1

Trapped in Corporatism? Trade Union Linkages to the Abahlali BaseMjondolo Movement in Durban.

Table Of Contents

Page Abstract 2 Introduction 3 Chapter One Methodology 7 Chapter Two COSATU and Neoliberal Corporatism in South Africa 10 Chapter Three Abahlali BaseMjondolo’s Challenge to Contemporary 24

Governance in South Africa Chapter Four Towards A United Struggle? 47 Chapter Five Conclusion 82 Bibliography 86

Appendix 91

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Abstract

This paper seeks to identify the relationship between the COSATU trade unions in Durban and the shack dwellers’ movement Abahlali baseMjondolo. It will outline how COSATU has been absorbed into a strategy of cooperating in corporatist structures and what implications this has. It will be argued that COSATU has not been able to reap the concessions it had hoped for from such arrangements and has been unable to exert the level of influence over the ANC that would allow it to guide a project for social transformation through the Alliance. The case study in Durban analyses the trade union attitudes towards the Abahlali movement and assesses whether trade union responses indicate that COSATU is trapped in a one-dimensional strategy of cooperation in corporatist governance. It also considers whether this has precluded COSATU from exploring linkages with groups like Abahlali that offer radical agendas for transforming South African society.

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Introduction

I will be investigating the relationship between COSATU trade unions in Durban

and a local social movement called Abahlali baseMjondolo (informal shack dwellers,

hereafter Abahlali) that has emerged in the shack settlements of Durban. The aim is to

explore the attitudes of trade unionists in the Durban area towards the movement and to

uncover whether COSATU unions believe that cooperation with the Abahlali movement

is desirable. By focusing on this relationship, I will examine some of the wider

connotations that such attitudes have for COSATU’s relationship with social movements

and the implications this has for COSATU’s role in contemporary South African politics.

The first chapter will give a brief account of my methodology. This will detail

how my data was generated and will also assess the limitations of the study. It will be

argued that whilst the sample size was restricted, the data gathered was sufficient to

produce a snap-shot of attitudes and was sufficient to conduct my analysis.

Chapter two will outline how COSATU has been absorbed into a neoliberal

corporatist arrangement between itself, the government and big business. I will explore

the reasons why COSATU has adopted a strategy of cooperating in corporatists

institutions. This, I will explain, must be understood in the context of the historic role

COSATU played in the liberation movement and its Alliance with the ANC and also

because of the balance of global political forces and the priority of securing the

4

democratic transition. Most importantly, cooperating in corporatist structures allows

COSATU to influence government policy and thus gain concessions for its members. It

also enables it to attempt to channel the ANC’s political trajectory into a

redistributionalist framework. However, in the wake of the ANC’s adoption of neoliberal

development strategies, I will argue that COSATU has been unable to fulfill its

objectives. Although it has been able to make limited gains for its members, it has

adopted a defensive strategy of protecting its members by contesting policy within the

neoliberal paradigm. This chapter will set the context for a later discussion of the

attitudes of unionists in Durban. It argues that such is the embedded logic of corporatist

strategies at a national level that COSATU unions are expected to exude revolutionary

discipline and reject cooperation with groups deemed illegitimate by the ANC

government. It will later be argued that such a logic pervades at a local level, a fact that

will be explored with respect to attitudes towards the Abahlali movement in Durban. The

implications of this is that COSATU is following a blinkered strategy of cooperating

within corporatist structures and that this has left it blind to alternative strategies. The

later chapter on Durban attitudes to Abahlali highlight the inability of unionists to

conceive of struggles outside of the corporatist strategy that permeates from the national

level.

Chapter three will discuss the Abahlali struggle and outline the manner in which

communities in the shack settlements are marginalised from politics at a local level. I will

discuss what the aims and tactics of this movement have been and what implications this

has for a serious challenge to neoliberal governance strategies in South Africa. This

5

group, it is argued, present a radical alternative strategy that is not mired in corporatist

logic and could present COSATU with a valuable partner if it sought to mount an

offensive oppositional strategy to the neoliberal trajectory of the ANC government rather

than simply defending worker privilege within the neoliberal framework.

The fourth chapter will focus on the responses of trade unionists in Durban. I will

firstly outline their attitudes towards community movements in general and explore how

these have changed since the community-organising strategies of the 1980s. I will also

explore the attitudes towards the unemployed and investigate whether the unions were

interested in committing to campaigns for a broader working class beyond its

membership base or whether they were more focused on protecting the interests of their

members. I will discuss the attitudes shown by those that I had contact with, explaining

that there was an extremely suspicious sentiment that prevailed amongst the unionists

towards the Abahlali movement. I will examine the concern that the unionists had over

the funders and why they thought that the Abahlali was being manipulated by external

forces. This forced the unions to be extremely wary of cooperating Abahlali as they felt

that the movement was anti-ANC. I will explain that such suspicions are unfounded and I

will argue that this reactionary attitude is a severe impediment to the unions linking with

such groups. I will then analyse how the unionists misconceived the goals of Abahlali,

conceiving it in technocratic terms as a single-issue campaign for housing. This

conception, I will argue, fails to recognise the broad appeal of the Abahlali campaign to

challenge the governance strategy of the local government. I will explain that the failure

to accurately comprehend the purpose of the Abahlali struggle is indicative of

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COSATU’s defensive, damage-limitation strategy towards opposing neoliberalism. This

strategy is restricted to what they perceive as the only “legitimate” organisational

strategy, namely demanding small gains from within neoliberal corporatist structures and

distancing themselves from groups that operate outside the confines of corporatist

strictures. It also dictates that groups must fight to win small material gains from the state

by working within the state structures provided. This is symptomatic of COSATU’s

inability to conceive of radical oppositional strategies, both tactically and ideologically.

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Chapter One

Methodology

My methodology was primarily based on interviews of trade unionists and

informal discussions and observations at gatherings such as the May Day rally in Durban.

The sample size was extremely restricted yet it covered a range of levels within the

unions, from shop stewards to those at the higher leadership levels such as the Regional

Chairperson for KwaZulu Natal. The interviews also covered educators at the workers

college who were responsible for educating shop stewards, giving them political tutoring

and various other training for their roles in the union. They had regular contact with many

of the unionists in Durban and were thus a useful barometer of attitudes amongst

unionists. Despite the limited sample size, I believe that the responses that I gained were

nonetheless useful and whilst the sample could only present a snap shot, it did yield some

interesting results for analysis. Some of the issues raised, such as attitudes towards the

Tripartite Alliance, drew responses that were uniform and could therefore be said to

represent the prevailing attitude of those unionists I had contact with. On other issues

there was a divergence in responses. However, rather than trying to go with the majority

sentiment at such times I have analysed the range of responses in order to highlight how

this is indicative of the misconceptions of the Abahlali movement, in terms of its aims

and its political purpose. Although, as I have already acknowledged, my sample size was

extremely limited, I do believe that this snap-shot of union attitudes did reveal some

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important insights into the current trajectory of trade union activity in Durban and that

this has some implications for COSATU at a national level.

My research on the Abahlali baseMjondolo movement consisted of an in-depth

interview with the President of Abahlali, Sbu Zikode, who was able to offer some

important insights into the movement and its attitudes towards trade union linkages, in

particular. I supplemented this by adopting a research strategy of participant-observation,

attending meetings and the UnFreedom Day campaign to observe the workings and

practice of the movement in action. It also offered me the chance to speak to several of

the people who attended the event in order to hear their perceptions of what was

happening. Attending the movement’s meetings allowed me to witness first-hand the

practice of decision-making and the organisational culture of Abahlali. I was able to see

how decisions were reached and how the commitment to democracy in the movement

was put into practice. My e mail interview with Mike Sutcliffe, the City Manager, also

allowed me to gain a valuable insight into how the City represents its slum clearance

project, and I was able to contrast this with the experiences that Abahlali members have

claimed to have. I have tried to document details of the claims that both sides have made

and have attempted to highlight the disparity between the rhetoric of the City and what

those in the Abahlali movement claim to be the lived experiences of the City’s

“participatory democracy”.

9

During this chapter, particularly when examining the Abahlali movement I will

quote heavily from members of the movement because, as will be explained, the struggle

is about setting up a radical new politics in South Africa, not one couched in technocratic

“specialist” terms or that of an academic tradition. I will do my best to present their

struggle in their own words without extracting it and applying it to some abstract theory,

because their struggle is about reclaiming South African politics and respect for those in

the shack settlements. I will also quote heavily from the activist/researchers who know

them best.

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Chapter Two

COSATU and Neoliberal Corporatism in South Africa

Introduction

This chapter will assess how COSATU has been inserted into the ANC’s governance

strategy in contemporary South Africa. I will explore how COSATU has been absorbed

into a corporatist mode of governance that is informed not simply by examples from

abroad, but also by the logic of a liberation movement and the historical relationship

between itself and the ANC. It is argued that because of its historical attachment to the

ANC, COSATU has been willing to subordinate its interests to the ANC’s national

development project. This is, however, also out of self-interest because COSATU has

benefited from corporatist arrangements that allow it a degree of influence over policy

that enables it to protect the interests of its members. COSATU also sees its position

within the Tripartite Alliance between itself, the ANC and the SACP as the only means

through which to pursue its project for the National Democratic Revolution (NDR).

The second section will argue that as the ANC pursues its commitment to national

development it has, as mentioned in the previous chapter, become increasingly

centralized and averse to dissent within the Alliance as it pursues the neoliberal

11

development strategy outlined in GEAR (the government’s Growth Employment and

Redistribution plan). This neoliberal shift has fundamentally altered the balance of forces

within the corporatist structures as business has been able to make its interest

synonymous with the ANC’s development strategy. The influence of COSATU has thus

been curtailed. Catchpowle and Cooper argue that the form of corporatism in South

Africa represents neoliberal corporatism which aims to ensure acceptance of neoliberal,

free market policies on the part of trade union leadership.1 It will be argued that although

cooperation in government is not necessarily a negative strategy, COSATU’s

involvement in neoliberal corporatism diminishes its ability to assert real influence. This

has resulted in COSATU adopting a reformist, damage-limitation strategy towards

opposing neoliberal initiatives in order to pursue the best solutions for its members within

the neoliberal paradigm.

1 Catchpowle, Lesley and Cooper, Christine “Neoliberal Corporatism: Origins and Implications for South Africa” in Bramble, Tom (ed) p.14

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Neoliberal Corporatism in South Africa

Following the democratic transition in South Africa COSATU became involved in a

corporatist mode of governance that aimed at solving disputes between itself and business

through mediation rather than adversarialism. Panitch describes corporatism as “a

political system within advanced capitalism which integrates organised socio-economic

groups through a system of representation and cooperative mutual interaction at the

leadership level and mobilisation and social control at the mass level”.2 This usually

entails a formal tripartite commitment by labour, capital and the state to work together in

an attempt to smooth over conflicts of interest through negotiation in order to ensure

social stability and the uninterrupted running of the economy. Catchpowle and Cooper

claim that it is not just an institutional commitment, it is political, and that it entails “the

voluntary subordination of sectional or class interest to the requirement of the ‘national

interest’. The institutionalisation of trade unions, inherent in any corporate strategy,

works as a mechanism of social control, and aims at integrating a section of the working

class into capitalist society.”3 Essentially these corporatist arrangements seek to pacify the

2 Catchpowle, Lesley and Cooper, Christine op. cit., p.14 3 ibid., p.14

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organised working class by allowing it a modicum of influence in exchange for the

unions accepting capitalist relations as the status quo. This militates against Marxist

understandings of class warfare being the motor of history and that class antagonisms are

fundamentally irreconcilable by offering competing class forces the opportunity to co-

determine economic policy and, in theory, reach a compromise favourable for both sets

of interests.4

From its founding in 1985, COSATU had consistently called for a socialist

revolution as part-and-parcel of the overthrow of the apartheid government. However,

Desai and Habib explored how during the transition period in the early nineteen nineties

COSATU’s demands for a socialist order became gradually curtailed in favour of

mediation and compromise with capital in order to ensure the continuation of the

transition process and to consolidate ANC rule thereafter.5 This change of tactic was the

result of COSATU’s involvement in the negotiating process with both business and with

the old regime itself which emphasised the need for compromise rather than adversarial

relations in order to secure both the transition and the new democratic order. As Desai

and Habib have noted: “The emergence of a popularly-elected government in April 1994

was followed by the latter’s immediate and continued assurance to local and international

capital that their position was secure in the new South Africa. The labour movement

responded to these changed conditions by adopting a discourse that emphasised ‘social

4 Adam, Heribert et al Comrades in Business: Post Liberation Politics in South Africa (South Africa, Tafelberg, 1998) p.144 5 Desai, Ashwin and Habib, Adam “COSATU and the Democratic Transition in South Africa: Drifting Towards Corporatism? In South Asia Bulletin: Comparitive Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East Volume XV Number 1p.30

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partnership’ rather than ‘takeover’ of the economy.”6 Adam et al have argued that despite

left-wing critics of COSATU’s adoption of corporatist arrangements, there was little

alternative for COSATU in the face of global economic pressures.7 Indeed, following the

fall of the Soviet Union alternative strategies were de-legitimised by a new configuration

of global forces intent on ensuring the ANC accept their doctrine of the need for market-

friendly development policies.8 Faced with immediate pressing demands from its

membership base for jobs, wages and improved living conditions plus demands for

stability from new government, it is little wonder that so many labour analysts at the time

supported corporatist arrangements.9

Corporatism might have been a desirable option for COSATU wanting to

consolidate the position of the new government and bring immediate benefits to its

members, and the same could also be said about business. Whilst during the transition

period the balance of forces in the global economy certainly favoured capital over labour,

COSATU was a well-organised union that had exerted considerable pressure on the

previous apartheid economy through its militancy and it was now demanding to be heard.

As one management consultant remarked during the transition period, “management will

have to give up some of its control in order to keep it.”10 By allowing the working class to

promote its interests within the institutional framework encourages it to pursue its

6 Ibid p.32 7 Adam, Heribert et al op. cit., p.140 8 For a more in-depth discussion of the ideological underpinnings of the transition period see Williams, Paul and Taylor, Ian “Neoliberalism and the Political Economy of the ‘New’ South Africa” in New Political Economy, Volume 5, Number 1 (2000) Peet, Richard “Ideology, Discourse, and the Geography of Hegemony: From Socialist to Neoliberal Development in Postaparteid South Africa” in Antipode, Volume 34 Number 1 (2002) 9 Desai, Ashwin and Habib, Adam (1995) op. cit., p.31 for a discussion of these analyses 10 Quoted in

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interests in a disciplined, cooperative manner rather than an adversarial manner that could

harm the economy as a whole.

