1

TrendsinCampaignFinancing,1980-2016

ReportfortheCampaignFinanceTaskForceOctober12th,2017ZacharyAlbert

2

ExecutiveSummary:

! Thetotalamountofmoneyinelections–includingbothdirectcontributionsandoutsidespending–hasincreaseddramaticallyovertime,withthelargestincreasebeginningin2000.Accountingforinflation,thetotalamountofmoneyincongressionalelectionsincreasedmorethan600percentfrom$372.5millionin1980to$2.6billionatitspeakin2012.Thetotalamountinpresidentialelectionsincreasedmorethan1,200percent,from$225millionin1980tonearly$3billionin2012.

! Therehasbeenasubstantialincreasein“earlymoney”,orcontributionsandexpendituresraisedduringtheprimaryperiod.Thishasbeenespeciallypronouncedinpresidentialprimaries,withearlymoneysharplyincreasingafter2000.Incongressionalelections,thedistributionoffundsinprimaryandgeneralelectionshasremainedfairlyequal.

! Theseincreaseshavebeendrivenmostlybyanincreaseinthenumberofindividualdonorsand,morerecently,alargejumpintheamountofoutsidespendingbyideologicalgroups.Excludingoutsidespending,individualdonorshavebeenthelargestsourceofdirectcontributionstobothcongressionalandpresidentialcandidatessince1994.In2016,individualcontributionsaccountedfor73percentofmoneydonateddirectlytocandidates,butonly51percentofallspendingwhenoutsideexpendituresareincluded.

! Since2004,ideological/membershipPACshavecomprisedanincreasingly

largeportionofgroupdonors,asaflurryofnewideologicalgroupsenteredthecampaignfinancesystem,perhapsduetothe2002McCain-Feingoldreforms.In2012,ideologicalgroupsdisplacedcorporatePACsasthelargestgroupdonors,whichhasimplicationsforwhichtypesofcandidatesarefunded.Ideologicalgroupsaremorelikelythanbusinessintereststosupportchallengersandopenseatcandidatesandtorelyonoutsidespending.

! Thenumberofindividualdonorshasincreasedsubstantially,especiallysince

2008.Thevastmajorityofthesenewindividualdonorscontributesmallsums(lessthan$500total),andsotheaverageindividualdonationhasdeclinedsignificantly.Thismeansthat,despiteajumpinthenumberofindividualscontributing,thepoolofindividualdonationshasbecomeincreasinglydominatedbyasmallsubsetofextremelylargedonors.

! Evenaslargerandlargersumsenterthecampaignfinancesystem,expendituresbycandidatesandtheircampaignshaveactuallydecreasedsince2010.Thissuggeststhatoutsidespendingisplayingalargerroleinfederalelections,asgroupsthatcannotdirectlycoordinatewithcandidatesarespendinglargeramountscampaigningontheirbehalf.

3

DataSources:

Thefinancialdatainthisreportcomesfromtwosources.First,alldataontotal(section1)andindividual(section3)campaigncontributionscomesfromAdamBonica’s(2016)DatabaseonIdeology,Money,andElections(DIME).Thisdatabasecontainscontributionrecordsatthelocal,state,andfederallevelfrom1979to2016aswellasawealthofinformationoncandidateandelectioncharacteristics.ThisdatasetimprovesonoriginalFederalElectionCommission(FEC)records(whicharegenerallyless‘clean’,orcontainmoreformattingerrors)andotherreputablesourcesliketheCenterforResponsivePolitics(CRP)(whichonlycoverselectionsfrom1990to2016).IoutlineanymanipulationofthisdataintheDataAppendix.

Second,IrelyonoriginalFECdatawhenoutliningPACspending(section2)becausethisdatacontainsamorecompletecategorizationofcommitteesaccordingtotheirtype.Inparticular,theFECdatacodeseachuniquecommitteeasacorporate,trade,membership/ideological,labor,orunknowngroup,allowingforcomparisonsofspendingbehaviorbyvariousindustriesandPACtypes.

Finally,dataoncampaignexpenditures(section4)comesfromtheFEC’sOperatingExpendituresdatasets,whichcovercampaignexpenditures2006to2016(thedataextendsbackto2004,buttheserecordsdonotcontaindatafrompaperfilers).Thedataprovideanoverviewoftotalcampaignspendingaswellasadetailedcategorizationofdifferenttypesofdisbursements.However,theFECwarnsthat–becausethereportsarefiledbyindividualcampaignsandlackstandardization–thesedatasetsaremoresusceptibletoinaccuracies.Iconsiderthislimitationwheninterpretingthedata.Additionally,Iturntotwooriginalreportstoaugmentmyownfindingsonexpenditureswithmorespecificdataonthedistributionofadvertisingfundsinparticular.Thesesecondarysourcesarecitedinthetextthatfollows.

4

1.TrendsinCampaignContributionsandCosts Themostnoticeabletrendincampaignfinancingsince1980hasbeenadramaticincreaseintheamountthatcampaignsraiseandspend.Avarietyofmeasuresoffinancialactivity–fromcontributionstototaloutsidespendingtotheaverageamountneededtowinanelection–haveallspikedsince2002.Thereappeartobetwofactorsbehindthisgrowth:theincreasingprevalenceofhigh-dollarindependentexpendituresforandagainstcandidates,andtheincreasingnumberofindividualdonors.Iexplorethesetrendsingreaterdetailinthenextsections.1.1TrendsinTotalContributionsandExpenditures

Totalcontributionsandoutsidespendinghaveincreasedsubstantiallyforbothindividualandgroupdonorsandinalltypesofraces.Figures1.1aandbdemonstratethispoint(seeTable1AintheAppendixfortheunderlyingdatainthisfigure,andFigure1AforabreakdownofcongressionalcontributionsbyHouseandSenatecandidates).Incongressionalelections,PACshavetraditionallybeenthe

largest

spenders,thoughtheproportionof

0

1000

2000

3000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Dire

ct C

ontri

butio

ns a

nd In

depe

nden

tEx

pend

iture

s in

Milli

ons

of D

olla

rs

Individuals PACs

(a) Congressional Elections

0

1000

2000

300019

80

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

2012

2016

Year

Individuals PACs

(b) Presidential Elections

Figures1.1aandb:TotalContributionsandOutsideSpendingbyDonorType.Depictstheinflation-adjusted,totalamountcontributedorspent(asanindependentexpenditureorcommunicationcost)tocandidatesandcandidatecommitteesbyindividualorcommitteedonors.

5

individualspendingbegantoincreasein1994.Infact,excludingindependentexpenditures,individualsbegantocontributemorethanPACsstartingin1994(seeFigure1.2).ForPACdonors,therearenotablespikesin1992,2004,and2012,whichseemtocorrespondwithanexpandedcandidatepool(1992),BCRA’s2002banon“softmoney”andacorrespondingshifttotraceabledirectcontributions(2004),andtwo2010SupremeCourtdecisionsrepealingaggregateindividualcontributionlimitsandallowingforunlimitedindependentexpendituresbygroups(2012).

