidas case, these unitswere to have a jihadist orientation.

Al-Qaidas intelligence chief, likewise, drafted a

paper in April 2012 dealing specically with the Sah-wa. He acknowledged that the Sahwa in Iraq clearlyhad an impact on the jihadist movement and that theSahwa in general is a new phenomenon for the fol-lowers of the jihadist movement, one with which theyhad not been accustomed to dealing.28Both analysescontained doctrinal guidelines for the future focusedlargely on dealing with the population with a greaterdegree of exibility and realism in order not to alien-ate potential tribal supporters into being receptive toa Sahwa in any theater.

The Case of Iraq: Phase II.

Barring a foreign patrons unlikely intent to re-

main on the ground indenitely or the eradication ofAl-Qaida, inherent in a Model 1 tribal militia, is aninevitable Model 2, in which the local government


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now plays the role of patron, as was the case with theSahwa in Iraq. As part of the phased handover of re-

sponsibility for the Sahwa from U.S. forces over theDecember 2008-April 2009 period, the identity of thegoverning authority changed for the Sahwa from theUnited States to that of a local playerthe Iraqi gov-ernment, with signicant implications for the Sahwasrole and for the security situation in the country.

The Sahwa and the Iraqi Government:A Rocky Relationship Benets Al-Qaida.

A Clash of Political Cultures: Centralization vs.Decentralization. The tribes quest for power andautonomy, supported by their ready-made Sahwaarmed muscle, was bound to make any partnershipwith the Iraqi state an uneasy one at best, and even

more so because of sectarian friction between thetribes in the Sunni areas and the predominantly Shia-based central government and military. Realistically,given the countrys political culture, any Iraqi state ispredisposed to centralize power and would look at aphenomenon such as the Sahwaor at the factor ofassertive tribes which lay behind the Sahwa militiawith concern as an active or potential threat. This re-lationship would have been difcult even without thepresence of Al-Qaida, and the result has been an op-erational environment that is more favorable for Al-Qaida by engendering potential critical vulnerabilitieswhich the latter could exploit.

The Iraqi government was never comfortablewith how the Sahwa had been established and how

it functioned independently with the United States,thereby sowing the seeds of mistrust from the start. AShia journalist, perhaps reecting government views,


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expressed his misgivings about the Sahwa early. Hedrew attention to the fact that the Sahwas creation

had bypassed the nascent Iraqi government in anextralegal move and that arming Sunni tribes wouldweaken the government in the long run.29A press re-port, citing unnamed sources close to the Iraqi gov-ernment, had called President George Bushs visit tothe Sahwa leader Shaykh Abd Al-Sattar Abu Rishain September 2007 a not very friendly signal, whichcontradicted protocol and embarrassed the politicianswho were brought in after midnight to meet with theU.S. President in the strongholds of the tribal mili-tias.30 The Iraqi government was reportedly angrythat the U.S. Government had not even informed itwhen an invitation had been extended to the AnbarSahwa leaders for a visit to the White House in 2007,as the Iraqi Prime Ministers adviser for tribal affairs,

Karim Bakhati, noted in a thinly veiled rebuke thatone would have thought that [the invitation] wouldhave been sent through the Iraqi government, andconcluded that sending invitations in this mannerbypasses the authority of the central government.31

The Sahwa expected to be treated as an equal play-er, alongside the government and the U.S. forces for,as a leading shaykh in Al-Anbar stressed, We are notgovernment employees.32 At times, Prime MinisterNuri Al-Maliki was interested in developing ties withthe Sunni tribes, as was the case before the March 2010elections. That proved difcult, however, as shaykhsin one meeting with his representative expressedskepticism about his intentions. The fact that the meet-ing was also attended by U.S. military ofcers ensured

some civility, but the government representatives as-sertion that The Sahwa was imposed on us becauseof the security situation and his rhetorical question,


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Does the Sahwa have any legal standing? high-lighted the lack of mutual trust.33Mistrust continued

to set the tone for the governments handling of theSahwa. When the author asked a senior Iraqi militaryofcer in 2012 about the current state of the Sahwa,he replied We didnt want them, and expressed re-sentment, saying that they were a drain on the Armysbudget you force us to pay [them]and insistedthat the Sahwa personnel could not be absorbed intothe military.34

(Mis)Managing the Sahwa and the Sunni Tribes.To make matters worse, the Iraqi government mis-managed its dealings with the Sahwa and with theSunni tribes in general after the U.S. handover. It triedto marginalize the Sahwa, thereby alienating manyshaykhs and tribesmen and helping to create a morefavorable operational environment for Al-Qaida. The

result was a reduction of the Sahwas force structureand a degradation of its capabilities.