The National-Liberation Context

COSATU’s commitment to negotiated decision-making and a corporatist structure of

governance is not merely predicated on an objective assessment of the scope to advance

worker interests within such a governance framework, it is also powerfully influenced by

COSATU’s historical background as an alliance partner with the ANC and its

commitment to pursue the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) in Alliance with the

ANC. Since 1989 COSATU has recognised the ANC as the leader of the Alliance and

figurehead of national liberation, a position continuously reaffirmed by the ANC

leadership today.11 In this respect, the ANC is careful to utilise emotive discourse of the

struggle years and the ‘national interest’ in order to command discipline from both

COSATU officials and its members.

Dorman argues that “the lasting impacts of liberation struggles are found not in

the post-liberation institution building, but in relationships and alliances formed during

11 See Buhlungu, Sakhele “From ‘Madiba Magic’ to ‘Mbeki Logic’: Mbeki and the ANC’s Trade Union Allies” in Jacobs, Sean and Calland, Richard (eds) Thabo Mbeki’s World: The Politics and Ideology of the South Africa President (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 2002) and Johnson, Krista “State and Civil Society in Contemporary South Africa: Redefining the Rules of the Game” in Jacobs, Sean and Calland, Richard (eds) Thabo Mbeki’s World: The Politics and Ideology of the South Africa President (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 2002)

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those difficult years.”12 Continuities can be traced between the relationship between

COSATU and the ANC during the liberation struggle and in their contemporary

relationship. Buhlungu asserts that the prerogatives of a movement in exile and the

demand for deference to the ANC as leader of the alliance, and the call to display

“revolutionary discipline” are still strong amongst ANC leaders: “Their instrumental

approach to unions – the ‘transmission belt’ approach, which was prevalent in the

collapsed socialist countries in eastern Europe and in developing countries – has

remained highly influential among activists and leaders.”13 The unions are expected to

play a “transmission belt” role, maintaining the discipline of its members and shaping

responsibility for the ANC’

Buhlungu believes that what can now be witnessed is a change from the more

inclusive politics of the Mandela presidency or “Madiba magic”, where there was an

effort to accommodate the concerns of the unions so that they would cooperate; towards

“Mbeki logic” where Mbeki does not simply offer cooperation but he demands it.14

Mbeki has recently declared that: “Constructive engagement in the continuing, difficult

and complex struggle to advance the objectives it [the liberation movement] has set for

the nation is what will define, in the masses of our people, who is a genuine

representative of these masses, and who is merely a pretender.”15 Members of the

liberation movement are required to not simply “critique” or “demand that the

government deliver”; it is expected that they remain disciplined and continue to engage

12 Rich Dorman, Sara “Post-liberation Politics in Africa: Examining the political legacy of struggle” Third World Quarterly volume 27, issue 6 (forthcoming Sept 2006) p.13 13 Buhlungu, Sakhele (I) p.183 14 Ibid p.193 15 Mbeki, Thabo ANC Today http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/index.html

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constructively with the government and that they must not “remain content to reap the

fruits of the revolution, determined to make no contribution to the growth of these

fruits.”16 Mbeki’s approach is perhaps the most striking example of a “transmission belt”

mentality towards the unions. COSATU unions are expected to accept the directives of

the COSATU leadership and defer to the leadership of the ANC. This involves

cooperating in the national development strategy and relinquishing the idea that the ANC,

as a government representing the ‘national interest’, can simply pursue the ‘selfish’ or

‘sectional’ interests of the labour unions.17

The most striking example of the ANC’s determination to proceed with its agenda

in the face of union opposition was the adoption of GEAR that has been the hallmark of

ANC economic policy. Mandela stated at the time of its launch that; “There are matters

on which we [the alliance partners] will agree. The second category is matters where we

disagree among us, but compromise. The third category is where there is no agreement at

all and the government will go on with its policy.”18 COSATU’s major grievance was that

it was left to deal only with the product of the ANC government’s policy rather than

directly affecting the ideological direction of the policy agenda.19 Neoliberal corporatism

insulates politics from popular scrutiny, even from those within the corporatist structures,

and assigns COSATU a role in mediating social disputes whilst ensuring the discipline of

its members in order to facilitate the government’s development strategy.

16 Ibid 17 Johnson, Krista op. cit., p.227 18 Quoted in Buhlungu, Sakhele (II) “Union-Party Alliances in the Era of Market Regulation: The Case of South Africa” Journal of Southern African Studies Volume 31, Number 4 (2005) p.710 19 Eidelberg, P.G The Tripartite Alliance on the Eve of the New Millenium: COSATU, the ANC and the SACP” in Adler, Glenn et al (ed) Trade Unions and Democratization in South Africa, 1985-1997 (Basingstoke, MacMillan 2000)

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Neoliberal Corporatism: Sapping COSATU’s Strength?

It should be noted that COSATU voluntarily subordinates itself to ANC leadership. This

is because, as mentioned above, it sees cooperation in Alliance corporatism as the best

strategy for protecting its members interests and furthering its goal of social

transformation through the NDR. However, this has caused COSATU to become

embedded in the logic of corparatism in South Africa. This logic entails the voluntary

deferment of working class interests to those of capital in order to facilitate the

government’s development programme whilst practicing discipline with regard to

industrial action and accepting responsibility for the growth of the economy as a whole.

COSATU adheres to this arrangement because it still believes the Alliance is the only

means through which to protect its members interests and influence policy. It is this same

logic and the very nature of the neoliberal corporatist arrangement that is disempowering

COSATU.

There is clearly a widespread feeling amongst COSATU officials of

marginalisation within the alliance structure and that COSATU is being left out in the

cold when it comes to determining the economic policy direction of the government.

Buhlungu has argued that in South Africa we witness a shift from “social regulation”

19

towards “market regulation” of the economy as the ANC shifted from the social-

democratic RDP towards the neoliberal policies of GEAR. As such, she argues, unions

have the been decreasingly able to influence government policy as the market is

prioritised as the primary vehicle for development.20 The trade unions have had to

forward their demands within the neoliberal paradigm rather than in opposition to it.

Cooperation with state institutions need not necessarily mean COSATU “selling

out” or diverting from its pursuit of socialism. Appolis believes that cooperation provided

a “launch pad for further forays into the territory of the enemy”.21 Appolis notes that

cooperation and reform should not be viewed as an end in themselves but that they

should be used as just one tactic to advance what he sees as the “protracted trench

warfare” of class struggle. He states that “It is not so much the struggle for reform that is

reformist but rather how reforms are viewed and where they are located in the struggle

for socialism. When reforms are seen as ends in themselves and not means to an end then

we have classic reformism.”22 COSATU does not need to follow a dichotomy between

strategies of cooperation and disengagement, so long as the overall objective of radical

social transformation is not surrendered to a reformist logic. Reforms in legislation such

as the Labour Relations Act (LRA) should be celebrated as temporary successes and the

means with which to gradually increase working class control over both state institutions

and the work place. These reforms complement the strategy of social revolution, they do

not preclude it; cooperation must not become the sole strategy, with small reforms its

20 Buhlungu, Sakhele (II) op. cit., 21 Appolis, John “The Registration Debate and Participation in Industrial Councils” in Left Movements and Participation in Bourgeois Institutions (Khanya College Publishing, 2006) p.17 22 Ibid p.17

20

only goal – it must be pursued in parallel with alternative strategies for furthering radical

transformation.

COSATU is committed to corporatism because of its historic link to the ANC in

the Alliance and its commitment to further social transformation through the Alliance and

the newly-won democratic state apparatus. It is also committed to corporatism in order to

secure short-term concessions for its membership. There is a continued commitment to

the Alliance structure as the best means through which to deliver the NDR. However,

COSATU fails to recognise the nature of the neoliberal corporatist strategy in which it

has become embroiled and has adopted a defensive, reform-minded strategy that seeks to

secure short term concessions at the expense of an offensive strategy for social

transformation. Whilst it is right to cite the democratic nature of the South African state

and the opportunities that this now offers for cooperation, COSATU has taken this too far

and have made participation a matter of principle which has fundamentally failed to

recognise the class character of the (neoliberal) state. As Appolis states, “It sees

participation in the plethora of bourgeois institution as a matter of common sense, not to

be questioned.”23 Although COSATU sees democratic institutions as a way to further

their socialist ideal through the NDR, cooperation in neoliberal institutions has been born

at too greater cost as working class interests have been subordinated to the prerogatives

of ‘market friendly’ legislations and the maintenance of “business confidence” and this

has reduced COSATU’s demands to transformist logic within the neoliberal paradigm

instead of in opposition to it. Both the advancement of its strategy of pursuing social

transformation through the Alliance and advancing the interests of its members and 23 Ibid p.21

21

gaining them immediate concessions are threatened by neoliberal corporatism because

COSATU’s influence in such structures is being gradually eroded.24

A fundamental tenet of neoliberal governance is that whilst competing

‘stakeholders’ might vie for influence in order to affect small changes, this cannot

supersede the priority of ‘market friendly’ policies. ‘Stakeholders’ like COSATU can

affect change but only within the parameters of neoliberalism. Because the parameters of

macroeconomic debate are set outside of forums such as NEDLAC, rather than

addressing the policy direction of the ANC directly, COSATU is forced to accept the

neoliberal policy agenda and is often left to deal with simply making adjustments to, or

implementing policy rather than debating its initial content. Whilst neoliberal discourse

might evoke the idea of “partnership”, such partnerships are highly unequal in terms of

the ability of some partners to influence policy. Under neoliberalism that prioritises,

above all else, the sanctity of “business confidence”, COSATU will always be a junior

partner. This process, however, should not cast COSATU as the victim of forces beyond

its control since the subordination of COSATU came about largely because of its

voluntary deference to the prerogatives of the ‘national interest’ and its continued

affirmation that Alliance corporatism is the best means to further both the interests of its

members and the NDR. This is coupled with its own inability to maintain powerful links

with community struggles and the strategy of social movement unionism, as will be

discussed later.

24 Buhlungu Sakhele (II) op. cit., and Webster, Eddie “The Alliance Under Stress: Governing in a Globalizing World” in Democratization, Volume 8, Number 1 (2001)

22

Lehulere has examined a gradual three-period shift in COSATU’s ideological

standpoint towards the right: “These three periods represent a steady evolution by the

federation in its economic strategy from a socialist position to a right-wing

Keynesianism.”25 Through her analysis of COSATU documents, she traces a gradual

acceptance of a capitalist system and a shift towards the federation accepting a position as

partner in negotiation for reforms with capital and dropping an overtly socialist

opposition strategy in favour of compromise. COSATU, because of its junior role in

neoliberal structures, has been left only to do its best to ameliorate the worst affects of

neoliberal policy rather than engaging it at its root.26

Concluding Remarks

While COSATU is unable to avert trends such as casualisation and flexibilisation

it is doing its best to ameliorate their worst effects on its membership base. However,

COSATU has not experienced the kind of influence that it had hoped for in terms of

being able to advance the interests of its members. Instead it has become locked into a

defensive strategy to protect their membership’s interests – but within the neoliberal

paradigm. It is increasingly incapable of channelling the ANC’s policy choices and has

thus lost the ability to direct social transformation from within the Alliance structures.

25 Lehulere, Oupa “The Road to the Right: COSATU Economic Policy in the Post-Apartheid Period” in Bramble, T. and Barchiesi, F., (eds). Rethinking the Labour Movement in the "New South Africa",(Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003) p.26 26 For a detailed discussion of this trend with respect to the example of privatization see Van Driel, Maria “Unions and Privatisation in South Africa, 1990-2001” in Bramble, T. and Barchiesi, F., (eds). Rethinking the Labour Movement in the "New South Africa",(Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003)

23

This is because the balance of forces in corporatist structures is weighed towards business

and the ANC has pursued a neoliberal development programme whilst COSATU has

become increasingly marginalised. This brings into serious question whether COSATU is

able to exert the influence within corporatist structures necessary to steer the ANC’s path

towards the kind of social transformation that COSATU envisaged in the NDR. After all,

it is in the very nature of neoliberalism to concentrate wealth and power in the hands of a

small elite and to remove economic determination from the working class. This is the

very antithesis of a progression towards socialism. COSATU must question whether it

can still hope to affect change from within the Alliance. The rest of this paper will focus

on whether COSATU sees itself as having a broad political role or whether it is reverting

to a traditional trade union role, focusing predominantly on shop floor issues. Whether or

not COSATU seeks to link up with community struggles, it is argued, is a major indicator

of this trend.

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Chapter Three

Abahlali baseMjondolo

Introduction

This chapter will firstly take a brief look at the imijondolos (shack settlements) in

Durban and explore the emergence of a social movement representing the shack dwellers.

I will explain how this movement emerged out of the Kennedy Road settlement in

response to the failure of local government to address the concerns of residents. I will

examine the Abahlali baseMjondolo movement and explain how they have attempted to

resist the slum clearance policies of the local government. It will be argued that their

movement does not simply demand housing; they aim at radically democratising both

their communities and their government that is elected to represent them. I will firstly

examine the politics of the Abahlali movement and then explain how the dynamics of the

movement contribute to its radical challenge to contemporary social movement theory

that too often groups “new social movements” under the umbrella term of “single issue”

politics. I will explain why this is not so in Abahlali’s case and why they could present an

alternative to the strategy that COSATU and some social movements pursue of simply

making material demands from the state. I will explore how their radical democratic

culture sustains the movement and allows it to pursue an agenda that transcends a simple

demand for housing.