Theincreaseinspendingisevenmorepronouncedinpresidentialelections.Priortothe2004election,spendingbybothindividualsandPACswasquitelimited.Thischangeddramaticallyinpresidentialelectionsbeginningin2004.Individualcontributionsincreasedroughly40percentfrom2000to2004andmorethandoubledfrom2008to2012.Excludingindependentexpenditures,individualsarethelargestcontributorstopresidentialcandidates.ForPACs,theincreasefrom2000to2004wasevenmoredramaticatroughly70percent.From2008to2012,PACspendingmorethantripled.

TheseincreasesinindividualandPACspendingarenotevenlydistributed

acrossprimaryandgeneralelections1.InCongressionalelections,individualstendtogivemoreearlyinthecycle(i.e.duringtheprimaryperiod)whilePACsprefergeneralelectioncontributions(seeFigures1.1.2aandb).Since1980individualdonorshavegivenmorethanhalfofallcongressionalcontributionsduringtheprimaryperiodbutonlyabout30percentofallcontributionsduringthegeneralelectionperiod.Sincemostcongressionalelectionsdonothavecompetitiveprimaries(seeFigure2AintheAppendix),itislikelythatmuchofthemoneycollectedduringtheprimaryperiodisallocatedtothegeneralelection,spreadtomorevulnerablecandidates,orsimplystoredawayinthecampaignwarchest.

Thistrendisevenmorepronouncedinpresidentialelections.Historically,

PACshavenotbeenveryactiveatanypointintheelectioncycle,thoughthisbegantochangein2004andagainfollowingthe2010SupremeCourtrulings.Additionally,manyrecentpresidentialcandidatesceasedusingthepublicfinancingsystem,allowingthemtoraisemorefundsfromprivategroupsandindividuals.PACspendinginpresidentialelectionshastypicallybeenhigherinthegeneralelection,though2016sawgreaterprimaryelectionspending(perhapsduetotheunconventionalcandidacyofDonaldTrump).Individuals,ontheotherhand,giveagooddealmoreinprimariesthangeneralelectionsforthewholeperiodexamined.Duetothelargeamountofearlyfundingfromindividuals,presidentialcandidatesreceivethemajorityoffundingduringthenominationstage,whenmanymorecandidatesareraisingfunds.

1TodistinguishbetweenprimaryandgeneralelectiongivingIuseBonica’selectiontypeindicator,whichreliesontheFEC’scategorization.

6

1.2TheRiseofOutsideSpending Individualsandgroupsappeartobespendingmoreduetodifferentcauses.Forindividuals,theincreaseisdrivenmainlybyachangeinthenumberofdonorsandtheamountthatthesedonorscontribute(seesection3).Forgroups,ontheotherhand,theincreaseinspendingisdrivenmainlybyanincreaseinoutsidespendingfollowingthe2010CitizensUniteddecision,whichallowedforunlimitedexpendituresadvocatingfororagainstacandidate.

ThiscanbeseeninFigure1.2,whichshowsthetotalamountcontributedtoorspentonbehalfofallcandidatesineachelectioncycle(includingboth

0

500

1000

1500

2000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Dire

ct C

ontri

butio

ns a

nd In

depe

nden

tEx

pend

iture

s in

Milli

ons

of D

olla

rs

Individuals PACs

(a) Congressional Primary Elections

0

500

1000

1500

2000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Individuals PACs

(b) Congressional General Elections

0

500

1000

1500

2000

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

2012

2016

Dire

ct C

ontri

butio

ns a

nd In

depe

nden

tEx

pend

iture

s in

Milli

ons

of D

olla

rs

Individuals PACs

(c) Presidential Primary Elections

0

500

1000

1500

2000

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

2012

2016

Individuals PACs

(d) Presidential General Elections

Figures1.1.2a–d:TotalContributionsandOutsideSpendingbyDonorandElectionType.Depictstheinflation-adjusted,totalamountcontributedorspent(asanindependentexpenditureorcommunicationcost)byindividualorcommitteedonorsinprimaryandgeneralelections.

7

congressionalandpresidentialcandidates).Forindividuals,independentexpenditureshavenevercomprisedmorethan1percentofalltheirspending,butdirectcontributionshaveincreasedsubstantiallyovertime.DirectcontributionsfromPACs,ontheotherhand,haveincreasedlesssharplyovertime(with2012asanexception),whileoutsidespendingbyPACshasincreasedsubstantiallybeginningin2004.OutsidespendingforPACspeaksespeciallyfollowingCitizensUnitedand,in2014and2016,accountedforagreaterproportionofPACspendingthantraditional,directcontributions.TheincreaseinPACspendingseeninFigure1.1,then,isdrivenmainlybyanincreaseinoutsidespending.Settingasidetheseexpenditures,individualssince1994havecomprisedthemajorityofdirectcontributionsinbothcongressionalandpresidentialelections.

Figure1.2:DirectContributionsandIndependentExpenditures.Depictsthetotal,inflation-adjusteddirectcontributionsandoutsidespending(topresidentialandcongressionalcandidatesandtheircommittees)byindividualorcommitteedonors.

0

1000

2000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Con

tribu

tions

and

Exp

endi

ture

sin

Milli

ons

of D

olla

rs

Individuals PACs DirectContributionsIndependentExpenditures

Total Contributions and Independent Expendituresby Donor Type

8

0

500000

1000000

1500000

2000000

2500000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Aver

age

Tota

l Con

tribu

tions

to C

andi

date

s,by

Can

dida

te T

ype

Challenger Incumbent Open Seat

(a) Competitive CongressionalPrimaries

0

500000

1000000

1500000

2000000

2500000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Challenger Incumbent Open Seat

(b) Competitive CongressionalGeneral Elections

0

500000

1000000

1500000

2000000

2500000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Aver

age

Tota

l Con

tribu

tions

to C

andi

date

s,by

Can

dida

te T

ype

Challenger Incumbent Open Seat

(c) All Congressional Primaries

0

500000

1000000

1500000

2000000

2500000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Challenger Incumbent Open Seat

(d) All CongressionalGeneral Elections

Figures1.3.1a–d:AverageContributionstoCandidatesinCongressionalPrimaryandGeneralElections.Depictstheaverage,inflation-adjustedamountcontributedtoincumbent(green),challenger(red),andopenseat(blue)candidatesincompetitiveandallprimariesandgeneralelections.