Interruptions and irritations connected withpay (now handled by the Army) alienated ghtersthroughout the system and made them more recep-tive to blandishments by Al-Qaida. In some cases, asin Diyala, pay to 4,500 Sahwa ghters was interruptedfor more than a year.35 Some Sahwa ghters simplywalked off the job to protest late pay, such as thosewho abandoned their checkpoints in Diyala.36Pay is-sues at times became so exasperating that Sahwa per-sonnel in Baghdad threatened to rejoin Al-Qaida ifthe situation did not improve.37A former Sahwa com-mander from Ramadi complained that:

What has been offered to the ghters in Al-Anbar upto the present has been paltry in comparison to thesacrices they have made. Those who were wounded


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or even permanently disabled ghting Al-Qaida donot have medical care.

He taxed government promises made in public aselectoral propaganda and pointed to the very lowpay of 120,000 dinars ($102) per month for Sahwa per-sonnel, categorizing that as sad.38Insufcient fund-ing also affected operational readiness, as the com-mander of the Sahwa in Samarra complained in 2010that Ever since the transfer of responsibility to the

Iraqi government, we have been suffering from a lackof support. . . . We are now obliged to buy our ownweapons and ammunition.39

Allegations of government harassment, rangingfrom gratuitous harassment and humiliation on payday to widespread arrests of prominent tribal shaykhsfor crimes allegedly committed during the ghting

against Al-Qaida, also generated anxiety and dis-satisfaction among Sahwa personnel and within theSunni tribes in general.40 In Salah Al-Din province,Sahwa members accused the central security forces ofstopping them routinely and accusing them of havingbelonged to Al-Qaida in the past.41 Rumors of moreforthcoming outstanding warrants for past activitieswhen many Sahwa personnel had been part of the in-

surgencyprompted hundreds of Sahwa ghters inDiyala province to abandon their posts, with one localSahwa commander concluding that such unfoundedarrests were just being used as a weapon to eliminatethe Sahwa.42

Another source of considerable resentment withinthe Sahwa and the Sunni tribes has been a perception

that the government was not doing enoughor evencaredabout the security of Sahwa personnel andtheir families. Al-Qaida, for its part, made the elimi-


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nation of Sahwa commanders a priority. The govern-ments decision to end the salaries of the Sahwa lead-

ers bodyguards in 2010 was a very risky move, as itincreased the shaykhs already high vulnerability toassassination attempts as the threats from Al-Qaidaincreased, thereby putting the entire Sahwa struc-ture in jeopardy. The government relented only withreluctance, in an effort to retain the loyalty of triballeaders, but agreed only to a palliative solution: theyincreased the shaykhs salaries and paid for just threebodyguards for each Sahwa commander.43

Mishandling the Demobilization and Integrationof the Sahwa. The government was especially warythat the Sahwa not become a parallel Sunni armedforce, but the clumsy demobilization effort only fur-ther fueled discontent within the tribes. As part ofthe handover, Al-Maliki had expressed his concern

at a press conference that the government needed toensure it had a monopoly over armed force and an-nounced it would limit Sahwa powers of arrest, whileexpressing the need to close out the Sahwa le.44In contrast, Iraqs tribal leaders expected to continueplaying a signicant political role, believing theyrepresent a dominant sector of society. The Sahwasrepresentative, Shaykh Thamir Al-Tamimi, positedthat the Sahwa should be maintained as long as therewas a security threat in the country, including fromShia and Kurdish militiasin effect, putting off theSahwas disbandment into the distant future.45 Thegovernments announced intention to disarm theSahwa ghters and to limit gun permits was also un-settling, especially in light of the integral gun culture

of tribal life. As one Sahwa leader, Shaykh Ali Hatim,noted deantly:


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We will not hand over our weapons . . . why shouldwe hand them over? Is that not part of my worldview,just like I have my religion so also I have my weapons.That is, I believe that weapons are a part of who I am.46

Clearly, the Shia-based military and security forcesdid not favor absorbing Sunnis from the Sahwa. Soondisagreements surfaced as to what had been agreed,with the government spokesman reiterating that ithad approved the integration of only 20 percent of

the Sahwa ghters into the security services, while theSahwas advisor was adamant that the governmenthad agreed to absorb all Sahwa ghters who met therequirements, while those who did not would be giv-en government jobs elsewhere.47Government spokes-men, in veiled warnings, continued to emphasize thatthe Sahwa was set up without the governments ap-proval and that it could, if it desired, suppress theSahwa account without fear, even if it had not doneso up to now.48