25

Political Dispossession

Imijondolos make up a huge proportion of urban dwellings in Durban. According to

government statistics, of the 3,026,974 people living in the municipal area, 920,000

people, or a half of the black population, live in the imijondolos.27 The imijondolos are

scattered across Durban (see map in appendix) and are constructed out of wood, card or

plastic or any other suitable material at hand. Despite promises of housing for the

residents of the imijondolos and that they are a temporary phenomena that will pass in

due time, the settlements continue to grow. Kennedy Road, one of the informal

settlements and the place where the Abahlali shackdwellers’ movement, originated is

located next to the municipal dump and the residents of these areas are forced to live in

conditions of extreme poverty. Such are the deprived conditions in the shacks and the

failure of government to build provide services and housing that the shackdwellers did

not feel they could celebrate Freedom Day on April 27th with the rest of the nation. As

the president of the Abahlali, Sbu Zikode, stated:

How can we celebrate freedom when we only here tales of freedom or see people’s lives changed

for the better in other parts of the country, but never in our communities. We cannot celebrate, we

have nothing to be cheerful about. We are the forgotten people who are expected to be content

with sharing five toilets among 5000 people. How can a community of 5000 people celebrate

when it is expected to make do with six taps?28

27 Marx, Colin and Charlton, Sarah University College London: Urban Slums Reports: The Case of Durban, South Africa on http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/cities/durban.htm 28 Majova, Zukile “5000 Join in ‘Death of Freedom Protests” in The Mercury 28th April, 2006

26

The residents of the Kennedy Road settlement are determined to stay where they

are despite the city’s plan to relocate the Kennedy Road settlement out to the peripheries

of the city onto new houses on the green-field site of Verulum. This site is located outside

the perimeter of the city. Whilst the residents of Kennedy Road want the housing they

were promised back in 1993, they assert that they want this on the adjacent strip of and at

Elf Road which had consistently been promised to them.29 This is because the residents of

the shack communities, although predominantly unemployed in the formal economy,

perform various roles in the informal sector. These include informal trading, casual

labour, recycling materials for money and many other such activities that demand that

they remain in the city area so that they can easily access their sites of work. They are

also wish to be close to local services like schools and hospitals that they fear will not be

provided for them in Verulum.30

Contrary to popular perceptions, including those of the unionists I interviewed,

Abahlali’s struggle does not simply come from impatience at the lack of housing or

service delivery. Rather, it comes from the lack of respect and outright contempt with

which they feel they have been treated by their local government. As Bryant has

observed, it is not the slow delivery of the council which has angered the shack-dwellers,

but the way in which they operate.31 Zikode criticises the manner in which local

councillors treat the shack-settlements, complaining that “they take the vote and then you

29 Pithouse, Richard (2006) (I) Struggle Is a School: The Rise of a Shack Dwellers’ Movement in Durban, South Africa Monthly Review http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28 30 Ibid 31 Bryant, Jacob Towards Delivery and Dignity: Community Struggle From Kennedy Road (Unpublished dissertation) p.46

27

never see them again.”(Zikode) He told me that they never felt listened to, that the local

ANC councillors would come into their communities during election time and then

disappear back to their middle class suburbs. Zikode’s impression was that the ANC took

these communities for granted.32

The municipality insists that where possible, it will upgrade settlements in situ.

City Manager Mike Sutcliffe states that this is the most desirable and cost-effective

strategy to pursue: “By densifying new developments in strategically located areas along

our High Priority Transport Network as well as in the former townships, the City plans to

reduce the creation of new and unsustainable residential areas which are outside the

urban edge and expensive to service.”33 He also emphasised the commitment of the City

to ensure that “basic infrastructure” was provided in the areas earmarked for resettlement

including “semi-pressured water, waterborne sanitation and electricity to each site.”34

However, there appears to be major discrepancies between the City management and the

shack communities as to how this project is being implemented. The residents of

Kennedy Road are concerned that they are being removed to ghettos at the edges of the

city with no basic infrastructure or access to services such as schools and hospitals.

Furthermore, as mentioned above, it is important to these communities that they stay in

the city where they can remain close to their places of work.

Deputy City Manager Derek Naidoo came to Kennedy Road in November 2005 in

order to try and prevent a protest march that had been arranged by Abahlali for the

32 Interview with Zikode, Sbu - President of Abahlali baseMjondolo (05/05/06) 33 Interview with Sutcliffe, Mike – Durban City Manager – E mail correspondence 34 ibid

28

following day. The meeting was attended by the representatives of Abahlali as well as a

large group of residents from the Kennedy Road settlement. At the meeting Naidoo

responded to the requests of residents to be given the adjacent land on Elf Road that they

had been consistently promised by telling them that the ground was not safe for building

(despite a brick factory being built there) and that the fumes from the nearby dump made

the air dangerous to the inhabitants (despite consistently reassuring middle class residents

in the area of the its safety).35 After the residents at the meeting continued to question

Naidoo, he then revealed to the people at the meeting that the entire settlement was to be

relocated. As Pithouse observed:

From the last days of apartheid until this meeting people had consistently been promised housing

in the area. People had been told that some housing would be provided in the outlying ghettos of

Verulum or Mount Moriah, but they had never been told that they would all be moved to the rural

periphery of the metro. Naidoo’s emphatic announcement of impending mass forced removals

from the city was deeply shocking.36

Despite angry protests at the meeting, and a number of residents storming out of the

community hall, Naidoo declared that the area had been “ring fenced” for clearance and

that the policy would not be reversed.37 It is important to note how the decision taken by

the City authority was not discussed with the shack-dwellers and that it was presented to

them (only after they interrogated Naidoo) as a fait accompli. At the end of the meeting,

Naidoo described what had transpired was “participatory democracy”(Pit MR) The City

Manager outlined to me the process of drafting housing policy and implementation:

35Pithouse, Richard (2006) (I) Struggle Is a School: The Rise of a Shack Dwellers’ Movement in Durban, South Africa Monthly Review http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28 36 Ibid 37 ibid

29

Housing policy is to a large extent drafted at the National and Provincial level. Draft policy

documents are circulated for public comment. When these are finalised, City officials

communicate them to councillors and directly to communities during meetings. The implications

of these polices are also workshopped with communities who have been selected for a housing

project.38

However, no such consultation process appears to have transpired at Kennedy Road, at

least according to the Abahlali movement that has arisen precisely because of the way

they have felt marginalised from determining their future. Zikode received a letter whilst

I was conducting my interview with him. The letter was a response to an earlier

correspondence sent by Zikode to the Ministry of Housing asking for a consultative

meeting between the Ministry and Abahlali. After over three months the ministry sent its

reply (see appendix). At the next meeting of Abahlali, Zikode angrily waved the letter to

those present declaring that it contains “no commitment, no timeframe…it is just a letter

to impress us.”39 There is clearly a difference between how the City has framed

participatory processes and what the shack dwellers at Kennedy Road claim to have

experienced of such processes. The Ministry of Housing claims that the “success” of the

slums clearance project “can be best summed up in the proven ability of various

municipal service units, councillors and communities to work together and prove that

integrated planning and development can be achieved within local authorities.”40

However, in the light of the Housing Ministry’s apparent ambivalence to the concerns of

the shack dwellers at Kennedy Road and the claim by Deputy City Manager Naidoo that

his meeting on Kennedy Road was an example of “participatory democracy”(PITHOUSE

MR) in action, there seems to be a wide disparity between the rhetoric and the practice of 38 Interview with Sutcliffe, Mike – Durban City Manager – E mail correspondence 39 Abahlali meeting Kennedy Road Community Centre (21/06/06) 40 Grimmet, Neville Slums Clearance Project on www.durban.gov.za

30

the City with respect to the levels of participation and democracy that the people of

Kennedy Road have witnessed. Indeed, their experience of “participatory democracy”

suggests that the City’s decision-making is anything but democratic and that participation

involves communities like Kennedy Road passively accepting the City’s directives and

moving quietly to the peripheral ghettos.

It is the perceived lack of consultation with the residents of the Kennedy Road settlement

and the way they believe that their requests have been ignored which has added ferocity

to the protests of Abahlali. As Patel argues: “Over the past few months, communities

around the country have erupted in protest, and all with a similar fundamental claim –

that they are tired, after a decade of democracy, of waiting for the government to treat

them with respect. Respect has certainly been lacking in the way eThekweni Municipality

has dealt with Durban’s poorest.”41 The manner in which they feel their elected

representatives treat them makes them feel like that they have been disposed of their

democracy and that determination of their lives is surrendered to technocratic

governance: “We believe that housing policy does not only require housing specialists,

rich consultants and government. We believe that housing policy requires, most

importantly, the people who need the houses.”42 The common sentiment of Abahlali’s

activities is that they have been consistently ignored and that only through action can they

begin to be heard and to regain the respect they have been deprived by the dispossession

of their democracy.43

41 Patel, Raj (2005) Somewhere to live in dignity . The Mercury http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28 42 Original Emphasis Zikode, Sbu op. cit., 43 ibid

31

Taking to the Streets

Whilst Abahlali had consistently attempted to work within the structures of

government, it was when they were consistently ignored and treated with contempt that

they took to the streets. In the face of increasing marginalisation from the local

government and the failure of local government to listen to the voices of the imijondolos,

Abahlali held a meeting on 20th March, 2005 to decide what action to take. It was decided

that on the following day they would block the Umgeni road near to the settlement. By

blocking the road next to the settlement it was hoped that it would highlight the plight of

the shack dwellers and also draw attentions to how the council had failed those in the

shack settlements. Zikode says that “we have been encouraged by our municipality that

the Zulu language cannot be understood by our officials, Xhosa cannot be understood,

Sotho cannot be understood, even English cannot be understood. The only language they

understand is us getting into the street. We have seen the result and have been

encouraged.”44 These protests emerge out of a sense of alienation from the local

government; the Abahlali movement claims that the only way the local government deals

with these shack communities is through lies and deceit. As Patel and Pithouse have said

“…while portrayed as activist outbursts, on closer examination these marches and

protests turn out to be rational, democratic engagements given the structures of power

44 Quoted in Bryant op. cit., p.35

32

within which South Africa’s poor live.”45 This is their way of making themselves heard

when they believe they would otherwise be ignored.

The road blockaded evoked a hostile reaction from both the national and local

government. The national government has reacted extremely defensively to Abahlali’s

uprising, brandishing protests as unwarranted criminal activity. Following the road

blockade, President Mbeki stated that “We must stop this business of people going into

the street to demonstrate about lack of delivery. These are the things the youth used to do

in the struggle against apartheid.”46 This attitude at a national level has also been evident

the local municipalities’ response in Durban. When Abahlali vented its grievances

through action, it was immediately criminalised and cast as an illegitimate means of

“participating” in South African democracy, despite Abahlali claiming that they have

been unable to participate in local government because they have been ignored by both

their councillors and the municipality.

Contrary to Mbeki’s belief that these protests arise out of impatience with a lack

of service delivery and that they are merely orchestrated to demand services. Abahlali

claims its continuous struggle is about reclaiming dignity. They feel that they should be

listened to and that they should be allowed to exercise their right to protest. As Pithouse

states:

45 Patel, Raj and Pithouse, Richard (2005) The Third Nelson Mandela. Voice of the Turtle http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28 46 Pithouse, Richard (2006) (I) Struggle Is a School: The Rise of a Shack Dwellers’ Movement in Durban, South Africa Monthly Review http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28

33

They had accepted that delivery would be slow and that they must take responsibility for their own

welfare. They were the model poor – straight out of the World Bank text books. They revolted not

because they had believed and had done everything asked of them and they were still poor. They

revolted because the moment they asked that their faith may not be spurned is the moment their

aspirations for dignity became criminal.47

The actions of the Abahlali have hitherto been met with repression from the

municipality. City Manager Mike Sutcliffe banned the marches of Abahlali in what the

Freedom of Expression Institute labelled “a flagrant violation of the Constitution and the

Regulation of Gatherings Act” and it went on to condemn “the eThekweni Municipality’s

blatant disregard for the rights of marginalised communities to exercise their freedom of

expression.”48 Activists on the marches have also been met with police brutality and

intimidation as the municipality aimed at suppressing the protests.49 This has included

threats of violence toward journalists and academics if they document what has

transpired.50 What Abahlali declared as its attempts to regain the respect and democracy,

the government dismissed as criminal. This began a new wave of protests. As Pithouse

put it, “On the day of the road blockade they entered the tunnel of the discovery of the

betrayal. Nothing has been the same since.”51 The road blockade was followed by

marches organised by Abahlali. The first took place on 13th May, 2005 when 3000

Kennedy Road residents and people from the surrounding settlements, flat residents from

47 ibid 48 Quoted in Pithouse, Richard (2005) (I) Coffin for the Councilor. Centre for Civil Society http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28 49 Patel Raj (2006) Shackdwellers resist KZN Premier. Indymedia South Africa http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28 50 ibid 51 Pithouse, Richard (2006) (I) Struggle Is a School: The Rise of a Shack Dwellers’ Movement in Durban, South Africa Monthly Review http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28

34

Sydenham, residents of Wentworth township and a groups from the Socialist Student’s

Movement marched on councillor Baig to demand land, housing and his immediate

resignation.52 They carried with them a mock coffin for the councillor to symbolise that

to them he was dead to them, and that he no longer represented them. The march faced a

large armed military presence and also a slur campaign attempting to cast the march as an

IFP march.53

Another example of the movement’s activity was when as many as 8000 people

from Kennedy Road and some newly-aligned partner settlements again marched to Baig,

this time enacting a mock funeral for the councillor which symbolised to them that he

was dead and no longer recognized as their councillor.54 On 27th April, 2006 Abahlali

mounted a symbolic UnFreedom Day event on the day that the rest of the country

celebrated Freedom Day on the anniversary of the first democratic elections in 1994. The

event brought groups from the various shack settlements together for what was

considered a day of mourning for the loss of their freedom. The sentiment of the day was

that the people of the shack settlements could not celebrate freedom with the rest of the

country when they were still trapped in poverty. It was estimated that as many as 500055

crammed St Johns Church Hall to witness array of speakers and entertainment provided

from across the different communities.

52 Pithouse, Richard (2005) (I) Coffin for the Councilor. Centre for Civil Society http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28 53 ibid 54 Bryant, Jacob op. cit., p.13 55 Majova, Zukile “5000 Join in ‘Death of Freedom Protests” in The Mercury 28th April, 2006

35

Abahlali’s actions fundamentally challenge the ANC government’s belief that as

leader of the liberation movement it is the only body bestowed with the responsibility to

define who is (and who is not) a “legitimate” voice in civil society and how they can raise

their grievances. Neocosmos argues that for a true democratic emancipatory project to

emerge, “the state should not be allowed to dictate whether popular organisations are

legitimate or not….only society itself should be entitled to bestow such legitimacy.”56

Although Abahlali has not turned its back on placing demands of the local government

(its invite to Naidoo being one example) it has also used protest with a view to ensuring

its voice is heard. It does not limit its demands to material concessions from the local

government for housing or service delivery but defines for itself what can or cannot be

granted by the government. In short, they want to subordinate government, in all its

workings, to the people so that they can determine for themselves what can or cannot be

demanded.