9

1.3TrendsinFinancingattheCampaignLevel Incumbentpoliticianshavebeenthebiggestbeneficiariesofincreasedcampaigncontributions,thoughchallengersandopenseatcandidateshave(onaverage)alsoreceivedmorecontributionsovertime.Figure1.3.1showstheaverageamountcontributedtoeachcongressionalcandidate/campaign,basedonthecandidate’sincumbencystatus,incompetitiveprimaries(a)andgeneralelections(b).Here,competitiveelectionsaredefinedasracesinwhichthedifferencebetweenthevotetotalsofthetoptwocandidateswaslessthan20percent.Figure2AintheAppendixdepictsthepercentageofracesclassifiedascompetitiveeachyear,withanaverageofroughly5-6percentofallprimariesandgeneralelectionsclassifiedascompetitive.Focusingonlyoncompetitiveracespaintsabetterpictureoftheoverallcampaignenvironment,becausenon-incumbentcandidatesinuncompetitiveracesarelesslikelytoraiselargesumsandbecauseincumbentsinuncompetitiveracesmayraiselargesumstopadtheir“warchest”oraidothercandidatesandtheparty.Forthesakeofcomparison,however,plots(c)and(d)showtheaveragecontributionstoallcandidatesregardlessofthecompetitivenessoftherace. Themostnotabletrendthatemergesfromthesefiguresisthatincumbentsalmostalwaysoutraisechallengersandopenseatcandidates,regardlessoftherace(primaryorgeneral)andwhetherornotitiscompetitive.Theonlyexceptiontothisfindingisin2004,whencandidatesforopenseatsreceived,onaverage,slightlymorethanincumbentsingeneralelections.Typically,challengersreceivefewerfundsthanbothopenseatandincumbentcandidates.Interestingly,untilrecentlytherearefewpredictabledifferencesbetweencandidatesincompetitiveracesandallcandidates.Theaveragecandidateinacompetitivegeneralelectionhasreceivedslightlymoremoneythantheaveragecandidateinalltypesofgeneralelections,butthedifferenceisnotsubstantialuntil2006.Sincethen,contributionstoincumbentsincompetitivegeneralshaveoutpacedcontributionstoincumbentsinnon-competitivegenerals.Infact,the2016electionssawatremendousincreaseinearlysupportforincumbentsandasubstantialdeclineincontributionstoalltypesofcandidatesduringthegeneralelectionperiod. Asafinalnote,Figure1.3.1seemstoindicatethatdonorscontributemoretochallengersandopenseatcandidatesoncetheyhavereachedthegeneralelection,whichperhapssuggeststhatcontributorsarestrategicinallocatingtheirdonationstolikelywinners(i.e.incumbents)evenwhentheprimaryiscompetitive.Ofcourse,suchstrategicgivingwouldbeexpectedmorefromaccessseekinggroupdonorsthanmoresymbolicindividualdonors.Totestthishypothesis,Figure1.3.2recreatestheaboveplotsforcompetitivecongressionalelectionsbutseparatesindividualdonorsfromPACdonors.Theplotssuggestthatindividualsdonotaltertheircontributionbehaviormuchfromtheprimarytothegeneralelection.PACs,ontheotherhand,arefarmorelikelytosupportincumbentsincompetitiveprimary

10

electionsandonlygivetochallengersoropenseatcandidatesinsubstantialsumsoncetheyhavewontheirprimary.Again,thissuggeststhatPACsaretraditionallyunwillingtoenterintocontentiousprimarieswherethewinnerisuncertain. Thefactthatcandidatesofalltypesareraisinggreatersumsofmoneymeansthatthecostofwinningacompetitivecongressionalelectionhasincreasedovertime.ThiscanbeseeninFigure1.3.3,whichdepictstheaverageamountraisedbywinningandlosingcampaignsfromindividualsandPACs.Unsurprisingly,winningcampaignsraiseagreatdealmorethanlosingcampaigns.However,thecostofwinninghasincreaseddramaticallyovertime,morethanquadruplingfrom1980to

0

500000

1000000

1500000

2000000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Aver

age

Tota

l Con

tribu

tions

to C

andi

date

s,by

Can

dida

te T

ype

Challenger Incumbent Open Seat

(a) Individual Contributions,Competitive Congressional Primaries

0

500000

1000000

1500000

2000000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Challenger Incumbent Open Seat

(b) PAC Contributions,Competitive Congressional Primaries

0

500000

1000000

1500000

2000000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Aver

age

Tota

l Con

tribu

tions

to C

andi

date

s,by

Can

dida

te T

ype

Challenger Incumbent Open Seat

(c) Individual Contributions,Competitive Congressional GeneralElections

0

500000

1000000

1500000

2000000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Challenger Incumbent Open Seat

(d) PAC Contributions,Competitive Congressional GeneralElections

Figures1.3.2a–d:AverageContributionstoCandidatesinCompetitiveCongressionalElections,byDonorType.Depictstheaverage,inflation-adjustedamountcontributedtoincumbent(green),challenger(red),andopenseat(blue)candidatesincompetitiveelectionsbyindividualsorPACs.

11

2012.Evenin2014and2016,whenthecostofwinningdropped,theaveragesuccessfulcampaignreceivedmorethantwiceasmuchinflation-adjustedmoneyastheaveragewinningcampaignin1980.2.GroupContributors TheriseinPACcontributionsandexpendituresnotedabovehasbeendriven,inpart,byanincreaseinthenumberofPACsmakingcontributionsovertime.Figure2.1showsthetotalnumberofactivenon-party,non-candidatescommitteesineachcycle(a)aswellasthenumberofnewcommitteesactiveineachcycle(b).ThetotalnumberisbrokendownbyPACtype,asclassifiedbytheFEC.

500000

1000000

1500000

2000000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Aver

age

Con

tribu

tions

to C

andi

date

s, b

y R

ace

Out

com

e

Lost Election Won Election

Average Contributions to Winning and LosingCandidates in Competitive Races

Figure1.3.3:AverageContributionstoWinningandLosingCongressionalCampaigns.Depictstheaveragetotalcontributions,adjustedforinflation,towinningandlosingcandidatesincongressionalelections.

12

Figure2.1:UniqueandNewPACDonors,byType.Depictsthenumberofunique,non-partyandnon-candidatePACsactiveineachelectioncycle(a)andthenumberofnewPACsactiveineachcycle(b),byPACclassification.