Those Sahwa members who were integrated intothe government sector were often dissatised withtheir experience. Members of the Sahwa preferredsecurity jobs rather than those in the civil side of thegovernment, which usually paid less.49 As one for-

mer Sahwa ghter complained, despite having facedgreat dangers in the ght against Al-Qaida, we aresurprised by . . . the jobs [we received], which are notappropriate to our dignity and our capabilities . . .such as in the sanitation or agricultural componentsof the state sector.50Other jobs were also temporaryat best and, reportedly, the civilian government sec-tor even discharged many Sahwa ghters it had hiredoriginally, citing their lack of qualications.51


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Sahwa forces became progressively depleted, notonly by partial integration into the government sector

but also by outright release and the voluntary depar-ture of disillusioned ghters. From a peak of 118,000Sahwa personnel in April 2009 (although there mayalso have been additional unofcial ghters), by Oc-tober 2010 only some 52,000 ghters remained on theofcial rolls.52Eventually, the Sahwa was allowed towither away in all but name due to government ne-glect, with a reported 30,000 members by early 2013,although the actual number of those present for dutyand demoralized and resentful ghters at thatwasprobably even considerably lower.53

Al-Qaidas Rebuilding Effort.

As noted earlier, Al-Qaidas reassessment in the

wake of defeat led it to modify, at least in part, its poli-cies to remove some of the irritants that had turnedthe Sunni tribes against it and had enabled the Sahwa.As part of a new carrot-and-stick policy, Al-Qaidacontinued to attack Sahwa commanders, while it re-duced its direct economic competition with the triballeaders. Al-Qaida shifted its revenue collection fromtrying to control convoys through tribal territory tocollecting from urban end-point merchants. Al-Qaidaalso began accepting neutral tribes, reduced leader-ship roles for foreign jihadists, and placed less focuson enforcing strict Sharia. Finally they expressed anintent to avoid civilian casualties, and showed greaterwillingness to work within the tribal hierarchy insteadof seeking to overturn it.

These efforts combined with the Iraqi govern-ments hostility and neglect toward the tribes andthe Sahwa gradually allowed Al-Qaida to regain itsformer inuence in the tribal areas. In particular, Al-


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Qaida had an opportunity to draw away disillusionedSahwa ghters by offering material incentives, and

one Sahwa commander in Bayji warned that Al-Qaida is spending large sums of money in order toattract back Sahwa members.54 In the northern partof the Baghdad region and in Diyala, some 15 percentof the Sahwa ghters were said to have reverted to ISIby late 2010.55One Sahwa commander urged the gov-ernment to rehire the Sahwa veterans who had beendismissed, with the specic purpose of preventing ISIfrom recruiting them again.56

Thanks to the mounting hostility against the gov-ernment, ISI penetrated some Sahwa units, especiallyas many former ISI members had joined the Sahwaas a refuge after the U.S. victories. In the Abu Ghraibarea, so great was the ofcial mistrust of the Sahwathat the security forces refused to share intelligence

with the local Sahwa.57

In Diyala, some ghters serv-ing in the Sahwa simply stopped cooperating withthe authorities; according to the provinces securityforces commander, They are not telling us if Al Qa-eda is in the area. They are not warning us . . . A lotof them are denitely helping the insurgents.58In atleast some instances, even before the U.S. withdrawal,the local Sahwa might cooperate with U.S. forces dur-ing the daytime, but then there would still be gunreand rockets directed at U.S. bases at night, indicat-ing that the Sahwa at the very least was not alwaysreacting forcefully to the ISI presence, if not actuallycooperating with the latter, as a way of hedging itsbets.59 Over time, Al-Qaida was able to rebuild itspresence in many Sunni areas, reestablishing camps,

continuing its harassment attacks against recalcitrantSahwa commanders and mounting small-scale opera-tionsand the occasional spectacular oneagainstgovernment targets.


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Tribal Revolt, the ISIS Onslaught,and Rehabilitating the Sahwa.

By 2010, general dissatisfaction had mounted inthe wake of the continuing deterioration of the eco-nomic situation and the growing resentment in theSunni areas thanks to government neglect and politi-cal marginalization. Even an individual in Al-Ramadiwho had suffered earlier at the hands of Al-Qaidanow complained. His comments reect a general dis-gruntlement with the status quo:

Everything has turned sour for us now. There are noservices; we dont have jobs; poverty is killing us.What are they waiting for? Do they want us to begin the streets so that we can live? Is that what theyrewaiting for?