Subordinating the state to the people

There is an unfortunate tendency of the both those in government and those on the

political left to compartmentalise all the activities of the “new social movements” under

the umbrella of “single issue” politics that will fade once the issue has been addressed.

This suggests that such struggles are parochial or, in Freund’s words, “‘popcorn’ politics

56 Neocosmos, Michael Development, Social Citizenship and Human Rights: Rethinking the Political Core of an Emancipatory Project in Africa Paper delivered at the Centre For Civil Society Seminar Series (2nd June, 2006) p.14

36

– immensely serious and volatile but unable to transcend the issues of the moment…”57 A

common criticism of social movements in South Africa is that they emerge as a

defensive, even reactionary force aiming to ameliorate or in some cases derail the worst

excesses of the affects of neoliberalism on the poor. As Neocosmos argues, “…there is

nothing inherent in social movements themselves which necessarily bears an

emancipatory potential, let alone a project. In fact, when social movements are simply

oppositional, simply against what exists, or clamour for state ‘delivery’ they can easily

be demobilised and incorporated.”58 This view is shared by Freund, who believes that

such movements can be neutralised by the state if it acts with dexterity. Small reforms, he

asserts, can help take the “fire” out of such processes.59

Nevertheless, this analysis only holds true if the movement limits its scope to a

material demand that the government can realistically fulfil. In the short term, the City

Manager admits that this is unlikely with respect to housing:

Given our current allocation of funding from the Province, we would only meet our target of

eradicating slums by 2015. In order to achieve the 2010 target, the City’s allocation of funding

would need to be doubled and reserved exclusively for addressing slums. Apart from funding there

are also other factors to consider such as capacity in the industry…consultation and

participation…[and] the availability of sufficient materials such as cement… while it would be

important for the City to meet such a target there are certain realities which need to be taken into

account.60

57 Freund, Bill “The State of South Africa’s Cities” in State of the Nation 2005-2006 (Cape Town, HSRC Press, 2005) p.322 58 Neocosmos, Michael op. cit., p.32 59 Freund, Bill op. cit., p.323 60 Interview with Sutcliffe, Mike – Durban City Manager – E mail correspondence

37

More importantly, Abahlali’s demands are not restricted to a single-issue material

demand than can be met by the municipality if it simply acts with dexterity. Far from a

parochial, simplistic demand for the state simply for more services, Abahlali demands

something seemingly simple but with far reaching implications; they demand their voice

to be heard and to be listened to. As Zikode put it to me:

What is interesting is that for the first time in the history of this country the poor of the poorest

have come to have a voice….the very same people senior people who claim to be leading who sit

in the union buildings and city hall will never put their feet here but they are always claiming to be

leading us, they don’t even know how we live but they claim to be our leaders….But now the tide

has turned…you are hearing from the horses’ mouth…we have come out to say this is who we

are, this is where we are and this is what they want.(original emphasis)61

Who ‘they’ are is the shack-dwellers, challenging the stereotypes of a “surplus

humanity”62 or a “dangerous underclass”, swimming in a sea of their own squalor and

vice who are judged too ignorant to know what to demand and are expected to simply

defer to those that claim to lead them; those that claim to know more about what the

shack-dwellers really need and what needs to be done in their name. What they want, as

Pithouse succinctly sums up, “is nothing less than to subordinate the local manifestations

of the sate to society.”63 Or, as Zikode recently told a packed university auditorium,

Our movement seeks to bring the government to the ground, to bring the institutions of

government and the private sector to the ground. We fight to bring policies that affect our people

under the control of our people. Our masses, our unity and diversity is our strength, our pain, our

voice. We have become the strong poor. The politics of a strong poor is an anti-party politics. Our

61 Interview with Zikode, Sbu - President of Abahlali baseMjondolo (05/05/06) 62 A term used by Davis, Mike Planet of Slums (New York, Verso, 2006) 63 Pithouse, Richard (2006) (I) Struggle Is a School: The Rise of a Shack Dwellers’ Movement in Durban, South Africa Monthly Review http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28

38

politics is not to put someone into an office. Our politics is to put our people above that office. And

once we have finished with one office we move on to the next office.”(Original emphasis)64

It is important to note that the struggle does not correspond to a reprisal of the anti-

government struggle characterised during the struggle against the apartheid government.

As such, it is not anti-ANC because, as Patel explains, many of the residents demanding

the resignation of their councillor still chant “viva ANC”.65 The ANC as an organisation

still enjoys support in these areas and many of the Abahlali activists are members of the

ANC. It is the local ANC councillors and ANC representatives in the Municipal

government and the manner in which they are perceived to neglect the shack

communities that are the subject of Abahlali’s protest, not the ANC as a whole. It is not

simply Abahlali’s aim to claim the rights deemed by government that they deserve, it is

their aim, through their actions, to determine these rights for themselves through their

own commitment to democracy. Neocosmos argues that for movements to be

emancipatory they “must be ‘for something’, and not simply against what exists.”66

Abahlali demands nothing more than the radical democratisation of South African

politics, and therefore their struggle will not simply end once small material concessions

are granted by the government. In Bryant’s words, “So when will they stop struggling?

Perhaps when South African democracy looks the way democracy looks at Kennedy

road.”67 Zikode believes that, in this way, the poor of South Africa can become the “third

Nelson Mandela”, reclaiming and deepening their democracy. He states that “The first

64 Zikode, Sbu The Greatest Threat To Future Stability In Our Country Vs The Greatest Strength Of Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement S.A. given at The Centre for Civil Society, Harold Wolpe Memorial Lecture Series, June 2006 65 Patel, Raj (2005) Somewhere to live in dignity . The Mercury http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28 66 Neocosmos, Michale op. cit., p.31 67 Bryant, Jacob op. cit., p.54

39

Nelson Mandela was Jesus Christ. The second was Nelson Rolihlanhla Mandela. The

third Nelson Mandela are the poor of the world.”68 Abahlali’s demand that “the people

shall govern” exists not simply in government rhetoric; they insist that it becomes the

abiding principle of South African democracy. This is the essence of their struggle; the

struggle for the poor to be heard and to be able to transform society from below.

It remains a moot point whether housing delivery will take the fire out of

Abahlali’s struggle and lead to the cessation of its activities. However, as the group

begins to discuss further expansion and the possibility of hosting a regional Social

Movement Indaba, as well as its commitment to join and transform the national SMI, it

appears that there is ambition on the part of the leadership to make Abahlali a greater

political force, transcending the issue of housing delivery. However, as I shall now

explain, this can only be achieved if Abahlali maintains its democratic culture that

ensures communities have direct control over Abahlali’s direction. Without this, it is

argued, Abahlali would lose its impetus as the support it depends on from the

communities will be eroded.

Democracy in the Imijondolos

There is a vibrant democratic culture in the shack settlements, as Pithouse asserts:

“Kennedy Road had, long before the road was blockaded, developed a profoundly

68 Patel, Raj and Pithouse, Richard (2005) The Third Nelson Mandela. Voice of the Turtle http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28

40

democratic culture and organisation.”69 This democracy can be witnessed in the practices

of the movement and the manner in which decision-making takes place. There is an

extremely high emphasis on democracy within the shack-dwellers movement. They hold

weekly open meetings to discuss issues raised by the residents and to discuss campaigns

and action. Each settlement has its own development committee and these are directly

elected from the settlements they represent and they attend the meetings of the Abahlali

movement each week as well as holding their own individual meetings in their respective

settlements.70 The Abahlali meetings are usually attended by about thirty to forty elected

representatives from the various development committees as well as residents from the

local settlements, particularly if they have a grievance to raise.71 So far the level of

involvement in these meetings appears to be fairly consistent and as the movement

grows, more development committees from the surrounding areas will hopefully attend

the meetings. When a major issue arises, such as the visit of deputy City Manager

Naidoo, the attendance of the meeting will be supplemented by regular residents form the

settlements. At the meetings each week a chair person is elected and the leaders of the

various development committees report back. The meetings are open and fluid, allowing

for anyone wishing to raise an issue or pass comment. Decisions are reached by

attempting to find consensus and if this cannot be done then a vote might be taken. Any

large decisions would have to first be referred back to the communities for future

69 Pithouse, Richard (2005) (I) Coffin for the Councilor. Centre for Civil Society http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28 70 Interview with Zikode, Sbu - President of Abahlali baseMjondolo (05/05/06) and see Bryant, Jacob op. cit., for more depth on this issue 71 Abahlali Meeting at Kennedy Road Community Centre (21/06/06) and Abahlali Workshop for Provincial Indaba at The University of KwaZulu Natal (21/05/06)

41

discussion.72 The meetings are followed by the practice of reporting back to the residents

what has transpired at the meetings and to consult over future strategy. The decision to

take actions such as marches is decided through debate at the meetings and although there

are often some elements that press more strongly for action, each issue is debated

thoroughly. Bryant, who witnessed many of these meetings, believes that there is a

genuine consensus and that the community reaches these decisions together.73 The

UnFreedom Day event allowed me to talk to some of the residents who had attended the

event. Many of them expressed their support for the movement and confidence in the

leadership’s ability to represent them.74 Furthermore, the sheer scale of the number who

attended the event and the marches suggests that the community firmly supports the

activities being organised by the Abahlali movement.

In the short time that it has been around Abahlali has grown fairly rapidly as a

movement. This has involved absorbing surrounding settlements into the movement.

However, the expansion of the movement is not achieved at the expense of the

democratic culture of the organisation. Each new settlement that joins and comes to

Abahlali’s meetings must first hold elections for its representatives and endorse the

democratic practices of those already in the movement. I was witness to this process at

one of the meetings where the newly elected representatives of another settlement were

greeted with applause and congratulated for their respective elections.75 There is a will to

expand the movement further but this is tempered by a rigid adherence to the groups

72 Abahlali Meeting at Kennedy Road Community Centre (21/06/06) and Abahlali Workshop for Provincial Indaba at The University of KwaZulu Natal (21/05/06 73 Bryant, Jacob op. cit., p.331 74 Informal communications with people at the Abahlali UnFreedom Day event (28/04/06) 75 Abahlali Meeting at Kennedy Road Community Centre (21/06/06)

42

democratic principles. The leadership is fully aware that the tremendous support that the

group enjoys from the communities is largely due to the leadership of the movement

being firmly rooted within their respective communities and they are thus held firmly

accountable by those that they represent.76 Desai argues that for social movements

representing the poor, “of absolutely crucial importance is that no insistence that

resistance should assume a character significantly different from the expectations that

inform it.”77 The actions that Abahlali takes are informed by the very people that they are

intended for, and as such it can act with the assurance that the community will not only

support the actions, but thousands of them will also participate. As Pithouse remarks, “It

was, I think, this highly democratic nature of organization in Kennedy Road that

produced its radicalism.”78

There is caution on the part of the movement’s leadership when trying to expand

the movement’s activities and there is careful debate and consideration of the value of

such ventures. An example of this was the idea of holding the regional Social Movements

Indaba in Durban. At meetings discussing such a move, there was careful deliberation

and it was emphasised that taking such a decision to move forward in this way would

have to be done carefully, so as not to pursue a course not informed by the communities

themselves. It was understood that agreement over these issues might take time, but that

frustrations would need to be curbed in order to allow time for proper deliberation and

76 Interview with Zikode, Sbu - President of Abahlali baseMjondolo (05/05/06) 77 Desai, Ashwin We Are the Poors: Community Struggles in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Cape Town, Monthly Review Press, 2002) p.143 78 Pithouse, Richard (2006) (I) Struggle Is a School: The Rise of a Shack Dwellers’ Movement in Durban, South Africa Monthly Review http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28

43

consultation with the communities.(Meeting) There is an extremely suspicious approach

towards large bodies such as the national SMI in Johannesburg. Having attended the

national SMI, Zikode told me that the delegates from Abahlali were extremely concerned

about the structure of the organisation and that

“there is a need for these groups to unite so the SMI is a good platform for that. But what we have

not so far found in the SMI, is the SMI was not democratic. So as Abahlali we have laid a

foundation of democracy in Abahlali but in the SMI…they don’t understand the culture of

democracy.”79

They were concerned that their comrades in the SMI would select who attended the

conference and that these people were not necessarily elected by those they purportedly

represent. Mthembu, at the University of KwaZulu Natal, has argued that many of the

new social movements are characterised by elite, rich activists who can afford to attend

national and international conferences whilst alienating the grassroots communities.

Where these movements take us will depend on the ability of the communities “to fully

lead and control their own struggles.”80 If movements are to pursue a truly emancipatory

agenda for the poor then they must take their direction from the poor.

Abahlali is not dependent on external funding in order to carry out its operations.

Many of the marches simple require a “whip round” for the materials to make banners

but, as Patel and Pithouse remarked, they “could have gone ahead without any of these

baubles.”81 Although Abahlali has received a small amount of funding from external

sources, this has only helped to facilitate Abahlali’s activities. For instance, logistical

79 Interview with Zikode, Sbu - President of Abahlali baseMjondolo (05/05/06) 80 Mthembu, Ntokozo “Poor Must Lead Their Own Struggles” in The Mercury (July 18th, 2006) 81 Patel, Raj and Pithouse, Richard (2005) The Third Nelson Mandela. Voice of the Turtle http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28

44

support for meetings is provided by people linked to the University, providing transport

or technical expertise such as enabling the marches and various gatherings to be

documented through photographs and film.82 However, whilst Abahlali might benefit

from such contributions, it is not dependent on any funders who influence the nature of

the struggle; such a situation would be the antithesis of Abihlai’s commitment to internal

democracy. As such, Abahlali is able to pursue an autonomous people-driven, rather than

elite-driven struggle that is independent and takes its direction from the communities

rather than external funders. This allows Abahlali to remain rooted in the interests of

those in the shack settlements that they claim to represent and relieves any pressure to

represent external interests such as those of political parties, trade unions or other social

movements. By remaining rooted within the community and enjoying the support of its

constituents, Abahlali is able to confidently assert both its legitimacy, and its

independence. As such, Abahlali can ward-off any organisation that seeks to absorb or

direct it in any particular way. Zikode claimed that:

Right now Abihali we are facing a big challenge, various organisations and social movements

want to absorb Abahlali and on the outside you know, the big fish wants to swallow the small fish.