0

2000

4000

6000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Num

ber o

f Dis

tinct

Com

mitt

ees

Corporations/Cooperatives

LaborUnions

Membership/Ideological Trade

(a) PACs and Super PACs by Type

0

500

1000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Num

ber o

f Dis

tinct

Com

mitt

ees

Firs

t Act

ive in

that

Cyc

le

Corporations/Cooperatives

LaborUnions

Membership/Ideological Trade

(b) New PACs and Super PACs by Type

13

ThenumberofactivePACsroughlydoubledfrom1980to2014,witha

particularlylargespikefrom2010to2012.ThisincreasecorrelateswiththeCitizensUniteddecisionandafloodofnewlycreatedPACs(seeplotbaswellasFigure2.2.2c).WithregardtothetypesofactivePACs,committeesrepresentingbusinessinterestsorcorporationshavetraditionallycomprisedtheplurality,thoughmembership/ideologicalgroupsbecamethepluralitybeginningin2012.Infact,membership/ideologicalPACshaverepresentedthepluralityofnewgroupssince2004.Thisfindinghasimportantimplicationsforpoliticaloutcomes,asmoreideologicallyextremegroupsarenowinvolvedinelections.2.2GroupSpendingTrends

Thesemembership/ideologicalgroupsarenotonlymorenumerous,buthavealsocomprisedanincreasinglylargerpercentageofgroupspendingsince2006.Figure2.2.1presentsthepercentageofcommitteespending(excludingpartyandcandidatecommittees)comingfromeachtypeofgroup(duetogapsinearlydata,somespendingpriorto2000isunclassified).Theplotshowsthat,followingadeclineinthelate1980sandearly1990s,spendingbymembership/ideologicalgroupshasincreasedsubstantiallyasapercentageofallcommitteespending.Atthesametime,spendingbybusiness,labor,andtradegroupshasremainedflatordeclinedovertheperiodexamined.By2010businessgroups–whichhavehistoricallyspentthegreatestcumulativeamountonelections–wereoutpacedby

0

20

40

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Perc

enta

ge o

f PAC

Con

tribu

tions

and

Expe

nditu

res

Corporate/Cooperative Labor

Membership/Ideological Trade Unknown

Contributions and Spending by Committee Type

Figure2.2.1:SpendingbyCommitteeType.Presentsthepercentageofnon-party,non-candidatecommitteespending(directcontributionsandoutsidespending)fromeachtypeofcommittee.CategorizationofcommitteescomesfromFECfiles.

14

membership/ideologicalgroupsasthesinglelargestspendertype.Again,thisislikelytohaveimportanteffectsonwhichtypesofcandidatesenterandwinraces,withatendencytowardmoreideologicallyextremecandidatesandawayfromthemorepragmaticmoderatespreferredbybusinessinterests. Circumstantialevidenceofthepotentiallydisruptiveimpactofincreasedmembership/ideologicalgroupspendingcanbefoundbyexaminingsupportfordifferenttypesofcandidates.Figure2.2.2depictsthepercentageofspendingfromeachtypeofcommitteesupportingDemocrats(plota)andincumbents(plotb).Plot(a)showsthat,historically,membership/ideologicalgroupshavebeenroughlyevenlydividedintheirsupportforDemocratsandRepublicans.Attimes,however,thesegroupshavespentroughly60percentoftheirmoneyinsupportofRepublicancandidates(e.g.between2008and2012,perhapsduetoaconservativebacklashagainstObama,embodiedbytheTeaPartymovement).Thus,whileitdoesnotappearthatconservativegroupshaveswampedthecampaignfinancesystem,atcertainsalienttimesthesegroupshavebeenrelativelymoreactivethantheirliberalcounterparts. Spendingbycorporateandtradegroupshasbeenmorebipartisan,withcandidatesenjoyingaslightadvantagewhentheirpartycontrolsCongress(e.g.moresupportforRepublicansbetween1996and2006).Thisfitswiththenotionthatbusinessgroupsarebipartisanaccess-seekersratherthanpartisanadherents.Finally,labororganizationshavealwaysdemonstratedapreferenceforDemocraticcandidates,thoughsinceroughly2008theyhavebecomesomewhatmorebipartisanintheirgiving. Supportforincumbents(plotb)alsohintsatdifferingmotivationsforspendingacrossgrouptypes.Corporateandtradegroupshavealwaysdemonstratedastrongpreferenceforincumbents,againindicatinganaccess-orientedgivingstrategy.Membership/ideologicalandlaborgroups,however,havebecomeincreasinglywillingtosupportchallengersandopenseatcandidates.Tothedegreethatchallengersandopenseatcandidatesaremoreideologicallyextremethanincumbents,theincreasinglylargesumsofmoneythatmembership/ideologicalgroupsarespendingontheirbehalfmightrepresentonecauseofincreasedpolarization. Finally,plotcpresentsthepercentageofgroupspendingclassifiedasoutsidespending(independentexpendituresandcommunicationcosts)ratherthandirectcontributions.Businessandtradeinterestsspendthevastmajorityoftheirmoneyondirectcontributionstocandidates,withaslightincreaseincorporateoutsidespendingin2012andperiodsofhigheroutsidespendingbytradegroupsin1986andfrom2000to2006.Laborgroups,ontheotherhand,havebecomeincreasinglymorelikelytomakeindependentorcommunicationcostexpendituresonbehalfofthecandidatestheysupport,withoutsidespendingexceedingorfairlyequaltodirectcontributionssince2008.Outsidespendingbymembership/ideologicalgroupsactuallydeclined,fromamajoritytominorityofallspending,from1980to

15

2006.Astotalspendingbythesegroupsincreasedafter2008,however,theproportionoffundsthatwenttowardsoutsidespendingincreasedsubstantially.AftertheCitizensUniteddecision,between60and80percentofallmembership/ideologicalgroupspendingwasintheformofoutsideexpenditures.

20

40

60

8019

8019

8219

8419

8619

8819

9019

9219

9419

9619

9820

0020

0220

0420

0620

0820

1020

1220

1420

16

Perc

enta

ge o

f Con

tribu

tions

to D

emoc

ratic

Can

dida

tes,

by

PAC

Typ

e

Corporate/Cooperative Labor

Membership/Ideological Trade

(a) Contributions and Spending by Donor Typeand Recipient Party

40

60

80

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Perc

enta

ge o

f Con

tribu

tions

to In

cum

bent

s, b

y PA

C T

ype

Corporate/Cooperative Labor

Membership/Ideological Trade

(b) Contributions and Spending by Donor Typeand Recipient Incumbency

0

20

40

60

80

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016O

utsi

de S

pend

ing

as a

Per

cent

age

of T

otal

Spe

ndin

g, b

y PA

C T

ype

Corporate/Cooperative Labor

Membership/Ideological Trade

(c) Direct Contributions vs. Outside Spending,by Donor Type

Figure2.2.2:GroupDifferencesinCandidateSupportandSpendingType.DepictsthepercentageofspendingbyeachtypeofgroupsupportingDemocrats(a)andincumbents(b),aswellasthepercentageofspendingonindependentexpendituresandcommunicationcosts(c).

16

3.IndividualContributors Excludingindependentexpenditures,directcontributionsfromindividualshaveincreasedatamuchfasterratethandirectcontributionsfromPACs.Figure3.1showsthatthisincreasehasbeendrivenbyanincreaseinthenumberofdonorsratherthananincreaseintheamountcontributedbytheaverageindividual.Atthesametime,however,individualcontributionsareincreasinglydominatedbyaselectnumberofverylargedonors.

Figure3.1:IndividualContributors.Forpresidentialandcongressionalelections,depictsthenumberofuniqueindividualdonors(a),theaverageamountcontributedbyeachindividualthroughoutthecycle(b),abreakdownofindividualcontributorsbycontributionlevel(c),andthepercentageoffundscomingfromdonorsateachoftheselevels(d).