And, he warned, By God, if there is no change bloodwill ow ankle-deep and violence and killing will re-turn once again to this province.60

The excessive use of force in a government crack-down against protesters in Al-Anbar in December2013 catalyzed an open rebellion by many of the Sun-ni tribes, whose ghters soon named themselves the

tribal insurgents. Although violence increased inmost Sunni areas, the epicenter of the dissidence wasin Al-Anbar province.

Sunnioften Bathist-based or nationalist-reli-giousinsurgent groups reemerged. More impor-tantly, the recently-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraqand Syria (ISIS), as the continuation of Al-Qaida inIraqbut now, as noted earlier, a dissident offshoot

from the traditional central Al-Qaida leadershipalsoexploited the situation to make a spectacular come-back. Although the Sahwa may have been willing to


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oppose ISISeven if not out of love for the govern-mentsome tribes now saw also ISIS as a useful, if

distasteful, ally against an even more distasteful cen-tral government, while still other tribes remainedneutral.61The government even accused some in theSahwa, such as in Babil, of being passive spectatorscollecting salaries.62 ISIS, for its part, tried to detertribesmen from participating in the Sahwa by de-capitating or hanging the Sahwa ghters it captured,They also took reprisals against the families of Sahwacommanders. Many Sunnis, in fact, have continued tosee ISIS as a counterweight to a hostile governmentor to Shia militias (or even to Kurdish forces in cer-tain areas), a factor that ISIS has stressed, thus makingthe Arab tribes more willing to cooperate with ISIS.63(See Figure 1.)

Beneting from the combat experience and equip-

ment acquired ghting against the Asad regime inneighboring Syria, ISIS (known in the local sources byits Arabic acronym DAISH) was able to transfer someforces from the latter and to take advantage of Sunnidiscontent with the central government and of theIraqi Armys critical vulnerabilities. In the campaignthat unfolded, ISIS was able rapidly to take many ofthe towns in Al-Anbar as well as in other provincesand, in the process, to cause signicant casualties andembarrassing defeats to the countrys security forces.

As the security situation worsened, a beleagueredgovernment hurriedly tried to reconstitute the de-pleted Sahwa, relying on Al-Anbars fragmentedsystem of tribal rivalries to nd support against ISISeven if only among part of the population. Baghdad

quadrupled Sahwa salaries to $430 a month for ght-ers in May 2013 and, the following month, allocated$130 million to nance the Sahwa through the rest ofthe year.64


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Note: Figure 1 denotes an ISIS cartoon reminding Iraqis theyneed it (ISIS) for protection against the government. Local resi-dent earlier telling ISI ghter to leave, but later regretting thatnow the area was at the mercy of the Iraqi government. Frame 1:All of you leave our hamlet. Its our hamlet and we will defendit. Frame 2: Help! The mujahidin have left and are allowing thegovernment to butcher us!

Source: Al-Minbar Al-Ilami Al-Jihadi Al-Qaida website, January2014.

Figure 1. ISIS Cartoon.


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In a 2013 recruitment campaign 10,000 new person-nel, eventually rising to 16,000, were added to the Sah-

wa rolls.65

The government also began to provide helpwith organization, logistics, equipment, and arms.66Some tribes, however, continued to hedge their bets,with their ghters working in the Sahwa during thedaytime and with the insurgents at night.67

However, no doubt concerned about creating afuture threat, the government remained reluctant toestablish Sahwa maneuver units, despite requestsfor that, preferring the Sahwa to continue operatingas small groups.68 In an effort to try to consolidatecommand and control, and playing on tribal andpersonal rivalries, the government engineered the re-placement in February 2013 of long-time Sahwa com-mander Ahmad Abu Risha by Wisam Al-Hardan, atribal shaykh with fewer connections in the Gulf, who

was seen as more cooperative with the government.By early-2014, the security situation had deterioratedfurther, and the government felt it necessary to in-crease the inducements to the Sahwa, promising $1billion for reconstruction in Al-Anbar (although someestimates placed the amount of damage in Al-Anbarat $20 billion by May 2014), the future absorption of10,000 Sahwa personnel into the security forces, andincreased operational support in the form of air powerand artillery.69

However, in the new operational and politicalenvironment, the Sahwas success is less likely thanwhen the Americans had been in charge. Currently,the Sahwa is no match in the eld for the reener-gized Al-Qaida with its recently-developed combat

capabilities.Relying on advanced weaponry (seized from Syr-

ian Army arsenals or funneled to the anti-Asad rebels


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by foreign countries) and combat experience gained inSyria, in both urban terrain and conventional opera-

tions, they have developed effective maneuver unitsthat use both mobility and surprise. These units op-erations are backed by solid intelligence, well-devel-oped psychological operations skills, solid plans tar-geting the adversarys weak points, exible logistics,and even combat engineers. Thanks to these strengths,ISIS forces have continually out maneuvered and out-fought the Iraqi Army.