But Abahlali are still new but they are huge right now. …its quite interesting because sometimes

we are aware that these organisations have got money but they don’t have constituents, you know,

people, … Abahlali’s is the poor struggle - struggle of the poor – therefore money will not tempt

us….we cannot therefore be bought.”83

Whilst well-funded groups such as the SMI might have vast resources, Abihali can resist

them because it has the most important resource, that that gives it most strength, the

support of its constituents.

82 for example the UnFreedom Day event was filmed. Abahlali UnFreedom Day event (28/04/06) 83 Interview with Zikode, Sbu - President of Abahlali baseMjondolo (05/05/06)

45

Concluding Remarks

Abahlali seek to transform state-civil society relations in such a way that South

Africa adopts a truly radical democratic structure. This starts in the imijondolos by

making Abahlali a thoroughly democratic organisation through rigorous meetings and

consultations with the communities they claim to represent. It is hoped that this bottom-

up democracy can be spread to the local government level and, in the future, become the

very foundation of South African democracy.

This offers a radical challenge to corporatist systems of government that attempt

to define legitimate and illegitimate groups in civil society in addition to the processes

and tactics that such groups can use and what they can reasonably demand from their

government, whether locally or nationally. Through their activities Abahlali has

attempted to define these for itself, advocating the idea that only the poor can determine

what is done in their name. This poses serious questions for COSATU which is itself

embroiled in the corporatist structures of the Alliance. The primacy of business interests

within neoliberal corporatism has given COSATU a junior role in decision-making and

forced it to accept the parameters of the neoliberal paradigm and the diktats of discipline

and responsibility within which to channel both its demands and its actions. As we shall

46

see in the following chapter, such a logic is extremely pervasive at local levels and

prevents COSATU from engaging with radical alternative strategies that could serve to

reverse its defensive strategy into an offensive one for emancipatory societal

transformation.

47

Chapter 4

Towards a united struggle?

Introduction

This chapter will firstly explore whether unionists in Durban felt that the priorities of

COSATU were different than they had been in the past. After its formation during the

nineteen eighties, COSATU emerged as a major political force, pursuing broad political

objectives that extended beyond the workplace; the traditional site of trade union

struggles.84 COSATU aimed at not simply overthrowing the apartheid government, it

sought to forge a new society, in allegiance with the ANC, based on an economic

transformation brought about by working class control of the economy. During the

struggle COSATU was active in community campaigns which it saw as indistinguishable

from the interests of its members as both workers and members of the community.

My study sought to establish whether in Durban such an orientation towards

broad political objectives could still be witnessed. During my contact with unionists I

asked questions to ascertain whether they thought COSATU’s commitment to community

struggles had diminished and whether or not COSATU was now primarily focused on

worker issues. I wanted to establish what their opinions were about mobilising those

outside their membership base such as the unemployed, and whether they thought

COSATU strategy should encompass these groups and the practical steps the unions were

84 Von Holdt, Karl “The Political Significance of COSATU: A Response to Plaut” in Transformation 5 (1987)

48

taking to mobilise groups like the unemployed. I found that there was less of a

commitment towards campaigns that did not directly involve the interests of union

members and that commitment to campaigns on the issue of unemployment was largely

limited to rhetoric or symbolic demonstrations and there seemed no long-term strategy of

how to mobilise this group.

I will demonstrate how this contrasted with Abahlali’s conception of links with

unions which dismissed the dichotomy between employed and unemployed workers

claiming that unions were an important actor in advancing working class interests as a

whole and that this was one part of a broader struggle to challenge the system of

governance in South Africa. I will then analyse the trade union responses to the Abahlali

movement. I will present some of the suspicious, reactionary responses that Abahlali

have provoked and explain what implications I believe this has for COSATU’s strategy

in the future. I will also look into the misconceptions of Abahlali’s goals and the

tendency to dismiss them as single-issue, material demands placed on the local

government. This, I will argue, reflects the blinkered strategy that COSATU has adopted

as it has become mired in the logic of South Africa corporatism; rendering it unable to

conceive of alternative strategies other than to win more influence within neoliberal

corporatist arrangements.

49

Changing Priorities For COSATU?

When I asked trade unionists whether they thought community campaigns were still

important it was commonly stated that they were and that community struggles were

important because they affected workers when they were outside the workplace. They

also identified it as integral to their own campaigns as a union. One example was Sdumo

Dlamini, KZN Provincial Chairperson of COSATU, who told me that community

campaigns were “very much important….the challenges that we are all faced with are in

common: workers are exposed to all these challenges where they are still in society

before they get to work they are affected by this, when they are at work whatever they are

doing affects society.”85 It is important to note here that although my interviewees

expressed sympathy for community campaigns, their language was often worker-

orientated and their immediate concern was for the wellbeing of their members within

those communities rather than the community as a whole.86

Indeed, I wanted to clarify whether or not my respondents felt that the priorities of

COSATU had now firmly shifted from a mass advocacy of both worker and community

rights towards a labour-centric orientation focusing on the interests of its members.

85 Interview with Dlamini, Sdumo – COSATU Provincial Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (19/05/06) 86 Interview with Hlophe, Richard – SAMWU Organisor – (15/05/06), Interview with Zondi, Nhlanthla – SAMWU Shop Steward – (18/05/06), Interview with Dlamini, Sdumo – COSATU Provincial Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (19/05/06)

50

Firstly I wanted to establish why they felt political unionism and engagement with

community campaigns had been important during the anti-apartheid struggle. During the

nineteen eighties the union debates that were being waged focused on whether the unions

should maintain a shop-floor, workerist orientation or whether they should engage in the

broader political struggles.87 COSATU was formed as a gradual consensus was reached

amongst some of the unions that workplace and community struggles were inseparable in

the face of the apartheid government and that COSATU had to fight as part of the broader

political struggle. When I asked them about COSATU’s previous role as a political union

they told me that this had been essential because, as one official said, “back then we all

had an enemy”88 I was repeatedly told that it was an integral part of COSATU’s political

project back in the nineteen eighties to ensure that it affiliated with groups like the United

Democratic Front (UDF) in order to empower the broader movement and that this

brought it closer to the communities.89

However, the unionists I had contact with repeatedly told me that the emphasis

had now changed and that shop floor issues were prioritised ahead of community issues.

One shop steward told me that he felt that unlike in the nineteen eighties, COSATU was

no longer “rooted” in the communities and that back in then “it was easy to get a

common understanding [with community struggles] but now you find COSATU moving

slowly to the working places.”90

87 See Plaut, M “The Political Significance of COSATU” in Transformation 2 (1986) and Von Holdt, Karl “The Political Significance of COSATU: A Response to Plaut” in Transformation 5 (1987) 88 Interview with Mbhele, Lenford – SAMWU Regional Security Coordinator KwaZulu Natal – (30/05/06) 89 Informal discussions at COSATU, SACP, ANC May Day Rally at Curreys Fountain, Durban (01/05/06) 90 Interview with Zondi, Nhlanthla – SAMWU Shop Steward – (18/05/06)

51

An interesting point that emerged on several occasions was that dealing with

community struggles and the unemployed was not necessarily part of COSATU’s remit.

One member of the National Union of Mineworkers at the May Day rally told me that “it

is up to the ANC to be doing these things”.(May Day) There was an acceptance of a de-

facto division of labour in the Alliance structures; that community issues were to be left

within the ambit of SANCO or local councillors. This division of labour was summed up

by one of the union educators stating that

There is a big conflict between councillors and trade unionists. Councillors are elected supposedly

directly from communities and are therefore in charge. Trade unionists are elected from the shop

floor and therefore they are in charge there. So [the councillor says] ‘how dare you cross the line

and you move over to where you are supposedly not in charge’.91

This might seem sensible; COSATU is elected by workers and despite the fact

that some of its members will no doubt live in the communities, it is not directly

accountable to the other residents. COSATU is, after all, a trade union and perhaps we

should not be surprised if it reverts to a predominantly workerist focus, particularly when

COSATU’s formation as a political union in the eighties was a result of the demand to

challenge the apartheid government directly, which included a broader political role and

greater involvement in community campaigns as part of the broader struggle. As was

discussed in chapter two, the end of apartheid resulted in a reconfiguration of state – civil

society relations as the ANC called upon those organisations that had fought in the

struggle to “join hands” for the country’s development project and the consolidation of

91 Interview with Anonymous – Union Educator – (18/05/06)

52

democracy. There was a shift in the orientation of COSATU from a militant organisation

opposing the apartheid state towards a developmentalist union cooperating with the

state’s national development strategy. The launch of COSATU as a political union was

based on the existence of an apartheid state that merged the interests of both workers and

communities and formed the need for shared struggle.92 Once its apartheid foe was

vanquished and COSATU’s ally in the struggle, the ANC, was now occupying

government offices COSATU’s outlook was radically altered as it accepted a role in

corporatist structures in order to pursue concessions for its members in political spaces

that had not previously be opened. It also sought to assist its ally, the ANC, to consolidate

its position and pursue its development project. It was assumed that through cooperation

with the ANC that COSATU would yield the major influence in government policy-

making and that its aspirations for social transformation could now be pursued through

the new democratic institutions.

However, as discussed in chapter three, the shift towards neoliberal policies by

the ANC government resulted in a change in the balance of forces within corporatists

structures. This change bolstered the capacity of business to influence policy whilst

eroding COSATU’s ability to exert the influence it had hoped to wield in order to

channel ANC policy into a more redistributionalist framework that would give the

working class greater control of the economy. This has led many commentators to

question whether it is now important for COSATU to re-engage with community

struggles, such as that of Abahlali in order to rekindle its political strength and perhaps

92 Von Holt op. cit.,

53

join an offensive strategy to challenge the ANC’s neoliberal shift.93 Desai has likened

COSATU to a once-proud boxing champion who has grown sluggish and ring rusty that

needs to re-engage with emerging social movements from the communities in order to

command the level of respect it had done in the nineteen eighties.94 A key factor in such a

strategy would be for COSATU to advance the interests of a broader working class

outside of its membership base, including the unemployed.

Attitudes Towards the Unemployed

A basic tenet of a commitment to a wider struggle in the form of political

unionism is to advance a broader working class interest outside of the union’s

membership base. This would include mobilising groups such as the unemployed and

embarking on strategies that will service the interests of this groups as well as its

immediate members. I wanted to find out whether such a commitment existed or whether

the unions has a member-centric, workerist focus. Those I interviewed made a telling

distinction between the interests of those who were employed and those who were

unemployed. When I asked whether or not a SAMWU official believed that his members

93 Desai, Ashwin (2005) Shadow Boxing? Cosatu, Social Movements and the ANC government. Centre for Civil Society http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28 and also see Webster, Eddie and Buhlungu, Sakhele “Between Marginalisation and Revitilisation? The State of Trade Unionism in South Africa” in Review of African Political Economy Number 100 (2004) for a detailed outlook on COSATU strategy 94 Desai, Ashwin (2005) Shadow Boxing? Cosatu, Social Movements and the ANC government. Centre for Civil Society http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28

54

felt they shared the same interests as those in the imijondolos and should engage in a

broader struggle with them he stated that:

My members are entitled to housing, we negotiated housing for them so they can’t complain about

housing. They are entitled to 120,000 Rand housing subsidies they cannot go with those people

[Abahlali] and demand housing. In most instances where people are employed, most of them have

housing subsidies....so if you go on the march of Abahlali and interviewed those people you would

find that the majority are unemployed – they want free housing….some of our interests can be

reconciled, some of them cannot. There will always be a conflict of interest.” (Emphasis added95)

There was an acknowledgement that the union members held a privileged position and

that COSATU would have to deal with their immediate concerns first.96 One shop

steward commented that what was needed was “two different strategies”, one for the

employed and one for the unemployed.97 Although there was a genuine will to show

solidarity with the unemployed, this was relatively symbolic and there seemed to be little

variety in ideas as to what strategy COSATU should use to try and mobilise this section

of the working class. When I asked about their strategy they cited the general strike and

march that was to be held in Durban.98 This referred to a one day general strike held on

the 18th June, 2006 and a mass march through the centre of Durban to demand that the

government do more to tackle poverty and unemployment. This appeared to be a clear-

cut demonstration of COSATU’s desire to represent the interests of a broader working

95 Interview with Hlophe, Richard – SAMWU Organisor – (15/05/06) 96 Interview with Hlophe, Richard – SAMWU Organisor – (15/05/06) Interview with Zondi, Nhlanthla – SAMWU Shop Steward – (18/05/06) Interview with Mbhele, Lenford – SAMWU Regional Security Coordinator KwaZulu Natal – (30/05/06) Interview with Pakkies, Mthimobe – SAMWU Regional Deputy Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (30/05/06) 97 Interview with Zondi, Nhlanthla – SAMWU Shop Steward – (18/05/06) 98 Interview with Hlophe, Richard – SAMWU Organisor – (15/05/06) Interview with Zondi, Nhlanthla – SAMWU Shop Steward – (18/05/06) Interview with Mbhele, Lenford – SAMWU Regional Security Coordinator KwaZulu Natal – (30/05/06) Interview with Pakkies, Mthimobe – SAMWU Regional Deputy Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (30/05/06)

55

class beyond its membership base. On the surface it also presented a clear example of

COSATU’s will to challenge the government over its political direction.

The reaction from the right wing press was predictable: The Financial Mail was

extremely critical of the strike action, quoting one former unionist (now an economic

advisor to the government), Iraj Abedian, as saying “how can you call a national strike on

the basis of something as broad as an end to unemployment and poverty?” He went on to

argue that COSATU should focus on achievable demands of the state and that “for a

national strike you need a realistic hook.”99 The article went on to condemn COSATU’s

strike action, claiming that COSATU leaders do not appreciate the damage that these

strikes can do to the economy and that tackling the problems of unemployment and

poverty were the remit of the government: “having achieved for its members just about

the best labour rights and protection in the world, COSATU now seems to be casting

about for a cause to maintain its influence…it is misguided if it believes it can rekindle

the kind of role labour played under apartheid as gladiators for a political cause.”100

It is important however, that one looks beyond the rhetoric of the strike action.