0

1000

2000

3000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Num

ber o

f Uni

que

Indi

vidu

alD

onor

s, in

Tho

usan

ds

(a) Individual Donors in Congressionaland Presidential Elections

0

2000

4000

6000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Aver

age

Tota

l Con

tribu

tions

by In

divi

dual

s

(b) Average Individual Donation

0

1000

2000

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Num

ber o

f Uni

que

Indi

vidu

alD

onor

s, in

Tho

usan

ds

< $500 $500 to$1,000 $1,000 to$10,000 > $10,000

(c) Individual Donors by Total Contributions

0

25

50

75

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Perc

enta

ge o

f all

Indi

vidu

al C

ontri

butio

ns

< $500 $500 to$1,000 $1,000 to$10,000 > $10,000

(d) Percentage of Contributions fromSmall, Medium, and Large Donors

17

First,plot(a)showsthatthenumberofuniqueindividualdonorscontributingtocongressionaland/orpresidentialcandidateshasskyrocketedfromalowof65,970in1982toahighofmorethan3.2millionin2016.Thisrepresentsa487percentincreaseinjust14electioncycles,withthelargestincreasesconcentratedinrecentcycles.ThisdramaticjumplikelyreflectsthefactthattargetedadvertisingandInternetfundraisingisnowamainstreamcomponentofcampaignsandallowscandidatestoreachamuchwideraudienceofpotentialdonors. However,asplots(b)and(c)show,thesenewindividualdonorsarecontributingfairlysmallamounts.First,plot(b)showsthattheaveragetotalamountcontributed(toanynumberofcandidates)fromeachuniqueindividualdonorhasdeclinedsharplysince1982.Infact,theaverageindividualcontributionin2016waslowerthananyotherpointinthistimeframe.ThisfindingsuggeststhattheMcCutcheondecision,whichallowedforunlimitedaggregatecontributionsbyindividuals,hasnotledtoacampaignfinancesystemfloodedbylargedonors(butseeFigure3.2below). Plot(c)furtherillustratesthispoint.Thisfigureplotsthenumberofindividualcontributorsatvariousstrataoftotalcontributionstocandidates.Theredline,representingindividualswithtotalcontributionslessthan$500,beginstooutpacelargerdonorsstartingin2008.Whilethenumberofdonorscontributingbetween$500and$1,000andbetween$1,000and$10,000hasalsoincreasedovertime,thesegroupshavebeenfaroutpacedbysmalldonors.And,importantly,thenumberofindividualscontributingmorethan$10,000hasremainedrelativelystableandquitelowovertime.3.2TheInfluenceofLargeIndividualDonors However,Figures3.1a–csimplydisplaythenumberofindividualdonorsandtheaveragetheycontributed.Thus,itdoesnotaccuratelycapturethefinancialweightoflargedonorsrelativetosmallerdonors.Forthisreason,Figure3.1ddisplaysthepercentageofallindividualcampaignfundscomingfromdonorsatvariouscontributionstrata.Thisfigureshowsthattheimportanceofmid-rangedonors($1,000to$10,000intotalcontributions)havedeclinedinoverallimportanceaslargedonors(morethan$10,000intotalcontributions)havebecomemoreprominent.Theinfluenceoftheselargedonorspeakedin2012–whentheycontributedthepluralityoffunds(roughly45percent)–andhasebbedslightlysincethen.

Figure3.2furtherhighlightstheimportanceofasmallnumberoflargedonorsbydepictingthecumulativepercentageofindividualdonationscontributed(y-axis)bythetopXpercentofindividualdonors(x-axis)forselectyears.Thus,alinethatrisesmorequicklyandsteeplyindicatesthatahigherpercentageofallindividualdonationscomefromasmallerpercentageofallindividualdonors.Indeed,thisisthetrendthatemergesovertime.In1980,thetop25percentofall

18

0

25

50

75

100

0 25 50 75 100Percentage of Top Donors

Perc

enta

ge o

f All

Indi

vidu

alD

onat

ions

1980

0

25

50

75

100

0 25 50 75 100Percentage of Top Donors

Perc

enta

ge o

f All

Indi

vidu

alD

onat

ions

1990

0

25

50

75

100

0 25 50 75 100Percentage of Top Donors

Perc

enta

ge o

f All

Indi

vidu

alD

onat

ions

2000

0

25

50

75

100

0 25 50 75 100Percentage of Top Donors

Perc

enta

ge o

f All

Indi

vidu

alD

onat

ions

2010

0

25

50

75

100

0 25 50 75 100Percentage of Top Donors

Perc

enta

ge o

f All

Indi

vidu

alD

onat

ions

2016

Figure3.2:PercentageofFundsFromTopDonors.Plotsthepercentageofallindividualdonationstocongressionalandpresidentialcandidates(y-axis)comingfromthetopXpercentofallindividualdonors(x-axis)forselectyears.

19

donorscontributedroughly58percentofallindividualfunds,whilethequartilecontainingthesmallestdonorscontributedonlyabout10percentofallfunds.By2010,however,thetop25percentofdonorsgavenearly85percentofallfunds;inthatsameyear,thebottomquartileofdonorsgavelessthan1percentofallfunds.In2016,thedominanceoflargedonorsisevenmorepronounced,withthetop5percentofdonorsgivingapproximately61percentofallfunds,thetop25percentgiving90percent,andthebottomquartileofdonorsgivinglessthan0.6percent.Thistrend–towardsasystemdominatedbyasmallnumberofheavyweightdonors–suggeststhatreformers’fearsaboutundueeliteinfluenceinelectionsmaybefounded,evenasthenumberofsmall,everydaydonorscontinuestorise.4.CampaignExpenditures Campaignexpendituresbygroupsandcampaignshavegrownalongsidecontributions,ascandidatesnowhaveaccesstolargerandlargersumsofmoney.Unfortunately,dataoncampaignexpendituresislimitedbytwofactors.First,theFEConlybegancollectingcomprehensivedataonexpendituresin2006,prohibitinganalysisoflonger-termtrends.Second,thecategorizationoftypesofexpenditureshasatremendousamountofmissingdata.Becauseexpenditureformsofferanopen-endedresponseregardingthetypeofactivitymoneywasspenton,thereisagreatdealofvariationacrosscampaignsintermsofhowtheyclassifyexpenditures.TheFEChasattemptedtoclassifytheseopen-endedresponsesaccordingtotheirownscheme,butthiscategorizationisincompleteduetothelaboritrequires(seeFigure4.1.3below). Despitetheselimitations,comprehensivedataontotalexpenditures(ofalltypes)since2006isavailable.Figure4.1.1summarizesthisdatainthreeways.First,plot(a)depictsthetotal,inflation-adjustedexpendituresinfederalelectionsbyanytypeofspender(candidates,committees,parties,andindividuals).Notsurprisingly,spendingspikesbyroughly$1.5to$2billioninpresidentialyearsandreturnstoroughly$3billioninnon-presidentialcycles.Additionally,thered‘bestfit’lineshowsthatexpenditureshavebeentrendingupwardssince2006.