The Iraqi Armyplagued by faulty planning,lackluster and corrupt leaders, inadequate training,poor intelligence, neglect of the troops basic needs,and inexperience in urban combatwas hard-pressedsurvive, much less to cooperate effectively with theSahwa in meeting the ISIS challenge. Often, the Armywas unable to seize and hold terrain, and usually re-

sorted to inaccurate shelling and airstrikes along withother heavy-handed behavior that caused civilian ca-sualties and damage that served as a further cause forSunni discontent.70Some critics contended that someArmy commanders were still reluctant to operate withthe Sahwa due to sectarian bias, while Baghdads of-cials in Al-Anbar in late 2013 had actually opposedexpanding the Sahwa.71

Army casualties mounted, which some uncon-rmed Iraqi security reports placed at over 6,000 deadand wounded by May 2014, out of 28,000 engaged incombat.72 By then, Sahwa commanders could onlytravel to Baghdad by air due to the insecure roads.Morale was becoming a signicant problem, leadingto desertions, with an Iraqi security source reporting

a 30 percent failure to return to the front after homeleave, requiring replacements to be deployed fromother parts of the country.73 By mid-June 2014, the


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Army in many areas had literally disintegrated in theface of a far smaller enemy, abandoning its equipment

and eeing, evenas in the case of Mosulbefore ISISattacked. Over 500 senior Army ofcers were said tohave ed to neighboring Kurdish territory dressed incivilian clothes.74 Notwithstanding continuing rosysituation reports from the government as well as theArmy calling the retreat from Al-Anbar only a tac-tical withdrawal, it was hard to argue that a smallISIS contingent had routed a much larger Army forceand that it had seized sizeable swathes of territory,including many cities. In their advance, ISIS also ac-quired additional weapons (including the arsenal ofthe disintegrated 3rd Division), money seized frombanks, and freed detained jihadis. They also soughtto establish control over dams and water supplies aswell as oil facilities, in order to exercise greater power

over the tribal areas in addition to an advantage onthe battleeld.

Assessing Iraqs Phase II.

Iraqs Phase II, with the Baghdad governmentin control of the Sahwa, highlighted some enduringproblems with the Sahwa model. Clearly, the han-dling of the Sahwa was far less effective that when theUnited States had been the Sahwas patron. In generalterms, Baghdad paid the price of neglecting the Sahwaagainst a background of alienating the parent tribes,something that could not be undone quickly or eas-ily. On the one hand, the political interestsexacer-bated by sectarian differencesof the Sahwa and of

Baghdad, as the countrys national government, werebound to clash in a way that was not the case with theUnited States, which operated on a short-term hori-


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zon and did not feel threatened by the autonomy andsectarianism of the Sahwa and its parent tribes.

In operational terms, the Sahwa was often mis-used. Lacking numbers (and no doubt reluctant totake heavy casualties), the Army at one point was con-sidering sending in the Sahwa and police to retake Al-Falluja, although they were likely to be outmatchedby a defending veteran Al-Qaida force.75 Such mili-tias cannot be considered a stand-alone maneuverelement. Lacking as they do the necessary trainingand weaponry, they would likely be outgunned andoutperformed by a procient combat force such asAl-Qaida had become. The Sahwa is most effective insmall-scale anti-guerrilla engagements and as a secu-rity force for consolidation operations. The Sahwa op-erates optimally with a regular force that can provideit with effective support in functions such as res, lo-

gistics, command and control, and mobility, supportwhich the Iraqi Army only slowly acknowledged asdesirable but became unable to provide.

Nevertheless, even as late as mid-2014, the condi-tions that had provided the favorable background forthe United States to develop the Sahwa were still inevidence. In its rapid advance with relatively smallforces, ISIS had not consolidated its control over ter-ritory, often bypassing areas of secondary importanceor those where tribes put up a stiff resistance. Also,as earlier, ISIS has been in an uneasy coalition withBathist ex-ofcers, tribal insurgents, national-religiousand moderate jihadistsallies who had joined recent-ly as ISISs success became apparent and, as before,friction soon arose among these disparate groups.