The strike is scant evidence that COSATU is once again trying to become a “gladiator for

a political cause.” This was a limited action and it was doubtful whether there were

indeed, any unemployed on the march through town that was being organised in their

name. One of the union educators explained that COSATU would arrange transport for

its members to come out on the march but that he thought it extremely unlikely that they

99 “Searching For A Role?” Financial Mail May 26th 2006 100 ibid

56

would arrange transport for the unemployed from communities such as Kennedy Road.101

Whilst the strike action grabbed the attention of the right wing media, it also allowed

COSATU to reaffirm its claim to be the representative of a broader working class.

However, it appeared that interaction with the unemployed would remain largely

symbolic; a single-day event and when I pressed them there appeared to be no apparent

strategy for long-term mobilisation of this group.102

This position differed markedly from that of Abahlali’s President who saw no

differentiation between those who were employed and those who were not and

envisioned a sustained struggle for all sections of the working class. It is clear that

Zikode saw a relationship with the unions as a natural result of being part of the same

struggle: “When you talk about the workers the reality is that we are all working class

actually; both unemployed and employed, we are all working class. So workers are found

within the communities.”103 Zikode articulates Abahlali’s struggle the following way: “It

is warned that this is not about making small changes to policies. This is class struggle.

This is a struggle between the Haves and Don’t Haves. Our society can only be saved if

the Don’t Haves win this struggle.”104 He saw it as important that employed workers

within the imijondolos and those recently retrenched or in insecure forms of employment

were involved with the unions. “It is important we engage more,” he said, for the unions

knew “table language,” and their knowledge of dealing with employers, earned through 101 Interview with Anonymous – Union Educator – (18/05/06) 102 Interview with Zondi, Nhlanthla – SAMWU Shop Steward – (18/05/06) Interview with Mbhele, Lenford – SAMWU Regional Security Coordinator KwaZulu Natal – (30/05/06) Interview with Pakkies, Mthimobe – SAMWU Regional Deputy Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (30/05/06) 103 Interview with Zikode, Sbu - President of Abahlali baseMjondolo (05/05/06) 104 Zikode, Sbu The Greatest Threat To Future Stability In Our Country Vs The Greatest Strength Of Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement S.A. given at The Centre for Civil Society, Harold Wolpe Memorial Lecture Series, June 2006

57

years of experience, was a positive prospect for the working people of the imijondolos.105

He believed that cooperation could happen in the future, but that COSATU leadership

who were detached from their membership, were the real object to cooperation. “It is just

that these high profile people are too close to the ANC and its hard for them to oppose the

law….but the reality is that the workers are at our level, we are the workers, we interact

with workers.”106 It was interesting that Zikode envisaged a broad movement of the

working class that steadfastly rejected the dichotomy between employed and

unemployed; as he put it, “we are all working class”.107

It is also important to note that this broad struggle included the unions and their

ability to advance workplace struggles through their “table talk” but that this should not

be the end goal of an emancipatory movement. As discussed above, Abahlali saw any

material concessions it could gain should as just part of a broader project to subordinate

all the realms of politics; local and national government, the workplace, the communities,

to the direction of the poor.108

Why has COSATU found it difficult to mobilise the unemployed?

As we shall see with a review of trade union responses to the Abahlali movement,

the trade unions failed to share such a broad political project. We must consider why this

105 Interview with Zikode, Sbu - President of Abahlali baseMjondolo (05/05/06) 106 Interview with Zikode, Sbu - President of Abahlali baseMjondolo (05/05/06) 107 ibid 108 Zikode, Sbu The Greatest Threat To Future Stability In Our Country Vs The Greatest Strength Of Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement S.A. given at The Centre for Civil Society, Harold Wolpe Memorial Lecture Series, June 2006

58

might be: Why is COSATU decreasingly able to mobilise the unemployed and does this

perhaps represent the lack of a genuine commitment to a broader political project as they

prioritise protecting their membership’s interests?

Neoliberal corporatism has put COSATU on the back-foot as the balance of

forces has tilted in favour of business and this has forced COSATU to adopt a defensive,

damage-limitation strategy of making small reforms within the neoliberal paradigm.109

COSATU’s inability to challenge the core foundations of neoliberalism such as

flexibilisation and casualisation leave it only able to try and ameliorate their least

desirable effects and to attempt to shield its member’s rights and privileges in the face of

this neoliberal onslaught.

Neoliberal policies such as casualisation and flexibilisation have led to a profound

weakening of COSATU. As more and more people are working in “non-standard”

employment (such as temps, casual labour, and part timers) COSATU is finding it harder

to mobilise this group. Barchiesi argues that because of the growth of these forms of

employment, COSATU has to adapt quickly to meet the needs of a changing working

class but that so far COSATU has, by its own admission, been slow to address this

problem.110 As Naidoo has explained:

COSATU’s principle of ‘one industry, one union, one federation’ seems ill-suited to the needs of a

changing working class, in the face of steady growth in the number of casual, seasonal, and

flexible workers without a single or permanent worksite. While it recognises openly that it is

109 See Van Driel, Maria “Unions and Privatisation in South Africa, 1990-2001” in Bramble, T. and Barchiesi, F., (eds). Rethinking the Labour Movement in the "New South Africa",(Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003) 110 Barchiesi, Franco op. cit., p.4

59

failing to organise these new workers, it still sticks solidly to its position of focusing on the formal

sector and building the industrial form of a trade union.111

COSATU is finding it difficult to represent a changing working class as more and more

labourers are employed as casuals or in the informal sector. As it stands, COSATU is

representing an ever-decreasing pool of full-time, contracted workers and is failing to

instigate strategies for recruiting those outside of this group.112 Neoliberal policies of

flexibilisation and casualisation of the workforce have thus had a detrimental impact on

COSATU’s ability to represent and mobilise workers across different industrial sectors

and have sapped much of its strength, challenging its position as guardian of a broader

working class.113

It is important to investigate whether or not COSATU has a thorough

commitment to mobilising and protecting the interests of the unemployed as part of a

broader political struggle. As I explained above, in Durban such a commitment was

extremely modest and although there was a certain level of symbolic activity there was

no long-term action or strategy to engage more with the unemployed. There was a

tendency to define their interests as being disparate and it is important to explore some of

the reasons for such attitudes.

The structural power of capital relative to labour is made particularly acute in

South Africa where this structural power is bolstered by extremely high levels of

111 Naidoo, Prishani “The New UDF” Centre for Civil Society Accessed on http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28,11,2199 May 11th 2006 112 Buhlungu, Sakhele and Webster, Eddie “Work Restructuring and the Future of Labour in South Africa” in State of The Nation 2006 (Capetown, HSRC Press, 2006) 113 Desai, Ashwin (2005) Shadow Boxing? Cosatu, Social Movements and the ANC government. Centre for Civil Society http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28

60

unemployment. Labour unions are severely restricted in pursuing strike action as their

members face the constant threat of “scabs” from the large (and growing) pool of

unemployed workers taking their jobs if they participate in prolonged industrial action

that could ironically be held in their name. The government is also quick to reaffirm the

discourse that strike action could damage the economy as a whole and threaten investor

confidence, thus endangering further job creation.114

Rampant unemployment and poverty erode solidarities between employed and

unemployed and create fragmented identities amongst sections of the working class. Such

sentiments are captured by Bramble’s study in which he detects an increasingly self

centred attitude amongst union members in which one of his interviewees stated: “Before

the LRA, workers would strike even over an individual worker. Now that is no more

there…Today, the slogan is ‘An injury to one…it’s that man’s baby.”115 Seekings has

suggested that COSATU has increasingly pursued policies such as the Basic Income

Grant and increases in education expenditure that whilst, on the surface, appear to be pro-

poor, in fact represent the interests of union members rather than simply the poor

themselves.116 He argues that the aim of COSATU’s strategy has increasingly come to

protect its members interests, protecting their jobs and increasing their wages whilst

114 Desai Aswin & Habib Adam (2004) Labour Relations in Transition: the Rise of Corporatism in South Africa's Automobile Industry. The Journal of Modern African Studies 115 Bramble, Tom (2003) “Social Movement Unionism since the Fall of Apartheid: the Case of NUMSA on the East Rand” in Bramble, T. and Barchiesi, F., (eds). Rethinking the Labour Movement in the "New South Africa",(Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003) p.91 116 Seekings, Jeremy “Trade Unions, Social Policy and Class Compromise in Post-Apartheid South Africa” in ROAPE (2004) Volume 31, Number 100

61

maintaining its pro-poor discourse in order to maintain its image as a champion for the

poor and a broader working class.117

It is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate whether or not such instances are

indicative of a wider trend towards an inward-facing, self interested COSATU, yet there

were clear instances in my contact with COSATU members that the close ties and

solidarity formed between COSATU unions and the unemployed were not as strong as

before. As discussed above, many of the unionists felt that COSATU was becoming

increasingly workerist in its orientation and strategy and actions towards mobilising and

defending the interests of the unemployed were largely symbolic. One reason for the

emphasis on a membership focus was suggested by a SAMWU shop steward who

suggested that “it is true that COSATU do more to those that are working because its

where their power lies…”118 Samantha Khan, an educator from the worker’s college

summarised this trend as follows:

the unions can get nothing out of people who are not working so its all about resources, its all

about what they can get out of people. And then they hide behind this mirage of ‘we are

representing all the workers and unemployed’ but the reality is that they only represent people’s

needs who give them something in return.119

The strategy of COSATU has been increasingly geared towards protecting its members.

Because, as discussed in chapter three, COSATU has been unable to halt the ANC’s

adoption of neoliberal policies it has adopted a defensive strategy of trying to ameliorate

the worst effects of these policies on its members. As neoliberal policies such as the

117 ibid 118 Interview with Zondi, Nhlanthla – SAMWU Shop Steward – (18/05/06) 119 Interview with Khan, Samantha – Union Educator – (18/05/06)

62

casualisation and flexibilisation of the workforce have been enacted, COSATU has found

it increasingly difficult to represent a changing working class. Its inability to mobilise the

unemployed is compounded by pressure on the leadership to protect its members’ jobs in

the face of a huge pool of unemployed workers.

Attitudes Towards Abahlali

What is particularly interesting in my interviews and discussions with the trade unionists

in Durban was the suspicion which they displayed towards Abahlali’s activities. These

suspicions were by no means homogenous however, and many different opinions as to

the funding and motives were voiced. Firstly I will discuss some of these suspicions and

then explain why, in Abahlali’s case, these are unfounded. I will then explain why this

profound misunderstanding highlights COSATU’s problem with conceptualizing

alternative movements outside of state structures and how its reactionary, defensive

attitude towards any movement that engages with the government (both locally and

nationally) in a critical manner prevents it from not only forging links with these groups,

but also from developing a common understanding and emancipatory project with them.

The major concern that the unionists raised was over the funding of Abahlali.

Doubts over where the group was able to access resources from caused a wide range of

suspicions and misconceptions as to who were the group’s funders and how these groups

were using Abahlali for other political purposes. There was a genuine concern on the part

of unionists I spoke with that external funders were taking the issue of housing and

63

channeling it into their own political agendas. As the Regional Chairperson of COSATU

told me “there is a danger of our organs of civil society being manipulated or dictated to

from outside…they tend to be dictated to by funders on what issues to raise and how they

must raise these issues.”(Original emphasis)120 He believed that being unsure about

Abahlali’s sources of funding was a major impediment to supporting and possibly

cooperating with the movement: “We would welcome a discussion with those groupings

where they feel that we can engage. Our doors are always open. But the determining

factor or weakness [is] around your [Abahlali’s] funders.”121

This idea that Abahlali’s issues over housing were being manipulated from

outside gave rise to a host of direct suspicions and allegations. One of these was that that

it was rival political parties or other anti-ANC forces raising these issues for their own

benefit at elections. As one shop steward said, the housing issue was “understandable”

but that:

the problem here is that it has been politicised, and when it is politicised it is politicised in such a

way that it is used [to] fight against the government….you find that it is led by the counterparts

who use it to dent the name of the African National Congress…It is now no longer the issue

[housing] but it is a fight against the ANC.122

Another organiser said there are:

Sometimes political under linings that you [Abahlali] are not mentioning in public…they used to

have a genuine complaint…now this has changed and they have become an independent candidate

120 Interview with Dlamini, Sdumo – COSATU Provincial Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (19/05/06) 121 ibid 122 Interview with Zondi, Nhlanthla – SAMWU Shop Steward – (18/05/06)

64

for ward councilor….We have to defend our own organization [the ANC]. That is where we have

got some kind of problem [with cooperating].123

Several of the unionists I had discussions with on Mayday also made the claim that it was

NADECO, an IFP splinter group, who had been responsible for mobilising this group at

election times. This suspicion was also shared by the Regional Chairperson. He told me

Abahlali had “said we don’t want ANC, we don’t want the SACP, we don’t want the IFP

we want ourselves.’ Yet before the elections the NEDECO, the political party, came and

launched a branch there.”124 It was assumed that groups organised outside the Alliance

structures must be mobilising against the ANC. One unionist even went as far to allege

that it might be the old regime behind Abahlali. This was only voiced by one unionist but

I found it telling of just how varied (and distorted) the perceptions of Abahlali were. It

was indicative of the general unease that COSATU has with regard to groups operating

outside Alliance structures. He stated that:

Maybe the money for these social movements is coming from the old regime….Personally I

believe we need to be more sure of what we are in for. I cannot support something that I am not

sure where the funds are coming from. Because, we really lost quite a number of people during the

old regime.125

Another suspicion that was raised by several unionists was that the movement was

influenced by intellectuals pursuing their own agenda.126 Often these intellectuals, it was

123 Interview with Mbhele, Lenford – SAMWU Regional Security Coordinator KwaZulu Natal – (30/05/06) 124 Interview with Dlamini, Sdumo – COSATU Provincial Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (19/05/06) 125 Interview with Hlophe, Richard – SAMWU Organisor – (15/05/06) 126 Interview with Zondi, Nhlanthla – SAMWU Shop Steward – (18/05/06) Interview with Mbhele, Lenford – SAMWU Regional Security Coordinator KwaZulu Natal – (30/05/06) Interview with Pakkies, Mthimobe – SAMWU Regional Deputy Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (30/05/06)

65

asserted, were “ultra leftists” intent on bringing down the ANC. In particular one named

Ashwin Desai as the key agitator, using the group for his own purposes.127 It has also

been leveled in the past that Patrick Bond had been involved in organising the group.128

There were several unionists who raised concern and intrigue as to why academics from

the university were involved with the group. There was the concern that these academics

were trying to further their own goals by manipulating this group: “we know it was

professors who went to speak to those people. They guide two issues, housing and going

for elections.”129

At this point it is important to challenge some of these suspicions. Abahlali has, as

discussed in chapter four, been able to remain relatively autonomous in terms of funding

and where it has received support this has never been conditional upon Abahlali raising

an issue or directing its campaign in some way or another. What little funding that

Abahlali has received has been from church groups and small contributions from the

Centre for Civil Society (CCS) at the University of KwaZulu Natal. As mentioned earlier,

however, these groups fund Abihalli to facilitate its activities rather than to direct them.

