Trends in Party Membership and Membership Participation:Smaller Parties, Different Types of Members?

Susan E. Scarrow Department of Political Science

University of HoustonHouston, TX 77204-3011

Burcu GezgorDepartment of Political Science

University of HoustonHouston, TX 77204-3011

Abstract: In Europe and elsewhere, party memberships have waned since their peaks in the 1960s and 1970s, yet at the same time, many parties have given their members new powers to influence the political process by selecting candidates, leaders and party policies. This increase in the power of party members makes it important to re-examine who joins political parties, and to ask whether previously noted patterns of demographic and political disparity have been exacerbated by the decrease in membership. To answer this question, this paper examines compares recent survey data on members of European parties with similar data from the late 1980s. It finds evidence of a continued aging of party memberships, but no other signs of a growing disconnect between those who choose to join political parties and other party supporters.

Paper presented for the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meetings, Chicago April 20-23, 2006.

Trends in Party Membership and Membership Participation: Smaller Parties, Different Types of Members?

Party memberships seems anachronistic in a world where mass parties are supposedly

being superseded by cartel parties, modern cadre parties, and/or electoral professional

parties. The expression of commitment implied by enrolling in a party appears outdated

in a world where the public is growing more suspicious of those who govern, parties are

increasingly unloved, and citizens are less likely to turnout to vote for those they do

support (Dalton and Weldon 2005, Dalton 2005). And indeed, in Europe and elsewhere,

party memberships have waned since their peaks in the 1960s and 1970s. As both

consequence and cause of these changes, many parties have turned to mass media to rally

supporters, and to opinion polls to stay in touch with the grass roots. Yes despite these

changes, parties’ members continue to play important if less visible roles, helping to

mobilize voters during elections, serving as candidates for all levels of elections, and,

increasingly, choosing party policies, candidates, and leaders.

This obverse change in the power and the size of party memberships makes it important

to re-examine the question of who joins political parties, and to ask whether previously

noted patterns of demographic and political disparity have been exacerbated by the

decrease in membership. When joining a party becomes a highly unusual activity, do

party memberships become less representative of parties’ other supporters? This paper

answers this question by examining the changing faces of party membership in 23

European democracies. It compares survey data over time to see whether the declining

popularity of party membership has altered the types of people who join and are active

within parties. It also compares trends in established and new democracies, asking

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whether membership patterns in the newer democracies of Central Europe replicate those

in the more established parties of western Europe.

The Changing Face of Membership Parties

Since the end of the 19th century, some political parties have made the formal enrollment

of supporters one key focus of their organizational strategies and mobilization efforts.

This organizational technique originated in parties of the left, but its apparent success led

other parties to adopt their own campaigns of membership recruitment. By the middle of

the twentieth century, the hey-day of membership parties, it was not uncommon for

parties in European democracies to claim enrollments in excess of 10% of the party vote.

Since then, however, party memberships in the established democracies have tended to

shrink in both absolute and relative terms. Today, few democratic parties can claim

membership over 5% of their electorate, and many are much smaller than this (see Table

1).

Despite this decline in the relative size of parties’ membership organizations, members

may be more important than ever to their parties, and to the political process. In recent

years, parties around the world have transferred important new powers to individual

members. This change has come about in part as a response to the drop in enrollments,

and in part as a response to apparently growing public discontent with out-of-touch

parties and political leaders. As a result, many parties have re-written their constitutions

to give members a greater direct role in selecting party candidates, party leaders, and

even party policies (Pennings and Hazan 2001; Scarrow et al 2000, etc.). For instance,

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within the past twelve months in the United Kingdom members of the Conservative and

Liberal Democrat parties have selected new party leaders in contests that very much

resembled general elections, complete with broadcast debates between the leading

candidates. Similarly, Romano Prodi, the presumed new prime minister in Italy,

cemented his claim to lead his party by securing the nomination in a newly-instituted

party primary. As this suggests, where members’ rights have expanded in this way,

party members have become more important than ever, not just to their own parties, but

to the wider polity, because the decisions of this small group now directly shape political

competition and political careers.

Party members’ new political rights potentially magnify the importance of differences

between party members and other party supporters. If their political ideology and/or their

life situations lead them to have priorities that are clearly different than the party’s

potential voters, members will be more likely to endorse candidates and policies which

are unreflective of the preferences of the wider electorate. In some cases, this divergence

may provide an opening for new parties. In cases where it is difficult for new parties to

compete, it may increase citizens’ feelings of being unrepresented by the choices they are

offered at the polls.

Patterns of party enrollment may affect the quality of democracy in other ways as well.