Moreover, ISIS was still bent on imposing strict reli-gious law (including banning soccer, burning downbeauty salons, and enforcing modest clothing), as


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well as demolishing saints shrines, pressuring localwomen into marriage, and executing perceived oppo-

nents.76

As late as June 2014, prominent Sunni tribalshaykhs and mainstream clerics expressed a willing-ness to work with the government against ISIS pro-vided Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki stepped down.77Resistance to ISIS by tribal forces, often raised on localinitiative, continued in cooperation with the remnantsof security forces in the eld in mid-2014.78ISIS itselfcontinues to view the Sahwa as a threat and has cre-ated special anti-Sahwa units, the Sahwa Hunters.(See Figure 2.)

Source: An ISIS anti-Sahwa unit in Iraqs Kirkuk province, May2014, available from Al-Minbar Al-Ilami Al-Jihadi, an Al-Qaidawebsite.

Figure 2. The Sahwa Hunters.

Although the possibility of mobilizing tribal mi-litias continued to exist, the government appeared


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unwilling to adopt that option. Sunni tribal militiaspersisted in requesting arms, nancial, logistic, and

operational support from the government, into mid-2014, but little was forthcoming.79Tribal militiamen inAl-Anbar, for example, complained in late June-2014that they received no guidance or weapons or othersupport from the Army, which they accused of with-drawing and abandoning them to face ISIS alone.80

When the government did encourage new tribalmilitias, as the ISIS threat approached the Shia heart-land, the focus was mainly among the Shia tribes incentral and southern Iraq, with a smattering of Sunnitribes in mixed areas. While some Shia militias contin-ued to be organized within party and religious broth-erhood structures, the Shia response was now alongtribal lines. It is claimed that 250,000 have volunteeredfor service, especially after the senior Shia cleric,

Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, issued a fatwa in June2014 designating such service as a religious duty.81Each tribe established a volunteer recruitment center,while in Baghdad, tribal meeting houses served asmustering centers for the new militiamen coming fromoutside the capital.82The outpouring of Shia support,and the Shia Sahwas promises that it would operatein and retake largely-Sunni areas such as Mosul andSalah Al-Din province, along with Prime Minister Al-Malikis declarations that he would liberate Al-Anbar,no doubt only alienated many Sunnis further.

Conversely, with increased government depen-dence on tribal ghters in the Shia community, de-mands for enhanced political power quickly alsoemerged among the newly-established Shia Sahwa.

In turn, the tribal Sahwa in the Basra area demandedthe creation of a stand-alone ministry for a NationalGuard, which may make Prime Minister Al-Maliki


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uncomfortable.83Moreover, government talk of incor-porating the new volunteers into the Armyalbeit as

distinct unitswas met within the Army with littleenthusiasm, as it assessed the often over-age, out-of-shape, and untrained manpower pool as unsuitablefor conventional military operations.84

As of mid-2014, although the situation remaineduid, Baghdad indicated that the government wouldno longer prioritize building a more effective relation-ship with the Sunni community or the Sunni Sahwa.They believed these efforts would entail a signicantrestructuring of the current Iraqi political system and adevolution of some powers from the center to the par-ent Sunni tribal areas. While Prime Minister Al-Malikicould try to reverse the major defeats suffered on theground with a renewed military effort buttressedby the help of foreign advice and support, it is more

likely that he may decide to focus instead on the Shiacore areas, which contain both the bulk of Iraqs oil re-serves and the only outlet to the sea, and which wouldenable him to consolidate his own power, rather thanworking to secure all or parts of majority-Sunni areasto the north of Baghdad for strategic reasons.85Evenin case of the countrys de facto partition, signicantinstability and conict are likely to persist for years,especially with no clearly dened borders and manymixed and disputed areas. This is even more likelybecause ISIS has become overcondent, imbued withvictory fever pursuing maximalist goals. However,even if, as seems likely, the Baghdad government hassquandered its opportunity to work with a Sunni tribalmilitia movement to counter the ISIS, that failure does

not invalidate the potential utility and even necessityof developing and using such a capability in dealingwith Al-Qaida and its offshoots.


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MODEL 2

The Case of Yemen.

Al-Qaida and the Arab Spring in Yemen.