For example, CCS gave money to cover the cost of printing booklets for the UnFreedom

Day event which contained various letters and thought pieces from the residents of the

shack settlements. It also helped towards transport costs and the printing of t-shirts and

127ibid 128 Pithouse, Richard (2006) (I) Struggle Is a School: The Rise of a Shack Dwellers’ Movement in Durban, South Africa Monthly Review http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28 129 Interview with Dlamini, Sdumo – COSATU Provincial Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (19/05/06)

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pamphlets for the UnFreedom Day event.130 Although this evidence relies on the word of

the group and of those closely involved with them, from attending meetings it was clear

to see that where funders did offer support, this came with no conditions.131 It was also

clear that there was a distinct lack of funding for some of the proposed activities such as

hosting the regional indaba.132 A strategy to enable the group to raise finances and keep

costs down to a minimum for these events was discussed at length at the meetings I

attended and there was a special workshop arranged to discuss the viability of the

regional indaba.133 The group asserts that it has not been under the influence of any

political party and, in reality, Abahlali has a principled objection to supporting any

political party - even independent candidates. It is clear from their campaigns that they

have not been engaged in party-political activity and have only launched “no land, no

house, no vote” campaigns at elections rather than show support for any particular

candidate.134 The group is not anti-ANC. On the contrary, many of its members are, or

have been, ANC members. Although academics have been involved this has been purely

in a facilitating role, getting the group media coverage or helping with logistical matters

at meetings or marches. Although some academics have offered logistical support to the

group, as mentioned before, academics have not attempted to control the agenda of

Abahlali or tried to direct its struggle in any particular way. It was clear from the

meetings that I attended and from those attended by researchers since the road blockade

130 Abahlali Meeting at Kennedy Road Community Centre (21/06/06) and Abahlali Workshop for Provincial Indaba at The University of KwaZulu Natal (21/05/06) 131 Abahlali Meeting at Kennedy Road Community Centre (21/06/06) 132 Abahlali Meeting at Kennedy Road Community Centre (21/06/06) 133 Abahlali Meeting at Kennedy Road Community Centre (21/06/06) and Abahlali Workshop for Provincial Indaba at The University of KwaZulu Natal (21/05/06) 134 Pithouse, Richard (2006) (I) Struggle Is a School: The Rise of a Shack Dwellers’ Movement in Durban, South Africa Monthly Review http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28

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that the emphasis in the meetings is on democracy and that the residents of the shack

settlements themselves should determine the direction of the struggle not external

funders.135

So why do these suspicions arise? I document the variety of attitudes to highlight

some of the misconceptions of the Abahlali movement among unionists and also to

suggest reasons for these attitudes and why these prevent them from adequately

understanding these groups. This is not to say that if COSATU had a greater

understanding of Abahlali it would naturally want to unite with them; it is argued that

these misunderstandings reveal the extent to which COSATU is locked into a singular

strategy of cooperation in Alliance corporatism, as I will elaborate in the next section.

It is interesting to note the assumption that groups such as Abahlali raising their

concerns against the government immediately made COSATU defensive and wary of

their intentions, if not openly hostile. Some went as far to brandish them “counter

revolutionaries”.136 Any group venting grievances outside of corporatist structures

towards government policy, it seemed, must be an oppositional force to the ANC itself.

COSATU’s assumption that these groups must be either directly opposing the ANC

themselves, or somehow the pawns of external forces seeking to do so, highlights the lack

of understanding of Abahlali’s struggle but more importantly, COSATU’s tendency to

conceive political struggles outside official corporatist processes anti-ANC and thus,

135 Abahlali Meeting at Kennedy Road Community Centre (21/06/06) and Abahlali Workshop for Provincial Indaba at The University of KwaZulu Natal (21/05/06) and also see Bryant, Jacob op. cit., 136 Interview with Hlophe, Richard – SAMWU Organisor – (15/05/06) and also discussions at COSATU, SACP, ANC May Day Rally at Curreys Fountain, Durban (01/05/06)

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contrary to its own interests and strategy. Because COSATU has emerged as part of a

liberation movement in Alliance with the ANC government it remains extremely

sensitive to what it sees as direct challenges to the ANC itself. Despite its criticism of the

ANC’s political trajectory, COSATU remains firmly committed to cooperation in the

corporatist structures of the Alliance as the best vehicle to further its members interests

and to pursue its political goals. This severely restricts COSATU’s ability to engage with

groups like Abahlali and the potential for COSATU to wage its struggles outside of

corporatist structures. The suspicions as to Abahlali’s agenda are, I would argue,

indicative of how COSATU struggles to conceive forms of struggle outside the logic of

corporatism and an Alliance with the ANC. COSATU still perceives the Alliance as the

only legitimate movement for change and immediately assumes that groups critical of

government (whether locally or nationally) are hostile to the liberation movement as a

whole.

Is COSATU Trapped in the Logic of Corporatism?

The unionists which I spoke to had failed to really define the purpose of the

Abahlali movement and they were unable to understand why Abahlali did not use the

Alliance structures in order to attain their goals for housing. What this fails to recognize

is that groups like the shack communities feel they have been let down by official

government structures and are isolated from the kind of corporatist arrangements that

COSATU is a part of. It is this that leads Abahlali to take direct action such as its protest

marches yet, as we shall see, COSATU are wary of such tactics and believe that

69

grievances should be vented through the “proper” channels. COSATU has

underestimated Abahlali’s demands by reducing them to material demands of the local

government for housing and services. This is indicative of COSATU’s inability to

conceive of a strategy that is not centered on placing material demands on the

government and bargaining through corporatist structures.

There was sincere sympathy amongst all the unionists I had contact with towards

the plight of the shack communities and there was a genuine curiosity as to why Abahlali

wasn’t using Alliance structures in order to pursue their demands. One shop steward told

me “We feel for these guys, but the manner in which their struggle is pushed; its like we

are fighting our own people who are government in the same way as we fought the

people in the old regime, and we can’t block the road and use the vulgar language against

our own people.”137 This is very much in tune with Mbeki’s idea that it is unacceptable

for citizens to take to the streets as they had done during the Apartheid struggle. I was

told on many occasions that actions such as blocking the road were examples of Abahlali

not behaving “responsibly” or even “acting in the ultra left tendency”.138 One official

commented that cooperating with groups outside the Alliance “can lead to internal

problems because, you must know they are the ultra left, we are left….[but] we are

members of the ANC, we are not here to [use] slogans [like] ‘away with the Alliance, the

ANC has sold out’ all these kind of things.”139 Once I told unionists about how Abahlali’s

concerns had been ignored by the local government some of them responded with

137 Interview with Biyela, Sbu – SAMWU Official – 22/05/06) 138 Interview with Hlophe, Richard – SAMWU Organisor – (15/05/06) and also discussions at COSATU, SACP, ANC May Day Rally at Curreys Fountain, Durban (01/05/06) 139 Interview with Hlophe, Richard – SAMWU Organisor – (15/05/06)

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disgust, and one suggested that careerism within the ANC was a possible reason for the

disrespect they showed these communities.140 However, it is important to note that their

initial reactions were to define Abahlali as being undisciplined or anti-ANC for not using

Alliance structures.

It is important to analyse this discourse of “responsibility” and “discipline”

because it underlies a fundamental weakness in COSATU’s current strategy. Because

Abahlali operate outside of the constraints of Alliance corporatism, they are construed as

“indisciplined” and portrayed as being bent on subverting the national development

project. And because they are outside of the liberation movement and the corporatist

strictures or “revolutionary discipline” that Alliance partners must practice they are seen

as a loose cannon, one that acts in the “ultra-left tendency” and is therefore de-legitimised

by Alliance discourse from the national level as being irreconcilable with the

“disciplined” liberation forces such as the unions.

Although they did not use these exact terms, there was a tendency of the

COSATU people that I spoke to of accepting the binary separation of those operating in

the “legitimate” sphere (i.e. cooperating within Alliance structures and those operating

independently of Alliance structures) when in fact Abahlali uses both cooperation and

oppositional strategies. As Oldfield and Stokke have argued, neoliberalism has a variety

of impacts on different sections of civil society and this creates a plethora of different

resistance strategies that do not simply follow the binary separation between cooperation

140 Interview with Zondi, Nhlanthla – SAMWU Shop Steward – (18/05/06)

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and disengagement.141 At one stage Abahlali would invite a councilor to the settlement to

discuss their issues and demand concessions. Once the councilor failed to listen to their

concerns and told them that the policy of removing the shack settlements was an

irreversible fait accompli they went on a march the next day, assuming an adversarial role

in order to make their voices heard. Whilst COSATU has been critical over the ANC’s

leadership at the national level, often ignoring COSATU’s demands, it has embarked on a

defensive strategy by accepting neoliberal policies and then seeking to alleviate their

worst affects upon its members in a disciplined manner instead of using militant action to

oppose and derail neoliberal initiatives before they are enacted. This is symptomatic of

COSATU’s commitment to corporatist dispute-resolution procedures. Rather than using

potentially damaging industrial action, COSATU attempts to secure concessions through

mediation.

Unlike COSATU, however, Abahlali do not have access to such structures. For

example, people in the Abahlali movement are not consulted during decision-making by

the City and have had their attempts at engaging with the Ministry of Housing ignored.142

One activist from the Joe Slovo settlement complained that his attempts to talk to the

local Ministry of Housing had been fruitless, “what they have been doing [is] referring

me to one another and I ended up boycotting the project.”143 Whilst corporatism might

allow some groups the chance to engage with government and influence policy, Adam et

141 Oldfield, Sophie and Stokke, Kristian Political Polemics, Local Practices of Community-Organizing and Neoliberal Politics in South Africa 142 See appendix and chapter four 143 Abahlali Workshop for Provincial Indaba at The University of KwaZulu Natal (21/05/06)

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al point out that such benefits are not enjoyed by marginalised sections of society.144

Unlike COSATU, Abahlali do not feel they are able to vent their voices through Alliance

structures and COSATU’s insistence that groups like Abahlali should have used these

structures betrays their failure to comprehend how some groups are still alienated from

the state. It also highlights COSATU’s one-dimentional strategy of cooperation within

corporatist structures rather than utilising strategies that combine tactics of cooperation

and opposition as complementary devices to advance a broader goal.

Another view that also prevailed among those I interviewed was that Abihlai’s

struggle was a single issue – housing – and that when their demand for housing was met

then their issue would simply go away. It was dismissed by one unionist as a “seasonal”

issue, one that failed to grasp the need for what he called a “comprehensive

programme.”145 Many of the unionists believed that Abahlali’s protest emerged out of

impatience. To quote one official:

We understand Abahlali’s and other people’s problems but we believe that they are impatient. The

ANC has just taken over twelve years, people are impatient you know. They thought that as soon

as we achieved democracy on the second day they would have a house.146

Another remarked, “these people, they are impatient. Rome was not built in a day!”147

COSATU officials mistakenly reduce Abahlali’s struggle to the demand for

housing and not one of them was aware of the concerns of the shack communities over

issues such as where the houses would be built. One of the basic tenets of Abahlali’s

144 Adam, Heribert et al op. cit., 145 Interview with Dlamini, Sdumo – COSATU Provincial Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (19/05/06) 146 Interview with Hlophe, Richard – SAMWU Organisor – (15/05/06) 147 COSATU, SACP, ANC May Day Rally at Curreys Fountain, Durban (01/05/06)

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campaign is that they do not simply want houses, but they want them in places near to

their work so that they can sustain their livelihoods. People in the shack settlements are

predominantly unemployed with respect to the formal economy yet their livelihoods

include a wide range of activities such as informal trading and labouring that require

them to be close to the city.

The unionists I spoke to tended to frame the issue in a simplistic, systematic

sense. The problem: people want houses. The solution: go through government structures.

What this fails to comprehend is that Abahlali’s struggle extends beyond simply housing,

or even housing in the right place. It is an attempt to make the local authority, and their

local ANC councilors, listen and take heed from the communities rather than the other

was around. It is not simple a demand that can be fulfilled once houses are built; it is a

demand for a lasting transformation, albeit at the local level, of South African democracy.

Their aim is to make those who govern accountable to those who elect them rather than

for the people to determine what they may or may not rightfully demand from their

government.

Unlike COSATU, Abahlali is not embedded in the logic of corporatism. Indeed, it

is the corporatist structures of decision-making between “big business”, “big unions” and

the government that marginalises communities such as those at Kennedy Road from

political processes. Abahlali is able to inhabit a space outside the corporatist model and

are therefore not bound like COSATU is to its strictures. Whilst COSATU has accepted

the neoliberal ‘rules of the game’, and what it can expect to reasonably demand and how

it may go about attaining reforms, Abihali’s struggle is, conversely, far more broad

74

ranging. Their demands are not bound by the logic of neoliberal corporatism that reduces

political conflict to a process of civil society ‘stakeholders’ placing delivery demands on

the state; instead, Abihali exhibit a broader political strategy of democratizing South

African society from below.