In many countries parties have long been vehicles for political mobilization and

activation which help to funnel citizens into the broader spectrum of political

engagement. Party membership has been a gateway activity, with those who join parties

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(or other groups) also more likely to participate in other political activities, be it talking

with elected officials, signing petitions, or standing for office themselves (Perry, Moyser,

Day 1992). In other words, parties have served as incubators of political engagement.

This is an important role in new democracies, but it is also important in more established

ones, where citizens are seemingly grown more wary of traditional political institutions

and processes. Moreover, in many countries some parties, particularly parties of the left,

have played a crucial role in compensating for resource-linked inequalities in

participation. Such parties have enrolled working class members who had lower incomes

and less education than those who otherwise became actively engaged in politics, thus

ensuring greater representation for the interests of those who were economically less

fortunate (Verba, Nie, Kim 1978). But parties of the left may not be performing this

function anymore if enrollment patterns have changed as these parties have broadened

their message, and their support, to appeal to a more white-collar base. Since group ties

and participatory skills acquired in one arena may encourage individuals to be more

active elsewhere (Perry. Moyser, Day 1992), any such change within the parties might

lead to greater inequalities across the political arena. Thus, a second question to be

asked: are at least some parties still mobilizing those with relatively lower resources who

might otherwise be less politically involved?

Survey research over past three decades has taught us a great deal about the

characteristics and views of those who join political parties. A growing number of

surveys of members of individual parties have explored the motivations for participation,

and the trajectories of involvement within each party (Germany: Falke 1982; Becker and

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Hombach 1983; Heinrich et al 2002; UK: Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley, Seyd and

Richardson 1994; Seyd and Whiteley 2004; Rüdig, Bennie and Franklin 1991; Norway:

Heidar and Saglie 2003; Canada: Cross and Young 2004; Denmark: Pedersen 2004;

Ireland: Gallagher and Marsh 2004; Netherlands: van Holsteyn 2001). National election

studies and cross-national surveys also have helped to draw more nuanced pictures of the

differences between those who merely support a party, and those who chose to join it

(especially Widfeldt 1995). This paper seeks to update these pictures by drawing on

twenty-first century cross-national surveys, asking whether recent drops in party

membership have reversed or perhaps intensified earlier patterns of participatory

inequality. The surveys, the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002/03 and 2004/05,

provide a picture of party membership in 17 democracies in Western Europe and 6 newer

Central European democracies at the beginning of the twenty-first century. To provide a

larger sample of party members, the results of the two surveys are pooled for each

country.i The first part of the analysis will look for changes in the ways that party

members differ from other supporters in terms of demographic characteristics, political

attitudes and activities. The second part will ask whether there are particular patterns of

changes visible in the countries where party membership has declined the most in the

1990s. Finally, the study will compare patterns of party participation in new and more

established democracies, asking whether the newer parties have replicated patterns of

political participation found elsewhere.

Membership Numbers in Flux

Our picture of the state of party enrollments became much clearer during the last third of

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the twentieth century, as an increasing number of parties centralized their record keeping

and imposed more precise definitions of membership. In the same period, national

election and other surveys began to ask respondents about their party membership.

Between the two types of sources, we have a relatively accurate picture of party

membership fluctuations in many countries. As Table 1 shows, the parties’ enrollment

data and survey responses present remarkably similar portraits of party membership

levels and membership trends. For instance, there is very little difference between

Widfeldt’s survey data from the late 1980s and Katz & Mair’s party record data from the

same period. Of the 10 countries included in both sets, all but 3 show survey and party

estimates of membership enrollments as a proportion of the electorate that are within 2

percentage points of each other. Similarly, in the 18 countries which are included in the

ESS from 2002 and in the Mair/Van Biezen party data from the late 1990s, all but 3

countries share estimates of overall enrollment that are within 2 percentage points.

Moreover, in the six cases where the estimates diverge, they do so in various ways.

Because we know that voter turnout is systematically over-reported in surveys, we might

expect that there would be a similar effect with self-reported party membership, but in

fact, where the two types of estimates differ, the surveys show the higher levels of

enrollment in only three of the six cases. This suggests that surveys are not

systematically biased, and the similarity of the figures in most cases suggests that they

are not bad instruments for estimating overall membership.

In terms of trends in party membership, both types of data are in broad agreement as well.

The survey data show bigger drops, with 7 out of 15 countries showing declines of more

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than 3 percentage points over the last decade of the twentieth century (compared with

only 3 of the 10 countries in the parties’ own figures). But in both types of data almost

all the other countries show small declines (2 percentage points or less). Only two

countries, Ireland and Spain, showed a slight increase according to one of the indicators

(polling data). In short, the picture painted by both types of data is of political parties

with a modest and declining ability to enroll their supporters. If party membership is

becoming less popular among the general electorate, who are the people who choose to

do such an untrendy thing as to join a political party, and how much do these individuals

differ from their fellow citizens?