The tribal militias that emerged in Yemen in thewake of the Arab Spring represent a Model 2 situation.That is, these militias have been the product of localinitiative from the very rst, with the Yemeni govern-ment acting as the managing patron of the militias es-tablished to ght Al-Qaida. These militias have beende factotribally-based militias, recruited and deployedas tribal units, and used most often (although not ex-clusively) on their own tribal territory.

The Arab Spring in Yemen, more so than in other

countries, was not so much a protest movement in fa-vor of reform but, more a struggle for power betweenthe ruling regime and competing forces that were of-ten similar in outlook but differed in their tribal, re-gional, or religious afliation, and were buttressed bypersonal ambitions. In relation to Al-Qaida, the ArabSpring set in motion events that eventually led to thedownfall of the countrys long-standing ruler, Presi-dent Ali Abd Allah Salih. This was accompanied bythe disruption of the establishedif ricketydomes-tic balance of forces.

In Yemen, up to the beginning of the Arab Spring,Al-Qaida had engaged mostly in a low-level guerillawar using the typical insurgent tactic of hit-and-runattacks. By late-spring 2011, the advent of the Arab

Spring, along with a concurrent challenge from theShia Houthi rebel movement in the north, had a para-lyzing effect on Yemens government and military.


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These circumstances apparently induced Al-Qaida tocalculate that the time had come to escalate its opera-

tional goals and change its objective to one of settingup a state. As even a low-level Al-Qaida operative sawit, We beneted from these revolutions. They gave usmaneuver space. We were able to come out. . . . Wewere able to tell people about our mission.86

Al-Qaida now escalated its activities and began tocarry out increasingly large-scale operations, leadingat times to engagements involving large units, andoften embarrassing the Yemeni Army and inictingheavy casualties. In particular, Al-Qaida decided toconcentrate its effort on where it could bring its great-est power to bear, namely in the Sunni tribal areas ofthe southern part of the country, where it had alreadybeen operating with mixed results and where therewas an inherent mistrust of and sense of neglect at

the hands of the government. For example, in Abyanprovince, the focus of its expanded activity, Al-Qaidareportedly was able to mass some 2,000 ghters byJune 2011.87

In fact, boasting of having captured artillery, airdefense guns, and tanks from the Army, Al-Qaida inSeptember 2011 proclaimed in its ofcial bulletin thecompletion of the attrition phase against the Army.They meant that the rst phase of the three-phaseMaoist-based insurgency program which Al-Qaidahad long internalized had been concluded, and that itwas now appropriate to move up to the second, moreadvanced, phase of insurgency.88 Al-Qaida also de-cided to expand its activity on the ground by seizingand holding terrain. True, Al-Qaida ran into tribal re-

sistance in Dali province, an area that had long been astronghold of leftist sentiment.89However, elsewhere,thanks to the weakened government and a reduced


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security presence, Al-Qaida was able to establish con-trol in several towns during 2011, including Zunjubar,

Jaar, Lawdar, and Shaqra in Abyan province, Rida inAl-Bayda province, and Azzan in Shabwa Province.They even planned to advance on Aden itself, thelargest city in the South.

Al-Qaida: Establishing a State and Creating Its OwnCritical Vulnerabilities.

Al-Qaida saw the opportunity to establish quick-ly the nucleus of an Islamic state in Yemen. In fact,buoyed by its initial success, Al-Qaida now boldlyand repeatedly proclaimed in its ofcial bulletin thatin the territories it controlled in the South, we havelaid down the rst foundation on which to build theCaliphate.90

Al-Qaidas hasty expansion, however, may havebeen responsible for the rapid growth of the tribalcommittees that was to follow, as Al-Qaidas newprominence and the exercise of power in the townsit controlled generated tension with the tribal leader-ship.91 In part, many tribes feared retaliation by theYemeni military and by U.S. airstrikes for any Al-Qa-ida presence in their areas, a factor of which Al-Qaidawas acutely sensitive. As its legal representative ac-knowledged, one reason Al-Qaida felt it was unable tospread further in Yemen was because the local popu-lation was afraid that it would attract air strikes.92

Despite the popularity of the social services andsecurity that Al-Qaida introduced, the cost was clearlyhigh. This was especially true in terms of Al-Qaidas

enforcement of its vision of an Islamic society, whichoften led it to come into conict with the local pop-ulation. As long as it had military superiority in an