COSATU’s Blinkered Strategy

The unionists I spoke to were critical of the current ANC government’s attempts

to centralise decision-making and felt that COSATU was not given the influence within

the Alliance which it deserved. As one remarked to me that the working class were “out

in the cold” and had little bearing over ANC policy.148 Others commented that Mbeki’s

style of leadership was “too centralised” and that economic policy was decided without

COSATU’s input.149 The feeling was that the ANC had been founded as an organisation

for the poor which would protect their interests but that it had at some stage been

“hijacked”.150

It was interesting to note that whilst they lamented the fact that COSATU had not

had the influence in the Alliance which it hoped for and they decried the lack of “worker

control” over the government, they were concerned that to leave the Alliance would leave

148 Interview with Dlamini, Sdumo – COSATU Provincial Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (19/05/06) 149 Interview with Mbhele, Lenford – SAMWU Regional Security Coordinator KwaZulu Natal – (30/05/06) and discussions at COSATU, SACP, ANC May Day Rally at Curreys Fountain, Durban (01/05/06) 150 Interview with Zondi, Nhlanthla – SAMWU Shop Steward – (18/05/06) Interview with Dlamini, Sdumo – COSATU Provincial Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (19/05/06) Interview with Pakkies, Mthimobe – SAMWU Regional Deputy Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (30/05/06)

75

COSATU without any political leverage.151 One official said “we cannot leave the ANC

just how it is, in the hands of rich people who direct government policies for their own

benefit.”(12) An interesting point to come out of my discussions with unionists was the

differentiation of the ANC from the government. I was corrected on several occasions

when I asked what they thought about the ANC’s neoliberal shift. I was told that, for

example, “The ANC does not have the policy of GEAR, the government has a policy of

GEAR.”152 It was often alleged that a neoliberal “clique” had emerged in government and

was pursuing its own agenda. Lehulere believes that differentiating between the

government and the ANC in such a way “absolves the ANC, as well as the ANC

government, from responsibility for GEAR and provides a justification for criticising the

failures of GEAR while at the same time arguing that the Alliance remains the only

vehicle for addressing the poverty that is brought about by GEAR.”153 Making a

distinction between the ANC as a movement and the government externalises blame for

the rightward shift of the ANC government on a bureaucratic clique within the

government and the ANC had been “sold out” by this clique. This allows COASATU to

continue justifying cooperation in Alliance corporatism as the only feasible strategy

despite the rightward shift of the ANC government. As Desai has argued, community

movements seeking “revolutionary confrontation….face a ANC which sensing the

growing combativeness of the Poors have started to differentiate the ANC from

government and the ANC as liberation movement, not to challenge the former but to try

151 ibid 152 Interview with Hlophe, Richard – SAMWU Organisor – (15/05/06) 153 Lehulere, Oupa op. cit., p.38

76

and head off challenges emanating from outside corporatist structures.”154 This attitude

tries to legitimate the idea that the ANC alone is the soul voice of the poor. It attempts to

channel the demands emanating from civil society groups into technocratic requests of

their “comrades” in government. If these “comrades” fail to adhere to their demands this

can be criticised, but above all, the ANC as a liberation movement, and the corporatist

structures of governance which it employs, remains unchallenged as the only legitimate

channel through which civil society can voice its demands. COSATU maintains its

principled dissidence towards neoliberalism but limits its resistance to demands for more

influence within the prevailing neoliberal structures of governance.155

The common sentiment emerging from the unionists I spoke to was that worker-

control of the ANC had to be restored, and that what was needed was nothing less than

“winning back” the ANC from within the Alliance rather than what they saw as the

alternative of leaving the Alliance and “surrendering” the government to bourgeois

control. Essentially this meant that the unionists still held the idea that the Alliance was

the only appropriate vehicle to affect social change; to quote one COSATU official:

We understand the ANC is not a socialist organisation. It is not. It has adopted the understanding

of the national democratic revolution to be culminating at one point to socialism, now they begin

to talk as if they don’t understand that. Just because they want to push us out of the Alliance. We

are not going to agree to that, we are not going to be pushed out. Instead our resolve and our work

is to endure that the Alliance remains a very strong bridge.156

Another shop steward told me:

154 Desai, Ashwin (2002) Neo-liberalism and its Discontents: The Rise of Community Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa. http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28 p.11 155 Van Driel, Maria op. cit., 156 Interview with Dlamini, Sdumo – COSATU Provincial Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (19/05/06)

77

People [in the ANC government] have been changed to the capitalist, opportunist, and all those

things…they’ve got interests now, they’ve got things to defend…before we were talking about

nationalisation now, it is privatisation. It is capitalism. They are eating, benefiting out of

capitalism knowing full well that a number of people, actually the majority of this country, they

are still deprived…. But the fact remains that we still believe that only the ANC can change that. It

cannot be rectified outside the ANC.157

Although they felt left “out in the cold” when it came to decision-making in corporatist

structures, they believed that their best hope was to try and eek out more influence within

these structures.158 As one shop steward said to me: “It is very, very sad to hear the

unionist say ‘let us make the ANC to be weaker friend’ – so they say ‘comrades we have

to make sure that we make the ANC to be weaker’. What do you mean? …why don’t you

say ‘let us make the ANC to be worker controlled.’” Because of the sentimental

commitment to the ANC and the perception that the Alliance remains the only means

through which to advance both the interests of its members and progressive social

transformation means that linking up with movements such as Abahlali is in no way

inevitable nor is it seen as necessary or desirable by the unionists I spoke to. It should not

be taken as a given that union members will automatically pressure their union leaders to

link with these struggles. As Appolis states: “you can preach to them in the union, but

there is no organic process acting as a catalyst.”159 I detected a strong commitment to

Alliance structures in my interviews despite an almost universal condemnation of the

current policy direction of the ANC government. Although unionists might display a high

157 Interview with Zondi, Nhlanthla – SAMWU Shop Steward – (18/05/06) 158 Interview with Dlamini, Sdumo – COSATU Provincial Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (19/05/06) Interview with Pakkies, Mthimobe – SAMWU Regional Deputy Chairperson KwaZulu Natal – (30/05/06) Interview with Mbhele, Lenford – SAMWU Regional Security Coordinator KwaZulu Natal – (30/05/06) 159 “Pressing Challenges Facing the South African Labour Movement: an Interview with John Appolis and Dinga Sikwebu” in Bramble, T. and Barchiesi, F., (eds). Rethinking the Labour Movement in the "New South Africa",(Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003)

78

degree of empathy with the struggles of social movements, they remain committed to the

Alliance as the only vehicle through which social transformation can occur. This was

very apparent from the interviews and conversations I had with Durban unionists. This

view is also propagated by the union leadership at the national level. One COSATU

discussion document asserts that

Still, the Alliance remains the only weapon in the hands of our people to deepen

transformation…We must not, because of the current situation and our frustration, throw away the

only weapon our people have developed over many years in the trenches of struggles, in our

communities and in our prison, in exile and internally. It would be class suicide if workers were to

hand the ANC over to the bourgeois state.160

The unions are extremely wary of new movements that are directly critical of the ANC

government despite COSATU’s own position as the left-most member of the Alliance

that is itself critical of both ANC policy and the centralised, even autocratic style of the

ANC government. However, one must take into account that COSATU has not simply

been drawn into the logic of corporatism in terms of the degree of influence it can exert

within an economic relationship between itself, the government and business; it is within

the context of an Alliance that fought the liberation struggle side by side and can

therefore endure despite lasting tensions over the government’s economic trajectory.161

When I pushed them it was evident that the immediate strategy was to focus on

the ANC presidential succession to ensure that their choice of leader for the ANC

Presidency is chosen. This was invariably Jacob Zuma. Whilst because he is a Zulu, his

support in KwaZulu Natal is extremely strong, there was also a strategic reason for their

160 Naidoo, Prishani op. cit., p.22 161 Gumede, William Mervin op. cit., p.268

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support of Zuma. They claimed that he was more “worker friendly” and would give

COSATU a greater role. Several the unionists I spoke with said that there was “no way”

Zuma could be pro-capitalist because he had seen what it had done to him during his

recent trials. Another went as far to call him South Africa’s “Chavez”, stating that a

radical redistributionalist agenda similar to that of the Venezualan leader would be

pursued under Zuma.162 As Desai has remarked: “This ‘Zuma moment’ revealed in

humiliating fashion the dead-end of COSATU’s political strategy…”163 Rather than

pursuing links to movements outside the corporatist structures of the Alliance, COSATU

remains intent on pursuing a one-dimensional strategy of trying to secure more influence

within neoliberal corporatist structures.

Unfortunately this highlights the blinkered strategy that COSATU is now

pursuing. It follows the strictures of Alliance corporatism as if no alternative path lay

open to them. Although a strategy of winning back worker control of the ANC is a

commendable objective, this must not be restricted to forwarding a more “worker

friendly” president who may perhaps give COSATU marginally more influence within

neoliberal corporatist structures. For the effects of the ANC government’s neoliberal

strategy have, as argued before, profoundly weakened COSATU, forcing it to take a

defensive, damage-limitation strategy towards dealing with neoliberalism. Taking back

“worker control” of the ANC can only begin once the rightward shift of the post-1994

period is reversed. This can only happen if the ANC government is subordinated not only

to COSATU and other leftist forces in the Alliance: it can only be truly achieved if the

162 Interview with Zondi, Nhlanthla – SAMWU Shop Steward – (18/05/06) 163 Desai, Ashwin (2005) Shadow Boxing? Cosatu, Social Movements and the ANC government. Centre for Civil Society http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?3,28

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liberation movement as a whole is subordinated to the directives of its members, and, at

the same time, those communities that are marginalised from politics.

Concluding Remarks

COSATU remains committed to evoke change from within existing structures and is

extremely cautious about engaging with groups it perceives to be challenging its Alliance

partner, the ANC. Cooperation in corporatist structures is seen as the only viable strategy

as the Alliance is considered the only vehicle through which COSATU can protect the

interests of its members and affect change in politics through its influence over the ANC

government. COSATU’s blinkered following of this corporatist strategy, has

haemorrhaged COSATU’s ability to conceive of alternative strategies for engaging with

the post-apartheid state which use both strategies of cooperation and opposition. Instead

of exploring linkages with groups such as Abahlali who present alternative relationships

between the government and its constituents, COSTATU remains committed to achieving

more influence within existing neoliberal structures of governance. COSATU’s strategies

remain embedded in technocratic remedies of how to achieve greater protections and

concessions for workers within the neoliberal paradigm. The failure to comprehend what

Abahlali were struggling for perhaps highlights how COSATU has become embedded in

the logic of making material demands of the existing corporatist structures of governance.

“Winning back” the ANC and subordinating it to “worker control” might be an important

short-term victory. However, the way this strategy is currently framed is at gaining more

influence within the existing systems of governance, rather than a truly radical

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conception of re-establishing working class control of government that envisions forcing

those who claim to lead society taking their directives from society; both union members

and more marginalised sections of the working class.

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Chapter Six

Conclusion

COSATU adopted a strategy of cooperating in corporatist governance structures

during the transition period that allowed it to advance its aim of securing immediate

material and legal concessions for its members through bargaining. Its historic

commitment to the ANC informed this strategy and the belief that through an Alliance in

government the liberation forces could enact social transformation in South Africa that

would begin to address the injustices of Apartheid.

However, it is my argument that COSATU has become trapped into this one-

dimensional strategy of cooperation in corporatist governance and the mindset that the

Alliance remains the only progressive vehicle for social transformation and advancing the

interests of union members. Whilst corporatism might have seemed to be the logical

solution during the transition period of the early nineteen nineties, this conception was

premised on the social-democratic strategy of the Redistribution and Development

Programme (RDP) that would allow greater labour-determination in corporatist

structures. As the ANC adopted the neoliberal development strategy conceived in GEAR,

COSATU’s ability to influence the policy direction of the ANC was diminished and

COSATU was forced to take on the role of “junior partner” to capital in corporatist

institutions. This is because neoliberal development strategies prioritise above all else,

the sanctity of “business confidence” that is deemed to be synonymous with economic

growth, and thus development. Demands emanating from groups such as COSATU are

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presented as sectional and are subordinated to the demands of neoliberal good

governance.

COSATU has become trapped in the logic of corporatism, i.e. making material

demands from the state and using bargaining rather than militancy to pursue its goals.

Whilst it has been able to achieve some protections for its members through this strategy,

the conditions for the workforce as a whole are gradually deteriorating as unemployment

persists and casualisation and flexibilisation strategies lead to increasing job insecurities

and retrenchments for those with jobs.

Abahlali presents a radical alternative to this strategy. Isolated from their local

government and marginalised by the corporatist decision-making structures enjoyed by

the likes of COSATU in the Alliance, Abahlali has sought to reclaim the ability for the

people of the imijondolos to determine their own destiny. This involves subordinating the

state to the people so that those who are elected to represent the poor take their direction

from the poor. This challenges the discourse of the ANC that as leader of the liberation

forces it alone can determine the national interest and that it is the singular representative

movement of the poor.

Abahlali do not accept the dichotomy between cooperation and disengaged

oppositional strategies. Whilst they make short-term demands from the state in order to

alleviate the hardships the people of the imijondolos face, they also hold demonstrations

to make sure their voice is heard. They see both these strategies as part of a greater

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struggle, a “class struggle”, that will not be appeased by the state granting small material

concessions. It is their commitment to being a poor-led, rather than an elite-led resistance

mired in the logic of corporatism and asking for small concessions of the neoliberal state

that make Abahlali’s “limits of the possible” defined by the poor themselves rather than

the technocratic neoliberal paradigm.

Can COSATU reinvigorate itself as a political union by allying with these

groups? It seems that a great deal of soul searching must happen first. Because it is so

wrapped up in the logic of corporatism, informed by its alliance with the ANC, COSATU

has the unfortunate tendency to shun movements that are deemed outside the legitimate

realm of South African politics, i.e. outside or in opposition to corporatist governance. It

also has become too embedded in the logic of corporatism that has reduced its goals to

obtaining short-term concessions of the state within the neoliberal paradigm and has

given up in all but name the goal of a broader emancipatory project for those outside its

membership base. The trade unionists misconceptions of the Abahlali in Durban were

perhaps indicative of how the unions have become mired in the strategy of making

technocratic demands of government and their inability to engage with or conceptualise

radical alternative projects.

Perhaps COSATU might not want to assume a broader political role, and it should not

be assumed that this is not so. But if COSATU does seek to be a political player in South

Africa, pursuing an emancipatory agenda for the working class as a whole it must ask

itself:

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• Can the battle for socialism be fought within corporatist structures that have

strengthened the very neoliberal relations that have concentrated wealth and in the

hands of a small elite: the very antithesis of socialism?

• If it is engaged in the fight for a creation for a new society, can this be achieved

without engaging with groups like Abahlali, those who are themselves engaged in

such a struggle and are in fact representative of the very people whom a new

society would be built for?

• Is it “ultra left” to ask that those that govern are subordinate to the people who

elect them?

• Is it “anti-ANC” to ask for the ANC to be a movement for the poor by taking its

directives from the poor?