Changing Patterns of Participation within Political Parties?

Demographic Characteristics

Political party memberships probably have never been a good mirror of the population, or

even of a particular party’s support base. We know from past studies that patterns of

party membership have closely resembled patterns of participation in other high intensity

political activities (Verba, Nie, Kim 1978; Parry et al 1992; Widfeldt 1995; and surveys

of individual parties, cited above). In other words, those who join parties tend to be

above the population average in terms of income, age, and education. They are also more

likely to be male than female, and more likely to be middle class than working class.

These patterns have held across a wide range of countries, and across most types of

parties, with only a few exceptions (mentioned below as appropriate). Have these

disparities either diminished, or been exacerbated, as memberships have shrunk? We can

use data from the ESS to track possible changes in party members’ demographic

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characteristics as well as in their attitudes and activities. (Because of some pending

coding questions, this analysis does not yet include an examination of parties’ class

composition.)

Age Party members have long tended to be somewhat older than the average population,

but this disparity may be gaining increasing political significance in a era where issues

like pension reform could have the potential to divide electorates along generational

lines. If all parties within a country have memberships (candidate selectorates) that are

much older than the general population, parties as a group may fail to offer voters choices

which reflect the interests of younger citizens. Given the importance of pension issues,

one way to measure age disparities is to look at the proportion of the general population

which is 61 or older, and compare this with the proportion of party members in this same

age group. By this measure, in most countries party members are older than the

electorate as a whole (positive difference score), and in some countries much older, with

Great Britain topping the list with a 31 percentage point difference between the two

groups (see Table 2). As Widfeldt and others found in the past, this pattern seems to be

intensifying in many parties, with 11 out of the 15 countries which were in both sets of

surveys showing a relative aging of the party membership (judged as an increase of at

least 2 points in age disparities between members and the general population).

Five countries did buck this general trend, having a smaller percentage of older members

than the general population (negative difference score). As Widfeldt found using his

slightly different measure of party age, most of the countries with memberships that were

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noticeably younger than the general population were newer democracies, where most

parties could not have recruited today’s seniors in their youth (Spain, Portugal, Poland

and Slovakia). However, these differences were diminishing in Greece and Portugal.

Furthermore, it was certainly not true that all of the newer democracies had younger

memberships. In this respect, Poland and Slovakia were not typical of the other Central

European newer democracies in the surveys (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,

Slovenia). In these countries, the older memberships probably are due at least in part to

the continued loyalty of members recruited by the Communists in pre-democratic

periods.

Gender Past studies of participation in political parties have consistently found party

memberships to be disproportionately male, with only a very few exceptions (such as the

Conservative Party of Great Britain in the 1980s and early 1990s) (Widfeldt 1995;

Whitleley et al 1994). This pattern of gender disparity did not disappear in the twenty

first century: in all the countries studied in the ESS, men remain more likely than women

to enroll in political parties (see Table 3). That said, there are some signs that this gap

may be closing, with 9 of the 15 countries included in the ESS and in the EB data

showing a drop in the difference between the proportion of women in the electorate and

women in political parties, while only 5 countries showed an increase in this difference.

Three Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Finland and Norway) had the lowest gender

disparity, something that is perhaps not surprising given the priority these countries have

given to electing female representatives. France was also in this group, possibly a

reflection of the new legal pressure on French parties to nominate female candidates

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(Freedman 2004). The data show no striking patterns when gender composition is

further broken down by party, though it is notable that by the beginning of the twenty-

first century the anomalistic over-representation of women in the British Conservative

Party had largely disappeared as this party’s membership declined.

Education Education has often been seen as a resource which fuels political participation

(Verba, Nie, Kim 1978). In keeping with this, Widfeldt found small but uniform

differences between members and supporters, with members generally being slightly

more educated than other supporters. Only in Scandinavia was this pattern reversed, with

party members having on average less education than the general electorate. More than a

decade later, the ESS figures show similar patterns, though with some weakening of the

pattern (Table 4). Scandinavia remained the exception to the overall rule: in Denmark,

Finland, Norway, and Sweden party members had, on average, fewer years of schooling

than the general population, and in Norway there was no difference between the two

groups in terms of educational levels. In addition, France and Ireland showed the

“Scandinavian” pattern of members having slightly less education on average than the

general population, and Luxembourg showed the two groups with equal average

education. In these countries, mobilizing by parties may indeed help to overcome some

of the resource-based disparities in political participation. In the other 16 countries, party

members were the more educated, though, as Widfeldt also found, in an era of high

overall education levels, these differences are generally small: only in 8 of these countries

was the average difference more than a year’s worth of schooling. It was not possible to

compare changes over time because of differences in the measure in the two surveys.