Importantly,thisincreaseseemstobedrivenmainlybyoutsidegroupsandindividualsratherthancandidates.Plot(b)depictsthetotalexpendituresbycandidatesandthecommitteesdirectlyassociatedwiththem(i.e.formalcampaigns).Forbothpresidentialandcongressionalcampaigns,totalexpenditureshavebeentrendingdownsinceahighin2008(forpresidentialcampaigns)and2010(forcongressionalcampaigns).Thus,spendersoutsideformalcampaignsseemtobedrivingtheincreaseintotalexpendituresbyalltypesofactors(plota).Thismightsuggestthatcampaignsareincreasinglywillingtoallowunaffiliatedoutsidespendinggroupstocampaignontheirbehalf,orsimplythatoutsidegroupshavesurpassedtraditionalcampaignsintheirfundraisingandspendingefforts.

20

Eventhoughtotalspendingbyformalcampaignsisdeclining,theaverageamountspentbyeachcampaignhasactuallyincreased(seeplotc).Thisincreaseisespeciallypronouncedforpresidentialcampaignswhich,onaverage,spent45percentmorein2016thantheydidin2008.Forcongressionalcampaignstheincreasefrom2006to2016ismuchloweratroughly3.2percent.Theseincreases–especiallyinpresidentialcampaigns–suggestthat,evenastotalcampaignspendinghasdecreased,themostwellfundedcampaignsarespendingincreasinglymore,drivingtheaveragecampaignexpenditurelevelup.

3000

3500

4000

4500

5000

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Tota

l Exp

endi

ture

s in

Milli

ons

of D

olla

rs(a) Total Expenditures in Federal Elections

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Tota

l Exp

endi

ture

s in

Milli

ons

of D

olla

rs

Congressional Campaigns Presidential Campaigns

(b) Total Expenditures by Campaignsin Federal Elections

0

5

10

15

20

25

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Aver

age

Expe

nditu

res

Mad

e by

Cam

paig

ns,

in M

illion

s of

Dol

lars

Congressional Campaigns Presidential Campaigns

(c) Average Expenditures by Campaignsin Federal Elections

Figure4.1:TotalandAverageExpenditures.Depictsthetotalinflation-adjustedamountspentinfederalelectionsbyallactors(a),thetotalamountspentbycampaignsdirectlyassociatedwithacandidate(b),andtheaverageamountspentbyeachcampaign(c).

21

0

100

200

300

400

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Tota

l Exp

endi

ture

s in

Milli

ons

of D

olla

rs,

by E

xpen

ditu

re T

ype

Administrative/Salary/OverheadAdvertising

Campaign Events/MaterialsLoan Repayments/Refunds

Political Contributions/DonationsPolling

Solicitation andFundraisingTravel

(a) Allocation of Expenditures in Congressionl Elections

0

5

10

15

2008

2012

2016

Tota

l Exp

endi

ture

s in

Milli

ons

of D

olla

rs,

by E

xpen

ditu

re T

ype

Administrative/Salary/OverheadAdvertising

Campaign Events/MaterialsLoan Repayments/Refunds

Political Contributions/DonationsPolling

Solicitation andFundraisingTravel

(b) Allocation of Expenditures in Presidential Elections

Figure4.2:ExpendituresbyType.Depictsthetotal,inflation-adjustedamountspentbycongressional(a)andpresidential(b)campaigns,bycategory,forallclassifiedexpenditures.ThesefiguresdonotincludethelargesumofmoneythatwasspentbutunclassifiedbytheFEC.

22

4.2TypesofExpenditures Asnotedabove,dataonthetypesofexpendituresishighlyincomplete.Forcongressionalcampaigns,anaverageof76percentofallexpendituresareunclassifiedfrom2006to2016(figurenotincluded).Forpresidentialcampaigns,afull97percentofspendingisunclassified.Thefollowingfiguresmustbeviewedinlightoftheselowcategorizationrates.IfthereissomesystematicfactorthatdriveswhetherornotanexpenditureisclassifiedbytheFEC,thentheratiosbetweendifferenttypesofspendingmaybeskewed. Withthisinmind,Figure4.2breaksdowntotal,inflation-adjustedexpendituresbytypeforthoserecordsthathavebeenclassified.Plot(a)showstheallocationofexpendituresbycongressionalcampaigns,whichduringtheperiodexaminedhaveallocatedthegreatestsumofclassifiedexpenditurestoadministrative,salary,andoverheadexpenses.Thistypeofspendingmorethandoubledfrom2008to2012,withaslightdeclinein2014and2016.Advertisingexpensesmakeupthesecondlargestcategoryandalsopeakedin2012,followedbysolicitationandfundraisingexpenses.Spendingoncampaignevents,polling,andtravelisrelativelylow,thoughtravelexpensesincreasedsomewhatin2016. Expenditureallocationsforpresidentialcampaignscanbeseeninplot(b).Thisfigureseems,morethanplot(a),tosufferfrommissingdatathatisnotevenlydistributedacrossspendingtypesandyears.Asaresult,therearefewtrendsthatemerge,andthosethatdo(e.g.anincreaseinadministrative/salary/overheadexpenses)arepotentiallyinaccurate.4.3AdvertisingSpendingbyType Ofparticularinterestinrecentelectionsistheallocationofadvertisingspendingtotraditionalversusdigitalmediaoutlets.Unfortunately,thereisnosystematic,publiclyavailabledataonthebreakdownofcampaignadvertisingspendingbymedium.However,severalprivateadvertisingfirmshavepublishedtheirownestimatesofadvertisingspendingbytype.Tothedegreethatthesereportsareaccurate,wecanassesstrends(inrecentyears)inspendingontraditionalversusInternetadvertising.

Figure4.3.1presentsthebreakdownofadvertisingspendingatthelocal,state,andfederallevelsince2008,asreportedbyNomuraSecurities.Becausethereportwaspublishedbeforetheconclusionofthe2016election,thevaluesfor2016representestimates(theseestimatescanbecomparedtotheactual2016valuesinFigure4.3.2).Themostnotabletrendinthisfigureisthepredictedincreaseinbroadcastadvertisingspending,thoughactual2016figuresshowthatbroadcastspendingdidnotincreasefrom2012(atleastinpresidentialelections;seeFigure4.3.2).Cableanddigitalmediaspendingalsoincreasedovertime.Thisisespecially

23

0

2

4

6

Broa

dcas

t

Cable

Digit

al

Out−o

f−Hom

e

Radio

Adve

rtisi

ng E

xpen

ditu

res

inBi

llions

of D

olla

rs

2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

Advertising Expenditures in Local, State, and Federal Elections

Figure4.3.1:CampaignAdvertisingExpendituresbyMedium.Depictstotaladvertisingexpenditures,bytypeofmedium,atthelocal,state,andfederallevel.2016figuresrepresentestimates.Source:NomuraSecurities,“WillPoliticalAdSpendingTrumpEstimates?”April6th,2016.