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area, Al-Qaida was able to impose its harsh modelof society. Special attention was devoted to Islamiz-

ing the educational system, and the sexes were nowstrictly separated in schools. In the town of Azzan,music was forbidden in public areas, shop ownerswere told to grow beards, women were not permittedto work outside the home, and television and maga-zines were banned.93In one town, Al-Qaida attacked awedding party and smashed the musical instrumentsbeing used in the festivities.94Al-Qaida also crackeddown on alcohol and drugs, imposing harsh Islamicpenalties, as was the case of a hashish user who wasogged.95

Al-Qaida, also sought to stamp out what it callssorcery and deviance, catch-all terms for whatare in reality deeply-entrenched features of tradi-tional folk religion. In Yemens case, such practices as

the veneration of saints and their tombs and of livingholy men as the medium of intercession, mystical subrotherhoods, talismans, curses, incantations, and for-tune tellers are widespread. In fact, Al-Qaida, whilein power, was proud to announce initiatives such astheir arrest of a sorcerer in one town, and it resumedthe campaign with the August 2013 declaration ofwar against sorcerers and their pursuit, especially inHadramawt province.96However, at times, Al-Qaidamet with spontaneous resistance, as in the case of theattempt to suppress one sorcerer in Rida, which ledto a lethal shootout between the latters followers andAl-Qaida personnel.97

More generally, the rapid imposition of the Shariato replace the more exible and familiar traditional

tribal law also created more than its share of frictionwith the tribesmen subjected to it.98 No doubt triballeaders often saw Al-Qaidas presence as a direct chal-


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lenge to own their authority within their tribe, notleast with the replacement of tribal law (in which the

tribal shaykh and notables would have considerableinuence and which would be a source of power andmaterial gain for the tribal notables) by the Sharia. AsAl-Qaidas Amir, or leader, in Abyan province, JalalAl-Marqashi, acknowledged, his organization hadtried to negotiate an agreement in one town with thelocal Popular Committees, but the stumbling blockwas Al-Qaidas insistence on the implementation ofthe Sharia, which the Popular Committees had re-jected categorically, asserting We cannot apply theSharia in the town!!99 Local people reportedly alsogrumbled that punishments were handed out arbi-trarily, without adequate investigations.100Even someof their initial supporters were said to have becomedisillusioned by the harshness of Al-Qaidas rule.101

Establishing the Popular Committees.

The Yemeni Army had already experimented withtribal militias in the South even before the countrysnew government came to power. The concept that hadbeen pioneered by the Egyptian Army to ght againstthe ousted Yemeni royalists after the 1962 Revolu-tion was revived more recently in the governmentsght against the Shia Houthi movement in northernYemen. It was a military factional leader, Staff MajorGeneral Ali Muhsin Al-Ahmar, then commander ofthe now-dissolved 1st Armored Division, who de-ployed Army units under his command into Abyanprovince and organized the ofcial Popular Commit-

tees there in June 2011, although the committees hesupported haphazardly were unsuccessful in the ghtagainst Al-Qaida.102


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To ll the vacuum resulting from the paralysis ofthe government as protests mounted in the capital

against President Salih, some local leaders had alsobegan to establish Committees in mid-2011, largelyto regulate prices for staples or the distribution of es-sentials such as propane.103At rst, such spontaneousCommittees often cooperated with Al-Qaida, as whenthe latter took the city of Jaar from the Army in 2011,but soon disputes emerged.104

However, with encouragement and money fromthe new government, additional ofcial Committeeswere now set up, often by government order, andmany tribal leaders in Abyan and Shabwa provinceswere quick to respond, with the specic intent of coun-tering Al-Qaida. Tribes in Yemen are traditionally al-ready well-armed, not only with personal weaponsand rocket propelled grenades, but also with crew-

served systems such as armor, artillery, multiple rock-et launchers,mortars, and truck-mounted anti-aircraftguns used in a ground mode. However, in operationalterms, the tribes on their own, isolated in their nar-row arena, found it hard to compete militarily withAl-Qaida. The latter enjoyed the same advantages offamiliarity with the local terrain, but also had the abil-ity to move and mass over wider territories, thanksto a cohesive force structure. They even had gainedartillery after their initial defeats of the Yemeni Army.

Perhaps the key inducement from the governmentside was the money that the latter provided to the Pop-ular Committees. The shaykhs commanding the Com-mittees became the conduit for the salaries and now,once again, it was the tribal shaykhs and notables who

settled disputes among their fellow-tribesmen, ratherthan Al-Qaidas Sharia ofcials, thus restoring theirusurped au

tribal militias- an effective tool to counter al-quaida and its affiliates

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