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Attitudes

We are interested in the demography of party membership, and how this differs from the

larger community, in part because we see demography as an easily observed proxy for

identifying interests and potential conflicts of interests: if party members come from very

different backgrounds than the voters the parties hope to recruit, the members may

promote party platforms and candidates that don’t reflect the interests of the broader

electorate. But surveys provide us with much more direct indicators that could alert us to

the degree of such attitudinal divergence. The most basic of these is the respondent’s

self-placement on a left/right scale: do party members and party supporters differ

systematically in terms of their ideological intensity?

There is some reason to think that party members will be more extreme in their political

convictions than those who make a lesser commitment to their party. This suspicion,

codified as “May’s Law”, is based on the assumption that most party members are

motivated by collective political goods, not selective benefits: they assume the costs of

membership because of their ideological commitments (May 1973). This would make

them systematically more radical in their views than those who remain “mere” party

supporters, but also than those who are motivated by the selective benefits of office

holding. Although this is a plausible theory, the supporting evidence remains rather thin.

Most studies have found at most small differences between the views of party supporters

and party activists, and have found that party officeholders tend to be more extreme than

either group, showing little evidence of curvilinearity in the dispersion of attitudes

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(Norris 1994; Narud and Skare 1999; Gallagher and Marsh 2002: Miller 1988; Herrera

and Taylor 1994). To the extent that curvilinearity has been found, it has been confined

to certain ideologically charged issues, in certain types of (ideological) parties (Kitschelt

1989, Narud and Skare 1999).

Widfeldt’s data told a similar story. He looked at differences between party members

and party supporters in their self-placement on an 11 point left-right scale (left = 0, right

= 10). In almost all of the 39 parties he examines, the gap exists and is in the expected

direction. In the other 5 parties, members and supporters place themselves in identical

positions. In no case were members more moderate than party supporters. But as

Widfeldt emphasizes, for the most part these differences are slight: in no case was the

difference as great as a whole point on a ten-point scale, and often the sum of differences

between members and supporters in left and right parties did not increase overall political

polarization by even a whole point. For Widfeldt, the small size of the difference

cautioned against over-emphasizing the disconnect between party members and other

party supporters. How, if at all, have these relationships changed in recent years? Is the

difference still as small as when Widfeldt wrote, or has the decrease in party membership

tended to exacerbate the ideological differences between those who are willing to join a

party, and other party supporters?

Table 5 replicates Widfeldt’s analysis with ESS data, though looking only at parties with

at least 40 members. The picture it presents is one of striking stability. In almost all the

parties, party members are more ideological than party supporters, but these differences

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are generally small (always less than one point).1 Moreover, to the extent that these

figures can be compared with Widfeldt’s data, there is no systematic pattern of change.

Between the end of the 1980s and the start of the twenty-first century, the gap between

members and supporters in terms of left-right self-placement stayed the same, grew, or

shrunk in exactly the same number of cases (5 each). In none of the countries for which

there is relevant data was the gap between members and supporters moving in the same

direction for two or more parties.

This message of ideological stability is good news in light of the expanding role of party

members in party decision-making. The appeal of party membership may be declining,

but parties do not seem to be more reliant on ideological firebrands than used to be the

case. In general, party members are no more extreme than they were. The growth of

intra-party democracy and the spreading use of party primaries may not inevitably

produce candidate slates that are increasingly unreflective of the wishes of the broader

electorate.

Activities

Are the shrinking parties made up of more politically active members? In other words, in

societies where party membership may have lost some of its broad appeal as a social

outlet or an affirmation of identity, are those who do join noticeably more engaged than

others? The ESS data allow us to compare the levels of political engagement of party

members with those of the population as a whole. ESS respondents were asked whether 1 One possible exception to this was the Swiss People’s Party, for which supporters were slightly further to the right than party members. But this party has been classified as a “rural” party rather than a conservative party, so attitudes within the party may not be well-described by a left-right scale (Lane and Ersson 1987).

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they had participated in 7 types of political activities in the last 12 months, ranging from

contacting a politician to engaging in a boycott or illegal protest. One of the activities,

“working in a political party”, seems likely to be correlated with party membership, but

theoretically it is certainly not identical: we know from other studies of party members

that it is only a minority of party members who are active within their parties, and even

non members may work in political parties, particularly during election campaigns.

(And in fact, correlation between the two is only 0.43.) We used these responses to

create an index of political activity, ranging from zero for those who participated in none

of the activities, to seven for those who participated in all of them. We then compared

average activity levels among party members and the general population.