0

20

40

60

Broa

dcas

tTV Ca

ble

Digita

l

Direc

tMa

ilMa

gazin

esNe

wspa

pers

Out−o

f−Hom

e

Radio

Telem

arketi

ng

Perc

enta

ge o

f Adv

ertis

ing

Expe

nditu

res

2012 2016

Advertising Expenditures in Local, State, and Federal Elections

Figure4.3.2:AdvertisingExpendituresinPresidentialElectionsbyMedium.Depictsthepercentageofpresidentialelectionadvertisingexpendituresbyadvertisingmedium.Source:BorrellAssociates,“TheFinalAnalysis:WhatHappenedtoPoliticalAdvertisingin2016(AndForever)”2017.

24

truefordigitalspending,whichincreasedfromroughly$20millionin2008toanestimated$1billionin2016.Cablespendingincreasedfromroughly$470millionin2008toapredicted$1.1billionin2016.

Figure4.3.2presentssimilardatafroma2017BorrellAssociatesreport.

Thisdataismorelimitedinitstimeframe(2012and2016),butithasthebenefitofprovidingactualratherthanpredicted2016totals.Thereportshowsthattotaladvertisingspendingmarginallyincreasedfrom2012(roughly$9.4billion)to2014(roughly$9.8billion),thoughtheallocationofspendingacrossadvertisingmediumschangedsubstantially.First,broadcasttelevisionspendingdeclinedfromapproximately58percentofalladvertisingspendingto45percent.Othertraditionalformsofmedia–likeradioandnewspapers–declinedslightly,whiledirectmailandtelemarketingremainedroughlythesamefrom2012to2016.Themoststrikingtrend,however,hasbeentowardsgreaterdigitalspendingand,toalesserdegree,increasedcablespending.From2012to2016,spendingondigitaladsrosenearly800percent,from1.7percentofallspendingto14.4percentin2016.TheBorrellreportestimatedthatroughlyhalfofthisdigitalspendingwouldbespentontargetsocialmediaads,thoughthisrepresentsapredictionratherthanactualfigures.

25

DataAppendix HereIdescribeanymanipulationsoftheoriginaldatausedinthisreport.Anyminordifferencesbetweentheestimatesreportedhereandthosereportedbyothersourcesarelikelyduetothesedecisions.However,acomparisonoftheestimatesinthisreporttootherreputablesources(e.g.theFECandtheCenterforResponsivePolitics)demonstratesthatanydifferencesaretypicallylessthan1percentagepoint,suggestingthatthefigurespresentedhereareexternallyvalid.Section1: ThedataongeneraltrendsincampaigncontributionsandcostscomesfromBonica’sDIMEdatabase.Becausethisdatacontainsdetailedfinancialrecordsatthefederal,state,andlocallevels,thefulldatasetswererestrictedtofederalelectionsfortheanalysisinthisreport.Specifically,onlyrecordsdocumentingcontributionsoroutsidespendingfromindividualsornon-candidate,non-partycommitteestocandidatesandtheircommitteeswereretained.Excludingcontributionsfromcandidate/partycommitteestoothercandidatesavoidsdoublecounting,wheremoneygiventoacandidate/partycommitteebyanindividualorgroupdonoristhenrecordedagainasitflowsouttoanothercandidate.Thus,unlessotherwisenoted,anyreferencetoPAC,group,orcommitteedonorsreferstonon-party,non-candidatestraditionalPACsaswellasSuperPACsandotheroutsidespendingentities. Additionally,certaintypesoftransactionsbetweendonorsandcandidateswereexcludedtoavoiddoublecountingortoremovemoneynotflowingtocandidates.Generally,thetypesoftransactionsremovedincludecontributionrefunds;contributionstoconventionaccounts,recountaccounts,andheadquartersaccounts;andcontributionsthatweredocumentedoncewhentheyenteredanintermediaryaccountandagainwhentheywerepassedontothefinalrecipient(inthiscase,thelatterrecordwasretainedbutthefirstrecordwasexcluded)2.For

2TheFEC’sTransactionTypecodingschemecanbefoundhere.Forindividuals,thespecificexcludedtransactiontypeswerecodes20Y,21Y,22Y,40T,40Y,41T,41Y,42T,and42Y(refunds),code15T(transfersintointermediaryaccount),and,in2016,codes30and30T(contributionstoconventionaccounts),codes32and32T(recountaccounts),and40Tand40Y(headquartersaccounts).ForPACcontributors,thefollowingtransactionswereremoved:code15C(contributionsfromcandidates),codes16C,16R,20C,and22H(loanstocandidatecommitteesandloanrepayments);contributionrefunds(codes22Yand22Z);andelectionrecountcontributions(code24R).Additionally,toavoiddoublecounting,transfersinandoutofaffiliatedcommitteeswereexcluded(seecodes18Gand24G);onlytransfersouttotheintendedrecipient(oftheinitialcontribution)wereincluded(codes24Iand24T).

26

figuresdistinguishingbetweendirectandindirectexpenditures,outsidespendingisdefinedasallelectioneeringcommunications,independentexpenditures,andcommunicationcostsadvocatingfororopposingtheelectionofacandidate3.Allotherincludedcodesareclassifiedasdirectcontributions. Inthefigurepresentingtheaverageamountneededtowinanelection,itshouldbenotedthatloanstoacampaignareexcludedfromtheseaverages.Thus,theplotmightunderestimatetheamountofmoneyneeded,onaverage,towinanelection.However,itprovidesanaccuratereflectionoftheamountofcontributionsandoutsidespendingfromindividualsandgroupsthatwinningcampaignsattract.Section2: DataongroupspendingtrendscomesfromFECandOpenSecretsdataratherthanBonica’sdatabase.BecauseoriginalFECdataongrouptypesisincomplete(andthereforesoistheBonicadata),ImergedOpenSecretsPACcategoriesintotheoriginalFECcontributionrecords.Inmostyears,thisresultedinahighrateofgroupclassification–since2000inparticulareverygrouphasbeenclassified.Forsimplicity,Ihavecombinedseveralofthesecodesintosinglecategories.Specifically,Icombinedcorporategroups(codeC)andcooperativeswithandwithoutcapitalstock(codesVandW)intoasinglecategory–Corporate/Cooperative–representingbusinessinterests.Additionally,IcombinedtheFEC’s“membership”groupcategory(M)withOpenSecrets’“ideological”groupcategory(I)intoasinglecategoryrepresentingmembership/ideologicalorganizations(thesetwoclassificationsrepresentroughlythesametypesofgroupsbutaresimplynameddifferently). Tocalculatethepercentageoffundscomingfromeachgroupcategory,Iexcludedpartyandcandidatecommitteecontributions/spendingandthenaggregatedtransactionsbygrouptype.Thedataincludesbothcongressionalandpresidentialtransactions,whenapplicable.CandidateleveldataonpartyaffiliationandincumbencycomesfromacombinationofFECandOpenSecretscoding,withthirdpartycandidatesandcandidateswithunknownincumbencystatusdroppedpriortothepercentagecalculations.Outsidespendingisagaindefinedasindependentexpenditures,communicationcosts,andelectioneeringcommunications.Section3: DataonindividualcontributorscomesfromtheDIMEdatabase.Thisdataisuniqueinthatitattemptstoprovideasingleidentifierforeachindividualdonorwithinandacrosselectioncycles.Thus,Iamabletoaccuratelyidentifythenumber3FECoutsidespendingcodesinclude19,24A,24E,24F,24N,and29.