The first thing that stands out in Table 6 are the low activity averages for the general

population: only in half of the countries was the average higher than 1. Second, as

expected, party members are more active than others, in most cases reporting scores that

were more than twice as high as those of the rest of the population. What is unclear from

these figures is whether the experience of party membership gives members confidence

and opportunities that encourage them to get more politically active, or whether those

who are more politically engaged to begin with are those who (also) chose to join a

political party. Since Widfeldt’s data do not provide a baseline for this, we can’t

measure change over time on this dimension. What we can say from this is that party

members are still distinguished from fellow citizens by their higher levels of political

engagement: party membership remains an important outlet for the most politically active

citizens.

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Parties with Biggest Membership Drops

So far we have looked for patterns across the entire range of countries and parties for

which data were available in the Eurobarometer and ESS studies, and for the most part no

strong patterns of change have emerged. What if we look only at the 7 countries for

which the survey data showed the largest drop in overall party enrollments? To assess

this, we look at changing patterns of enrollment in countries which all registered a

decline of 2 points or more in the percentage of self-reported party members (Finland,

Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Norway and Sweden). Do stronger patterns of

change emerge where the membership decline has been steepest, and where we might

suspect that parties have shed some of their more “casual” and “social” members while

keeping those who have more strongly political motives? The results for these countries

from earlier tables are summarized in Table 7. Demographic changes do not stand out

more strongly here than in countries where party membership has been more stable. In

terms of age, the seven countries with the biggest membership decline ranged across the

spectrum in regards to the change in the relative proportion of older party members. In

regards to gender, there was no difference between the countries with greater and lesser

membership declines: 4 of the 7 (57%) parties with the biggest drop in membership

enrollment showed a decreasing difference between female enrollment and the proportion

of the population that is female, slightly less widespread than the 5 out of 8 (63%)

countries in the other group that showed this decrease. In terms of left-right self

placement, the message is even stronger: in the countries with the largest membership

declines, none of the parties showed an increase in distance between party members and

i The Norwegian Social Science Data Services are the data archive and distributor of the ESS data.

15

party supporters (see Table 5). In terms of education, the seven countries with the

greatest membership drops were dispersed across the spectrum of educational disparities.

Parties in New Democracies

The ESS data also allow us to observe the development of party membership in the newer

democracies of Southern and East/Central Europe, and to ask whether they conform to

patterns of participation previously observed in more established political parties. As

reflected in the figures in Table 1, some parties in the new democracies of East/Central

Europe have adopted the organizational strategy of enrolling supporters as party

members, with the result that overall membership levels in the new members of the

European Union are not that much different than those in Western Europe. Nevertheless,

joining a party is not a particularly popular activity in any of these countries, and unlike

some of their Western European counterparts, the parties of Central Europe generally

have not evolved out of pre-existing movements which could provide a continuing

foundation of societal support for the parties, and of social ties for prospective members

(van Biezen 2005). These factors might be expected to translate into some differences in

the types of people who enroll.

Since most of the parties in these countries were founded after the establishment of

democracy, we might expect that party members would be younger than their

counterparts in the west. Indeed, the most visible demographic difference between

members in the established and new democracy is one of age: almost all of the newer

democracies are at the low end in terms of the difference between the proportion of older

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party members and their weight in the total population. The two countries that buck this

trend are Italy, and the Czech Republic. In Italy party members are on the younger side

compared to elsewhere, something that was true even before the post-1990 collapse of the

Italian party system. In the Czech Republic party members are on the older side, possibly

a reflection of the continuing strength of the former Communist party. On the other

hand, educational differences are more pronounced in the newer democracies, with all of

these countries at the higher end of the scale (half a year or more) of disparity in average

number of years of schooling. Portugal, Spain and Greece, new democracies in Western

Europe, were also in this upper end of the range. This does suggest a greater resource-

linked disparity in participation in these countries than is characteristic today in the more

established democracies, though it should be noted that Italy, Germany, the Netherlands

and Great Britain also figure in this same range. The newer democracies showed no

systematic difference from their established counterparts in terms of gender disparities

between party members and the general population. Party memberships in these

countries were not large enough to gauge the differences in left-right self-placements

between party members and supporters of individual parties.

Conclusion

The results presented above present a surprisingly benign picture of the effects of party

change on the democratic process. Party memberships may be shrinking, but there is

little evidence that the declining appeal of enrollment has changed the characteristics of

those who do chose to join. The biggest change of this sort is in terms of age: the everage

age of party members has continued to rise, something that may result in a

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disproportionate political influence for pensioners and those nearing retirement. In other

ways, however, the differences between party members and the general public remained

small and, in the case of gender, possibly shrinking. Most crucially, there was no sign

that parties with declining memberships have members who are comparatively more

ideologically motivated, and hence more distant from their at large supporters: there was

no systematic increase in the ideological distance between party members and party

supporters. This does not mean that smaller memberships may not present other

problems for parties: many have traditionally relied on their members to supply large

numbers of local and regional government candidates, and have counted on the regular

income from party dues to provide a cushion of monetary support for some aspects of

party activity. These contributions of party members are likely to be missed. But at the

least, as intra-party democracy spreads, there is no reason to think that today’s smaller

party memberships are more likely to make polarizing political decisions, or to pick

candidates and policies that might alienate their parties’ less committed supporters.

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Table 1Enrollment in Political Parties

as % of electorate 

Survey Data Party Data (year)

 Widfeldt 1989

ESS 1 2002/03

ESS 2 2004/05

Katz & Mair Scarrow

Mair & Van Biezen

Austria -- 14 13 21 (1990) 17 (1994) 18 (1999)Belgium 9 7 7 9 (1987) 8 (1995) 7 (1999)Denmark 8 6 6 7 (1988) 3 (1995) 5 (1998)Finland 14 (1987) 7 7 13 (1987) 11 (1995) 10 (1998)France 4 2 2 -- 2 (1995) 2 (1999)Germany 6 4 3 4 (1987) 3 (1996) 3 (1999)Great Britain 5 3 2 3 (1987) 2 (1997) 2 (1998)Greece 12 5 8 -- -- 7 (1998)Ireland 4 5 5 5 (1989) 3 (1997) 3 (1998)Italy 7 4 -- 10 (1987) 3 (1997) 4 (1998)Luxembourg 9 7 8 -- -- --Netherlands 7 5 6 3 (1989) -- 3 (2000)Norway 12 9 9 13 (1989) 8 (1997) 7 (1997)Portugal 3 5 3 -- -- 4 (2000)Spain 3 3 4 -- -- 3 (2000)Sweden 12 (1988) 8 7 8 (1988) 7 (1997) 6 (1998)Switzerland -- 9 7 -- 9 (1994) 6 (1997)

 Czech Republic -- 4 3 -- -- 4 (1999)Estonia -- -- 2 -- -- --Hungary -- 2 1 -- -- 2 (1999)Poland -- 2 1 -- -- 1 (2000)Slovakia -- -- 2 -- -- 4 (2000)Slovenia -- 5 3 -- -- --

Sources: Widfeldt 1995; Jowell et al 2003; Jowell et al 2005; Katz, Mair et al 1992; Scarrow 2000; Mair and van Biezen 2001.

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Table 2Age Distribution Of Party Members

(ESS figures above, Widfeldt below in italics)

PARTY POPULATIONDifference Score 61+

  18-30 31-60 61+ N 18-30 31-60 61+ N  Austria 10.4 70.1 19.5 522 23.7 61.2 15.1 4242 4.4Belgium 7.8 61.5 30.7 244 22.2 57.1 20.7 3324 10.0  21 60 19 333 30 50 20 3863 -1.0Denmark 7.6 55.8 36.6 172 19.3 58.9 21.8 2785 14.8

11 58 31 419 29 49 22 3793 9.0Finland 9.2 47.4 43.4 272 20.9 55.1 24 3710 19.4  10 70 20 164 25 58 17 1472 3.0France 4.3 61.9 33.8 66 20.3 58.4 21.3 3116 12.5

26 50 24 14 29 50 21 3789 3.0Germany 9 58 33 173 17 58.2 24.9 5329 8.1  12 64 24 261 25 51 24 4016 0.0Great Britain 7.3 38.8 53.9 90 20.5 56.6 22.9 3630 31.0

17 54 29 257 28 48 24 4597 5.0Greece 9.4 63.4 27.3 286 19.3 52.9 27.8 4689 -0.5  26 60 14 334 26 53 21 3740 -7.0Ireland 11.6 52.2 36.3 223 23.3 56.5 20.2 4092 16.1

23 61 16 147 30 51 19 3602 -3.0Italy 23.3 57.3 19.4 44 21.8 58 20.2 1145 -0.8  20 62 18 354 28 53 19 3839 -1.0Luxembourg 7.45 62.76 29.8 276 27.6 57.2 15.2 2899 14.6

12 70 18 110 26 57 17 1130 1.0Netherlands 10.3 59.9 29.8 207 16.1 63.2 20.7 3989 9.1  14 52 34 299 31 49 20 3754 14.0Norway 10.1 60.2 29.7 313 19.6 62.5 17.8 3599 11.9