27

ofuniqueindividualdonorsandaggregatethetotalamounttheycontributedinagivencycle.Theseaggregatesincludealldirectcontributionsfromindividualstocandidatesaswellastheextremelyrareoutsidespendingonbehalfof/opposingacandidate.Section4: DataonoperatingexpenditurescomesfromtheFEC.Thesefilescontainallspendingbyindividuals,groups,candidates,andparties.Examplesofexpendituresincludeutilitypayments,staffsalaries,mediabuys,campaignliteratureprinting,andcandidatetravel.Asnotedinthereport,thecodingofexpendituresbytypehasagreatdealofmissingdata.Whencommitteesfileexpenditurereportstheyfillinanopen-endedformthatexplainswhatthemoneywasspenton,butthereistremendousvariationinhowdifferentcommitteesreportthesametypeofspending.TheFEChascreatedasimplifiedcodingscheme(foundhere)buthasnothadtheresourcestoimplementthiscodeformostrecords.Thus,whilewehavegooddataonthetotalamountspentbyvariousactors,wearelesscertainregardingwhattheyspentthismoneyon. Thefiguresreportingtotalandaverageexpendituresincludeeitherallspendingbycommittees,individuals,andparties(Figure4.1a)orallspendingbycandidatesandtheiraffiliatedcampaigncommittee(s)(Figure4.1bandc).Fornon-candidatecommittees,alloutsidespendingandcontributionsareexcluded,thoughcontributionsfromonecandidatecommitteetoanotherareincludedascampaignexpenses.Figure4.2,whichbreaksdownspendingbytype,includesonlyexpendituresfromcandidatesandtheircampaigncommittees.Again,thisdatashouldbeviewedwithsomeskepticism,asitishighlyincomplete.Dataonadvertisingexpenditures(Figure4.3)comesdirectlyfromstatisticsprovidedbyindustryreports(seereportforcitations).

28

Appendix

ContributionsandExpenditurestoCandidates

Year

IndividualstoCongressionalCandidates

PACstoCongressionalCandidates

IndividualstoPresidentialCandidates

PACstoPresidentialCandidates

1980 $165,162,562.66 $207,333,680.11 $147,264,273.77 $77,760,512.041982 $169,543,579.92 $276,009,209.71 NA NA1984 $193,986,910.72 $378,457,730.84 $65,483,020.96 $19,019,967.831986 $231,511,001.83 $350,819,875.81 NA NA1988 $264,978,265.64 $366,765,605.26 $118,922,968.71 $44,764,956.901990 $281,686,314.81 $658,772,434.26 NA NA1992 $391,685,562.47 $827,174,486.59 $104,981,195.74 $110,986,503.571994 $434,064,149.41 $384,087,317.67 NA NA1996 $454,041,175.62 $417,928,155.13 $112,995,991.07 $47,532,500.041998 $438,262,141.44 $409,632,030.78 NA NA2000 $590,980,726.14 $473,538,607.72 $277,702,955.45 $76,899,160.962002 $591,582,525.38 $471,881,818.05 NA NA2004 $801,568,639.17 $682,042,326.88 $665,160,127.36 $444,613,959.872006 $873,954,895.77 $853,286,809.64 NA NA2008 $866,711,440.14 $966,040,368.49 $1,561,161,335.53 $342,572,326.832010 $1,129,831,832.61 $1,166,032,283.57 NA NA2012 $1,080,560,312.17 $1,562,253,983.02 $1,593,694,866.62 $1,402,451,441.562014 $984,504,647.17 $1,249,506,032.78 NA NA2016 $873,871,947.11 $1,223,599,069.46 $904,876,117.56 $1,148,716,032.99

Table1A:Table,TotalContributionsandOutsideSpendingbyDonorType.DepictsunderlyingdatafromFigures1aandb.

29

Becausetheincreaseincontributionsandindependentexpenditureshas

followedroughlythesamepatternforHouseandSenatecandidates,thefiguresin

0

500

1000

150019

8019

8219

8419

8619

8819

9019

9219

9419

9619

9820

0020

0220

0420

0620

0820

1020

1220

1420

16

Dire

ct C

ontri

butio

ns a

nd In

depe

nden

tEx

pend

iture

s in

Milli

ons

of D

olla

rs

Individuals PACs

(a) Contributions and Spendingin House Elections

0

500

1000

1500

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Dire

ct C

ontri

butio

ns a

nd In

depe

nden

tEx

pend

iture

s in

Milli

ons

of D

olla

rs

Individuals PACs

(b) Contributions and Spendingin Senate Elections

0

1

2

3

4

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Aver

age

Con

tribu

tions

Expe

nditu

res

in M

illion

s of

Dol

lars

House Candidates Senate Candidates

(c) Avergage Contributions and Expendituresby Race Type

Figure1A:TotalandAverageContributions/IndependentExpenditurestoCongressionalCandidates,bySeatType.Depictsthetotal,inflation-adjustedcontributionsandindependentexpendituresmadebyindividualsandPACstoHousecandidates(a)andSenatecandidates(b),aswellastheaveragetotalcontributionstoeachcandidate(c).

30

thisreportpresentaggregateresultsforcongressionalcandidates.However,thereareseveralnotabledifferencesbetweenHouseandSenateraces.First,takentogether,Housecandidatesraiseroughly1.5timesaremuchmoneyasSenatecandidates(seeplotsaandb)inanygivenyear.ThisdisparityisdrivenentirelybythefactthattherearesignificantlymorecandidatesinelectionsfortheHousethanthereareinelectionsforSenateseats.Infact,theaverageSenatecampaignattractssignificantlymoremoneythantheaverageHousecampaign(seeplotc).

4

6

8

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Perc

enta

ge o

f Rac

es C

lass

ified

as

Com

petit

ive (M

argi

n of

Vic

tory

less

than

20%

)

General Elections Primary Elections

Frequency of Competitive Races

Figure2A:CompetitivePrimaryandGeneralElections.Depictsthepercentageofallprimaryandgeneralelectionsinagivencycleclassifiedascompetitive,definedasaraceinwhichthedifferenceinvotetotalsbetweenthetoptwocandidatesislessthan20percent.