13 56 31 274 26 53 21 2190 10.0Portugal 28.6 47.2 24.2 118 23.3 50.9 25.8 3322 -1.6  24 59 17 78 31 48 21 3719 -4.0Spain 19.1 65.5 15.5 113 23.7 53.6 22.6 3101 -7.1

22 61 17 88 31 47 22 3669 -5.0Sweden 11.8 51.3 36.9 263 20.7 57.5 21.8 3614 15.1  12 56 32 311 25 52 23 2845 9.0Switzerland 5.2 60.1 34.7 310 18.3 61.3 20.4 3860 14.3

 Czech Republic 7.1 52.7 40.2 146 19.4 57.3 23.3 4015 16.9Estonia 16.7 52.4 31 42 21.9 50.9 27.2 1821 3.8Hungary 21.2 48.2 30.6 38 21.6 54.1 24.3 2973 6.4Poland 11.1 77.7 11.2 52 28.4 53.2 18.4 3501 -7.2Slovenia 10.9 60.5 28.6 119 23.8 53.2 23 2735 5.6Slovakia 7.1 78.6 14.3 28 27.4 57.2 15.4 1343 -1.1Sources: Jowell et al 2003; Jowell et al 2005; Widfeldt 1995. 

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Table 3Gender Distribution of Party Members

(ESS figures above, Widfeldt below in italics)

MEMBERS ELECTORATE DIFFERENCEDIRECTION OF CHANGE

  % Male n % Male n    Austria 63.3 482 47.1 4513 16.2Belgium 61.4 236 50.4 3648 11.0 minus  63 336 49 4043 14.0  Denmark 68.2 179 49.7 2989 18.5 plus

61 343 50 4003 11.0Finland 51.8 280 47.4 4022 4.4 minus  64 164 51 1472 13.0  France 50.5 65 47.3 3309 3.2 minus

65 145 48 4021 17.0Germany 66.4 173 47.8 5789 18.6 minus  70 275 46 4293 24.0  Great Britain 66.1 104 48.8 3947 17.3 plus

58 266 48 4844 10.0Greece 63.3 273 44.1 4972 19.2 minus  73 337 48 4000 25.0  Ireland 59 223 44 4331 15.0 minus

66 155 50 4016 16.0Italy 70.5 46 44.8 1207 25.7 plus  73 360 49 4091 24.0  Luxembourg 61 259 50.3 3184 10.7 minus

78 110 54 1202 24.0Netherlands 56.4 222 44.3 4245 12.0 same  61 311 49 3971 12.0  Norway 60 326 53.2 3796 6.8 plus

52 274 50 2190 2.0Portugal 71 111 43.1 3563 27.9 plus  72 79 48 4000 24.0  Spain 70.5 101 49.14 3390 21.4 minus

76 91 48 4018 28.0Sweden 53.1 290 50.6 3943 2.5 minus  70 311 52 2845 18.0  Switzerland 60.3 325 48.3 4180 12.0

 Czech Republic 66.8 152 48.4 4180 18.4Estonia 53.5 43 41.1 1989 12.4Hungary 58.5 35 45.2 3183 13.3Poland 79.9 53 48.9 3826 31.0Slovakia 64.5 31 50.3 1477 14.2Slovenia 61.3 124 46.8 2929 14.5

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Table 4Education Levels (mean years)

  Party Members N Population N DifferenceAustria 12.3 536 12.2 4432 0.1Belgium 12.5 253 12.2 3637 0.3Denmark 13.1 182 13.2 2961 -0.1Finland 11.0 292 12.1 4015 -1.1France 11.9 67 12.0 3244 -0.1Germany 14.3 180 12.9 5713 1.4Great Britain 13.2 107 12.5 3926 0.7Greece 10.4 300 9.9 4964 0.5Ireland 12.2 228 12.8 4207 -0.6Italy 12.1 50 10.7 1176 1.4Luxembourg 12.0 283 12.0 3097 0Netherlands 13.8 223 12.6 4221 1.2Norway 13.2 331 13.2 37889 0Portugal 8.6 123 7.4 3545 1.2Spain 12.6 114 10.8 3206 1.8Sweden 11.9 295 12.0 3933 -0.1Switzerland 11.0 327 10.7 4171 0.3

 Czech Republic 13.0 162 12.3 4241 0.7Estonia 13.2 46 11.9 1986 1.3Hungary 12.9 39 11.7 3173 1.2Poland 12.9 53 11.4 3811 1.5Slovakia 12.9 31 12.0 1471 0.9Slovenia 12.2 124 11.3 2944 0.9

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Table 5Political Attitudes in Parties

Mean Left-Right Self Placement (ESS figures above, Widfeldt below)

  Party Supporters N Members N Difference

Change Since 1980s

Austria SPÖ 4 631 3.9 193 0.1

ÖVP 5.7 613 5.7 206 0.0

 

Belgium CVP 5.6 120 6 47 0.4 plus

6.8 280 6.9 68 0.1

 

Switzerland Radicals 6.1 364 6.3 96 0.2

Christian Democrats 5.5 211 5.8 59 0.3

Social Democrats 3.2 729 2.6 58 0.6

Swiss People's Party 6.8 485 6.5 70 0.3

 

Czech Republic Communists 1.8 276 1.4 67 0.4

 

Denmark Social Democrats 4.7 601 4.4 56 0.3 plus

4.9 752 4.8 138 0.1

Venstre 4.9 142 5.9 59 1.0

 

Finland Centre 6.8 483 6.8 141 0.0 same

6.4 249 6.4 50 0.0

Social Democrats 4.3 545 3.4 55 0.9 plus

4.3 286 3.6 33 0.7

 

Great Britain Conservatives 6.6 521 7.2 44 0.6 same

7.5 1079 8.1 124 0.6

 

Greece PASOK 4.7 519 4.4 103 0.3 minus

4.5 930 4.1 105 0.4

New Democracy 8.2 465 8.3 142 0.1 plus

8.3 922 8.7 121 0.4

 

Ireland Fianna Fail 6.0 840 6.5 106 0.5 plus

7.1 639 7.3 78 0.2

Fine Gael 5.9 403 6.1 64 0.2 minus

6.8 368 7.1 43 0.3

 

Luxembourg Christian Socialists 5.9 472 6.1 106 0.2 same

7.2 228 7.4 45 0.2

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Table 5 (Continued)Socialist Workers 3.5 310 3.4 62 0.1 minus

4.3 82 3.6 28 0.7

Democratic 5.9 178 5.6 49 0.3

 

Norway Labour Party 3.9 628 3.4 104 0.5 same

4.4 581 3.9 72 0.5

Conservatives 7.4 404 7.6 53 0.2 minus

7.5 393 8.1 69 0.6

 

Portugal Social Democrats 7.2 302 6.3 46 0.9

 

Sweden Conservatives 7.7 456 8 59 0.3 minus

7.8 340 8.4 51 0.6

Social Democrats 3.7 991 3 113 0.7 same

3.7 1023 3 140 0.7

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Table 6Political Activities Index

ElectorateParty Member Difference

Austria 1.1 4347 2.3 520 1.2Belgium 0.9 3631 1.9 253 0.9Denmark 1.1 2958 2.2 181 1.1Finland 1.3 4008 2.2 292 1.0France 1.3 3285 3.2 68 2.0Germany 1.0 5764 3.0 181 1.9Great Britain 1.0 3921 2.4 107 1.4Greece 0.4 4926 1.9 298 1.5Ireland 0.9 4169 2.1 228 1.1Italy 0.7 1185 3.4 48 2.8Luxembourg 1.1 3108 2.0 273 1.0Netherlands 0.8 4215 2.1 221 1.3Norway 1.5 3783 2.7 331 1.2Portugal 0.3 3528 2.1 122 1.7Spain 1.1 3306 2.9 114 1.8Sweden 1.4 3902 2.7 293 1.3Switzerland 1.2 4122 2.6 323 1.4

Czech Republic 0.6 4181 2.0 157 1.4Estonia 0.3 1967 1.8 45 1.5Hungary 0.3 3155 2.4 38 2.1Poland 0.3 3788 1.9 52 1.6Slovakia 0.6 1441 2.6 32 2.0Slovenia 0.3 2917 1.6 122 1.3

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Table 7

Comparing Countries with Bigger & Smaller Membership Declines

 

Change in Age Disparity

Change in Gender Difference

Education Difference Members & Supporters

Activity Difference Members & Supporters

BIG DECLINE*Finland 16.4 -8.6 -1.1 0.7*Germany 8.1 -5.4 1.4 1.6*Great Britain 26.0 7.3 0.7 1.2*Greece 6.5 -13.8 0.5 1.3*Italy 0.2 -5.8 1.4 2.4*Norway 1.9 1.7 0 0.9*Sweden 6.1 4.8 -0.1 1.1

SMALL/NO DECLINEBelgium 11.0 -15.5 0.3 0.8Denmark 5.8 -3.0 -0.1 0.9France 9.5 7.5 -0.1 1.6Ireland 19.1 -1.0 -0.6 1.0Luxembourg 13.6 -13.3 0 0.8Netherlands -4.9 0.0 1.2 1.0Portugal 2.4 3.9 1.2 1.6Spain -2.1 -6.6 1.8 1.6

26

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